![Experiments in art and value: burning Bitcoins to buy Ai Weiwei
Andrew Newman
University of Applied Arts
Vienna, Austria
andrew@anewman.net
!
! Abstract
Critical new media art is based on research-based art practice. It
is both research- and process-oriented, so that the final result is
not “completed” works (products) but rather process artifacts.
This paper describes the artistic research and development of the
art-group “Artistic Bokeh”, which is developing new
documentation formats, and conducting experiments about the
value of artistic practice and labor.
! Keywords
Artistic Research, Bitcoin, Performance, Media Arts, Artistic
Bokeh, Bitcoincloud, Community Practice, Artistic Capital
!
Introduction
“The human gaze has the power of making things
precious; though it’s true that they become more costly
too.“ Ludwig Wittgenstein [1]
!
How many seconds do you need to stand in front of a work
of art, staring either blankly or attentively at it before it has
served its function? Before it has served you? How can the
attention an artwork receives be measured? Would it be
useful to place a little red button next to each work so that
the gallery audience could press it and ‘like’ the work?
In 2012, I became aware that a photograph of one my
installations had been doing the rounds on Tumblr. It was
the first work of mine that was ever exhibited for sale at a
commercial gallery. This one never sold. Yet I was
strangely satisfied that despite this particular failure in the
art market, it found a home online. Being re-blogged 3000
times by teenagers on Tumblr meant that it had been seen.
This multi-channel video installation found its biggest
audience not as an art object inside the gallery, but outside
the artworld, as a still image distributed within the
fragmentations of the network society.
!
No market?
According to Geert Lovink, “there was—and still is—no
market [for media art], no galleries, few curators and
critics, and no audience.” [2] There is a need for new
distributed forms of attention and presentation for art, new
markets for the new economies that are emerging, this
sharing economy, that conceptual economy or the ever-
pervasive attention economy. We find ourselves in an age
of capitalism that fuels itself with the effigies of
knowledge, creativity, individuality, openness and the
social. The artist should be well placed to supply the
increasing demand for these resources, and they often do,
once they are extracted from the artworld and integrated
into the creative industries.
But what of the work of art? What role does it have in
this world of Joshua Simon’s neomaterialism? [3] A world
where art prices go up: not when the whole of society
becomes wealthier, but when income inequality increases.
[4] It’s only when the rich get richer and the poor get
poorer that the work of art increases in value, at least in
quantifiable terms, which are the only terms that seem to
matter in this rational realm of the knowledge economy.
I had been working through these ideas in my
performance practice with the works “The Old In Out,
Dancing in his bedroom (It was a waste of time anyway)”
and “Comings and Goings” when I was first approached to
participate in the Viennese group Artistic Bokeh. My
performance works dealt with the generation of conceptual
capital as a form of ‘value adding’ within the knowledge
economy. Conceptual capital is the ‘value added’ to the
viewer of the work of art, a sort of upgrade to the viewer’s
perception of the world, and an increased capacity to
manufacture meaning in and from the world. Artistic
Bokeh had been exploring similar questions of art and
value within the networked society, so I joined the group to
continue to develop their experimental practice [5] that
slips in and out of the art world, working with them to
perform “The Old In Out” for the Austrian Chamber of
Labour’s symposium on knowledge work, and most
notably continuing the development of BitcoinCloud. [6]
Figure 1. Artistic Bokeh, Bitcoin Cloud v3.1 (Installation view at
Museum of Applied Arts Vienna), 2013, modified LED fans,
custom built Bitcoin mining rig, pyro-electric sensors, custom
hardware, software and circuits ©Artistic Bokeh.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-5-320.jpg)
![“It is necessary,” opens Thomas,[601] “to affirm (ponere) that
there are incorporeal creatures. For in created things God chiefly
intends the good, which consists in assimilation to Him. Perfect
assimilation of the effect to the cause is seen when the effect
resembles the cause in that through which the cause produces
the effect. God produces the creature through intelligence and
will. Consequently the perfection of the universe requires that
there should be intellectual creatures. To know cannot be the act
(actus) of the body or of any corporeal faculty (virtus); because
all body is limited to here and now. Therefore it is necessary, in
order that the universe may be perfect, that there should be
incorporeal creatures.”[602]
Thomas then argues that the intellectual substance is entirely
immaterial. “Angelic substances are above our understanding. So our
understanding cannot attain to apprehending them as they are in
themselves; but only in its own fashion as it apprehends composite
things.” These immaterial substances exist in exceeding great
number, and each is a species, because there cannot be several
immaterial beings of one species, any more than there could be
separate whitenesses or many humanities. Angels in their nature are
imperishable. For nothing is corrupted save as its form is separated
from its matter. But these immaterial substances are not composed
of matter and form, being themselves subsisting forms and
indestructible. Brass may have and lose a circular shape; but the
circular shape cannot be separated from the circle, which it is.
Thomas next shows (Pars prima, Qu. li.) that angels have no bodies
by nature joined to them. Body is not of the ratio of intellectual
substances. These (when perfect and not like the human soul) have
no need to acquire knowledge through sensation. But though angels
are intellectual substances, separate (separatae) from bodies, they
sometimes assume bodies. In these they can perform those actions
of life which have something in common with other kinds of acts; as
speech, a living act, has something in common with inanimate
sounds. Thus far only can physical acts be performed by angels, and](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-8-320.jpg)
![“In God an entire plenitude of intellectual cognition is held in
one, to wit, in the divine essence through which God knows all
things. Intelligent creatures possess such cognition in inferior
mode and less simply. What God knows through one, inferior
intelligences know through many; and this many becomes more
as the inferiority increases. Hence the higher angel may know
the sum total of the intelligible (universitatem intelligibilium)
through fewer ideas or concepts (species); which, however, are
more universal since each concept extends to more [things]. We
find illustration of this among our fellows. Some are incapable of
grasping intelligible truth, unless it be set forth through particular
examples. This comes from the weakness of their intelligence.
But others, of stronger mind, can seize many things from a few
statements” (Qu. lv. Art. 3).
Through this argument, and throughout the rest of his exposition of
the knowledge of God, angel, and man, we perceive that, with
Thomas, knowledge is superior and more delightful, as it is abstract
in character, and universal in applicability. By knowing the abstract
and the universal we become like to God and the angels; knowledge
of and through the particular is but a necessity of our half-material
nature.
Thomas turns now to consider the knowledge had by angels of
immaterial beings, i.e. themselves and God (Qu. lvi.): “An angel,
being immaterial, is a subsisting form, and therefore intelligible
actually (actu, i.e. not potentially). Wherefore, through its form,
which is its substance, it knows itself.” Then as to knowledge of each
other: God from the beginning impressed upon the angelic mind the
likenesses of things which He created. For in Him, from the
beginning, were the rationes of all things, both spiritual and
corporeal. Through the impression of these rationes upon the angelic
mind, an angel knows other angels as well as corporeal creatures.
Their natures also yield them some knowledge of God. The angelic
nature is a mirror holding the divine similitude. Yet without the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-11-320.jpg)
![illumination of grace the angelic nature knows not God in His
essence, because no created likeness may represent that.
As for material things (Qu. lvii.), angels have knowledge of them
through the intelligible species or concepts impressed by God on the
angelic mind. But do they know particulars—singularia? To deny it,
says Thomas, would detract from the faith which accords to angels
the ministration of affairs. This matter may be thought thus:
“Things flow forth from God both as they subsist in their own
natures and as they are in the angelic cognition. Evidently what
flowed from God in things pertained not only to their universal
nature, but to their principles of individuation.... And as He
causes, so He also knows.... Likewise the angel, through the
concepts (species) planted in him by God, knows things not only
according to their universal nature, but also according to their
singularity, in so far as they are manifold representations of the
one and simple essence.”
One observes that the whole scholastic discussion of universals lies
back of arguments like these.
The main principles of angelic knowledge have now been set forth;
and Thomas pauses to point out to what extent the angels know the
future, the secret thoughts of our hearts, and the mysteries of grace.
