Folini Extended Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS3
- 1. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS 2019-11-27 An Introduction to ModSecurity and the OWASP Core Rule Set (BCS DevSecOps SG) Christian Folini / @ChrFolini
- 2. Baseline / 1st Line of Defense Safety Belts
- 3. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Boring Bio ● Christian Folini / ChrFolini ● Security Engineer at netnea in Switzerland ● Author, teacher and speaker ● OWASP CRS project Co-Lead
- 4. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Plan for Today ● What is a WAF? ● What is ModSecurity? ● What is Core Rule Set? ● Demo ● Key concepts ● Rules ● False Positives
- 5. Web Application Firewalls Complex • Overwhelming • Rarely Functional
- 6. ModSecurity Embedded • Rule oriented • Granular Control
- 9. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Include in server config (depending on path): Include /path-to-owasp-crs/crs-setup.conf Include /path-to-owasp-crs/rules/*.conf Clone the repository (or download latest release): $> git clone https://github.com/SpiderLabs/owasp-modsecurity-crs Copy the example config: $> cp crs-setup.conf.example crs-setup.conf Demo Time (Installation)
- 10. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Research based on 4.5M Burp requests. CRS3 Default Install Redir.: RFI: LFI: XSS: SQLi: 0% 0% -100% -82% -100%
- 11. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Paranoia Level 1: Minimal number of false positives Baseline protection Paranoia Level 2: More rules, some false positives Real data in the service Paranoia Level 3: Specialized rules, more FPs Online banking level security Paranoia Level 4: Crazy rules, many FPs Nuclear power plant level security Paranoia Levels
- 12. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Important Groups of Rules Request Rules REQUEST-910-IP-REPUTATION.conf REQUEST-911-METHOD-ENFORCEMENT.conf REQUEST-912-DOS-PROTECTION.conf REQUEST-913-SCANNER-DETECTION.conf REQUEST-920-PROTOCOL-ENFORCEMENT.conf REQUEST-921-PROTOCOL-ATTACK.conf REQUEST-930-APPLICATION-ATTACK-LFI.conf REQUEST-931-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RFI.conf REQUEST-932-APPLICATION-ATTACK-RCE.conf REQUEST-933-APPLICATION-ATTACK-PHP.conf REQUEST-941-APPLICATION-ATTACK-XSS.conf REQUEST-942-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SQLI.conf REQUEST-943-APPLICATION-ATTACK-SESS-FIX.conf REQUEST-944-APPLICATION-ATTACK-JAVA.conf REQUEST-949-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf
- 13. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Important Groups of Rules Response Rules RESPONSE-950-DATA-LEAKAGES.conf RESPONSE-951-DATA-LEAKAGES-SQL.conf RESPONSE-952-DATA-LEAKAGES-JAVA.conf RESPONSE-953-DATA-LEAKAGES-PHP.conf RESPONSE-954-DATA-LEAKAGES-IIS.conf RESPONSE-959-BLOCKING-EVALUATION.conf
- 14. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Paranoia Level Example: Protocol Enforcement Rules Paranoia Level 1: 31 Rules Paranoia Level 2: 7 Rules Paranoia Level 3: 1 Rules Paranoia Level 4: 4 Rules
- 15. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Stricter Siblings Example: Byte Range Enforcement Paranoia Level 1: Rule 920270: Full ASCII range without null character Paranoia Level 2: Rule 920271: Full visible ASCII range, tab, newline Paranoia Level 3: Rule 920272: Visible lower ASCII range without % Paranoia Level 4: Rule 920273: A-Z a-z 0-9 = - _ . , : &
- 16. Anomaly Scoring Adjustable Limit • Blocking Mode • Iterative Tuning
- 17. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Sampling Mode Easing into CRS adoption / limit the impact • Define a sampling rate of n • Only n% of the requests are being funneled into CRS3 • 100% - n% of requests bypass CRS3 • Monitor performance and fix problems • Slowly raise n in an iterative way until it reaches 100%
- 18. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27
- 19. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27
- 20. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27
- 21. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27
- 22. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27
- 23. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27
- 24. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 False Positives False Positives are expected from PL2 • FPs are fought with rule exclusions • Tutorials at https://www.netnea.com • Get cheatsheet from Netnea • Please report FPs at PL1 (github)
- 25. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Apache / ModSecurity / CRS Tutorials https://www.netnea.com/cms/apache-tutorials/
- 26. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Summary ModSecurity & CRS3 • 1st Line of Defense against web application attacks • Generic set of blacklisting rules for WAFs • Blocks 80% of web application attacks in the default installation (with a minimal number of FPs) • Granular control over the behaviour down to the parameter level More information at https://coreruleset.org
- 27. @ChrFolini Introduction to ModSecurity and CRS – BCS London 2019-11-27 Questions and Answers, Contact Contact: christian.folini@netnea.com @ChrFolini