Fundamentals of Management 8th Edition Robbins Solutions Manual
1. Fundamentals of Management 8th Edition Robbins
Solutions Manual download
https://testbankdeal.com/product/fundamentals-of-management-8th-
edition-robbins-solutions-manual/
Find test banks or solution manuals at testbankdeal.com today!
2. We have selected some products that you may be interested in
Click the link to download now or visit testbankdeal.com
for more options!.
Fundamentals of Management Canadian 8th Edition Robbins
Solutions Manual
https://testbankdeal.com/product/fundamentals-of-management-
canadian-8th-edition-robbins-solutions-manual/
Fundamentals of Management 8th Edition Robbins Test Bank
https://testbankdeal.com/product/fundamentals-of-management-8th-
edition-robbins-test-bank/
Fundamentals of Management Canadian 8th Edition Robbins
Test Bank
https://testbankdeal.com/product/fundamentals-of-management-
canadian-8th-edition-robbins-test-bank/
Contemporary Business Mathematics Canadian 10th Edition
Hummelbrunner Test Bank
https://testbankdeal.com/product/contemporary-business-mathematics-
canadian-10th-edition-hummelbrunner-test-bank/
3. Cognition Exploring the Science of the Mind 5th Edition
Reisberg Test Bank
https://testbankdeal.com/product/cognition-exploring-the-science-of-
the-mind-5th-edition-reisberg-test-bank/
Your College Experience Concise 12th Edition Gardner Test
Bank
https://testbankdeal.com/product/your-college-experience-concise-12th-
edition-gardner-test-bank/
Principles of Business Forecasting 1st Edition Ord
Solutions Manual
https://testbankdeal.com/product/principles-of-business-
forecasting-1st-edition-ord-solutions-manual/
Illustrated Microsoft Office 365 and Word 2016
Comprehensive 1st Edition Duffy Test Bank
https://testbankdeal.com/product/illustrated-microsoft-office-365-and-
word-2016-comprehensive-1st-edition-duffy-test-bank/
Principles of Managerial Finance Brief 6th Edition Gitman
Test Bank
https://testbankdeal.com/product/principles-of-managerial-finance-
brief-6th-edition-gitman-test-bank/
22. approach of the expiration of the charter. But the charter had yet to
run about two and a half of the twenty years to which it was limited.
During the whole term the public deposits were to continue to be
made with the bank. It was clearly foreseen, at the commencement
of the term, as now, that it would expire, and yet congress neither
then nor since has ever thought proper to provide for the withdrawal
of the deposits prior to the expiration of the charter. Whence does
the secretary derive an authority to do what congress had never
done? Whence his power to abridge in effect the period of the
charter, and to limit it to seventeen and a half years, instead of
twenty? Was the urgency for the removal of the deposits so great,
that he could not wait sixty days, until the assembling of congress?
He admits that they were perfectly safe in the bank; that it promptly
met every demand upon it; and that it faithfully performed all its
duties. Why not, then, wait the arrival of congress? The last time the
house of representatives had spoken, among the very last acts of
the last session, that house had declared its full confidence in the
safety of the deposits. Why not wait until it could review the subject,
with all the new light which the secretary could throw upon it, and it
again proclaims its opinion? He comes into office on the twenty-third
of September, 1833, and in three days, with intuitive celerity, he
comprehends the whole of the operations of the complex
department of the treasury, perceives that the government, from its
origin, had been in uniform error, and denounces the opinions of all
his predecessors! And, hastening to rectify universal wrong, in
defiance and in contempt of the resolution of the house, he signs an
order for the removal of the deposits! It was of no consequence to
him, whether places of safety, in substitution of the bank of the
United States, could be obtained or not; without making the
essential precautionary arrangements, he commands the removal
almost instantly to be made.
Why, sir, if the secretary were right in contending that he alone
could order the removal, even he admits that congress has power to
provide for the security of the public money, in the new places to
which it might be transferred. If he did not deign to consult the
23. representatives of the people as to the propriety of the first step, did
not a decent respect to their authority and judgment exact from him
a delay, for the brief term of sixty days, that they might consider
what was fitting to be done? The truth is, that the secretary, by law,
has nothing to do with the care and safe-keeping of the public
money. As has been already shown, that duty is specifically assigned
by law to the treasurer of the United States. And, in assuming upon
himself the authority to provide other depositories than the bank of
the United States, he alike trampled upon the duties of the treasurer,
and what was due to congress. Can any one doubt the motive of this
precipitancy? Does anybody doubt, that it was to preclude the action
of congress, or to bring it under the influence of the executive veto?
Let the two houses, or either of them, perform their duty to the
country, and we shall hereafter see whether, in that respect, at least,
Mr. Secretary will not fail to consummate his purpose.
Second. The next reason assigned for this offensive proceeding,
is the reëlection of the present chief magistrate. The secretary says:
‘I have always regarded the result of the last election of president of the
United States, as the declaration of a majority of the people, that the charter
ought not to be renewed.’ * * * ‘Its voluntary application to congress for the
renewal of its charter four years before it expired, and upon the eve of the
election of president, was understood on all sides as bringing forward that
question for incidental decision at the then approaching election. It was
accordingly argued on both sides before the tribunal of the people, and their
verdict pronounced against the bank,’ and so forth.
What has the secretary to do with elections? Do they belong to
the financial concerns of his department? Why this constant
reference to the result of the last presidential election? Ought not
the president to be content with the triumphant issue of it? Did he
want still more vetoes? The winners ought to forbear making any
complaints, and be satisfied, whatever the losers may be. After an
election is fairly terminated, I have always thought that the best way
was to forget all the incidents of the preceding canvass, and
especially the manner in which votes had been cast. If one has been
24. successful, that ought to be sufficient for him; if defeated, regrets
are unavailing. Our fellow-citizens have a right freely to exercise
their elective franchise as they please, and no one, certainly no
candidate, has any right to complain about it.
