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Student ID No. (srn): 1170728
Programme of study: BA Political Science
Year of study: 4th
Module title: Dissertation
Module banner code: 20905 (POLS)
Supervisor: Dr Peter Kerr
Submission date: 12th March 2015
Assignment title: Populism in the UK:
Identifying reasons for
UKIP’s recent growth in
popularity
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Populism in the UK:
Identifying the reasons for the United Kingdom Independence Party’s
recent growth in popularity.
Dissertation submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of
BA Political Science.
Words: 13,150
Supervisor: Dr Peter Kerr
4

CONTENTS
1. Abstract 7
2. Introduction 8
3. Chapter One, Strategic Conservatives to the Populist Left Behind. An Inadequate
Explanation for UKIP’s Rise. 12
1.1- From ‘strategic’ Tories to the Working class ‘Left Behind’ 13
1.2- The Need for Theory 14
1.3- Cosmetically Rebranding Neoliberalism. The Third Way. 16
1.4 Contemporary events and constructing a crisis: The emergence of populism. 18
4. Chapter Two, The Centre Ground- ‘The Ground on which Political Success is Built’
Leading Towards a Political Cartel. 21
2.1- Downsian Convergence. 21
2.2- Applying Katz and Mair’s Cartel Party Thesis to New Labour. 25
2.3 Applying Katz and Mair’s Cartel Party Thesis to the Conservatives. 28
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5. Chapter Three, If only the duck house and moat had been kept a secret. The increase
in Populism in a Climate of Anti-politics. 31
3.1- A Climate of Anti-politics 31
3.2- The Culmination of events. The Construction of a political crisis. 33
3.3. Identifying the Ukippers. 37
6. Conclusion 41
7. Bibliography 45
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Abstract:
This dissertation seeks to explain why the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) has grown
in prominence in recent years. The leading academics on the party Ford and Goodwin, attribute
much of UKIP’s recent success to ‘left behind voters; who are mainly white, blue collar, older males.
The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that whilst Ford and Goodwin’s analysis is useful, it only
provides a partial explanation to the party’s rise. To provide a more complete understanding of the
party’s recent success this dissertation will examine the confluence of factors that have contributed
to UKIP’s recent surge in support. Specifically it will argue that the convergence and subsequent
cartelisation of the UK’s main political parties is a major factor contributing to UKIP’s recent
development. Therefore, this dissertation will draw on Anthony Downs’ economic theory of party
competition and the more recent Cartel Party Thesis by Richard Katz and Peter Mair, to provide a
conceptual basis to explain UKIP’s rise. However this piece will go further by arguing that these
processes in themselves are not enough to explain the growth of UKIP; we also need to consider
the impact of contemporary events as another major factor. Events like the global financial crisis
and the MP’s expenses scandal, have presented the Westminster elite as incompetent and out-of-
touch, allowing populist parties like UKIP to present themselves as outsiders and on the side the
British people. In sum, this dissertation will stress that UKIP’s recent success, can be best
understood by looking at a complex mixture of long term changes to the political system, as well as
the turn of short-term events.
7

Introduction
In 1993 Alan Sked a history lecturer at the London School of Economics, founded UKIP after the
passage of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which saw the creation of the European Union (E.U) and
its single currency, the euro. Dismayed at the creation of the E.U, Sked along with a small number
of fellow academics chose to campaign solely on withdrawing Britain from the newly created
supranational union. With this as its only political agenda, UKIP featured little if at all in national
politics. However things have significantly changed, and many commentators now consider UKIP as
a ‘major player in British politics’ (Dixon, 2014). As a result, some political scientists are trying to
explain why UKIP has had a recent surge in support and why it is growing in popularity. Robert Ford
and Matthew Goodwin, the leading political scientists to research UKIP, argue that the party’s recent
success can be attributed to an increase in support from disenfranchised, older, working-class
males (2014, p.146). They define these individuals as ‘left behind voters’, who are attracted to UKIP
because of the party’s outsider and populist image.
Though Ford and Goodwin’s analysis is useful, it only provides a partial understanding of UKIP’s
recent success and who the party’s supporters are. To have a fuller understanding, we must realise
that a confluence of factors have contributed to the party’s success. Arguably one of these factors is
the convergence and subsequent cartelisation of the UK’s main political parties around the centre
ground, which seems to have given UKIP the opportunity to emerge on the right. Therefore it will be
useful to consult Anthony Downs’ (1957) dominant economic theory party competition and Richard
Katz and Peter Mair’s (1995; 2009) leading Cartel Party Thesis to help explain the parties’
convergence and subsequent cartelisation around the centre of politics. No previous study has
relied on political science theories to examine UKIP’s emergence, therefore, this dissertation will be
filling a significant void that currently exists in the literature. However to understand UKIP’s recent
success, we cannot rely solely on the processes of convergence and cartelisation. We need to go
further and assess the the impact of contemporary ‘events’ as another major factor for UKIP’s
recent rise.
8

Events like the financial crisis and the MP’s expenses scandal have significantly undermined
people’s trust in politicians and have led to an increased climate of anti-politics. At a time when elite
politicians appear far removed from the concerns of ordinary people, populists outsiders like UKIP
and also the SNP have been able to argue of a crisis in Britain’s democracy. For Ford and Goodwin,
they claim UKIP’s populist discourse has become most appealing to ‘left behind voters’ as these
individuals feel someone is finally listening to their concerns after feeling left behind and ignored by
the main political parties.This is especially regarding their concerns over Britain’s supposed lack of
control on immigration, which UKIP has been able to make synonymous with the country’s
membership to the EU. Even though Ford and Goodwin’s claim that it is the ‘left behind’ most
attracted to UKIP’s, this will be questioned by showing that people from a variety of demographics
appear to be drawn to the party’s populist discourse.
This dissertation’s analysis of UKIP’s recent rise will be carried out in three chapters. In Chapter
One there will be an examination of the limited literature on UKIP to address its shortfall in trying to
comprehend its recent success. Firstly there will be an assessment of the earlier literature which
identifies UKIP as a single issue group gaining only the support of ‘strategic’ Conservative voters
(see Ingle 2008; Vallaste 2009; Driver 2011; Ford, Goodwin and Cutts, 2012). From this point on,
the chapter will examine the more recent literature which attributes UKIP’s success to working
class, male voters who are attracted to the party’s populist appeal and opposition to immigration
(Lynch and Whitaker 2012; Flamini 2013; Ford and Goodwin 2014). Ford and Goodwin have taken
the lead on this assumption in their concept of the ‘left behind’ voter and whilst their analysis will be
shown as useful, Chapter One will stress it only partially explains UKIP’s recent success. From this
the chapter will argue that a major default in the limited literature on UKIP is its failure to properly
examine the convergence of the main political parties to the centre-ground and the subsequent
creation of a political cartel. Therefore the chapter will show how the theories of Downs and more
recently Katz and Mair can help to explain this and how these processes have helped UKIP emerge
on the right.
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Chapter Two will look in greater depth at the theories of Downs and Katz and Mair and use them to
understand the convergence and cartelisation of New Labour and the Conservatives around the
centre-ground. It will be suggested the process of party convergence discussed by Downs, acts a
precursor to the development of a political cartel which Katz and Mair develop. This will lead the
chapter to suggest that New Labour’s convergence towards the centre ground unconsciously laid
the foundations of a cartel system. Furthermore, by drawing on Peter Burnham’s theory of
depoliticisation, it will also be suggested that New Labour’s depoliticising of areas of governmental
responsibility reduced the scope of political debate and contributed to the creation of a political
cartel. After using these theories in relation to New Labour, Chapter Two will then apply them to
David Cameron’s Conservatives. Ultimately, the chapter will argue that because both parties
converged to the centre and depoliticised areas of responsibility, both unconsciously created a
cartel and left a space on the right for UKIP to emerge.
In Chapter Three, this dissertation will examine the other main factor in the lead to UKIP’s recent
success, the impact of contemporary events. Here the financial crisis and the MPs’ expenses
scandal will be shown as significantly undermining the public’s trust in elite politicians and helping to
provoke a climate of anti-politics. By looking at the impact of these events, the chapter will show that
populists discourses have become increasingly appealing and that populist actors enabling them
imply a crisis is happening in the political system. To reflect on this, the chapter will borrow on the
ideas of Colin Hay in his Narrating Crisis (1996), to demonstrate how Nigel Farage has seemingly
narrated a crisis in Westminster and the E.U. At this point, the chapter will analyse the voters
attracted to UKIP’s populism. Ford and Goodwin’s analysis of the ‘left behind’ voter will be useful to
to show where the party is gaining some support from. Nevertheless, the chapter will question Ford
and Goodwin’s claim that these voters are the driving force behind UKIP’s recent success by
presenting figures from the British Election Study to show the party has support from variety of
voters.
In the conclusion of this dissertation, it will be reemphasised that UKIP’s recent success is due to a
confluence of factors. As the current literature fails to acknowledge this, the conclusion will assert
10

