Development Administration chapter 7 (UNPAS 2012)

Prof. Ginandjar Kartasasmita

Program Doktor Bidang Ilmu Sosial
Universitas Pasundan
Bandung
2012

THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE OF DYSFUNCTIONAL
BUREAUCRACIES AVIDLY DEVOURING SCARCE
RESOURCES BUT FAILING TO PRODUCE ANTICIPATED
OUTCOMES.
IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO FIND POLICIES THAT SERVE TO
KEEP ILLEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTS IN OFFICE
RATHER THAN ATTENDING TO THE BUSINESS OF
STRENGTHENING THE ECONOMY AND IMPROVING
WELFARE FOR THE POOR.
THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM OF
OFFICIAL AID AGENCIES THAT GIVE OR LEND MONEY
FOR PROJECTS THAT BRING LIMITED GAINS TO
TARGET POPULATIONS.

S3-Unpas_2012 www.ginandjar.com 2

THE DECADES SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR TWO
HAVE WITNESSED AN UNRIVALLED DRIVE FOR
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT BY THE
MAJORITY OF THE WORLD'S NATIONS.
HOWEVER, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT
GOALS IN A SHORT TIME HAS PROVED ELUSIVE FOR ALL
EXCEPT A SMALL NUMBER OF 'TIGERS' IN EAST ASIA.
MANY PROCESSES AND FACTORS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED
AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DIFFERING LEVELS OF
ACHIEVEMENT, AND PROMINENT AMONGST THESE HAS
BEEN THE ARGUMENT THAT PUBLIC SECTOR
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE OFTEN PERFORMED POORLY.


COMMON ATTRIBUTES OF ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

FRED RIGGS FERREL HEADY OTHERS

OVERLAP IMMITATIONS RATHER THAN OVERSTAFFED PUBLIC
IDIGENOUS ORGANIZATION
HETEROGENITY DEFICIENCY OF SKILLS UNDERPAID PUBLIC EMPLOYESS

FORMALISM NONPRODUCTION-ORIENTED LOW PRODUCTIVITY
BUREAUCRACIES
DIFFUSSION FORMALISM LACK OF INNOVATIVE AND
SKILLED PUBLIC MANAGERS
PARTICULARISM AUTONOMY EXCESSIVELY CENTRALIZED
DECISION MAKING
ASCRIPTION CORRUPTION THAT REGULARLY
IMPEDES REFORM

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES
THAT MIRROR THE POLITICAL
CONTEX


THE MAIN THEMES OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DEVELOPMENT
FIRST, THE ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF
DEVELOPMENT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO A TECHNICAL
FIX.
THUS, ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND
INNOVATION ARE NOT SIMPLY A MATTER OF INSTALLING
SOME PIECE OF MANAGERIAL TECHNOLOGY WHICH HAS
PROVED EFFECTIVE ELSEWHERE.
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, ADMINISTRATIVE TECHNIQUES
AND ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS ARE NOT NEUTRAL
VALUE-FREE PHENOMENA.


THE SECOND THEME CONCERNS THE IMPORTANCE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS, THAT ENVELOPE OF
FACTORS AND FORCES IN WHICH ORGANIZATIONS OPERATE.
ORGANIZATIONS ARE NOT CLOSED TECHNICAL SYSTEMS.
THEY ARE NECESSARILY INVOLVED IN MULTIPLE
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND
INDIVIDUALS. COMPLEX WEBS OF RELATIONSHIPS ARE THUS
WOVEN AND HAVE PROFOUND EFFECTS ON THE OPERATION
OF ORGANIZATIONS.
NATIONAL CULTURE MAY BE A KEY DETERMINANT OF THE
WAY IN WHICH ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED AND MAY
INFLUENCE OPERATIONAL NORMS AND PRACTICES AS
MUCH AS THE PUBLIC SERVICE MANUAL OF PROCEDURES.


THE THIRD THEME EMPHASIZES ONE ASPECT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT, THAT IS THE IMPORTANCE
OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE ANALYSIS
AND PRACTICE.
ORGANIZATIONAL ACTION TAKES PLACE IN POLITICAL
CONTEXTS. POWER AND AUTHORITY PERMEATE
RELATION-SHIPS BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL MEMBERS AND
BETWEEN THESE PERSONS AND THOSE IN THE EXTERNAL
ENVIRONMENT.


