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Email Forensics
Part II.B. Techniques and Tools:
Network Forensics
CSF: Forensics Cyber-Security
Fall 2015
Nuno Santos
Summary
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos2
}  Introduction to network forensics
}  Email forensics
Remember were we are
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}  Our journey in this course:
}  Part I: Foundations of digital forensics
}  Part II: Techniques and tools
}  A. Computer forensics
}  B. Network forensics
}  C. Forensic data analysis
Starting today
Introduction to network forensics
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Model for reasoning about evidence sources
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}  Data is stored and
processed in computers
}  Data can be exchanged
between computers
through networks
A simple way to reason about evidence sources
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}  Data are groups of 1’s
and 0’s
}  Typical data abstractions:
}  In computers: the file
}  In networks: the message
}  Can be stored in
persistent or volatile
memory
file
message
In networks, we care about messages
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos7
}  In particular, we look at:
}  The content of messages
}  And traces left by messages
message
sender
receiver
Network architecture example
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Network abstraction layers
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}  OSI reference model: is a reference tool for understanding data
communications between networked systems
OSI vs TCP/IP models
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}  Correspondence between OSI and TCP/IP models
}  And example protocols:
Message representation
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}  Packets are encoded per network stack layer:
Forensic investigators
may get evidence
at different levels
Need adequate tools for forensic analysis
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Roadmap for network forensic classes
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}  Application layer
}  Email
}  Transport and network layer
}  Data link layer
Today
Email forensics
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Motivation for email investigations
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}  Email has become a primary means of communication
}  Email can easily be forged
}  Email can be abused
}  Spam
}  Aid in committing a crime …
}  Threatening email, …
Importance of email as evidence
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos16
}  E-mail can be pivotal evidence in a case
}  Due to its informal nature, it does not always represent
corporate policy
}  Many cases provide examples of the use of e-mail as
evidence
}  Enron
}  Knox vs. State of Indiana
}  Harley vs. McCoach
}  Nardinelli et al. vs. Chevron
}  Adelyn Lee vs. Oracle Corporation
Working with email
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos17
}  E-mail evidence typically used to corroborate or refute
other testimony or evidence
}  Can be used by prosecutors or defense parties
}  Two standard methods to send and receive e-mail:
}  Client/server applications
}  Webmail
Email fundamentals
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}  Typical path of an email message:
Client
Mail
Server Mail
Server
Mail
Server
Client
Email investigations overview
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}  Email evidence is in the email itself (header)
}  Email evidence is left behind as the email travels from
sender to recipient
}  Contained in the various logs
}  Maintained by system admins
}  Law enforcement can use subpoenas to collect emails
headers and logs
Typical actors in an email flow
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}  MUA – Mail User Agent
}  E.g. thunderbird, outlook
}  MTA – Mail Transfer Agent
}  E.g sendmail, qmail
}  MDA – Mail Delivery Agent
}  E.g procmail
}  MRA – Mail Retrieval Agent
}  POP/IMAP client
}  NS – Name Server
}  DNS server
1.  MUA implements smtp client to smtp server
2.  MTA solves address using MX record in NS
3.  MTA contacts MTA though SMTP
4.  Receiving MTA delivers the email to MDA
5.  MRA uses IMAP/POP/MAPI to retrieve from MDA
6.  MUA presents mail to user
MUA
MRA
MTA
NS
MTA MUA
MRAMDAMDA
1
2
3
4
5
6
Email communication between sender & receiver
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Steps in the email communication
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1.  Alice composes an email message on her computer for Bob and
sends it to her sending server smtp.a.org using SMTP protocol
2.  Sending server performs a lookup for the mail exchange record of
receiving server b.org through DNS protocol on DNS server
mx.b.org for the domain b.org
3.  The DNS server responds with the highest priority mail exchange
server mx.b.org for the domain b.org
4.  Sending server establishes SMTP connection with receiving server
and delivers the email to Bob’s mailbox on the receiving server
5.  The receiving server receives the incoming email message
6.  The receiving server stores the email message on Bob’s mailbox
7.  Bob downloads the message from his mailbox on receiving server to
local mailbox on his client computer using POP3 or IMAP protocols
(Bob can optionally use a Webmail program)
Client protocols
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Post Office Service Protocol Characteristics
Stores only incoming
messages
POP Investigation must be at the
workstation.
Stores all messages IMAP
MS’ MAPI
Lotus Notes
Copies of incoming and outgoing
messages might be stored on the
workstation or on the server or on
both.
Web-based send and
receive
HTTP Incoming and outgoing messages are
stored on the server, but there might
be archived or copied messages on
the workstation
SMTP headers
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}  Reviewing e-mail headers can offer clues to true
origins of the mail and the program used to send it
}  Common e-mail header fields include:
}  Message-ID
}  Received
}  Subject
}  To
}  X-Priority
}  Bcc
}  Cc
}  Content-Type
}  Date
}  From
SMTP headers example
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}  Example of a message header for an email sent from
MrJones@emailprovider.com to MrSmith@gmail.com
Delivered-­‐To:	
  MrSmith@gmail.com	
  
