DIY Internet: Snappy, Secure Networking with MinimaLT (JSConf EU 2013)
1 like2,072 views
The document discusses the minimalt protocol, a low-latency networking solution designed to enhance security and privacy while addressing vulnerabilities in traditional protocols like TCP and TLS. It highlights the importance of strong cryptography, forward secrecy, and the ability to handle connections more efficiently than existing methods. The speaker, Andy Wingo, emphasizes the necessity for a new protocol that meets the growing demand for privacy in an increasingly monitored internet landscape.
![Anatomy of a GET
000.00
130.50
130.78
278.00
→
←
→
←
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
TCP
TCP
HTTP
TCP
SYN
SYN/ACK
GET /
[begin]
Begin receiving response. Early parsing.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/jsconf-eu-2013-slides-140205071857-phpapp01/85/DIY-Internet-Snappy-Secure-Networking-with-MinimaLT-JSConf-EU-2013-16-320.jpg)
![Anatomy of a GET
000.00
130.50
130.78
278.00
282.00
→
←
→
←
→
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
TCP
TCP
HTTP
TCP
TCP
SYN
SYN/ACK
GET /
[begin]
SYN x 3
Kick off more connections for parallel fetch.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/jsconf-eu-2013-slides-140205071857-phpapp01/85/DIY-Internet-Snappy-Secure-Networking-with-MinimaLT-JSConf-EU-2013-17-320.jpg)
![Anatomy of a GET
000.00
130.50
130.78
278.00
282.00
410.71
→
←
→
←
→
←
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
TCP
TCP
HTTP
TCP
TCP
HTTP
SYN
SYN/ACK
GET /
[begin]
SYN x 3
200 OK
Total: 7108 bytes over 411 milliseconds.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/jsconf-eu-2013-slides-140205071857-phpapp01/85/DIY-Internet-Snappy-Secure-Networking-with-MinimaLT-JSConf-EU-2013-18-320.jpg)
![Anatomy of a GET
000.00
130.50
130.78
278.00
282.00
410.71
414.85
→
←
→
←
→
←
→
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
www.gnu.org
TCP
TCP
HTTP
TCP
TCP
HTTP
TCP
SYN
SYN/ACK
GET /
[begin]
SYN x 3
200 OK
SYN/ACK x 3
Initial round-trip kills parallel fetch :-(](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/jsconf-eu-2013-slides-140205071857-phpapp01/85/DIY-Internet-Snappy-Secure-Networking-with-MinimaLT-JSConf-EU-2013-19-320.jpg)
DIY Internet: Snappy, Secure Networking with MinimaLT (JSConf EU 2013)
- 1. DIY Internet with MinimaLT Low-latency secure networking JSConf.EU 2013 Andy Wingo
- 2. wingo@igalia.com Compiler hacker at Igalia Recently: ES6 generators in V8, SpiderMonkey (sponsored by Bloomberg) Not a cryptographer This talk is for folks that deploy both endpoints, for cryptonerds, and for early-stage tinkerers
- 3. You are here Context: Militarization of daily life Generals peeping on your web searches Read the wrong things and they send the SWAT team
- 4. what’s he building in there?
- 5. what’s he building in there? He has subscriptions to those RSS feeds And he’s been tweeting about MinimaLT We’re in his router, and his mobile phone You won’t believe what we got from the drone What’s he building in there? What the hell is he building in there? We have a right to know
- 6. Solution? Smash the state! Meanwhile, let’s not make it easy for the NSA
- 7. HTTPS vs... Attack vectors: ❧ Cryptanalysis (RC4) ❧ MITM via rogue certificates (DigiNotar &c) ❧ Use JavaScript! CRIME, BEAST, ... ❧ Backdoors in TLS implementations (Windows?)
- 8. HTTPS vs... Attack vectors: ❧ Cryptanalysis (RC4) ❧ MITM via rogue certificates (DigiNotar &c) ❧ Use JavaScript! CRIME, BEAST, ... ❧ Backdoors in TLS implementations (Windows?) ❧ HTTP
- 9. HTTPS vs HTTP “Cryptography that is not actually used can be viewed as the ultimate disaster” – DJB competitions.cr.yp.to/disasters.html How many of you...
- 10. HTTPS vs HTTP “Cryptography that is not actually used can be viewed as the ultimate disaster” – DJB competitions.cr.yp.to/disasters.html How many of you... ❧ use EFF’s “HTTPS everywhere” extension?