THE FOURTH THEME FLOWS FROM THE ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES. IT IS THAT ORGANIZATIONAL
IMPROVEMENT IS NOT A PANACEA FOR DEVELOPMENT.
DEVELOPMENT IS MULTI-FACETED AND SUCCESS OR FAILURE ARE
BASED ON MORE THAN ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN, ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM OR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.
SUCH ITEMS HAVE A STRONG BEARING ON WHETHER
DEVELOPMENTAL PROGRESS WILL OCCUR BUT THEY ARE NEVER THE
SOLE DETERMINANTS, ADMINISTRATION WORKS ONLY IN
CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER FACTORS OF CHANGE.
FURTHERMORE, PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE UTILIZED
TO OPPRESS OR TO DEFEND THE PRIVILEGES OF CERTAIN CLASSES
AND GROUPS IN SOCIETY. THEY ARE NOT INNATELY BENIGN BUT
MUST BE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE ATTAINMENT OF
DEVELOPMENTAL GOALS.


ADMINISTRATIVE


DEVELOPMENT
FAILURES

INAPPROPRIATE POOR STATE
POLICY CHOICES INSTITUTIONS


Development Administration chapter 7 (UNPAS 2012)

BUREAUCRACY

BUREAUCRACY EMERGED AS A DOMINANT FEATURE OF
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD.
VIRTUALLY EVERYWHERE ONE LOOKED IN BOTH
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS, ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL LIFE WERE EXTENSIVELY AND
EVER INCREASINGLY INFLUENCED BY BUREAUCRATIC
ORGANIZATIONS.
BUREAUCRACY, WHILE IT IS OFTEN USED AS A GENERAL
INVECTIVE TO REFER TO ANY ORGANIZATION THAT IS
PERCEIVED TO BE INEFFICIENT, IS MORE PROPERLY USED
TO REFER TO A SPECIFIC SET OF STRUCTURAL
ARRANGEMENTS.

THE BASIC CONCEPTS

SPECIALIZED JURISDICTIONS, OFFICES, AND TASKS,
THAT IS, A DIVISION OF LABOR AND AUTHORITY
REGARDING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE
ORGANIZATION’S GOALS.
A HIERARCHY OF AUTHORITY TO COORDINATE THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIALIZED OFFICES AND
INTEGRATE THEIR JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY.


MINISTER

VICE/DEPUTY
MINISTER ASSISTANT
MINISTER

DIRECTOR SECRETARY INSPECTOR
GENERAL GENERAL GENERAL

DIRECTOR BUREAU INSPECTOR

REGIONAL SUB- WORKING
OFFICE DIRECTORATE UNIT DIVISION


BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE TENDS TO BE
PERMANENT. IT REMAINS INTACT REGARDLESS OF
THE FLOW OF MEMBERS IN AND OUT OF IT.
SOCIETY BECOMES DEPENDENT ON THE
BUREAUCRACY’S FUNCTIONING TO THE EXTENT
THAT CHAOS RESULTS IF IT IS DESTROYED.
BY IMPLICATION, BUREAUCRACIES ARE LARGE
ORGANIZATIONS
(WEBER, 1947)


IDEAL TYPE BUREAUCRACY
CONTEMPORARY THINKING ALONG THESE LINES
BEGINS WITH THE WORK OF THE BRILLIANT GERMAN
SOCIOLOGIST MAX WEBER.
HIS ANALYSIS OF BUREAUCRACY, FIRST PUBLISHED IN
1922 AFTER HIS DEATH, IS STILL THE MOST
INFLUENTIAL STATEMENT –THE POINT OF DEPARTURE
FOR ALL FURTHER ANALYSES– ON THE SUBJECT.
WEBER USED AN "IDEAL-TYPE" APPROACH TO
EXTRAPOLATE THE CENTRAL CORE OF FEATURES
CHARACTERISTIC OF THE MOST FULLY DEVELOPED
BUREAUCRATIC FORM OF ORGANIZATION.


WEBER’S IDEAL TYPE BUREAUCRACY
1. BUREAUCRACY IS BASED UPON RULES WHICH ARE
ACCEPTED (IN BOARD TERMS) BY THE MEMBERS OF THE
ORGANIZATION.
2. BUREAUCRACY IS RELATIVELY COUNTINUOUS IN ITS
OPERATION.
3. THE SPHERES OF COMPETENCE OF BUREAUCRATIC
ADMINISTRATION ARE SPECIFIED.
4. BUREAUCRACY IS BASED UPON THE IDEA OF HIERARCHY.
5. THE OFFICIALS ARE TRAINED SO THAT THE STRUCTURES
CAN FUNCTION IN THE WAYS INTENDED.


6. OFFICIALS IN BUREAUCRACY ARE NOT THEMSELVES
OWNERS OF THE MEANS OF PRODUCTIONS.
7. OFFICIALS DO NOT ‘OWN’ THEIR JOBS, THAT IS, THE JOB
ITSELF BELONGS TO THE ORGANIZATION, NOT TO THE
INDIVIDUAL WHO HAPPENS TO BE OCCUPYING IT.
8. THE SUCCESSFUL AND COUNTINUING OPERATION OF
BUREAUCRACY DEPENDS TO A LARGE EXTENT UPON
WRITTEN RECORD.


