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DNSSEC Industry Coalition
                   Webinar Series
                 Brought to you by
.ORG, The Public Interest Registry, Shinkuro, Inc. and
                      Dyn, Inc.




                                             Presented 2 December 2009
The first open gTLD to be signed

A .ORG registrar also providing
DNS service for its registrants
with a strong desire to support
DNSSEC


Two organizations funded* to
support the deployment of
DNSSEC.



                                   *The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
                                   (S&T) Directorate has funded SPARTA, Inc., dba Cobham Analytic
                                   Solutions, under contract FA8750-04-C-0229 and Shinkuro, Inc.
                                   under contracts FA8750-04-C-0269 and FA8750-10-C-0020.
                                   The information presented does not necessarily represent the
                                   views of the U.S. Government.
                                                                                                    2
   Our registry is ready for DNSSEC
   Our registrar wants to sign and serve zones
    for its registrants and accept DS records for
    those signing and serving elsewhere
   Some of our registrants want to click a button
    to have the zone the registrar serves for them
    signed while some merely want to provide
    their DS records
   DNSSEC tools have many settable parameters
    and it isn’t clear which settings are right for
    our registrar and those in a similar situation


                                                      3
   Multiple standards (NSEC vs. NSEC3)
   Recommendations from others (RFCs, NIST)
   One size (key size, signature lifetime) does
    not fit all
   Non-ubiquitous support for DNSSEC and its
    underlying standards (EDNS0)
   Additional computational requirements
   Legacy systems that have a limited
    understanding of DNS, let alone DNSSEC


                                                   4
   A consistent set of DNSSEC parameters
   Suitable for small zones with guessable
    names
   Adequate cryptographic security
   Avoiding undue burden on
    ◦ The registrar’s infrastructure
    ◦ ISPs and recursive resolvers
    ◦ Last-mile connectivity
   Updates as DNSSEC adoption grows


                                              5
   DNSSEC Operations: Setting the Parameters
    (http://dnssec-deployment.org/documents/SettingtheParameters.pdf)

   A work in progress
   Feedback: dnssec-parameters@shinkuro.com
   Most recent version: 2009-11-24 (03)




                                                                        6
During the time remaining we will go over
DNSSEC Operations: Setting the Parameters, its
recommendations, and the reasoning behind
them. The paper contains more detailed
explanations than are in this presentation.




                                                 7
RR Type                   TTL

SOA                       1 day

NS                        1 day

A/AAAA                    <= 1 day

DNSKEY                    1day

Max UDP packet Size       1492
SOA Expire Value          1 week
SOA Negative Cache Time   1 hour


                                     8
Algorithm                     RSA w/SHA1

Key Type    Key         Key        Signature   Re-
            Length      Lifetime   Lifetime    Signing
                                               Period
KSK         1280 bits   4 years    4 weeks     2 weeks
ZSK         1024 bits   1 year     2 weeks     1 week

Jitter                        1 hour




                                                         9
Negative   Support
Response
NSEC       Default
                      Hash         Salt Size   Salt
                      Iterations               Lifetime
NSEC3      Optional   1            64 bits     Signature
                                               lifetime




                                                           10
Key          Prepublication/ Introduction Retirement
             Signing Policy  Time for New Time for Old
                             Key          Key
KSK          2K, 1S           1 week         4 weeks
ZSK          2K, 1S           4 days         2 weeks


  2K,1S means two keys and one active signature. Old
  keys must be removed to prevent DNSKEY answers
  from growing in size with each rollover.




                                                         11
   You can ask questions now
   You can send questions to dnssec-
    parameters@shinkuro.com




                                        12
Jeremy Hitchcock
Dyn Inc. / jeremy@dyn.com
   Go over our story with DNSSEC
   Some lessons learned
   Poll DNSSEC knowledge/plans
   Answer questions
   DNS operator first
    ◦ Dynamic DNS to twitter.com (plus some [g|cc]TLDs)
   Registrar with about 50k registrations
   Allow managed DNSSEC on one system
   Allow DS keys/registry EPP on different system
   Plan both systems to do both operations
RFC




Theory
           PIR Documentation




             Registry Practice




             User Experience
Practice
   Some conversations with DNSSEC transfers
   Did some internal testing with DNSSEC and
    NS
   Did DNS part first (DNSSEC key management)
   Added DS record EPP commands
   Spec is pretty fleshed out
    ◦ Operational practices alright
    ◦ Best practices still being worked on
   Most written about
   RFCs and BIND/NSD well documented
   TLDs have great operational experience
   Secure key management (HSM/software)
   Not doing NSEC3
   DS, RSIG, NSEC records