But the argument of the secretary is, that the question of the
bank was fully submitted to the people, by the consent of all parties,
fully discussed before them, and their verdict pronounced against
the institution, in the reëlection of the president. His statement of
the case requires that we should examine carefully the various
messages of the president, to ascertain whether the bank question
was fairly and frankly, (to use a favorite expression of the president,)
submitted by him to the people of the United States. In his message
of 1829, the president says:
‘The charter of the bank of the United States expires in 1836, and its
stockholders will most probably apply for a renewal of their privileges. In order to
avoid the evils resulting from precipitancy in a measure involving such important
principles, and such deep pecuniary interests, I feel that I cannot, in justice to the
parties interested, too soon present it to the deliberate consideration of the
legislature and the people.’
The charter had then upwards of six years to run. Upon this
solemn invitation of the chief magistrate, two years afterwards, the
bank came forward with an application for renewal. Then it was
discovered that the application was premature. And the bank was
denounced for accepting the very invitation which had been formally
given. The president proceeds:
‘Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the bank are well questioned
by a large portion of our fellow-citizens.’
This message was a noncommittal. The president does not
announce clearly his own opinion, but states that of a large portion
of our fellow-citizens. Now we all know that a large and highly
respectable number of the people of the United States have always
entertained an opinion adverse to the bank on both grounds. The
president continues:
25. ‘If such an institution is deemed essential to the fiscal operations of the
government, I submit to the wisdom of the legislature whether a national one,
founded upon the credit of the government, and its resources, might not be
devised.’
Here, again, the president, so far from expressing an explicit
opinion against all national banks, makes a hypothetical admission of
the utility of a bank, and distinctly intimates the practicability of
devising one on the basis of the credit and resources of the
government.
In his message of 1830, speaking of the bank, the president
says:
‘Nothing has occurred to lessen, in any degree, the dangers which many of
our citizens apprehend from that institution, as at present organized. In the spirit
of improvement and compromise, which distinguishes our country and its
institutions, it becomes us to inquire whether it be not possible to secure the
advantages afforded by the present bank through the agency of a bank of the
United States, so modified in its principles and structure, as to obviate
constitutional and other objections.’
Here, again, the president recites the apprehensions of ‘many of
our citizens,’ rather than avows his own opinion. He admits, indeed,
‘the advantages afforded by the present bank,’ but suggests an
inquiry whether it be possible, (of course doubting,) to secure them
by a bank differently constructed. And towards the conclusion of that
part of the message, his language fully justifies the implication, that
it was not to the bank itself, but to ‘its present form,’ that he
objected.
The message of 1831, when treating of the bank, was very brief.
The president says:
‘Entertaining the opinions heretofore expressed in relation to the bank of the
United States, as at present organized,’ (noncommittal once more: and what that
means, Mr. President, nobody better knows than you and I,) ‘I felt it my duty, in
my former messages, frankly to disclose them.’
26. Frank disclosures! Now, sir, I recollect perfectly well the
impressions made on my mind, and on those of other senators with
whom I conversed, immediately after the message was read. We
thought and said to each other, the president has left a door open to
pass out. It is not the bank; it is not any bank of the United States
to which he is opposed, but it is to the particular organization of the
existing bank. And we all concluded that, if amendments could be
made to the charter satisfactory to the president, he would approve
a bill for its renewal.
We come now to the famous message of July, 1832, negativing
the bill to recharter the bank. Here, it may be expected, we shall
certainly find clear opinions, unequivocally expressed. The president
cannot elude the question. He must now be perfectly frank. We shall
presently see. He says:
‘A bank of the United States is, in many respects, convenient to the
government, and useful to the people. Entertaining this opinion, and deeply
impressed with the belief that some of the powers and privileges possessed by the
existing bank, are unauthorized by the constitution.’ and so forth. * * * ‘I felt
it my duty, at an early period of my administration, to call the attention of
congress to the practicability of organizing an institution, combining all its
advantages, and obviating these objections. I sincerely regret, that in the act
before me I can perceive none of those modifications,’ and so forth. * * *
‘That a bank of the United States, competent to all the duties which may be
required by the government, might be so organized as not to infringe on our own
delegated powers, or the reserved rights of the states, I do not entertain a doubt.
Had the executive been called on to furnish the project of such an institution, the
duty would have been cheerfully performed.’
The message is principally employed in discussing the objections
which the president entertained to the particular provisions of the
charter, and not to the bank itself; such as the right of foreigners to
hold stock in it; its exemption from state taxation; its capacity to
hold real estate, and so forth, and so forth. Does the president, even
in this message, array himself in opposition to any bank of the
United States? Does he even oppose himself to the existing bank
27. under every organization of which it is susceptible? On the contrary,
does he not declare that he does not entertain a doubt that a bank
may be constitutionally organized? Does he not even rebuke
congress for not calling on him to furnish a project of a bank, which
he would have cheerfully supplied? Is it not fairly deducible, from the
message, that the charter of the present bank might have been so
amended as to have secured the president’s approbation to the
institution? So far was the message from being decisive against all
banks of the United States, or against the existing bank, under any
modification, that the president expressly declares that the question
was adjourned. He says:
‘A general discussion will now take place, eliciting new light, and settling
important principles; and a new congress, elected in the midst of such discussion,
and furnishing an equal representation of the people, according to the last census,
will bear to the capitol the verdict of public opinion, and I doubt not bring this
important question to a satisfactory result.’
