Gene sharp

THERE ARE
REALISTIC
ALTERNATIVES
Gene Sharp
The Albert Einstein Institution

Mission Statement
The mission of theAlbert Einstein Institution is to advance the world-
wide study and strategic use of nonviolent action in conflict.
The Institution is committed to:
• defending democratic freedoms and institutions;
• opposing oppression, dictatorship, and genocide; and
• reducing the reliance on violence as an instrument of policy.
This mission is pursued in three ways, by:
• encouraging research and policy studies on the methods of non-
violent action and their past use in diverse conflicts;
• sharing the results of this research with the public through pub-
lications, conferences, and the media; and
• consulting with groups in conflict about the strategic potential
of nonviolent action.
427 Newbury Street
Boston, MA 02115-1802, USA

THERE ARE
REALISTIC
ALTERNATIVES

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ISBN 1-880813-12-2
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is in the public domain.
Citation of the source, and notification
to the Albert Einstein Institution for
reproduction, translation, and reprinting
of this publication, are requested.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE 1
Developing a Realistic Alternative to
War and Other Violence
The need for a means of waging conflicts 2
There is another technique of struggle 4
Cases of nonviolent struggle 4
Characteristics and methods of nonviolent struggle 7
Misconceptions 9
Requirements for success 9
Repression and political jiu-jitsu 10
Undermining the opponents’ power 11
Four ways to success 13
Uses of a refined technique 14
Reducing reliance on war and other violence 15
CHAPTER TWO 17
The Importance of Strategic Planning
in Nonviolent Struggle
The importance of strategy 17
Formulating wise strategies 19
Levels of planning and action 20
Some key elements of nonviolent strategy 22
CHAPTER THREE 25
Steps in Strategic Planning for Nonviolent
Struggles Against Repressive Regimes
Elements of strategic planning 26
APPENDIX ONE 31
Glossary of Important Terms
in Nonviolent Struggle
There are Realistic Alternatives v

APPENDIX TWO 39
198 Methods of Nonviolent Action
The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion 39
The Methods of Noncooperation
Social Noncooperation 41
Economic Noncooperation: Economic Boycotts 42
Economic Noncooperation: The Strike 43
Political Noncooperation 45
The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention 47
APPENDIX THREE 49
For Further Reading
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 51
A NOTE ABOUT TRANSLATIONS AND 53
REPRINTING OF THIS PUBLICATION
vi Gene Sharp

1
1
“Violence” is used here with the restricted meaning of physical violence against
persons to inflict injury or death, or action dependent on the threat of such
results, not as a term of moral or political opinion.
CHAPTER ONE
DEVELOPING A REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE
TO WAR AND OTHER VIOLENCE
Violence in society and politics, whether in the form of war, terror-
ism, dictatorship, oppression, usurpation, or genocide, is widely
recognized as a grave problem.
All the proposals to solve the problem of violence, or particu-
lar expressions of it, have been unsuccessful. It is probable that the
problem remains unsolved because such proposals have been based
on inadequate understandings of its nature. Without understand-
ing a problem, it is difficult, if not impossible, to solve it.
The objective of this essay is to explore a different perspective
on the nature of the problem of widespread violence in society and
politics that suggests what will be required for its resolution.1
We need to analyze the conditions under which it will be pos-
sible to reduce drastically the reliance on military and other violent
means of conflict. We need to examine why violence is so widely
regarded as necessary for good causes as well as for bad ones, and
how fundamental change away from that syndrome might be
achieved.
The perspective in this essay is simple, but perhaps fundamen-
tal to solving the problem of violence in political and international
conflicts.
It is important to recognize that conflict in society and politics
is inevitable and, in many cases, desirable. Some conflicts can be
resolved by mild methods, such as negotiation, dialogue, and con-
ciliation—methods that involve compromise. These are feasible
when the issues at stake are not fundamental. Even then, the reso-
lution of a conflict by negotiation is more often influenced by the
relative power capacities of the contenders than by reasoned joint
assessment of where justice lies.

2 Gene Sharp
However, in many conflicts fundamental issues are, or are be-
lieved to be, at stake. These are “acute conflicts.” They are not
deemed suitable for any resolution that involves compromise.
In acute conflicts at least one side regards it as necessary and
good to wage the conflict against hostile opponents. Acute conflicts
are often believed to be waged to advance freedom, justice, religion,
or one’s civilization, or to resist and defeat hostile violence. Hostile
violence may be applied to impose oppression, injustice, or dicta-
torship. Hostile violence also may be applied to attack one’s moral
or religious principles or human dignity, or even to threaten the sur-
vival of one’s people.
In acute conflicts at least one side regards submission, capitu-
lation, or defeat as disastrous for its principles, convictions, whole
society, and at times even to life itself. In such situations, people
believe it is necessary to wage the conflict as strongly as possible.
The need for a means of waging conflicts
War and other violence have been applied for diverse purposes, but
in acute conflicts political and international violence has served as a
means of waging the conflict to protect and advance causes believed
to be good and noble. Violence has been believed to be the neces-
sary alternative to passive submission to great evil.
In most political systems, war and other violence serve as an
“ultimate sanction.” That is, forms of violence are believed to be the
means of last resort, the most powerful activity that can be applied,
the final means of applying pressure, punishment, or power when
all presumably milder means are seen to have failed, or to be des-
tined to fail. Violence is used then, it is believed, to advance and
defend all that is held to be good and worthwhile.
Unless this role of violence is understood, there is no possibil-
ity of a major reduction of reliance on war and other violence in
acute conflicts.
In conflicts with basic issues at stake it is naïve to think and act
as though the offer of negotiation or dialogue is an adequate re-
sponse. Hostile opponents are most unlikely to abandon their goals

There are Realistic Alternatives 3
or means without a struggle. It is unreasonable to aim for a “win-
win” resolution. Brutal dictators and perpetrators of genocide do
not deserve to win anything.
We have many decades of evidence that violence in the con-
duct of conflicts is not eliminated by protests against such violence.
In acute conflicts, the majority of people will not reject war and other
violence because they believe, or are told, that such violence vio-
lates ethical or religious principles. Adherence to expectations to
the contrary is unrealistic.
It has been nearly forty years since psychiatrist Jerome D. Frank
reminded us that for most people peace is not the highest value.2
People, groups, and governments will not renounce violence
when that is seen to mean becoming powerless and helpless in a
conflict in which their basic beliefs and the nature of their society
are, or are believed to be, under attack.
In acute conflicts in order for war and other violence not to be
used as the final means of action to advance or defend one’s prin-
ciples, ideals, society, or existence, some other means of strong ac-
tion need to be available. There has to be a substitute means of con-
ducting the conflict powerfully with the chance of success equiva-
lent to or greater than the violent option.
Of necessity, such a functional alternative must be able to deal
satisfactorily with the “hard cases” for which violence has in the
past been believed to be required. These “hard cases” include con-
flicts against dictatorships, foreign invasions and occupations, in-
ternal usurpations, oppression, attempted genocide, and mass ex-
pulsions and killings.
A very important clue that such an alternative is possible lies
in the fact that the strength of even dictatorships is dependent on
sources of power in the society, which in turn depend on the coop-
eration of a multitude of institutions and people—cooperation which
may or may not continue, as we shall see later in more detail.
2
Jerome D. Frank, “Psychological Problems in the Elimination of War” in Prevent-
ing World War III: Some Proposals. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962.

