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Learning Objectives
In this chapter you will learn to:
•Demonstrate knowledge of the key concepts in public policy
formulation and adoption.
•Identify the key actors involved in public policy formulation
and adoption.
•Identify the different arenas of influence and contexts in which
public policy formulation and
adoption occur.
Formulating, Designing,
and Adopting Policy
5
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Section 5.1 What Is Policy Formulation? CHAPTER 5
Federal public policies do not just appear; they have to be
created or designed and then adopted by an authoritative
decision-making body. If policies are to solve per-ceived
problems or emerging issues, then analysis of the most
appropriate action
to address the problem must take place. As Chapter 1 discussed,
policy makers can then
choose which type of policy to formulate and adopt. The choice
of policy type will also
include decisions about who will benefit and who will bear the
burden of the policy, based
on how groups are socially constructed. In essence, this
amounts to which target popula-
tion will be affected by the policy. Groups that society
perceives negatively will either be
ignored or negatively affected by the policy. Analysis involves
policy makers’ choosing
among alternative courses of action. Inherent in this process is
the fact that policy makers
must deal with the question of policy design—selecting the
correct set of instruments that
can actually be adopted and best match the problem. Simply, for
successful policy formu-
lation, a policy must be politically adoptable. Ideally, the best
policy formulation solves
the identified problem. In actuality, policy formulation is a
political exercise in which the
best policy is often sacrificed in favor of an adoptable policy. In
sum, the policy must be
acceptable to those who adopt policy as well as to target
populations. Just as a football
team needs support to help it play well, policy formulation is
influenced heavily by policy
makers’ need to win support for their proposed policy from

policy actors within the for-
mal institutions of government and society as a whole.
Once policy alternatives are designed, however, some kind of
governmental decision must
be made regarding the direction and type of governmental
action that will follow. This
seemingly simple act of making the decision to adopt a
proposed course of policy action
represents a defining moment in the policy process. Only by
adopting policies can a pro-
posed course of action garner legitimacy within the political and
public arena. In sum, the
policy adoption stage represents the critical stage in which
policy makers politically explore
alternatives in the law-making arenas, conduct debate and
negotiate within the legislative
bodies, and take official actions to promote specific legislative
positions over others.
5.1 What Is Policy Formulation?
Once a problem or issue is on the public agenda, then remedies
or solutions to it must be seriously considered. Policy
formulation is the development of remedies that deal with a
specific problem or address a particular issue within the insti-
tutional agenda. It takes place before legislation is enacted and
theoretically ends once
the policy is implemented. In reality, however, formulation
often becomes reformulation
because after policy is implemented and then evaluated, it is
often redesigned to address
political or essential inadequacies. This, then, typifies the
iterative nature of formulation.
The policy process itself is also iterative.

Inherent to policy formulation is the notion of bargaining and
compromise. Often
policy-making actors will make concessions to win the most
political support for a par-
ticular solution. From start to finish, policy formation is an
incredibly political process.
The process of formulation involves many competing realities.
One essential reality of
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Section 5.2 Policy Design and Policy Instruments CHAPTER 5
policy formulation is that, multiple actors can design different
remedies or mechanisms at
the same time for solving the same problem. In Congress, for
example, numerous policy
proposals compete with each other for adoption. This often
results in competing propos-
als fighting for political support. Another reality is that
formulation can occur over a long
period of time, and while it is happening, a continuous process
of coalition building is
going on behind certain policy proposals. A final reality is that
policy formulation does
not necessarily result in policy adoption, even though the
expected result of policy formu-
lation is to solve a problem.
5.2 Policy Design and Policy Instruments
Once policy makers have decided that government should
intervene to deal with a problem and develop policy, they
involve themselves in policy design, in which they have at their

disposal a number of policy instruments, tools, approaches and
techniques with which to craft
a policy. Policy instruments
are simply the means or tools
by which governments reach
the solution to the problem
they are attempting to address.
When discussing what policy
solutions may be developed,
note that policy makers have
the option of using more than
one instrument to solve a prob-
lem and achieve the objectives
of a proposed policy. Often the
choice of instrument(s) depends
on the nature of the problem,
the target population, the goals
of the policy, and finally, how
the policy will be implemented.
Policy scholars have developed
various policy instrument clas-
sification schemes (Schneider and Ingram, 2000). All schemes
describe mechanisms by
which government seeks to alter the behavior of specified target
populations. In reality, such
change might not occur without the government giving the
target populations the ability to
do so. Other common dimensions of these classification
schemes include, first, a focus on
activity, which provides a general sense of what government is
attempting to achieve with
the policy. The second dimension is a delivery system through
which the implementation’s
level of complexity can be gauged. The third dimension is the
program’s administrative

level of centralization. The final dimension is the degree to
which the program requires
detailed administrative action. Overall, these dimensions help
us better appreciate just how
similar these schemes are, regardless of the labels used by each
author.
Polka Dot/Thinkstock
Elderly people are among the advantaged population and tend
to have a good deal of influence and thus a greater likelihood
of receiving benefits when targeted by policies.
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Actual policy solutions may come in the form of legislation,
executive orders, judicial
decisions, regulations, and approval of referendum or
initiatives. To make sense of these
different forms and of the various policy instrument
classification schemes found in the
literature, one can divide policy instruments into two broad
categories: negative instru-
ments and affirming instruments (Brigham & Brown, 1980).
Negative instruments restrain
the behavior of the target population by prohibiting or deterring
certain actions; affirma-
tive instruments promote certain behavior from the target
population by prescribing or
encouraging certain actions (Verdung, 2003). Thus, negative
instruments will apply pen-
alties, punishments, or costs to the target population. Examples

of negative instruments
include laws that compel citizenry compliance—such as
regulating speed limits or alcohol
consumption while driving—or the use of financial incentives to
compel desired behavior
through taxes and spending. Affirmative instruments employ
incentives such as grants,
tax exemption, information, and education to shape citizen
behavior through programs
such as the Just Say No drug awareness campaign. Other
examples of affirmative instru-
ments include intergovernmental loans or the delivery of
services either directly or indi-
rectly through contracts or subsidies.
Although policy solutions are specific to the problem at hand
and may use different means
to achieve the desired outcome, each broadly attempts to
accomplish one of the following:
• prohibit behaviors that put society in jeopardy; for example,
banning smoking in
public areas;
• protect certain activities, markets, or groups; for example,
minorities or people
with disabilities;
• promote activities that are important or of value for the
government and for
society; and
• provide benefits to citizens directly; for example, Social
Security payments.
Whatever policy solution is selected, the following factors must

be taken into consideration:
• political feasibility—even if a policy proposal has technical
feasibility, it will not
work without political support;
• availability of resources to implement the solution—without
sufficient resources
to carry out the solution, it is not viable;
• administrative feasibility—can the policy be successfully
established and
managed;
• reaction of the target population—the receptivity of the target
population to
changing its behavior or complying with the policy. A policy
that fails to change
a target population’s behavior fails by definition.
Some policy scholars recognize that designing policy is not just
a matter of determining
the type of policy or the instruments; it is also acknowledging
the influence that per-
ceived merit and political power have on both the design of
policy and its justification. As
Chapter 3 discussed, the theoretical framework known as the
social construction of target
populations argues that within society, groups of individuals
(target populations) with
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culturally constructed images inevitably affect the policy
process. In sum, social construc-
tion is how society perceives a group; it is the image others
within the political arena and
society hold of a group. Public policy scholars like A. L.
Schneider and H. Ingram argue
that the justification and substance of any policy can be
understood by identifying how
groups targeted by a given policy are socially constructed.
Schneider and Ingram (2000)
contend that policy makers are influenced by these images when
they design policy; social
construction dictates the benefits and burdens they are willing
to distribute to the groups
through policy.
The effect of such image construction, some authors argue, is to
allow office holders
seeking reelection to maximize their electoral advantage
through the policy choices they
made while in office (Donovan, 1993; Herek & Capitanio,
1998). The ideal objective of
such behavior is to give the greatest benefits to groups with the
most positive images and
the most political power while giving the burdens to groups
with negatively constructed
images and the least political power. In reality, of course, the
ideal is often not achieved.
In the real world many groups are positively constructed but
powerless; other groups
are negatively constructed but historically powerful, due to their
economic and political
resources. For example, battered women are positively
constructed but weak in terms of
their power to influence policy makers, while unions are

generally negatively constructed
but strong in their position to influence elected representatives.
Thus, the distribution
of benefits and burdens is not as straightforward as the ideal
suggests. Often the influ-
ence a group wields through its actual or attributed power will
dictate the distribution of
benefits and burdens of the group in order to maximize the
electoral ambitions of policy
makers. To justify this behavior, Schneider and Ingram (1993)
argue, policy makers offer
a number of believable rationalizations. Thus, policy makers
rationalize maximizing the
benefits and minimizing the burdens for favored groups.
In the social construction model, four types of target
populations are identified using
a typology that measures the interrelationship between social
construction and political
power. Figure 5.1 shows four distinct population types:
advantaged, contenders, dependents,
and deviants. What determines each group’s label is the manner
in which they mobilize
their members, the public’s perception of how deserving the
group is to be helped (based
on general assumptions of lifestyle), and the group’s general
political fortunes (based on
the group’s level of resources). The resources that are available
to groups are economic,
political, motivational, and organizational. The net effect of this
balance between image
and power is that advantaged populations tend to have a good
deal of influence and thus
a greater likelihood of receiving benefits when policies target
them. They are also likely
to have a high level of control over the way policy is shaped.

Contender populations
have little influence over the distribution of benefits but a
relatively good deal of control
over the substance of policy burdens. In comparison, dependent
populations are more
likely to receive burdens than benefits. However, dependents,
because of their image, can
exercise some influence over the policy process, so they may
also be targeted for benefits.
Finally, deviant populations receive burdens rather than benefits
and have little or no
influence over policies that may affect them. A deviant social
construction is significant
because policy makers will create policies that are punitive
rather than rewarding.
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Figure 5.1: Social construction and political power—types of
target
populations
Advantaged populations have more available resources and
more influence and are thus more likely to
benefit from targeted policies.
Adapted from Schneider, A. L., & Ingram, H. (1993). Social
construction of target populations: Implications for politics and
policy.
American Political Science Review, 87, 334–347.
Groups and individuals seek policy changes to achieve benefits

while minimizing costs
or transferring them to other groups or individuals. James Q.
Wilson is the author of one
of the most prominent typology classifications of policy.
Wilson’s (1973b) scheme focuses
on policies’ distribution of costs and benefits. Costs and
benefits are not necessarily finan-
cial and can be perceived as concentrated or diffuse. According
to Wilson (1973b), “costs
and benefits are widely distributed or narrowly concentrated
from the point of view of
those who bear the costs or enjoy the benefits” (p. 332).
Basically, Wilson’s concern is
whether benefits or cost are being distributed and whether the
beneficiaries are concen-
trated or dispersed. Concentrated costs and benefits are
confined to a few individuals or
particular segment of society. If costs and benefits are
distributed, then society as a whole
accrues them. Table 5.1 illustrates the Wilson classification
scheme and gives examples
of how costs and benefits are distributed. Wilson’s concentrated
or dispersed typology
helps explain why certain types of policy are implemented, even
though they seem to
have little support.
Social Construction
Power
ADVANTAGED
Elderly
Business
Veterans
Health-care workers