                                     Example…
DNSSEC:  What a Registrar Needs to Know (Part 2)
; ; f l ags : qr aa r d; QUERY: 1, ANSW      ER: 2, AUTHORI TY: 5, ADDI TI ONAL: 1
;; W  ARNI NG: r ec ur s i on r eques t ed but not av ai l abl e

; ; QUESTI ON SECTI ON:
; s l eepz er o. or g.                   IN        A

; ; ANSW SECTI ON:
          ER
s l eepz er o. or g.           3600         IN        A         204. 13. 248. 107
s l eepz er o. or g.           3600         IN        RRSI G    A 5 2 3600
    20091123214939 20091024214939 13911 s l eepz er o. or g.
    H4pnVbaf aDGP+dQEol Gh7y t QW y KR0Zz r s ZPpRHP0f m VJ g/ / ERUO4n
                                     pj                      y
    EEA3hKr gj v hULj 8VHj BNg9i f t z 9VJ AM75wk i +WXdAz 63W SL2+3+Kt R4c
    Uf EKYZnLQU9x ql nx r mHUoEGO3EON8qI 3YgTLQt r I or 14i eKu05nM Yuq y J U=
                                                                       I
$ di g @ 1. p26. dy nec t . net s l eepz er o. or g dns k ey +s hor t
         ns
256 3 5 AwEAAds DDf 9p7eEVo/ W    euGuChdCRwm UW k e3s m
                                                  M Gc         NBB5QT6y W s Ql nQ
                                                                           1x
  CE3Dy 0Pn4Vz 9z nv DN7BPDp+hOk p90r m s c W y T4bE4c 6aSW c Qc 2
                                          bj      +Si               Tl
  m KRpeY32bs uFZCR6aUPOM PgZ1Ap0Ui euZYf v j s 8j m
                             x                            q6Rnc y CU4Ti LHo hYx a+J Dd
257 3 5 AwEAAem   PX/ k P3+ox Cu9s SGt 5Ns g1U+8oTI v GYI m y / EUz wBI hqP7Hv t z
                                                             f
  j KmFoBg9E53c aD/ eo3dpt eZ5aI v M  7dq8s pi Vx Sj ZUERgf a49y LGx Yac z
  W 4FeCs Lk M
    m          Bq0f 6PDCm 2K4Hk oHCPV1i PDI i D3Vt VDa0F3k j Dz R8M
                          k                                             p8n
  3qhl EXI 9x O72M bm f t / Sr t Cohx ny Od29KoOz 3e9R9nNdUnEx QJ l M
                  Dk ex                                                    v
  qJ 5l d3Cnz q5Su4w27O6bbYHPnKTHeFz f 41UCVVHz 355QM F4aqgpx LOe
                                                             r
  ThZFCE0Q0nhYXHXpT9OPs x r Zx l dBnf k 4qZ+7J Dwx Ci / 9QGhqk m    wBpW j
                                                                         s
  doKQXCNQo0s =
   EPP extensions are simple
   It’s expected all registries similar
   Just another piece of data
   Testing with registry
DNSSEC:  What a Registrar Needs to Know (Part 2)
$ di g @ ORG. AFI LI AS- NST. I NFO. s l eepz er o. or g +dns s ec
        A2.

s l eepz er o. or g.               86400    IN       DS      17917 5 1
    CC8EB33C421B1829EBF5449D741D661C4F4A0C1B
s l eepz er o. or g.               86400    IN       RRSI G  DS 7 2 86400
    20091215181210 20091201171210 53990 or g.
    hz / FW u4W pCFj s T6b7bAgi x 5ey 6M l l wBk c FHH1pEr W M
            eql     w2x                        m                P8z U20C
    7Ev c s N9t 3Bv g/ Pv Ex 5BKi Unby 489wp6Q0Yi 46w563DwoE7pf dt ey 5l XT
    t j FSPX4Cay / x qVdpk 0BOI 6hVAZOz uJ h/ 0Oi A6AMKqKRXqx 1RaSNI R1l 4 +D8=
   Next steps: both systems to get both
   System is all in-house, same as you?
   Transfer testing is ongoing
    ◦ ccTLDs have done this for years, requires registrar
      cooperation
   Key rollover and registry operations separate
    ◦ Bit of a mess since DNS drives registry operation
   Maybe not so much?
   A few customers actually using it to try out
   Solid single digit percentage of resolvers have
    do bit set (DNSSEC ok), active validation?
   Has to be easy, tools to validate
   Makes DNS more brittle
   How many have heard DNSSEC demand?
   How many have had had no DNSSEC demand?
   How many are rolling DNSSEC out now?
   How many in 3-6 months?
   How many in 6-12 months?
   Currently have no DNSSEC plans?
Jeremy Hitchcock
Dyn Inc. / jeremy@dyn.com
Lauren Price
The DNSSEC Industry Coalition
     Feedback lprice@pir.org