that this dissertation has filled a significant void that currently exists in the literature. By assessing
the convergence and cartelisation of the main parties around the centre-ground, this dissertation will
be clearly accounting for how UKIP have been able to offer a new political discourse on the right of
British politics. However, it would be premature to rely only on these processes, thus the conclusion
will stress that to understand the party’s recent rise we must also look at the impact of contemporary
events. As will be emphasised, these events have significantly damaged the reputation of elite
politicians, and have seemingly providing a gateway for UKIP to project its populist message.
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Chapter One
Strategic Conservatives to the Populist Left Behind.
An Inadequate Explanation for UKIP’s Rise.
The growth in popularity of UKIP during the last few years can be noted from the surge in media
attention it now gains on a very regular basis. However, for a party in its third decade, it has thus far
been significantly under-researched. The task of this chapter is to examine the current literature on
the party to emphasise that political scientists have failed to give a full explanation for UKIP’s recent
rise. Ford and Goodwin, the leading political scientists to analyse UKIP, do provide a convincing
argument that the party’s recent success is due to ‘left behind’ working class voters. Nonetheless
this claim only partially explains UKIP’s recent success. Instead we need realise a confluence of
factors have contributed to the party’s rise. One major factor the literature fails to assess is the
movement of Britain’s main parties to the centre-ground which has arguably led to the creation of a
political cartel. Thereby, this chapter will show how the dominant theories of Downs (1957), and
Katz and Mair (1995, 2009) can help explain this, so as to illustrate how UKIP have been able to
emerge on the right.
However drawing only on the theories of Downs and Katz and Mair is not enough to explain UKIP’s
recent success. As was emphasised in the introduction, we need to go further and look at the
impact of contemporary events like the financial crisis and the MP’s Expenses Scandal, to see how
people have lost trust in politicians. This will allow the chapter to see how Nigel Farage has
capitalised on this lack of trust by claiming of a crisis within Britain’s democracy. Here the chapter
will show how we can draw on Colin Hay’s Narrating Crisis (1996) to show how Farage has
assessed the current political climate and depicted a crisis. Moreover, this will illustrate how UKIP
has been able to use populist rhetoric to present itself as being on the side of many disillusioned
voters. By assessing these two major factors, this will highlight how there is a significant lack in the
current literature in trying to explain UKIP’s recent success because it fails to see it is due to a
confluence of factors.
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1.1 From ‘Strategic’ Tories to the ‘Left Behind’ working class.
Until UKIP’s success in the European elections in 2009, it received limited coverage by political
scientists. One reason is because UKIP only properly emerged as a possible alternative in national
elections following these European elections. Secondly, because the party’s sole policy aim was to
take Britain out of the E.U, this gave little room for political scientists to discuss and analyse the
party. However, one issue that seemed of interest to a small number of political scientists was how
the party did surprisingly well in European elections (Ingle 2008; Vallaste 2009; Driver 2011). It was
suggested that this success came from disgruntled Tories, who voted ‘strategically’ for UKIP in
European elections to vent their frustration at the Conservatives over the E.U. Nevertheless it was
argued that in British general elections, these voters would switch back to voting for the
Conservatives (Ford, Goodwin and Cutts, 2012). However, since the 2009 European elections,
political scientists have taken a keener interest in trying to understand why UKIP has recently been
successful. The explanations they give will now be looked at in greater detail.
Ford and Goodwin’s ‘Left behind voter’.
Since the 2009 European elections, much of the literature on the party has argued that UKIP’s
recent success derives from working class voters who have become disillusioned with the main
parties (Lundberg 2009; Lynch and Whitaker 2012; Brett; 2013; Flamini 2013; Ford 2013; and Ford
and Goodwin 2014). The literature claims that these voters have become receptive to UKIP’s main
goal of leaving the E.U because they are attracted to the party’s populist and outsider image. This
literature, which is mostly found online or in journal articles, has generally moved away from the
claim that UKIP’s support is based on ‘strategic’ Conservative voters and is instead focusing on
these new working class supporters as the drive for UKIP’s rise. Ford and Goodwin’s
comprehensive analysis of UKIP in their recent book, Revolt on the Right (2014) extensively tracks
UKIP’s origins as a single issue party through to it becoming a potential force in British politics and
continues with this theme that the party’s recent success is due to support of working class
individuals.
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Ford and Goodwin do go further and define these individuals as ‘left-behind voters’ whom they
believe are older blue-collar white males with few qualifications (2014, p.175). They claim that these
voters have been ‘left behind’ by the main political parties which has made them disillusioned with
politics. Ford and Goodwin argue that UKIP has re-ignited their interest in politics by representing
an image of Britain more akin to their own. The concept of the left-behind voter has been mentioned
only sparsely by academics like McLaren (2013, p.16), therefore Ford and Goodwin’s analysis is a
unique understanding of where UKIP seems to be gaining some of its support. Their leading piece
on UKIP also illustrates that the limited literature on the party is moving away from the idea of
‘strategic’ Tories as the cornerstone for UKIP’s support.
The ‘Left-Behind’ is not enough.
Ford and Goodwin’s analysis is certainly useful in understanding whence the party is gaining some
of its support. Nonetheless, it is only one explanation for the party’s recent success. Even though
they touch on Britain’s two main parties moving to the centre ground to obtain ‘middle class
votes’ (2014, p.10), Ford and Goodwin fail to elaborate on the significance of this. This is a major
fault in their work as the movement of the parties can be seen as fundamental to UKIP’s emergence
on the right. Arguably had the parties not converged on the centre, then UKIP would not have
gained the support of ‘left behind’ voters, as the interests of these voters would be represented by
the main parties. To remedy the deficiency in the current literature, this dissertation will examine the
parties’ movement and argue that it is a crucial factor for UKIP’s recent success. To do so this
chapter will show how we can borrow on the dominant theories in the literature by Downs (1957)
and Katz and Mair (1995; 2009), to help explain this.
1.2 The Need for Theory.
Converging to the Centre-Ground
Downs’ economic theory of party competition is found within a framework of Rational Choice Theory
and he suggests that in a two party system, parties are utility maximisers who simply aim to win
elections (1957, p.35). Downs suggests that the best way for a party to win an election is to
‘become more moderate and less extreme in policy’ so as to gain the support of ‘middle-of-the-road
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voters’ at the centre of the political environment (1957, pp.116-117). Colin Hay has accused New
Labour of adopting this type of approach by ‘studiously targeting…the median voter in marginal
constituencies of middle England’ (1999, p.139). There seems to be a general agreement in the
literature on New Labour that the party moved to centre and towards its Thatcherite opposite (Hay
1994; 1999; Driver and Martell 1999; Heffernan 2001). Thus, this illustrates the usefulness of
Downisan Theory to understanding New Labour’s convergence.
Furthermore, Downsian Theory is also useful to understanding the Conservative’s apparent
convergence to the centre-ground. The contemporary literature on the party has acknowledged
David Cameron’s attempts in trying to move the party from the right to the centre, to make it more
electable (Beech and Lee 2009; Snowdon 2010; Childs and Webb 2012; Bale and Hampshire 2012;
Farage 2014; Ford and Goodwin 2014). As Kerr et al., argue it was necessary for the Conservatives
‘to take the centre ground and abandon a raft of policies that were seen as divisive and that were
unpalatable to a wide variety of groups within society’ (2011, p.194). Therefore this makes it clear
why Downs’ theory can be useful to understand how both parties have converged towards the
centre-ground of British politics.
Leading to Katz and Mair’s Cartel Party System?
With both parties converging to the centre-ground, it is possible to suggest that this acted as a
precursor to a political cartel. Similarly it is possible to suggest that the process of depoliticisation
also unconsciously led to the development of a cartel. Depoliticisation is a theory developed by
Peter Burnham and he argues it is a ‘process of placing at one remove the political character of
decision making’ (2001, p.136). This means that government will offload responsibility of areas of
decision making to avoid having to make unpopular decisions (Burnham, 2001, p.137). Both parties
can be seen to depoliticise areas of policy and in combination with their convergence, it is possible
to say that this has reduced the parameters of political debate. Arguably this has led to the creation
of a cartel system in British politics, therefore it is worthwhile to draw on the features of a political
cartel that Katz and Mair’s outline in their Cartel Party Thesis. According to Katz and Mair:
15

