Colaboración Juan Pablo Somiedo Foreknowledge2

foreknowledge
Essential Resources for Intelligence Analysts
Issue Two
April 2012

www.foreknowledge.info
ISSN 2225-5613

Collaborative intelligence analysis
Crowdsourcing &
Crowd forecasting
Intelligence
analytics

Structured
brainstorming

Bitácora de análisis
o memo analítico

Contents

Editor:
Dalene Duvenage

From the editor 3
Collaboration in intelligence analysis 4
Collaborative intelligence sourcing and collection 6
Collaborative intelligence analysis 8

Publisher:
4Knowledge Analysis Solutions
PO Box 40467
Moreleta Park

Exploring collective intelligence and forecasting 12

Pretoria
0044

Other collaborative analysis projects 13

Psychology of intelligence analysis 14
Analyst toolbox

South Africa
Contributions and advertising enquiries:

Structured brainstorming 16
Intelligence analytics 18
Analysis blog or analytic memorandum 19

editor@foreknowledge.info

Disclaimer
Views expressed in articles are not necessarily those of

News about our profession 20

4Knowledge Analysis Solutions cc or of any executive member or director of the endorsing professional organizations
unless expressly so stated.

The effective analyst 21

Editorial submissions

Meet Charmian Taylor 22

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April 2012 • Foreknowledge

2

From the editor
Editor: Dalene Duvenage, Pretoria, South Africa
The reception of the 1st edition for Foreknowledge was phenomenal! The aim of this e-magazine and the website is to educate and inform intelligence analysts and their managers and support personnel about developments in our growing discipline. In this edition we focus on the
emerging trend of collaborative intelligence analysis and how the Lone Ranger analyst can tap into the
knowledge of other experts. Recent research has shown that the levels of teamwork have increased in more
than 95% of scientific subfields; most probably because the remaining problems are incredibly hard to solve.
We experience that in intelligence analysis as well where specialists have to collaborate because many of
our answers lie beyond our own individual cognitive grasp.
The following few pages will provide you with a framework to understand collaborative intelligence analysis and a snapshot of what intelligence organisations are doing to “exploit the collective intelligence of the
masses”. Remember to click on the links to access more information. Enjoy!
Dalene Duvenage

Our contributors:
Richards Heuer is a veteran intelligence scholar and
analyst. He has written
numerous books and articles and resides in
Monterey, California, USA. He gave
us permission to summarise his book,
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.

Brett Peppler is AIPIO
President, Vice Chair of the
International Association
for Intelligence Education
(IAFIE), and a member of
the adjunct faculties of several universities.

Tony Nolan is a risk, intelligence and analysis officer in the Australian
government.

3

Juan Pablo Somiedo is
from Madrid, Spain where
he is strategic and competitive intelligence and a
specialist in the field of
epistemology applied to the
analysis of information

Janet Evans is Associate
Investigator, Centre of
Excellence in Policing
and Security, Australia


need2share

Collaboration in
intelligence
analysis
A new trend that will change the
dynamics of the intelligence industry?
Dalene Duvenage

W

hen one looks at the landscape

challenges are not managed effective-

of intelligence analysis the last

ly. The main obstacle to collaborative

In the Knowledge Age, traditional intelligence organisations have been dis-

few years, it seems as though the lone

intelligence remains tight production

analyst in her cubicle is gradually re-

schedules and the prevailing secret or-

monopoly over their core intelligence

placed by teams of analysts to provide

ganisational culture.

function: forewarning. In fact, the in-

either operational or strategic analysis
support to intelligence functions. The
trend is definitely more evident in the
US and Europe where intelligence
problems have forced disparate agen-

The following few pages take a snapshot of what intelligence organisations
are doing to exploit the collective “wisdom of the crowds”.1

enfranchised from holding the

telligence “space” has expanded with
stakeholders and role-players like
NGOs, transnational organisations
and companies, private knowledge broker firms, as well as interest and pressure groups representing communities,
concepts and ideologies… This “de-

cies to collaborate, than here in Africa

First we glance over what these terms

mocratisation” of intelligence will

where most organisations agencies

might mean in an intelligence context,

have a profound impact on the way in-

have not yet matured to that extent.

before we look at different examples of

Team analysis is more the exception
than the rule and many agencies still
rely on the expert advice of the individual analyst. This is especially evi-

the two main components of collaborative collection or sourcing and

Snowden’s Cynefin model and a pre-

collaborative analysis.

vious model of mine to create this con-

Collective intelligence has developed

and in other national security agencies

in a distinctive discipline with propo-

with minimal analytical resources.

nents and critics in the last few years

privilege of collaborative opportunities
and tools like A-space and Intellipedia.
The rest of the world is sadly trailing
far behind.
We are all well aware of the cognitive
and bias challenges faced by these lone
analysts, in addition to the overwhelming deluge of information. Collaborating with other analysts might
lighten some these burdens, but the
team effort can also fail if the associated complex dynamics and inherent

3

Dalene Duvenage (2010)

tion in intelligence namely collabora-

dent in law enforcement intelligence

Since 2008, analysts in the US had the

telligence is conducted.

tinuum. Of course, this framework is
not absolute and only attempts to provide a provisional framework.

with numerous applications in natural

There is limited collaboration in the

sciences, psychology, economy, digital

knowable domain. Those of you fa-

media, software development etc. Our

miliar with the puzzle and mysteries

focus here will be a very shallow but

analogy, would understand that in

hopefully engaging perspective on de-

this space, the analyst would seek for

velopments and possible applications

missing puzzle pieces to complete his

in the intelligence analysis realm.

understanding of an intelligence prob-

The graphic on the next page depicts
the fluidity of collaboration modes
within intelligence analysis. I have
used some creative license with Dave

lem that many of us are familiar with:
election results of a stabile country
with few role players, an organised
crime syndicate involved in human

1 James Surowiecki (2004) The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the

smuggling, a patent analysis of a com-

Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom

petitor or an analysis of a new weap-

Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations.


need2share
Many intelligence organisations are accepting the fact that they might not know all
the answers. Expert opinions of external scholars, think tanks, consultants and the
general public are increasingly sought to assist in making sense of the threats and
opportunities of the new world. This collaboration will impact on the way intelligence
organisations collect, analyse and communicate their insights to decision-makers.
Continuum of analysis collaboration in intelligence organisations
Complex domain

Unknown domain

● Teams of expert analysts applying structured techniques

● Crowd sourcing & network of
external experts to make
sense of strategic mysteries

Knowable domain
● Individual expert analyst
using intuitive and other
basic techniques
● Traditional intelligence
problems with clearly discernable cause and effect
elements or with little room
for alternatives
● Mainly operational and
tactical analysis

● Complicated strategic intelligence problems with no
clear-cut cause and effect
elements, and which morph
continuously
● Analysts focus more on variables that change intelligence
problem’s essence and
dynamics

● Chaotic, unexpected problems with unknown agents
and variables (“black swans”)
● Flows and patterns not discernable, only in retrospect
● No stable solutions, outcome
is never predictable or explainable

● Emergent solutions

Limited

In-house teams

Broad collaboration
Dalene Duvenage, 2012

ons system. He intuitively knows

pattern, but there is just never enough

In the unknown domain, intelligence

where to get the intel and what it

time or pieces to confirm whether you

problems are chaotic and unexpected

means and might use some basic ana-

hypothesis is correct or not, so you

while the intelligence community ac-

lytical tools like social network analy-

have to reach out and share puzzle

knowledges that it does not have suf-

sis and, timeline analysis to build a

pieces and collaborate to get a grasp of

ficient analytical capacity to deal with

narrative. He rarely collaborates with

what is happening. Intelligence issues

it. These problems, like the possible

other analysts and his intelligence

like the ongoing unrest in Syria, the

economic implosion of China, are real

products are usually of an operational

growing threat of instability on the

mysteries and in-house analyst teams’

or tactical nature.