This review of the various messages of the president,
conclusively evinces that they were far from expressing, frankly and
decisively, any opinions of the chief magistrate, except that he was
opposed to the amendments of the charter contained in the bill
submitted to him for its renewal, and that he required further
amendments. It demonstrates that he entertained no doubt that it
was practicable and desirable to establish a bank of the United
States; it justified the hope that he might be ultimately reconciled to
the continuation of the present bank, with suitable modifications;
and it expressly proclaimed that the whole subject was adjourned to
the new congress, to be assembled under the last census. If the
parts of the messages which I have cited, or other expressions, in
the same document, be doubtful, or susceptible of a different
interpretation, the review is sufficient for my purpose; which is, to
refute the argument, so confidently advanced, that the president’s
opinion, in opposition to the present or any other bank of the United
States, was frankly and fairly stated to the people, prior to the late
election, was fully understood, and finally decided by them.
28. Accordingly, in the canvass which ensued, it was boldly asserted
by the partisans of the president, that he was not opposed to a bank
of the United States, nor to the existing bank with proper
amendments. They maintained, at least, wherever those friendly to
a national bank were in the majority, that the reëlection would be
followed by a recharter of the bank, with proper amendments. They
dwelt, it is true, with great earnestness, upon his objections to the
pernicious influence of foreigners in holding stock in it; but they
nevertheless contended that these objections would be cured, if he
was reëlected, and the bank sustained. I appeal to the whole
senate, to my colleagues, to the people of Kentucky, and especially
to the citizens of the city of Louisville, for the correctness of this
statement.
After all this, was it anticipated by the people of the United
States, that, in the reëlection of the president, they were deciding
against an institution of such vital importance? Could they have
imagined, that, after an express adjournment of the whole matter to
a new congress, by the president himself, he would have prejudged
the action of this new congress, and pronounced that a question,
expressly by himself referred to its authority, was previously settled
by the people? He claimed no such result in his message,
immediately after the reëlection; although in it he denounced the
bank as an unsafe depository of the public money, and invited
congress to investigate its condition. The president, then, and the
secretary of the treasury, are without all color of justification for their
assertions, that the question of bank or no bank was fully and fairly
submitted to the people, and a decision pronounced against it by
them.
Sir, I am surprised and alarmed at the new source of executive
power, which is found in the result of a presidential election. I had
supposed that the constitution and the laws were the sole source of
executive authority; that the constitution could only be amended in
the mode which it has itself prescribed; that the issue of a
presidential election, was merely to place the chief magistrate in the
29. post assigned to him; and that he had neither more nor less power,
in consequence of the election, than the constitution defines and
delegates. But it seems that if, prior to an election, certain opinions,
no matter how ambiguously put forth by a candidate, are known to
the people, these loose opinions, in virtue of the election,
incorporate themselves with the constitution, and afterwards are to
be regarded and expounded as parts of the instrument.
Third. The public money ought not, the secretary thinks, to
remain in the bank until the last moment of the existence of the
charter. But that was not the question which he had to decide on the
twenty-sixth of September last. The real question then was, could he
not wait sixty days for the meeting of congress? There were many
last moments, nearly two years and a half, between the twenty-sixth
of September and the day of the expiration of the charter. But why
not let the public money remain in the bank until the last day of the
charter? It is a part of the charter, that it shall so remain; and
congress having so ordered it, the secretary ought to have
acquiesced in the will of congress, unless the exigency had arisen on
which alone it was supposed his power over the deposits would be
exercised. The secretary is greatly mistaken, in believing that the
bank will be less secure in the last hours of its existence than
previously. It will then be collecting its resources, with a view to the
immediate payment of its notes, and the ultimate division among the
stockholders of their capital; and at no period of its existence will it
be so strong and able to pay all demands upon it. As to the
depreciation in the value of its notes in the interior, at that time,
why, sir, is the secretary possessed of the least knowledge of the
course of the trade of the interior, and especially of the western
states? If he had any, he could not have made such a suggestion.
When the bank itself is not drawing, its notes form the best medium
of remittance from the interior to the Atlantic capitals. They are
sought after by merchants and traders with avidity, are never below
par, and in the absence of bank drafts may command a premium.
This will continue to be the case as long as the charter endures, and
especially during the last moments of its existence, when its ability
30. will be unquestionable, Philadelphia being the place of the
redemption; whilst the notes themselves will be received in all the
large cities in payment of duties.
Fourth. The secretary asserts, that ‘it is well understood that the
superior credit heretofore enjoyed by the notes of the bank of the
United States, was not founded on any particular confidence in its
management or solidity. It was occasioned altogether by the
agreement on behalf of the public, in the act of incorporation, to
receive them in all payments to the United States.’ I have rarely seen
any state paper characterized by so little gravity, dignity, and
circumspection, as the report displays. The secretary is perfectly
reckless in his assertions of matters of fact, and culpably loose in his
reasoning. Can he believe the assertion which he has made? Can he
believe, for example, that if the notes of the bank of the Metropolis
were made receivable in all payments to the government, they
would ever acquire, at home and abroad, the credit and confidence
which are attached to those of the bank of the United States? If he
had stated that the faculty mentioned, was one of the elements of
the great credit of those notes, the statement would have been true;
but who can agree with him, that it is the sole cause? The credit of
the bank of the United States results from the large amount of its
capital; from the great ability and integrity with which it has been
administered; from the participation of the government in its affairs;
from its advantageous location; from its being the place of deposit of
the public moneys, and its notes being receivable in all payments to
the government; and from its being emphatically the bank of the
United States. This latter circumstance arranges it with the bank of
England, France, Amsterdam, Genoa, and so forth.