He has still to consider the mode and measure of the angelic
knowledge from other points of view. Whatever the angels may
know through their implanted natures, they know perfectly (actu);
but it may be otherwise as to what is divinely revealed to them.
What they know, they know without the need of argument. And the
discussion closes with remarks on Augustine’s phrase and conception
of the matutina and vespertina knowledge of angels: the former
being the knowledge of things as they are in the Word; the latter
being the knowledge of things as they are in their own natures.[603]
V](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-12-320.jpg)
![That the abstract and the universal is the noble and delectable, we
learn from this exposition of angelic knowledge. We may learn the
same from Thomas’s presentation of the modes and contents of
human understanding. The Summa theologiae follows the Scriptural
order of presentation;[604] which is doubtless the reason why
Thomas, instead of passing from immaterial creatures to the partly
immaterial creature man, considers first the creation of physical
things—the Scriptural work of the six days. After this he takes up the
last act of the Creation—man. In the Summa he considers man so
far as his composite nature comes within the scope of theology.
Accordingly the principal topic is the human soul (anima); and the
body is regarded only in relation to the soul, its qualities and its fate.
Thomas will follow Dionysius (Pseudo-Areopagite) in considering first
the nature (essentia) of the soul, then its faculties (virtus sive
potentiae), and thirdly, its mode of action (operatio).
Under the first head he argues (Pars prima, Qu. lxxv.) that the soul,
which is the primum principium of life, is not body, but the body’s
consummation (actus) and forma. Further, inasmuch as the soul is
the principium of mental action, it must be an incorporeal principle
existing by itself. It cannot properly be said to be the man; for man
is not soul alone, but a composite of soul and body. But the soul,
being immaterial and intellectual, is not a composite of form and
matter. It is not subject to corruption. Concerning its union with the
body (Qu. lxxvi.), “it is necessary to say that the mind (intellectus),
which is the principle of intellectual action, is the form (forma) of the
human body.” One and the same intellectual principle does not
pertain to all human bodies: there is no common human soul, but as
many souls as there are men.[605] Yet no man has a plurality of
souls. “If indeed the anima intellectiva were not united to the body
as form, but only as motor (as the Platonists affirm), it would be
necessary to find in man another substantial form, through which
the body should be set in its being. But if, as we have shown, the
soul is united to the body as substantial form, there cannot be
another substantial form beside it” (Qu. lxxvi. Art. 4). The human
soul is fitly joined to its body; for it holds the lowest grade among](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-13-320.jpg)
![“The reason of this is that the knowing faculty is suited to the
knowable (potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili). The
appropriate object of the intelligence of an angel, who is
separate from all body, is intelligible immaterial substance
(substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata); through this kind of
intelligible he cognizes also material things. But the appropriate
object of the human mind, which is joined to a body, is the
essence or nature (quidditas sive natura) existing in material
body; and through the natures of visible things of this sort it
ascends to some cognition of invisible things. It belongs to the
idea (ratio) of this nature that it should exist in some individual
having corporeal matter, as it is of the concept (ratio) of the
nature of stone or horse that it should be in this stone or this
horse. Hence the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot
be known completely and truly, unless it is known as existing in
some particular [instance]. We apprehend the particular through
sense and imagination; and so it is necessary, in order that the
mind should know its appropriate object, that it should turn itself
to images, in order to behold the universal nature existing in the
particular. If, indeed, the appropriate object of our intelligence
were the separate form, or if the form of sensible things did not
subsist in the particular [instances], as the Platonists say, our
mind in knowing would have no need always to turn itself to
images” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 7).
It is next queried whether the judgment of the mind is impeded
through binding (per ligamentum) the senses. In view of the
preceding argument the answer is, that since “all that we know in
our present state, becomes known to us through comparison with
sensible things, it is impossible that there should be in us perfect
mental judgment when the senses are tied, through which we take
cognizance of sensible things” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 8).
This entire argument shows in what firm Aristotelian manner,
scholasticism, in the person of Thomas, set itself upon a basis of
sense perception; through which it still pressed to a knowledge of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-17-320.jpg)
![has one mode of existence when united to the body, and another
when separated, but with its nature remaining. Souls united to
bodies may know through resort to images of bodies, which are in
the bodily organs; but when separated, they may know by turning to
that which is intelligible simply, as other separate substances do. Yet
still this raises doubt; for why did not God appoint a nobler way for
the soul to know than that which is natural to it when joined to the
body? The perfection of the universe required that there should be
diverse grades among intellectual substances. The soul is the lowest
of them. Its feeble intelligence was not fit to receive perfect
knowledge through universal conceptions, save when assisted by
concrete examples. Without these, souls would have had but a
confused knowledge. Hence, for their more perfect knowledge of
things, they are naturally united to bodies, and so receive a
knowledge from things of sense proper to their condition; just as
rude men can be led to know only through examples. So it was for a
higher end that the soul was united to the body, and knows through
resort to images; yet, when separated, it will be capable of another
way of knowing.[606]
Separated from the body, the soul can know itself through itself. It
can know other separated souls perfectly, but the angels, who are
higher natures, only imperfectly, at least through the knowledge
which the separated soul has from its nature; but that may be
increased through grace and glory. The separated soul will know
natural objects through the species (ideas) received from the
inflowing divine light; yet less perfectly than the angels. Likewise,
less universally than angels, will separated souls, by like means of
species received from the divine light, know particular things, and
only such as they previously knew, or may know through some
affection or aptitude or the divine decree. For the habit and aptitude
of knowledge, and the knowledge already acquired, will remain in
the separated soul, so far as relates to the knowledge which is in the
intellect, and no longer in the lower perceptive faculties. Neither will
distance from the object affect the soul’s knowledge, since it will
know through the influx of forms (species) from the divine light.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-21-320.jpg)
![“separated soul.” The composite creature man shares it with brutes:
it is of enormous importance, since it may affect his spiritual
progress in this life, and so determine his state after death. Let us
observe these qualities in God, in the immaterial substances called
angels, and in man.
In God there is volition as well as intelligence; for voluntas
intellectum consequitur; and as God’s being (esse) is His knowing
(intelligere), so likewise His being is His will (velle).[607] Essentially
alike in God and man and angel are the constituents of spiritual
beatitude and existence—knowing, willing, loving. From Creator
down to man, knowledge differs in mode and in degree, yet is
essentially the same. The like is true of will. As to love, because
passion is of the body, love and every mode of turning from or to an
object is passionless in God and the angels. Yet man through love,
as well as through willing and through knowing, may prove his
kinship with angels and with God.
God is love, says John’s Epistle. “It is necessary to place love in
God,” says Thomas. “For the first movement of will and any
appetitive faculty (appetitivae virtutis) is love (amor).” It is objected
that love is a passion; and the passionless God cannot love. Answers
Thomas, “Love and joy and delight are passions in so far as they
signify acts (or actualities, actus) of the appetitus sensitivi; but they
are not passions when they signify the actus of the appetitus
intellectivi; and thus are they placed in God” (Pars prima, Qu. xx.
Art. 1).
God loves all existences. Now all existences, in so far as they are,
are good. For being itself (esse) is in a sense the good of any thing,
and likewise its perfection. It has been shown that God’s will is the
cause of all things; and thus it is proper that a thing should have
being, or good, in so far as it is willed by God. God wills some good
to every existent thing. And since to love is nothing else than to will
good to something, it is evident that God loves all things that are,
yet not in the way we love. For since our will is not the cause of the
goodness of things, but is moved by it as by an object, our love by](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-23-320.jpg)
![life’s via non tuta, has his guardian angel. And the archangels have
care of multitudes of men (Qu. cxiii.).
Thus Thomas’s, or rather, say the Christian doctrine as to angels,
becomes a corollary necessary to Christian theism, and true at least
symbolically. But—and this is the last point as to these ministering
spirits—do the angels who love without passion, grieve and suffer
when those over whom they minister are lost?
“Angels grieve neither over the sins nor the punishment of men.