THE BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTE THE INSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH AND THROUGH WHICH
PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT MANAGERS FUNCTION.


DIFFERENTIATED PUBLIC
THE NORMAL TENDENCY IN BUREAUCRACY IS
TO REGARD ITS CLIENTELE AS AN
UNDIFFERENTIATED PUBLIC TO WHOM
REGULATIONS ARE TO BE APPLIED AND
SERVICES DELIVERED UNIFORMLY, THEREFORE
OBJECTIVELY AND EQUITABLY.


THE THEME OF “REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY”
DESCRIBES BUREAUCRATS AS A KIND OF RANDOM
SAMPLE OF THE POLITY, DESERVING OF THE SAME
TREATMENT ACCORDED OTHER CITIZENS.
PUCLIC ADMINISTRATION ARE EXPECTED TO HELP
RESTRAIN ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THEIR
OWN RANKS IN ORDER TO REDUCE COMMUNAL
TENSION.


BUREAUCRATS ARE RARELY SYMPATHETIC
FIGURES EVEN WHEN THEY ARE HELPING
PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN BENEFITS TO WHICH
THEIR CITIZENSHIP ENTITLES THEM.

(JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, 1988)


EMPOWERMENT BUREAUCRATIC EXPLOITATION
POPULISM


THE THEORY OF BUREAUCRATIC POPULISM
DEPENDS UPON THE ASSUMPTION THAT
GOVERNMENTS CAN MOTIVATE THE PEOPLE
TO PRODUCE A PUBLIC GOOD THAT PROVIDES
OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEM TO GENERATE
PRIVATE GOODS


AS SOCIETY BECAME MORE COMPLEX AND
ORGANIZATIONS GREW LARGER, ORGANIZATIONS
(BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC) INCREASED THEIR
DIVISION OF LABOR INTO MORE AND SMALLER
SPECIALIZED UNITS.
LARGER INSTITUTIONS BEGAN TO DEFER TO THE
JUDGMENTS OF THESE UNITS, WHICH SHOWS THAT A
MAJOR FOUNDATION OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER IS
EXPERTISE,
EXPERTISE OR SPECIALIZED KNOWLEDGE
KNOWLEDGE.


DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION LARGELY REMAINS
BURDENED BY A COMBINATION OF INHERITED
STRUCTURES AND BEHAVIORS AND DEEPLY
INTERNALIZED LOCAL CULTURAL PATTERNS.
UNABLE TO ATTAIN A TIMELY CORRECTION OF ITS
DEFICIENCIES OR TO LEARN FROM ITS FAILURES.
THIS COMBINATION OF LEGACIES HAS HAD THE
EFFECT OF IMPEDING PERFORMANCE AND WASTING
BADLY NEEDED INSTITUTIONAL ENERGIES ON OTHER
THAN PRODUCTIVE ENDEAVORS TO ACCOMPLISH
DEVELOPMENTAL MANDATES.


ALL ORGANIZATIONS OPERATE WITH IMPERFECTION;
ALL ARE INFECTED WITH BUREAUPATHOLOGIES.
THIS DOES NOT STOP THEM PERFORMING WELL,
BUT IF LEFT UNTREATED THE BUREAUPATHOLOGIES
WILL SPREAD AND INTENSIFY AND EVENTUALLY
IMPEDE PERFORMANCE NOTICEABLY.


TENDENCY TO MAINTAIN AND ENLARGE POWER
AND CONTROL


PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS BOTH PROFESION AND
SCIENTIFIC STUDY FROM THE BEGINNING HAS BEEN
VERY MUCH CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEMS OF
CORRUPTION OR ABUSE OF POWER.


A CORRUPTED BUREAUCRACY, BY DEFITION, IS ONE
THAT, DOES NOT DO WHAT IT IS SUPPPOSED TO, SINCE
ILLEGAL PAYMENTS TO OFFICIALS ARE PRESSUMABLY
NOT MADE UNLESS THOSE WHO RECEIVE PAYMENT
CAN AND DO CONTRAVENE THE INTENT OF THE LAWS
THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO APPLY. ALTHOUGH FORMALLY
SALARIED, BUREAUCRATS IN SUCH QUASI-SALARY
SYSTEMS INDULGE IN SELF-ENRICHMENT ON A LARGE
SCALE (RIGGS,1995).


Authority
-Control Public Agency
-Check and balance
Accountable to

control
Legislative Excecutive

Election

People/Public/Voters


ACCOUNTABILITY

ACCOUNTABILITY IS THE DEGREE TO WHICH A PERSON
MUST ANSWER TO SOME HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR
ACTIONS IN THE LARGER SOCIETY OR IN THE AGENCY.
ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE ACCOUNTABLE TO
VOTERS. PUBLIC AGENCY MANAGERS ARE
ACCOUNTABLE TO ELECTED EXECUTIVES AND
LEGISLATURES.
AGENCY LEADERS ARE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE
POLITICAL CULTURE OF SOCIETY, WHICH HOLDS
GENERAL VALUES AND IDEAS OF DEMOCRACY AND
PUBLIC MORALITY.