Fifth. The expansion and contraction of the accommodations of
the bank to its individual customers, are held up by the secretary, in
bold relief, as evidences of misconduct, which justified his
withdrawal of the deposits. He represents the bank as endeavoring
to operate on the public, by alternate bribery and oppression, with
the same object in both cases, of influencing the election, or the
31. administration of the president. Why this perpetual reference of all
the operations of the institution to the executive? Why does the
executive think of nothing but itself? It is I! It is I! It is I, that is
meant! appears to be the constant exclamation. Christianity and
charity enjoin us never to ascribe a bad motive if we can suppose a
good one. The bank is a moneyed corporation, whose profits result
from its business; if that be extensive, it makes better; if limited,
less profit. Its interest is to make the greatest amount of dividends
which it can safely. And all its actions may be more certainly ascribed
to that than any other principle. The administration must have a
poor opinion of the virtue and intelligence of the people of the
United States, if it supposes that their judgments are to be warped,
and their opinions controlled by any scale of graduated bank
accommodations. The bank must have a still poorer conception of its
duty to the stockholder, if it were to regulate its issues by the
uncertain and speculative standard of political effect, rather than a
positive arithmetical rule for the computation of interest.
As to the alleged extension of the business of the bank, it has
been again and again satisfactorily accounted for by the payment of
the public debt, and the withdrawal from Europe of considerable
sums, which threw into its vaults a large amount of funds, which, to
be productive, must be employed; and, as the commercial wants
proceeding from extraordinary activity of business, created great
demands about the same period for bank accommodations, the
institution naturally enlarged its transactions. It would have been
treacherous to the best interests of its constituents if it had not done
so. The recent contraction of its business is the result of an obvious
cause. Notwithstanding the confidence in it, manifested by one of
the last acts of the last house of representatives, congress had
scarcely left the district before measures were put in operation to
circumvent its authority. Denunciations and threats were put forth
against it. Rumors, stamped with but too much authority, were
circulated, of the intention of the executive to disregard the
admonition of the house of representatives. An agent was sent out—
and then such an agent—to sound the local institutions as to the
32. terms on which they would receive the deposits. Was the bank, who
could not be ignorant of all this, to sit carelessly by, without taking
any precautionary measures? The prudent mariner, when he sees
the coming storm, furls his sails, and prepares for all its rage. The
bank knew that the executive was in open hostility to it, and that it
had nothing to expect from its forbearance. It had numerous points
to defend, the strength or weakness of all of which was well known
from its weekly returns to the secretary, and it could not possibly
know at which the first mortal stroke would be aimed. If, on the
twentieth of September last, instead of the manifesto of the
president against the bank, he had officially announced, that he did
not mean to make war upon the bank, and intended to allow the
public deposits to remain until the pleasure of congress was
expressed, public confidence would have been assured and
unshaken, the business of the country continued in quiet and
prosperity, and the numerous bankruptcies in our commercial cities
averted. The wisdom of human actions is better known in their
results than at their inception. That of the bank is manifest from all
that has happened, and especially from its actual condition of
perfect security.
Sixth. The secretary complains of misconduct of the bank in
delegating to the committee of exchange the transaction of
important business, and in that committee’s being appointed by the
president and not the board, by which the government directors
have been excluded. The directors who compose the board meet
only periodically. Deriving no compensation from their places, which
the charter, indeed, prohibits them from receiving, it cannot be
expected that they should be constantly in session. They must,
necessarily, therefore, devolve a great part of the business of the
bank in its details, upon the officers and servants of the corporation.
It is sufficient, if the board controls, governs, and directs the whole
machine. The most important operation of a bank, is that of paying
out its cash, and that the cashier or teller and not the board
performs. As to committees of exchange, the board not being always
in session, it is evident that the convenience of the public requires
33. that there should be some authority at the bank daily, to pass daily
upon bills, either in the sale or purchase, as the wants of the
community require. Every bank, I believe, that does business to any
extent, has a committee of exchange, similar to that of the bank of
the United States. In regard to the mode of appointment by the
president of the board, it is in conformity with the invariable usage
of the house of representatives, with the practice of the senate for
several years, and, until altered at the commencement of this
session, with the usage, in a great variety, if not all of the state
legislatures, and with that which prevails in our popular assemblies.
The president, speaker, chairman, moderator, almost uniformly
appoints committees. That none of the government directors have
been on the committee of exchange, has proceeded, it is to be
presumed, from their not being entitled, from their skill and
experience, and standing in society, to be put there. The
government directors stand upon the same equal footing with those
appointed by the stockholders. When appointed, they are thrown
into the mass, and must take their fair chances with their colleagues.
If the president of the United States will nominate men of high
character and credit, of known experience and knowledge in
business, they will, no doubt, be placed in corresponding stations. If
he appoints different men, he cannot expect it. Banks are exactly the
places where currency and value are well understood, and duly
estimated. A piece of coin, having even the stamp of the
government, will not pass, unless the metal is pure.
Seventh. The French bill forms another topic of great complaint
with the secretary. The state of the case is, that the government
sold to the bank a bill on that of France for nine hundred thousand
dollars, which the bank sold in London, whence it was sent by the
purchaser to Paris to receive the amount. When the bank purchased
the bill, it paid the amount to the government, or, which is the same
thing, passed it to the credit of the treasury, to be used on demand.
The bill was protested in Paris, and the agents of the bank, to avoid
its being liable to damages, took up the bill on account of the bank.