the cartel party is a type that is postulated to emerge in democratic polities that are
characterised by the interpenetration of party and the state and by a tendency towards inter-
party collusion. With the development of the cartel party, the goals of politics become self-
referential, professional and technocratic, and what substantive inter-party competition
remains focused on the efficient and effective management of the polity (2009, p.755).
This thesis is usually applied to European countries, where parties can access public money to fund
their campaigns, thus the idea arises that parties merge with the state. However to use this theory in
regards to British politics, we need to pay closer attention to Katz and Mair's suggestion, that the
‘inter-party competition [that] remains becomes focused on the efficient and effective management
of the polity’ (2009, p.755). This is where their thesis is particularly useful, because it seems that the
parties’ convergence and depoliticisation has limited competition to the effective management of a
neoliberal paradigm. The next two sections will look further at possible examples of British
cartelisation to show the usefulness of Katz and Mair’s thesis.
1.3 ‘Cosmetically Rebranding’ Neoliberalism. The Third Way.
When New Labour accepted no alternative to a neoliberal free market (McIlroy, 2009 p.49) arguably
they restricted the parameters of political debate to a neoliberal hegemony (Heffernan, 2001, p.
159). Therefore the ideological battles that once characterised British politics between social
democracy and neoliberalism were no more. It has been suggested that New Labour’s acceptance
of neoliberalism was shown by it ‘cosmetically rebranding’ it in the form of the Third Way (Phelan,
2014, p.53). Arguably, this enabled the party to retain elements of its social democratic past, like a
commitment to social justice by investing in health and education but embrace the dominance of a
free market (See Finlayson, 2007; Atkins 2010). Although the party presented itself as committing to
social justice this was restricted to the rules a neoliberal paradigm, thus arguably this why the party
placed great emphasis on a neoliberal idea of individual responsibility as a way of achieving social
justice (Bevir, 2012, p.103). Therefore it is possible to suggest that this overall acceptance of
neoliberalism, led New Labour to unconsciously set the foundations of a cartel system because they
ring fenced political debate within the parameters of neoliberalism.
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Accepting the Third Way.
New Labour’s cosmetic rebranding of neoliberalism was shown to be successful after three
consecutive election victories and this appeared to influence David Cameron to rebrand the
Conservative Party to fit within the mould left by the Third Way. This is visible from the
Conservative’s apparent adoption of New Labour ideals, such as a commitment to social justice and
the provision of quality public services (see Dorey 2007; Beech 2010; Garnett 2010). Similarly David
Cameron aimed at dispelling the harsh and individualistic image of his party, by committing to
services like the NHS like New Labour (Garnett, 2010, p.124). Clearly, this demonstrates that the
politics of the two parties became confined to specific goals. It seemed that this led to the parties
only competing over the management of the neoliberal state and who could deliver good and
efficient public services. Therefore it is possible that the Conservative Party’s move towards New
Labour created a political cartel in Britain.
The Problem with Downs and Katz and Mair.
The examples above demonstrate why the literature from Downs and also Katz and Mair can be
useful in understanding the current state of Britain’s political system. This is allowing the dissertation
to show how UKIP has been able to emerge on the right of British politics, which the previous
literature has yet to do. However these two theories cannot fully help in explaining UKIP’s recent
success. One major reason for this is that both fail to discuss what will happen after convergence
and cartelisation has taken place. Katz and Mair do briefly highlight that because cartel parties have
limited the competition between themselves they ‘unwittingly provided the ammunition with which
protesters of the right can effectively wage their wars’ (1995, p.24). However, they do not go further
to explain the emergence of right wing parties and what will happen to the cartel.
A second reason why these theories are not fully useful to help explain UKIP’s rise is they fail to
take into account the impact of contemporary events in helping populist parties emerge. Events like
the financial crisis and the MP’s expenses scandal in Britain significantly undermined the public’s
trust in politicians and made them disillusioned with the main political parties. This has allowed
outsider populist parties like UKIP and the SNP to offer alternatives to the Westminster elite and re-
17

engage many voters into politics. They have done this by presenting themselves as wanting to
restore democracy that has supposedly been impaired by the Westminster elite (Gilbert 2014). This
is why in order to understand UKIP’s recent success we cannot solely assess the changes to the
party system. Rather we must also examine the impact of contemporary events as another factor
leading to the party’s recent success.
1.4 Contemporary events and constructing a crisis: The emergence of populism.
Undoubtably the financial crisis and the MP’s expenses scandal significantly heightened the public’s
contempt towards Westminster politicians (Shepherd, 2012 p351). This has allowed Farage and
other political outsiders like him to claim that there is a crisis at the heart of Britain’s democracy.
Farage has combined his depiction of a crisis in Westminster with a perceived crisis of being part of
the E.U, allowing him to reignite the debate on Britain’s membership of the E.U. To understand this
implication of a crisis, it is worth drawing on the literature from Colin Hay and his Narrating Crisis
(1996). Hay suggests that political actors narrate crises by identifying ‘an object as in need of
decisive intervention and a project through which decisive intervention can be made’ (1996, p.254).
This means that actors identify a problem and suggest their own solutions to the problem. By
drawing on Hay’s work, this will allow the dissertation to demonstrate how contemporary events
have allowed political outsiders like Farage to attach a crisis to the political system and thus offer an
alternative epistemological outlook to that being offered by the Westminster elite .
The Emergence of Populism
Farage’s panacea for the apparent political crisis is withdrawing Britain from the E.U, as he claims
this will allow Britain to put more money into public services and deal with issues like immigration
(Farage, cited by BBC, 2014). Farage can be seen as intertextualising the issue of E.U membership
as a cause of many of Britain’s problems. This certainly is a complete alternative to the policies of
the main parties and Farage is able to gain much attention for his political goals by using populist
rhetoric. Therefore, it is worth drawing on the definitions of populism in the literature to see why
Farage, and ultimately UKIP, can be seen as populist. A common characteristic of populists is their
tendency to use simple language and emphasise the centrality of the people (Abedi and Lundberg,
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2009; Brett, 2013; Rooduijn, 2013; Mounk, 2014; Mudde, 2014). Thus Farage can be seen to
achieve this when insinuating ideas like “You cannot have your own immigration policy and remain a
member of the European Union” (Farage, cited by BBC News 2014a).
The party’s use of populist rhetoric can be seen as another factor, combined with those explained
above, as a reason for UKIP’s recent success. This is where Ford and Goodwin’s analysis of the
‘left-behind voter’ is useful in seeing who is supporting the party. This is because the party’s populist
rhetoric is arguably making ‘left-behind voters’ feel like they can associate with the party, as they
feel their political views are similar to Farage’s. Also, because Farage has made politics easily
digestible through his populist rhetoric, he has confined the causes of the crisis to Britain being part
of the E.U. Thus, this has allowed certain voters to believe that the answer to the crisis is simple:
leave the E.U and Britain’s problems will be solved. Ford and Goodwin are right to claim that ‘left-
behind voters’ do find UKIP appealing, however these are not the only people supporting the party.
As will be shown in chapter three, UKIP seems to be gaining support from different demographics,
thus Ford and Goodwin’s claim that ‘left-behind voters’ are the party’s main support base is
questionable.
A Confluence of Factors Leading to UKIP’s Success.
The aim of this chapter has been to show that the literature on UKIP doesn’t fully explain why the
party has been recently successful. Though Ford and Goodwin provide a useful insight into how the
party has obtained the support of ‘left behind’ voters, this only partially explains the party’s recent
success. To provide a fuller account we need to look at a confluence of factors. One factor is the
movement of Britain’s main parties towards the centre-ground and the subsequent creation of a
political cartel. Thus as has been shown the literature from Downs and Katz and Mair is useful to
explain this and show how a gap on the right has opened for UKIP. Nonetheless, drawing on these
theories is still not enough to understand UKIP’s recent success. We need to go deeper and look at
the impact of contemporary events which have exposed the failings of politicians. Looking at these
events will show how the likes of Farage have entrenched the idea of a crisis within British politics
and Hay’s Narrating Crisis (1996) is useful to help explain this. Furthermore this will allow the
19

dissertation to show how UKIP’s populist image has become attractive to many disillusioned voters.
However, before looking at the impact of events such as the financial crisis and the MP’s expenses
scandal, we will now examine in more detail the changes to Britain’s party system in Chapter Two
by borrowing on the work of Downs and Katz and Mair.
20