border between the US and Mexico or

expertise and are not sufficient to

In the complex domain the intelli-

an upcoming tightly contested elec-

make sense of the myriad interrelated

gence problems gets a bit more diffi-

tion in a neighbouring country re-

variables. External experts, sometimes

cult to understand as there are usually

quires multi-faceted analysis. A team

even the general public are ap-

a myriad of role players, interests and

of analysts then collaboratively try to

proached to assist in either the

factors impacting across functional

make sense of the essence and dynam-

sourcing/collection of relevant infor-

desks and intelligence priorities with

ics of the intelligence problem. They

mation and/or the analysis and inter-

strategic implications for various gov-

apply various structured analytical

pretation of disparate flows of

ernment departments. Again, taking

tools to make sure they have ad-

information. Usually, collaborative

the puzzle analogy, analysts receive

dressed and argued as many as possi-

software is used to gather the views

puzzle pieces that just won’t fit any

ble assumptions, hypotheses,

from across a country or even interna-

familiar pattern, most of the time no

scenarios and possible decision impli-

tionally, which is then either moderat-

two pieces will even be from the same

cations. Minority viewpoints are also

ed by in-house experts or self

puzzle. With careful consideration,

taken into account as the team realise

regulated like a wiki. The next pages

you start picking up semblances of a

they might still not have the full pic-

give you a glimpse of collaboration in

ture.

intelligence organisations .


2

need2share

collaborative
igence sourcing
intell
& collection
Crowd sourcing: the practice of obtaining needed services, ideas,
or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of people and especially from the online community rather than from
traditional employees or suppliers
(Merriam Webster)

M

ark Blair, CEO of Defense
Analyst’s Generic Intelligence Requirements Company
(DAGIR Co.) shares his viewpoints
on collaborative intelligence sourcing and collection, or crowd sourcing:
“The crowd represents giant, often
untapped, populations of passive
and active collectors. This is, of
course, a known quantity… from
Tip Lines to Milk Cartons to ‘How’s
my driving?’ bumper stickers, companies and agencies have harnessed
the collection prowess of the crowd
for decades. The crowd is a powerful collection of independent, au-

tonomous operators that, once
activated, produce extremely powerful bodies of information in an
extremely short time frame.
For example, in early 2009 the St
Paul police released a database of
church burglaries and asked the
public for help. We built a crowdsourcing web page with a geospatial analysis system and an array of
analytic tools. Although the effort
was terminated for reasons that
were never made public, contributors from 11 different countries lent
their labor and expertise to solve
the problem and produced findings
that provided valuable insight.”

Today there are unprecedented
technologies and tools that push
crowd collection far beyond its simple beginnings that incorporates
dynamic GIS maps, databases, cell
phone geo-tagged image capturing
and feature recognition.

Crowd sourcing is about the
many contributing a little, not a
few contributing a lot. It is low
cost, rather speedy, and has a
wide breadth of opinions, expertise, and dissent (which is good).
A properly managed crowd is a
formidable analytic machine that
asks for little and gives great dividends”

Spain’s security strategy - everyone’s responsibility
In its new security strategy released in June 2011, the Spanish government envisages
three fora that will incorporate external input to its national security strategy:
Social Forum which, as an advisory body, will bring together
representatives of the Public
Administrations, field experts,
academics, researchers, universities, specialized institutions,
business firms and social organisations to carry out joint analyses on security matters.

3

Integrated External Response
Unit (URIE) for the deployment
of Spanish civilian experts in
national and multinational missions abroad, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, emergencies
or humanitarian aid. It will increase Spanish civilian capabilities and a civilian-military
approach, making Spain a more
effective and committed international actor.

Economic Intelligence System
(SIE), in collaboration with the
private sector, for collecting and
analysing economic, financial
and business information relevant to security, detecting and
preventing acts against our interests, and supporting the action of the State and better
decision-making in this area.


need2share
The

U

crowdmapping story

shahidi which means "testimony" in Swahili,
was a website that was initially developed to

map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-election fallout at the beginning of 2008 for Kenyans to
report and map incidents of violence that they saw via
SMS, email or the web. It has grown to a system that
facilitates early warning systems and helps in data
visualization for response and recovery.
The Ushahidi platform has been used to monitor elections in India, Mexico, Lebanon and Afghanistan. It
has been deployed in the DR Congo to track unrest,
Zambia to monitor medicine stockouts and the Philippines to track the mobile phone companies. It has also
been crucial in rescue operations in Haiti.

Screen shot of the Syrian Spring Crowd map

Crowdmap is the fastest, simplest installation of the

A key component of Ushahidi is the ability to use mo-

Ushahidi platform. Within minutes you'll be up

bile phones as a primary means of both sending crisis

and running with your own installation, mapping

incidents and receiving updates. The Internet can be

reports events and visualizing information.

difficult to access or completely unavailable in some
parts of the world, so the platform was created with
the mobile phone as a foundational element.

Read more about Ushahidi here and here. Listen to
a podcast on Ushahidi crowdsourcing here.. Read
about crowdsourcing here and here.

The US’ Homeland Security National Dialogue Project
Six years after its creation, the
US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) undertook the
first Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review (QHSR), which
will inform the design and implementation of actions to ensure the safety of the United
States and its citizens. The QHSR includes recommendations
addressing the long-term strategy and priorities of the nation
for homeland security and
guidance on the programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities of the
department.
Rather than set policy internally
and implement it in a top-down
fashion, DHS undertook the


QHSR in a new and innovative
way by engaging tens of thousands of stakeholders and soliciting their ideas and comments
at the outset of the process.

cialized knowledge into the review. It also provided the
opportunity to strengthen trust
and create buy-in for later policy
implementation.

Through a series of three weeklong, web-based discussions,
stakeholders reviewed materials
developed by DHS study groups,
submitted and discussed their
own ideas and priorities, and rated or “tagged” others’ feedback
to surface the most relevant ideas
and important themes deserving
further consideration.

Many forms of media were used
to reach potential participants.
These included e-mails to thousands of professionals, invitations delivered at conferences or
meetings, links and buttons
placed on web pages of DHS
and component sites, references
in articles and homeland security journals, and “Dear Colleague” letters passed among
congressional offices as well as
Twitter, Facebook, GovLoop,
and Ning.

This National Dialogue on the
QHSR had important benefits. By
engaging stakeholders at all levels, DHS was able to incorporate
ground-level expertise and spe-

See reports here and here.