ETHICS
ETHICS CONCERN WITH WHAT IS RIGHT AND WHAT
IS WRONG.
(FREDERICKSON, 1994)

ETHICS CAN BE CONSIDERED A FORM OF SELF-
ACCOUNTABILITY, OR AN “INNER CHECK” ON PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS CONDUCT.
(ROOSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)


STANDARDS AND NORMS

STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE DEFINED AS
PRINCIPLES OF RIGHT ACTION BINDING UPON THE
MEMBERS OF A GROUP AND SERVING TO GUIDE,
CONTROL, OR REGULATE PROPER AND ACCEPTABLE
BEHAVIOR.
STANDARDS AND NORMS ARE THE CODIFICATION OF
GROUP, ORGANIZATIONAL, COMMUNITY, OR
GOVERNMENTAL VALUES, LAWS, REGULATIONS,
CODES OF ETHICS.
RULES ARE TYPICAL OF STANDARDS AND NORMS.
(FREDERICKSON, 1994)


ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS

ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS INVOLVES THE
APPLICATION OF MORAL PRINCIPLES TO THE
CONDUCT OF OFFICIALS IN ORGANIZATIONS.
BROADLY SPEAKING, MORAL PRINCIPLES SPECIFY
1) THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD RESPECT
WHEN THEY ACT IN WAYS THAT SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE WELL-
BEING OF OTHER INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY; AND
2) THE CONDITIONS THAT COLLECTIVE PRACTICES AND POLICIES
SHOULD SATISFY WHEN THEY SIMILARLY AFFECT THE WELL-
BEING OF INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY.
(DENNIS THOMPSON, 1985)


FOUR LEVELS OF ETHICS
IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THERE IS A HIERARCHY
OF LEVELS OF ETHICS, EACH OF WHICH HAS ITS
OWN SET OF RESPONSIBILITIES.
1) PERSONAL MORALITY—THE BASIC SENSE OF RIGHT AND
WRONG. THIS IS A FUNCTION OF OUR PAST AND IS
DEPENDENT ON FACTORS SUCH AS PARENTAL
INFLUENCES, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL
MORES, AND ONE'S OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES.


2) PROFESSIONAL ETHICS. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS
INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZE A SET OF PROFESSIONAL NORMS
AND RULES THAT OBLIGATE THEM TO ACT IN CERTAIN
"PROFESSIONAL" WAYS. OCCUPATIONS SUCH AS LAW AND
MEDICINE, WHILE OPERATING WITHIN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, ALSO HAVE THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT
PROFESSIONAL CODES.


3) ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS. EVERY ORGANIZATION HAS AN
ENVIRONMENT OR CULTURE THAT INCLUDES BOTH FORMAL
AND INFORMAL RULES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT. PUBLIC
ORGANIZATIONS TYPICALLY HAVE MANY SUCH RULES. PUBLIC
LAWS, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND AGENCY RULES AND
REGULATIONS ALL CAN BE TAKEN AS FORMAL
ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS FOR ETHICAL BEHAVIOR.


4) SOCIAL ETHICS. THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIAL ETHICS
OBLIGE MEMBERS OF A GIVEN SOCIETY TO ACT IN WAYS THAT
BOTH PROTECT INDIVIDUALS AND FURTHER THE PROGRESS
OF THE GROUP AS A WHOLE. SOCIAL ETHICS ARE FORMAL TO
THE EXTENT THAT THEY CAN BE FOUND IN THE LAWS OF A
GIVEN SOCIETY, INFORMAL TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY ARE
PART OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S SOCIAL CONSCIENCE.

(SHAFRITZ, RUSSEL, CHRISTOPHER, 2007)


THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF DECISION MAKING
WHEN MAKING DECISIONS, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS
INEVITABLY PURSUE CERTAIN GOALS, WHETHER
PERSONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL, OR SOME MIXTURE OF
BOTH. THE PURSUIT OF GOALS INVOLVES STRATEGIC
AND TACTICAL CHOICES TO ACHIEVE THEM (MEANS
AND ENDS).
SUCH DECISIONS RAISE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
PROPRIETY OF THE MEANS USED IN IMPLEMENTING A
COURSE OF ACTION TO DEAL WITH A PUBLIC
PROBLEM.


INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS

WHEN AN INSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT PURSUES
ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND SETS ON A COURSE OF
ACTION TOWARD REACHING THOSE GOALS, THE END
ITSELF MAY BE SEEN AS SO COMPELLING AS TO
SEEMINGLY JUSTIFY ANY MEANS.
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE OFTEN STRIVEN TO CLARIFY
SUCH DILEMMAS IN DECISION MAKING BY
ARTICULATING CODES OF ETHICS TO GUIDE THE
BEHAVIOR OF THEIR MEMBERS.


PERSONAL ETHICS

OFTEN AT ISSUE IN DECISION MAKING ARE PERSONAL
ETHICS.
THE TEMPTATION TO DIVERT SOME OF PUBLIC FUNDS
OR RESOURCES TO PERSONAL USE CAN BE GREAT
AND THE RISK OF EXPOSURE OFTEN SMALL.
THE MAIN REASON FOR THE WORLDWIDE PRESENCE
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION IS THAT
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATORS HAVE SOMETHING TO
ALLOCATE THAT OTHER PEOPLE WANT.


INTENDED OR DESIGNED CHANGES INTO
ESTABLISHED OR ROUTINE WAYS OF LIFE

(FARAZMAND, 2007)


THE MEANING OF ‘REFORM’ IS QUITE DISTINCT
FROM THE IDEA OF ‘REVOLUTION’, WHICH
IMPLIES THE TOTAL OVERTHROW OF OLD
STRUCTURES AND SYSTEM, AND THEIR
REPLACEMENT BY NEW ONES.


ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

A USEFUL WORKING DEFINITION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IS THE INDUCED,
PERMANENT IMPROVEMENT IN
ADMINISTRATION.

(WALLIS, 1993)


THE WORD ‘INDUCED’ INDICATES A FORM OF
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE WHICH IS
DELIBERATELY BROUGHT ABOUT, NOT ONE WHICH
JUST HAPPENS BY ACCIDENT OR WITHOUT THE
MAKING OF ANY CONSCIOUS EFFORT.
THE WORD ‘PERMANENT’ CARRIES THE
CONNOTATION THAT THE CHANGES INTRODUCED
WILL BE LONG-TERM, NOT JUST TEMPORARY.
SIMPLY PUT TO IMPROVE MEANS ‘TO MAKE
BETTER’.


THE FOCUS IS ON THE NATIONAL ADMINISTATIVE
SYSTEM AS THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND IT TENDS TO
CONCENTRATE ON BUREAUCRACY AS A NATIONAL
INSTITUTION AS WELL AS THE BUREAUCRACY’S
RELATIONS WITH THE ENVIRONMENT, PARTICULARLY
THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY AND THE PEOPLE AS
REPRESENTED AMONG OTHERS BY THE CIVIL SOCIETY.


FOCUS OF ANALYSIS

POLITICAL
SOCIETY
AUTHORITY


CV


IN A CLIMATE OF SOCIAL VALUES THAT STRESS
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY,
BUREAUCRACIES WITH THEIR CENTRALIZED
STRUCTURES OF AUTHORITY AND CONTROL ARE
ANACHRONISTIC.
(PFEFFER AND SALANCIK, 1978)

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY, SOCIETAL
TRANSFORMATIONS, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
PROGRESS HAVE MODIFIED THE STRUCTURES AND
VALUES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.


A COMPLEX PROCESS OF FUNCTIONAL AND SOCIAL
DIFFERENTIATION HAS GRADUALLY ERODED THE
RIGIDITIES OF HIERARCHICAL AUTHORITY
STRUCTURES AND FURTHER MITIGATED THE OLD
PERCEIVED ANTINOMY BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND
CHANGE.
CHANGE
IN MANY WAYS, DEBUREAUCRATIZATION IS THE
MANYSIDED OUTCOME OF THIS CUMULATIVE
PROCESS.


PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION CULTURE IS CHANGING

TRANSNATIONAL MULTINATIONAL NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS CORPORATIONS ORGANIZATIONS

POLICY POLICY POLICY

LEGISLATORS

PUBLIC
MANAGER

POLICY

PUBLIC 1
PUBLIC 5

PUBLIC 3 PUBLIC 4
PUBLIC 2

S3-Unpas_2012 56
SOURCE: JONATHAN F. ANDERSON IN FARAZMAND, PINKOWSKI, 2007

GLOBALIZED PUBLIC POLICY PROCESS

FLEXIBLE

RULE BOUND

INNOVATIVE

PROBLEM
SOLVING
PROCESS REFORM
ORIENTED DYNAMIC
RESULT
ORIENTED

ENTERPRENEURIAL
FOCUS ON
INPUTS RATHER
THAN RESULT
ENTERPRISING


INSTITUTIONAL BUILDING.
INSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT.
SKILL AND PROFFESIONAL DEVELOPMENT --> CAPACITY
BUILDING.
DECENTRALIZATION.
DEBUREAUCRATIZATION.
PRIVATIZATION.