Chapter 2
The centre ground- ‘the ground on which political success is built’ (Cameron 2006)
Leading Towards a Political Cartel.
After analysing the literature on UKIP in Chapter One, this chapter will explain how Britain’s main
parties appear to have converged and cartelised around the current centre of politics. Doing so will
allow the dissertation to show how UKIP have emerged on the right and offered a new political
alternative. To help explain how the parties have converged and cartelised, this chapter will borrow
on Downs’ economic theory of party convergence and also Katz and Mair’s Cartel Party Thesis. It
will be argued in this chapter that the parties’ convergence to the centre-ground has acted as a
precursor to the creation of a political cartel in Britain. Furthermore, this chapter will acknowledge
the depoliticising of areas of governmental responsibility, discussed by Peter Burnham, as also
helping in the lead to the creation of a cartel. Therefore, this chapter will begin by using these
theories to reflect on New Labour’s convergence and depoliticisation which arguably laid the
foundations of a political cartel. Following this the same theories will be used in conjunction with the
Conservatives’ convergence and depoliticisation, which will be shown as finalising the creation of a
cartel. In sum this will show how UKIP have gained a space on the right and why the changes in
Britain’s political system are a major factor for the party’s recent success.
2.1 Downsian Convergence.
In his leading work An Economic Theory of Democracy, Downs pays close attention to the different
types of party systems. When assessing a two party-system, Downs borrows on Harold Hotelling’s
spatial market apparatus, where Hotelling uses the example of two grocery stores which gravitate
towards each other and become increasingly similar (Hotelling, 1929, p.52). Downs uses Hotelling’s
spatial market as a metaphor for a two party political system in which the two parties move towards
each other. He suggests that this system can be presented on ‘a linear scale running from zero to
100, in the usual left-to-right fashion’ (1957, p.115-116). Thus in this sense, the position of zero
represents where an extreme left party would sit and position 100 would be where an extreme right
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party would be. From here Downs presents the scenario where party A, which is notably left in
terms of ideology, positions itself at 25 on the scale but over time gradually moves towards the
position of 50. The same action is said of the party B, which is ideologically on the right and which
normally situates at position 75 (1957, p.116).
For Downs the move towards position 50 means parties become more moderate and less extreme
in policy (1957, pp.116-117). Moreover he believes the move to position 50 is a rational act because
he argues the best way for parties ‘to gain more support is to move towards the other
extreme’ (1957, p.116). Moving towards the other extreme means parties can obtain the support of
what Downs calls ‘middle-of-the-road voters…those whose views place them between the two
parties’ (1957, p.117). For Down’s gaining the support of these median voters is essential as they
can determine the outcome of an election. Though Downs’ model may appear simplistic for
assuming a clear left-to-right political scale with a visible centre (Rowley, 1984, p.111), its logic of
the convergence of political parties towards their opposition is useful to discuss the apparent
convergence of Britain’s main parties. As Hay remarks, Down’s model offers a heuristic appeal and
can be useful as a suggestive description of contemporary British democracy (1999, p.93).
Towards the Opposition: Setting the Foundations of a Cartel.
To apply Downs’ model to New Labour, this will be undertaken in two ways: firstly we will look at
how New Labour moved towards its opposition of Thatcherism and became less extreme as a
traditionally social democratic party; secondly we will assess how this move saw the party seek the
support of the median voter. According to authors like Hay (1999) and Heffernan (2001), the Labour
Party’s attempt to move towards its opposite of Thatcherite, neoliberalism began with Neil Kinnock
and continued through to Tony Blair. To make the party less extreme as a left-wing social democratic
party, these leaders appeared to shift the party in a direction towards neoliberalism. This was visible
from its acceptance of free market capitalism and by abandoning its commitment to a Keynesian-
style planned economy (Heffernan, 2001, p.80). In turn, this meant the party left intact the limits to
industrial action which Mrs Thatcher’s government enacted as well as leaving once publicly owned
companies in private hands (Heffernan. 2001, p.23). Arguably, the most symbolic way Labour
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became less extreme as a left wing social democratic party was by replacing its original Clause IV
constitution with an updated and neoliberal-friendly version (Driver, 2011, p.98).
In its supposed move towards Thatcherism, Blair’s New Labour was arguably trying to obtain the
support of voters who positioned themselves between the extremes of social democracy and
neoliberalism. In a Downsian sense, it is possible to suggest that Blair saw the importance of
gaining the support of these ‘median’ voters to increase Labour’s electoral utility. Blair seemed to
view ‘Middle-England’ voters as being at the centre of British politics and appeared to go out of his
way to court their support (Driver and Martel 2002, p.397). According to Norris, these voters can be
described as university-educated public professionals, ‘such as social workers, teachers, local
government officials and doctors’ (2007, p.55). Moreover, these voters are generally viewed as
being open-minded on issues like homosexuality and social justice but value economic competency
and prudence (Maconie, 2010, p.337). Therefore to prove it could economically competent, New
Labour was seen to adopt prudent economics similar to those seen in the Thatcher years (Hay,
1999, p.42). This was visible from Gordon Brown’s 1997 budget, when he announced low income
tax, a need for low inflation and a cut in corporation tax (Driver and Martell,1998, p.63). Therefore
many in ‘Middle-England’ became reassured that Labour could govern be economically competent
(Bartle, 2002, p.11).
Converging and Depoliticising: Setting the Foundations of a Cartel.
At the start of this chapter, it was suggested that the process of Downsian convergence can be a
precursor to the development of a political cartel. In the case of New Labour, by converging towards
the centre and by appearing to adopt features of neoliberal Thatcherism, arguably they set the
foundations of a cartel. This was because the party ended the distinct competition that once
characterised British politics between social democracy and neoliberalism. Thus this meant the
clear left and right alternatives that were once on offer to the electorate were no more. Instead it
seemed that political competition was reduced to the parameters of neoliberal discourse. Debate
has been had on whether New Labour was outrightly neoliberal and there is no clear consensus in
the literature (see Hay 1996; 1999; Driver and Martel 1999; Heffernan 2001; Finlayson 2003).
23