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collaborative
intelligence
analysis
Mark Blair, CEO of Defense Analyst’s Generic Intelligence Requirements Company (DAGIR
Co.) shares his view on collaborative intelligence analysis:
“The key to organizing and synthesizing collaborative analytic
efforts is to provide a simple and
intuitive interface allowing individuals to make small contributions with little effort. We don’t
advise trying to re-invent the
wheel here.
For instance, the Delphi Method is
well suited for many analytic
tasks and we often incorporate
such methods in our systems.
Some analytic endeavors require
more complex, specialized apparatuses or low-cost solutions. It is
important to remember that collaborative analysis is about the
crowd, not the analysis.
The crowd will take care of the
analysis, if you give them the
right tools and dynamic navigation to peruse the contributions of
others. A new contributor must
quickly and easily find his/her
place in the larger effort. At the
high-level, facilitators/solicitors
need an easy way solicit the right
help to meet their needs. CrowdSourcing systems must address all
of these issues.
Crowds have other benefits as
well. Crowds can fight cognitive

3

biases, plan accordingly. For instance, the ability for contributors
to remain anonymous can combat
Group Think (Mind Guarding,
Bandwagon Effect, etc.), and the
overemphasis of the opinions of
“experts” or individuals in an authoritative position (Halo Effect).
Other dangers such as Confirmation Bias, Availability Heuristic,
and Anchoring Effect are diluted
as they are less likely to express a
uniform influence over a larger
group (crowd) of contributors.
When organizing a collaborative
effort it is important to give the
crowd an array of tools. If you
give them only a hammer “every
problem is a nail.”
Providing evidence-driven or data-driven tools can ensure that the
crowd develops an empirical
foundation for analytic conclusions. A program (ACH2.0) based
on Richard Heuer’s Analysis of
Competing Hypotheses produced
by the Palo Alto Research Center
can be downloaded for free here.
Tools such as this and even simple
databases encourage the development empirical foundations (e.g.
statistical models, regression analysis, etc.) and bolster confidence.
From our experience, another surprising quality of the crowd, is
that if you give them tools, they
will use them. “

Collaborative
intelligence analysis
competition in UK
In December 2010, the UK
Ministry of Defence’s Centre for
Defence Enterprise (CDE) launched
a Collaborative Multi-Source
Intelligence competition for
proposals that show novel
approaches to collaborative fusion
and analysis using multiple and
different sources of intelligence.
One of the specific challenges is
Collaborative analysis models,
tools and services. The aim is to
develop the understanding of team
sense-making concepts and
processes, together with
applications and services which
offer support to those processes.
More information on the
competition here.
Current status of the project is
unknown.


need2share
Collaboration is fundamentally about behaviors and interactions among individuals working toward a common objective
enabled by IT tools and appropriate organizational policies and underlying cultural norms. The correct nexus for
collaboration is the human interface
with other minds, not the human interface with IT. Robust social networks
serve as an essential underpinning of
collaboration and ensure that communities can come together to put more eyes
on the target, promote analytic excellence, and facilitate informed decisionmaking. Achieving a robust collaborative
environment requires sustained leadership commitment on the part of senior
leaders in every intelligence community
and military organization.
Randoph Pherson and Joan McIntyre
2009

Collaborative
sensemaking in
internal teams
Travels with Shiloh
Imagine an intelligence shop where the analysts are
afforded some control over their time like Google
time. It could be something pretty modest, like 10%
or 20% of their total work time. Analysts can then
‘pitch’ projects to their peers and ask for their assistance in order to benefit from their expertise (‘Can
you take four hours to do a statistical analysis of IED
detonations from 2007-2009?’) or can ask for time
(‘I’d like to ask for 20 hours to complete project X.’)
In the latter case, analysts would donate the time to
someone whose project they endorsed and agree to
‘cover’ for them (with consideration for office
needs).

Randy Pherson proposes that analytical units
should have Transformation Cells which will drive
the establishing of a collaborative culture and mechanisms that are most appropriate to their work environment and in interpreting the rules of the road.
Such help must have a human face to be effective.
The success or failure of efforts to promote cultural
change usually depends on how effectively the
transforming vision is articulated to lower level
managers and the workforce at large.
This is best accomplished by forming a small group
of interpreters and facilitators who can function as a
“help desk” for managers and officers by providing
tailored guidance on how to implement collaborative practices within their work environment in the
most effective and efficient manner possible. Such
Transformation Cells can provide the human infrastructure needed to interpret the leader’s vision (his
or her Command Intent) and help officers apply it
effectively in their workspace.


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collaborative
intelligence
analysis

Collaborative
sensemaking by
external expert teams

The world’s first civil society intelligence
agency
Open Briefing is the world’s first
civil society intelligence agency; an
accessible platform for insight and
analysis on key defence, security
and foreign policy issues. They
provide open source intelligence
assessments and independent
security briefings, so that a better
informed civil society can properly
engage with peace and security
debates and influence positive
policy developments in these
areas. Open Briefing incorporates
social media into everything it
does. They use new
communication technologies to
complement traditional
dissemination strategies and allow
users to access content how they
want, when they want.
They rely on the good will and hard
work of a small group of associate
analysts to support the different
intelligence desks. This is a
voluntary, remote work role, which
can be easily fitted around your
other

commitments. It is only open to
those with excellent research and
analytical skills and demonstrable
knowledge and considerable
experience in one or more of our
issue or regional desk areas.
Associate analysts have an
informal relationship with Open
Briefing, in that they are affiliated to
but independent of the
organisation. They assess
intelligence items, complete source
reliability assessments and file
material and analysis on the
organisation’s website. They also
provide commentary on items filed
on the website and create and
publish dossiers.
They help develop social networks
by commenting on Open Briefing’s
Facebook page, suggesting
sources to add to the desk Twitter
lists, suggesting videos to add to
the desk YouTube playlists,
commenting on LinkedIn and other
professional networks using your
Open Briefing affiliation,
and suggesting items to
add to the digital library.
They also conduct peer
review and help improve
Open Briefing’s
publications. The
analysts are at this stage
not paid but are
included in Open
Briefing’s “list of
experts” for media
enquiries.
See their website here

Collaboration
challenges
Waiting to speak
Domination
Fear of speaking
Misunderstanding
Inattention
Lack of focus
Inadequate criteria
Premature decision
Missing information
Distractions
Digressions
Missing stakeholders
Groupthink
Poor grasp of problem,
Ignored alternatives
Lack of consensus
Poor planning
Hidden agenda
Conflict
Inadequate resources
Poorly defined goals

Robert O Briggs 2009

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Singapore’s Risk Assessment and
Horizon Scanning Programme
Singapore’s Horizon Scanning Centre (HSC) is located
within the National Security Coordination Secretariat under the Prime Minister’s Office. HSC serves as the operational nerve centre of the Risk Assessment and Horizon
Scanning (RAHS) programme. HSC investigates and recommends, through horizon scanning, case studies or other
initiatives, key emerging issues as well as risks or uncertainties across various domains that would have a significant impact on Singapore.
The RAHS system provides end-to-end capabilities to collect and classify data, analyse and understand relationships, and anticipate as well as discover emerging issues
that could have a strategic impact on Singapore. It combines tools, methods and networks for effective scanning
and analysis.
RAHS has provided an opportunity to adopt a whole-ofgovernment approach to strategic anticipation. It hinges on
a collaborative approach linking ministries and agencies
across government. It has the potential to connect silos and
challenge mindsets, develop an instinct to share, and encourage a collective analysis of possible futures.
The RAHS programme was also designed with strategic
networking in mind. To this end, the RAHS programme
has been utilized by and contained the contributions of analysts from the academia and beyond Singapore. The key
objective of such an integrative approach is to bring partner agencies together to work collaboratively on issues of
interest and towards a unique solution to the problems at
hand.
However, collaboration with the private sector has proven
to be a big challenge and HSC is still trying to find the
right collaboration model.