Received:	
  by	
  10.36.81.3	
  with	
  SMTP	
  id	
  e3cs239nzb;Tue,	
  29	
  Mar	
  2005	
  15:11:47	
  
-­‐0800	
  (PST)	
  
Return-­‐Path:	
  MrJones@emailprovider.com	
  
Received:	
  from	
  mail.emailprovider.com	
  (mail.emailprovider.com	
  
[111.111.11.111])	
  by	
  mx.gmail.com	
  with	
  SMTP	
  id	
  h19si826631rnb;	
  Tue,	
  29	
  
Mar	
  2005	
  15:11:47	
  -­‐0800	
  (PST)	
  
Message-­‐ID:	
  <20050329231145.62086.mail@mail.emailprovider.com>	
  
Received:	
  from	
  [11.11.111.111]	
  by	
  mail.emailprovider.com	
  via	
  HTTP;	
  Tue,	
  
29	
  Mar	
  2005	
  15:11:45	
  PST	
  
Date:	
  Tue,	
  29	
  Mar	
  2005	
  15:11:45	
  -­‐0800	
  (PST)	
  
From:	
  Mr	
  Jones	
  	
  
Subject:	
  Hello	
  
To:	
  Mr	
  Smith	
  	
  
The Received header
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}  Received is the most essential field of the email header: it
creates a list of all the email servers through which the
message traveled in order to reach the receiver
}  The best way to read are from bottom to top
}  The bottom “Received” shows the IP address of the sender’s mail
server
}  The top “Received” shows the IP address of receiver mail server
}  The middle “Received” shows the IP address of the mail server
through which email passes from sender to receiver
The Received headers in the example
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}  From mail.emailprovider.com to mx.gmail.com
	
  
Received:	
  from	
  mail.emailprovider.com	
  (mail.emailprovider.com	
  
[111.111.11.111])	
  by	
  mx.gmail.com	
  with	
  SMTP	
  id	
  h19si826631rnb;	
  Tue,	
  29	
  
Mar	
  2005	
  15:11:47	
  -­‐0800	
  (PST)	
  
	
  
	
  
Received:	
  from	
  [11.11.111.111]	
  by	
  mail.emailprovider.com	
  via	
  HTTP;	
  Tue,	
  
29	
  Mar	
  2005	
  15:11:45	
  PST	
  
	
  
SMTP protocol
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}  Neither IMAP or
POP are
involved
relaying
messages
between servers
}  Simple Mail
Transfer
Protocol: SMTP
S:	
  220	
  smtp.example.com	
  ESMTP	
  Postfix	
  
C:	
  HELO	
  relay.example.org	
  	
  
S:	
  250	
  Hello	
  relay.example.org,	
  I	
  am	
  glad	
  to	
  meet	
  you	
  
C:	
  MAIL	
  FROM:<bob@example.org>	
  
S:	
  250	
  Ok	
  
C:	
  RCPT	
  TO:<alice@example.com>	
  
S:	
  250	
  Ok	
  
C:	
  DATA	
  
S:	
  354	
  End	
  data	
  with	
  <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>	
  
C:	
  From:	
  "Bob	
  Example"	
  <bob@example.org>	
  
C:	
  To:	
  "Alice	
  Example"	
  <alice@example.com>	
  
C:	
  Cc:	
  theboss@example.com	
  
C:	
  Date:	
  Tue,	
  15	
  January	
  2008	
  16:02:43	
  -­‐0500	
  
C:	
  Subject:	
  Test	
  message	
  
C:	
  	
  
C:	
  Hello	
  Alice.	
  
C:	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  test	
  message.	
  
C:	
  Your	
  friend,	
  
C:	
  Bob	
  
C:	
  .	
  
S:	
  250	
  Ok:	
  queued	
  as	
  12345	
  
C:	
  QUIT	
  
S:	
  221	
  Bye	
  
{The	
  server	
  closes	
  the	
  connection}	
  
Sending spoofed emails
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos29
}  SMTP is simple, but can be spoofed easily
}  How to spoof email easily:
C:	
  telnet	
  server8.engr.scu.edu	
  25	
  
S:	
  220	
  server8.engr.scu.edu	
  ESMTP	
  Sendmail	
  8.12.10/8.12.10;	
  Tue,	
  23	
  Dec	
  2003	
  16:32:07	
  
-­‐0800	
  (PST)	
  
C:	
  helo	
  129.210.16.8	
  
S:	
  250	
  server8.engr.scu.edu	
  Hello	
  dhcp-­‐19-­‐198.engr.scu.edu	
  [129.210.19.198],	
  pleased	
  to	
  
meet	
  you	
  
C:	
  mail	
  from:	
  jholliday@engr.scu.edu	
  
S:	
  250	
  2.1.0	
  jholliday@engr.scu.edu...	
  Sender	
  ok	
  
C:	
  rcpt	
  to:	
  tschwarz	
  
S:	
  250	
  2.1.5	
  tschwarz...	
  Recipient	
  ok	
  
C:	
  data	
  
S:	
  354	
  Enter	
  mail,	
  end	
  with	
  "."	
  on	
  a	
  line	
  by	
  itself	
  
C:	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  spoofed	
  message.	
  