Moreover, Blair and New Labour supporters were at pains to stress that the party had adopted a
Third Way approach which retained core elements of social democracy like a commitment to social
justice but which saw the virtues of a free market (Giddens 1998, p.40). Even though Blair claimed
to have a Third Way approach, it does seem hard not to see this as a capitulation to neoliberalism
(Ellwood,2014, p.117). Thus it is possible to suggest that the foundations of a political cartel were
established due to New Labour’s acceptance of neoliberalism.
Another way in which New Labour possibly laid the foundations of a cartel was by depoliticising
areas of governmental responsibility. According to Burnham, depoliticisation is a form of statecraft
where parties place ‘at one remove the political character of decision making’ (2001, p.136). To
understand this further, Burnham suggests that state managers delegate the main decisions over
particular issues to unelected institutions, to avoid the consequences of unpopular decisions (2001,
p.136). The most obvious example of New Labour’s depoliticisation was granting independence to
the Bank of England in 1998. For Burnham, this allowed New Labour to ‘evade responsibility for
high interest rates and the high value of sterling, [and] establish credibility with the markets' (2001,
p.139). Though New Labour’s depoliticising may have been a way for the party to avoid having to
make difficult decisions, a long term effect of this process is it prevents elected politicians debating
on how these issues should be governed. This means that over time political debate can become
ring-fenced to a few policy areas and if like in the case of New Labour, a party converges towards
their opposition and appears to accepts similar ideas on how to govern, this makes it harder for
voters to clearly distinguish between the parties. Therefore political cartelisation can be said to be a
product of depoliticisation as there is supposedly reduced policy space over which the parties can
conceivably compete (Blyth and Katz, 2005, p.44).
2.2 Applying Katz and Mair’s Cartel Party Thesis to New Labour.
On the issue of political cartelisation it is Katz and Mair who are the leading academics on this topic.
In discussing whether or not New Labour’s convergence and depoliticisation set the foundations of
political cartel in Britain, it is worth looking at the features of a cartel system discussed by Katz and
Mairl. In their Cartel Party Thesis Katz and Mair define the cartel Party system as:
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A type that is postulated to emerge in democratic polities that are characterised by the
interpenetration of party and state and by a tendency towards inter-party collusion. With the
development of the cartel party, the goals of politics become self referential, professional
and technocratic, and what substantive inter-party competition remains becomes focused
on the efficient and effective management of the polity (2009, p.755).
It seems useful to pay attention firstly to the latter part of this definition. Katz and Mair’s belief that in
a cartel, competition is ‘focused on the efficient and effective management of the polity’ (2009, p.
755), can be applied to how New Labour became committed to effectively managing a free market
neoliberal state (Hall, 2003). This was shown by it presenting itself as being economically
competent and able to work with business. Even though it framed its governing style within the
contours of the Third Way, New Labour had seemingly accepted that there was no alternative to a
neoliberal free market (Fairclough. 2002, p.viii). This meant that the competition between itself and
the Conservatives was now based on who could secure a healthy economy of low tax and low
inflation- the main tenets of free market neoliberalism (Driver and Martell,1998, p.63).
Secondly, Katz and Mair’s claim that politics becomes ‘self referential, professional and technocratic’
can be identified in New Labour’s depoliticising of areas of governmental responsibility. As Katz and
Mair make the point, depoliticisation can act as a possible lead towards cartelisation because
parties take ‘issues out of the realm of party competition by delegating them to non-political
agencies like independent central banks, courts or the E.U commission’ (2009, p.758). From this
analysis it seems clear that New Labour’s convergence and depoliticisation seems to have set the
foundations of a political cartel because they appear to fit with the features of a cartel discussed by
Katz and Mair. To see whether a political cartel was fully established we now need to look at the
Conservative Party to see if they completed the process.
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Towards the Opposition: Unconsciously Building on the Foundations of a Cartel.
Whether or not New Labour was outrightly neoliberal, one thing is clear is that its Third Way
approach successfully provided it with three consecutive and unprecedented election victories. With
this as the case, many Conservatives realised that their own party needed to change if it was to
properly challenge New Labour’s electoral dominance. Therefore a Downsian process of
convergence appeared to become relevant once again as shown by David Cameron’s attempt to
rebrand the Conservative Party and move it away from the right to the centre-ground. In moving to
the centre-ground, it was converging towards its opposite and arguably this meant it had to adopt
similar policies to New Labour. It has been argued that when New Labour tried to position itself at
the centre one way it achieved this was by presenting itself as modern party for modern times
(Royle, p.180, 2012). As a zeitgeist of the 21st century, ‘modern’ invokes the connotations of
freshness and progression, and it is possible that Cameron tried to latch onto this idea when
attempting to establish a ‘modern and compassionate Conservative Party’ (Cameron cited by
Stratton 2011).
According to Dorey, Cameron’s modern rebranding of the party was an example of how he tried to
change the party’s ideology on a macro-level (2007, p.143). Similarly Cameron tried to dispel the
‘nasty party’ image gained in the Thatcher years by committing to progressive ideals of social
tolerance and cultural diversity (Dorey. 2007, p.143). This was also shown from the party’s new
commitment to tackling social injustice and aiming to help the most disadvantaged (Garnett 2010, p.
109). In a speech in 2005, Cameron said “I am deeply committed to social action for social justice.
In the end, the test of our policies will not be how they affect the better off, but how they help the
worst-off…empowering them to climb the ladder from poverty to wealth” (Cameron, cited by BBC
News, 2005). What is striking about his speech is its similarity to Tony Blair’s speech on his own
commitment to social justice. In 2001, Blair said that “The governing idea of modern Social
Democracy is community. Founded on the principles of social justice. That people should rise
according to merit not birth; the test of any decent society is not the contentment of the wealthy but
the commitment to the poor and the weak” (Blair, 2001).
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Cameron was also shown to make progressive changes to the party on a meso and micro level
(Dorey, 2007, p.142). This was visible from his commitment to the NHS: ‘the NHS must flourish. It
must expand. It must continue to serve us all’ (Cameron, 2007, p.79). Furthermore progressive
changes at the micro level were shown from Cameron’s committing of the party to gay rights which
was demonstrated by the passing of the 2013 Marriage (Same Sex) Act and also its commitment to
greater fairness for women (Childs and Webb, 2011, p.123). It seems clear from these changes that
Cameron’s Conservatives appeared to be far from Thatcherism and had moved much closer to the
the ideals that supposedly New Labour was more in touch with (Garnett, 2010, p.109). Moreover, by
making these changes and accepting new progressive ideals, Cameron believed he could move the
party to the centre. He even said that the centre is “is the ground on which political success is
built…Not some bog on the fringes of debate” (Cameron cited in Dorey 2007, p.143). Therefore this
clearly illustrates how Downsian logic can be applied to the actions of the Conservatives in drawing
on the psephological idea that the centre is where success lies (McAnulla, 2010, p.289).
Converging and Depoliticising: Entrenching a Cartel.
It is now important to once again draw on the assumption, made throughout this chapter, that the
process of Downsian convergence acts as a precursor to the development of a political cartel. The
argument will be put forth that Cameron’s Conservative Party has built on the foundations set by
New Labour and has confirmed the creation of a political cartel. By appearing to move towards the
centre-ground and by adopting many ideals similar to those of New Labour’s Third Way, the
Conservatives have significantly limited the scope of political debate. Arguably politics is now
focused on the preferences of voters who position themselves in the centre-ground (McAnulla,
2010, p.289). This limiting of political debate can be identified from David Cameron’s lack of
discussion on traditional right-wing issues like immigration and Europe when the party was in
opposition (Heppell, 2012, p.11). Moreover, it is possible to suggest that the debate between the two
parties came to be based on who could provide effective and efficient public services and alleviate
social injustice by using a neoliberal state. Thereby it is possible to argue that the Conservatives’
convergence is one way it confirmed the creation of a political cartel.
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Another way it has possibly finalised the creation of a cartel is by its own depoliticising areas of
governmental responsibility like New Labour. Much of the party’s recent depoliticisation is visible
from its austerity measures, which have been intertextualised as essential for reducing the
economic deficit. This is seen from austerity measures like the neoliberalisation of higher education
(Sealey-Huggins et al., 2013, p.81) as well as the establishing of Police and Crime Commissioners
who are now responsible for setting the budget for their forces (Reiner, 2014). Indeed it seems that
Cameron is shifting much governmental responsibility to voluntary and charitable organisations, and
is doing this under the notion of the ‘Big Society’ (Kerr et al., 2011, p.200). As such, these examples
demonstrate how the parameters of debate are being further reduced and how the political system
has arguably moved towards a cartel. It is possible that this has made it much harder to differentiate
between the parties, and why it has become common amongst many voters to feel the ‘parties are
all the same’ (Moore, 2013)
2.3 Applying Katz and Mair’s Cartel Party Thesis to the Conservatives.
In assessing whether the Conservative Party have fully established a political cartel, it seems
appropriate once again to consult Katz and Mair’s distinguished Cartel Party Thesis. One of the
main aspects that Katz and Mair discuss of the political cartel is how the inter-party competition that
remains ‘becomes focused on the efficient and effective management of the polity (2009. p.755).
From the assessment of the Conservatives’ convergence and modernisation it appears that David
Cameron has tried to present his party as being capable of effectively and efficiently managing a
Third Way polity created by New Labour. Arguably this is why he made his party adopt many
progressive policies in order to show it could be modern and share the interest of voters at the
centre.
Moreover, as was shown Katz and Mair do highlight that one possible lead to a political cartel is
depoliticisation where parties take ‘issues out of the realm of party competition by delegating them
to non-political agencies’ (2009, p.758). It can be argued that David Cameron’s Conservative’s have
built on New Labour’s depoliticisation. This can be shown from Cameron’s institutionalisation of
Gordon Brown’s golden rules of fiscal policy (where government would only borrow to invest and
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public sector debt would not exceed 40 percent of GDP), by his creation of the Office for Budget
Responsibility (Byrne, et al., 2011, p.28). The OBR has the goal of balancing the government’s
cyclically adjusted budget five years ahead to ensure public sector debt is falling (Byrne, et al.,
2011, p.28), thus the government is supposedly restricted and unable to spend more than the OBR
has instructed. Therefore with the OBR made up of unelected officials this seems to highlight Katz
and Mair’s assumption that the goal of politics becomes ‘professional and technocratic’ (2009, p.
755). By drawing on what Katz and Mair believe to be the features of a political cartel, it seems clear
that the Conservative’s have indeed finalised the creation of a cartel.
A space available on the right for UKIP.
With Britain’s two main parties appearing to converge towards the centre-ground, as well as by
adopting measures of depoliticisation, it seems clear that a political cartel has established in
Westminster. By converging to maximise their own chances of winning an election and also
depoliticising areas of responsibility, the parties have seemingly reduced the parameters of political
debate around the preferences of voters at the centre-ground. This Downsian view that the political
centre is where success is, has caused the parties to unintentionally leave gaps on the political
spectrum for new parties to emerge. Thus arguably this is why parties like The Green Party, the
SNP and of course UKIP have been able to emerge. Although the move to the centre by the main
parties may have seemed rational at the time, it could be argued that they have shot themselves in
the political foot because they have opened themselves up to attack from political outsiders.
Clearly UKIP’s emergence has been possible because a gap on the right has opened for it to
situate. and this has allowed it to offer an alternative epistemological discourse. From the analysis in
this chapter, it is clear that the convergence and subsequent creation of a political cartel has been a
major factor contributing to UKIPs recent success. It is unfortunate the recent literature on UKIP
doesn’t properly acknowledge this, therefore in doing so this dissertation has filled a significant void
that currently exists. However these processes alone cannot fully explain UKIP’s recent success.
The task of Chapter Three will be to examine the impact of contemporary events like the financial
crisis and the MPs’ expenses scandal as another factor in the lead to UKIP’s rise. These events
29