Checklist for successful collaboration
(Tamra Hall & Kerry Buckley, Mitre Corporation)
1

Define collaboration goals and schedule & get buy-in

2

Define collaboration processes and workflow

3

Establishing trusting working relationships

4

Define rules of engagement, data ownership and
attribution

5

Ensure mutual benefit

6

Obtain management support

7

Align reward structures with collaboration goals

8

Develop comprehensive training programs

9

Ensure critical mass usage

Wikistrat is the world’s first Massively Multiplayer Online Consultancy (MMOC). It leverages a global network
of subject-matter experts via a patent pending crowd-sourcing methodology to provide insights unavailable
anywhere else. This online network offers a uniquely powerful and unprecedented strategic consulting service:
the internet’s only central intelligence exchange for strategic analysis and forecasting, delivered, for the first
time, on a real-time, interactive platform. Their network of hundreds of experts follow our scenario-driven
crowd-sourced policy planning methodology to generate unique intelligence products.See their website here


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Exploring Collective
Intelligence and Forecasting
collaborative
intelligence
analysis

T

he MIT Center for Collective Intelligence is exploring a very interesting research question; "How can people
and computers be connected so that –
collectively - they act more intelligently
than any individuals, groups, or computers have ever done before?" The research is based on the phenomenon
observed in natural and human systems
where a group tends to make better decisions than its individual members.
Elsewhere researchers already have operationalised the phenomenon of collective intelligence by developing
prediction markets in which participants
buy and sell predictions about uncertain future events and are paid only if
their predictions are correct. Prediction
markets have been found to be surprisingly accurate in a wide range of situations (including forecasting product
sales and US Presidential elections).
Collective forecasting methods such as
prediction markets are used for decision support by a range of leading organisations. Decision support is a
process of assessing a range of likely
futures, and selecting the action leading
to the best expected outcome. Forecasting, especially the quality of forecasts is
critical for decision support. Collective
forecasting methods utilize all available
data, insight and human intuition by
collecting clear, probabilistic forecasts
of well defined events, pooling the collective forecasts of analysis in a structured, disciplined manner.

Australian Institute
for Professional
Intelligence
Officers
3

Brett Peppler, FAIPIO
President,
Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence Officers

Leveraging collective intelligence and
forecasting offers tangible benefits for
intelligence practice especially when
applied to the challenge of predictive
intelligence. All good intelligence
should be forward-looking because the
future is where the consumer’s next decisions will be made. More broadly,
collective forecasting offers an organising principle for intelligence practice,
which may help to break down barriers
to collaboration across enterprise
boundaries.
During 2012, the Australian Institute of
Professional Intelligence Officers
(AIPIO) is partnering with Presciient to
offer a Collective Forecasting Competition to expose intelligence practitioners
and other interested observers to these
emerging forecasting methods. The
Competition also allows AIPIO to make
a substantive contribution to the intelligence body of knowledge. The Competition was launched in Canberra,
Australia on the 16 February 2012, and
the Competition website is now live at
http://aipio.system-ii.com.
The purpose of the Competition is to
introduce participants to a number of
simple, powerful collective forecasting
methods, including probabilistic forecasting, forecast accuracy measurement,
pooled (collective) forecasting and conditional forecasts. These are cutting
edge methods being used by a range of
organisations and agencies around the
world. The Competition gives participants an opportunity to be exposed to,
and trained in these powerful modern
methods.
The Competition allows participants to
predict the outcomes of a range of
events of interest to intelligence professionals across all domains of intelligence practice. The selected events
include regional and global events relating to weapons proliferation, conflict,
the movement of people and goods, and

statistics such as arrest numbers, boat
arrivals and numbers of casualties.
Events will include both unconditional
(simple predictions) and conditional
(dependent on policy/action) events.
Participants are able to submit
suggested events to add to the mix, by
email to AIPIOcfc@presciient.com, or
create your own events by using the
“new” button on the interface.
The Competition works on three event
expiries; in April, July and October 2012
allowing participants to focus
predictions on event outcomes at one,
three and six months from the Competition’s launch date. Predicted event
outcomes will be assessed against actual outcomes, with competition participants ranked by a range of accuracy
measures, and compared with pooled
forecasts. Presiciient is making available its online collective forecasting platform – System II – for AIPIO to run the
forecasting competition. The System II
platform also provides a systematic
measure of prediction accuracy: of the
pool of predictors, and of any individual predictors within the Competition.
All interested folk may participate, so
please register to create a Competition
account to make predictions. A “How
To” manual may be found at the top of
the main page of the Competition website, and additional supporting documents explaining collective forecasting
and the competition ‘rules’ will shortly
be available on the AIPIO website
(www.aipio.asn.au).
In related activity, AIPIO will be running a master class on Collective Forecasting with System II during the
annual AIPIO conference – Intelligence
2012 – to be held at the Swissotel Sydney during 24-26 July 2012. A review
of the Collective Forecasting Competition will be presented at the annual Forum, which will be held in Perth on 30
November 2012.


need2share
Other collaborative analysis projects
The U.S. Government, specifically the Intelligence Advanced
Research Projects Activity (IARPA), is funding the work of several projects that explore new
methods to combine predictions
from a wide range of volunteer
contributors to provide more
accurate forecasts of global
event with the expectation that
it will improve the accuracy of
intelligence analysis.
Informed investigates various aspects of individual and
group predictions to gain fresh insights into the factors that

Resources

influence people’s predictions about key world events and
trends. In addition, it looks at ways to leverage and inte-

Collaboration White paper: Collaboration

grate this information to develop more accurate overall

in the National Security Arena: Myths

predictions.

and Reality - What Science and Experi-

Daggre by George Mason University aims to learn more

ence Can Contribute to its Success here

about the cognitive and social dynamics involved in accu-

Collaborative Intelligence: Using Teams

rate intelligence forecasting. If you agree to participate, you

to Solve Hard Problems Lessons from and

will be asked to browse and modify forecasts of local and

for Intelligence Professionals J. Richard

world events through a password-protected website
SPADE by The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, with Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign aims to enhance the accuracy, precision, and timeliness of forecasts for a broad range of events.
The predictions you provide will be combined and weight-

Hackman, 2010 here
A Wiki Is Like A Room…And Other Lessons Learned From 15 Wiki-based, Open
Source, Intelligence Analysis Projects,
Kristan Wheaton here

ed with thousands of others in a unique way that outper-

Groupthink: The brainstorming myth by

forms simple aggregation techniques.

Jonah Lehrer here

Forecasting ACE is a joint venture by private research

A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic

company and seven different universities. The universities

Techniques for Improving Intelligence

are: The University of Maryland, The University of Michi-

Analysis here

gan, Ohio State University, Fordham University, Wake
Forest University, Wichita State University and the University of California-Irvine. The company is Applied Research
Associates.


2

thinking

Psychology
of
intelligence
analysis
Richards Heuer
There are still thousands of intelligence analysts and their managers who have not yet read the seminal Psychology of Intelligence
Analysis by Richards Heuer. We will carry excerpts from the book’s chapters in each edition of Foreknowledge. This is an excerpt of
chapter 2 on Perception. You can also download the entire book here.