- 11. HTTPS vs HTTP “Cryptography that is not actually used can be viewed as the ultimate disaster” – DJB competitions.cr.yp.to/disasters.html How many of you... ❧ use EFF’s “HTTPS everywhere” extension? ❧ never use plain HTTP with Google?
- 12. HTTPS vs HTTP “Cryptography that is not actually used can be viewed as the ultimate disaster” – DJB competitions.cr.yp.to/disasters.html How many of you... ❧ use EFF’s “HTTPS everywhere” extension? ❧ never use plain HTTP with Google? There is a reason for this
- 13. Anatomy of a GET 000.00 → www.gnu.org TCP SYN Visiting http://www.gnu.org/ over French wired ADSL.
- 14. Anatomy of a GET 000.00 130.50 → www.gnu.org ← www.gnu.org TCP TCP SYN SYN/ACK 130 ms RTT, ~65ms latency. Remote server hosted in Boston, ~4000 miles away. 4000 miles is 22 light-milliseconds.
- 15. Anatomy of a GET 000.00 130.50 130.78 → www.gnu.org ← www.gnu.org → www.gnu.org TCP TCP HTTP The GET is delayed by 130 ms. SYN SYN/ACK GET /
- 16. Anatomy of a GET 000.00 130.50 130.78 278.00 → ← → ← www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org TCP TCP HTTP TCP SYN SYN/ACK GET / [begin] Begin receiving response. Early parsing.
- 17. Anatomy of a GET 000.00 130.50 130.78 278.00 282.00 → ← → ← → www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org TCP TCP HTTP TCP TCP SYN SYN/ACK GET / [begin] SYN x 3 Kick off more connections for parallel fetch.
- 18. Anatomy of a GET 000.00 130.50 130.78 278.00 282.00 410.71 → ← → ← → ← www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org TCP TCP HTTP TCP TCP HTTP SYN SYN/ACK GET / [begin] SYN x 3 200 OK Total: 7108 bytes over 411 milliseconds.
- 19. Anatomy of a GET 000.00 130.50 130.78 278.00 282.00 410.71 414.85 → ← → ← → ← → www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org TCP TCP HTTP TCP TCP HTTP TCP SYN SYN/ACK GET / [begin] SYN x 3 200 OK SYN/ACK x 3 Initial round-trip kills parallel fetch :-(
- 21. HTTPS sadness 000.00 129.91 130.46 → www.gnu.org ← www.gnu.org → www.gnu.org TCP TCP TLS SYN SYN/ACK Client Hello
- 22. HTTPS sadness 000.00 129.91 130.46 266.13 267.08 267.73 → ← → ← ← → www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org TCP TCP TLS TLS TLS TLS SYN SYN/ACK Client Hello Server Hello Certificate Key Exchange
- 23. HTTPS sadness 000.00 129.91 130.46 266.13 267.08 267.73 449.06 449.10 → ← → ← ← → ← → www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org TCP TCP TLS TLS TLS TLS TCP TLS SYN SYN/ACK Client Hello Server Hello Certificate Key Exchange ACK (???) Change Cipher
- 24. HTTPS sadness 000.00 129.91 130.46 266.13 267.08 267.73 449.06 449.10 580.28 583.72 → ← → ← ← → ← → ← → www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org TCP TCP TLS TLS TLS TLS TCP TLS TLS HTTPS SYN SYN/ACK Client Hello Server Hello Certificate Key Exchange ACK (???) Change Cipher Change Cipher GET /
- 25. HTTPS sadness 000.00 129.91 130.46 266.13 267.08 267.73 449.06 449.10 580.28 583.72 764.97 → ← → ← ← → ← → ← → ← www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org www.gnu.org TCP TCP TLS TLS TLS TLS TCP TLS TLS HTTPS HTTPS ... and then the CSS, the JS, ... SYN SYN/ACK Client Hello Server Hello Certificate Key Exchange ACK (???) Change Cipher Change Cipher GET / 200 OK
- 26. MinimaLT, a low-latency networking protocol “properly implemented, strong crypto” ... that connects faster than TCP SYN/ACK – Just say no!