There is another technique of struggle
Such a substitute for violent conflict is a realistic option. It is often
forgot that war and other violence have not been universal in the
conduct of acute conflicts. In a great variety of situations, across
centuries and cultural barriers, another technique of struggle has at
times been applied. This other technique has not been based on
turning the other cheek, but on the ability to be stubborn and to
resist powerful opponents powerfully.
Throughout human history, in a multitude of conflicts one side
has fought—not by violence, but—by psychological, social, eco-
nomic, or political methods, or a combination of these. This type of
conflict has been waged not only when the issues were relatively
limited and the opponents relatively decent. Many times this alter-
native form of struggle has been applied when fundamental issues
have been at stake and when ruthless opponents have been willing
and able to apply extreme repression. That repression has included
executions, beatings, arrests, imprisonments, and mass slaughters.
Despite such repression, when the resisters have persisted in fight-
ing with only their chosen nonviolent weapons, they have some-
times triumphed.
This technique is called nonviolent action or nonviolent
struggle. This is “the other ultimate sanction.” In acute conflicts it
potentially can serve as an alternative to war and other violence.
Cases of nonviolent struggle
Nonviolent struggle has occurred in widely differing cultures, peri-
ods of history, and political conditions. It has occurred in "the West"
and in "the East." Nonviolent action has occurred in industrialized
and nonindustrialized countries. It has been practiced under consti-
tutional democracies and against empires, foreign occupations, and
dictatorial systems. Nonviolent struggle has been waged on behalf
of a myriad of causes and groups, and even for objectives that many
people reject. It has also been used to prevent, as well as to promote,
change. Its use has sometimes been mixed with limited violence.
4 Gene Sharp

The issues at stake have been diverse. They have included so-
cial, economic, ethnic, religious, national, humanitarian, and politi-
cal matters, and have ranged from the trivial to the fundamental.
Although historians have generally neglected this type of
struggle, it is clearly a very old phenomenon. Most of the history of
this technique has doubtless been lost, and most of what has sur-
vived has been largely ignored.
Many cases of the use of nonviolent action have had little or
nothing to do with governments. Cases include labor-management
conflicts and efforts to impose or resist pressures for social confor-
mity. Nonviolent action has also been used in ethnic and religious
conflicts and many other situations, such as disputes between stu-
dents and university administrations. Important conflicts between
the civilian population and governments where one side has em-
ployed nonviolent action have also occurred very widely. The fol-
lowing examples are often of this type.
From the late eighteenth century through the twentieth cen-
tury, the technique of nonviolent action was widely used in highly
diverse conflicts: colonial rebellions, international political and eco-
nomic conflicts, religious conflicts, and anti-slavery resistance. This
technique has been aimed to secure workers' right to organize,
women's rights, universal manhood suffrage, and woman suffrage.
This type of struggle has been used to gain national independence,
to generate economic gains, to resist genocide, to undermine dicta-
torships, to gain civil rights, to end segregation, and to resist foreign
occupations and coups d’état.
Cases of the use of this technique early in the twentieth cen-
tury included major elements of the Russian 1905 Revolution. In
various countries the growing trade unions widely used the strike
and the economic boycott. Chinese boycotts of Japanese products
occurred in 1908, 1915, and 1919. Germans used nonviolent action
against the Kapp Putsch in 1920 and against the French and Belgian
occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. In the 1920s and 1930s, Indian na-
tionalists used nonviolent action in their struggles against British
rule, under the leadership of Mohandas K. Gandhi.

From 1940 to 1945 in various European countries people, espe-
cially in Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, used nonviolent
struggle to resist Nazi occupation and rule. Nonviolent action was
used to save Jews from the Holocaust in Berlin, Bulgaria, Denmark,
and elsewhere. The military dictators of El Salvador and Guate-
mala were ousted in brief nonviolent struggles in the spring of 1944.
The American civil rights nonviolent struggles against racial segre-
gation, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, changed laws and long-
established policies in the US South. In April 1961 noncooperation
by French conscript soldiers in the French colony of Algeria com-
bined with popular demonstrations in France and defiance by the
Debré-de Gaulle government defeated the coup d’état in Algiers
before a related coup in Paris could be launched.
In 1968 and 1969, following the Warsaw Pact invasion, Czechs
and Slovaks held off full Soviet control for eight months with im-
provised nonviolent struggle and refusal of collaboration. From 1953
to 1990 dissidents in Communist-ruled countries in Eastern Europe,
especially in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic States,
repeatedly used nonviolent struggles for increased freedom. The
sophisticated Solidarity struggle in Poland began in 1980 with strikes
to support the demand of a legal free trade union, and concluded in
1989 with the end of the Polish Communist regime. Nonviolent
struggle also brought about the end of Communist dictatorships in
Czechoslovakia in 1989 and in East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania in 1991.
The attempted “hard-line” coup d'état in Moscow in 1991 was
defeated by noncooperation and defiance. Nonviolent protests and
mass resistance were highly important in undermining the Apart-
heid policies and European domination in South Africa, especially
between 1950 and 1990. The Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines
was destroyed by a nonviolent uprising in 1986.
In July and August 1988 Burmese democrats protested against
the military dictatorship with marches and defiance, brought down
three governments, and finally that struggle succumbed to a new
military coup d'état and mass slaughter. In 1989 Chinese students
and others in over three hundred cities (including in Tiananmen
6 Gene Sharp

Square, Beijing) conducted symbolic protests against government
corruption and oppression, but the protests finally ended following
massive killings by the military.
In Kosovo theAlbanian population between 1990 and 1999 con-
ducted a noncooperation campaign against repressive Serbian rule.
When the de facto Kosovo government lacked a nonviolent strategy
for gaining de jure independence, a guerrilla Kosovo Liberation
Army initiated violence. This was followed by extreme Serbian re-
pression and massive slaughters by so-called “ethnic cleansing,”
which led to NATO bombing and intervention.
Starting in November 1996 Serbs conducted daily parades and
protests in Belgrade and other cities against the autocratic gover-
nance of President Milosovic and secured correction of electoral fraud
in mid-January 1997. At that time, however, Serb democrats lacked
a strategy to press on the struggle and failed to launch a campaign
to bring down the Milosovic dictatorship. In early October 2000,
the Otpor (Resistance) movement and other democrats rose up again
against Milosovic in a carefully planned nonviolent struggle and
the dictatorship collapsed.
In early 2001 President Estrada, who had been accused of cor-
ruption, was ousted by Filipinos in a “People Power Two” campaign.
In order to understand better those conflicts and their outcomes
it is important to understand the nature of this technique.
Characteristics and methods of nonviolent struggle
In this type of struggle, instead of using violence people have prac-
ticed three general types of behavior. First, they have engaged in
symbolic protests, such as marches, vigils, distributing leaflets, or
wearing of specific colors to communicate their support for, or op-
position to, some objective.
Second, the resisters have refused to continue existing coop-
eration, or to begin new cooperation, with the opponents or with
certain practices. They have practiced noncooperation. This has
taken social, economic, and political forms.

For example, the resisters have practiced social boycotts of oppo-
nents or have refused to participate in observances or celebrations,
or to attend meetings or schools that they believe support their op-
ponents.
The resisters have at times discontinued economic cooperation
by refusing to supply or transport goods and services or by refusing
to buy or sell materials or products. Sometimes economic relations
with an opponent country have been halted by government initia-
tive. These all have been forms of economic boycott.
Labor strikes have taken various forms, such as a short sym-
bolic work stoppage, a single factory strike, a massive general strike,
or an economic shut-down of a city or a country.
Political noncooperation has included boycotts of rigged elec-
tions, rejection of the legitimacy of a regime, nonobedience without
direct supervision, noncooperation by government employees, and
civil disobedience of “immoral” laws.
Third, active intervention and disruption of the normal opera-
tion of the system has been applied in various psychological, social,
economic, physical, and political forms. The many methods of non-
violent intervention include occupation of offices, sit-downs on the
streets, hunger strikes, establishment of new economic institutions,
nonviolent invasions, overloading of administrative facilities, seek-
ing imprisonment, and parallel government.
The methods of nonviolent action are identified and catego-
rized by the type of action applied, not by the motives or beliefs of
the people applying it. Very importantly, this technique has been
applied by people of diverse beliefs and clearly does not require a
belief in ethical or religious nonviolence, which is a very different
phenomenon. Most often, the participants and the leaders (if iden-
tifiable) have refrained from violence because it was understood to
be both unnecessary and counterproductive. The 198 classified
methods of nonviolent action are listed in Appendix Two, and pre-
sented in full with historical examples in Gene Sharp, The Politics of
Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action. (See
Appendix Three: For Further Reading).
8 Gene Sharp

Misconceptions
A widespread series of false conceptions and misperceptions have
plagued the understanding of nonviolent struggle. The following
are some corrections:
• It is widely believed that violence always works quickly, and
nonviolent struggle always takes very long. Both of these
beliefs are false.
• Nonviolent struggle is often believed to be weak, but in fact
it can be very powerful. It can paralyze and even disinte-
grate a repressive regime.
• Nonviolent struggle does not need a charismatic leader.
• Nonviolent struggle is a cross-cultural phenomenon.
• Nonviolent struggle does not require any religious beliefs
(certainly no specific religious beliefs), although at times it
has been practiced with religious motives.
• Nonviolent struggle is not the same as religious or ethical
principled nonviolence, but a very different phenomenon.
This distinction must be made clear and not downplayed.
• Although it is still widely believed that this technique can
succeed only against humanitarian and democratic oppo-
nents, it has at times been successful against brutal regimes
and dictatorships, including Nazi and Communist ones.
• It is said by some persons and groups that nonviolent struggle
only succeeds by melting the hearts of the oppressors. How
ever, it has been coercive and even destroyed extreme dicta-
torships.
Requirements for success
The choice to use this type of struggle is not a guarantee of success,
just as the use of violence is not a guarantee of success. There are
requirements for achieving success with this technique, just as there
are with violence. Simply refraining from violence and speaking
the word “nonviolent” does not produce the desired results.