A

nalysts have a set of assumptions and expectations
about the motivations of people
and the processes of government
in foreign countries. Events consistent with these expectations
are perceived and processed easily, while events that contradict
prevailing expectations tend to be
ignored or distorted in perception.
Of course, this distortion is a subconscious or pre-conscious process. This tendency of people to
perceive what they expect to perceive is more important than any
tendency to perceive what they
want to perceive.
Expectations have many diverse
sources, including past experience, professional training, and
cultural and organizational
norms. All these influences predispose analysts to pay particular
attention to certain kinds of information and to organize and inter3

pret this information in certain
ways. Perception is also influenced by the context in which it
occurs. Patterns of expectations
tell analysts, subconsciously,
what to look for, what is important, and how to interpret what is
seen.
These patterns form a mind-set
that predisposes analysts to
think in certain ways. A mind-set
is akin to a screen or lens through
which one perceives the world.
There is a tendency to think of a
mind-set as something bad, to be
avoided. Actually, mind-sets are
neither good nor bad; they are
unavoidable.
People have no conceivable way
of coping with the volume of
stimuli that impinge upon their
senses, or with the volume and
complexity of the data they have
to analyze, without some kind of
simplifying preconceptions about

what to expect, what is important, and what is related to what.
Analysts do not achieve objective
analysis by avoiding preconceptions; that would be ignorance or
self-delusion. Objectivity is
achieved by making basic assumptions and reasoning as explicit as possible so that they can
be challenged by others and analysts can, themselves, examine
their validity.
Comprehending the nature of
perception has significant implications for understanding the nature and limitations of
intelligence analysis.
The circumstances under which
accurate perception is most difficult are exactly the circumstances
under which intelligence analysis
is generally conducted--dealing
with highly ambiguous situations
on the basis of information that is
processed incrementally under

pressure for early judgment. This
is a recipe for inaccurate perception.
Intelligence seeks to illuminate
the unknown. Almost by definition, intelligence analysis deals
with highly ambiguous situations.
As previously noted, the greater
the ambiguity of the stimuli, the
greater the impact of expectations
and pre-existing images on the
perception of that stimuli. Thus,
despite maximum striving for objectivity, the intelligence analyst's
own preconceptions are likely to
exert a greater impact on the analytical product than in other fields
where an analyst is working with
less ambiguous and less discordant information.
Moreover, the intelligence analyst
is among the first to look at new
problems at an early stage when
the evidence is very fuzzy indeed.
The analyst then follows a problem as additional increments of
evidence are received and the picture gradually clarifies. An analyst who starts observing a
potential problem situation at an
early and unclear stage is at a disadvantage as compared with others, such as policymakers, whose
first exposure may come at a later
stage when more and better information is available.
The receipt of information in
small increments over time also
facilitates assimilation of this information into the analyst's existing views. No one item of
information may be sufficient to
prompt the analyst to change a
previous view. The cumulative
message inherent in many pieces
of information may be significant
but is attenuated when this information is not examined as a
whole.

chologists call premature closure.
Customer demand for interpretive
analysis is greatest within two or
three days after an event occurs.
The system requires the intelligence analyst to come up with an
almost instant diagnosis before
sufficient hard information, and
the broader background information that may be needed to gain
perspective, become available to
make possible a well-grounded
judgment. This diagnosis can only
be based upon the analyst's preconceptions concerning how and
why events normally transpire in
a given society.

Comprehending the nature
of perception has significant
implications for
understanding the nature
and limitations of
intelligence analysis
As time passes and more information is received, a fresh look at all
the evidence might suggest a different explanation. Yet, the perception experiments indicate that
an early judgment adversely affects the formation of future perceptions.
Once an observer thinks he or she
knows what is happening, this
perception tends to resist change.
New data received incrementally
can be fit easily into an analyst's
previous image. This perceptual

thinking
bias is reinforced by organizational pressures favoring consistent
interpretation; once the analyst is
committed in writing, both the
analyst and the organization have
a vested interest in maintaining
the original assessment.
That intelligence analysts perform
as well as they do is testimony to
their generally sound judgment,
training, and dedication in performing a dauntingly difficult
task.
The problems outlined here have
implications for the management
as well as the conduct of analysis.
A prudent management system
should:
● Encourage products that clearly delineate their assumptions
and chains of inference and
that specify the degree and
source of uncertainty involved
in the conclusions.
● Support analyses that periodically re-examine key problems
from the ground up in order to
avoid the pitfalls of the incremental approach.
● Emphasize procedures that expose and elaborate alternative
points of view.
● Educate consumers about the
limitations as well as the capabilities of intelligence analysis;
define a set of realistic expectations as a standard against
which to judge analytical performance. #

The intelligence analyst operates
in an environment that exerts
strong pressures for what psyApril 2012 • Foreknowledge

2

toolbox

Analyst
Structured Brainstorming
From Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis
by Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson. 2010.

Rules
● Be specific about the purpose
and the topic of the brainstorming session.
● New ideas are always encouraged, so never criticize an
idea during the divergent
(creative) phase of the process
no matter how weird or unconventional or improbable it
might sound. Instead, try to
figure out how the idea might
be applied to the task at hand.
When to Use It

● Allocate enough time to do
the brainstorming correctly.

Brainstorming in some form is
one of the most widely used analytic techniques. It is often used at
the beginning of a project to identify a list of relevant variables,
driving forces, a full range of hypotheses, key players or stakeholders, available evidence or
sources of information, potential
solutions to a problem, potential
outcomes or scenarios, or, for law
enforcement, potential suspects or
avenues of investigation.

● To avoid groupthink and
stimulate divergent thinking,
include one or more “outsiders” in the group – that is, astute thinkers who do not
share the same body of
knowledge or perspective as
the other group members but
do have some familiarity with
the topic.

Value Added

● Summarize and distribute the
key findings at the end of the
session. A wiki let the discussion evolve further.

The stimulus for creativity comes
from multiple analysts bouncing
ideas off each other. A brainstorming session usually exposes
an analyst to a greater range of
ideas and perspectives than the
analyst could generate on his or
her own, and this typically results
in a better analytic product.

3

● Write it down! Track the discussion on a whiteboard, easel, or with sticky notes.

● Participants should be encouraged to express every
idea that pops into their
heads. Even ideas that are
outside the realm of the possible may stimulate other ideas
that are more feasible.

The underlying assumption of
brainstorming is that if people
are scared of saying the wrong
thing, they’ll end up saying nothing at all. … there is a problem
with brainstorming. It doesn’t
work…Decades of research have
consistently shown that brainstorming groups think of far
fewer ideas than the same
number of people who work alone
and later pool their ideas…
While the instruction ‘Do not
criticize’ is often cited as the
important instruction in brainstorming, this appears to be a
counterproductive strategy. Our
findings show that debate and
criticism do not inhibit ideas but,
rather, stimulate them relative to
every other condition.
Osborn thought that imagination
is inhibited by the merest hint of
criticism, but Nemeth’s work and
a number of other studies have
demonstrated that it can thrive
on conflict…Dissent stimulates
new ideas because it encourages
us to engage more fully with the
work of others and to reassess
our viewpoints
Jonah Lehrer (2012)


toolbox
Exploiting divergent viewpoints to
enhance collaboration

Structured brainstorming steps
There are no hard and fast rules on exactly how Structured Brainstorming should be done. The following
12-step process was developed for the CIA’s Sherman Kent School of Intelligence Analysis and has worked
well for a number of years. The process is divided into two phases, a divergent thinking (creative) phase
when ideas are presented, and a convergent thinking phase when these ideas are evaluated.

Divergent or creative phase
1. Pass out “Post-It” or “sticky” notes and
marker pens to all participants.
2. Pose the problem or topic in terms of a “focal
question.” Display this question in one sentence for all to see on a large easel or whiteboard.
3. Ask the group to write down responses to the
question with a few key words that will fit on
a Post-It. When a response is written down,
the participant is asked to read it out loud or
to give it to the facilitator who will read it out
loud. Marker pens are used so that people
can easily see what is written on the Post-It
notes later in the exercise.
4. Stick all the Post-Its on a wall in random order as they are called out. Treat all ideas the
same. Encourage participants to build on
each others’ ideas.
5. Usually there is an initial spurt of ideas followed by some pauses as participants contemplate the question. After five or ten
minutes there is often a long pause of a
minute or so. This suggests that the group
has “emptied the barrel of the obvious” and
is now on the verge of coming up with some
fresh insights and ideas. Do not talk during
this pause even if the silence is uncomfortable.