The bill being dishonored, the bank comes back on the drawer, and
34. demands the customary damages due according to the course of all
such transactions. The complaint of the secretary is, that the bank
took up the bill to save its own credit, and that it did not do it on
account of the government; in other words, that the bank did not
advance at Paris nine hundred thousand dollars to the government
on account of a bill which it had already paid, every dollar, at
Philadelphia. Why, sir, has the secretary read the charter? If he has,
he must have known that the bank could not have advanced the
nine hundred thousand dollars for the government at Paris, without
subjecting itself to a penalty of three times the amount, (two million
and seven hundred thousand dollars.) The thirteenth section of the
charter is express and positive:
‘That if the said corporation shall advance or lend any sum of money for the
use or on account of the government of the United States, to an amount
exceeding five hundred thousand dollars, all persons concerned in making such
unlawful advances or loan, shall forfeit treble the amount, one fifth to the
informer,’ and so forth.
Eighth. The last reason which I shall notice of the secretary is,
that this ambitious corporation aspires to possess political power.
Those in the actual possession of power, especially when they have
grossly abused it, are perpetually dreading its loss. The miser does
not cling to his treasure with a more death-like grasp. Their
suspicions are always active and on the alert. In every form they
behold a rival, and every breeze comes charged with alarm and
dread. A thousand spectres glide before their affrighted
imaginations, and they see, in every attempt to enlighten those who
have placed them in office, a sinister design to snatch from them
their authority. On what other principles can we account for the
extravagant charges brought forward by the secretary against the
bank? More groundless and reckless assertions than those which he
has allowed himself to embody in his report, never were presented
to a deceived, insulted, and outraged people. Suffer me, sir, to group
some of them. He asserts, ‘that there is sufficient evidence to prove
that the bank has used its means to obtain political power;’ that, in
the presidential election, ‘the bank took an open and direct interest,
35. demonstrating that it was using its money for the purpose of
obtaining a hold upon the people of this country;’ that it ‘entered the
political arena;’ that it circulated publications containing ‘attacks on
the officers of government;’ that ‘it is now openly in the field as a
political partisan;’ that there are ‘positive proofs’ of the efforts of the
bank to obtain power. And, finally, he concludes, as a demonstrated
proposition:
‘Fourthly, that there is sufficient evidence to show that the bank has been and
still is seeking to obtain political power, and has used its money for the purpose of
influencing the election of the public servants.’
After all this, who can doubt that this ambitious corporation is a
candidate for the next presidency? Or, if it can moderate its lofty
pretensions, that it means at least to go for the office of secretary of
the treasury, upon the next removal? But, sir, where are the proofs
of these political designs? Can any thing be more reckless than these
confident assertions of the secretary? Let us have the proofs; I call
for the proofs. The bank has been the constant object for years of
vituperation and calumny. It has been assailed in every form of
bitterness and malignity. Its operations have been misrepresented;
attempts have been made to destroy its credit, and the public
confidence in its integrity and solidity; and the character of its
officers has been assailed. Under these circumstances, it has dared
to defend itself. It has circulated public documents, speeches of
members of congress, reports made by chairmen of committees,
friends of the administration, and other papers. And, as it was
necessary to make the defence commensurate with the duration and
the extensive theatre of the attack, it has been compelled to incur a
heavy expense to save itself from threatened destruction. It has
openly avowed, and yet avows, its right and purpose to defend itself.
All this was known to the last congress. Not a solitary material fact
has been since disclosed. And when before, in a country where the
press is free, was it deemed criminal for any body to defend itself?
Who invested the secretary of the treasury with power to interpose
himself between the people, and light and intelligence? Who gave
36. him the right to dictate what information should be communicated to
the people and by whom? Whence does he derive his jurisdiction?
Who made him censor of the public press? From what new sedition
law does he deduce his authority? Is the superintendence of the
American press a part of the financial duty of a secretary of the
treasury? Why did he not lay the whole case before congress, and
invite the revival of the old sedition law? Why anticipate the arrival
of their session? Why usurp the authority of the only department of
government competent to apply a remedy, if there be any power to
abridge the freedom of the press? If the secretary wishes to purify
the press, he has a most Herculean duty before him. And when he
sallies out on his quixotic expedition, he had better begin with the
Augean stable, the press nearest to him, his organ, as most needing
purification.
I have done with the secretary’s reasons. They have been
weighed and found wanting. There was not only no financial motive
for his acting—the sole motive which he could officially entertain—
but every financial consideration forbade him to act. I proceed now,
in the third and last place, to examine the manner in which he has
exercised his power over the deposits.
Thirdly. The whole people of the United States derive an interest
from the public deposits in the bank of the United States, as a
stockholder, in that institution. The bank is enabled, through its
branches, to throw capital into those parts of the union where it is
most needed. Thus it distributes and equalizes the advantages
accruing from the collection of a large public revenue, and the
consequent public deposits. Thus it neutralizes the injustice which
would otherwise flow from the people of the west and the interior’s
paying their full proportion of the public burdens, without deriving
any corresponding benefit from the circulation and deposits of the
public revenue. The use of the capital of the bank has been signally
beneficial to the west. We there want capital, domestic, foreign—any
capital that we can honestly get. We want it to stimulate enterprise,
to give activity to business, and to develope the vast resources
37. which the bounty of Nature has concentrated in that region. But, by
the secretary’s financial arrangements, the twenty-five or thirty
millions of the public revenue collected from all the people of the
United States, (including those of the west,) will be retained in a few
Atlantic ports. Each port will engross the public moneys there
collected. And, as that of New York collects about one half of the
public revenue, all the people of the United States will be laid under
contribution, not for the sake of the people of the city of New York,
but of two or three banks in that city, in which the people of the
United States, collectively, have not a particle of interest; banks, the
stock in which is or may be held by foreigners.