Positive Negative
Strong
Weak
CONTENDERS
Wealthy
Minorities
Unions
Cultural elite
DEPENDENTS
Children
Battered women
People with disabilities
DEVIANTS
Criminals
Drug addicts
Gangs
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Table 5.1: Wilson’s typology of concentrated or distributed
costs and benefits of policies
Benefits Broadly Distributed Concentrated Benefits
Costs broadly distributed Majoritarian politics: Many
people benefit and many

people pay.
Example: Social Security
Client politics: Few people
benefit but many people pay.
Example: Veterans benefits
Concentrated costs Entrepreneurial politics: Many
people benefit but few pay.
Example: environmental
protection
Interest group politics: Few
people benefit and few people
pay.
Example: auto industry workers
unions vs. auto industry
corporations
Adapted from Wilson, J. Q. (1980). The politics of regulation.
New York: Basic Books.
To recap: When policy is designed, it will either benefit or cost
target populations. Next, in
policy design it is impossible to ignore the interplay of factors
such as economic analysis,
societal values, policy makers’ belief systems, the structure of
the policy process, and the
distribution of power within the structure. With these two
considerations in mind, how
does one judge one particular policy solution against another
policy solution that deals

with the same issue?
As the earlier discussion made clear, policy makers are not
monolithic or neutral, so bear
in mind that the choice of policy solutions is often fought for
among a group of policy
makers, each pushing their own alternatives within the
institutional agendas. This bat-
tle is theoretically the process of examining and evaluating
alternative policy proposals
intended to lessen or resolve a problem and is generally referred
to as policy analysis.
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Section 5.3 Policy Analysis CHAPTER 5
5.3 Policy Analysis
First used by political economist Charles Lindblom in 1958, the
term policy analysis refers to a type of quantitative analysis
involving incremental comparisons in which nonquantitative
methods are included in the recognition of values and policy
(Lind-
blom, 1959). Over the years, policy analysis has also come to be
defined in other ways that
can be categorized as either analysis for policy making or
analysis of existing policy (Gor-
don, Lewis, & Young, 1977). In terms of policy formulation,
analysis for policy making is
the most useful approach.
Analysis for policy making involves decision makers using
reason and evidence to

choose the best policy from a number of alternatives. This type
of policy analysis identi-
fies and verifies a problem’s existence; it allows alternative
ways to address the problem
to be compared and then formats that comparison in a way that
is useful for decision
makers. The objective of this type of policy analysis is to help
decision makers make more
intelligent, more ethical, more effective, and more efficient
choices. Policy analysis, how-
ever, is not an exact science, because it cannot ensure that
chosen proposals will be in the
best interest of the public or will even solve the problem
completely.
Most public policy theorists would agree that policy analysis
requires a sequence of
steps (Patton & Sawicki, 1986). Theorists might disagree about
the number of steps in the
sequence, but general agreement exists that a sequence of
activities that must be carried
out for effective analysis. Each step clearly links to the next,
and if the sequence is dramati-
cally broken, then the likelihood of the analysis being flawed
greatly increases. Figure 5.2
illustrates this sequence (MacRae & Wilde, 1985; Patton &
Sawicki, 1986; Bardach, 2000).
The objective of any piece of analysis for policy making is to
develop alternatives (policy
proposals) that can be evaluated by how well they address the
problem as it is identified
and understood.
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Section 5.3 Policy Analysis CHAPTER 5
Figure 5.2: Policy analysis steps
The number of steps in the policy process can vary, but
theorists do agree the sequence of the steps is
significant and greatly impacts policy analyses.
Adapted from Patton, C., & Sawicki, D. (1986). Basic methods
of policy analysis and planning. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, pp. 2, 26.
• Policy makers identify alternative policy
solutions specifically to meet problem.
• Policy makers must identify all possible
options so there is choice.
• Policy makers should redefine, modify,
adapt, and omit alternatives until a short
list of viable options remains.
• Policy makers then compare shortlist with
evaluation criteria and problem definition.
• Needed if policy makers are to compare and evaluate
generated
alternatives’ effectiveness in dealing with the problem.

• Allows policy makers to judge alternatives as acceptable to
relevant constituencies.
• Common categories of criteria may be applied to all
alternatives;
policy makers can develop other criteria as needed according to
the problem definition.
• Common categories are technical feasibility, including
effectiveness and adequacy; economic feasibility, including
costs,
benefits, and cost-effectiveness; political viability, including
acceptibility to actors and stakeholders; administrative
viability,
including the ability to implement and manage legality and
ethics
(is it legal, is it ethical).
• Policy makers evaluate and compare developed
alternatives against established criteria.
• Policy makers must rank criteria to see which
alternatives are preferable.
• Requires policy makers to identify differences

among alternatives.
• Process comes full circle.
• Allows policy makers to
include feedback.
• Allows decision makers to
see if adopted policy is doing
what it’s supposed to, and if
not, why.
PROBLEM
DEFINITION
ESTABLISHING
EVALUATION
CRITERIA
DEVELOPING
ALTERNATIVES
COMPARING
ALTERNATIVES
SELECTING
ALTERNATIVES
EVALUATION
• Verifies, defines, and details

problem-including causes.
• Policy makers must identify all
relevant actors from most to least
affected based on their individual
definition of what problem is.
• Policy makers must identify and take
all influencing factors into account.
• Crucial because if policy makers define
incorrectly, solutions can be flawed.
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Section 5.4 Actors Involved With Policy Formulation
CHAPTER 5
Analysis of existing policy is the second approach to policy
analysis. It is concerned with
how, why, when, and for whom policy is made, or describes a
policy in terms of its content
and relationship to other policies. Factors such as effectiveness,
feasibility, and equity are
crucial to this type of analysis.
Policy analysis—be it analysis of existing policy or analysis for
policy making—allows

one to understand and examine the problem, its nature, and its
dynamics. It is critical to
developing appropriate, effective, and efficient policy solutions.
Common to both policy
analysis approaches is a requirement that they be systematic and
organized so that policy
makers can assess either the feasibility of policy alternatives or
the usefulness of an exist-
ing policy. Analysis for policy making represents a critical
thread that ties together all of
the implications of the previously discussed predecision stage.
In essence, policy formula-
tion represents the proposed solution to the identified problem.
Real-world politics often
ensure that because problems are not identified correctly,
generated policy solutions are
not always as effective as they could be. More important, the
most politically feasible solu-
tion is often the one that is adopted, resulting in the wrong
solution to the problem.
5.4 Actors Involved With Policy Formulation
An earlier discussion of the who of policy making (see Chapter
2) referred to the institutional and noninstitutional actors in
policy formulation. The difficulty of formulating policy is that
it involves multiple actors in the process with few rules.
B. Guy Peters (1999) argues that this absence of rules is
responsible in part for the com-
plexity of formulation. The fact that many actors are operating
in a process with few rules
ensures formulation is fraught with political and policy
difficulties. What follows is a
discussion of the important policy formulation actors at the
national level of government.
Note that some actors are more important than others and that in

many respects the policy
domain dictates who may be actively involved with any given
issue. However, all actors
involved in the different venues of policy design can and may
attempt to influence formu-
lation at varying points.
The President
The president and the executive offices associated with the
White House are often very
active in policy formulation. The last 50 years has witnessed a
number of president-
created commissions and task forces that solidify the
president’s participation in formu-
lating policy. Such commissions draw attention to a specific
problem. Recent examples
include President Bill Clinton’s 1993 task force on health-care
reform, George W. Bush’s
commission on the intelligence capabilities regarding weapons
of mass destruction in
2005, and President Barack Obama’s 2010 commissions on
fiscal responsibility and reform,
the BP oil spill, and offshore drilling.
In the modern era, presidents commonly take an active personal
interest in policy formu-
lation. (For example, the staffs of Ronald Reagan and Bill
Clinton were often involved in
the preparation of legislation for congressional review.) More
often than not, presidents
are part of the process because they were elected to office with
a policy agenda. That
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CHAPTER 5
agenda is establishing an administration’s pol-
icy goals and priorities. The public often judges
presidents on the success of their agenda, which
means assessment of which policy solutions
are pursued as well as those that are enacted.
The advantage of presidential participation in
the policy formulation process is that the presi-
dent is the only actor with a national constitu-
ency and national political recognition. This
allows presidents to formulate policies with the
national interest as their focus and to redefine
the national interest to serve their policy agenda.
That can be a drawback, as presidents tend to
define national interests in line with the interests
of those who elected them and not always the
public at large. For example, many critics argue
that George W. Bush tended to initiate policy
proposals in areas such as the environment that
rewarded his electoral backers in the energy and
oil industry. However, in this respect Bush was
no different than any of his predecessors, who
also had to contend with the political and policy
implications of their individual policy agendas.
In his first 2 years in office, President Barack
Obama initiated an ambitious legislative agenda
in response to the policy agenda laid out in his
2008 presidential election campaign. His agenda promised
change and reform that would
bring smart, effective government to Washington. Such an

agenda requires a president to
be actively involved in policy formulation. The Obama White
House’s first 2 years saw a
flurry of policy proposals on issues ranging from health-care
reform to corporate execu-
tive compensation to energy to stimulating the economy to
cybersecurity. By the end of
his first year in office, Obama had named 35 policy czars to
manage broad areas of policy
formulation (Schambra, 2009).
Congress
Members of Congress are a significant source of draft
legislation and therefore are most
often associated with policy formulation. Members of Congress
participate in formulation
principally by developing new legislation, legislative oversight,
and legislative review.
Additionally, the integral role played by members’ personal or
committee staffs facilitates
their involvement in policy formulation. These staffs not only
research possible policy
proposals but also design them.
Congressional involvement in developing policy proposals
means that partisan or politi-
cal influence shapes the kinds of remedies that are formulated.
Each member of Congress
confronts the political reality that the best politically
formulated policy is not necessarily
the best solution to a problem. Often the solution is the one that
has or will receive the
Visions of America/Superstock

The president plays a large role in policy
formation as former president Bill Clinton
did in the 1993 task force on health-care
reform.
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CHAPTER 5
most political support. In addition, legislators tend to formulate
detailed policy propos-
als that often require programs be micromanaged. An example
of this is laws removing
discretionary exclusions from the hands of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
This policy action was the result of congressional members’
formulating and adopting a
policy that returned control of a critical area of immigration
back to policy makers and
away from the day-to-day policy implementers.
The Bureaucracy
Governmental agencies initially develop many policy proposals.
Bureaucrats often have
more expertise and involvement in policy issue areas than many
elected office holders;
bureaucrats may possess the relevant information and data
resources necessary to formu-
late proposals that can be possible policy solutions.
Additionally, bureaucrats understand
implementation procedures and what can and cannot be
accomplished. Such characteris-

tics place the bureaucracy in a strong position in the race to
formulate possible remedies
to problems. Bureaucrats therefore have significant
responsibility in the overall policy
formulation process. The implications of such prominence can
be serious for the formu-
lated solutions. For example, because of their desire to maintain
their agency’s survival,
bureaucrats might lack the initiative to develop dramatic or
innovative policy solutions.
Moreover, the political necessity of achieving accountability,
efficiency, and effectiveness
places even greater constraints on the type of policies designed
by bureaucrats. Thus,
bureaucrats have a tendency to formulate incremental proposals.
Interest Groups
Interest groups are major actors in policy formulation and often
propose or initiate pol-
icy solutions. Political scientist Theodore Lowi argues that such
a situation reflects inter-
est group liberalism, in which government defers to interest
groups. Lowi (1967) does not
disagree that interest group demands are legitimate and that the
government’s job is to
advance such demands. Such groups are also key facilitators in
the bargaining, negotia-
tions, and compromises that occur around various alternative
policy proposals. Interest
group primacy in policy formulation can best be understood by
realizing that the primacy
reflects group resources and level of influence. For some, this
translates to buying influ-
ence, lobbying for influence, and suing for influence (Spiller &
Liao, 2006). Authors such

as Schattschneider (1975) and Lowi (1979) argue that U.S.
interest groups have undue
power in the policy process and often structure formulations
that reflect their interests
rather than the common good. Critics of interest groups’
activities in this stage of the pol-
icy process argue that powerful groups have significant impact
on the direction of legisla-
tion through the resources at their disposal (see Figure 5.3).
Those who support significant
interest group participation in policy formulation and thus
interest group liberalism argue
that in spite of disparities among groups in terms of their
resources and influence, interest
group participation enhances the democratic process because it
allows for more grass-
roots participation in the policy-making process. Therefore, one
could argue that policy
formulation reflects how the more influential interest groups in
U.S. society mobilize.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 156 11/21/12 12:48 PM
CHAPTER 5
Figure 5.3: Total funds given to members of Congress by the
top 50
interest groups
Powerful groups have more disposable resources and, as a
result, often have more of an impact on
legislation.