For, as says Augustine, sadness and grief arise only from what
contravenes the will. But nothing happens in the world that is
contrary to the will of the angels and other blessed ones. For
their will is entirely fixed (totaliter inhaeret) in the order of the
divine righteousness (Justitiae); and nothing takes place in the
world, save what takes place and is permitted by the same. And
so, in brief, nothing takes place in the world contrary to the will
of the blessed” (Qu. cxiii. Art. 7).
We come to man. He has will, and free will or choice, as the angels
have. Will is part of the intellectual nature: it is as the intellectivus
appetitus. But man differs from the angels in possessing appetites
which belong to his sense-nature and do not perceive the good in its
common aspects; because sense does not apprehend the universal,
but only the particular.[608] Sometimes Thomas speaks of amor as
including every form of desire, intellectual or pertaining to the world
of sense. “The first movement of will and of any appetitive faculty
(virtus) is amor.”[609] So in this most general signification amor “is
something belonging to appetite; for the object of both is the good.”
“The first effect of the desirable (appetibilis) upon the appetitus,
is called amor; thence follows desiderium, or the movement
toward the desirable; and at last the quies which is gaudium.
Since then amor consists in an effect upon the appetitus, it is
evidently passio; most properly speaking when it relates to the
yearning element (concupiscibile), but less properly when it
relates to will” (Pars prima, Qu. xxvi. Art. 2).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-26-320.jpg)
![cleaves to God (inhaeret Deo) for Himself (secundum
seipsum).”[610]
Caritas is one of the theological virtues, and as such Thomas treats
it. To it corresponds the “gift” of sapientia, likewise a virtue
bestowed by God, but more particularly regarded as the “gift” of the
Holy Spirit. Caritas is set not in the appetitus sensitivus, but in the
will. Yet as it exceeds our natural faculties, “it is not in us by nature,
nor acquired through our natural powers; but through the infusion of
the Holy Spirit, who is the amor Patris et Filii.” He infuses caritas
according to His will; and it will increase as we draw near to God;
nor is there any bound to its augmentation. May caritas be perfect in
this life? In one sense it never can be perfect, because no creature
ever can love God according to His infinite lovableness.
“But on the part of him who wills to love (ex parte diligentis),
caritas is perfect when he loves as much as he is able. Which
may be taken in three ways. In one way, as the whole heart of
man is always borne toward God; and this is the perfection of the
love of home (caritas patriae), unattainable here, where because
of this life’s infirmities it is impossible always actually to think
upon God, and be drawn toward Him by voluntary love
(dilectione). In another way, as a man may strive to keep himself
free for God and things divine, laying other matters aside, save
as life’s need requires: and that is the perfection of caritas,
possible in this life, yet not for all who have caritas. And the third
way, when any one habitually sets his heart on God, so that he
thinks and wills nothing that is contrary to the divine love: this
perfection is common to all who have caritas.”[611]
The caritas with which we love God, extends to our neighbours, and
even to our enemies, for God’s sake; also to ourselves, including our
bodies; it embraces sinners, but not their sinfulness. It embraces the
angels. There is order and grade in caritas, according to its
relationship to God, the source of beatitude and voluntary love
(dilectionis). God is to be loved ex caritate above all; for He is loved
as the cause of beatitude, while our neighbour is loved as a](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-28-320.jpg)
![participant with us in the beatitude from God. We should love God
more than ourselves; because beatitude is in God as in the common
and fontal source of all things that participate in beatitude.
“But, after God, man should love himself, in so far as he is spirit
(secundum naturam spiritualem), more than any one else. This is
plain from the very reason of loving. God is loved as the principle
of good, on which the dilectio caritatis is based. Man loves
himself ex caritate for the reason that he is a participator in that
good. He loves his neighbour because of his association
(societas) in that good.... Participation in the divine good is a
stronger reason for loving, than association in this participation.
Therefore, man ex caritate should love himself more than his
neighbour; and the mark (signum) of this is, that man should not
commit any sin barring his participation in this beatitude, in order
to free his neighbour from sin.... But one should love his
neighbour’s salvation more than his own body.”[612]
We may love some of our neighbours more than others; for those
bound to us by natural ties and proximity can be loved more and in
more actual ways. The order and grades of love will endure when
our natures are perfected in glory.
Love (caritas) is the supreme theological virtue. It comes to us in
this life through grace; it can be perfected only when grace is
consummated in glory. Likewise the highest knowledge possible in
this life comes through grace, to be perfected in glory. All is from
God, and that which, of all the rest, seems most freely given is the
divine influence disposing the intelligence and will toward good, and
illuminating these best God-given faculties. This, as par excellence,
through the exceeding bounty of its free bestowal, is called gratia
(grace). It is a certain habitual disposition of the soul; it is not the
same as virtus, but a divinely implanted disposition, in which the
virtues must be rooted; it is the imparted similitude of the divine
nature, and perfects the nature of the soul, so far as that has part in
likeness to the divine: it is the medial state between nature and that
further consummation of the grace-illumined nature, which is glory;](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-29-320.jpg)
![and so it is the beginning, the inchoatio, of our glorified beatitude.
Clearly, grace is no part of our inborn nature, and does not belong to
our natural faculties. It is a divinely bestowed increment, directing
our natural faculties toward God and uplifting them to higher
capacities of knowing and loving.
To follow Thomas’s exposition of grace a little more closely:[613]
man, through his natural powers, may know truth, but not the
highest; and without grace, our fallen nature cannot will all the good
belonging to it (connaturale), nor love God above all else, nor merit
eternal life. “Grace is something supernatural in man coming from
God.” It
“is not the same as virtue; and its subject (i.e. its possessor, that
in which it is set) cannot be a faculty (potentia) of the soul; for
the soul’s faculties, as perfected, are conceived to be virtues.
Grace, which is prior to virtue, is set, not in the faculties, but in
the essence of the soul. Thus, as through his faculty of knowing
(potentiam intellectivam), man shares the divine knowledge by
the virtue of faith, and through the faculty of will shares the
divine love by the virtue of caritas, so by means of a certain
similitude he shares in the divine nature through some
regeneration or recreation” (Pars I. ii., Qu. cx. Art. 4).
Grace may be conceived either as “divine aid, moving us to willing
and doing right, or as a formative and abiding (habituale) gift,
divinely placed in us” (Qu. cxi. Art. 2). “The gift of grace exceeds the
power of any created nature; and is nothing else than a sharing
(participatio) of the divine nature” (Qu. cxii. Art. 1).