Three months have elapsed, and the secretary has not yet found
places of deposit for the public moneys, as substitutes for the bank
of the United States. He tells us, in his report of yesterday, that the
bank at Charleston, to which he applied for their reception, declined
the custody, and that he has yet found no other bank willing to
assume it. But he states that the public interest does not in
consequence suffer. No! What is done with the public moneys
constantly receiving in the important port of Charleston, the largest
port, (New Orleans excepted,) from the Potomac to the Gulf of
Mexico? What with the revenue bonds? It appears that he has not
yet received the charters from all the banks selected as places of
deposit. Can any thing be more improvident than that the secretary
should undertake to contract with banks, without knowing their
power and capacity to contract by their charters? That he should
venture to deposit the people’s money in banks, without a full
knowledge of every thing respecting their actual condition? But he
has found some banks willing to receive the public deposits, and he
has entered into contracts with them. And the very first step he has
taken has been in direct violation of an express and positive statute
of the United States. By the act of the first of May, 1820, section
sixth, it is enacted:
‘That no contract shall hereafter be made by the secretary of state, or of the
treasury, or of the department of war, or of the navy, except under a law
38. authorizing the same, or under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment; and
excepting, also, contracts for the subsistence and clothing of the army or navy,
and contracts by the quarter-master’s department, which may be made by the
secretaries of those departments.’
Now, sir, what law authorized these contracts with the local
banks, made by the secretary of the treasury? The argument, if
I understand the argument intended to be employed on the other
side, is this; that, by the bank charter, the secretary, is authorized to
remove the public deposits, and that includes the power in question?
But the act establishing the treasury department confides, expressly,
the safe-keeping of the public moneys of the United States to the
treasurer of the United States, and not to the secretary; and the
treasurer, not the secretary, gives a bond for the fidelity with which
he shall keep them. The moment, therefore, that they are withdrawn
from the bank of the United States, they are placed, by law, under
the charge and responsibility of the treasurer and his bond, and not
of the secretary, who has given no bond. But let us trace this
argument a little further. The power to remove the deposits, says the
secretary, from a given place, implies the power to designate the
place to which they shall be removed. And this implied power to
designate the place to which they shall be removed, implies the
power to the secretary of the treasury to contract with the new
banks of deposit. And, on this third link, in the chain of implications,
a fourth is constructed, to dispense with the express duties of the
treasurer of the United States, defined in a positive statute; and yet
a fifth, to repeal a positive statute of congress, passed four years
after the passage of the law containing the present source of this
most extraordinary chain of implications. The exceptions in the act of
1820, prove the inflexibility of the rule which it prescribes. Annual
appropriations are made for the clothing and subsistence of the
army and navy. These appropriations might have been supposed to
be included in a power to contract for those articles, notwithstanding
the prohibitory clause in that act. But congress thought otherwise,
and therefore expressly provided for the exceptions. It must be
admitted that our clerk, (as the late governor Robinson, of Louisiana,
39. one of the purest republicans I have ever known, used to call a
secretary of the treasury,) tramples with very little ceremony upon
the duties of the treasurer, and the acts of the congress of the
United States, when they come in his way.
These contracts, therefore, between the secretary of the treasury
and the local banks are mere nullities, and absolutely void,
enforceable in no court of justice whatever, for two causes; first,
because they are made in violation of the act of the first of May,
1820; and, secondly, because the treasurer, and not the secretary of
the treasury, alone had, if any federal officer possessed the power to
contract with the local banks. And here, again, we perceive the
necessity there was for avoiding the precipitancy with which the
executive acted, and for awaiting the meeting of congress. Congress
could have deliberately reviewed the previous legislation, decided
upon the expediency of a transfer of the public deposits, and, if
deemed proper, could have passed the new laws adapted to the new
condition of the treasury. It could have decided whether the local
banks should pay any bonus, or pay any interest, or diffuse the
public deposits throughout the United States, so as to secure among
all their parts, equality of benefits as well as of burdens, and
provided for ample guarantees for the safety of the public moneys in
their new depositories.
But let us now inquire, whether the secretary of the treasury has
exercised his usurped authority, in the formation of these contracts,
with prudence and discretion. Having substituted himself to congress
and to the treasurer of the United States, he ought at least to show
that, in the stipulations of the contracts themselves, he has guarded
the public moneys and provided for the public interests. I will
examine the contract with the Girard bank of Philadelphia, which is
presented as a specimen of the contracts with the Atlantic banks.
The first stipulation limits the duty of the local banks to receive in
deposit, on account of the United States, only the notes of banks
convertible into coin, ‘in its immediate vicinity,’ or which it is, ‘for the
time being, in the habit of receiving.’ Under this stipulation, the
40. Girard bank, for example, will not be bound to receive the notes of
the Louisville bank, although that also be one of the deposit banks,
nor the notes of any other bank, not in its immediate vicinity. As to
the provision that it will receive the notes of banks which, for the
time being, it is in the habit of receiving, it is absurd to put such a
stipulation in a contract, because by the power retained to change
the habit, for the time being, it is an absolute nullity. Now, sir, how
does this compare with the charter and bank of the United States?
The bank receives every where, and credits the government with the
notes, whether issued by the branches or the principal bank. The
amount of all these notes is every where available to the
government. But the government may be overflowing in distant bank
notes when they are not wanted, and a bankrupt, at the places of
expenditure, under this singular arrangement.