APPROACHES TO
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

OUTCOMES PROCESS BOTH


THE OUTCOMES: THE MEANS TO MAKE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM A MORE EFFECTIVE
INSTRUMENT FOR SOCIAL CHANGE, A BETTER
INSTRUMENT TO BRING ABOUT POLITICAL EQUALITY,
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (SAMONTE,
1970)
ON PROCESS: CHANGING ESTABLISHED BUREAUCRATIC
PRACTISE, BEHAVIOURS AND STRUCTURES (KHAN, 1981)
INTERPORATE BOTH VIEWS BY LINKING THE PROCESSUAL
CHANGED TO THE PRODUCTION OF A MORE EFFECTIVE
AND EFFICIENT BUREAUCRACY (QUAH, 1976 AND JREISAT,
1988)

THE DIFFICULTIES
LACK OF AWARENESS OF HOW BAD THE
ADMINISTRATION’S PERFORMANCES IS, OR HOW
IMPROVEMENTS MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN.
THE CHANGE INVOLVED IN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM MAY
MEET CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE. BUREAUCRACIES
THEMSELVES TEND TO DISLIKE CHANGE, ESPECIALLY WHEN
THEIR OWN INTEREST ARE AT STAKE.
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE MAY BE TOO VAGUE OR
CONFUSED TO BE EASILY PUT INTO PRACTISE.


THOSE WHO ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION
MAY HAVE VERY LITTLE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS
SUPPOSED TO BE HAPPENING OR OF WHAT HAS BEEN
PROPOSED
WHAT MAY WORK IN ONE SITUATION MAY BE QUITE
UNWORKABLE IN ANOTHER.


THESE MORE TRADITIONALLY ORIENTED GROUPS WANT TO
HOLD ON TO THEIR EXISTING POSITIONS AND RESIST
EFFORTS BY THE MODERNIZING ELITE TO TRANSFORM
THEM. THEY MAY EVEN TURN INTO AN ANTIMODERN ELITE
USING, HOWEVER, MODERN METHODS, TO PUSH
NONMODERN DEMANDS.


TO OVERCOME THE DIFFICULTIES
THE PROGRAM OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM SHOULD
BE AS BROAD AS POSSIBLE, SPREADING INTO AS MANY
INTERSTICES OF THE SOCIAL ORDER AS IS POSSIBLE.
ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO STRENGTHENING
INSTITUTIONS THAT MIGHT ULTIMATELY RESTRAIN
BUREAUCRATIC EXCESS. THE QUALITY OF LEGISLATIVE
OVERSIGHT AND JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF
BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR ARE IMPORTANT
ELEMENTS.
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SCRUTINY IS ALSO IMPORTANT,
SUCH AS PLAYED BY THE MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY.

THE REFORMER'S TASK IS TO IDENTIFY CORRECTLY THE
PROBLEMS AND SUPPLY ANSWERS WHICH ARE FEASIBLE
BOTH TECHNICALLY AND POLITICALLY. THE REFORMS
NEED TO ADDRESS THE FIT BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS
AND ENVIRONMENT.
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD ARE UNCERTAIN AND TURBULENT. THIS MEANS
THAT REFORM WILL BE PERMANENTLY ON THE AGENDA
BUT VARYING IN INTENSITY ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE
OF TURBULENCE, THE FUNDING AVAILABLE AND THE
LEVEL OF FAITH IN THIS FORM OF ORGANIZATIONAL
ENGINEERING.


1945-1950 1950-1959 1959-1966 1966-1999 1999-SEKARANG

REVOLUSI DEMOKRASI DEMOKRASI ORDE BARU DEMOKRASI
PARLEMEN TERPIMPIN

BAGIAN DARI
REZIM YANG
BERKUASA
LOYALITAS
?
DEPOLITI-
POLARISASI TUNGGAL SASI
IDEOLOGI BIROKRASI
MENDUKUNG POLITISASI TRILOGI
IDEOLOGI- BIROKRASI
PARPOL PEM-
SASI MENDUKUNG
BIROKRASI BANGUNAN
DEMOKRASI


1945
BIROKRASI RI PENINGGALAN BELANDA DAN MENUNJANG PERJUANGAN KEMERDEKAAN
S.D. JEPANG DAN KEDAULATAN
1950
1950 DEMOKRASI LIBERAL/PARLEMENTER
S.D. UPAYA REFORMASI ADMINISTRASI
1959 SUDAH DIMULAI
BIROKRASI TERKOTAK-KOTAK DALAM PARTAI PANITIA ORGANISASI KEMENTRIAN
POLITIK (WILOPO), 1952

1959 DEMOKRASI TERPIMPIN
BADAN PENGAWAS
S.D. KEGIATAN APARATUR
1966 POLARISASI NEGARA (BAPEKAN), 1959
(IDEOLOGI) PANITIA REFORMASI
BIROKRASI APARATUR NEGARA
(PARAN) 1962