Some of the past instances of nonviolent action failed to ac-
complish their objectives. Some won only limited victories. Some-
times a victory was short-lived because people did not then use it to
consolidate and perhaps institutionalize their gains, nor did they
effectively resist new threats to their liberty. In other instances, vic-
tory in a single campaign won concessions, but new struggles were
required to achieve the full objectives.
In some cases, however, major victories were achieved that
would have been impossible by resistance with violence. In order
to better understand these outcomes, it is necessary to understand
the nature of this technique.
Although the ways nonviolent struggle “works” differ widely
from case to case, it is important to identify two crucial special pro-
cesses that may be present in certain nonviolent conflicts, but not in
every one. These are: (1) an ability to defy and at times to reverse
the effects of repression, and (2) an ability to undermine and sever
the sources of power of the opponents.
Repression and political jiu-jitsu
Naturally, dictators are sensitive to actions and ideas that threaten
their power to do as they like. Oppressors are therefore likely to
threaten and punish those who disobey, strike, or refuse to cooper-
ate. However, repression and even brutalities do not always pro-
duce a resumption of the necessary degree of submission and coop-
eration to enable the regime to function.
Under some circumstances, but not in every case, severe re-
pression may initiate a special process called “political jiu-jitsu.”
The opponents’ difficulties in dealing with nonviolent action
are primarily associated with the special dynamics and processes of
this technique. It is designed to operate against opponents able and
willing to use violent sanctions. However, political struggle by means
of nonviolent action against violent repression creates a special,
asymmetrical, conflict situation. The nonviolent resisters can use
the asymmetry of nonviolent means versus violent action in order
10 Gene Sharp

to apply to their opponents a political operation analogous to the
Japanese martial art of jiu-jitsu. The contrast in types of action throws
the opponents off balance politically, causing their repression to re-
bound against their position and weaken their power. By remain-
ing nonviolent while continuing the struggle, the resisters will im-
prove their own power position. This process is called political jiu-
jitsu.
Political jiu-jitsu causes increased alienation from the opponents
by any or all of three possible groups: members of the opponent
group itself, members of the population affected by the issues, and
third parties not directly involved in the conflict. That alienation
can result in the growth of internal opposition in the opponents’
camp. It can also increase the numbers of resisters and the extent of
resistance. It also often turns third parties against the opponents
and in favor of the resisters.
Undermining the opponents’ power
Political jiu-jitsu does not operate in all situations or in every case of
nonviolent action. The other major way nonviolent struggle oper-
ates is through undermining the sources of power required by the
opponents, even dictatorships. This process operates primarily in
struggles when the objective is to pressure or coerce a government
to do or not to do something, or when the objective is to disintegrate
the regime.
The principle is simple. Dictators require the assistance of the
people they rule, without which they cannot secure and maintain
the sources of political power they require. These sources of politi-
cal power include:
• Authority, or legitimacy;
• Human resources, the persons and groups that obey, coop-
erate with, or assist the rulers;
• Skills and knowledge, needed by the regime and supplied
by the cooperating persons and groups;

12 Gene Sharp
• Intangible factors, psychological and ideological factors
which may induce people to obey and assist the rulers;
• Material resources, control of or access to property, natural
resources, financial resources, the economic system, and
means of communication and transportation; and
• Sanctions, punishments, threatened or applied, to ensure the
submission and cooperation that are needed for the regime
to carry out its policies and to exist.
All these sources, however, depend on acceptance of the re-
gime, on the submission and obedience of the population, and on
the cooperation of many people and institutions of the society.
Political power, therefore, is always dependent for its strength
and existence upon a replenishment of its sources by the coopera-
tion of a multitude of institutions and people—cooperation that may
or may not continue. Political power is therefore always potentially
fragile and is always dependent on the society over which it is ap-
plied.
This necessary submission and cooperation are not guaranteed,
and each source of power is vulnerable to restrictions or losses.
Nonviolent action can be directly targeted to strike at the availabil-
ity of each of these sources. Depending on several factors, the sup-
ply of all these sources of power potentially can be weakened and
even severed.
Noncooperation and defiance subvert the needed obedience
and cooperation that supply the necessary sources of power. For
example, rejection of the rulers’ legitimacy reduces a crucial reason
for obedience by both aides and the general populace. Extensive
popular disobedience and defiance creates immense enforcement
problems. Massive strikes can paralyze the economy. Widespread
administrative noncooperation of the bureaucracy can thwart gov-
ernmental operations. Mutinies of the opponents’ police and troops
can dissolve the opponents’ capacity to repress nonviolent resisters
and to maintain their regime.

Without availability of those sources of power, the opponents’ power
weakens and finally dissolves. The regime dies from political star-
vation.
Contrary to popular opinion, even totalitarian dictatorships are
dependent on the support of the population and the societies they
rule, as the political scientist Karl. W. Deutsch noted in 1953.3
Four ways to success
Successful nonviolent struggles have “worked” in four basic ways.
These differing ways of operation depend to a high degree on the
specific conflict situation, the issues at stake, the social structure of
the resisting population, the nature of the opponents, the chosen
grand strategy (if any), the preferred mechanism of change, the spe-
cific methods used, and the skill, discipline, and tenacity of the re-
sisters. The pressures exerted may be psychological, social, economic,
and political, each in varying degrees.
Additionally, the nonviolent struggle may affect the stability of
the social or political system or may change its operation. The
struggle also may affect the opponents’ ability to continue specific
policies. In certain conflicts nonviolent noncooperation and defi-
ance may undermine the opponents’ capacity to continue to gov-
ern, or may even disintegrate their regime.
There are major differences in how nonviolent struggle oper-
ates in different conflicts. For example, the dynamics in a local la-
bor strike for increased wages will differ from those in a conflict
conducted by a minority group for greater rights, or those of a
struggle to destroy a dictatorship.
In cases of success, the change may come as a result of one of
four mechanisms. Rarely, as a result of nonviolent struggle, changes
of attitude have led the opponents to make concessions voluntarily
because it is right to do so—conversion. Far more often, the with-
drawal of economic or political cooperation has forced the opponents
3
Karl W. Deutsch, “Cracks in the Monolith: Possibilities and Patterns of Disinte-
gration in Totalitarian Systems,” in Carl. J. Friedrich, ed., Totalitarianism, pp. 308-
333. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.

14 Gene Sharp
to agree to a compromise—accommodation. At times the defiance
and noncooperation have been so strong and so skillfully targeted,
and the sources of the opponents’ power have been sufficiently weak-
ened that the opponents have been left with no option but to capitu-
late—nonviolent coercion. In some rare instances, the defiance and
noncooperation have been so massive, and the severance of the
sources of the opponents’ power has been so complete, that the re-
gime has simply fallen apart—disintegration.
Uses of a refined technique
Whether or not this technique of nonviolent struggle is, or can be
made to be, a major contribution to the resolution of the problem of
violence in society and politics hinges to a high degree on if it can
help to reduce reliance on violence in acute conflicts. Can it be made
sufficiently effective so as to be used in acute conflicts in place of
violence? In some cases the answer offered by some persons may
be a clear “yes,” but in other cases the answer may be “perhaps,”
“doubtful,” or “no.” Those answers will likely depend upon the
degree of understanding those persons have of this technique and
the degree to which nonviolent struggle is judged capable of pro-
viding an effective substitute for violence in acute conflicts.
It is possible to learn how to make this type of struggle more
effective than it has been in its past improvised applications. This
can be done by increasing our knowledge of the requirements of
this technique, spreading widely this knowledge and understand-
ing, and increasing general and specific planning and strategy for
the use of this technique in future acute conflicts.
The development of a satisfactory solution to the problem of
violence, and the examination of the future political development
of nonviolent struggle, require that we give attention to the present
and potential future role of this technique. This is especially impor-
tant in those acute conflicts in which many people and governments
believe that military means and other violence are required. The
questions are: to what extent we can understand and refine this tech-
nique, and how far can it be effectively substituted for violence?