Convergent or evaluative phase
1. Ask all participants as a group to go up to the
wall and rearrange the Post-Its into affinity
groups (groups that have some common
characteristic). Participants are not allowed to
talk during this process. Some Post-Its may
be moved several times, but they will gradually cluster into logical groupings. Post-Its
may be copied in order for one idea to be fit
into more than one group.
2. When all Post-Its have been arranged, ask the
group to select a word or phrase that best describes each grouping.
3. Look for Post-Its that do not fit neatly into
any of the groups. Consider whether such an
outlier is (1) useless noise, or (2) the germ of
an idea that deserves further attention.
4. Assess what the group has accomplished.
Have new ideas or concepts been identified,
have key issues emerged, or are there areas
that need more work or further brainstorming?
5. To identify the best ideas, the facilitator or
group leader should establish up to five criteria for judging the value or importance of the
ideas.
6. Set the analytic priorities accordingly, and
decide on a work plan for the next steps in
the analysis.

6. After two or three of these pauses, conclude
this divergent thinking phase of the brainstorming session.

2

toolbox
Intelligence analytics:
intelligence analysis + mathematical analytics
Tony Nolan
Risk, Intelligence and Analytics Officer, Australian Government

H

ello and welcome to my
column about Intelligence Analytics. Its focus
is the cross over between Intelligence Analysis and Mathematical
Analytics, which I call Intelligence
Analytics. We have all seen in fictional storylines and TV shows,
where the use of data solves
crimes, brings down the bad person and saves the day. Of course
there is much exaggeration, over
simplification, and of course there
is always perfect data, and lots of
data available.
Now, when we deal with the real
world, things are never that fast or
easy. However, mathematics, data
mining and modelling has contributed to solve crimes, reduce
risks, and preventing criminal
events.
When we get down to it, we all
use maths every day in our lives,
but we don't always think about
where we can use maths in our
intelligence careers. This is because of a number of reasons:
● we don't think we are maths
people,
● maths can't possibly measure
what we need,
● there is not enough data,
● maths is something other
people do,
● I don't have the skills I need,
etc.
3

I'm sure we can think up lots
more. But on the other side of the
coin:
● maths can help us tell a story,
● maths can help us join pieces
together,
● mathematical modelling can
uncover patterns,
● maths can help solve a case,
and
● maths has helped to save
many lives all around the
world.

Before I continue, I want to get
one thing straight. Maths can not
do it all, it is not meant to replace
you, it is not meant to take away
any part of your job. Indeed without the Intelligence Analysts perspective, data mining, analytics,
and computer modelling is useless, because it has no context
without the Analyst to interpret
and incorporate the results into
the problem / case at hand.
What I intend to do in this column, is point you to resources,
share open source tools, and tell
you about various methods used
in the intelligence process. I hope
you will find these columns helpful and informative, making your
job easier and helping you to get
better results.
So you know a little about me, I
am an Intelligence Officer who uses mathematical analysts and pat-

tern recognition to profile people
and environments, as well as uncover factors in events.
I failed mathematics at school,
and was never good at maths in
university. Now, I develop new
techniques, help mentor different
people, and advise all levels of
Australian Government, as well
as to the corporate sector. I am a
supporter of Analyst First, a
movement which puts people before software.
However, I could not really end,
with out a few suggestions. Did
you know that there is software
freely available, that will text
mine a document, or website, and
produce lists of words, draws relational maps of the most used
terms, and that is just the beginning.
There are tools of analysis which
use what is called Random Forrest, to make 500 decision trees,
and then tell you just how well
the model will predict a future
event. There are free online tutorials on how to use maths to improve the intelligence product.
Maths and Analytics give the intelligence analyst a scientific platform to support their logic and
deductions, combining together
to make quality reports. Until
next time!


toolbox
Bitácora de análisis o memo analítico
Juan Pablo Somiedo
Madrid, Spain http://elbuhoanaltico.blogspot.com/

El memo analítico es un instrumento
de apoyo al análisis muy importante.
Goza de mala fama entre los analistas, porque además de suponer un
trabajo extra (con el consiguiente
tiempo invertido), puede hacer las
veces de pequeño "chivato" de si trabajamos duro o nos dedicamos a
otras cosas.
Los memos analíticos se elaboran con
fines de triangulación entre analistas
o investigadores, para que otras personas puedan ver lo que hicimos y
cómo lo hicimos. El analista refleja en
este documento los pasos que ha seguido para realizar sus análisis así como el por qué ha escogido
determinadas técnicas en lugar de
otras. La bitácora analítica refleja lo
que “transpiramos” al analizar la in-

formación y nos apoya al establecer
la credibilidad del método de análisis. Además facilita el hecho de que
si, por cualquier motivo, abandonamos ese análisis, otro analista pueda
continuar donde nosotros lo dejamos. Para la elaboración del memo
analítico se sugiere seguir las siguientes indicaciones:
● Registrar la fecha de anotación
● Incluir cualquier referencia o
fuente importante. Por ejemplo,
si consultamos a un colega, anotar quién es él, su puesto y su
comentario. Señalar material de
apoyo localizado (fotografías,
videos, etc).
● Marcar los memos con encabezados que sinteticen la idea, categoría o concepto analizado.

● No restringir el contenido de los
memos o anotaciones, permitirnos el libre flujo de ideas. Por
ejemplo, incluir anotaciones o
comentarios sobre los problemas
durante el proceso.
● Usar diagramas y esquemas
para explicar ideas, hipótesis y
conceptos
● Cuando uno piense que una categoría o concepto haya sido lo
suficientemente definido, crear
un memo adicional y etiquetarlo
con la palabra “saturación”.
● Registrar las reflexiones que ayuden a pasar de un nivel descriptivo a otro interpretativo.
● Guardar una copia de todos los
memos.

Analysis Blog or Analytic Memorandum
Translated by Anina Bester, Pretoria, South Africa
The analytic memorandum is a very
important aid instrument in analysis.
However, it is not popular amongst
analysts because, in addition to signify additional work (with the consequent time spend), it may sometimes
serve as an “indicator” that we are
working hard or that we are working
on something else.
The analytic memorandum is drafted
with the aim of triangulation between
analysts or investigators so that other
people can see what we do and how
this was done. In this document the
analyst reflects on the steps he has
taken to do his analysis, as well as on
the reasons why he has selected certain techniques as opposed to others.
The analysis blog therefore reflects
that which we “perspire” while analyzing information and assists us to


establish the credibility of the analysis method used. It furthermore facilitates the possibility that, should we
abandon the analysis for whatever
reason, another analyst could continue with the process where we left. In
drafting an analytic memorandum, it
is suggested that the following process be followed:
● Register the date of drafting.
● Include all references or important sources. For example, if a
colleague was consulted, note his
name, position and his comment.
Indicate available support material (photographs, videos, etc).
● Mark the memorandum with
subtitles which summarizes the
idea, category or analyzed concept.