C:	
  .	
  	
  
S:	
  250	
  2.0.0	
  hBO0W76P002752	
  Message	
  accepted	
  for	
  delivery	
  
C:	
  quit	
  	
  
S:	
  221	
  2.0.0	
  server8.engr.scu.edu	
  closing	
  connection	
  	
  
Spotting spoofed messages
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos30
}  Contents usually gives a hint:
1.  Each SMTP server application adds a different set of
headers or structures them in a different way
}  A good investigator knows these formats
2.  Use internet services in order to verify header data
}  However, some companies can outsource email or use internal
IP addresses
3.  Look for breaks / discrepancies in the “Received”
lines
Look for inconsistencies in the Received field
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From	
  jholliday@engr.scu.edu	
  Tue	
  Dec	
  23	
  16:44:55	
  2003	
  
Return-­‐Path:	
  <jholliday@engr.scu.edu>	
  
Received:	
  from	
  server8.engr.scu.edu	
  (root@server8.engr.scu.edu	
  [129.210.16.8])	
  
by	
  server4.engr.scu.edu	
  (8.12.10/8.12.10)	
  with	
  ESMTP	
  id	
  hBO0itpv008140	
  
for	
  <tschwarz@engr.scu.edu>;	
  Tue,	
  23	
  Dec	
  2003	
  16:44:55	
  -­‐0800	
  
From:	
  JoAnne	
  Holliday	
  <jholliday@engr.scu.edu>	
  
Received:	
  from	
  129.210.16.8	
  (dhcp-­‐19-­‐198.engr.scu.edu	
  [129.210.19.198])	
  
by	
  server8.engr.scu.edu	
  (8.12.10/8.12.10)	
  with	
  SMTP	
  id	
  hBO0W76P002752	
  
for	
  tschwarz;	
  Tue,	
  23	
  Dec	
  2003	
  16:41:55	
  -­‐0800	
  (PST)	
  
Date:	
  Tue,	
  23	
  Dec	
  2003	
  16:32:07	
  -­‐0800	
  (PST)	
  
Message-­‐Id:	
  <200312240041.hBO0W76P002752@server8.engr.scu.edu>	
  
X-­‐Spam-­‐Checker-­‐Version:	
  SpamAssassin	
  2.60-­‐rc3	
  (1.202-­‐2003-­‐08-­‐29-­‐exp)	
  on	
  
server4.engr.scu.edu	
  
X-­‐Spam-­‐Level:	
  
X-­‐Spam-­‐Status:	
  No,	
  hits=0.0	
  required=5.0	
  tests=none	
  autolearn=ham	
  version=2.60-­‐r	
  
c3	
  
	
  
This	
  is	
  a	
  spoofed	
  message.	
  