have significantly undermined the public's trust in the main parties and have led to outsiders like
Nigel Farage to imply a crisis is happening in the political system because elites are considered as
out-of-touch with citizens. Therefore as will be shown this has given a great deal of prominence to
the populist discourses of parties like UKIP.
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Chapter 3
If only the duck house and moat had been kept a secret.
The increase in Populism in a Climate of Anti-politics.
This chapter will argue that contemporary events like the financial crisis and the MPs expenses
scandal, have haemorrhaged people’s trust in politicians and is another factor contributing to UKIP’s
recent success. Assessing the animosity towards politicians will demonstrate how political actors
like Nigel Farage have capitalised on this political toxicity, by attaching a crisis to Britain’s political
establishment. Thus, Colin Hay’s theory on the construction of crisis narratives (1996) will be useful
to examine Farage’s apparent fashioning of a crisis. From this point on, the chapter will highlight
that amidst the ‘political crisis’, Farage has distinguished UKIP as an outsider, who he claims are on
the side of ‘the people’. In a climate where elite politicians are viewed as egoistic and out-of-touch,
UKIP’s populist nature has become increasingly appealing, therefore it will be useful to examine the
people attracted to UKIP’s cause. Here, it will be worth drawing on Ford and Goodwin’s view that it
is ‘left behind voters’ most invigorated by the party’s populism. Nonetheless, the chapter will seek to
question Ford and Goodwin’s claim that it is ‘left behind’ voters most attracted to UKIP, by
presenting figures from the British Election Survey, which suggest the party is receiving support
from a range of people.
3.1 A Climate of Anti-Politics.
The End of Competence.
The financial crisis in 2007/08 is arguably the first major event to offset the recent indignation
towards British politicians. After a decade of sustained economic growth and stability, the global
financial crisis plunged the UK into a deep and long lasting recession. The catalyst for the crisis was
the breakdown of sub-prime mortgage markets in the USA (Adair et al., 2009, p.3) and its effect on
Britain, began with an economic downturn caused by the country’s soaring house prices and
household debt. Much of the initial blame was placed on bankers for reckless complacency (Farlow,
2013, p.174), however, politicians like Gordon Brown were soon pulled into the frame for tolerating
and even supporting huge increases in private sector debt. As Chancellor, Brown tolerated soaring
31

debt because of the economic benefits debt brought, like fuelling economic growth, boosting
demand in wholesale and retail industries (Marsden, 2009) and providing generous tax revenues
(Coates, 2008, p.10). Also, as this was private debt, Brown was able to maintain his golden
economic rule of being prudent with public debt and thus was able to retain an image of governing
competence (Coates, 2008, p.10).
The Tipping Point: Northern Rock.
The earliest signs of economic catastrophe came from the run on the Northern Rock bank in
September 2007. Resultantly, the Brown government took the bank into public control in February
2008, saddling the tax payer with the bank’s £100 billion debt. Following the saga with Northern
Rock, the economic crisis snowballed, with a downturn in business investment and unemployment
rapidly increasing. By the end of 2009, 290,000 people lost their jobs and unemployment reached
1.92 million (Adair, et., al, 2009, p.11). As Prime Minister, Brown’s response was to try and stimulate
economic growth by increasing Britain’s budget deficit to to an astonishing £156.3 billion in 2009,
ten times the amount inherited by the party in 1997 of £15.6 billion (Rogers and Kollewe, 2013).
Thus Brown’s once esteemed reputation for prudence and economic competency was becoming
highly questionable (Porter and Conway, 2008).
This allowed Leader of the Opposition, David Cameron, to associate the turmoil with Gordon Brown,
arguing of the “utter mess this Labour government and this Labour Prime Minister have made of the
British economy” (Cameron, cited by BBC News, 2009). Hence, many voters came to the belief that
Labour caused much of the crisis and had lost all economic competence (Heppell, 2013, p.166). For
Cameron, the only solution to Brown’s ‘age of irresponsibility’ was an ‘age of austerity’ (Bramall,
2013, p.20) in which he argued ‘difficult decisions would have to be made’ (O’Hara, 2014, p.70).
With the economy in chaos and the only answer supposedly being harsh austerity measures, this
certainly brought into question the governing ability of politicians. A YouGov poll for The Sunday
Times in June 2009, asked, ‘Do you think Gordon Brown is doing well or badly as prime minister?’
and 74 percent of those polled thought he was doing a bad job (YouGov, 2009). Similarly, a YouGov
poll for The Sun in October 2010, asked, ‘Thinking about the way the government is cutting
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spending to reduce the deficit, do you think this being done fairly or unfairly? and 50 per cent
believed it was being done unfairly (YouGov, 2010). Thus the public’s animosity towards politicians
was clearly tempestuous following the financial crisis .
Adding Fuel to the Fire: The MPs’ Expenses Scandal.
In the midst of the financial crisis, another damaging event was unfolding that would be as ‘dramatic
as the economic one’ (Mandleson, 2010, p.468). In May 2009, The Telegraph Group exposed many
MPs for abusing the parliamentary expenses system at the tax payers’ expense. The unravelling of
MPs’ expenses rapidly escalated, to the dismay and outrage of the public, who had been tightening
their own finances due to the economic crisis. The public’s fury intensified when information was
disclosed about some MPs claiming expenses for the most trivial of items, like a moat and duck
island (Bell, 2009, pp.21-27). Some MPs even acted criminally with their expenses, by claiming on
interest payments for mortgages that had already been paid (Pattie and Johnston, 2012, p.733).
Such profligacy magnified the public’s already large vexations towards politicians, and as Van
Heerde-Hudson discusses, ‘that MPs had apparently sought to keep expenses details from being
disclosed, and were essentially free to regulate their own activities, reinforced for many of the public
a belief that politicians were ‘out of touch’ with the ‘ordinary’ lives of British citizens’ (2009, pp.
241-242). From a survey conducted by Ipsos MORI following the scandal, sixty two percent of
people believed MPs put their own interests ahead of their party, constituents and the country and
more than two-thirds believed that most MPs made a lot of money using public office improperly
(Ipsos MORI, 2009). Therefore, the trifling behaviour of many MPs clearly incensed the public’s
mood towards politicians, and helped to foster widespread anti-politics sentiments (Cowley, 2015, p.
136).
3.2 The Culmination of Events: The Construction of a Political Crisis.
The development of a climate of anti-politics appears to have given political outsiders the chance to
attach the assumption of a crisis in contemporary politics. Colin Hay suggests that political actors
construct crises by identifying ‘an object as in need of decisive intervention and a project through
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which decisive intervention can be made’ (1996, p.254). Although Hay’s theory was used to
describe Mrs Thatcher’s crisis narrative during the Winter of Discontent, it can also be applied to the
current construction of a crisis in British politics. It seems the anti-politics age which the financial
crisis and MPs’ expenses scandal have helped to foster has provided the ammunition to political
outsiders like UKIP and the SNP to narrate a crisis within the political establishment. Arguably, the
examples for ‘decisive intervention’ that these parties are projecting are the main policy goals that
they are founded on; in UKIP’s case it is withdrawing Britain from the E.U, and for the SNP it is
Scottish independence from the UK.
Nigel Farage’s Presentation of a Crisis.
With the mood towards British politicians so contemptuous, it seems Nigel Farage has seized the
opportunity to jump onto the anti-politics bandwagon, and adjoin the idea that E.U politicians are as
corrupt and out-of-touch as those in Westminster. He has established the idea that Britain’s
sovereignty is in crisis because many of its powers have been transferred to ‘big bureaucrats’ in
Brussels (Farage,2014a). This view was presented very graphically in UKIP’s 2014 E.U election
campaign, where they claim that 75% of Britain’s laws are now made in Brussels, see image 1.1
(Hope and Holehouse 2014). This certainly helps to emphasise a belief that there is a crisis
happening in Britain’s democracy with it losing its sovereignty to the E.U. Similarly, this idea can
also be noted from Farage’s argument that there is now a “battle of national democracy versus E.U
state bureaucracy” (Farage 2014a). To apply Hay’s theory here, (1996, 254), the ‘object’ with which
Farage has identified as needing ‘decisive intervention’ is Britain’s membership of the E.U because
for him it is limiting Britain’s sovereignty. Thus for Farage and ultimately UKIP, the ‘project’ with
which ‘decisive intervention’ can be made, is by ‘getting our nation out of the European Union and
reasserting the sovereignty of Parliament’ (UKIP, 2015).
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Image 1.1 Courtesy of Hob and Holehouse, 2014: UKIP/PA
By presenting the E.U as threatening Britain’s sovereignty, Farage has put the issue of membership
of the union firmly onto the political agenda, which arguably forced David Cameron to offer an in/out
referendum on Britain’s membership (Hunt, 2014). Furthermore, Farage has intertextualised the
issue of E.U membership as preventing Britain from controlling matters like immigration, arguing
“you cannot control immigration as a member of the European Union” (Farage, cited by BBC News
2014). An interesting point that t’Hart makes is that, ‘the most important instrument of crisis
management is language. Those who are able to define what the crisis is all about also hold the key
to defining the appropriate strategies for [its] resolution’ (1993, p.41). In Farage’s case, he has
pinpointed the crisis as being part of the E.U and the solution is for Britain to leave.
The Appeal of the Populist Outsider and the Creation of a New Choice in Politics.
As many politicians are now regarded as egoistic and incompetent, a widespread belief has
emerged that both the E.U and British state have ‘ceased to be representative and truly
democratic’ (Seymour, 2014). This age of anti-politics has given much appeal to populist discourses,
allowing parties like UKIP to present themselves as wanting to restore democracy. This is visible
from Farage’s belief that Britain should use forms of direct democracy, ‘when the political class has
got too far out of touch with public opinion’ (Farage cited by Holehouse, 2014b). This is appealing
because it draws on the foundations of democratic thought that ‘the rule of the people is a good
thing’ (Brett, 2013, p.410). Moreover, populist sentiments have gained recent prominence, because
35