Center for Responsive Politics, http://www.opensecrets.org, Top
Interest Groups to Congress.
Policy Entrepreneurs
Policy entrepreneurs can be found in formal institutions of
government as well as out-
side government. They are distinguished by their motivation to
initiate dynamic policy
change within society (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Kingdon,
1984). Policy entrepreneurs
believe in a cause and want to make that cause part of the
political agenda. Their pres-
ence and actions can significantly affect the probability that the
formulation process will
include particular policy proposals. Entrepreneurs identify
problems, network in policy
circles, shape the terms of policy debates, and build coalitions
behind certain proposals.
These activities attract the attention of decision makers and can
encourage them to initi-
ate appropriate policy responses (Kingdon, 1984; Majone,
1988). Through networking,
entrepreneurs can determine what arguments will persuade
others to support their policy
ideas, and this allows them to shape the debate around their
preferred policy solution
(Kelman, 1987; Kingdon, 1984; Riker, 1986). Simply,
entrepreneurs know which issue to
push and how to sell it to different audiences. For example,
policy entrepreneurs can be
members of an interest group who communicate with
government on behalf of the group
0

200,000,000
400,000,000
600,000,000
800,000,000
1,000,000,000
1,200,000,000
1,400,000,000
Amount contributed to members of Congress
D
o
ll
a
rs
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012*
** September 2011—March 2012
Year
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CHAPTER 5
(Ainsworth & Sened, 1993). They can also be bureaucrats who

want to improve or change
governmental services (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993). Policy
entrepreneurs who successfully
engage in such activity will be in a good position to build
leverage when it comes to
coalition building and in the long run be more effective in
getting their ideas approved as
viable policy solutions. In many ways policy entrepreneurs are
similar to business entre-
preneurs acting as “brokers” and making the most of any
opportunity that comes their
way. Policy entrepreneurs’ activity will not always lead to the
adoption of a policy, but
whether it does or does not, the significance of such actors in
policy innovation and the
formulation of policy proposals is great.
Think Tanks
The last 40 years have witnessed an explosion in the number of
organizations and individ-
uals who attempt to influence the direction of policy solutions
through expertise housed
in policy think tanks (see Figure 5.4). The Center for American
Progress, the Brookings
Institution, and the Heritage Foundation are examples of such
organizations. These actors
often initiate policy proposals and push other actors to support
their policy preferences.
The implication of such behavior is debatable. The group and
individual level of influ-
ence with key legislators and other policy formulators will
largely determine the degree
of influence in policy formulation. Think tanks, either
independent or associated with
institutions of higher learning, often provide vital research on

the feasibility and pos-
sible effects of particular policy proposals. Theoretically, they
operate without any par-
ticular agenda. However, over the last few years it has become
more and more evident
that many of these organizations are linked to specific
ideological platforms. Hence, think
tanks are taking a much more active role in influencing policy
formulation. Today think
tanks develop policy recommendations for specific societal
problems and distribute them
to members of Congress, the executive branch, and the mass
media with the desired goal
that the policy recommendation becomes law.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 158 11/21/12 12:48 PM
CHAPTER 5
Figure 5.4: Growth in the number of policy think tanks in the
United States
since 1970
There has been a growth in the number of think tanks during the
past 40 years. These organizations
now have a more active role in the policy process.
Rich, A. (2004). Think tanks, public policy and the politics of
expertise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 15; and
The Global
Go-To Think Tanks Report 2007, 2010 and 2011, retrieved from
Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program,
http://www.gotothinktank.com.

0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Number of Think Tanks
N
u
m
b
e
r
Year
1970 1986 2000 2007 2011

Policy in Practice: Grassroots Organizations in Policy
Formulation and Design
As of 2009 research indicated that more than 1,800 college
students die each year due to alcohol-
related incidents, including car accidents. Universities,
legislatures, and other institutional stakehold-
ers have developed a range of top-down policies to reduce these
rates and have had some success.
However, some of the most effective policy initiatives come not
from the top, but from the grassroots.
In the late spring of 1980, 13-year-old Cari Lightner was struck
and killed by a drunk driver. She was
one of an estimated 30,000 alcohol-related fatalities that year.
In response, her mother Candy and
ultimately thousands of others who have been affected by or
were concerned about drinking and
driving came together to form one of the most effective
grassroots policy advocacy organizations
ever: Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD). (continued)
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Section 5.5 Models of Policy Formulation CHAPTER 5
5.5 Models of Policy Formulation
Many different models of policy formulation exist, and each
model depends on the criteria used for classification. B. Guy
Peters’s (1999) book on U.S. public policy develops a scheme
for classifying particular approaches for preparing
policy solutions. For Peters policy formulation depends on two
interacting factors: how

much factual information is available to the formulators and
how well they understand
the problem’s causes (Peters, 1999). Peters (1999) demonstrates
the interaction between
knowledge of causation and the level of factual information.
Figure 5.5 shows that Peters’s
classification scheme encompasses simple to complex
formulation models: routine, condi-
tional, creative, and craftsman.
Policy in Practice: Grassroots Organizations in Policy
Formulation and Design
(continued)
Extraordinarily effective from almost the very beginning, by
1983 MADD saw 129 anti-drunk-driving
laws passed across the nation, and in the following year,
Candice Lightner appeared with President
Ronald Regan as he signed the Uniform Drinking Age Act into
law. Since then MADD has continued
to be active and effective in contributing to the design and
content of alcohol-related legislation.
In the 1990s MADD was among the leading stakeholders in
moving the legal blood alcohol content
(BAC) level from 0.10 to 0.08. MADD has continued to work to
shape future policy with activities that
include hosting national summits of traffic safety experts and
providing testimony before Congress.
By its 25th anniversary, the efforts of MADD and other alcohol
and transportation policy stakeholders
had resulted in a reduction of alcohol-related fatalities to
around 17,000 that year.
Although many policies are highly technical and significantly
influenced by powerful institutional
actors, the awareness about and content of some policies is
significantly shaped by grassroots orga-

nizations like MADD.
Critical Thinking and Discussion Questions
1. Given that grassroots organizations often do not have the
expertise, stature, or other resources
of larger, more institutional stakeholders, what tools do
grassroots organizations have that
enable them to successfully influence policy?
2. Of the four policy goals described in this chapter, which are
grassroots organizations likely to
have the most influence on and why?
3. To what degree do you think MADD has changed over its
history from a grassroots organization
to a more institutional stakeholder? How does this change what
it does or how it functions?
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 160 11/27/12 3:28 PM
Section 5.5 Models of Policy Formulation CHAPTER 5
Figure 5.5: Peters’s formulation model
These four types of policy formulation models are based on the
interactions between knowledge of
causation and level of factual information.
Adapted from Peters, B. G. (1999). American public policy:
Promise and performance (5th ed.). Chatham, NJ: Chatham
House.
The simplest type of policy formulation is routine formulation,

which requires high lev-
els of knowledge about causation and high levels of factual
information. It is the routine
adjustment of existing policies and thus incremental policy
making. Shifts in routine poli-
cies can occur if underlying theories of causation change.
Changes to Social Security poli-
cies are an example of routine formulation.
Conditional formulation occurs when formulators have
sufficient information but lack
causal knowledge. Policy proposals are triggered by changing
indicators of the problem.
Thus, policy proposals are based on the likely effects of the
policy. Such proposals often
allow for possible modification of the policy as it is being
implemented and as conditions
change. A good example of conditional formulation is fiscal
policy.
Creative formulation occurs because formulators lack sufficient
information and causal
understanding. Policy is innovative in design, but effects of
policy proposals are doubt-
ful. Policy makers not only need to be creative but also cautious
in matching individuals’
needs with the needs of the implementing agency. Often, this
requires that policy makers
build in reversible policy choices for use if the creatively
formulated policy turns out to
be unworkable or in need of correction (Peters, 1999). As a
consequence, formulators can
be influenced by bureaucratic claims of expertise and
knowledge of the issue area. An
example of creative formulation is personal social services,
such as counseling.

Craftsman formulation occurs when formulators clearly
understand the causes of the
problem but lack supportive information. Formulators base
policy design on what deci-
sion makers believe to be the right response, but lack
knowledge of how the policy will
Routine
High knowledge of causation
High information
Conditional
Low knowledge of causation
High information
Craftsman
High knowledge of causation
Low information
Creative
Low knowledge of causation
Low information
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 161 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Section 5.6 Defining Policy Adoption CHAPTER 5
be received. Formulators must therefore develop contingencies.
Thus, a formulated policy

relies heavily on probability of outcome. More often than not,
the policy is poorly formu-
lated because even if decision makers know causes, they know
little of the facts of the
situation, and errors are inevitable. A policy that dictates the
use of military force is one
example of craftsman formulation.
The predecision stages of the policy process lead to the
identification of problems, the
setting of agendas, and the formulation of policy solutions.
During these initial stages,
issues of concern emerge, formulators debate ideas, issues enter
and leave the agenda,
and policy makers design alternatives that best address a policy
problem. Once the
formulators design policy alternatives, however, government
must make some kind of
decision regarding the course and form of governmental action.
This entails adopting a
formulated solution.
5.6 Defining Policy Adoption
For a policy to be adopted, the actors and groups with the power
and authority to make decisions must accept it. Policy adoption
is the formal approval by institu-tional actors of a policy
proposal. The key to adoption is political feasibility, which
is the likelihood that the policy has a consensus of support
behind it. The policy might not
present the best or the most correct way to solve the problem,
but it has the most support.
The process of the adoption of laws or policies by a legislature,
such as Congress, is also
referred to as policy legitimation.