With respect to the transfer of moneys from place to place, the
local banks require in this contract, that it shall not take place but
upon reasonable notice. And what reasonable is, has been left totally
undefined, and of course open to future contest. When hereafter a
transfer is ordered, and the bank is unable to make it, there is
nothing to do but to allege the unreasonableness of the notice. The
local bank agrees to render to the government all the services now
performed by the bank of the United States, subject, however, to the
restriction that they are required ‘in the vicinity’ of the local bank.
But the bank of the United States is under no such restrictions; its
services are coextensive with the United States and their territories.
The local banks agree to submit their books and accounts to the
secretary of the treasury, or to any agent to be appointed by him,
but to be paid by the local banks pro rata, as far as such
examination is admissible without a violation of their respective
charters; and how far that may be, the secretary cannot tell,
because he has not yet seen all the charters. He is, however, to
appoint the agents of examination, and to fix the salaries which the
local banks are to pay. And where does the secretary find the
41. authority to create officers and fix their salaries, without the
authority of congress?
But the most improvident, unprecedented, and extraordinary
provision in the contract, is that which relates to the security. When,
and not until the deposits in the local bank shall exceed one half of
the capital stock annually paid in, collateral security, satisfactory to
the secretary of the treasury, is to be given for the safety of the
deposits. Why, sir, a freshman, a schoolboy, would not have thus
dealt with his father’s guardian’s money. Instead of the security
preceding, it is to follow the deposit of the people’s money! That is,
the local bank gets an amount of their money, equal to one half its
capital, and then it condescends to give security! Does not the
secretary know, that when he goes for the security, the money may
be gone, and that he may be entirely unable to get the one or the
other! We have a law, if I mistake not, which forbids the advance of
any public money, even to a disbursing agent of the government,
without previous security. Yet, in violation of the spirit of that law, or,
at least, of all common sense and common prudence, the secretary
disperses upwards of twenty-five millions of public revenue among a
countless number of unknown banks, and stipulates that, when the
amount of the deposit exceeds one half of their respective capitals,
security is to be given!
The best stipulation in the whole contract, is the last, which
reserves to the secretary of the treasury the power of discharging
these local banks from the service of the United States whenever he
pleases; and the sooner he exercises it, and restores the public
deposits to the place of acknowledged safety, from which they have
been rashly taken, the better for all parties concerned.
Let us look into the condition of one of these local banks, the
nearest to us, and that with respect to which we have the best
information. The banks of this district (and among them that of the
Metropolis) are required to make annual reports of their condition on
the first day of January. The latest official return from the Metropolis
42. bank is of the first of January, 1832. Why it did not make one on the
first of last January, along with the other banks, I know not. In point
of fact, I am informed, it made none. Here is its account of January,
1832, and I think you will agree that it is a Flemish one. On the
debit side stand capital paid in, five hundred thousand dollars. Due
to the banks, twenty thousand nine hundred and eleven dollars and
ten cents; individuals on deposit, seventy-four thousand nine
hundred and seventy-seven dollars and forty-two cents; dividend
and expenses, seventeen thousand five hundred and ninety-one
dollars and seventy-seven cents; and surplus, eight thousand one
hundred and thirty-one dollars and two cents; making an aggregate
of six hundred and eighty-four thousand four hundred and ninety-six
dollars and thirty-one cents. On the credit side, there are bills and
notes discounted, and stock (what sort?) bearing interest, six
hundred and twenty-six thousand and eleven dollars and ninety
cents; real estate, eighteen thousand four hundred and four dollars
and eighty-six cents; notes of other banks on hand, and checks on
the same, twenty-three thousand two hundred and thirteen dollars
and eighty cents; specie—now, Mr. President, how much do you
imagine? Recollect, that this is the bank selected at the seat of
government, where there is necessarily concentrated a vast amount
of public money, employed in the expenditure of government.
Recollect that, by another executive edict, all public officers, charged
with the disbursement of the public money here, are required to
make their deposits with this Metropolis; and how much specie do
you suppose it had at the date of its last official return? ten
thousand nine hundred and seventy-four dollars and seventy-six
cents; due from other banks, five thousand eight hundred and ninety
dollars and ninety-nine cents; making in the aggregate on the credit
side, six hundred and eighty-four thousand four hundred and ninety-
six dollars and thirty-one cents. Upon looking into the items, and
casting them up, you will find that this Metropolis bank, on the first
day of January, 1832, was liable to an immediate call for one
hundred and seventy-six thousand three hundred and thirty-five
dollars and twenty-nine cents, and that the amount which it had on
hand, ready to meet that call, was forty thousand and seventy-nine
43. dollars and fifty-five cents. And this is one of the banks selected at
the seat of the general government, for the deposit of the public
moneys of the United States. A bank with a capital of thirty millions
of dollars, and upwards of ten millions of specie on hand has been
put aside, and a bank with a capital of half a million, and a little
more than ten thousand dollars in specie on hand, has been
substituted in its place! How that half million has been raised,
whether in part or in the whole, by the neutralizing operation of
giving stock notes in exchange for certificates of stock, does not
appear.
The design of the whole scheme of this treasury arrangement
seems to have been, to have united in one common league a
number of local banks, dispersed throughout the union, and subject
to one central will, with a right of scrutiny instituted by the agents of
that will. It is a bad imitation of the New York project of a safety-
fund. This confederation of banks will probably be combined in
sympathy as well as interest, and will be always ready to fly to the
succor of the source of their nourishment. As to their supplying a
common currency, in place of that of the bank of the United States,
the plan is totally destitute of the essential requisite. They are not
required to credit each other’s paper, unless it be issued in the
‘immediate vicinity.’