So it is clear that without grace man cannot rise to the highest
knowledge and the purest love of which he is capable in this life; far
less can he reach that final and perfected blessedness which is
expected hereafter. For this he must possess the virtue of Faith,
which comes not without grace.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21644314-250516110804-a9c69d37/85/Experiments-In-Art-And-Value-Burning-Bitcoin-To-Buy-Ai-Weiwei-Tarasiewicz-30-320.jpg)
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- 5. Experiments in art and value: burning Bitcoins to buy Ai Weiwei Andrew Newman University of Applied Arts Vienna, Austria andrew@anewman.net ! ! Abstract Critical new media art is based on research-based art practice. It is both research- and process-oriented, so that the final result is not “completed” works (products) but rather process artifacts. This paper describes the artistic research and development of the art-group “Artistic Bokeh”, which is developing new documentation formats, and conducting experiments about the value of artistic practice and labor. ! Keywords Artistic Research, Bitcoin, Performance, Media Arts, Artistic Bokeh, Bitcoincloud, Community Practice, Artistic Capital ! Introduction “The human gaze has the power of making things precious; though it’s true that they become more costly too.“ Ludwig Wittgenstein [1] ! How many seconds do you need to stand in front of a work of art, staring either blankly or attentively at it before it has served its function? Before it has served you? How can the attention an artwork receives be measured? Would it be useful to place a little red button next to each work so that the gallery audience could press it and ‘like’ the work? In 2012, I became aware that a photograph of one my installations had been doing the rounds on Tumblr. It was the first work of mine that was ever exhibited for sale at a commercial gallery. This one never sold. Yet I was strangely satisfied that despite this particular failure in the art market, it found a home online. Being re-blogged 3000 times by teenagers on Tumblr meant that it had been seen. This multi-channel video installation found its biggest audience not as an art object inside the gallery, but outside the artworld, as a still image distributed within the fragmentations of the network society. ! No market? According to Geert Lovink, “there was—and still is—no market [for media art], no galleries, few curators and critics, and no audience.” [2] There is a need for new distributed forms of attention and presentation for art, new markets for the new economies that are emerging, this sharing economy, that conceptual economy or the ever- pervasive attention economy. We find ourselves in an age of capitalism that fuels itself with the effigies of knowledge, creativity, individuality, openness and the social. The artist should be well placed to supply the increasing demand for these resources, and they often do, once they are extracted from the artworld and integrated into the creative industries. But what of the work of art? What role does it have in this world of Joshua Simon’s neomaterialism? [3] A world where art prices go up: not when the whole of society becomes wealthier, but when income inequality increases. [4] It’s only when the rich get richer and the poor get poorer that the work of art increases in value, at least in quantifiable terms, which are the only terms that seem to matter in this rational realm of the knowledge economy. I had been working through these ideas in my performance practice with the works “The Old In Out, Dancing in his bedroom (It was a waste of time anyway)” and “Comings and Goings” when I was first approached to participate in the Viennese group Artistic Bokeh. My performance works dealt with the generation of conceptual capital as a form of ‘value adding’ within the knowledge economy. Conceptual capital is the ‘value added’ to the viewer of the work of art, a sort of upgrade to the viewer’s perception of the world, and an increased capacity to manufacture meaning in and from the world. Artistic Bokeh had been exploring similar questions of art and value within the networked society, so I joined the group to continue to develop their experimental practice [5] that slips in and out of the art world, working with them to perform “The Old In Out” for the Austrian Chamber of Labour’s symposium on knowledge work, and most notably continuing the development of BitcoinCloud. [6] Figure 1. Artistic Bokeh, Bitcoin Cloud v3.1 (Installation view at Museum of Applied Arts Vienna), 2013, modified LED fans, custom built Bitcoin mining rig, pyro-electric sensors, custom hardware, software and circuits ©Artistic Bokeh.
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- 7. endowing these guardian spirits with heart and soul, and fashioning responsive stories of their doings. For men loved and feared them, and looked to them as God’s peculiar messengers. Thus they flash past us in the Divina Commedia; and their forms become lovely in Christian art. As we enter upon the contemplation of the angelic nature, let us not as of course regard angels simply as imaginative conceptions of Scripture and of the patristic and mediaeval mind. Thomas will show his reasons for their necessary existence, which may not convince us. Yet we may believe in angels, inasmuch as any real conception of the world’s governance by God requires the fulfilling of His thoughts through media that bring them down to move and live and realize themselves with each of us. Who, in striving to express, can do more than symbolize, the ways of God? What symbols truer than angels have been devised?
- 8. “It is necessary,” opens Thomas,[601] “to affirm (ponere) that there are incorporeal creatures. For in created things God chiefly intends the good, which consists in assimilation to Him. Perfect assimilation of the effect to the cause is seen when the effect resembles the cause in that through which the cause produces the effect. God produces the creature through intelligence and will. Consequently the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. To know cannot be the act (actus) of the body or of any corporeal faculty (virtus); because all body is limited to here and now. Therefore it is necessary, in order that the universe may be perfect, that there should be incorporeal creatures.”[602] Thomas then argues that the intellectual substance is entirely immaterial. “Angelic substances are above our understanding. So our understanding cannot attain to apprehending them as they are in themselves; but only in its own fashion as it apprehends composite things.” These immaterial substances exist in exceeding great number, and each is a species, because there cannot be several immaterial beings of one species, any more than there could be separate whitenesses or many humanities. Angels in their nature are imperishable. For nothing is corrupted save as its form is separated from its matter. But these immaterial substances are not composed of matter and form, being themselves subsisting forms and indestructible. Brass may have and lose a circular shape; but the circular shape cannot be separated from the circle, which it is. Thomas next shows (Pars prima, Qu. li.) that angels have no bodies by nature joined to them. Body is not of the ratio of intellectual substances. These (when perfect and not like the human soul) have no need to acquire knowledge through sensation. But though angels are intellectual substances, separate (separatae) from bodies, they sometimes assume bodies. In these they can perform those actions of life which have something in common with other kinds of acts; as speech, a living act, has something in common with inanimate sounds. Thus far only can physical acts be performed by angels, and
- 9. not when such acts essentially belong to living bodies. Angels may appear as living men, but are not; neither are they sentient through the organs of their assumed bodies; they do not eat and digest food; they move only per accidens, incidentally to the inanimate motion of their assumed bodies; they do not beget, nor do they really speak; “but it is something like speech, when these bodies make sounds in the air like human voices.” Dropping the sole remark, that scholasticism has no sense of humour, we pass on to Thomas’s careful consideration of the angelic relations to space or locality (Qu. lii. and liii.). “Equivocally only may it be said that an angel is in a place (in loco): through application of the angelic virtue to some corporeal spot, the angel may be said in some sense to be there.” But, as angels are finite, when one is said, in this sense, to be in a place, he is not elsewhere too (like God). Yet the place where the angel is need not be an indivisible point, but may be larger or smaller, as the angel wills to apply his virtue to a larger or smaller body. Two angels may not be in the same place at the same time, “because it is impossible that there should be two complete immediate causes of one and the same thing.” Angels are said, likewise equivocally, to move, in a sense analogous to that in which they are said to be in a place. Such equivocal motion may be continuous or not. If not continuous, evidently the angel may pass from one place to another without traversing the intervening spaces. The angelic movement must take place in time; there must be a before and after to it, and yet not necessarily with any period intervening. Now as to angelic knowledge: De cognitione Angelorum. Knowing is no easy thing for man; and we shall see that it is not a simple matter to know, without the senses to provide the data and help build up knowledge in the mind. The function of sense, or its absence, conditions much besides the mere acquisition of the elements from which men form their thoughts. Thomas’s exposition of angelic knowledge and modes of knowing is a logical and
- 10. consistent presentation of a supersensual psychology and theory of knowledge. Entering upon his subject, Thomas shows (Qu. liv.) that knowing (intelligere) is not the substantia or the esse of an angel. Knowing is actio, which is the actuality of faculty, as being (esse) is the actuality of substance. God alone is actus purus (absolute realized actuality), free from potentiality. His substantia is His being and His action (suum esse and suum agere). “But neither in an angel, nor in any creature, is virtus or the potentia operativa the same as the creature’s essentia,” or its esse or substantia. The difficult scholastic- Aristotelian categories of intellectus agens and possibilis do not apply to angelic cognition (for which the reader and the angels may be thankful). The angels, being immaterial intelligences, have no share in those faculties of the human soul, like sight or hearing, which are exercised through bodily organs. They possess only intelligence and will. “It accords with the order of the universe that the supreme intellectual creature should be intelligent altogether, and not intelligent in part, like our souls.” Quaestio lv., concerning the medium cognitionis angelicae, is a scholastic discussion scarcely to be rendered in modern language. The angelic intelligence is capable of knowing all things; and therefore an angel does not know through the medium of his essentia or substantia, which are limited. God alone knows all things through His essentia. The angelic intellect is made perfect for knowing by means of certain forms or ideas (species). These are not received from things, but are part of the angelic nature (connaturales). The angelic intelligence (potentia intellectiva) is completed through general concepts, of the same nature with itself (species intelligibiles connaturales). These come to angels from God at the same time with their being. Such concepts or ideas cover everything that they can know by nature (naturaliter). And Thomas proves that the higher angels know through fewer and more universal concepts than the lower.