they appear as non-ideological and common-sense (Brett, 2013, p.410). When ideas are presented
as non-ideological and common sense, they can unite many people to a particular cause. Farage
has tried to achieve this when arguing that the E.U is threatening Britain’s democracy: “Left and
right is irrelevant…We need big change. We’ve got to get back control of our country…When you
get back control of your country you get proper democracy” (Farage cited by Cowley, 2014).
The outsider image with which UKIP has projected, is arguably another reason why the party’s
populism is engaging in this era of anti-politics (Goodwin, 2014). Not only does UKIP’s outsider
image allow it to depict the elite as self-absorbed, it allows the party to separate itself from the elite
and reflect the emotions of voters who feel the main parties are ‘out-of-touch’ (Wright, 2005). In this
way the party has presented itself as sharing the interests of ordinary people, which the political
elite has been characterised as not doing. As Roger Knapman, the party’s former leader invoked,
‘members of this party do not see themselves as politicians; they are people from all backgrounds
who feel deeply what the majority of British people feel’ (Knapman cited in Abedi and Lundberg,
2009, p.76).
A New Choice?
With the apparent cartelisation of Britain’s main political parties, the choice between the parties has
become much less clear. Nevertheless, with UKIP’s emergence onto the political scene, they have
presented a new epistemological discourse to contemporary politics. Arguably this is why their
populism - like that of the SNP’s - is appealing, because voters are now being offered a new choice.
By presenting a new choice, UKIP are able to offer new solutions to supposed problems, as well as
a different perception of what is good and what might be considered dangerous (Moffit 2014, p.2).
Farage’s emphasis that E.U membership costs ‘£40 million everyday and each British family £2000
each year’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014, p.76), demonstrates how he is depicting the E.U as
dangerous because of its supposed high expense. Furthermore, Farage has portrayed immigrants
and progressive policies as dangerous, by criticising the Conservative Party for being ‘obsessed
with wind farms, introducing gay marriage and happy to open the door to 29 million Romanians and
Bulgarians’ (Farage, cited by Moseley, 2013). By depicting the level migrants being able to easily
36

come to Britain in this way allows Farage to ignite fears in peoples minds on the possible strain it
may bring on public services, to jobs and also to British national identity, which in turn allows him to
offer a new discourse to contemporary politics.
3.3 Identifying the Ukippers.
In the run up to the 2015 general election, UKIP have been averaging on fourteen percent in
election polls (Wilkinson, 2015), meaning the majority of the British electorate have clearly not
become attuned to the party’s populism. However, UKIP has overtaken the Liberal Democrats as
Britain’s third main political party, so its populism is clearly appealing to some voters. Therefore, it is
important to see who these people are, to understand why they are supporting UKIP. According to
Ford and Goodwin, these people are ‘left behind voters’, who, as the name suggests, have been left
behind in political debate and ignored by mainstream politics (2014, p.10). They identify them as
generally older, blue-collar males, with few qualifications (2014, p.175). Moreover, Ford and
Goodwin argue that these voters are as much former Labour supporters as they are former
Conservatives, as they tend to be manual workers with strong links to Labour, especially through
trade unions, but also have distinct attitudes on nationalism, social conservatism and
Euroscepticism, which links them to the Conservatives (2014, p.173).
Feeling Unrepresented.
Ford and Goodwin argue that one of the main reasons ‘left-behind’ voters are turning to support
UKIP is due to their dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties (2014, p.173). With the mainstream
parties courting the support of voters from ‘Middle-England’ and becoming more socially liberal, it
has been said that ‘left-behind’ voters feel their concerns have been ignored by the political elite
(Ford and Goodwin, 2014, p.128). In particular, it has been their concerns on mass immigration,
especially migration from across Europe, which they feel the main parties have ignored. Ford and
Goodwin argue that these voters are generally hostile towards European migration, because they
see themselves as being ‘likely to be undercut by workers from other member states’ (2014, p120).
Moreover, they claim these voters are generally sceptical of mass immigration, because they fear its
impact on traditional British identity (Ford and Goodwin, 2014, p.120).
37

Therefore, with the mainstream parties supposedly ignoring the concerns of ‘left behind’ voters,
UKIP have been able to address these immigration concerns by making them synonymous with
Britain’s membership of the E.U. They have been able to present a somewhat convincing argument
to ‘left behind’ voters, that “you cannot control immigration as a member of the European Union
because we have total open borders with the other member states” (Farage, 2014). Therefore, UKIP
have forced the issue of Britain’s membership of the E.U onto the political agenda by presenting it
as the main cause of mass immigration. This is a clear example of intertextuality. An interesting
point Ernesto Laclau makes when borrowing on the theory of Sigmund Freud, is that populists are
successful when ordinary individuals introject their ideas and attitudes (Laclau, 2007, p.55).
Arguably UKIP have achieved this introjection with many ‘left behind’ voters by convincing them that
Britain’s supposed inability to control immigration is caused by being part of the E.U.
Questioning Ford and Goodwin’s ‘Left Behind’ Voter.
The claim that Ford and Goodwin make that UKIP’s recent support is due to ‘left behind’ voters, is
certainly persuasive. However, figures released in 2014 by the British Election Study (B.E.S)
showed UKIP is obtaining support from a varied demographic of people, not just ‘left-behind’ voters
(Fenton and Mann, 2015). Certainly the ‘left behind’ are playing a major part in UKIP’s recent
success, however as Figure 1 shows, the party is gaining significant support from small employers,
high managers and large employers. These people, especially high managers and large employers,
could be placed into the A and B socio-economic demographic, whereby their status is considered
as upper middle class and middle class. Thus, Ford and Goodwin’s claim that ‘left-behind’ voters
are the party’s main support base is questionable, as it appears to be gaining support from a range
of people. Indeed the ‘left-behind’ voter has been very important to UKIP’s recent success, but they
seem to be one of several types of voter who have propelled the party forward.
38