This looks very convincing...
Only hint: received line gives the name of my machine,
defaulting to dhcp-19-198
The DHCP server logs might tell you what machine this is,
given the time. But you need to know the clock drift at the
various machines
Hints for investigation of fake emails
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos32
}  Verify all IP addresses
}  Keeping in mind that some addresses might be internal
addresses
}  Make a time-line of events
}  Change times to universal standard time
}  Look for strange behavior
}  Keep clock drift in mind
}  Check server logs
Server logs
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos33
}  Email logs usually identify email messages by:
}  Account received
}  IP address from which they were sent.
}  Time and date (beware of clock drift)
}  IP addresses
}  Many servers keep copies of emails
}  Logs are typically purged after certain # of entries / time
}  Very useful for solving cases
Email forensics: Case study
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos34
}  An email attached to a $20 million dollar lawsuit
purported to be from the CEO of “Tech.com” to a venture
capital broker. The message outlined guaranteed
“warrants” on the next round of funding for the broker.
}  “Tech.com filed counterclaim and claimed the email was a
forgery. Their law firm engaged us to determine the
validity of the message.
Tech.com Broker
?
Email forensics: Case study
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos35
}  We imaged all of the CEO’s computers at his
office and his home. Recalled the email server
backup tapes from off-site storage.
}  Searched all hard drives and email server
backups for “questioned” message. Search
revealed no trace of the message on any of
the hard drives or mail spools.
}  When the timestamps and message ids were
compared with the server logs we found that
the “questioned” message could not have
gone through either “Tech.com’s” webmail or
mail server at the time indicated by the date/
time stamp on the message.
Tech.com
Email forensics: Case study
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos36
}  Based on our analysis defendants filed motion to image and
examine broker’s computers
}  Federal Judge issued subpoena and we arrived at broker’s
business, but he refused to allow his system to imaged
}  Broker’s lawyer went into State Court, on a companion case,
and got Judge to issue an order for a new Court appointed
examiner
}  The examination revealed direct proof of the alteration of
a valid message’s header to create the “questioned” email
}  What follows are some of the tools and techniques used to
document the activity
Broker
Tracking timestamp inconsistencies
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos37
The allegedly
received email:
Return-Path: CEO Good_Guy@tech.com
Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152])
by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id
e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400
Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com
[10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch-
2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000
14:41:32 -0500
Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190])
by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP
id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500
content-class: urn:content-classes:message
Subject: Warrants on $25 Million Funding
Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:43:47 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: application/ms-tnef;
name="winmail.dat"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
Message-ID: <3989e793.87BDEEE2@tech.com>
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: <3989e793.87BDEEE2@tech.com>
Thread-Topic: Warrants on $25 Million Funding
Thread-Index: AcHatCZUSkaLe0ajEdaelQACpYcy8A==
From: "CEO Good_Guy@tech.com" <ceo_good_guy@tech.com >
To: "Bad_Guy_Broker" <bad_guy@fund.com>
The Received fields in more detail
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos38
}  ESMTP id:
}  A unique identification assigned by each intermediate relay or
gateway server. This id is usually in a hexadecimal string that
is reset each day. Resulting in an id that can be resolved to a
time window on a particular server.
Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152])
by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id
e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400
Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com
[10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch-
2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000
14:41:32 -0500
Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190])
by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP
id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500
Claimed path from the email’s Received fields
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos39
Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152])
by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id
e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400
Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com
[10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch-
2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000
14:41:32 -0500
Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190])
by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP
id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500
14:41:31 14:41:32 15:45:31
webmail.tech.com mail.tech.com hedgefund.fund.com
Compare against server logs: webmail@tech.com
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos40
}  Analysis of the webmail server logs revealed several issues
regarding the validity of the suspect message
}  Matching trace header timestamps and ESMTP ids revealed that
RAA01318 was issued at 17:41:31 to the authentic message
}  Comparing the 14:41:31 timestamp of the suspect message with
the log revealed the server was assigning ESMTP ids beginning
with “OAA” not “RRA” as represented in the header
Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152])
by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id
e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400
Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com
[10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch-
2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000
14:41:32 -0500
Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190])
by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP
id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500
Compare against server logs: webmail@tech.com
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos41
}  Analysis of the mail server logs confirmed that the suspect
message was not authentic
}  Matching trace header timestamps and ESMTP ids revealed that the
authentic Message-ID was logged at 17:41:32 and assigned ESMTP id
e73MfW903843 then it was sent to the hedgefund@fund.com server and
it was assigned a new ESMTP id e73MfZ331592
}  Comparing the 14:41:32 timestamp of the suspect message with the log
revealed the were no messages for over an hour during that time frame
Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152])
by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id
e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400
Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com
[10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch-
2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000
14:41:32 -0500
Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190])
by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP
id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500
Timeline of events
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos42
Working with mail servers
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos43
}  Some initial things to consider:
}  Which users are serviced?
}  E-mail retention policies of the company
}  Accessibility of the e-mail server
}  Examining UNIX email logs: an example
}  /Etc/Sendmail.cf
}  Configuration information for Sendmail
}  /Etc/Syslog.conf
}  Specifies how and which events Sendmail logs
}  /Var/Log/Maillog
}  SMTP and POP3 communications
}  Check UNIX man pages for more information
Working with resident email files
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos44
}  Some users store email is stored locally
}  Great benefit for forensic analysts because the e-mail is
readily available when the computer is seized
}  Begin by identifying e-mail clients on system
}  You can also search by file extensions of common e-
mail clients
Local email storage files
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos45
}  Email clients have own file formats for storing email
E-Mail Client Extension Type of File
AOL
.abi
.aim
.arl
.bag
AOL6 organizer file
Instant Message launch
Organizer file
Instant Messenger file
Outlook Express
.dbx
.dgr
.email
.eml
OE mail database
OE fax page
OE mail message
OE electronic mail
Outlook
.pab
.pst
.wab
Personal address book
Personal folder
Windows address book
Accessing headers from email clients
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos46
}  Different tools have different ways to read headers:
To enable headers
}  Eudora:
}  Use the Blah Blah Blah button
}  Hotmail:
}  Options à Preferences à Message Headers.
}  Juno:
}  Options à Show Headers
}  MS Outlook:
}  Select message and go to options.
}  Yahoo!:
}  Mail Options à General Preferences à Show all headers.
Headers on a WebMail client
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos48
Forensic tools and services
Email forensic tools Online services
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos49
}  AccessData’s FTK
}  EnCase
}  FINALeMAIL
}  Sawmill-GroupWise
}  DBXtract
}  MailBag
}  Assistant
}  Paraben
}  Geolocation of IP address
}  https://www.iplocation.net
Antiforensics: Open relays
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos50
}  Open relays
}  SMTP server configured in such a way that it allows anyone
on the Internet to send e-mail through it, not just mail destined
to or originating from known users
}  Spoofers use open relays to attempt to hide the
person and IP of the system that sent the email
}  Where to look for evidence:
}  Email header will contain the originating address
}  Open relay log files will also contain the originating address
Antiforensics: False received from header
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos51
}  Leads the investigator to the wrong server by adding a
seemingly valid Received from header
}  To avoid detection, the spoofer’s real address will be
recorded somewhere in the Received from headers, but the
investigator will not know which one
}  Where to look for evidence:
}  Email received from headers will contain the actual IP address of
the originating system, you just won’t know which header is correct
}  Trace backwards by looking at the log files of the servers the mail
claims to have passed through: once you get to a server that has no
record of the email, the previous system is the originating IP
Antiforensics: Anonymizer
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos52
Antiforensics: Anonymizer
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos53
}  Where to look for evidence:
}  The email headers and web mail log files will point back to
the anonymizer
}  You will need to look at the anonymizer’s log files to
determine what IP address accessed the web email account
at the specific time the email was sent
}  If the anonymizer is a paying service then you can also
request subscriber information for the account that was using
the anonymizer to send the web based email.
Conclusions
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos54
}  Network forensics cares about tracking the exchanging
of messages in a networked system
}  Email is a fundamental networked application that
provides a very important source of digital evidence
}  The primary focus of email forensics is the analysis of
email headers and server logs
References
2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos
}  Primary bibliography
}  [Casey05], Chapter 21, 23.2.2
55
Next class
CSF - Nuno Santos
}  Web and online anonymity
2015/1656