PERAN PERAN
NEGARA APARATUR
MAKIN NEGARA
BESAR MEMBESAR


1966 ORDE BARU TAP MPRS NO. 1/1966
S.D.
1998
BIROKRASI MENYATU DENGAN
TIM PAAP
KEKUASAAN (LOYALITAS TUNGGAL)

SISTEM OTORITER MENTERI PAN PADA
AWAL ORDE BARU
MENGHASILKAN: WAKIL KETUA
•STABILITAS BAPPENAS
•PERTUMBUHAN EKONOMI
•PEMERATAAN/PENGURANGAN
KEMISKINAN

MENKO WASBANG PAN
TRILOGI PEMBANGUNAN

1998 DEMOKRASI MENPAN
S.D.
SEKARANG PEMISAHAN PENGUASA TIM
POLITIK DENGAN REFORMASI
BIROKRASI BIROKRASI
(DEPOLITISASI NASIONAL
BIROKRASI)
MENPAN DAN
REFORMASI BIROKRASI


LITHMUS TEST KINERJA
BIROKRASI

INSTITUSI TERTATA BAIK?

SDM BERKUALITAS?

CARA KERJA - EFISIEN?
- EFEKTIF?


ETIKA - JUJUR?
- BERSIH?

AKUNTABILITAS - TEGAS?
- JELAS?

TRANSPARANSI TERBUKA?


KONTROL - BERFUNGSI?
MASYARAKAT - RESPONSIF?

HASIL KARYA OPTIMAL?


KAUFMANN-KRAAY (KK)
COUNTRY POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL
ASSESSMENT (CPIA)
DOING BUSINESS
INVESTMENT CLIMATE SURVEY (ICS)
GLOBAL INTEGRITY INDEX (GII)
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY (PEFA)


TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
CORRUPTION INDEX
UNDP:
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS:
A USER GUIDE


GOOD THEORY, BAD POLICY?
GOOD POLICY, BAD PRACTICE?
INSTITUSI : BERKEMBANG PESAT
LEMBAGA-LEMBAGA
BARU
KOMISI-KOMISI
BADAN-BADAN
DEWAN-DEWAN

DESENTRALISASI : - 33 PROVINSI
- 398 KABUPATEN
PEMEKARAN - 93 KOTA
REFORMASI : SISTEM PENGGAJIAN KHUSUS
BIROKRASI BEBERAPA INSTANSI

GOOD THEORY

GOOD POLICY

GOOD PRACTICE


CHIEF EXECUTIVE
EXECUTIVE STAFF
SOCIOCULTURAL
AGENCIES
NORMS

OUTSIDE
LEGISLATURE
AUDITORS

PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS: LEGISLATIVE
MEDIA STAFF AGENCIES
DEPARTMENT AND
AGENCY HEAD
INTEREST
COURTS
GROUPS

POLITICAL PARTIES OTHER AGENCIES,
OTHER AGENCIES, SAME LEVEL
DIFFERENT
LEVELS

(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)


PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN A DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE CONVERSION PROCESS
ENVIRONMENT INPUTS ADMINISTRATIVE OUTPUTS
• CULTURAL LINE AGENCIES
• DEMANDS FOR • GOODS
CHANGES AND PROGRAMS AND “WITHIN-PUTS”
EVENTS • SERVICE
SERVICES
• RULES
• ECONOMIC • POLICIES
SUPPORT
CHANGES AND • PROCEDURES
• PROGRAMME
EVENTS • MONEY
• GOALS
• POLITICAL • INFORMATION
• STAF
CHANGES AND • STRUCTURE
EVENTS ROLES PLAYED
• PERSONAL
BY
• SOCIETAL CHANGES • EXPERIENCE
AND EVENTS • PARTY
• INTEREST
GROUP
• STAFF
AGENCIES
LEAD TO

(ROSENBLOOM, KRAVCHUCK, 2005)


ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PERSISTING
CHALLENGES OF MODERN GOVERNMENT IS HOW TO
RECONCILE THE DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY WITH THE
IMPERATIVES OF BUREAUCRACY.
BUREAUCRACIES ARE HIERARCHICAL INSTITUTIONS THAT
CAN PROVIDE THE CAPACITY AND EXPERTISE TO
ACCOMPLISH COMPLEX SOCIAL TASKS, BUT THEY ARE
FREQUENTLY CHARACTERIZED, AS UNDEMOCRATIC AND
EVEN THREATENING TO DEMOCRACY.
DEMOCRACIES ARE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT THAT ARE
BASED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
POPULAR CONTROL.