- 27. Properly implemented, strong crypto Uses high-level NaCl library from @hashbreaker and @hyperelliptic Avoids many HTTPS/TLS pitfalls ❧ Well-chosen cyphers ❧ Timing-independent implementation ❧ No plaintext (HTTP) mode MinimaLT adds forward secrecy
- 28. Minimal latency 1 round trip if you need “DNS” lookup 0 otherwise Persistent tunnels Tunnels can migrate over IP changes – invisible to applications
- 29. A protocol for today’s internet UDP-based Reliable: replaces TCP + TLS Denial-of-Service (DoS) resistance Low overhead, scales to tens of Gb/s
- 30. Tunnels and connections Tunnels multiplex connections Connection 0 is the control connection ❧ flow control ❧ connection creation ❧ authentication (client certs) Multiple connections can proceed concurrently QUIC more advanced here in some ways
- 31. Wire protocol c l e a r c y p h e r +----------------------+ | Ethernet, IP, UDP | |----------------------| | Tunnel ID, Nonce | |----------------------| | Ephemeral public key | |======================| | Checksum | |----------------------| | Seq, Ack | |----------------------| | Payload | | ... | 42 bytes 16 bytes 32 bytes (first) 16 bytes 8 bytes
- 32. Crypto NaCl “box”: +------------+ C'→S' | Cyphertext | n +------------+ Tunnel ID (TID): a random 64-bit number, provided by client when creating the tunnel After first packet, TID looks up C'→S': the shared secret Protocol to change TID and evolve shared secret for forward security
- 33. How to get server’s public key? TLS: ❧ Client knows address of DNS provider ❧ DNS gives server address (maybe) ❧ Client connects to server, server provides certificate ❧ Client verifies cert. using public key infrastructure (PKI)
- 34. How to get server’s public key? MinimaLT: ❧ Client knows address, long-term key of Directory Service ❧ Server registers address, port, long-term public key and ephemeral public key with DS ❧ Client asks DS for server info, trusts DS Servers could register info in DNS records with suitably low TTL (TBD)
- 35. Directory server protocol At first lookup of any name, or at boot: ❧ 1 round-trip to fetch DS’s ephemeral key To look up a name: ❧ 1 round-trip using fresh ephemeral client key, DS’s ephemeral key Authenticated and encrypted
- 36. Performance The “expensive” part: establishing the shared secret via Curve25519, which happens when tunnels are created. ❧ 8000 connections/s/core on modern x86 ❧ ~750 connections/s/core on modern ARM (estimate) Afterwards, MinimaLT can saturate Gb/s links
- 37. Denial-of-Service Why is MinimaLT able to avoid 3-way handshake? ❧ A server can slow down clients arbitrarily using puzzles ❧ Clients may have to “mine for bitcoins” ❧ Puzzles can be sent at any point (tunnel GC) ❧ Pre-RT responses should be smaller than requests (hello DNSSEC)
- 38. Amplification vs latency? In general, response can be larger than the request (e.g. HTTP GET) Does the client IP (spoofable cleartext) correspond to the client request (authenticated, tamper-proof)? One round trip seems needed in general :-( Mitigated by long-term tunnels, multiplexed connections No worse than TCP
- 39. Faster than TCP 0RT connects faster than TCP at any latency above 0.5 ms (150 km) Always faster than OpenSSL At 64ms latency: 130ms full connection, request, response vs 516ms for OpenSSL Compare to 278ms for HTTP Tor-friendly
- 40. Project status University of Illinois at Chicago research project (Jon Solworth) Very 2013 Ethos, new Xen-based OS ❧ Security-focused ❧ Typed filesystem, typed IPC ❧ Written in C and Go http://ethos-os.org/ W. Michael Petullo doing MinimaLT
- 41. MinimaLT: remote IPC for Ethos res := <-Ipc("example.com", "http", "GET", "/") res := <-Ipc("example.com", "foo", &Foo{bar:42, baz:"qux"})
- 42. And POSIX? Ongoing work to make a shared library; expect it out shortly minimalt_connection* minimalt_connect_and_write (char *host, char *service, uint8_t *data, size_t count); Probably not RPC-based – type tools are a mess
- 43. And JavaScript?? :) Upcoming: Libuv integration, and from there to Node ❧ MinimaLT needs an event loop running, somehow Pure-JS reliability layer? ❧ Experiments in congestion control
- 44. On the front lines Bandwidth goes up, but latency stays the same. There is demand for privacy at low latency: demand for a new protocol.
- 45. Go forth and hack! MinimaLT @ ACM CCS 2013 – Here (Berlin) in Nov. SYN/ACK – Just say no! @andywingo for slides, upcoming lib release