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Email Forensics

  • 1. Email Forensics Part II.B. Techniques and Tools: Network Forensics CSF: Forensics Cyber-Security Fall 2015 Nuno Santos
  • 2. Summary 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos2 }  Introduction to network forensics }  Email forensics
  • 3. Remember were we are 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos3 }  Our journey in this course: }  Part I: Foundations of digital forensics }  Part II: Techniques and tools }  A. Computer forensics }  B. Network forensics }  C. Forensic data analysis Starting today
  • 4. Introduction to network forensics 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos4
  • 5. Model for reasoning about evidence sources 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos5 }  Data is stored and processed in computers }  Data can be exchanged between computers through networks
  • 6. A simple way to reason about evidence sources 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos6 }  Data are groups of 1’s and 0’s }  Typical data abstractions: }  In computers: the file }  In networks: the message }  Can be stored in persistent or volatile memory file message
  • 7. In networks, we care about messages 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos7 }  In particular, we look at: }  The content of messages }  And traces left by messages message sender receiver
  • 9. Network abstraction layers 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos9 }  OSI reference model: is a reference tool for understanding data communications between networked systems
  • 10. OSI vs TCP/IP models 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos10 }  Correspondence between OSI and TCP/IP models }  And example protocols:
  • 11. Message representation 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos11 }  Packets are encoded per network stack layer: Forensic investigators may get evidence at different levels
  • 12. Need adequate tools for forensic analysis 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos12
  • 13. Roadmap for network forensic classes 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos13 }  Application layer }  Email }  Transport and network layer }  Data link layer Today
  • 15. Motivation for email investigations 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos15 }  Email has become a primary means of communication }  Email can easily be forged }  Email can be abused }  Spam }  Aid in committing a crime … }  Threatening email, …
  • 16. Importance of email as evidence 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos16 }  E-mail can be pivotal evidence in a case }  Due to its informal nature, it does not always represent corporate policy }  Many cases provide examples of the use of e-mail as evidence }  Enron }  Knox vs. State of Indiana }  Harley vs. McCoach }  Nardinelli et al. vs. Chevron }  Adelyn Lee vs. Oracle Corporation
  • 17. Working with email 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos17 }  E-mail evidence typically used to corroborate or refute other testimony or evidence }  Can be used by prosecutors or defense parties }  Two standard methods to send and receive e-mail: }  Client/server applications }  Webmail
  • 18. Email fundamentals 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos18 }  Typical path of an email message: Client Mail Server Mail Server Mail Server Client
  • 19. Email investigations overview 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos19 }  Email evidence is in the email itself (header) }  Email evidence is left behind as the email travels from sender to recipient }  Contained in the various logs }  Maintained by system admins }  Law enforcement can use subpoenas to collect emails headers and logs
  • 20. Typical actors in an email flow 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos20 }  MUA – Mail User Agent }  E.g. thunderbird, outlook }  MTA – Mail Transfer Agent }  E.g sendmail, qmail }  MDA – Mail Delivery Agent }  E.g procmail }  MRA – Mail Retrieval Agent }  POP/IMAP client }  NS – Name Server }  DNS server 1.  MUA implements smtp client to smtp server 2.  MTA solves address using MX record in NS 3.  MTA contacts MTA though SMTP 4.  Receiving MTA delivers the email to MDA 5.  MRA uses IMAP/POP/MAPI to retrieve from MDA 6.  MUA presents mail to user MUA MRA MTA NS MTA MUA MRAMDAMDA 1 2 3 4 5 6
  • 21. Email communication between sender & receiver 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos21
  • 22. Steps in the email communication 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos22 1.  Alice composes an email message on her computer for Bob and sends it to her sending server smtp.a.org using SMTP protocol 2.  Sending server performs a lookup for the mail exchange record of receiving server b.org through DNS protocol on DNS server mx.b.org for the domain b.org 3.  The DNS server responds with the highest priority mail exchange server mx.b.org for the domain b.org 4.  Sending server establishes SMTP connection with receiving server and delivers the email to Bob’s mailbox on the receiving server 5.  The receiving server receives the incoming email message 6.  The receiving server stores the email message on Bob’s mailbox 7.  Bob downloads the message from his mailbox on receiving server to local mailbox on his client computer using POP3 or IMAP protocols (Bob can optionally use a Webmail program)
  • 23. Client protocols 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos23 Post Office Service Protocol Characteristics Stores only incoming messages POP Investigation must be at the workstation. Stores all messages IMAP MS’ MAPI Lotus Notes Copies of incoming and outgoing messages might be stored on the workstation or on the server or on both. Web-based send and receive HTTP Incoming and outgoing messages are stored on the server, but there might be archived or copied messages on the workstation