THEY ATTEND IN DIFFERING MEASURES TO PRINCIPLES
OF MAJORITY RULE AND DEFERENCE TO THE
PERSPECTIVES OF INTENSE INTERESTS AMONG THE
PUBLIC. BUT AS SUCH, THEY NEED NOT NECESSARILY
SHOW KEEN ATTENTION TO THE VALUES OF EFFICIENCY,
EFFECTIVENESS, OR SPECIALIZED EXPERTISE.
BUREAUCRACY MAY BE THOUGHT OF AS
GOVERNMENT'S TOOL TO EXERCISE COERCION AS AN
INSTRUMENT FOR PRODUCTIVE ACTION. AS
INSTITUTIONAL FORMS DESIGNED TO EMPHASIZE
DIFFERENT VALUES, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY
SIT IN AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH EACH OTHER.


Democracy >< Bureaucracy

Transactional cost


TENSION

BUREAUCRATIC/
DEMOCRATIC
TECHNOCRATIC
PROCESS
PROCESS


www.ginandjar.com

DEMOCRATIC BUREAUCRATIC
IMPERATIVES VS PROFESIONALISM

SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF THE
PEOPLE EFFICIENCY
VS &
EFFECTIVENESS
ELECTED
REPRESENTATIVES

CONTEST FOR POWER ACCOUNTABLE


POLITICAL BUREAUCRATIC
CORRUPTION CORRUPTION

POLITICAL BUREAUCRATIC
REFORM REFORM

THE BEST INTEREST OF THE PEOPLE


A GOVERNANCE APPROACH SEEKS TO INTEGRATE POLITICAL
AND BUREAUCRATIC FORCES AT MULTIPLE LEVELS TO
INDICATE HOW PROGRAMS ARE DESIGNED, ADOPTED,
IMPLEMENTED, AND EVALUATED IN TERMS OF BOTH
EFFECTIVENESS AND DEMOCRACY.
SUCH A POINT OF VIEW CLEARLY RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY
WITH EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONS CAN
SOCIETIES GENERATE THE FAIRNESS AND SLACK RESOURCES
THAT PERMIT DEMOCRACIES WITH THEIR LARGE
TRANSACTION COSTS TO EXIST AND PROSPER.


IN CONCLUSION
THE PROGRAM OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM SHOULD
BE AS BROAD AS POSSIBLE, SPREADING INTO AS MANY
INTERSTICES OF THE SOCIAL ORDER AS IS POSSIBLE.
ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO STRENGTHENING
INSTITUTIONS THAT MIGHT ULTIMATELY RESTRAIN
BUREAUCRATIC EXCESS. THE QUALITY OF LEGISLATIVE
OVERSIGHT AND JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF
BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR ARE IMPORTANT
ELEMENTS.
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC SCRUTINY IS ALSO IMPORTANT,
SUCH AS PLAYED BY THE MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY.


THE REFORMER'S TASK IS TO IDENTIFY CORRECTLY THE
PROBLEMS AND SUPPLY ANSWERS WHICH ARE FEASIBLE
BOTH TECHNICALLY AND POLITICALLY. THE REFORMS
NEED TO ADDRESS THE FIT BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS
AND ENVIRONMENT.
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD ARE UNCERTAIN AND TURBULENT. THIS MEANS
THAT REFORM WILL BE PERMANENTLY ON THE AGENDA
BUT VARYING IN INTENSITY ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE
OF TURBULENCE, THE FUNDING AVAILABLE AND THE
LEVEL OF FAITH IN THIS FORM OF ORGANIZATIONAL
ENGINEERING.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION IS NO LESS EVIL THAN
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION. THUS POLITICAL REFORM IS
AS IMPORTANT AS BUREAUCRATIC REFORM.

DIMANA KITA SEKARANG?

PRE- MODERN POST-
MODERN MODERN
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
MORE OLD PUBLIC NEW PUBLIC
ARTS ADMINISTRATIO ADMINISTRATION
THAN N
SCIENCE ENTRE-
FREDERICKSON’S NPM
PRENEURIAL NPS
NPA
GOVERN-
MENT
CORE
WEBERIAN VALUES:
BUREAUCRACY II EFFICIENCY
PRE EFFECTIVEN
WILSONIA ESS CULTURAL “TEN
N ECONOMY
COMPETENCE AND COMMAND-
IMPERSONAL SOCIETAL MENTS”
IMPARTIAL VALUES
PERFORMANCE
AFFIRMATIVE
OUTSOURCING
CONTRACTING
COLONIA PUBLIC =
L STUCTURE FUNCTION CUSTOMER
FEUDAL HIERARCHY II
TRADI-
TIONAL

RULES/PROCEDURE/PROCESS GOVERNANCE

NETWORK
COLLABORATIVE
ETHICS, ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY PARTICIPATORY
STAKEHOLDER E-GOVERNANCE
DEMOCRACY

DISINI? DISINI? DISINI? DISINI?

Development Administration chapter 7 (UNPAS 2012)

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