Decision Criteria Used in Policy Adoption
The decision to adopt a proposed policy would seem a simple
vote: adopt or not. In
actuality, policy adoption is the by-product of the decisions
made by critical institu-
tional actors with the authority to approve a proposed
government action. During the
decision-making process, a variety of decision criteria influence
all institutional actors.
These criteria—values, political party affiliation, interests of
constituents, and defer-
ence to authorities’ interests—reflect the various influences and
factors that actors may
consider when deciding whether to adopt a specific policy
alternative. (For additional
insights, see Kugler & Feng, 1997.)
Values
One of the criteria for decision making, values are a general set
of beliefs and norms that
shape the kind of policy action, if any, that a policy actor
should take. These values reflect
organizational, professional, personal, policy, and ideological
perspectives that may influ-
ence an individual (Anderson, 2000). In many circumstances
some or all of these values
will interact and affect the preference of the decision maker for
certain policy actions over
others (see Figure 5.6).
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 162 11/21/12 12:48 PM

Figure 5.6: Values affecting policy actors’ decisions to adopt
policy
Values influence perspectives that could affect policy actions.
Political Party Affiliation
Political parties directly influence the decisions the various
policy actors make; each pol-
icy maker’s political party affiliation helps to set the
institutional agenda, define the pro-
cess by which legislation is adopted, and influence and
constrain the decisions supported
by the legislative actor. Although independents—those not
affiliated with a particular
political party—have had some success over the last 20 years,
U.S. policy making operates
within a two-party system dominated by Republicans and
Democrats. These two politi-
cal parties continue to have an indelible impact on the policy-
making process. Congress
Values
Organizational
Agencies and institutions
develop cultures that reflect
their mandates, missions,
goals, and histories.
Organizations place high

premiums on loyalty and on
adherence to goals that
could compete with
other interests.
Professional and
Personal
Personal backgrounds,
training, and professional
networks can make
individuals favor particular
courses of action over others.
Individuals bring with them
personal values that reflect
their moral, ethical, career, or
financial interests.
Policy and
Ideological
Policy makers must take
credible policy positions

so that they do not seem
to allow a problem to persist.
Perceived negative policy
positions will lead to
electoral vulnerability.
Ideology helps to clarify how
someone views the world and
problems; it determines what
action best meets a problem
and fits that person’s vision
of what the world should be.
An individual’s view of the
world will shape his or her
decision about what position
to take on a policy.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 163 11/21/12 12:48 PM

reflects the two-party system. Members of political parties
introduce legislation, and often
political party leadership will attempt to influence party
members to support or oppose a
particular policy. The Patient and Affordable Care Act of 2010
offers one example of how
political parties influence policy adoption. Democrats in
Congress worked together to
ensure the adoption of this legislation and Republicans worked
together to try to block it.
Political parties affect policy decisions because of the obvious
role the parties play in the
political life of an elected policy maker. Legislatively, because
the passage of legislation
depends on the support of various majorities, members rely on
and foster party loyalty.
Political parties provide an immediate and potential source of
majority political support
for a congressional member’s agenda or policy initiative.
However, the strength of the
political parties rises and falls depending on the degree of
cohesion and party voting that
exists. From 1970 on, the party unity and polarization between
the two dominant political
parties has steadily grown in both the U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives (Stan-
ley & Niemi, 2000). Since 1992, for instance, more than 50
percent of all recorded votes
reflected a majority of Democrats opposed by a majority of
Republicans in both chambers
of the legislative branch (Stanley & Niemi, 2000). Moreover,
the Republican revolution of
1994 reinvigorated the role of the party whips in attempting to
ensure and coerce party
discipline. Party whips are senior members of each political

party’s congressional delega-
tion whose job is to ensure that their party’s members are in
their respective chamber of
congress and ready to vote. The whip’s responsibility often
involves using tactics to per-
suade members to vote the position of the party leadership. On
average, for every party
line vote in Congress over the last decade, 80 percent of
Democrats and 80 percent of
Republicans voted with their parties (Dye, 2012).
Every elected member of Congress confronts the real threat of
political retaliation, politi-
cal isolation, and the long-term political consequences that may
result from failing to sup-
port his or her party’s preferred policy positions. From the
passage of legislation within
committees, to the structure and composition of committees, to
placement of legislation
on the various calendars, to the votes and debate on the floor,
elected members must often
rely on the support of their party members if they are to survive
and thrive politically.
The advantage of the political party is that loyalty will be
rewarded. As a member rises
in seniority, more prominent positions on committees become
available. With loyalty and
seniority come opportunities for senior party positions.
Additionally, the parties represent
a potentially powerful group to rely on to pass legislation that
aids the political agenda
of a respective member. In terms of future elections, the
political party offers the political
resources and organizational structure that greatly aid the next
campaign for reelection.

In short, the party can significantly influence the decisions
various institutional actors
make. Still, the nature of a particular issue may be even more
significant in explaining
how institutional actors decide or whether they side with the
preferences of the party and
senior political figures.
That is to say certain issues—because of their intrinsic political
nature or sensitivity—
diminish the party’s influence on decision making. Issues that
are of special importance
for constituents within the district, state, or nation, may compel
an actor to stray from
stated positions of his or her political party. The 2002 McCain-
Feingold legislation, deal-
ing with campaign finance reform, represented a legislative
issue that many members
of the Republican Party supported—despite widespread
opposition within the party
(Gleckman, 2002). Similarly, a number of Senate Democrats
dissented from the party
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 164 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Constituency Interests
Elected decision makers, whether at the local, state, or federal
level, must decide among
the sometimes-conflicting motivations of their constituents,
their political party, and
their own preferences for a particular course of policy action. In
sum, should they be

trustees or delegates? The political realities of the electoral
process, however, suggest
that all elected representatives are first and foremost political
animals. As such, constitu-
ency interests must predominate
over all other interests.
The notion of constituency inter-
est suggests, however, that the
preferences of an elected official’s
constituents are clear and readily
discerned. In actuality, decision
makers seldom encounter such
clarity. Certain significant events
or issues may indeed develop
within a respective political arena
and reflect a degree of popular
interest that provides clarity for
the decision maker. Yet, effectively
and consistently determining the
constituency interest can prove
difficult. Constituency interests
are by no means fixed, and the
America’s Polarized Politics
Criticisms of the U.S. political system often suggest there is too
great of a polarization between the
Democratic and Republican Parties. More people have flocked
toward the extremes, making it more
difficult for politicians to find middle ground. Several experts
discuss the current state of U.S. political
parties in the following video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyDgd887sUI
1. Why have political parties and Congress become increasingly

polarized since 2010?
2. What impacts might such polarization have on the legislative
process?
3. Are there credible solutions or conditions that might help
minimize party and political
polarization?
Getty Images
Political parties have a large effect on not only the elected
policy maker but also on the policy decisions.
majority in supporting President George W. Bush’s 2001 tax cut
plan. Hence, decisions
regarding whether or not to formally support a policy proposal
reflect a mixture of the
dominance and cohesion of the party, coupled with the political
realities pertaining to
a given issue that surround the institutional actor. At some
point, policy makers have
to decide between the wishes of their political party and the
demands of their respec-
tive constituents. How elected officials decide depends, in part,
on the interests of their
constituencies.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 165 11/21/12 12:48 PM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyDgd887sUI
preferences of the policy actor’s respective public can and does
change over time as new

circumstances and issues emerge. Moreover, some policy
makers within divided political
districts confront the added difficulty of attempting to discern
what the majority may pre-
fer, even when no clear majority interest may exist among the
constituency. Nonetheless,
the impact of constituency interests may be exaggerated in light
of the day-to-day realities
of policy making.
The impact of constituency interests may depend on how the
term is defined. A narrow
definition may focus on a vast segment of the public. A broader
definition would include
the constituent role of interest groups, associations, lobbyists,
citizen activists, and the
general public. In actuality, a broad definition of constituency
interests includes actors with
an active role in the policy-making process. The public’s
interest, attention, and activism
in the policy-making process vary greatly depending on the
issue. In the absence of an
active and consistent role by the public, decision makers must
make decisions based on
their own preferences, as well as the information, positions, and
preferences outlined by
those actors who are active in the policy process.
Arguably, the role of constituency interests varies depending on
how an issue is perceived
within the public and political agenda. Many policy actions,
such as those dealing with
detailed regulatory changes, budgetary appropriations, or other
detailed legislation, may
hinder the constituency from playing a wider role. Essentially,
the more detailed and

obscure the proposed policy action, the more unlikely it is that
the broad spectrum of the
public will become active participants in the legislative process.
Other proposed policy
actions, such as those dealing with emotional issues like civil
rights, the environment,
education, or abortion, can be more sensitive to the direct
pressures of constituents. Even
though such emotional issues may spark responses in
constituents’ overall positions, the
detailed minutiae of writing legislation may further obscure the
positions a legislator
should or should not take because proposed legislation may
include a variety of initia-
tives and actions designed to deal with a respective policy
problem.
Deference to Authorities’ Interests
Decisions within the policy-making process are also influenced
by the deference decision
makers can show to the interests of certain policy, political, and
administrative authori-
ties. The technical complexity of certain issues may increase the
role and influence of vari-
ous policy groups both within and out of the government.
Governmental policy groups,
such as the General Accounting Office (GAO) or the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO),
may affect policy makers’ analysis, understanding, and
positions on specific issues. At a
minimum, these governmental policy agencies provide a useful
source of information and
analysis. Aside from governmental policy research groups,
decision makers may also take
into consideration the analysis and position favored by think
tanks such as Rand, Cato,

the Urban Institute, or Brookings. Such think tanks offer policy
expertise and analysis of
both specific issues and broad policy areas. Deference to such
policy actors, however, is
a product of the decision maker’s willingness to accept the
findings and analysis of such
government institutions or think tanks.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 166 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Aside from these governmental or research think tanks, various
political associations
and interest groups provide additional policy expertise and
analysis. Decision makers
may pay attention to the views key political associations and
interest groups offer. Inter-
est groups such as the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP), the National
Rifle Association (NRA), and the Sierra Club provide both
analysis and understanding
of policy problems. Additionally, associations such as the
National Governor’s Associa-
tion (NGA), the National League of Cities (NLC), or the
National Education Association
(NEA) also conduct independent policy research and analysis.
Policy research provided by interest groups and associations
will inevitably favor certain
positions and decisions on key policy issues. When addressing
issues of particular impor-
tance to them, these organizations may have considerable
influence on policy makers’

decisions. In particular, such groups may use financial
resources to influence a legislator,
for example, through campaign contributions. These groups
amass further influence by
the sheer political weight that their stated policy positions carry
within the broad political
arena. For instance, decision makers may defer to such groups
out of reluctance to pub-
licly oppose the positions of politically powerful interest
groups.
Apart from the political influence of interest groups or
associations, decision makers can
and do accommodate senior legislative authorities on certain
issues. Within Congress, for
instance, newer representatives may defer to the party
leadership or senior members of
the committee. To some extent, policy-making reality compels
legislative actors to defer
to the expertise of members who sit on the committee
responsible for the proposed piece
of legislation. That is not surprising given the sheer size of
some proposed pieces of legis-
lation, coupled with the scope of various programs and services
under discussion. Aside
from policy and political deference, various administrative
agencies provide additional
guidance.
The administrative agency’s hierarchical nature leads officials
within the agency to fol-
low the guidance and dictums of both administrative and
political superiors. Officials
must follow the directives of their administrative authorities for
an agency to be effective.
Deference is based on the authority accorded certain agency

officials and political appoin-
tees. Such deference, however, can lead to conflicts between the
stated positions preferred
by the political appointees and the preferences of career agency
officials. Additionally,
agency oversight by congressional actors further complicates
decision making because
agency officials, vulnerable to the regulatory and budgetary role
of Congress, may have to
defer to the preferences of respective members of Congress.
Conversely, during the policy
formulation and adoption stages, members of Congress may also
decide to defer to the
positions preferred by senior administrative officials within
various respective agencies.
Overall, deference reflects the interpersonal role that persuasion
and influence can have
on the policy decisions various institutional actors make.
Deference may be based on
the hierarchy of authority established within an administrative
agency. In other cases,
however, deference reflects the political power of senior party
officials, senior commit-
tee members, policy actors, and interest groups to compel other
actors to defer to their
positions. Still, the real weight of such deference depends on
the extent to which other
factors—values, political party affiliation, or constituency
interests—affect the decision-
making process of the legislative actor.
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Section 5.7 The Legislative Process and Policy Adoption
CHAPTER 5
5.7 The Legislative Process and Policy Adoption
Policy proposals are adopted by winding through an
institutional process that helps structure the respective political
actors’ course of action. The path of policy adoption varies
among and within each institution with degrees of policy-
making power. The
courts, the executive branch, and Congress all have unique
environments and contexts in
which various government actions are considered for adoption.
Institutionally, the policy
process is fragmented and divided among all three branches of
the federal government.
Formulation and adoption of proposed policy actions occur
within the executive and leg-
islative branches, and constitutional oversight is afforded to the
judicial branch. The focus
of the following section, however, is on the prominence of
Congress and its central role in
decision making throughout the legislative process.
The primary responsibility for formulating and adopting of
federal policy proposals rests
within the legislative and executive branches. The bicameral—
or two-chamber—Congress
pairs with the executive branch in guiding policy proposals.
These roles are critical to under-
standing the origins of policy proposals, as well as the
particular kinds of policy action that
the government can take. Congress can take four kinds of
legislative action: bills, joint reso-
lutions, concurrent resolutions, and simple resolutions (for more
information, see http://

thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php). Table 5.2 summarizes these
types of action.
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http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php
Section 5.7 The Legislative Process and Policy Adoption
CHAPTER 5
Table 5.2: Kinds of legislative action
Bills Joint Resolutions Concurrent
Resolutions
Simple Resolutions
• Form used for most
legislation can be
either public or
private. A public bill
is one that affects the
wider public, while a
private bill affects a
specified individual.
• A bill originating in
the House of Repre-
sentatives is desig-
nated by the letters
H.R. and is followed
by a number it re-
tains throughout the
legislative process.