  • 24. SMTP headers 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos24 }  Reviewing e-mail headers can offer clues to true origins of the mail and the program used to send it }  Common e-mail header fields include: }  Message-ID }  Received }  Subject }  To }  X-Priority }  Bcc }  Cc }  Content-Type }  Date }  From
  • 25. SMTP headers example 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos25 }  Example of a message header for an email sent from MrJones@emailprovider.com to MrSmith@gmail.com Delivered-­‐To:  MrSmith@gmail.com   Received:  by  10.36.81.3  with  SMTP  id  e3cs239nzb;Tue,  29  Mar  2005  15:11:47   -­‐0800  (PST)   Return-­‐Path:  MrJones@emailprovider.com   Received:  from  mail.emailprovider.com  (mail.emailprovider.com   [111.111.11.111])  by  mx.gmail.com  with  SMTP  id  h19si826631rnb;  Tue,  29   Mar  2005  15:11:47  -­‐0800  (PST)   Message-­‐ID:  <20050329231145.62086.mail@mail.emailprovider.com>   Received:  from  [11.11.111.111]  by  mail.emailprovider.com  via  HTTP;  Tue,   29  Mar  2005  15:11:45  PST   Date:  Tue,  29  Mar  2005  15:11:45  -­‐0800  (PST)   From:  Mr  Jones     Subject:  Hello   To:  Mr  Smith    
  • 26. The Received header 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos26 }  Received is the most essential field of the email header: it creates a list of all the email servers through which the message traveled in order to reach the receiver }  The best way to read are from bottom to top }  The bottom “Received” shows the IP address of the sender’s mail server }  The top “Received” shows the IP address of receiver mail server }  The middle “Received” shows the IP address of the mail server through which email passes from sender to receiver
  • 27. The Received headers in the example 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos27 }  From mail.emailprovider.com to mx.gmail.com   Received:  from  mail.emailprovider.com  (mail.emailprovider.com   [111.111.11.111])  by  mx.gmail.com  with  SMTP  id  h19si826631rnb;  Tue,  29   Mar  2005  15:11:47  -­‐0800  (PST)       Received:  from  [11.11.111.111]  by  mail.emailprovider.com  via  HTTP;  Tue,   29  Mar  2005  15:11:45  PST    
  • 28. SMTP protocol 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos28 }  Neither IMAP or POP are involved relaying messages between servers }  Simple Mail Transfer Protocol: SMTP S:  220  smtp.example.com  ESMTP  Postfix   C:  HELO  relay.example.org     S:  250  Hello  relay.example.org,  I  am  glad  to  meet  you   C:  MAIL  FROM:<bob@example.org>   S:  250  Ok   C:  RCPT  TO:<alice@example.com>   S:  250  Ok   C:  DATA   S:  354  End  data  with  <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>   C:  From:  "Bob  Example"  <bob@example.org>   C:  To:  "Alice  Example"  <alice@example.com>   C:  Cc:  theboss@example.com   C:  Date:  Tue,  15  January  2008  16:02:43  -­‐0500   C:  Subject:  Test  message   C:     C:  Hello  Alice.   C:  This  is  a  test  message.   C:  Your  friend,   C:  Bob   C:  .   S:  250  Ok:  queued  as  12345   C:  QUIT   S:  221  Bye   {The  server  closes  the  connection}  
  • 29. Sending spoofed emails 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos29 }  SMTP is simple, but can be spoofed easily }  How to spoof email easily: C:  telnet  server8.engr.scu.edu  25   S:  220  server8.engr.scu.edu  ESMTP  Sendmail  8.12.10/8.12.10;  Tue,  23  Dec  2003  16:32:07   -­‐0800  (PST)   C:  helo  129.210.16.8   S:  250  server8.engr.scu.edu  Hello  dhcp-­‐19-­‐198.engr.scu.edu  [129.210.19.198],  pleased  to   meet  you   C:  mail  from:  jholliday@engr.scu.edu   S:  250  2.1.0  jholliday@engr.scu.edu...  Sender  ok   C:  rcpt  to:  tschwarz   S:  250  2.1.5  tschwarz...  Recipient  ok   C:  data   S:  354  Enter  mail,  end  with  "."  on  a  line  by  itself   C:  This  is  a  spoofed  message.   C:  .     S:  250  2.0.0  hBO0W76P002752  Message  accepted  for  delivery   C:  quit     S:  221  2.0.0  server8.engr.scu.edu  closing  connection    
  • 30. Spotting spoofed messages 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos30 }  Contents usually gives a hint: 1.  Each SMTP server application adds a different set of headers or structures them in a different way }  A good investigator knows these formats 2.  Use internet services in order to verify header data }  However, some companies can outsource email or use internal IP addresses 3.  Look for breaks / discrepancies in the “Received” lines
  • 31. Look for inconsistencies in the Received field 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos31 From  jholliday@engr.scu.edu  Tue  Dec  23  16:44:55  2003   Return-­‐Path:  <jholliday@engr.scu.edu>   Received:  from  server8.engr.scu.edu  (root@server8.engr.scu.edu  [129.210.16.8])   by  server4.engr.scu.edu  (8.12.10/8.12.10)  with  ESMTP  id  hBO0itpv008140   for  <tschwarz@engr.scu.edu>;  Tue,  23  Dec  2003  16:44:55  -­‐0800   From:  JoAnne  Holliday  <jholliday@engr.scu.edu>   Received:  from  129.210.16.8  (dhcp-­‐19-­‐198.engr.scu.edu  [129.210.19.198])   by  server8.engr.scu.edu  (8.12.10/8.12.10)  with  SMTP  id  hBO0W76P002752   for  tschwarz;  Tue,  23  Dec  2003  16:41:55  -­‐0800  (PST)   Date:  Tue,  23  Dec  2003  16:32:07  -­‐0800  (PST)   Message-­‐Id:  <200312240041.hBO0W76P002752@server8.engr.scu.edu>   X-­‐Spam-­‐Checker-­‐Version:  SpamAssassin  2.60-­‐rc3  (1.202-­‐2003-­‐08-­‐29-­‐exp)  on   server4.engr.scu.edu   X-­‐Spam-­‐Level:   X-­‐Spam-­‐Status:  No,  hits=0.0  required=5.0  tests=none  autolearn=ham  version=2.60-­‐r   c3     This  is  a  spoofed  message.   This looks very convincing... Only hint: received line gives the name of my machine, defaulting to dhcp-19-198 The DHCP server logs might tell you what machine this is, given the time. But you need to know the clock drift at the various machines