The future political development of nonviolent struggle needs
to include nonviolent alternatives to violence in the following types
of conflicts:
• Dismantling dictatorships;
• Blocking new coups d’état and preventing new dictatorships;
• Defending against foreign aggression and occupation;
• Preserving the existence and ways of life of indigenous
peoples;
• Lifting social and economic injustices;
• Developing, preserving and extending democratic practices
and human rights; and
• Incorporating in additional ways nonviolent means into
democratic societies.
Reducing reliance on war and other violence
For these and other general purposes, and for specific conflicts, prac-
tical strategic plans need to be developed to enable the nonviolent
option to be effectively applied. As this is done incrementally, it
will be possible in instance after instance to substitute refined non-
violent struggle for the use of violence in acute conflicts.
In order to meet this challenge—to explore and develop the
potential of nonviolent action to address acute conflicts—a great deal
more research, analysis, strategic studies, policy development, plan-
ning, and courageous action is required.
The tools of historians, social psychologists, sociologists, social
and political theorists, political scientists, strategists, and others are
needed. It is important not only to study nonviolent struggle, but
also to examine other topics, including the weaknesses and vulner-
abilities of dictatorships and other systems of oppression.
It is also important to learn how to develop and spread the
capacity to think strategically and to plan strategies for future non-
violent struggles.
The application of these efforts will require going beyond, and
often against, important established trends of modern society and

powerful national and international forces. The centralization of
power, the militarization of inter-state politics, the hegemony of tra-
ditional methods of problem solving, these and other factors work
against reasoned consideration of the potential relevance of nonvio-
lent struggle.
However, there are grounds to suggest that whether a society
chooses to rely ultimately on violent or nonviolent struggle in cer-
tain acute conflicts has highly important consequences for the social
and political structure. It strongly appears that violent conflict tends
to produce a more centralized and potentially repressive political
system, whereas nonviolent conflict tends to produce a more decen-
tralized and popularly controlled political system. Military capac-
ity can be used internally to repress the population, while nonvio-
lent struggle can be used by the population to achieve and defend
freedoms and to resist centralized repression.
Careful informed consideration of the potential relevance and
viability of means of applying nonviolent pressures and power is
likely to reveal realistic options that have hitherto been inadequately
explored. This approach has the potential for making fundamental
changes in modern politics and international relations through re-
ducing reliance upon violence.
How much we will succeed in replacing violent with nonvio-
lent forms of conflict, thereby reducing drastically the reliance on
military and other violent means, will to a very high degree be de-
termined by the extent to which we can develop and apply effective
nonviolent alternatives of conflict.
The unavoidable question is whether we are now going to at-
tempt to refine this technique and adapt and adopt it for use in con-
flicts to challenge, replace, and remove extreme expressions of vio-
lence by effective and powerful action.
16 Gene Sharp

17
CHAPTER TWO
THE IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
IN NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE
The use of strategy is best known in military conflict. For centuries
military officers have engaged in strategic planning for military cam-
paigns, and important thinkers such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and
Liddell Hart have analyzed and refined military strategy. In con-
ventional military warfare and in guerrilla warfare, the use of so-
phisticated strategy is a basic requirement for effectiveness.
Just as effective military struggle requires wise strategies, plan-
ning, and implementation, nonviolent action will be most effective
when it also operates on the basis of sound strategic planning. The
formulation and adoption of wise strategies can greatly increase the
power of nonviolent struggle.
The importance of strategy
If one wishes to accomplish something, the chances of achieving
that goal will be greatest if one uses one's available resources and
leverage to maximum effectiveness. That means having a strategic
plan that is designed to move from the present (in which the goal is
not achieved) to the future (in which it is achieved). Strategy per-
tains to charting the course of action that makes it most likely to get
from the present to a desired situation in the future.
For example, if one wants to travel from one place to another,
one needs to plan in advance how to do so. Will one walk? Take a
train? Drive a car? Fly? Even then the plan is far from complete.
Does one have the money to pay for the cost of the trip and other
expenses? If the trip is a long one, where will one sleep and eat?
Are travel documents, passports, or visas required, and if so how
will one obtain them? Are there matters to be arranged to cover
one's absence during the trip?
This type of thinking and planning which some individuals
undertake for ordinary purposes in daily life, should be undertaken

by leaders of social and political movements. Unfortunately, how-
ever, strategic planning is rarely given the attention it deserves with
such movements.
Some people naively think that if they simply assert their goal
strongly and firmly enough, long enough, it will somehow come to
pass. Others assume that if they remain true to their principles and
ideals and witness to them in the face of adversity, then they are
doing all they can to help to achieve them. Assertion of desirable
goals and remaining loyal to ideals are admirable, but are in them-
selves grossly inadequate to change the status quo and bring into
being designated goals.
Of course seeking to change a society, or to prevent changes in
a society, or to remove a foreign occupation, or to defend a society
from attack, are all far more complicated tasks than planning a trip.
Yet only rarely do people seeking such objectives fully recognize the
extreme importance of preparing a comprehensive strategic plan
before they act.
Very often in social and political movements, the individuals
and groups involved recognize that they need to plan how they are
to act, but do so only on a very limited, short-term, or tactical, basis.
They do not attempt to formulate a broader, longer-term, or strate-
gic plan of action. They may not see it to be necessary. They may at
the time be unable to think and analyze in those terms. Or, they
may allow themselves to be repeatedly distracted from their larger
goal by focusing continually on small issues, repeatedly responding
to the opponents' initiatives, and acting feverishly on short-term
activities. They may not allocate time and energy to planning a
strategy, or exploring several alternative strategies, which could
guide their overall efforts toward achieving their goal.
Sometimes, too, it must be admitted, people do not attempt to
chart a strategy to achieve their goal, because deep down they do
not really believe that achieving their goal is possible. They see them-
selves as weak, as helpless victims of overpowering forces, so the
best they can do, they believe, is to assert and witness, or even die,
in the faith that they are right. Consequently, they do not attempt to
think and plan strategically to accomplish their objective.
18 Gene Sharp

The result of such failures to plan strategically is that the chances
of success are drastically reduced, and at times eliminated. One's
strength is dissipated. One's actions are ineffective. Sacrifices are
wasted and one's cause is not well served. The failure to plan strate-
gically is likely to result in the failure to achieve one's objectives.
Without the formulation of a careful strategic plan of action:
• one's energy can be deflected to minor issues and applied
ineffectively;
• opportunities for advancing one's cause will go unutilized;
• the opponents' initiatives will determine the course of events;
• the weaknesses of one's own side will grow and have detri-
mental effects on the attempt to achieve the goal; and
• the efforts to reach the goal will have very little chance of
being successful.
On the contrary, the formulation and adoption of brilliant strat-
egies increase the chances of success. Directed action in accordance
with a strategic plan enables one to concentrate one's strengths and
actions to move in a determined direction toward the desired goal.
They can be focused to serve the main objectives and to aggravate
the opponents' weaknesses. Casualties and other costs may be re-
duced and sacrifices may serve the main goal more effectively. The
chances of the nonviolent campaign succeeding are increased.
Formulating wise strategies
The selection, or formulation, of a wise strategy requires:
• an accurate sense of the whole context in which the struggle
is to be waged;
• identification of the nature of the difference between where
one is and where one wants to be;
• assessment of the impediments to achieving the goal and
the factors that may facilitate the task;
• assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of one's oppo-

20 Gene Sharp
nents, of one's own group, and of third parties which may
assist or hinder the campaign;
• evaluation of the merits and limitations of several potential
courses of action one might follow;
• selection of a viable course among existing options or the
charting of a completely new one; and
• identification of an overall plan of action which determines
what smaller (tactical) plans and specific methods of action
should be used in pursuit of the main goal (i.e., what spe-
cific localized or shorter-term activities or steps should be
taken to implement the overall strategic plan).
Levels of planning and action
In developing a strategic plan one needs to understand that there
are different levels of planning and action. At the highest level is
grand strategy. Then there is strategy itself, followed by tactics and
methods.
Grand strategy is the overall conception which serves to coordi-
nate and direct all appropriate and available resources (economic,
human, moral, political, organizational, etc.) of the nation or other
group to attain its objectives in a conflict.
Grand strategy includes consideration of the rightness of the
cause, assessment of other influences in the situation, and selection
of the technique of action to be used (for example, nonviolent
struggle, conventional politics, guerrilla warfare, or conventional
warfare), how the objective will be achieved, and the long-term con-
sequences.
Grand strategy sets the basic framework for the selection of
more limited strategies for waging the struggle. This level of plan-
ning also includes the allocation of general tasks to particular groups
and the distribution of resources to them for use in the struggle.
Furthermore, it includes consideration of how the struggle itself re-
lates to the achievement of the objectives for which the conflict is
waged.