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DNSSEC: What a Registrar Needs to Know (Part 2)

  • 1. DNSSEC Industry Coalition Webinar Series Brought to you by .ORG, The Public Interest Registry, Shinkuro, Inc. and Dyn, Inc. Presented 2 December 2009
  • 2. The first open gTLD to be signed A .ORG registrar also providing DNS service for its registrants with a strong desire to support DNSSEC Two organizations funded* to support the deployment of DNSSEC. *The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has funded SPARTA, Inc., dba Cobham Analytic Solutions, under contract FA8750-04-C-0229 and Shinkuro, Inc. under contracts FA8750-04-C-0269 and FA8750-10-C-0020. The information presented does not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Government. 2
  • 3. Our registry is ready for DNSSEC  Our registrar wants to sign and serve zones for its registrants and accept DS records for those signing and serving elsewhere  Some of our registrants want to click a button to have the zone the registrar serves for them signed while some merely want to provide their DS records  DNSSEC tools have many settable parameters and it isn’t clear which settings are right for our registrar and those in a similar situation 3
  • 4. Multiple standards (NSEC vs. NSEC3)  Recommendations from others (RFCs, NIST)  One size (key size, signature lifetime) does not fit all  Non-ubiquitous support for DNSSEC and its underlying standards (EDNS0)  Additional computational requirements  Legacy systems that have a limited understanding of DNS, let alone DNSSEC 4
  • 5. A consistent set of DNSSEC parameters  Suitable for small zones with guessable names  Adequate cryptographic security  Avoiding undue burden on ◦ The registrar’s infrastructure ◦ ISPs and recursive resolvers ◦ Last-mile connectivity  Updates as DNSSEC adoption grows 5
  • 6. DNSSEC Operations: Setting the Parameters (http://dnssec-deployment.org/documents/SettingtheParameters.pdf)  A work in progress  Feedback: dnssec-parameters@shinkuro.com  Most recent version: 2009-11-24 (03) 6
  • 7. During the time remaining we will go over DNSSEC Operations: Setting the Parameters, its recommendations, and the reasoning behind them. The paper contains more detailed explanations than are in this presentation. 7
  • 8. RR Type TTL SOA 1 day NS 1 day A/AAAA <= 1 day DNSKEY 1day Max UDP packet Size 1492 SOA Expire Value 1 week SOA Negative Cache Time 1 hour 8
  • 9. Algorithm RSA w/SHA1 Key Type Key Key Signature Re- Length Lifetime Lifetime Signing Period KSK 1280 bits 4 years 4 weeks 2 weeks ZSK 1024 bits 1 year 2 weeks 1 week Jitter 1 hour 9
  • 10. Negative Support Response NSEC Default Hash Salt Size Salt Iterations Lifetime NSEC3 Optional 1 64 bits Signature lifetime 10
  • 11. Key Prepublication/ Introduction Retirement Signing Policy Time for New Time for Old Key Key KSK 2K, 1S 1 week 4 weeks ZSK 2K, 1S 4 days 2 weeks 2K,1S means two keys and one active signature. Old keys must be removed to prevent DNSKEY answers from growing in size with each rollover. 11
  • 12. You can ask questions now  You can send questions to dnssec- parameters@shinkuro.com 12
  • 13. Jeremy Hitchcock Dyn Inc. / jeremy@dyn.com
  • 14. Go over our story with DNSSEC  Some lessons learned  Poll DNSSEC knowledge/plans  Answer questions
  • 15. DNS operator first ◦ Dynamic DNS to twitter.com (plus some [g|cc]TLDs)  Registrar with about 50k registrations  Allow managed DNSSEC on one system  Allow DS keys/registry EPP on different system  Plan both systems to do both operations