  • 32. Hints for investigation of fake emails 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos32 }  Verify all IP addresses }  Keeping in mind that some addresses might be internal addresses }  Make a time-line of events }  Change times to universal standard time }  Look for strange behavior }  Keep clock drift in mind }  Check server logs
  • 33. Server logs 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos33 }  Email logs usually identify email messages by: }  Account received }  IP address from which they were sent. }  Time and date (beware of clock drift) }  IP addresses }  Many servers keep copies of emails }  Logs are typically purged after certain # of entries / time }  Very useful for solving cases
  • 34. Email forensics: Case study 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos34 }  An email attached to a $20 million dollar lawsuit purported to be from the CEO of “Tech.com” to a venture capital broker. The message outlined guaranteed “warrants” on the next round of funding for the broker. }  “Tech.com filed counterclaim and claimed the email was a forgery. Their law firm engaged us to determine the validity of the message. Tech.com Broker ?
  • 35. Email forensics: Case study 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos35 }  We imaged all of the CEO’s computers at his office and his home. Recalled the email server backup tapes from off-site storage. }  Searched all hard drives and email server backups for “questioned” message. Search revealed no trace of the message on any of the hard drives or mail spools. }  When the timestamps and message ids were compared with the server logs we found that the “questioned” message could not have gone through either “Tech.com’s” webmail or mail server at the time indicated by the date/ time stamp on the message. Tech.com
  • 36. Email forensics: Case study 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos36 }  Based on our analysis defendants filed motion to image and examine broker’s computers }  Federal Judge issued subpoena and we arrived at broker’s business, but he refused to allow his system to imaged }  Broker’s lawyer went into State Court, on a companion case, and got Judge to issue an order for a new Court appointed examiner }  The examination revealed direct proof of the alteration of a valid message’s header to create the “questioned” email }  What follows are some of the tools and techniques used to document the activity Broker
  • 37. Tracking timestamp inconsistencies 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos37 The allegedly received email: Return-Path: CEO Good_Guy@tech.com Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152]) by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400 Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com [10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch- 2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:32 -0500 Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190]) by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500 content-class: urn:content-classes:message Subject: Warrants on $25 Million Funding Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:43:47 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: application/ms-tnef; name="winmail.dat" Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary Message-ID: <3989e793.87BDEEE2@tech.com> X-MS-Has-Attach: X-MS-TNEF-Correlator: <3989e793.87BDEEE2@tech.com> Thread-Topic: Warrants on $25 Million Funding Thread-Index: AcHatCZUSkaLe0ajEdaelQACpYcy8A== From: "CEO Good_Guy@tech.com" <ceo_good_guy@tech.com > To: "Bad_Guy_Broker" <bad_guy@fund.com>
  • 38. The Received fields in more detail 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos38 }  ESMTP id: }  A unique identification assigned by each intermediate relay or gateway server. This id is usually in a hexadecimal string that is reset each day. Resulting in an id that can be resolved to a time window on a particular server. Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152]) by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400 Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com [10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch- 2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:32 -0500 Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190]) by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500
  • 39. Claimed path from the email’s Received fields 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos39 Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152]) by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400 Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com [10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch- 2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:32 -0500 Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190]) by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500 14:41:31 14:41:32 15:45:31 webmail.tech.com mail.tech.com hedgefund.fund.com
  • 40. Compare against server logs: webmail@tech.com 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos40 }  Analysis of the webmail server logs revealed several issues regarding the validity of the suspect message }  Matching trace header timestamps and ESMTP ids revealed that RAA01318 was issued at 17:41:31 to the authentic message }  Comparing the 14:41:31 timestamp of the suspect message with the log revealed the server was assigning ESMTP ids beginning with “OAA” not “RRA” as represented in the header Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152]) by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400 Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com [10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch- 2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:32 -0500 Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190]) by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500