Strategy is the conception of how best to achieve objectives in a
conflict (violent or nonviolent). Strategy is concerned with whether,
when, or how to fight, and how to achieve maximum effectiveness
in order to gain certain ends. Strategy is the plan for the practical
distribution, adaptation, and application of the available means to
attain desired objectives.
Strategy may also include efforts to develop a strategic situa-
tion so advantageous that it may bring success without open struggle.
Applied to the struggle itself, strategy is the basic idea of how the
campaign shall develop, and how its separate components shall be
fitted together most advantageously to achieve its objectives.
Strategy involves consideration of the results likely to follow
from particular actions; the development of a broad plan of actions;
the skillful determination of the deployment of conflict groups in
smaller actions; consideration of the requirements for success in the
operation of the chosen technique; and making good use of success.
Strategy operates within the scope of grand strategy. Tactics
and methods of action are used to implement the strategy. To be
most effective, the tactics and methods must be chosen and applied
so that they really assist the application of the strategy and contrib-
ute to achieving the requirements for success.
In formulating strategy in nonviolent struggle, the following
aspects are to be taken into account: one's own objectives, resources
and strength; the opponents' objectives, resources, and strength; the
actual and possible roles of third parties; the opponents' various
possible courses and means of action; one's own various possible
courses and means of action (both offensive and defensive); the re-
quirements for success with this technique, its dynamics of action,
and its mechanisms of change.
A tactic is a limited plan of action, based on a conception of
how best to utilize the available means of fighting to achieve a re-
stricted objective as part of the wider strategy. A tactic is concerned
with a limited course of action which fits within the broad strategy,
just as a strategy fits within the grand strategy. A particular tactic
can only be understood as part of the overall strategy of a battle or a
campaign.

Tactics deal with how particular methods of action are applied,
or how particular groups of combatants shall act in a specific situa-
tion. Tactics are applied for shorter periods of time than strategies,
or in smaller areas (geographical, institutional, etc.), or by a more
limited number of people, or for more limited objectives, or in some
combination of these.
Method refers to the specific means of action within the tech-
nique of nonviolent struggle. These include dozens of particular
forms of action, such as the many kinds of strikes, boycotts, political
noncooperation and the like. (For a listing of 198 methods of non-
violent action that have been used in historical instances, see Ap-
pendix Two.)
The development of a responsible and effective strategic plan
for a nonviolent struggle depends upon the careful formulation and
selection of grand strategy, strategies, tactics, and methods.
Some key elements of nonviolent strategy
There is no single strategy for the use of nonviolent struggle that is
appropriate for all occasions. Indeed, the technique of nonviolent
action makes possible the development of a variety of strategies for
meeting various types of conflict situations. Additionally, nonvio-
lent struggle may often need to be combined in a grand strategy
with the use of other means of action.
This does not mean that nonviolent struggle is compatible with
all other techniques of action. For example, the use of violence along
with nonviolent struggle destroys various processes by which non-
violent struggle operates, and thereby contributes to its ineffective-
ness at best and its collapse or defeat at worst.
However, it is fairly obvious that such means as fact-finding,
publicity, public education, appeals to the opponents, negotiations,
and the like could beneficially in many situations be used in con-
nection with the use of nonviolent struggle. These means are often
used in connection with economic boycotts and labor strikes, for
example.
Essential to the planning of nonviolent struggle campaigns is a
basic principle: Plan your struggle so that the success of the conflict
22 Gene Sharp

becomes possible by reliance on yourselves alone. This was Charles
Stewart Parnell's message to Irish peasants during a rent strike of
1879-1880: "rely on yourselves," and not on anyone else.
Assuming that a strong nonviolent struggle is planned and
being waged, it is fine to seek limited and nonviolent assistance from
others, but winning the struggle must depend on one's own group.
Then, if no one else provides help, assuming that the strategic plan-
ning has been sound, one still has a chance to succeed. However, if
the responsibility for success and failure has been given to others,
when they do not come forward the struggle will fail. In any case,
responsible external support is more likely to be forthcoming when
a strong nonviolent struggle is being conducted by the aggrieved
population, acting correctly as though success or failure will be de-
termined by its efforts only.
The formulation of wise strategies and tactics for nonviolent
struggles requires a thorough understanding of the dynamics and
mechanisms of nonviolent struggle, such as is presented in The Poli-
tics of Nonviolent Action. (See Appendix Three: For Further Read-
ing). It is necessary to be attentive to the development of those plans
and actions that facilitate their operation and to reject those that, if
implemented, would disrupt the very factors that can contribute to
effectiveness.
Attention will also be needed to such additional factors as psy-
chological elements and morale, geographical and physical elements,
timing, numbers and strength, the relation between the issue and
the concentration of strength, maintenance of the initiative, and the
choice of specific methods of action that can contribute to achieving
the objectives of the strategy and tactics.
The importance of strategic planning for nonviolent struggle
cannot be overemphasized. It is the key to making social and politi-
cal movements more effective. It may not guarantee that a move-
ment will achieve its objectives, but it will certainly make the possi-
bility of success more likely.4
4
For guidance on how to plan strategies for future nonviolent struggles, see Gene
Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First
Century Potential. Forthcoming.

25
CHAPTER THREE
STEPS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR
NONVIOLENT STRUGGLES AGAINST
REPRESSIVE REGIMES
Nonviolent struggle is a technique for conducting conflicts by so-
cial, psychological, economic, and political methods of protest, non-
cooperation, and disruptive intervention.
It is a technique built on the social, economic, and political ap-
plication of basic human stubbornness—the determination and abil-
ity to dissent, to refuse to cooperate, to defy, and to disrupt. In other
words, people may refuse to do things they are asked to do, and
may do what they are forbidden to do.
All governments rely on cooperation and obedience for their
very existence. When people choose to withhold or withdraw that
cooperation, governments are left without any pillars to support their
weight.
Nonviolent struggle has been applied in various types of con-
flicts throughout human history to resist oppression, undermine
dictatorships, oppose foreign occupations, defend detested minori-
ties, and to expand freedom.
Such struggles in the past have largely been the result of intu-
ition, chance events, improvisation, and people acting without clearly
identifying their objectives, or without understanding what was re-
ally required to achieve them.
Some of these struggles displayed a degree of tactical (or short-
term) planning, but very few operated under grand strategic plans
for the development and conduct of the overall struggle.
Now, groups engaged in nonviolent struggle no longer need to
re-invent the wheel. Through deeper understanding of this tech-
nique, the sharing of this knowledge, and the use of strategic, or
long-term, planning, nonviolent struggle is becoming more effec-
tive.

26 Gene Sharp
Elements of strategic planning
The following are some of the key elements requiring attention when
planning a nonviolent struggle:
Phase I: Initial assessment and analysis
• Examine the issues at stake as seen by both sides.
• Prepare an analysis of the cultural, political, and socio-eco-
nomic systems present in the society or country, as well as
the population distribution.
• Prepare a strategic estimate5
, meaning: identify the strengths
and weaknesses of both sides to the conflict. This includes
identification of the sources of power for the contending sides
and the institutions that serve as their pillars of support, an
analysis of resources available to or controlled by each side,
an examination of the degrees of dependency each side has
on the other for meeting particular needs, and the relative
struggle power of the two sides.
• Identify which of the opponents' sources of power can be
best targeted to be weakened or removed.
• Identify and examine the potential roles and attitudes of third
parties to the conflict, including the "non-committed" popu-
lation-at-large.
• Identify other external factors affecting possible courses of
action: geography, weather, climate, infrastructure, etc.
• Identify what other kinds of pressures may lead to gaining
the resisters' objectives.
• Examine the above factors to identify whether existing con-
ditions are favorable or unfavorable to conducting a nonvio-
lent struggle within a particular timeframe. Which of those
conditions are "fixed," which are variable, and which can be
directly influenced by the actions of the resisters or their ad-
versaries?
5
This term and concept was introduced to the field of strategic nonviolent action
by Robert Helvey.