• A Senate bill is des-
ignated by an S and
a number that it re-
tains throughout the
legislative process.
• The term Companion
Bill describes a bill
that is identical to
a bill introduced in
the other house of
Congress.
• May originate in
either the Senate or
House—not jointly
in both houses.
• Are similar to bills,
requiring approval
by both chambers
and the president,
except when dealing
with constitutional
amendment issues,
when approval by
the president is
unnecessary if two-
thirds congressional
support is garnered.
• If originating in the
House, it is desig-
nated as H.J. Res.
followed by a num-

ber. A joint resolu-
tion in the Senate
is designated as S.J.
Res. followed by a
number. Such joint
resolutions become
law in the same
manner as bills.
• Address matters
affecting the opera-
tions of both houses
and are not equiva-
lent to a bill.
• Such resolutions
are used to express
facts, principles,
opinions, and pur-
poses of the two
houses.
• These actions are
not presented to
the president for
veto or signature.
• Such resolutions in
the House are des-
ignated H. Con Res.
followed by a num-
ber. On approval by
both houses, they
are signed by the
Clerk of the House
and the Secretary of

the Senate.
• Concern the rules,
operation, or the
opinion of either
house alone. Simple
resolutions are con-
sidered only by the
body in which they
are respectively
introduced.
• In the House, simple
resolutions are
designated as H.
Res. together with a
number. In the Sen-
ate, simple resolu-
tions are designated
as S. Res. together
with a number.
• Upon adoption,
simple resolutions
are attested to by
the Secretary of
the Senate or Clerk
of the House and
are published in
the Congressional
Record.
Constitutionally, the separation of powers ensures a multiple
path by which individuals,
groups, and institutions can attempt to influence and shape the
beginnings of the adop-

tion of legislation. In theory, no one institution, individual, or
group possesses greater
influence than any other, and no one policy actor can be
prevented from proposing a piece
of legislation and pursuing its adoption. Interestingly, any
citizen can draft and propose
a piece of legislation for an elected representative to consider
submitting. Depending on
the issue, various institutions, groups, and individuals can have
considerable influence on
legislative decisions.
To what extent any one actor influences policy adoption
depends to some degree on how
well the actors understand the formal legislative process. This
process by which a bill
becomes law represents the main policy playing field for the
formulation and adoption
of proposed legislation. In other words, the legislative arena can
be recognized as the
playing field for an intense political competition in which
advocates, both in and out of
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 169 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Section 5.8 The Roles of Congress and the President in the
Legislative Process CHAPTER 5
government, hold competing positions as to what decisions
should be made and what
policy should be adopted.
5.8 The Roles of Congress and the President in the Legislative
Process

To become adopted, a bill must survive a fragmented, conflict-
prone legislative pro-cess that also involves competing bills,
each of which faces institutional and political obstacles. The
U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 7, outlines the basic
legislative
process. The legislative process begins when a proposed piece
of legislation or bill is intro-
duced into the House and the Senate (see Figure 5.7). Once
introduced, the bill is referred
to a specific committee. At this stage, the real business of
policy adoption occurs.
After being introduced and assigned to the relevant full
committees, a bill can be further
divided among relevant subcommittees. If a bill successfully
leaves the committee review
in the House and the Senate, it moves to the floor of each
chamber for a vote to pass into
law. Before it may become law, a bill must emerge from both
chambers of Congress with
identical wording; the conference committee performs this task.
A piece of legislation that
is adopted by majorities in both chambers continues its path to
either law or extinction
when it is transmitted to the president for consideration. A
president has the power to
approve or veto the bill. A bill becomes law if the president
signs it or if the bill remains
unsigned for more than 10 days while Congress is in session. A
vetoed bill, however, goes
back to Congress, where a two-thirds majority in both chambers
can override the presi-
dential veto. However, if a session of Congress formally ends
its session within the 10-day
window in which a president is considering a piece of

legislation, and if the president has
not yet signed the bill, the president effectively vetoes the bill
by means of the pocket veto.
While the president’s legislative power seems limited in
nature—essentially signing or
vetoing a bill—the threat of veto represents a powerful force in
the formulation and adop-
tion of policy throughout the legislative process in Congress.
In reality, the modern-day legislative process extends beyond
the framework outlined
by Article 1 and includes the significant role of congressional
committees, political par-
ties, and rules that are not specifically articulated within the
Constitution. In particular,
within the bicameral Congress, the legislative process is
structured and divided between
the dominant legislative roles committees and subcommittees
within both chambers play
and the party structure that establishes key party positions are
accorded specific legisla-
tive roles. Any member of Congress can introduce legislation.
Although some bills may be symbolic or political in value, only
a few can or will become
law. Between 1999 and 2010, of the total number of acts, bills,
and joint resolutions intro-
duced, no more than 4.5 percent became law (for more
information, see http://www.gov
trackUS.com, August 4, 2011). This statistic makes
resoundingly clear the circuitous and
obstacle-ridden path that legislation must follow if it is to
become law (see Figure 5.7).
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 170 11/21/12 12:48 PM

http://www.govtrackUS.com
http://www.govtrackUS.com
Figure 5.7: The federal legislative process
Only 4.5% of acts, bills, and resolutions introduced between
1999 and 2010 became laws.
Bill Introduced
Committee and
Subcommittee
Hearings and Markup
Committee Vote
Post Committee
Adjustment
Rules Committee
House Floor Action
Vote and Immediate
adoption
*Identical to Senate bill
Bill Introduced
HOUSE SENATE

Committee and
Subcommittee
Hearings and Markup
Committee Vote
Post Committee
Adjustment
UCA Rules
Committee
Senate Floor Action
Conference Committee
Final Vote
House/Senate Action
Veto Override Law
President
Signature
Veto
Vote and Immediate
adoption
*Identical to Senate bill
Adoption by both Houses

• The bill is placed on
the calendar for
discussion on the floor
of the other house.
• If the bill fails to pass on
the floor, is is dead; if it
passes, it must then
repeat this process in
the other chamber of
Congress.
• Legislation originates
in the House, Senate,
White House, or
federal department or
agency.
• Representative or
Senate submits
proposal to the clerk

or the House or Senate.
• If the same version of bill
adopted, sent to President
for consideration.
• Different versions of the bill
can result in a call for joint
Conference committee.
• If Conference report is
favorable, the bill is sent
back to both Chambers for
Final Vote with no possible
changes to the final version
of the bill.
• President must then review
the bill, and if he does
nothing in 10 days, it
becomes law.
• He may veto bill, in which

case it goes back to House
and Senate, where 2/3
majority is needed to
override Presidential veto.
• The bill is referred to proper
committee, which refers it to
subcommittee for research
and hearings; bill can be
amended at this point.
• Subcommittee sends bill back
to committee, and it may
proceed without further
review, or it may be subject
to more hearings.
• Bill may now be amended or
killed; most bills introduced in
Congress die in committee.
• If bill survives, it’s sent to

Rules committee (majority
leader in Senate), which
decides whether bill will be
subject to open or closed rule;
under open rule, a bill sees
more debate and can be
amended to a greater degree.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 171 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Presidents are far more influential in the policy adoption stage
when they work with a
Congress controlled by their own political party. Because both
houses had large Demo-
cratic majorities during his first 2 years of office, Obama was
much more successful in
getting legislation that he favored adopted than he was during
the next 2 years. The years
2011 and 2012 have proved far more challenging to him, and the
Obama administration’s
record for these years exemplifies how formulation and
adoption are complicated by the
political environment in which they operate and the presence of
multiple actors who all
try to influence the process. However, data demonstrate that for

many presidents, the
number of times a majority of the members of Congress vote
with the president’s position
on roll call votes is still more than 50 percent and that for many
presidents the percentage
is much higher (see Figure 5.8).
Figure 5.8: Percentage of members of Congress voting with the
president’s
position on roll call votes, 1956–2010
Presidents are generally more influential during policy adoption
if their own political party controls
Congress. Still, the majority of Congress members vote with the
president’s position at least 50% of
the time.
Stanley, H. W., & Niemi, R. G. (2000). Vital Statistics on
American Politics 1999–2000. Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp.
264–265.
Percentage Voting With President
Position on Roll Call Voters
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e

Ei
se
nh
ow
er
96
81
58
64
82
57
77
52
62
85
70
Ke
nn
ed
y
Jo
hn

so
n
Ni
xo
n
Fo
rd
Ca
rte
r
Re
ag
an
Bu
sh
Cl
in
to
n
Bu
sh
O
ba

m
a
09
/1
0
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 172 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Presidents can be particularly influential in the policy adoption
stage by stopping or
threatening to stop legislation that Congress has passed. A piece
of legislation adopted
by majorities in both chambers continues its path to either law
or extinction when it goes
to the president for consideration. The two-thirds override
established by the Constitu-
tion also represents a formidable obstacle, and such large
majorities are rare within each
of the chambers. Thus, the mere threat of veto can reshape the
legislative agenda in both
chambers to better reflect the legislative interests of the
president. Presidents may choose
to veto a legislative proposal they consider to be
unconstitutional, an encroachment on
presidential authority, ill-advised policy, or unacceptable for
political or ideological rea-
sons (Oleszek, 2010). Historically, the use of the veto has
declined significantly from Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt’s record of 635 vetoes over his

tenure to Obama’s tally of 2 as
of January 2012 (Peters, 2012) (see Table 5.3).
Table 5.3 : Presidential vetoes, 1932–2012
President Total Number of Vetoes During
President’s Tenure
Percentage of Vetoes That Congress Did
Not Override
Roosevelt 635 97.6%
Truman 250 93.3
Eisenhower 181 97.3
Kennedy 21 100
Johnson 30 100
Nixon 43 73.1
Ford 66 75
Carter 31 84.6
Reagan 78 76.9
G. Bush 44 96.6
Clinton 37 94.4
G. W. Bush 12 63.6
Obama 2 100