● Do not limit the content of the
memorandum or notes in order
to allow for a free flowing of ideas. For example, include notes
and comments on different problems during the process.
● Use diagrams and sketches to
explain ideas, hypotheses and
concepts.
● When you think a category or
concept has been sufficiently defined, create an additional memorandum and label it with the
word “saturated”.
● Register the thought processes
which assisted you to move from
a descriptive to an interpretative
level.
● Keep a copy of all the memorandums.

2

in the news
News about our profession
GCHQ shortlisted in
National Council for
Work Experience
Awards 2012
GCHQ (ed: excerpted)

The GCHQ Student Sponsorship
Scheme (SSS) has been shortlisted
for an award by the National
Council for Work Experience
(NCWE). The GCHQ SSS scheme
(formerly called the Sponsored
Undergraduate Technologist
Scheme) was established in 2005.
The aim is to attract and retain
technologists to GCHQ with a real
technical interest and focus. They
are recruited onto the scheme
from University for one or two
summer placements or an industrial year placement.
During their time in GCHQ they
are given the opportunity to work
in technical areas across the department and do project work
that benefits both the organisation
and the student’s personal and
academic development. The
GCHQ SSS scheme has seen over
200 students pass through, a substantial number of which are now
working as permanent employees
in the Department.

ACH software
used by French
biotechnology
students
Jan 2012: Twenty-six students in
the Advanced Master in Biotechnology Management (link) at Grenoble Ecole de Management
(GEM) are becoming beta-testers
of an intelligence analysis software developed by CIA veterans –
3

a first in Europe. Arsia AmirAslani, Professor and Director of
the Advanced Master in Biotechnology Management at GEM,
said: “We are training students
who already have a strong scientific background, bringing them
strategic management, technology
and innovation skills. It is essential for us to expose our students
to the most advanced analytical
techniques and more particularly
cutting-edge software for them to
immediately add value to their
companies, upon graduation.”

During the 24-hour of bachelor
level courses and the 16-hour of
graduate level courses, the student will be trained to protect
sensitive data and company
know-how to gain and maintain
competitive advantages.
From the year 2012, 20 French
universities including Paris-Dauphine and the University Jean
Monnet in Saint-Etienne, will pioneer these CI courses it should be
spread in all the French educational programs in 2013."

News release by University

CIA to software
vendors: A revolution
is coming
Reuters 21 Feb 2012 (ed: excerpted)

Business Intelligence
compulsory subject
for all French
students in 2013
Sudyrama 9 Jan 2012

From 2013 the French Government announced that business intelligence will become a
compulsory subject in the educational curriculum of all French
students.
Olivier Buquen, the French government representative in charge
of Business/economic Intelligence
stated that this project is designed
to train future employees and
business leaders by raising awareness on the concept of intelligence.

The U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency told software vendors on
Tuesday that it plans to revolutionize the way it does business
with them as part of a race to
keep up with the blazing pace of
technology advances.
Rather than stick with traditional
all-you-can-eat deals known as
"enterprise licensing agreements,"
the CIA wants to buy software
services on a "metered," pay-asyou-go basis, Ira "Gus" Hunt, the
agency's top technology officer,
told an industry conference.
Reginald Brothers, deputy assistant secretary of defense for research, told the conference that
existing software tools for data
analysis, management and interaction lagged the vast amounts of
information that drones and other
high-tech U.S. military sensors
were vacuuming up. "The big data problem is the analysis of it," he
said. Existing tools "do not aid
users ... in the mission timelines."

career

The effective analyst
Janet Evans
Associate Investigator, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Australia
In this 2nd article in a series of four articles, Janet takes us through the findings of research by her and
Mark Kebbell on what makes intelligence analysts effective.

I

n the last issue I
described how
three themes
emerged in the
process of understanding what constitutes an effective
analyst. In this issue I am going to
explore in some detail the first
theme as an indicator of an effective
analyst, the Analytical product.
I find it difficult to reflect on the effectiveness an analyst without
wanting to ask what they produce. I
am not alone because of the thirty
subject matter experts who contributed to the study all wanted to
know about products. Responses
were categorised into product development and the skills required
to disseminate the product. Here
the focus is developing the analytical product.
Four main arguments emerge when
assessing analysts’ effectiveness in
relation to developing products.
The first is the analyst as a competent thinker. It creates a picture of
an effective analyst as a person who
is capable of lateral thinking, creative thought and “thinking outside
the box”.
The second conceptualises the analyst as a problem-solver who provides inferences and
recommendations for action movApril 2012 • Foreknowledge

ing the role from that of technician
to decision makers associate, as described in the first article of this series. In summary the decision
making aspect of the role includes
mental processes resulting in the
nomination of several justified alternatives for action and Mark Lowenthal (2009) describes intelligence
as existing solely to support policy
makers and that the analyst contribution should be to support decision makers.
The third is that life experience
counts for a lot in assessing analyst’s
effectiveness. This study clearly
identified the analyst needing a diverse range of experiences that they
can draw on for their analysis.
These experiences included but
were not limited to being well travelled, extensive work experience
and being exposed to many situations or experience within policing,
being trusted and respected by
peers and superiors or experience in
the criminal investigations department. Everyone in the study describe a need to have something to
draw on to be effective.
The last is the need for training,
mentioned by some but not emphasised.
What this tells me is when I am
looking to recruit an analyst I need
to make sure they can think well,

“thinking outside the box” and
they use their life experience to inform their thinking.
When I reflect on the recruitment
processes I have used I am not sure
a one hour written test adequately
captures how well someone thinks
particularly if I am trying to capture outside the box thinking.
Equally knowing someone has collected many life experiences may
not translate into something meaningful in a single interview. The
question I leave you with is: do
your current recruitment practices
really test what you think, and research suggests will make an effective analyst? I am not sure mine
have!
What is also apparent is how important thinking was rated in comparison to training. Training was
mentioned but thinking was emphasised. This poses some what of
a dilemma because changing someone’s ability to think laterally or
creatively is a much bigger challenge for organisations than training an analyst in a technique or
software but if thinking is an underlying element of effectiveness
we need to recruit it or develop it.
Again I pose a question. How do
we measure thinking skills and
how do we develop them? •

2

people
Meet Charmian Taylor
Corrections intelligence analyst
Department of Corrections, Wellington, New Zealand

N

ot many countries have intelligence analysts in their
corrections department. What is
the role and function of intelligence analysts in the NZ Corrections department and what value
do you bring to the organisation?
Operational Intelligence, the Department’s intelligence function,
assists in protecting the public by
identifying possible criminal activity by prisoners and working
with prison management to prevent or address it. This in turn reduces the number of victims of
crime, holds prisoners to account
and ensures sentence compliance.
Protecting the public is the NZ
Corrections Department’s key priority.

Operational Intelligence plays an
important role in ensuring the
safety of staff and prisoners and
the good order of the prison environment by detecting criminal activity. Information gathered by
analysts working in the Operational Intelligence Unit includes
such things as who prisoners are
associating with, criminal activity
attempts, any tensions between
prisoners or groups of prisoners
(including gang tensions) and other information likely to shape or
influence criminal activities.
Intelligence gathered is used to
track emerging trends and
‘hotspots’ of criminal behaviour,
and advise prison management,
so that strategies can be put in
place. We believe one of the most
effective ways to tackle criminals
and organised crime is to have

Charmian Taylor
was awarded the
2011 Prime Minister’s Prize in Strategic Studies from
Victoria University
for achieving excellent all-round academic performance

3

advance knowledge of their activities and provide recommendations for action.
Our activities also contribute to
reducing crime in the community.
The team liaises closely with other
Government agencies, such as the
NZ Police, and provides them
with information and evidence to
use in their investigations or bring
charges against those involved in
criminal offending. There are
many examples where the monitoring of prisoners’ telephone
conversations has led to arrests in
the community for family violence, drug offending and fraud,
etc.