- 11. “In God an entire plenitude of intellectual cognition is held in one, to wit, in the divine essence through which God knows all things. Intelligent creatures possess such cognition in inferior mode and less simply. What God knows through one, inferior intelligences know through many; and this many becomes more as the inferiority increases. Hence the higher angel may know the sum total of the intelligible (universitatem intelligibilium) through fewer ideas or concepts (species); which, however, are more universal since each concept extends to more [things]. We find illustration of this among our fellows. Some are incapable of grasping intelligible truth, unless it be set forth through particular examples. This comes from the weakness of their intelligence. But others, of stronger mind, can seize many things from a few statements” (Qu. lv. Art. 3). Through this argument, and throughout the rest of his exposition of the knowledge of God, angel, and man, we perceive that, with Thomas, knowledge is superior and more delightful, as it is abstract in character, and universal in applicability. By knowing the abstract and the universal we become like to God and the angels; knowledge of and through the particular is but a necessity of our half-material nature. Thomas turns now to consider the knowledge had by angels of immaterial beings, i.e. themselves and God (Qu. lvi.): “An angel, being immaterial, is a subsisting form, and therefore intelligible actually (actu, i.e. not potentially). Wherefore, through its form, which is its substance, it knows itself.” Then as to knowledge of each other: God from the beginning impressed upon the angelic mind the likenesses of things which He created. For in Him, from the beginning, were the rationes of all things, both spiritual and corporeal. Through the impression of these rationes upon the angelic mind, an angel knows other angels as well as corporeal creatures. Their natures also yield them some knowledge of God. The angelic nature is a mirror holding the divine similitude. Yet without the
- 12. illumination of grace the angelic nature knows not God in His essence, because no created likeness may represent that. As for material things (Qu. lvii.), angels have knowledge of them through the intelligible species or concepts impressed by God on the angelic mind. But do they know particulars—singularia? To deny it, says Thomas, would detract from the faith which accords to angels the ministration of affairs. This matter may be thought thus: “Things flow forth from God both as they subsist in their own natures and as they are in the angelic cognition. Evidently what flowed from God in things pertained not only to their universal nature, but to their principles of individuation.... And as He causes, so He also knows.... Likewise the angel, through the concepts (species) planted in him by God, knows things not only according to their universal nature, but also according to their singularity, in so far as they are manifold representations of the one and simple essence.” One observes that the whole scholastic discussion of universals lies back of arguments like these. The main principles of angelic knowledge have now been set forth; and Thomas pauses to point out to what extent the angels know the future, the secret thoughts of our hearts, and the mysteries of grace. He has still to consider the mode and measure of the angelic knowledge from other points of view. Whatever the angels may know through their implanted natures, they know perfectly (actu); but it may be otherwise as to what is divinely revealed to them. What they know, they know without the need of argument. And the discussion closes with remarks on Augustine’s phrase and conception of the matutina and vespertina knowledge of angels: the former being the knowledge of things as they are in the Word; the latter being the knowledge of things as they are in their own natures.[603] V
- 13. That the abstract and the universal is the noble and delectable, we learn from this exposition of angelic knowledge. We may learn the same from Thomas’s presentation of the modes and contents of human understanding. The Summa theologiae follows the Scriptural order of presentation;[604] which is doubtless the reason why Thomas, instead of passing from immaterial creatures to the partly immaterial creature man, considers first the creation of physical things—the Scriptural work of the six days. After this he takes up the last act of the Creation—man. In the Summa he considers man so far as his composite nature comes within the scope of theology. Accordingly the principal topic is the human soul (anima); and the body is regarded only in relation to the soul, its qualities and its fate. Thomas will follow Dionysius (Pseudo-Areopagite) in considering first the nature (essentia) of the soul, then its faculties (virtus sive potentiae), and thirdly, its mode of action (operatio). Under the first head he argues (Pars prima, Qu. lxxv.) that the soul, which is the primum principium of life, is not body, but the body’s consummation (actus) and forma. Further, inasmuch as the soul is the principium of mental action, it must be an incorporeal principle existing by itself. It cannot properly be said to be the man; for man is not soul alone, but a composite of soul and body. But the soul, being immaterial and intellectual, is not a composite of form and matter. It is not subject to corruption. Concerning its union with the body (Qu. lxxvi.), “it is necessary to say that the mind (intellectus), which is the principle of intellectual action, is the form (forma) of the human body.” One and the same intellectual principle does not pertain to all human bodies: there is no common human soul, but as many souls as there are men.[605] Yet no man has a plurality of souls. “If indeed the anima intellectiva were not united to the body as form, but only as motor (as the Platonists affirm), it would be necessary to find in man another substantial form, through which the body should be set in its being. But if, as we have shown, the soul is united to the body as substantial form, there cannot be another substantial form beside it” (Qu. lxxvi. Art. 4). The human soul is fitly joined to its body; for it holds the lowest grade among
- 14. intellectual substances, having no knowledge of truth implanted in it, as the angels have; it has to gather knowledge per viam sensus. “But nature never omits what is necessary. Hence the anima intellectiva must have not only the faculty of knowing, but the faculty of feeling (sentiendi). Sense-action can take place only through a corporeal instrument. Therefore the anima intellectiva ought to be united to such a body, which should be to it a convenient organ of sense” (Art. 5). Moreover, “since the soul is united to the body as form, it is altogether in any and every part of the body” (Art. 8). It is a cardinal point (Qu. lxxvii.) with Thomas that the soul’s essentia is not its potentia: the soul is not its faculties. That is true only of God. In Him there is no diversity. There is some diversity of faculty in an angel; and more in man, a creature on the confines of the corporeal and spiritual creation, in whom concur the powers of both. There is order and priority among the powers of the soul: the potentiae intellectivae are higher than the potentiae sensitivae, and control them; while the latter are above the potentiae nutritivae. Yet the order of their generation is the reverse. The highest of the sensitive faculties is sight. The anima is the subject in which are the powers of knowing and willing (potentiae intellectivae); but the subject in which are the powers of sensation is the combination of the soul and body. All the powers of the soul, whether the subject be soul alone or soul and body, flow from the essence of the soul, as from a source (principium). Thomas follows (Qu. lxxviii.) Aristotle in dividing the powers of the soul into vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, motor, and intellectual. In taking up the last, he points out (Qu. lxxix.) that intelligence (intellectus) is a power of the soul, and not the soul itself. He then follows the Philosopher in showing how intelligence (intelligere) is to be regarded as a passive power, and he presents the difficult Aristotelian device of the intellectus agens, and argues that memory and reason are not to be regarded as powers distinct from the intelligence (intellectus).
- 15. How does the soul, while united to the body (the anima conjuncta), (1) know corporeal things which are beneath it? (2) how does it know itself and what is in itself? and (3) how does it know immaterial substances which are above it? The exposition of these problems is introduced by (Qu. lxxxiv.) a historical discussion of the primi philosophi who thought there was nothing but body in the world. Then came Plato, seeking “to save some certain cognition of truth” by means of his theory of Ideas. But Plato seems to have erred in thinking that the form of the known must be in the knower as it is in the known. This is not necessary. In sense-perception the form of the thing is not in sense as it is in the thing. “And likewise the intelligence receives the species (Ideas) of material and mobile bodies immaterially and immutably, after its own mode; for the received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient. Hence it is to be held that the soul through the intelligence knows bodies by immaterial, universal, and necessary cognition.” Thomas sets this matter forth in a manner very illuminating as to his general position regarding knowledge: “It follows that material things which are known must exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. And the reason of this is that the act of cognition extends itself to those things which are outside of the knower. For we know things outside of us. But through matter, the form of the thing is limited to what is single (aliquid unum). Hence it is plain that the ratio (proper nature) of cognition is the opposite of the ratio of materiality. And therefore things, like plants, which receive forms only materially, are in no way cognoscitivae, as is said in the second book of De anima. The more immaterially anything possesses the form of the thing known, the more perfectly it knows. Wherefore the intelligence, which abstracts the species (Idea) not only from matter, but also from individualizing material conditions, knows more perfectly than sense, which receives the form of the thing known without matter indeed, but with material conditions. Among the senses themselves, sight is the most cognoscitivus, because least
- 16. material. And among intelligences, that is the more perfect which is the more immaterial” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 2). Then Thomas again differs from Plato, and holds with Aristotle, that the intelligence through which the soul knows has not its ideas written upon it by nature, but from the first is capable of receiving them all (sed est in principio in potentia ad hujusmodi species omnes). Hereupon, and with further arguments, Thomas shows “that the species intelligibiles, by which our soul knows, do not arise from separate forms” or ideas. To the converse question, whether intelligent cognition comes from things of sense, Thomas answers, following Aristotle: “One cannot say that sense perception is the whole cause of intellectual cognition, but rather in a certain way is the matter of the cause (materia causae).” On the other hand, “it is impossible that the mind, in the state of the present life, wherein it is joined to the passive body (passibili corpori), should know anything actually (actu) except by turning itself to images (phantasmata). And this appears from two arguments. In the first place, since the mind itself is a power (vis) using no bodily organ, its action would not be interrupted by an injury to any bodily organ, if for its action there was not needed the action of some faculty using a bodily organ. Sense and imagination use a bodily organ. Hence as to what the mind knows actually (actu), there is needed the action of the imagination and other faculties, both in receiving new knowledge and in using knowledge already acquired. For we see that when the action of the imaginative faculty is interrupted by injury to an organ, as with the delirious, the man is prevented from actually knowing those things of which he has knowledge. Secondly (as any one may observe in himself), whenever he attempts to know (intelligere) anything, he forms images by way of example, in which he may contemplate what he is trying to know. And whenever we wish to make any one else understand, we suggest examples, from which he may make for himself images to know by.