The legislative process at the federal level ensures that policy
adoption—or passage of
laws—will prove difficult. At many points in the legislative
process, constitutional and
institutional procedures require members of Congress—as well
as those who seek to
influence them—to decide which actions to take. Figure 5.7
highlights some of the key
points in this legislative process, in which institutional actors
must decide whether to
adopt or reject a policy proposal. Dramatic and immediate
attempts at policy adoption,
although possible, require the effective cooperation of
majorities in both the House and
Senate, party leadership, the committee members, senior
members of the committee,
and the president—as well many noninstitutional actors who
seek to influence these
institutional actors.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 173 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Section 5.9 Arenas of Action: The Playing Field CHAPTER 5
5.9 Arenas of Action: The Playing Field
This circuitous legislative process for policy adoption takes
place in more than a single arena such as the Congress; instead,
the process occurs in many important arenas that can be likened
to playing fields of action in which the proposed policies
are debated, formulated, and considered for adoption. Moreover,
such arenas often inter-
mingle to frame the manner in which policy actors adopt the

policy positions. The most
significant playing fields of action are the public, executive,
congressional, and political.
The Public Arena
U.S. policy making occurs within a public arena in which public
opinion can shape directly
many legislative positions and strategies, as well as the voting
behavior of elected officials.
The public theater can directly influence the behavior of
legislative actors by constraining
or encouraging actions by decision makers. Attempts to hinder
or encourage policy adop-
tion will inevitably be affected by the extent to which a decision
maker is concerned with
the reactions of the public. The fickle nature of public opinion
makes measured responses
particularly difficult for decision makers.
Within the public arena, various advocates for a particular issue
will attempt to mobi-
lize public opinion to influence the passage or obstruction of
legislation. Elected officials,
quite obviously, are especially sensitive to the public opinions
of their respective constitu-
ent bases. Every elected decision maker remains cognizant of
the positions favored or
opposed by their constituents. The difficulty, however, is that
formulation of public opin-
ion can be shaped and changed as new information and events
develop. For example, as
the public and policy makers learned more about HIV and
AIDS, the policy positions of
policy actors changed and became more supportive of policy
attempting to alleviate the

situation and help those suffering from the disease.
Executive Arena
The president, the president’s cabinet, and the agencies that fall
under the responsibility
of the executive branch constitute an additional playing field of
action. Legislative pro-
posals often develop under the direction or guidance of the
president. The preparation
of the fiscal year federal budget that covers all proposed federal
spending represents the
most consistent example of a presidential policy proposal.
Within the executive branch,
cabinet and agency officials also play an integral role in the
development of the budget,
offer policy initiatives, and develop their own regulatory
proposals to address areas of
agency responsibility. As a playing field of action, the
president, the cabinet, and agency
officials will not only prove essential to the development of
policy proposals but also
directly affect whether a policy is adopted via their support—or
lack of it.
Congressional Arena
Congress’s significance as a playing field of action extends
beyond the two chambers to
include both the formal and informal sets of actors who
influence and affect policy adop-
tion. Clearly, within this arena, the voting positions of the 535
members of Congress are
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 174 11/21/12 12:48 PM

Section 5.9 Arenas of Action: The Playing Field CHAPTER 5
the most important in ascertaining whether a policy is likely to
be adopted. However, a
member of Congress’s ability to affect explicitly whether a
policy is adopted or not also
depends on the member’s party seniority, position on the
relevant committee, whether
the member is part of the party leadership, and whether the
member’s vote is critical to
develop a majority for or against the policy.
The Political Arena
Through the policy adoption stage, various political players’
personal agendas inter-
mingle within all of the previous playing fields of action. These
sets of noninstitutional
actors—party organizations, interest groups, political
associations, lobbyists, and citizen
activists—represent how intrinsically political the business of
policy making is in mod-
ern U.S. politics. Each of these actors plays a constant role in
attempting to influence the
positions of elected officials critical to the adoption of a policy.
For such political actors,
the goal remains a desire to maximize their self-interests, or the
interests of their clients
or members, at the expense of those with differing interests.
The goal for such actors is
seldom the adoption of the best policy.
National party organizations, such as the Republican National
Committee (RNC) or the

Democratic National Committee (DNC), provide fiscal and
electoral resources to elected
members and would-be representatives. During the election
cycle, and especially in what
are expected to be close and contentious congressional
elections, many members of Con-
gress depend on the financial monies and election infrastructure
necessary to run a mod-
ern, media-driven campaign. For members of Congress, their
future in politics can be
affected by the extent to which they can garner the necessary
party support. Therefore,
where a national party organization stands on key policy
proposals, as well as the mem-
ber’s dependence on the party, can provide insight into the
positions a representative may
take during policy adoption.
Interest groups and political associations, in comparison, remain
engaged in the legislative
process from the moment a piece of legislation is even
considered for introduction. These
actors will readily make initiatives and proposals for policy
solutions as they seek to fur-
ther their legislative goals. More important, associations and
interest groups are extremely
active in mobilizing and building coalitions to advance their
legislative interests. Interest
groups can also be essential in influencing the legislative
positions of members of Con-
gress. These groups not only offer policy analyses and
proposals but also actively recruit
members of their association to lobby members of Congress or
the executive branch in
support of their preferred policy positions.

Lobbying campaigns are the hallmark strategy by which such
noninstitutional political
actors attempt to influence policy adoption. Lobbying
campaigns include media cam-
paigns, attempts to mobilize members’ voting behavior, letter
and advocacy campaigns,
building political coalitions with other policy actors, as well as
the use of monies to foster
access and influence with members who are essential to policy
adoption in Congress and
the executive branch. To what extent such actors influence
policy adoption depends on
the strategies they employ during the policy process.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 175 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Section 5.10 Influencing Policy Adoption CHAPTER 5
5.10 Influencing Policy Adoption
The previous description of policy adoption and the legislative
process suggests that it is so complex and so institutional that
only the professional political actors can affect the votes of
critical decision makers in government. In actuality, average
citi-
zens can—if they choose—become citizen activists and
successfully influence which policy
actions are adopted by decision makers. The way such influence
develops involves a pro-
cess and strategy that an array of policy actors can adopt (see
Figure 5.9).
Figure 5.9: A process used to influence the adoption of policy

Average citizens can successfully influence policy adoption.
Vote For Adoption Vote Against Adoption
Influence
Meetings
Mobilized
Members
and Votes
Direct
Lobbying
Mail/
Telephone
Campaign
Media
Campaign
Policy Positions
Elected Officials
Active Cititzens and Groups
Direct Influence
Indirect Influence
Unelected Officials
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 176 11/21/12 12:48 PM

Some of the available means of influencing policy adoption
include: mobilizing members
and votes, direct lobbying, focused mail and telephone
campaigns, and an aggressive
multimedia campaign.
Mobilizing Members and Votes
For the political activist, influencing elected decision makers
depends on the ability to
mobilize politically like-minded individuals, such as members
of one’s interest group, to
display a show of political force.
Mobilizing requires seeking out
individuals willing to actively
participate in the political process.
Participation may first come in the
form of joining a grassroots move-
ment, which is a loosely organized
group of interested citizens or a
more organized interest group.
Vital to effective mobilizing, how-
ever, is whether members seek to
directly influence elected officials.
The power of mobilizing within a
democratic system is that it pro-
vides a clear political message
that members will vote for elected
officials who support their legis-
lative positions. Because elected
officials are especially cognizant

of the political power of disaffected voters, a well-organized
mass of potential voters can
affect whether a decision maker will support a specific policy
position.
Instrumental to mobilizing the ultimate political power of
members of an interest group
or movement is the size of the group. In general, more political
influence is obtained as
the size of the group increases relative to the size of the
electorate. Clearly, sheer numbers
of supporters can translate into both potential votes and
potential political influence. To
what extent a decision maker may be influenced roughly
depends on the size and cohe-
sion of the membership, and whether a group’s support is
essential for reelection. Still,
a small, well-organized group can acquire influence if it is
extremely impassioned, orga-
nized, well financed, and focused in its advocacy efforts. For
example, Mothers Against
Drunk Driving (MADD) began as an especially small interest
group in 1980. Founded in
California by Candice Lightner after a drunk driver killed her
teenage daughter, MADD
has become extremely successful in influencing the adoption of
policies designed to
reduce drunk driving. Today MADD is recognized as a major
interest group, with mem-
bers across the nation.
Getty Images
Attempting to mobilize members’ voting behaviors through
grassroots techniques can be one portion of a campaign.

the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 177 11/21/12 12:48 PM
The Corrupt Side of Lobbying
Lobbyist Jack Abramoff was an extremely influential
Washington lobbyist, but his influence was not
achieved on charisma alone. Abramoff lavished politicians with
expensive gifts such as golf trips and
Super Bowl tickets. He discusses how these and other
techniques helped him gain his widespread
influence, and he notes that he is not the only person to employ
such methods: http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=CHiicN0Kg10
1. What does the video segment say about the role of lobbyists
in the legislative process?
2. How did Abramoff influence congressional members and
their staff?
3. How do our legislative system and the process of policy
adoption permit such abuses to occur?
Direct Lobbying
Direct lobbying attempts in an explicit way to influence the
voting or decisions of elected
or other political decision makers. Either through hiring a
lobbyist or by developing and
engaging in a lobbying campaign, direct lobbying promotes
specific policy positions.
Overall, lobbying is an exercise that uses money, knowledge of
the issue, and access to

key officials in order to obtain the desired legislative outcome.
Lobbyists, through fundraisers for and contributions to
candidates and parties, can use
money to develop contacts and access. Although money does
not necessarily translate
into direct influence on policy positions, it represents a
powerful tool for lobbyists to gar-
ner access, be able to meet with staff and decision makers, and
present positions to policy
makers instrumental to policy adoption. Money also helps
finance the campaigns—via
the fostering of meetings, presentation materials, and other
research—that allow lobby-
ists to establish knowledge and clear positions for issues during
meetings with decision
makers (Schneier & Gross, 1993).
Knowledge of an issue and the ability to provide clear and
factual information are ingredi-
ents of influence in direct lobbying. With greater information
and knowledge of an issue,
the direct lobbyist can move from being merely a source of
influence to a source of infor-
mation for the decision maker (Smith, 1988; Sherrill, 2000).
Lobbyists prove to be essen-
tial sources of information for decision makers and their staffs
as they formulate policy,
evaluate the consequences of a proposal, and determine whether
or not to adopt a specific
public policy position.
Direct lobbying may rise and fall depending on the access that
the lobbying campaign can
gain and exploit. Access provides the basic opportunity to meet
directly and to influence

the opinions and positions of decision makers. Such direct
access and meetings provide
lobbyists with the opportunity to build interpersonal
relationships with staff and decision
makers, establish themselves as knowledgeable experts about
the issues for which they
lobby, and allow them to communicate the political and policy
position they prefer the
decision maker take when deciding whether to adopt a policy
proposal.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 178 11/21/12 12:48 PM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CHiicN0Kg10
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CHiicN0Kg10
Focused Mail and Telephone Campaigns
The notion of a letter, fax, or telephone campaign may seem
antiquated in an era of such
modern technologies as e-mail, Facebook, Twitter, and
LinkedIn. However, according to
former governmental officials and staffers in Congress, a well-
designed, focused mail and
telephone campaign represents a potent weapon with which to
influence the opinions of
the decision maker. When conducted appropriately, a personal
letter and mail campaign
reflects the emotion and passion that can affect how actors in
the political process perceive
issues and policy proposals.
A letter campaign can be either handwritten, pro forma