  • 41. Compare against server logs: webmail@tech.com 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos41 }  Analysis of the mail server logs confirmed that the suspect message was not authentic }  Matching trace header timestamps and ESMTP ids revealed that the authentic Message-ID was logged at 17:41:32 and assigned ESMTP id e73MfW903843 then it was sent to the hedgefund@fund.com server and it was assigned a new ESMTP id e73MfZ331592 }  Comparing the 14:41:32 timestamp of the suspect message with the log revealed the were no messages for over an hour during that time frame Received: from mail.tech.com (mail.tech.com [201.10.20.152]) by hedgefund.fund.com (8.11.0/8.11.0) ESMTP id e73MfZ331592; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 15:45:31 -0400 Received: from webmail.tech.com (webmail.tech.com [10.27.30.190]) by mail.tech.com (Switch-2.0.1/Switch- 2.0.1) ESMTP id e73MfW903843; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:32 -0500 Received: from tech.com (ostrich.tech.com [10.27.20.190]) by webmail.tech.com (8.8.8+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP id RAA01318; Thu, 3 Aug 2000 14:41:31 -0500
  • 42. Timeline of events 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos42
  • 43. Working with mail servers 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos43 }  Some initial things to consider: }  Which users are serviced? }  E-mail retention policies of the company }  Accessibility of the e-mail server }  Examining UNIX email logs: an example }  /Etc/Sendmail.cf }  Configuration information for Sendmail }  /Etc/Syslog.conf }  Specifies how and which events Sendmail logs }  /Var/Log/Maillog }  SMTP and POP3 communications }  Check UNIX man pages for more information
  • 44. Working with resident email files 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos44 }  Some users store email is stored locally }  Great benefit for forensic analysts because the e-mail is readily available when the computer is seized }  Begin by identifying e-mail clients on system }  You can also search by file extensions of common e- mail clients
  • 45. Local email storage files 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos45 }  Email clients have own file formats for storing email E-Mail Client Extension Type of File AOL .abi .aim .arl .bag AOL6 organizer file Instant Message launch Organizer file Instant Messenger file Outlook Express .dbx .dgr .email .eml OE mail database OE fax page OE mail message OE electronic mail Outlook .pab .pst .wab Personal address book Personal folder Windows address book
  • 46. Accessing headers from email clients 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos46 }  Different tools have different ways to read headers:
  • 47. To enable headers }  Eudora: }  Use the Blah Blah Blah button }  Hotmail: }  Options à Preferences à Message Headers. }  Juno: }  Options à Show Headers }  MS Outlook: }  Select message and go to options. }  Yahoo!: }  Mail Options à General Preferences à Show all headers.
  • 48. Headers on a WebMail client 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos48
  • 49. Forensic tools and services Email forensic tools Online services 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos49 }  AccessData’s FTK }  EnCase }  FINALeMAIL }  Sawmill-GroupWise }  DBXtract }  MailBag }  Assistant }  Paraben }  Geolocation of IP address }  https://www.iplocation.net
  • 50. Antiforensics: Open relays 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos50 }  Open relays }  SMTP server configured in such a way that it allows anyone on the Internet to send e-mail through it, not just mail destined to or originating from known users }  Spoofers use open relays to attempt to hide the person and IP of the system that sent the email }  Where to look for evidence: }  Email header will contain the originating address }  Open relay log files will also contain the originating address
  • 51. Antiforensics: False received from header 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos51 }  Leads the investigator to the wrong server by adding a seemingly valid Received from header }  To avoid detection, the spoofer’s real address will be recorded somewhere in the Received from headers, but the investigator will not know which one }  Where to look for evidence: }  Email received from headers will contain the actual IP address of the originating system, you just won’t know which header is correct }  Trace backwards by looking at the log files of the servers the mail claims to have passed through: once you get to a server that has no record of the email, the previous system is the originating IP
  • 53. Antiforensics: Anonymizer 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos53 }  Where to look for evidence: }  The email headers and web mail log files will point back to the anonymizer }  You will need to look at the anonymizer’s log files to determine what IP address accessed the web email account at the specific time the email was sent }  If the anonymizer is a paying service then you can also request subscriber information for the account that was using the anonymizer to send the web based email.
  • 54. Conclusions 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos54 }  Network forensics cares about tracking the exchanging of messages in a networked system }  Email is a fundamental networked application that provides a very important source of digital evidence }  The primary focus of email forensics is the analysis of email headers and server logs
  • 55. References 2015/16CSF - Nuno Santos }  Primary bibliography }  [Casey05], Chapter 21, 23.2.2 55
  • 56. Next class CSF - Nuno Santos }  Web and online anonymity 2015/1656