- 17. “The reason of this is that the knowing faculty is suited to the knowable (potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili). The appropriate object of the intelligence of an angel, who is separate from all body, is intelligible immaterial substance (substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata); through this kind of intelligible he cognizes also material things. But the appropriate object of the human mind, which is joined to a body, is the essence or nature (quidditas sive natura) existing in material body; and through the natures of visible things of this sort it ascends to some cognition of invisible things. It belongs to the idea (ratio) of this nature that it should exist in some individual having corporeal matter, as it is of the concept (ratio) of the nature of stone or horse that it should be in this stone or this horse. Hence the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, unless it is known as existing in some particular [instance]. We apprehend the particular through sense and imagination; and so it is necessary, in order that the mind should know its appropriate object, that it should turn itself to images, in order to behold the universal nature existing in the particular. If, indeed, the appropriate object of our intelligence were the separate form, or if the form of sensible things did not subsist in the particular [instances], as the Platonists say, our mind in knowing would have no need always to turn itself to images” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 7). It is next queried whether the judgment of the mind is impeded through binding (per ligamentum) the senses. In view of the preceding argument the answer is, that since “all that we know in our present state, becomes known to us through comparison with sensible things, it is impossible that there should be in us perfect mental judgment when the senses are tied, through which we take cognizance of sensible things” (Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 8). This entire argument shows in what firm Aristotelian manner, scholasticism, in the person of Thomas, set itself upon a basis of sense perception; through which it still pressed to a knowledge of
- 18. the supersensible and abstract. In this argument we also see, as always with Thomas, that knowledge is perfect and blessed, the more immaterial and abstract are its modes. All of which will continue to impress us as we follow Thomas, briefly, through his exposition of the modus and ordo of knowing (intelligendi) (Qu. lxxxv.). The first question is whether our mind knows corporeal things by abstracting the species from the images—the type from the particular. There are three grades of the cognizing faculty (virtutis cognoscitivae). The lowest is sensation, which is the act of a bodily organ. Its appropriate object is form as existing in matter. And since matter is the principle of individuation (i.e. the particularizing principle from which results the particular or individual), sense perception is confined to the particular. The highest grade of the cognitient faculty is that which is independent of bodily organs and separate from matter, as the angelic intelligence; and its object is form subsisting without matter. For though angels know material things, they view them only in the immaterial, to wit, themselves or God. Between the two is the human mind, which “is the forma of the body. So it naturally knows form existing individually in corporeal matter, and yet not as form is in such matter. But to know form, which is in concrete matter, and yet know it not as it is in such matter, is to abstract it from this particular matter which the images represent. It follows that our intelligence knows material things by abstracting them from images; and through reflecting on these material abstractions we reach some cognition of the immaterial, just as conversely the angels know the material through the immaterial” (Qu. lxxxv. Art. 1). It is next proved that the soul, through the intelligible species or forms abstracted from particulars, knows things which are outside the soul. In a way, intellection arises from sense perception; therefore the sense perception of the particular precedes the intellectual knowledge of universals. But, on the other hand, the
- 19. intelligence, in coming to perfect cognition, proceeds from the undistinguished to the distinguished, from the more to the less general, and so knows animal before it knows homo, and homo before it knows Socrates. The next conclusion reads very neatly in scholastic Latin, but is difficult to paraphrase: it is that the intelligence may know many things at once (simul) per modum unius, but not per modum multorum; that is to say, the mind may grasp at once whatever it may grasp under one species, but cannot know a number of things at once which fall under different species. Next as to what our mind knows in material things (Qu. lxxxvi.). It does not know the particular or singular (singularia) in them directly; for the principle of singularity in material things is the particular matter. But our mind knows by abstracting from such the species, that is, the universal. This it knows directly. But it knows singularia indirectly, inasmuch as, when it has abstracted the intelligible species, it must still, in order to know completely (actu), turn itself to the images in which it knows the species. How does the anima intellectiva know itself, and those things which are in it (Qu. lxxxvii.)? Everything is knowable in so far as it is actually (in actu) and not merely potentially. So the human intelligence knows itself not through its essence, which is still but potential, but in so far as it has actually realized itself; knows itself, that is, through its actuality. The permanent qualities (habitus) of the soul exist in a condition between potentiality and actuality. The mind knows them when they are actually present or operative. Does the human intelligence know its own act—know that it knows? In God, knowing and being are one. Although this is not true of the angelic intelligence, nevertheless with an angel the prime object of knowledge is his own essence. With one and the same act an angel knows that it knows, and knows its essence. But the primal object of the human intelligence is neither its knowledge (knowing, intelligere) nor its essence, but something extrinsic, to wit, the nature of the material thing. Hence that is the first object known by the human intelligence; and next is known its own actus, by which that first
- 20. object is known. Likewise the human intelligence knows the acts of will. An act of will is nothing but a certain inclination toward some form of the mind (formam intellectam) as natural appetite is an inclination toward a natural form. The act of will is in the knowing mind and so is known by it. So far as to how the soul knows material things, which are below it, and its own nature and qualities. It is another question whether the soul knows those things which are above it, to wit, the immaterial substances. Can the soul in the state of the present life know the angels in themselves? With lengthy argument, differing from Plato and adhering to Aristotle, Thomas proves the negative: that in the present life we cannot know substantias separatas immateriales secundum seipsas. Nor can we come to a knowledge of the angelic substances through knowing material things. “For immaterial substances are altogether of another nature (ratio) from the whatnesses (quidditates) of material things; and however much our intelligence abstracts from matter the essence (quidditas) of the material thing, it will never arrive at anything like an immaterial substance. And so, through material substances, we cannot know immaterial substances perfectly” (Qu. lxxxviii. Art. 2). Much less can we thus know God. The discussion hitherto has been confined to the intellectual capacities of souls united to their bodies. As to the knowledge which the “separated” soul may have, other considerations arise akin to those touching the knowledge possessed by the separated substances called angels. Is the separated soul able to know? Thomas has shown that so long as the soul is joined to the body it cannot know anything except by turning itself to images. If this were a mere accident of the soul, incidental to its existence in the body, then with that impediment removed, it would return to its own nature and know simply. But if, as we suppose, this turning to images is of the nature of the soul, the difficulty grows. Yet the soul
- 21. has one mode of existence when united to the body, and another when separated, but with its nature remaining. Souls united to bodies may know through resort to images of bodies, which are in the bodily organs; but when separated, they may know by turning to that which is intelligible simply, as other separate substances do. Yet still this raises doubt; for why did not God appoint a nobler way for the soul to know than that which is natural to it when joined to the body? The perfection of the universe required that there should be diverse grades among intellectual substances. The soul is the lowest of them. Its feeble intelligence was not fit to receive perfect knowledge through universal conceptions, save when assisted by concrete examples. Without these, souls would have had but a confused knowledge. Hence, for their more perfect knowledge of things, they are naturally united to bodies, and so receive a knowledge from things of sense proper to their condition; just as rude men can be led to know only through examples. So it was for a higher end that the soul was united to the body, and knows through resort to images; yet, when separated, it will be capable of another way of knowing.[606] Separated from the body, the soul can know itself through itself. It can know other separated souls perfectly, but the angels, who are higher natures, only imperfectly, at least through the knowledge which the separated soul has from its nature; but that may be increased through grace and glory. The separated soul will know natural objects through the species (ideas) received from the inflowing divine light; yet less perfectly than the angels. Likewise, less universally than angels, will separated souls, by like means of species received from the divine light, know particular things, and only such as they previously knew, or may know through some affection or aptitude or the divine decree. For the habit and aptitude of knowledge, and the knowledge already acquired, will remain in the separated soul, so far as relates to the knowledge which is in the intellect, and no longer in the lower perceptive faculties. Neither will distance from the object affect the soul’s knowledge, since it will know through the influx of forms (species) from the divine light.