(prewritten petitions that con-
stituents simply sign and mail), or e-mail. According to former
officials, representatives,
and staffers, a well-designed campaign can influence how they
see an issue vis-à-vis their
constituency. In particular, a personal, handwritten letter
reflects an increasingly rare con-
stituent action that a policy actor sees as an authentic emotional
expression. An e-mail
or pro forma letter has less emotional significance, but can
resonate if a large number
of citizens participate. Similarly, a telephone campaign garners
influence depending on
the number of calls constituents make in favor of a given issue
position. For the elected
official, the relative dearth of letters and calls made by
constituents concerning many of
the issues Congress debates suggests that a well-organized,
mobilized campaign can and
does greatly influence the course of policy adoption. (More
commonly, many congressio-
nal offices will tally the calls, e-mails, and letters, in order to
roughly evaluate the issue
positions from constituents.)
Aggressive Multimedia Campaigns
Modern advocacy requires not only the exploitation of
traditional tools but also a realiza-
tion that politics and policy operate within a society where a
variety of media sources
frame perceptions and issues. Accordingly, successful advocacy
requires a strategy with
which to build attention and support across a wide swath of the
public and political arena.
An aggressive media campaign mobilizes the disinterested and

uninformed public and
political decision maker and further mobilizes the already
politically active. Figure 5.10
highlights some of the elements of a successful media
campaign.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 179 11/21/12 12:48 PM
Figure 5.10: Elements of media campaigns to influence the
adoption of
public policy
Successful media campaigns can bring attention to issues and
can increase both public and political support.
Press releases, for example, raise awareness about new policy
analyses, special reports
on the problem, and public marches or forums that could lead to
coverage by local or
national news services. Letters to media editors and opinion
pieces represent an attempt
to influence newspaper, magazine, or broadcast positions or to
interject preferences for
certain policy positions within the public debate. Further, radio
talk-show call-ins are
an organized attempt to frame and structure the public debate
surrounding an issue.
Similarly, TV interviews of advocates or encouraging special
reports on an issue of con-
cern represent the goal of influencing public opinion through
the most commonly used
communication medium. Distributing handouts, fliers, and

leaflets is a basic grassroots
strategy to build public attention by raising awareness person-
by-person. Finally, the
Internet has revolutionized the ways in which citizens
communicate and inform each
other; it is a relatively simple way to reach supporters and
“educate” those who might
not be supporters about issue positions and other types of
information about the cam-
paign and opponents.
Press Releases
Radio Talk-Show
Call-Ins
Letters to Media
Editors and
Opinion Pieces
TV News
Interviews
Websites,
Facebook,
Twitter
Handouts,
Fliers, Leaflets
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 180 11/21/12 12:48 PM

Case Study: Net Neutrality and Policy Development
Today’s technology operates in an increasingly cloud-based
computing environment, an environment where more and
more of the digital information used is located at a remote
server and streamed or downloaded to your local device.
Whether it’s music from Pandora or Spotify, a video from You-
Tube or Netflix, or data from a university’s research library,
the ability to have fast, unrestricted access to the Internet is
increasingly important. But what if Internet service provid-
ers (ISPs) decided to restrict access to such videos or music
contents because they didn’t like or didn’t value the content
or the media sources? This is the central question of net
neutrality—do ISPs have the legal ability to regulate the flow
of information to users or charge those users different rates
based on content or source?
Some commentators suggest the concept of net neutrality, or a
communications network that doesn’t
discriminate between kinds or qualities of message, dates back
to the early days of the telegraph,
when all users and all messages were given equal access to the
network of copper wires that made
up the telegraph system. The formal regulation of the phone and
communications system didn’t
come until decades later, when Congress passed the
Communications Act of 1934, which created the
Federal Communications Commission and gave it the authority
to regulate communications carriers,
the private companies that own the lines through which analog
and now digital information flow.
The current debate about net neutrality emerged in the first few
years of the 21st century with the
collision of three dynamics that represented commercial,

entrepreneurial, and regulatory interests.
The first dynamic was largely commercial. Carriers, or ISPs,
companies that built and maintained the
communications infrastructure, realized the number of digital
users and the volume of data being
transmitted was going up enormously. This growth required
considerable expansion and upkeep for
the infrastructure. Who would bear the cost of this expansion
and upkeep? The solution that many
carriers supported was to charge the biggest users the highest
cost, but then in turn assure those
same users the fastest connections.
The second dynamic was entrepreneurial. New and innovative
uses of the Internet were also emerg-
ing at an unprecedented pace. Companies like Vonage began
offering voice over Internet protocol
(VOIP), or phone service via the Internet, in competition with
the older and established phone com-
panies. In addition, the open source file-sharing service
BitTorrent gave users a new, faster, and more
robust way to share all sorts of information over the Internet.
For innovators and entrepreneurs the
possibility that carriers and ISPs would charge them higher
rates because they were smaller, newer,
or marginal users was seen as a potential threat and constraint
to the opportunities afforded by
these new and emerging technologies.
The third dynamic was regulatory. Changes in the technology
and in the communications industry
cast the FCC’s regulatory author into question, requiring several
years of administrative, legislative,
and judicial clarification. Some of the uncertainty was resolved
in 2005 when the Supreme Court
ruled that the FCC did in fact have jurisdiction over broadband

providers in relation to competition
issues. Following the court’s decision, the FCC released its
Internet Policy Statement confirming that
the FCC retained the jurisdiction to ensure that ISPs and their
networks are operated
Baran Ozdemir/Vetta/Getty Images
Much of the digital information
streamed today is located on
remote servers.
(continued)
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 181 11/21/12 12:49 PM
Summary CHAPTER 5
Summary
Once policy actors have thoroughly examined various solutions
to public prob-lems and have formulated a preferred policy,
they must formally adopt the pol-icy. However, even after
policy adoption, policy formulation is a battle that never
ends, because more often than not, the problem is not solved.
By evaluating implemented
policy, policy makers can change or terminate adopted policy.
The relationship between
formulation and adoption is clear: The nature of a problem
affects how policy makers
formulate solutions and which solution they finally adopt.
Policy adoption is the stage in
the policy process in which policy makers decide what type of
policy action, if any, they

should take.
Case Study: Net Neutrality and Policy Development (continued)
in a neutral manner. The FCC also adopted four Internet
connectivity principles, which have come to
be seen as the foundation of Network Neutrality:
1. Freedom to access legal content;
2. Freedom to run any application that won’t harm the network;
3. Freedom to attach any device that does not abet crime; and
4. Freedom to obtain meaningful information about service
plans.
Despite the court’s ruling and the administrative statements by
the FCC, the question of net neutral-
ity has not been resolved into stable policy. The years since
2005 have seen efforts to change and
refine Internet policy administratively, legislatively and
judicially. The FCC has issued administrative
rulings giving greater clarification to what ISPs can and cannot
do. Several pieces of legislation that
would codify net neutrality have been introduced in Congress,
but none have yet passed. Several
new court cases have been filed and are making their way
through the district and appellate system
en route to the Supreme Court. It is possible that through the
various policy processes described
throughout this text, a relatively clear and stable policy on
Internet access and use will emerge. In the
meantime, net neutrality will continue to be a work in progress
of policy formulation, legitimation,
and adoption.
1. Who are the major governmental and unofficial policy makers

affiliated with net neutrality?
What tools do they have at their disposal to influence any
potential policy and its adoption?
2. How might the technical nature of net neutrality affect the
processes of formulation and adop-
tion? How might policy makers cope with the increasing
technical complexity of science and
technology policy like net neutrality?
3. What are the pros and cons of giving administrative agencies,
which likely have greater techni-
cal capacity than Congress, the courts, and the executive office,
the lead in the policy-making
process?
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 182 11/27/12 3:28 PM
Key Terms CHAPTER 5
advantaged populations Groups that are
positively socially constructed and highly
powerful.
analysis of existing policy How, why,
when, and for whom policy is made, or a
description of a policy in terms of its con-
tent and relationship to other policies.
analysis for policy making Using reason
and evidence to allow decision makers to
choose the best policy from a number of
alternatives.

conditional formulation Policy that
allows for possible modification of the
policy as it is being implemented and as
conditions change.
Key Points to Remember
• Policy formulation takes place before legislation is enacted
and theoretically ends
once the policy is implemented, although through evaluation of
implemented
policy, policy makers can revisit policy that has been adopted
and change or
terminate it.
• Bargaining and compromise are inherent to policy
formulation. Often policy
actors make concessions to win the most political support
among the relevant
policy-making actors.
• Policy formulation is a political process from start to finish.
• The essential reality of policy formulation is that at the same
time, multiple actors
are designing different remedies for solving the same problem.
• During policy design, policy actors may select from a number
of instruments.
These policy instruments are the means by which governments
achieve a solu-
tion to a problem.
• Policy analysis provides evidence to allow decision makers to
choose the best
policy from a number of alternatives that have been developed.

• Different models of policy formulation exist, and one of the
most useful is the
Peters classification scheme, which outlines four formulation
models: routine,
creative, conditional, and craftsman.
• It is a constant battle to see a specific policy adopted.
• Crucial to policy adoption is whether a majority coalition can
be put together to
support one particular proposal.
• A more efficient legislative process is generally unlikely,
given differences among
critical institutional actors.
• Policy adoption is not limited to a single institution or policy
actor but involves
multiple fields of action where policy adoption is influenced
and affected.
• The diverse and pluralistic nature of the U.S. government
provides the oppor-
tunity for a variety of noninstitutional actors to directly
influence and affect the
decisions that determine what policy action is adopted.
• Because of this political and institutional context, the adopted
policy may not
represent the best solution for the problem, but simply the most
practical and
feasible policy that can escape this stage of the policy process.
• Political feasibility is defined as the likelihood that a
particular policy will

achieve the greatest consensus.
Key Terms
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 183 11/21/12 12:49 PM
Key Terms CHAPTER 5
constituency interests What the major-
ity in an elected representative’s district
policy prefers.
contender populations Groups who are
negatively socially constructed but are
very powerful.
craftsman formulation Policy that is
based on what decision makers believe
to be the right response but, because they
lack knowledge of how it will be received,
determine they must develop contingen-
cies for.
creative formulation Policy that is inno-
vative in design but doubtful in terms of
its effects.
decision criteria The various influences
and factors—such as values, political party
affiliation, constituency interests, and
deference—that actors may consider when
deciding whether to adopt a specific policy
alternative.

deference The consideration decision
makers pay to various institutional and
noninstitutional actors because of the posi-
tion or knowledge such actors possess.
dependent populations Groups who are
positively socially constructed and have
little power.
deviant populations Groups who are
negatively socially constructed and are
powerless.
party whips Senior members of each
political party’s congressional delegation
whose job is to ensure that their party’s
members are in their respective chamber of
Congress and ready to vote.
policy adoption The formal approval by
institutional actors of a policy proposal.
policy analysis The development of
alternatives (policy proposals) that can be
judged on how well they meet the problem
as it is identified and understood.
policy design The policy instruments,
tools, approaches, and techniques with
which to craft a policy.
policy formulation Development of solu-
tions that deal with a specific problem or
address a particular issue within the insti-
tutional agenda; takes place before legisla-
tion is enacted and theoretically ends once

the policy is implemented.
policy instruments The means or tools by
which governments achieve solutions to
the problems they attempt to address; may
come in the form of legislation, executive
orders, judicial decisions, regulations, and
approval of referendum or initiatives.
policy legitimization The process of the
adoption of laws or policies by a legisla-
ture, such as Congress.
political feasibility Consensus of sup-
port for a policy action that is achievable in
terms of costs and available resources.
routine formulation The routine adjust-
ment of existing policies in order to make
incremental changes.
values A general set of beliefs and norms
that shape the kind of policy action, if any,
that a policy actor should take.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 184 11/21/12 12:49 PM
Applied Internet Exercises CHAPTER 5
Applied Internet Exercises: Policy Formulation and Design
1. A common opinion in Washington and among many in the
nation is that members of Congress
serve their reelection interests by ensuring that only their

constituents are pleased. Your objec-
tive is to find out whether members of Congress, both Senate
and House, will respond to you
if you are NOT from their district. Your tasks are as follows:
a. First, select 10 prominent national Senators and
Representatives who are not from your
state. Prepare the same e-mail on any issue that you are
interested in or concerned about
that is occurring at the national level.
i. Use these two links to find members and Senators.
http://www.senate.gov/and http://
www.house.gov/representatives/
ii. Emphasize that, as quickly as possible, you would like a
written response and informa-
tion to a series of questions (at least two) or concerns you have
about this issue.
1. Many believe the problem of secondhand smoke to be not
only serious but also
an attack on the common good. Develop four well-articulated
problem state-
ments that identify the problem from the perspective of a
parent, a bar owner, a
smoker, and the CEO of a large tobacco manufacturing
corporation.
2. Develop 10 one-sentence alternatives for solving the
following problem. Do not
worry about real-world constraints. Propose alternatives that are
as different
from each other as possible, and all of which address the stated

