![…What was it that Ryle said (1949)
Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976)was a lecturer in philosophy at Christ Church College Oxford and in 1945 was
elected to the Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy; a position he held until his retirement in 1968.
He was Editor of the journal Mind for almost twenty-five years.
“When we [talk about the mind] we are not making
untestable inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in
streams of consciousness which we are debarred from
visiting; we are describing the ways in which those people
conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour.” (p.
39)
“The statement ‘the mind is its own place’… is not true, for
the mind is not even a metaphorical ‘place’. On the contrary,
the chessboard, the platform, the scholar’s desk, the
judge’s bench, the lorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the
football field are among its places. These are where people
work and play stupidly or intelligently. ‘Mind’ is not the
name of another person, working or frolicking behind an
impenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place
where work is done or games are played; and it is not the
name of another tool with which work is done, or another
appliance with which
games are played.” (p 38-39)](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/dijk2013embodiedcognitionlecture2small-130917094257-phpapp02/85/Dijk-2013-Embodied-Cognition-lecture-2-Socially-Situated-Practices-3-320.jpg)
Dijk 2013 Embodied Cognition lecture 2 Socially Situated Practices
- 1. Embodied Cognition as a basis for researching and designing interaction Lecture 2 Socially Situated Practices
- 2. …What was it we were talking about?
- 3. …What was it that Ryle said (1949) Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976)was a lecturer in philosophy at Christ Church College Oxford and in 1945 was elected to the Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical Philosophy; a position he held until his retirement in 1968. He was Editor of the journal Mind for almost twenty-five years. “When we [talk about the mind] we are not making untestable inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways in which those people conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour.” (p. 39) “The statement ‘the mind is its own place’… is not true, for the mind is not even a metaphorical ‘place’. On the contrary, the chessboard, the platform, the scholar’s desk, the judge’s bench, the lorry-driver’s seat, the studio and the football field are among its places. These are where people work and play stupidly or intelligently. ‘Mind’ is not the name of another person, working or frolicking behind an impenetrable screen; it is not the name of another place where work is done or games are played; and it is not the name of another tool with which work is done, or another appliance with which games are played.” (p 38-39)
- 4. Ryle’s distinction: Knowing-how vs Knowing that Knowing-that: Facts, histories, theories, propositions, descriptive claims about the world Knowing-how: The skill of being able to deal with the world in practical circumstances The A-10 Amsterdam ring road can be reached from all directions. Follow the A-10 to the Zuid/Amstelveen exit S 108. Turn left at the end of the slip road onto Amstelveenseweg: after about three hundred yards (at the VU University hospital building) turn left again onto De Boelelaan. VU University Amsterdam can be reached via city routes S 108 and S 109. Turn left here
- 5. Anyway… where were we?… Cognition is Distributed Computation Socially Situated!
- 6. Social Situatedness Movie Silent Disco: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ctxluRFbSs
- 7. Situated activity and social context • More than: “social factors are also important” • More than: people solve problems together. (Different from „Distributed Representation and Computation‟ theory, see first lecture) • Situated activity: People make sense of the world through continuous „embodied‟ interaction with other people • Social context: What we encounter in the world is only intelligible for us as seen against a common sense, socially shared „background‟. • Practice: Situated activities in real-world contexts create „practices‟: In a practice, socially shared „know-how‟ is shared by all members of the community.
- 8. Exercise • Try to observe the „social nature of sense-making‟: How to people collaboratively make sense of things „in practice‟? – How do they use verbal interaction to this end? – How do they use non-verbal interactions to this end? – How is the body used to this end? – How are physical objects and props used to this end? – (Where) do you see social norms and -relationship at work as an aspect of the sense-making process?
- 9. Lucy Suchman: Planning as ‘situated action’ (improvisation) • Real-world practice vs process descriptions • Studying „Ethno-methods‟ (Garfinkel, 1967) • Conversation Analysis (Sacks, 1992) of
- 10. Flight strips: the role of artifacts • Study by Hughes et al, 1995 • Studying practical and practiced everyday work of traffic controllers • Flight strips do not just ‘record information’ • Strips form part of the way in which work is done (in practice, in social interactions) • (Dourish, 2001) • Representations (like flight strips) “orient ourselves in a way that will allow us, through local interactions, to exploit some contingencies of our environment and avoid others (Suchman, 1987)”
- 11. Activity Theory (Vygotsky, Leontiev) • Learning always first mediated by important others (social scaffolding) • Tool-use as accumulation and transmission of „social knowledge‟ • (Internalization and externalization)
- 12. Situated learning (Lave, Wenger, ..) and ‘identity’
- 13. Movie
- 14. Thought (copy) Input Thought External representation Of the thought Classical model of communication Communication as passing a message from one ‘mind’ to the other.
- 15. Situated Practice: making sense ‘in action’ Cognition is “where the (shared) action is” (Dourish, 2001)
- 17. Accountability • Within a community • Observable and reportable behavior • What counts as „normal‟ (rational) behavior to the other • Available to members as situated practices of looking- and-telling • Endless, ongoing, contingent accomplishment • One acts in the awareness that the other person will hold you accountable for your actions: • E.g. if you do not answer the door-bell, you know that something will be „thought of it‟ by the ringer (Schegloff)
- 19. A design example (to discuss)
- 20. Next lecture (in two weeks from now) • Socially Situated Practice studies talk a lot about social interaction, communication, collaboration, etc… • But the body here is used really secondary: it is used as a means to communicate between people. • What about the embodiment of cognition? • What about bodies „as such‟ • About their activity • About movement • The senses • Skilled actions? • Habits? • Coupling? • Temporal dynamics?
Editor's Notes
- #15: klassiek idee: representatie van een idee of inzicht.Zender heeft idee in zijn hoofd, zet het op papier, stuurt het naar ontvanger, ontvanger leest het bericht en heeft het idee nu ook in zijn hoofd.Communicatie als het versturen van boodschappenKennis als het maken, opslaan, zoeken en vinden van informatie.If this goes ‘wrong’ it is because of noise (loss of information along the way).