Phase II: Strategy development
• Develop a grand strategy for the overall conflict. Identify
the objective of the struggle in clear, specific terms. Calcu-
late in general terms how the nonviolent struggle should
operate in order to achieve that objective. This is the broad,
long-term, master concept for the conduct of the struggle,
coordinating and directing all appropriate and available re-
sources of the struggle group.
• Can the primary objective of the conflict be achieved in a
single all-out campaign? If so, plan how to do that. If not,
the struggle will need to be deliberately phased to include
more limited campaigns for secondary but important objec-
tives.
• Develop strategies for individual campaigns for more lim-
ited objectives to be obtained during the course of struggle.
This is where the broad framework of the grand strategy
becomes more detailed, to answer the who, what, where,
when, and how in the planning of a particular campaign in
the conflict.
• Select specific short-term tactics and individual methods of
action that will implement the chosen strategy. It is very
important to select tactics and methods carefully within the
framework of a particular strategic campaign, and only af-
ter one has developed a grand strategy. Nonviolent meth-
ods that can be selected include those of protest and persua-
sion, noncooperation, and intervention. Some will work
better than others in different situations, depending largely
on the grand strategy and overall objective, the strategic es-
timate, and the objective of the individual campaign. Some
methods will be more capable than others of restricting and
severing the regime’s sources of power.
• Ensure that the adopted strategic plan is harmonious in its
objective, types of pressures to be applied, and selected tac-
tics and methods.

28 Gene Sharp
Phase III: Capacity building
• Ensure that the selected strategies for the struggle are within
the capacity of the population to implement. If they are not,
deliberate efforts will be needed to strengthen the popula-
tion’s capacity. Or, the strategies will need to be modified.
• Strengthen organizations and institutions that are outside the
opponents' control, especially if the grand strategy calls for
using these independent bodies during the struggle for ap-
plying noncooperation and defiance.
• Plan for third-party assistance, but do not rely on it.
Phase IV: Open struggle
• Concentrate the resisters' strengths against the opponents'
weaknesses to gain selected objectives according to the grand
strategy, strategy, and selected methods, especially in restrict-
ing and severing the opponents’ sources of power.
• Ensure that the strategic plan is applied in a disciplined way
without violence that will weaken the resistance.
• Ensure that the struggle activities help to empower the re-
sisters.
• Ensure the resisters’ access to critical resources.
• Keep the opponents off-balance.
• Defy the opponents' repression but stick to one’s own forms
of struggle.
• Act, rather than react. Maintain the initiative and momen-
tum. The struggle should be conducted on the terms of the
resistance group, not the opponents.
• Continuously re-assess and evaluate the conduct of the
struggle according to the strategic plan.

Phase V: Conclusion of the conflict
• Success, failure, or mixed results?
• Conduct a post-conflict assessment and plan for the future.
These are only elementary notes for the application of strategic non-
violent struggle.6
6
For more detailed recommendations for strategic planning, see Gene Sharp,
Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First Century
Potential. Forthcoming.

31
APPENDIX ONE
GLOSSARY OF IMPORTANT TERMS
IN NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE
Accommodation: A mechanism of change in nonviolent action in
which the opponents resolve, while they still have a choice, to agree
to a compromise and grant certain demands of the nonviolent re-
sisters. Accommodation occurs when the opponents have neither
changed their views nor been nonviolently coerced, but have con-
cluded that a compromise settlement is desirable.
The accommodation may result from influences that, if con-
tinued, might have led to the conversion, nonviolent coercion, or
disintegration of the opponents’ system or regime.
Authority: The quality that leads the judgments, decisions, recom-
mendations, and orders of certain individuals and institutions to be
accepted voluntarily as right and therefore to be implemented by
others through obedience or cooperation. Authority is a main source
of political power, but is not identical with it.
Boycott: Noncooperation, either socially, economically, or politically.
Civic abstention: A synonym for acts of political noncooperation.
Civic action: A synonym for nonviolent action conducted for politi-
cal purposes.
Civic defiance: Assertive acts of nonviolent protest, resistance or
intervention conducted for political purposes.
Civic resistance: A synonym for nonviolent resistance with a politi-
cal objective.
Civic strike: An economic shut-down conducted for political rea-
sons. Not only workers may go on strike, but importantly students,

32 Gene Sharp
professionals, shopkeepers, white-collar workers (including govern-
ment employees), and members of upper classes may participate.
Civil disobedience: A deliberate peaceful violation of particular
laws, decrees, regulations, ordinances, military or police orders, and
the like.
These are usually laws that are regarded as inherently immoral,
unjust, or tyrannical. Sometimes, however, laws of a largely regula-
tory or morally neutral character may be disobeyed as a symbol of
opposition to wider policies of the government.
Conversion:Achange of viewpoint by the opponents against whom
nonviolent action has been waged, such that they come to believe it
is right to accept the objectives of the nonviolent group. This is one
of four mechanisms of change in nonviolent action.
Disintegration: The fourth mechanism of change in nonviolent ac-
tion, in which the opponents are not simply coerced, but their sys-
tem or government is disintegrated and falls apart as a result of
massive noncooperation and defiance. The sources of power are
restricted or severed by the noncooperation to such an extreme de-
gree that the opponents’ system or government simply dissolves.
Economic shut-down: A suspension of the economic activities of a
city, area, or country on a sufficient scale to produce economic pa-
ralysis. The motives are usually political.
This may be achieved with a general strike by workers while
management, business, commercial institutions, and small shopkeep-
ers close their establishments and halt their economic activities.
Freedom (political): A political condition that permits freedom of
choice and action for individuals and also for individuals and groups
to participate in the decisions and operation of the society and the
political system.

Grand strategy: The broadest conception of how an objective is to
be attained in a conflict by a chosen course of action. The grand
strategy serves to coordinate and direct all appropriate and avail-
able resources (human, political, economic, moral, etc.) of the group
to attain its objectives in a conflict.
Several more limited strategies may be applied within a grand
strategy to achieve particular objectives in subordinate phases of
the overall struggle.
Grievance group: The general population group whose grievances
are issues in the conflict, and are being championed by the nonvio-
lent resisters.
Human resources: A term that is used here to indicate the number
of persons and groups who obey "the ruler" (meaning the ruling
group in command of the state), cooperate with, or assist the ruling
group in implementing their will. This includes the proportion of
such persons and groups in the general population, and the extent,
forms, and independence of their organizations.
A ruler’s power is affected by the availability of these human
resources, which constitute one of the sources of political power.
Material resources: This is another source of political power. The
term refers to property, natural resources, financial resources, the
economic system, means of communication, and modes of trans-
portation. The degree to which the ruler controls, or does not con-
trol, these helps to determine the extent or limits of the ruler’s power.
Mechanisms of change: The processes by which change is achieved
in successful cases of nonviolent struggle. The four mechanisms are
conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegra-
tion.
Methods: The specific means of action within the technique of non-
violent action. Nearly two hundred specific methods have thus far