- 22. “Yet through the cognition belonging to their nature, separated souls do not know what is doing here below. For such souls know the particular and concrete (singularia) only as from the traces (vestigia) of previous cognition or affection, or by divine appointment. And the souls of the dead by divine decree, and in accordance with their mode of existence, are separated from the intercourse of the living and joined to the society of spiritual substances. Therefore they are ignorant of those things which are done among us.” Nevertheless, it would seem, according to the opinions of Augustine and Gregory, “that the souls of the saints who see God know all that is done here. Yet, perfectly joined to the divine righteousness, they are not grieved, nor do they take part in the affairs of the living, save as the divine disposition requires.” “Still the souls of the dead are able to care for the affairs of the living, although ignorant of their condition; just as we have care for the dead, though ignorant of their state, by invoking the suffrages of the Church. And the souls of the dead may be informed of the affairs of the living from souls lately departed hence, or through angels or demons, or by the revealing spirit of God. But if the dead appear to the living, it is by God’s special dispensation, and to be reckoned as a divine miracle” (Qu. lxxxix. Art. 8). VI We have thus traced Thomas’s view of the faculty of knowledge, the primary constituent of beatitude in God, and in angels and men. There are other elements which not only supplement the faculty of knowledge, but even flow as of necessity from a full and true conception of that faculty and its perfect energizing. These needful, yet supplementary, factors are the faculties of will and love and natural appetite; though the last does not exist in God or angel or in
- 23. “separated soul.” The composite creature man shares it with brutes: it is of enormous importance, since it may affect his spiritual progress in this life, and so determine his state after death. Let us observe these qualities in God, in the immaterial substances called angels, and in man. In God there is volition as well as intelligence; for voluntas intellectum consequitur; and as God’s being (esse) is His knowing (intelligere), so likewise His being is His will (velle).[607] Essentially alike in God and man and angel are the constituents of spiritual beatitude and existence—knowing, willing, loving. From Creator down to man, knowledge differs in mode and in degree, yet is essentially the same. The like is true of will. As to love, because passion is of the body, love and every mode of turning from or to an object is passionless in God and the angels. Yet man through love, as well as through willing and through knowing, may prove his kinship with angels and with God. God is love, says John’s Epistle. “It is necessary to place love in God,” says Thomas. “For the first movement of will and any appetitive faculty (appetitivae virtutis) is love (amor).” It is objected that love is a passion; and the passionless God cannot love. Answers Thomas, “Love and joy and delight are passions in so far as they signify acts (or actualities, actus) of the appetitus sensitivi; but they are not passions when they signify the actus of the appetitus intellectivi; and thus are they placed in God” (Pars prima, Qu. xx. Art. 1). God loves all existences. Now all existences, in so far as they are, are good. For being itself (esse) is in a sense the good of any thing, and likewise its perfection. It has been shown that God’s will is the cause of all things; and thus it is proper that a thing should have being, or good, in so far as it is willed by God. God wills some good to every existent thing. And since to love is nothing else than to will good to something, it is evident that God loves all things that are, yet not in the way we love. For since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by an object, our love by
- 24. which we will good to anything is not the cause of its goodness; but its goodness calls forth the love by which we wish to preserve and add to the good it has; and for this we work. But God’s love imparts and creates goodness in things. The divine love embraces all things in one and the same act of will; but inasmuch as His love creates goodness, there could be no greater goodness in one thing than in another unless He willed greater good to one than to the other: in this sense He may be said to love one creature more than another; and in this way He loves the better things more. Besides love, the order of the universe proves God’s justitia; an attribute which is to be ascribed to Him, as Dionysius says, in that He grants to all things what is appropriate, according to the dignity of the existence of each, and preserves the nature of each in its own order and virtue. Likewise misericordia is to be ascribed to God, not as if He were affected by pitying sadness, but in that He remedies the misery or defects of others. Thus far as to will and love in God. Next, as to these qualities in Angels. Have angels will? (Pars prima, Qu. lix.). Thomas argues: All things proceed from the divine will, and all per appetitum incline toward good. In plants this is called natural appetite. Next above them come those creatures who perceive the particular good as of the senses; their inclination toward it is appetitus sensitivus. Still above them are such as know the ratio of the good universally, through their intelligence. Such are the angels; and in them inclination toward the good is will. Moreover, since they know the nature of the good, they are able to form a judgment as to it; and so they have free will: ubicumque est intellectus, est liberum arbitrium. And as their knowledge is above that of men, so in them free will exists more excellently. The angels have only the appetitus intellectivus which is will; they are not irascible or concupiscent, since these belong to the appetitus sensitivus. Only metaphorically can furor and evil concupiscence be ascribed to demons, as anger is to God—propter similitudinem effectus. Consequently amor and gaudium do not exist as passions
- 25. in angels. But in so far as these qualities signify solely an act of will, they are intellectual. In this sense, to love is to will good to anything, and to rejoice (gaudere) is to rest the will in a good obtained. Similarly, caritas and spes, in so far as they are virtues, lie not in appetite, but in will; and thus exist in angels. With man the virtues of temperance and fortitude may relate to things of sense; but not so with angels, who have no passions to be bridled by these virtues. Temperance is ascribed to them when they temper their will according to the will divine, and fortitude, when they firmly execute it (Qu. lix. Art. 4). In a subsequent portion of Pars prima (Qu. cx.) Thomas has occasion to point out that, as in human affairs, the more particular power is governed by the more universal, so among the angels. “The higher angels who preside over the lower have more universal knowledge. It is likewise clear that the virtus of a body is more particular than the virtus of a spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is form particularized (individuata) through matter, and limited to the here and now. But immaterial forms are unconditioned and intelligible. And as the lower angels, who have forms less universal, are ruled by the higher angels, so all corporeal things are ruled by angels. And this is maintained not only by the holy Doctors, but by all philosophers who have recognized incorporeal substances.” Next Thomas considers the action of angels upon men, and shows that men may have their minds illumined by the lower orders of angels, who present to men intelligibilem veritatem sub similitudinibus sensibilium. God sends the angels to minister to corporeal creatures; in which mission their acts proceed from God as a cause (principio). They are His instruments. They are sent as custodians of men, to guide and move them to good. “To every man an angel is appointed for his guard: of which the reason is, that the guardianship (custodia) of the angels is an execution of divine providence in regard to men.” Every man, while as viator he walks
- 26. life’s via non tuta, has his guardian angel. And the archangels have care of multitudes of men (Qu. cxiii.). Thus Thomas’s, or rather, say the Christian doctrine as to angels, becomes a corollary necessary to Christian theism, and true at least symbolically. But—and this is the last point as to these ministering spirits—do the angels who love without passion, grieve and suffer when those over whom they minister are lost? “Angels grieve neither over the sins nor the punishment of men. For, as says Augustine, sadness and grief arise only from what contravenes the will. But nothing happens in the world that is contrary to the will of the angels and other blessed ones. For their will is entirely fixed (totaliter inhaeret) in the order of the divine righteousness (Justitiae); and nothing takes place in the world, save what takes place and is permitted by the same. And so, in brief, nothing takes place in the world contrary to the will of the blessed” (Qu. cxiii. Art. 7). We come to man. He has will, and free will or choice, as the angels have. Will is part of the intellectual nature: it is as the intellectivus appetitus. But man differs from the angels in possessing appetites which belong to his sense-nature and do not perceive the good in its common aspects; because sense does not apprehend the universal, but only the particular.[608] Sometimes Thomas speaks of amor as including every form of desire, intellectual or pertaining to the world of sense. “The first movement of will and of any appetitive faculty (virtus) is amor.”[609] So in this most general signification amor “is something belonging to appetite; for the object of both is the good.” “The first effect of the desirable (appetibilis) upon the appetitus, is called amor; thence follows desiderium, or the movement toward the desirable; and at last the quies which is gaudium. Since then amor consists in an effect upon the appetitus, it is evidently passio; most properly speaking when it relates to the yearning element (concupiscibile), but less properly when it relates to will” (Pars prima, Qu. xxvi. Art. 2).