W

ho are your clients and
what types of intelligence
products do you provide to
them?
We follow the National Intelligence Model, whereby we work
closely with decision makers, to
both provide intelligence products and advice, as well as receive
direction as to intelligence priorities. This involves the integration
of tasking and coordination processes within operational decision
making. Intelligence products
provided to decision makers
within Corrections range from
simple intelligence reports which
detail a crime or disorder problem
and suggested responses, to telephone monitoring disclosures,
prisoner profiles, and tactical assessments at both a prison and
national level.


people
T

ell us about your studies
and the award you received
from the Prime Minister?
During my studies in the Master
of Strategic Studies course offered by Victoria University I
completed papers covering topics
such as Strategic Analysis, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism,
Intelligence Analysis and Interpretation, Transnational Crime
and Intelligence-Led Enforcement.

strategic intelligence as part of the
day-to-day culture of Corrections.
As Intelligence is still a relatively
new function, this may take some
time. It’s not impossible though,
and I believe there’ll be a shift towards safety and security within
prisons becoming intelligence led,
much like how NZ Police and
Customs operate now.

W

hat can intelligence analysts do to promote our
profession?

To complete the research component of the MSS, my dissertation
examined how terrorist, extremist and organised crime groups
are utilising the internet and
web-based technology, and identified points of convergence
where intelligence operations can
best utilise resources in order to
achieve the most effective results.

One of the most important ways

Graduating in December 2010
with a MSS, I received the Prime
Minister’s Prize in Strategic Studies in September 2011. The annual prize is one of three Prizes in
public policy, public management and strategic studies, which
are awarded to the students who
have the best overall performance in the Master of Public Policy, Master of Public Management
and Master of Strategic Studies.

nised, you can help others to

W

hat are your greatest challenges you face as an intelligence analyst and how do
you overcome them?
As an analyst, I face a number of
different challenges each day, including information collection,
competing priorities and time
available to undertake analysis. I
wouldn’t say these are challenges
are unique to just me though, but
most intelligence analysts worldwide. One of the greatest challenges I face would probably be
working towards embedding

to promote intelligence is for analysts to always work with honesty, integrity and passion. By
building trust with information
sources, as well as your decision
makers, and writing products
that you believe in and are willing to stand up to when scrutiunderstand and believe in the
value intelligence can provide.

Read more about intelligence analysis in the corrections domain:
● Example of a Criminal Tradecraft report here
● Investigation into contraband entering a prison and related issues
(strategic report) here
● Intelligence: the key to gang suppression, Brain Parry here
● Using prison gang intelligence from the Inside-out, Melissa Johnson
pages 4-8 here
● State of New Jersey Investigation: Gangland behind bars here (see
appendix for typical use of analysis tools)
● The correction connection: intelligence gathering approaches in
prisons, Jess Maghan here
● Corrections Intelligence chapter written by Melissa Johnson in
Criminal Intelligence for the 21st Century: a guide for Intelligence
Professionals available from LEIU and IALEIA here

2

events

discuss

share

collaborate

2
il 201
Apr
International Studies
Association
Annual Convention

San Diego

1 - 4 April 2012 : Hilton San Diego Bayfront, US
The Intelligence Studies Section's contribution to the
annual ISA conference is 18 intelligence studies
oriented panels, and a number of single papers on
other panels that are intelligence (national security
and defense) related including:
▪ Intelligence, IT, and the Global Information Age
▪ Beyond the intelligence cycle

LEIU & IALEIA Annual
Conference

▪ Intelligence transformation in new democracies

April 30 – May 4, 2012
Loews Coronado Bay, San Diego, US
A wide range of topics and training sessions on law
enforcement intelligence related topics
For more information: Click here

▪ Explaining and evaluating Intelligence Analysis

▪ Who's Watching? Intelligence and surveillance in
the Information Age
▪ Intelligence cooperation and communication
▪ Intelligence and the private sector
▪ Improving intelligence analysis methodologies
For conference information click here
For programme information, click here

May
International Association for Intelligence
Education (IAFIE) 8th Annual Conference

2012

21- 24 May 2012 : Washington DC, US
Intelligence Education: Theory and Practice
Call for papers on the following topics:
▪ Research initiatives
▪ History of intelligence analysis
▪ Future trends in the field of intelligence analysis
▪ Nexus between intelligence education and intelligence training
▪ Successes and lessons learned in intelligence education
▪ International perspectives in developing the profession
Contact Bascom D. Talley, Events Committee Chair, at dittalley@jhu.edu no later than close of business on February
29, 2012. More info on CFP here, more info on conference here

3


J

events

2012
une
International BISA-ISA
conference

ISPM conference
Strategic foresight, strategic agility and future
orientation special interest group

20-22 June 2012 : Edinburgh, Scotland
British International Studies Association and the
International Studies Association Joint
International Conference has the following intelligence related themes:
▪ Risks and Challenges: Information, Intelligence
and Procurement in the Military
▪ International Perspectives on the Teaching of
Intelligence
▪ Intelligence, Misconduct and Torture
▪ Understanding Intelligence: From National Systems to Abstract

17-20 June 2012 : Barcelona, Spain
Not an intelligence conference, but topics has
relevance to intelligence business and
methodologies
▪ Strategic agility
▪ Environmental scanning and peripheral vision
▪ Strategic foresight
▪ Future orientation
For special interest group information, click here


July

The Australian Institute of Professional
Intelligence Officers (AIPIO) Annual
conference

2012

Intelligence 2012: Anticipating Risk & Influencing Action
24th - 26th July 2012: Sydney, Australia
Intelligence 2012 explores the challenges arising from the growing
partnership between intelligence practitioners and their customers.
Customer expectations of intelligence officers are growing as
intelligence-led approaches are becoming more widely employed
in government and the private sector.
Two key challenges to be explored at Intelligence 2012 concern:
▪ anticipating risks in the operating environment; and
▪ influencing action by decision-makers.
Intelligence 2012 will include case-based perspectives from
practitioners, managers and customers, offering practical advice to
address these topical professional challenges. You can also attend
two master classes in critical thinking and collective intelligence.
For more information: Click here


2

Contribute to the growing body of
knowledge in the intelligence
discipline by writing for journals
and presenting at the following
conferences. Send notices of CFP’s
to editor@foreknowledge.info

Call for Papers

Due in April 2012
International Symposium on Foundations of Open Source Intelligence and
Security Informatics: August 27 & 28,
2012, Istanbul, Turkey. Proposals: 15
April 2012. Information here
Workshop on Innovation in Border
Control 2012, August 21-22, 2012,
Odense, Denmark. Proposals: 30 April
2012. Information here
International Symposium on Open
Source Intelligence & Web mining
2012, August 21-22, 2012, Odense,
Denmark. Proposals: 30 April 2012.
Information here

Due in May 2012
Need to Know II: Lessons learned:
October 16-17 21-22, 2012, Odense,
Denmark. Proposals: May 20, 2012.
Information here
IALEIA Journal Summer 2012:
Manuscripts: May 15, 2012.
Information here

In the next Foreknowledge:
● Feedback on the ISA conference
● Should we kill the intelligence cycle?
● Learning from other disciplines
● We talk to various thought leaders
● A wiki for the Foreknowledge resources list?
● And many more!

3


Colaboración Juan Pablo Somiedo Foreknowledge2

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