We have seen what is in this contract. Now let us see what is not
there. It contains no stipulation for the preservation of the public
morals; none for the freedom of elections; none for the purity of the
press. All these great interests, after all that has been said against
the bank of the United States, are left to shift and take care of
themselves as they can. We have already seen the president of a
bank in a neighboring city, rushing impetuously to the defence of the
secretary of the treasury against an editorial article in a newspaper,
although the ‘venom of the shaft was quite equal to the vigor of the
bow.’ Was he rebuked by the secretary of the treasury? Was the
bank discharged from the public service? Or, are morals, the press,
and elections, in no danger of contamination, when a host of banks
44. become literary champions on the side of power and the officers of
government? Is the patriotism of the secretary only alarmed when
the infallibility of high authority is questioned? Will the states silently
acquiesce, and see the federal authority insinuating itself into banks
of their creation, and subject to their exclusive control?
We have, Mr. President, a most wonderful financier at the head of
our treasury department. He sits quietly by in the cabinet, and
witnesses the contest between his colleague and the president; sees
the conflict in the mind of that colleague between his personal
attachment to the president on the one hand, and his solemn duty
to the public on the other; beholds the triumph of conscientious
obligation; contemplates the noble spectacle of an honest man,
preferring to surrender an exalted office with all its honors and
emoluments, rather than betray the interests of the people;
witnesses the contemptuous and insulting expulsion of that
colleague from office; and then coolly enters the vacated place,
without the slightest sympathy or the smallest emotion. He was
installed on the twenty-third of September, and by the twenty-sixth,
the brief period of three days, he discovers that the government of
the United States had been wrong from its origin; that every one of
his predecessors from Hamilton down, including Gallatin, (who,
whatever I said of him on a former occasion, and that I do not mean
to retract, possessed more practical knowledge of currency, banks,
and finance, than any man I have ever met in the public councils,)
Dallas, and Crawford, had been mistaken about both the expediency
and constitutionality of the bank; that every chief magistrate, prior
to him whose patronage he enjoyed, had been wrong; that the
supreme court of the United States, and the people of the United
States, during the thirty-seven years that they had acquiesced in or
recognised the utter utility of a bank, were all wrong. And, opposing
his single opinion to their united judgments, he dismisses the bank,
scatters the public money, and undertakes to regulate and purify the
public morals, the public press, and popular elections!
45. If we examine the operations of this modern Turgot, in their
financial bearing, merely, we shall find still less for approbation.
First. He withdraws the public moneys, where, by his own
deliberate admission, they were perfectly safe, with a bank of thirty-
five millions of capital, and ten millions of specie, and places them at
great hazard with banks of comparatively small capital, and but little
specie, of which the Metropolis bank is an example.
Second. He withdraws them from a bank created by, and over
which the federal government had ample control, and puts them in
other banks, created by different governments, and over which it
has no control.
Third. He withdraws them from a bank in which the American
people, as a stockholder, were drawing their fair proportion of
interest accruing on loans, of which those deposits formed the basis,
and puts them where the people of the United States draw no
interest.
Fourth. From a bank which has paid a bonus of a million and a
half, which the people of the United States may be now liable to
refund, and puts them in banks which have paid to the American
people no bonus.
Fifth. Depreciates the value of stock in a bank, where the general
government holds seven millions, and advances that of banks in
whose stock it does not hold a dollar; and whose aggregate capital
does not probably much exceed that very seven millions. And, finally,
Sixth. He dismisses a bank whose paper circulates in the greatest
credit throughout the union and in foreign countries, and engages in
the public service banks whose paper has but a limited and local
circulation in their ‘immediate vicinities.’
These are immediate and inevitable results. How much that large
and long-standing item of unavailable funds, annually reported to
46. congress, will be swelled and extended, remains to be developed by
time.
And now, Mr. President, what, under all these circumstances, is it
our duty to do? Is there a senator, who can hesitate to affirm, in the
language of the resolution, that the president has assumed a
dangerous power over the treasury of the United States, not granted
to him by the constitution and the laws; and that the reasons
assigned for the act, by the secretary of the treasury, are insufficient
and unsatisfactory?
The eyes and the hopes of the American people are anxiously
turned to congress. They feel that they have been deceived and
insulted; their confidence abused; their interests betrayed; and their
liberties in danger. They see a rapid and alarming concentration of
all power in one man’s hands. They see that, by the exercise of the
positive authority of the executive, and his negative power exerted
over congress, the will of one man alone prevails, and governs the
republic. The question is no longer what laws will congress pass, but
what will the executive not veto? The president, and not congress, is
addressed for legislative action. We have seen a corporation,
charged with the execution of a great national work, dismiss an
experienced, faithful, and zealous president, afterwards testify to his
ability by a voluntary resolution, and reward his extraordinary
services by a large gratuity, and appoint in his place an executive
favorite, totally inexperienced and incompetent, to propitiate the
president. We behold the usual incidents of approaching tyranny.
The land is filled with spies and informers; and detraction and
denunciation are the orders of the day. People, especially official
incumbents in this place, no longer dare speak in the fearless tones
of manly freedom, but in the cautious whispers of trembling slaves.
The premonitory symptoms of despotism are upon us; and if
congress do not apply an instantaneous and effective remedy, the
fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die—ignobly die! base,
mean, and abject slaves—the scorn and contempt of mankind—
unpitied, unwept, unmourned!
47. Welcome to our website – the perfect destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world,
offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.
More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge
connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and
personal growth every day!
testbankdeal.com