- 27. Further distinguishing definitions are now in order: “Four names are applied to what pertains to the same: amor, dilectio, caritas, et amicitia. Of the three first, amor has the broadest meaning. For all dilectio or caritas is amor; but not conversely. Dilectio adds to amor a precedent choice (electionem praecedentem) as its name indicates. Hence dilectio is not in the concupiscent nature, but in the will, and therefore in the rational nature. Caritas adds to amor a certain perfectionem amoris, inasmuch as what is loved, is esteemed as very precious, as the name shows” (Ibid. Art. 3). Moreover, amor may be divided into amor amicitiae, whereby we wish good to the amicus, and amor concupiscentiae, whereby properly we desire a good to ourselves. The Good is the object and, in that sense, the cause, of amor (Qu. xxvii.). “But love requires a cognition of the good which is loved. Therefore the Philosopher says, that bodily sight is the cause of amoris sensitivi. Likewise contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the cause of amoris spiritualis. Thus, therefore, cognition is the cause of love, inasmuch as the good cannot be loved unless known.” From this broad conception of amor the argument rises to amor in its purest phases, which correspond to the highest modes of knowledge man is capable of. They are considered in their nature, in their causes, and effects. It is evident whither we are travelling in this matter. “Love (amor) may be perfect or imperfect. Perfect love is that by which some one is loved for himself, as a man loves a friend. Imperfect love is that by which some one loves a thing, not for itself, but in order that that good may come to him, as a man loves the thing he desires. The first love pertains to caritas which
- 28. cleaves to God (inhaeret Deo) for Himself (secundum seipsum).”[610] Caritas is one of the theological virtues, and as such Thomas treats it. To it corresponds the “gift” of sapientia, likewise a virtue bestowed by God, but more particularly regarded as the “gift” of the Holy Spirit. Caritas is set not in the appetitus sensitivus, but in the will. Yet as it exceeds our natural faculties, “it is not in us by nature, nor acquired through our natural powers; but through the infusion of the Holy Spirit, who is the amor Patris et Filii.” He infuses caritas according to His will; and it will increase as we draw near to God; nor is there any bound to its augmentation. May caritas be perfect in this life? In one sense it never can be perfect, because no creature ever can love God according to His infinite lovableness. “But on the part of him who wills to love (ex parte diligentis), caritas is perfect when he loves as much as he is able. Which may be taken in three ways. In one way, as the whole heart of man is always borne toward God; and this is the perfection of the love of home (caritas patriae), unattainable here, where because of this life’s infirmities it is impossible always actually to think upon God, and be drawn toward Him by voluntary love (dilectione). In another way, as a man may strive to keep himself free for God and things divine, laying other matters aside, save as life’s need requires: and that is the perfection of caritas, possible in this life, yet not for all who have caritas. And the third way, when any one habitually sets his heart on God, so that he thinks and wills nothing that is contrary to the divine love: this perfection is common to all who have caritas.”[611] The caritas with which we love God, extends to our neighbours, and even to our enemies, for God’s sake; also to ourselves, including our bodies; it embraces sinners, but not their sinfulness. It embraces the angels. There is order and grade in caritas, according to its relationship to God, the source of beatitude and voluntary love (dilectionis). God is to be loved ex caritate above all; for He is loved as the cause of beatitude, while our neighbour is loved as a
- 29. participant with us in the beatitude from God. We should love God more than ourselves; because beatitude is in God as in the common and fontal source of all things that participate in beatitude. “But, after God, man should love himself, in so far as he is spirit (secundum naturam spiritualem), more than any one else. This is plain from the very reason of loving. God is loved as the principle of good, on which the dilectio caritatis is based. Man loves himself ex caritate for the reason that he is a participator in that good. He loves his neighbour because of his association (societas) in that good.... Participation in the divine good is a stronger reason for loving, than association in this participation. Therefore, man ex caritate should love himself more than his neighbour; and the mark (signum) of this is, that man should not commit any sin barring his participation in this beatitude, in order to free his neighbour from sin.... But one should love his neighbour’s salvation more than his own body.”[612] We may love some of our neighbours more than others; for those bound to us by natural ties and proximity can be loved more and in more actual ways. The order and grades of love will endure when our natures are perfected in glory. Love (caritas) is the supreme theological virtue. It comes to us in this life through grace; it can be perfected only when grace is consummated in glory. Likewise the highest knowledge possible in this life comes through grace, to be perfected in glory. All is from God, and that which, of all the rest, seems most freely given is the divine influence disposing the intelligence and will toward good, and illuminating these best God-given faculties. This, as par excellence, through the exceeding bounty of its free bestowal, is called gratia (grace). It is a certain habitual disposition of the soul; it is not the same as virtus, but a divinely implanted disposition, in which the virtues must be rooted; it is the imparted similitude of the divine nature, and perfects the nature of the soul, so far as that has part in likeness to the divine: it is the medial state between nature and that further consummation of the grace-illumined nature, which is glory;
- 30. and so it is the beginning, the inchoatio, of our glorified beatitude. Clearly, grace is no part of our inborn nature, and does not belong to our natural faculties. It is a divinely bestowed increment, directing our natural faculties toward God and uplifting them to higher capacities of knowing and loving. To follow Thomas’s exposition of grace a little more closely:[613] man, through his natural powers, may know truth, but not the highest; and without grace, our fallen nature cannot will all the good belonging to it (connaturale), nor love God above all else, nor merit eternal life. “Grace is something supernatural in man coming from God.” It “is not the same as virtue; and its subject (i.e. its possessor, that in which it is set) cannot be a faculty (potentia) of the soul; for the soul’s faculties, as perfected, are conceived to be virtues. Grace, which is prior to virtue, is set, not in the faculties, but in the essence of the soul. Thus, as through his faculty of knowing (potentiam intellectivam), man shares the divine knowledge by the virtue of faith, and through the faculty of will shares the divine love by the virtue of caritas, so by means of a certain similitude he shares in the divine nature through some regeneration or recreation” (Pars I. ii., Qu. cx. Art. 4). Grace may be conceived either as “divine aid, moving us to willing and doing right, or as a formative and abiding (habituale) gift, divinely placed in us” (Qu. cxi. Art. 2). “The gift of grace exceeds the power of any created nature; and is nothing else than a sharing (participatio) of the divine nature” (Qu. cxii. Art. 1). So it is clear that without grace man cannot rise to the highest knowledge and the purest love of which he is capable in this life; far less can he reach that final and perfected blessedness which is expected hereafter. For this he must possess the virtue of Faith, which comes not without grace.
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