34 Gene Sharp
been identified. They are classed under three main classes: nonvio-
lent protest and persuasion, noncooperation (social, economic, and
political), and nonviolent intervention.
Noncooperation: A large class of methods of nonviolent action that
involve deliberate restriction, discontinuance, or withholding of so-
cial, economic, or political cooperation (or a combination of these)
with a disapproved person, activity, institution, or regime.
The methods of noncooperation are classified in the subcatego-
ries of social noncooperation, economic noncooperation (economic
boycotts and labor strikes), and political noncooperation.
Nonviolence (religious or ethical): Beliefs and behavior of several
types in which violent acts are prohibited on religious or ethical
grounds. In some belief systems, not only physical violence is barred
but also hostile thoughts and words. Certain belief systems addi-
tionally enjoin positive attitudes and behavior toward opponents,
or even a rejection of the concept of opponents.
Such believers often may participate in nonviolent struggles
with people practicing nonviolent struggle for pragmatic reasons,
or may choose not to do so.
Nonviolent action: A general technique of conducting protest, re-
sistance, and intervention without physical violence.
Such action may be conducted by (a) acts of omission—that is,
the participants refuse to perform acts that they usually perform,
are expected by custom to perform, or are required by law or regu-
lation to perform; or (b) acts of commission—that is, the participants
perform acts that they usually do not perform, are not expected by
custom to perform, or are forbidden by law or regulation from per-
forming; or (c) a combination of both.
The technique includes a multitude of specific methods that
are grouped into three main classes: nonviolent protest and persua-
sion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

Nonviolent coercion: A mechanism of change in nonviolent action
in which demands are achieved against the will of the opponents
because effective control of the situation has been taken away from
them by widespread noncooperation and defiance. However, the
opponents still remain in their official positions and the system has
not yet disintegrated.
Nonviolent insurrection: A popular political uprising against an
established regime regarded as oppressive by use of massive non-
cooperation and defiance.
Nonviolent intervention: A large class of methods of nonviolent
action that in a conflict situation directly interfere by nonviolent
means with the opponents’ activities and operation of their system.
These methods are distinguished from both symbolic protests and
noncooperation. The disruptive intervention is most often physical
(as in a sit-in) but may be psychological, social, economic, or politi-
cal.
Nonviolent protest and persuasion: Alarge class of methods of non-
violent action that are symbolic acts expressing opposition opinions
or attempting persuasion (as vigils, marches or picketing). These
acts extend beyond verbal expressions of opinion but stop short of
noncooperation (as a strike) and nonviolent intervention (as a sit-
in).
Nonviolent struggle: The waging of determined conflict by strong
forms of nonviolent action, especially against determined and re-
sourceful opponents who may respond with repression.
Nonviolent weapons: The specific methods of nonviolent action.
Pillars of support: The institutions and sections of the society that
supply the existing regime with the needed sources of power to main-
tain and expand its power capacity.

36 Gene Sharp
Examples are the police, prisons, and military forces supply-
ing sanctions, moral and religious leaders supplying authority (le-
gitimacy), labor groups and business and investment groups sup-
plying economic resources, and similarly with the other identified
sources of political power.
Political defiance: The strategic application of nonviolent struggle
in order to disintegrate a dictatorship and to replace it with a demo-
cratic system.
This resistance by noncooperation and defiance mobilizes the
power of the oppressed population in order to restrict and cut off
the sources of the dictatorship's power. Those sources are provided
by groups and institutions called "pillars of support."
When political defiance is used successfully, it can make a na-
tion ungovernable by the current or any future dictatorship and
therefore able to preserve a democratic system against possible new
threats.
Political jiu-jitsu: A special process that may operate during a non-
violent struggle to change power relationships. In political jiu-jitsu
negative reactions to the opponents’ violent repression against non-
violent resisters is turned to operate politically against the oppo-
nents, weakening their power position and strengthening that of
the nonviolent resisters. This can operate only when violent repres-
sion is met with continued nonviolent defiance, not violence or sur-
render. The opponents’ repression is then seen in the worst possible
light.
Resulting shifts of opinion are likely to occur among third par-
ties, the general grievance group, and even the opponents’ usual
supporters. Those shifts may produce both withdrawal of support
for the opponents and increased support for the nonviolent resist-
ers. The result may be widespread condemnation of the opponents,
internal opposition among the opponents, and increased resistance.
These changes can at times produce major shifts in power relation-
ships in favor of the nonviolent struggle group.
Political jiu-jitsu does not operate in all cases of nonviolent

struggle. When it is absent the shift of power relationships depends
highly on the extent of noncooperation.
Political power: The totality of influences and pressures available
for use to determine and implement official policies for a society.
Political power may be wielded by the institutions of government,
or in opposition to the government by dissident groups and organi-
zations. Political power may be directly applied in a conflict, or it
may be held as a reserve capacity for possible later use.
Sanctions: Punishments or reprisals, violent or nonviolent, imposed
either because people have failed to act in the expected or desired
manner or because people have acted in an unexpected or prohib-
ited manner.
Nonviolent sanctions are less likely than violent ones to be
simple reprisals for disobedience and are more likely to be intended
to achieve a given objective. Sanctions are a source of political power.
Self-reliance: The capacity to manage one's own affairs, make one's
own judgments, and provide for oneself, one's group or organiza-
tion, independence, self-determination, and self-sufficiency.
Skills and knowledge: Asource of political power. The ruler’s power
is supported by the skills, knowledge and abilities that are provided
by persons and groups in the society (human resources) and the
relation of those available skills, knowledge and abilities to the ruler’s
needs for them.
Sources of power: These are origins of political power. They in-
clude: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible
factors, material resources and sanctions. These derive from the so-
ciety. Each of these sources is closely associated with and depen-
dent upon the acceptance, cooperation, and obedience of the popu-
lation and the society's institutions. With a strong supply of these
sources the ruler will be powerful. As the supply is weakened or
severed, the ruler's power will weaken or collapse.

38 Gene Sharp
Strategic nonviolent struggle: Nonviolent struggle that is applied
according to a strategic plan that has been prepared on the basis of
analysis of the conflict situation, the strengths and weaknesses of
the contending groups, the nature, capacities, and requirements of
the technique of nonviolent action, and especially strategic principles
of that type of struggle. See also: grand strategy, strategy, tactics,
and methods.
Strategy: A plan for the conduct of a major phase, or campaign,
within a grand strategy for the overall conflict. A strategy is the
basic idea of how the struggle of a specific campaign shall develop,
and how its separate components shall be fitted together to contrib-
ute most advantageously to achieve its objectives.
Strategy operates within the scope of the grand strategy. Tac-
tics and specific methods of action are used in smaller scale opera-
tions to implement the strategy for a specific campaign.
Strike: A deliberate restriction or suspension of work, usually tem-
porarily, to put pressure on employers to achieve an economic ob-
jective or sometimes on the government in order to win a political
objective.
Tactic: A limited plan of action based on a conception of how, in a
restricted phase of a conflict, to use effectively the available means
of action to achieve a specific limited objective. Tactics are intended
for use in implementing a wider strategy in a phase of the overall
conflict.
Violence: Physical violence against other human beings that inflicts
injury or death, or threatens to inflict such violence, or any act de-
pendent on such infliction or threat.
Some types of religious or ethical nonviolence conceive of vio-
lence much more broadly. This narrower definition permits adher-
ents to those beliefs to cooperate with persons and groups that are
prepared on pragmatic grounds to practice nonviolent struggle.

39
APPENDIX TWO
198 METHODS OF NONVIOLENT ACTION
The Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion
The following 198 methods of nonviolent action have all been used
in historical instances of nonviolent struggle. Definitions of these
methods and examples are provided in Gene Sharp, The Politics of
Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods of Nonviolent Action.7
Formal Statements
1. Public speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public statements
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions
Communications with a Wider Audience
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting
Group Representations
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections
7
Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973 and later editions.