Figure 1. Courtesy of Evans and Mellon, BES, 23/05/2014.
The Centre Ground.
At present, UKIP’s support appears to be coming from a range of voters, however, one thing that is
clear is that the party is failing to gain support from young people. Britain’s first-time voters in 2015
are said to be pro-EU, socially liberal and no fans of Farage (Helm, 2014). According to surveys
39

conducted by Opinium forThe Observer, sixty four percent of young people between the ages of
seventeen and twenty-two disapprove of Farage, with forty percent believing Europe is a good
thing, and forty eight percent believing immigration is good for Britain (Helm, 2014). The youth vote
could certainly determine the outcome of the election and there are said to be more than three
million young people able to vote in 2015 (Helm, 2014). It is indeed plausible that these young
people are the voters who are currently at the centre of British politics. As shown by the analysis of
Downsian theory in chapter two, gaining the support of these centre voters is essential for any party
to do well in a two party system. Therefore UKIP’s success may be hampered if it cannot obtain
some support from young people at the centre. It has been clear from this chapter that UKIP’s
recent success can also be attributed to the impact of contemporary events as well as the
convergence and cartelisation of Britain’s main parties around the centre ground discussed in
Chapter Two. As has been shown these events in creating a climate of anti-politics has allowed
UKIP’s populist nature to become increasingly appealing especially to ‘left behind’ voters but also
seemingly from voters from a variety of demographics.
40

Conclusion
In seeking to understand the reasons behind UKIP’s growth in popularity, this dissertation has
revealed that a confluence of factors have contributed to the party’s recent success. Unlike the
previous literature on the party, this piece has emphasised that the convergence towards the centre-
ground by the main parties and the apparent creation of a political cartel, is one major factor for
UKIP’s recent emergence. By borrowing on the dominant theories by Downs (1957) and Katz and
Mair (1995; 2009) to help explain this, this dissertation has shown how UKIP have emerged on the
right of British politics and offered an alternative political discourse to the electorate. Furthermore,
this dissertation has argued that contemporary events have also been essential to the party’s rise.
With the financial crisis and the MP’s expenses scandal presenting elite politicians as egoistic and
out-of-touch, populist parties like UKIP and the SNP, have become increasingly appealing in this
climate of anti-politics. These parties have argued of a crisis in contemporary politics and thus have
been able to push forward their radical agendas as the solution to the problem. In UKIP’s case their
populist discourse looks to be particularly appealing to what Ford and Goodwin term, ‘left-behind
voters’. Though Ford and Goodwin’s analysis is very convincing, it appears that ‘left-behind’ voters
are not the only people attracted to UKIP’s populist message.
The examination of the literature on UKIP in Chapter One, illustrated the failure of academics to fully
account for the party’s recent success. Moreover, with the party now in its third decade, the chapter
also highlighted that UKIP has been significantly under-researched. Early on in UKIP’s history, very
few political scientists took an interest in the party, and those that did only tried to explain its
peculiar success in European Elections. The general consensus amongst these political scientists
was UKIP’s european success could be attributed to ‘strategic’ Tory voters who voted UKIP in
European elections. Arguably these ‘strategic’ Tories, voted UKIP as a way of venting their anger at
the lax approach of the Conservative Party towards the E.U in recent years. However, since the
party’s notable success in the 2009 European Elections, authors have given less attention to
‘strategic’ Tory voting as the basis of the party’s support. Now they are turning to analyse how the
party’s populist image is becoming increasingly attractive to working-class males and who are
arguedas becoming the main support base for the party.
41

Ford and Goodwin the leading academics on UKIP, have contributed most to this assumption that
working-class male voters are the main supporters of the party and have been fundamental to its
recent success. Though their analysis of the ‘left behind’ voter is useful, as has been shown it only
partially explain UKIP’s recent success. Ford and Goodwin’s failure to examine the convergence
and cartelisation of Britain’s main parties around the centre ground is a major shortfall in their
argument. Therefore, Chapter One emphasised that by borrowing on the leading theories of Downs
(1957) and Katz and Mair (1995; 2009), a proper examination could be made of the changes to the
political system to show how UKIP have been able to emerge on the right. Upon this, Chapter Two
applied these theories to New Labour and the Conservative Party, so as to address their apparent
convergence to centre as well as the unconscious lead to a political cartel.
By firstly examining New Labour’s move towards the centre-ground, Chapter Two highlighted that
the party appeared to accept many principles of Thatcherism and neoliberalism. Even though the
party had branded itself as having a Third Way approach, as was shown it had come to accept
many of the main features of neoliberalism. Therefore, the distinct political alternatives that once
characterised British politics between social democracy and neoliberalism, were no more. From this,
the chapter sought to show how this unconsciously set the foundations of cartel system as
competition now became limited to a neoliberal paradigm. Moreover, the chapter then borrowed on
the theory of depoliticisation by Peter Burnham to address another possible lead to a cartel system.
With New Labour delegating areas of governmental responsibility to unelected institutions so as to
avoid making unpopular decisions, this significantly reduced the parameters of political debate and
competition. Political discourse was shown to become ring-fenced around few policy areas and the
remaining competition which did exist, became ‘focused on the efficient and effective management
of the [neoliberal] polity’ (Katz and Mair 2009, p.755)
From then on, Chapter Two sought to show the Conservative Party as appearing to build on these
cartel foundations. With New Labour’s Third Way approach providing three consecutive election
victories, many in the Conservative Party realised that their party needed to move from the right to
the centre if they were to have a chance of winning an election. Therefore, under David Cameron
the party appeared to converge in a Downsian fashion towards the centre of British politics. This
42

process as was shown, was undertaken by Cameron making macro level changes to the party’s
ideology, which saw him try and modernise the Conservatives and remove its nasty party image
(Dorey, 2007, p.142). This saw the party adopt new progressive ideals, especially on issues like
social justice, which saw it become strikingly similar to New Labour. Thus from here it became clear
that the competition between the parties and subsequently the differences between them were
massively reduced.
Moreover, as was shown, the depoliticisation of areas of responsibility that the Conservatives have
enacted whilst in government under their narrative of austerity, has further reduced the areas of
political debate, and seemingly the competition between the parties. Therefore, the Conservative’s
convergence and depoliticisation appears as having confirmed the creation of a political cartel
because many in the electorate feel they can no longer clearly differentiate between the two parties
(Moore, 2013). As was emphasised at the end of Chapter Two, with the parties converging and
cartelising around the centre, this has given the opportunity for UKIP to offer a distinct and
alternative discourse on the right of British politics. However, as was acknowledged in Chapter One,
we cannot solely rely on these changes in Britain’s political system to understand UKIP’s rise.
Therefore Chapter Three set out to assess how contemporary events have generated a climate of
anti-politics, which have been another huge factor for UKIP’s rise.
The events of focus were the financial crisis and the MP’s expenses scandal, which have presented
politicians as incompetent and egoistic. By drawing on Colin Hay’s leading work on the creation of
crisis narratives, the chapter demonstrated how populists parties like UKIP and their leader Nigel
Farage have depicted a crisis in the political system. By portraying a crisis, Farage has been able to
push forward UKIP’s radical agenda of withdrawing Britain from the EU, as his solution to the
problem. Therefore, with the sentiments towards the political elite being toxic, UKIP’s populist
discourse has become rather appealing, which has been illustrated by it becoming the third most
popular party in British politics. In trying to analyse the voters attracted to UKIP’s populism, it has
been useful to draw on Ford and Goodwin’s view that it is ‘left behind’ voters who are now the main
support base of the party. As was shown, UKIP have been able to present themselves as in-touch
with the concerns of these voters on issues like immigration by making the issues synonymous with
43

membership of the E.U. These voters are indeed playing an important role in the party’s recent
success, but as was shown from the statistics from the B.E.S, UKIP appear to be gaining support
from a range of voters. More research needs to be conducted into why voters in middle-class
positions are also finding UKIP’s populism appealing, which unfortunately, due to the insufficient
space this dissertation has not been able to do so.
UKIP’s recent catapulting onto the political stage may have gained it a fixture in British politics for
the years to come. Of course only time will tell on this. One thing that is clear, is it has been able to
gain this position due to a range of factors. The combination of the convergence and cartelisation of
the main parties to the centre along with the impact of contemporary events in establishing a climate
of anti-politics, has allowed the party’s populism to become increasingly appealing. By assessing
these factors this dissertation has filled a significant void that currently exists in the literature. UKIP’s
populism is certainly shaking up the political system, however, one thing that seems clear is this
populist discourse is failing to sway many younger voters to support the party.Young people who are
seen to be generally positive towards immigration and the E.U, may well halt UKIP’s recent rise. To
maintain longevity, the party may need to alter its political goals to secure support from these
younger voters who are arguably at the centre of the political environmen. Therefore in time, we
may indeed see UKIP’s own Downsian convergence to the centre ground of British politics.
44

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