  • 16. RFC Theory PIR Documentation Registry Practice User Experience Practice
  • 17. Some conversations with DNSSEC transfers  Did some internal testing with DNSSEC and NS  Did DNS part first (DNSSEC key management)  Added DS record EPP commands  Spec is pretty fleshed out ◦ Operational practices alright ◦ Best practices still being worked on
  • 18. Most written about  RFCs and BIND/NSD well documented  TLDs have great operational experience  Secure key management (HSM/software)  Not doing NSEC3  DS, RSIG, NSEC records Example…
  • 20. ; ; f l ags : qr aa r d; QUERY: 1, ANSW ER: 2, AUTHORI TY: 5, ADDI TI ONAL: 1 ;; W ARNI NG: r ec ur s i on r eques t ed but not av ai l abl e ; ; QUESTI ON SECTI ON: ; s l eepz er o. or g. IN A ; ; ANSW SECTI ON: ER s l eepz er o. or g. 3600 IN A 204. 13. 248. 107 s l eepz er o. or g. 3600 IN RRSI G A 5 2 3600 20091123214939 20091024214939 13911 s l eepz er o. or g. H4pnVbaf aDGP+dQEol Gh7y t QW y KR0Zz r s ZPpRHP0f m VJ g/ / ERUO4n pj y EEA3hKr gj v hULj 8VHj BNg9i f t z 9VJ AM75wk i +WXdAz 63W SL2+3+Kt R4c Uf EKYZnLQU9x ql nx r mHUoEGO3EON8qI 3YgTLQt r I or 14i eKu05nM Yuq y J U= I
  • 21. $ di g @ 1. p26. dy nec t . net s l eepz er o. or g dns k ey +s hor t ns 256 3 5 AwEAAds DDf 9p7eEVo/ W euGuChdCRwm UW k e3s m M Gc NBB5QT6y W s Ql nQ 1x CE3Dy 0Pn4Vz 9z nv DN7BPDp+hOk p90r m s c W y T4bE4c 6aSW c Qc 2 bj +Si Tl m KRpeY32bs uFZCR6aUPOM PgZ1Ap0Ui euZYf v j s 8j m x q6Rnc y CU4Ti LHo hYx a+J Dd 257 3 5 AwEAAem PX/ k P3+ox Cu9s SGt 5Ns g1U+8oTI v GYI m y / EUz wBI hqP7Hv t z f j KmFoBg9E53c aD/ eo3dpt eZ5aI v M 7dq8s pi Vx Sj ZUERgf a49y LGx Yac z W 4FeCs Lk M m Bq0f 6PDCm 2K4Hk oHCPV1i PDI i D3Vt VDa0F3k j Dz R8M k p8n 3qhl EXI 9x O72M bm f t / Sr t Cohx ny Od29KoOz 3e9R9nNdUnEx QJ l M Dk ex v qJ 5l d3Cnz q5Su4w27O6bbYHPnKTHeFz f 41UCVVHz 355QM F4aqgpx LOe r ThZFCE0Q0nhYXHXpT9OPs x r Zx l dBnf k 4qZ+7J Dwx Ci / 9QGhqk m wBpW j s doKQXCNQo0s =
  • 22. EPP extensions are simple  It’s expected all registries similar  Just another piece of data  Testing with registry
  • 24. $ di g @ ORG. AFI LI AS- NST. I NFO. s l eepz er o. or g +dns s ec A2. s l eepz er o. or g. 86400 IN DS 17917 5 1 CC8EB33C421B1829EBF5449D741D661C4F4A0C1B s l eepz er o. or g. 86400 IN RRSI G DS 7 2 86400 20091215181210 20091201171210 53990 or g. hz / FW u4W pCFj s T6b7bAgi x 5ey 6M l l wBk c FHH1pEr W M eql w2x m P8z U20C 7Ev c s N9t 3Bv g/ Pv Ex 5BKi Unby 489wp6Q0Yi 46w563DwoE7pf dt ey 5l XT t j FSPX4Cay / x qVdpk 0BOI 6hVAZOz uJ h/ 0Oi A6AMKqKRXqx 1RaSNI R1l 4 +D8=
  • 25. Next steps: both systems to get both  System is all in-house, same as you?  Transfer testing is ongoing ◦ ccTLDs have done this for years, requires registrar cooperation  Key rollover and registry operations separate ◦ Bit of a mess since DNS drives registry operation
  • 26. Maybe not so much?  A few customers actually using it to try out  Solid single digit percentage of resolvers have do bit set (DNSSEC ok), active validation?  Has to be easy, tools to validate  Makes DNS more brittle
  • 27. How many have heard DNSSEC demand?  How many have had had no DNSSEC demand?  How many are rolling DNSSEC out now?  How many in 3-6 months?  How many in 6-12 months?  Currently have no DNSSEC plans?
  • 28. Jeremy Hitchcock Dyn Inc. / jeremy@dyn.com
  • 29. Lauren Price The DNSSEC Industry Coalition Feedback lprice@pir.org