40 Gene Sharp
Symbolic Public Acts
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobings
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamations
30. Rude gestures
Pressures on Individuals
31. “Haunting” officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils
Drama and Music
35. Humorous skits and pranks
36. Performances of plays and music
37. Singing
Processions
38. Marches
39. Parades
40. Religious processions
41. Pilgrimages
42. Motorcades

Honoring the Dead
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places
Public Assemblies
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins
Withdrawal and Renunciation
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one’s back
The Methods of Noncooperation
Social Noncooperation
Ostracism of Persons
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic nonaction
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict

42 Gene Sharp
Noncooperation with Social Events, Customs, and Institutions
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions
Withdrawal from the Social System
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation
67. “Flight” of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)
Economic Noncooperation: Economic Boycotts
Actions by Consumers
71. Consumers’ boycott
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers’ boycott
77. International consumers’ boycott
Action by Workers and Producers
78. Workmen’s boycott
79. Producers’ boycott

Action by Middlemen
80. Suppliers’ and handlers’ boycott
Action by Owners and Management
81. Traders’ boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants’ “general strike”
Action by Holders of Financial Resources
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government’s money
Action by Governments
92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers’ embargo
95. International buyers’ embargo
96. International trade embargo
Economic Noncooperation: The Strike
Symbolic Strikes
97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)

44 Gene Sharp
Agricultural Strikes
99. Peasant strike
100. Farm Workers’ strike
Strikes by Special Groups
101. Refusal of impressed labor
102. Prisoners’ strike
103. Craft strike
104. Professional strike
Ordinary Industrial Strikes
105. Establishment strike
106. Industry strike
107. Sympathetic strike
Restricted Strikes
108. Detailed strike
109. Bumper strike
110. Slowdown strike
111. Working-to-rule strike
112. Reporting “sick” (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
114. Limited strike
115. Selective strike
Multi-Industry Strikes
116. Generalized strike
117. General strike

Combination of Strikes and Economic Closures
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown
Political Noncooperation
Rejection of Authority
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance
Citizens’ Noncooperation with Government
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government depts., agencies, and other
bodies
127. Withdrawal from government educational institu-
tions
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions
Citizens’ Alternatives to Obedience
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse

46 Gene Sharp
138. Sit-down
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of “illegitimate” laws
Action by Government Personnel
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative noncooperation
146. Judicial noncooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation
by enforcement agents
148. Mutiny
Domestic Governmental Action
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units
International Governmental Action
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representations
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organizations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organizations

The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention
Psychological Intervention
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast
a) Fast of moral pressure
b) Hunger strike
c) Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial
161. Nonviolent harassment
Physical Intervention
162. Sit-in
163. Stand-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. Mill-in
167. Pray-in
168. Nonviolent raids
169. Nonviolent air raids
170. Nonviolent invasion
171. Nonviolent interjection
172. Nonviolent obstruction
173. Nonviolent occupation
Social Intervention
174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theater
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system

48 Gene Sharp
Economic Intervention
181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions
Political Intervention
193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government
Without doubt, a large number of additional methods have al-
ready been used but have not been classified, and a multitude of
additional methods will be invented in the future that have the char-
acteristics of the three classes of methods: nonviolent protest and
persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.
It must be clearly understood that the greatest effectiveness is
possible when individual methods to be used are selected to imple-
ment the previously adopted strategy. It is necessary to know what
kind of pressures are to be used before one chooses the precise forms
of action that will best apply those pressures.

49
APPENDIX THREE
FOR FURTHER READING
Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, A Force More Powerful: One Hun-
dred Years of Nonviolent Conflict. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000.
Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Con-
flict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century. Westport,
Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1994.
Ronald McCarthy and Gene Sharp, with Brad Bennett, Nonviolent
Action: A Research Guide. New York: Garland Publishing, 1994.
Gene Sharp and Bruce Jenkins, The Anti-Coup. Boston, Massachu-
setts: Albert Einstein Institution, 2003.
Gene Sharp, Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System.
Princeton, New Jersey and London: Princeton University Press, 1990.
Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy. Bangkok: Committee
for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma, 1993. Also, Boston,
Massachusetts: Albert Einstein Institution, 2002.
Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent,
1973. Now available only in three paperback volumes.
Gene Sharp. “The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle.” Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Albert Einstein Institution, 1990.
Gene Sharp. Social Power and Political Freedom. Boston: Porter Sargent,
1980.
Gene Sharp, Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice
and Twenty-First Century Potential. Forthcoming 2003.

51
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This booklet has been published with financial support from the
International Peace Research Association Foundation.
Hardy Merriman of the Albert Einstein Institution has been of very
great help in the preparation of this publication, through advice,
evaluation of possible texts for inclusion, editorial skills, and man-
aging the production arrangements. Jamila Raqib has offered help-
ful advice and comments.
Chapter One, “Developing a Realistic Alternative to War and Other
Violence,” is based on a lecture presented to the joint conference of
the Peace StudiesAssociation and the Consortium on Peace Research,
Education and Development held at Siena College, Loudon, New
York, April 10, 1999. At this occasion Gene Sharp was awarded a
Peace Studies Lifetime Achievement Award.
I am grateful to Chris Miller, Charles Bloomstein, Lloyd (Jeff)
Dumas, Walter Conser, Carolyn Stephenson, and Ken Bresler for
editorial suggestions.
Chapter Two, “The Importance of Strategic Planning in Nonviolent
Struggle” has not been previously published in this form.
Chapter Three, “Steps In Strategic Planning for Nonviolent Struggles
Against Repressive Regimes” is a revision of a paper presented at a
conference of the United States Institute of Peace and the Interna-
tional Center on Nonviolent Conflict at Aerlie House in Warrenton,
Virginia, 9 January 2002, in cooperation with Freedom House.
Appendix One, “Glossary of Important Terms in Nonviolent
Struggle,” has been selected from a far larger manuscript by Gene
Sharp on terminology and definitions in the field of nonviolent
struggle and tangential subjects, that at this date (2003) is still in
progress.

52 Gene Sharp
Appendix Two, “198 Methods of Nonviolent Action” is based on
Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part Two, The Methods
of Nonviolent Action. Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973 and later editions.
That book contains detailed definitions, discussions, and examples
of each method. A text similar to this chapter was issued as a leaflet
by the Albert Einstein Institution in the 1990s and reproduced in
several languages including Thai and Russian.

53
A NOTE ABOUT TRANSLATIONS
AND REPRINTING OF THIS PUBLICATION
To facilitate dissemination of this publication it has been placed in
the public domain. That means that anyone is free to reproduce it
or disseminate it.
The author, however, does have several requests that he would
like to make, although individuals are under no legal obligation to
follow such requests.
• The author requests that no changes be made in the text, ei-
ther additions or deletions, if it is reproduced.
• The author requests notification from individuals who in-
tend to reproduce this document. Notification can be given
to theAlbert Einstein Institution (contact information appears
in the beginning of this publication immediately before the
Table of Contents).
• The author requests that if this document is going to be trans-
lated, great care must be taken to preserve the original mean-
ing of the text. Some of the terms in this publication will not
translate readily into other languages, as direct equivalents
for “nonviolent action” and related terms may not be avail-
able. Thus, careful consideration must be given to how these
terms and concepts are to be translated so as to be under-
stood accurately by new readers.
For individuals and groups that wish to translate this work,
theAlbert Einstein Institution has developed a standard set of trans-
lation procedures that may assist them. They are as follows:
• A selection process takes place to select a translator. Candi-
dates are evaluated on their fluency in both English and the
language into which the work will be translated. Candidates

54 Gene Sharp
are also evaluated on their general knowledge surrounding
the subject area and their understanding of the terms and
concepts present in the text.
• An evaluator is selected by a similar process. The evaluator’s
job is to thoroughly review the translation and to provide
feedback and criticism to the translator. It is often better if
the translator and evaluator do not know the identities of
each other.
• Once the translator and evaluator are selected, the translator
submits a sample translation of two or three pages of the
text, as well as a list of a number of significant key terms that
are present in the text.
• The evaluator evaluates this sample translation and presents
feedback to the translator.
• If major problems exist between the translator’s sample trans-
lation and the evaluator’s evaluation of that translation, then
either the translator or the evaluator may be replaced, de-
pending upon the judgement of the individual or group that
is sponsoring the translation. If minor problems exist, the
translator proceeds with the full translation of the text, keep-
ing in mind the comments of the evaluator.
• Once the entire text is translated, the evaluator evaluates the
entire text and gives feedback to the translator.
• Once the translator has considered this feedback and made
any necessary changes, the final version of the text is com-
plete and the translated book is ready to be printed and dis-
tributed.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Gene Sharp, D. Phil. (Oxon.), is Senior Scholar at theAlbert Einstein
Institution in Boston, Massachusetts. He holds a B.A. and an M.A.
from Ohio State University and a D.Phil. in political theory from
Oxford University. He is also Professor Emeritus of political science
at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. For nearly thirty
years he held a research appointment at Harvard University’s Cen-
ter for International Affairs. He is the author of various books, in-
cluding The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1973), Gandhi as a Political
Strategist (1979), Social Power and Political Freedom (1980), Making
Europe Unconquerable (1985), Civilian-Based Defense (1990), and From
Dictatorship to Democracy (1993 and 2002). Anew major book is now
in preparation (2003) Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century
Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential. His writings have been
published in more than thirty languages.

Gene sharp

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