problem: The
state of California is short of energy every summer, and every
summer the short-
age gets worse.
3. The president and his senior advisors are in the process of
determining what
policy actions should be taken to address the risk Iran poses by
developing a
nuclear bomb. Your tasks are as follows:
a. Define the problem and determine the nature and scope of the
threat. You
should also make clear the consequences or risks posed by
doing nothing.
b. Determine and describe various policy instruments you
recommend and how
to use them to address the specific nature of the threat.
c. Make two basic recommendations for formulating policy:
• A policy recommendation without any consideration of
domestic political/
international constraints.
• A policy recommendation with consideration of domestic
political/interna-
tional constraints.
Your brief should be no more than three pages. It should be
single spaced and
presented in a manner that enhances its clarity for the president
and his staff.
4. If you had to choose just one of the fields of action identified

in this chap-
ter, which do you think plays the most important role in the
stage of policy
adoption?
5. Which of the values discussed, in your opinion, are the most
and least important
when various policy-making actors have to make decisions?
Discuss why.
(continued)
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 185 11/27/12 3:28 PM
http://www.senate.gov/
http://www.house.gov/representatives/
http://www.house.gov/representatives/
Applied Internet Exercises CHAPTER 5
Applied Internet Exercises: Policy Formulation and Design
(continued)
b. Second, if one business week passes between your e-mail and
a response, send the e-mail
again. Repeat no more than twice.
c. Third, prepare one to two pages of analysis of whether they
responded and how quickly, the
amount of information provided, and the quality of information.
d. Conclude with a summary of whether, based on your analysis,
the elected officials are more
interested in serving their constituent interests or the national
interest.

2. It is often said lobbying is both an art and science. Because
of your knowledge of the legislative
process, you have decided to become more active in attempting
to influence the legislative
process. Your tasks are as follows:
a. Identify a current legislative issue being considered for
policy adoption (go to http://Thomas.
loc.gov)
b. Specify what your legislative goals are with respect to this
proposed legislation:
i. Stop or kill it
ii. Change it
iii. Ensure its adoption as is
c. Identify the five senior members in the House and Senate who
will be the targets of your
campaign. Remember you will first want to target the chairs of
key committees and leading
members of these specific committees.
d. Define your lobbying strategy for achieving your goal. Your
lobbying strategy should include
the following:
i. Telephone campaign: Prepare a two- to three-paragraph
statement of what will you say
ii. Letter-writing campaign: Prepare a one-page draft letter that
outlines your position on
the issue
iii. Personal meetings
• You can meet with no more than four Members of Congress or

other officials. Iden-
tify who and why.
• Prepare a one-page set of talking points on what you want to
communicate to the
decision makers and/or their staff
iv. Mass mobilization. To mobilize others who may be
interested in this issue, prepare the
following:
• A sample letter to the editor
• A sample flier to hand out at public arenas
v. Online campaign. Utilizing an online campaign is critical to
any effective lobbying cam-
paign. Prepare the following:
• A sample e-mail that will be sent to your friends/contacts in
order to encourage
them to contact a specific member. Remember, offices get a
flood of form e-mails,
so the challenge is to make the letter unique without minimizing
the seriousness of
your issue.
• A tweet for your Twitter account to encourage your friends to
get involved.
• A Facebook post to encourage your friends to get involved.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 186 11/21/12 12:49 PM
http://Thomas.loc.gov
http://Thomas.loc.gov
Suggested Readings CHAPTER 5

Suggested Readings
Bardach, E. A. (2005). Practical guide for policy analysis: The
eightfold path to more effective
problem solving. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Ingram, H. M., & Schneider, A. L. (2006). Policy analysis for
democracy. In M. Moran,
M. Rein, & R. E. Goodin, (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of
public policy (pp. 169–189).
New York: Oxford University Press.
James, T. E., & Jorgensen, P. D. (2009). Policy knowledge,
policy formulation, and
change: Revisiting a foundational question. Policy Studies
Journal, 37(1), 14–162.
Majone, G. (2006). Agenda setting. In M. Moran, M. Rein, & R.
E. Goodin, (Eds.), The
Oxford handbook of public policy (pp. 228–250). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Munger, M. (2000). Analyzing policy: Choices, conflicts, and
practices. New York: Norton.
Radin, B. (2000). Beyond Machiavelli: Policy analysis comes of
age. Washington, DC: George-
town University Press.
Weimer, D., & Vining, A. (2005). Policy analysis: Concepts and
practice. Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Wilson, R. (2006). Policy analysis as policy advice. In M.
Moran, M. Rein, & R. E. Goodin,

(Eds.), The Oxford handbook of public policy (pp. 152–168).
New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Wood, B. D., & Doan, A. (2003, October). The politics of
problem definition: Applying
and testing threshold models. American Journal of Political
Science, 47, 640–653.
Wood, B. D., & Vedlitz, A. (2007, July). Issue definition,
information processing, and the
politics of global warming. American Journal of Political
Science, 51, 552–568.
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 187 11/21/12 12:49 PM
the80472_05_c05_145-188.indd 188 11/21/12 12:49 PM
Part 3
Assignment 3: Technology Influences
Considering your chosen topic (Corrections), write a (2) page
paper in which you:
1. Discuss how technologies or information systems have
contributed to the problem.
2. Discuss how you will propose technology be implemented
into the solution.
3. Use at least three (3) quality references. Note: Wikipedia
and other Websites do not qualify as academic resources.

Ji
m
W
es
t/A
ge
F
ot
os
to
ck
/S
up
er
st
oc
k
Learning Objectives
In this chapter you will learn to:
•Identify key issues and specific areas of concern for
contemporary policy makers within the welfare
policy arena.
•Articulate the debates within contemporary welfare policy and
the arguments advanced by

each side.
•Describe the arenas in which welfare policy making takes place
and the most common welfare
policy instruments.
A Case Study in Formulation and
Legitimation of Policy
Solution
s:
The Forming and Reforming
of Federal Welfare Policy
10
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 313 11/27/12 3:06 PM
Section 10.1 The Social Welfare Debate CHAPTER 10
Through the formulation and implementation of social policy,
modern governments have provided appropriate and sufficient
standards of living to citizens. Social pol-icy encompasses a

wide range of social and economic phenomena, from individual
rights and needs to complex policy questions such as the relief
of indigence, inequalities,
and unemployment. Social policy also includes the
government’s supplying of goods and
services, such as housing, education, and health care.
The extent of a government’s welfare state dictates how much
will be allocated for social
policy expenditure. Many nations spend the largest portion of
their governmental bud-
get on social policy: pension programs, unemployment and
disability benefits, subsidies
to support families with dependent children, and assistance to
families and individuals
with low incomes. In the United States references to welfare
policy—as opposed to social
policy—are more common. As a result, many people think of
welfare policy as a series of
programs designed to assist poor and economically
disadvantaged people, thus excluding
Social Security and many other social programs from the
welfare debate. This text, how-
ever, uses the terms social welfare policy and welfare policy to
describe all of the programs,

including Social Security, which the U.S. government provides
to protect and advance
citizens’ standards of living.
10.1 The Social Welfare Debate
A vast amount of literature discusses why governments need to
provide social wel-fare for their citizens. One argument posits
welfare provision as a relief program that supplements
economic arrangements (Gough, 1979). In a free-labor market
based on supply and demand, certain individuals will be more
vulnerable to market
fluctuations. Governments provide services that absorb and
control unemployment, dis-
abilities, ill health, and aging. That is, social welfare policy is
made necessary by the
instability that is inherent in capitalist economies such as the
United States. Another
argument contends that welfare policy regulates labor (Mishra,
1990). This perspective
sees welfare as punitive and degrading, instilling a fear of
receiving government relief.
Those who subscribe to this view assert that many individuals
would rather work than
receive welfare relief. Another argument has it that societies

cannot afford large num-
bers of individuals suffering obvious inequalities without relief
(Frankel, 1962). Wel-
fare pacifies those individuals who—without welfare relief—
would be forced to find
resources through whatever means they could. Thus, welfare
exists to help reintegrate
disaffected groups back into the system (Piven & Cloward,
1971). In its broadest sense
welfare policy provides security, temporary or permanent, to
those in need. Finally, the
literature offers one other view, that welfare policy fosters
independence by encouraging
citizens to be self-supporting (Stone, 1988).
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 314 11/21/12 1:02 PM
The U.S. government has always been much more reluctant than
its European counter-
parts to intervene in the general area of social policy. Indeed,
not until the 1930s did the

federal government offer any sort of welfare or Social Security
benefits for low-income
and elderly people. Even then, the extent and level of coverage
were extremely limited.
The history of U.S. policy contrasts sharply with that of
European governments, which
initiated social service programs beginning in the late 19th
century (see Table 10.1).
Table 10.1: Year of introduction of various social services in
selected nations
Nation Old Age Pension Unemployment Insurance Sickness Pay
Medical Services
Germany 1889 1927 1889 1883
Britain 1908 1911 1911 1911
France 1930 1914 1930 1990
United States 1935 1935 1965
Adapted from Theodoulou, S. Z. (2002). Policy and politics in
six nations: A comparative perspective. Upper Saddle River, NJ:

Pearson, p. 128.
Social welfare in most industrialized nations falls under two
general categories: (a) poli-
cies that benefit low-income citizens, and (b) policies that help
the general public. The first
category includes general assistance programs that give money,
food, or clothing directly
to qualifying individuals; work assistance programs for people
in need; and assistance
for specific groups, such as aid for low-income individuals. The
second category includes
policies such as tax breaks and old-age pension programs like
Social Security. Such pro-
grams can take many forms. For example, social insurance
covers income losses due to
illness, unemployment, and retirement. Social regulation
programs, such as consumer and
worker protections, protect individuals from the problems of
industrialized society.
Industrialized nations have taken several different approaches in
their attempts to
address poverty. The preventive approach attempts to ensure
that individuals do not

become poor in the first place. The alleviative approach
attempts to alleviate the poverty
of individuals who are already poor. The punitive approach
assumes that it is the fault
of individuals that they are poor and attempts to discourage
them from being dependent
by making it difficult to obtain government assistance. The
curative approach attempts
to cure the causes of poverty. And the incomes approach
encourages individuals to
work while they are receiving assistance in an effort to help
them make their way out of
poverty permanently. Table 10.2 summarizes these approaches
and provides examples
of related policies.
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 315 11/21/12 1:02 PM
Table 10.2: Approaches taken by governments to deal with
poverty

Approach Objective Policy Option
Preventive approach This attempts to ensure that individuals do
not
become poor.
Social Security
(old age pensions)
Unemployment benefits
Alternative approach This deals with those individuals who are
already
poor and attempts to provide some kind of
governmental assistance to alleviate their condition.
Temporary aid to needy
families
Food stamps
Punitive approach This is based on the assumption that if
individuals
are poor, it’s because of their own moral and
character defects. In other words, it’s their own

fault. Government should try to discourage
them from being lazy by making it as difficult as
possible to obtain public assistance in the form
of governmental benefits. And when government
does have to provide assistance, it should be
minimal.
Workfare
Curative approach This posits that causes of poverty, such as
lack
of education and job training, should be cured.
Emphasizes programs that attack the causes
of poverty. Often used with a political strategy
of giving the poor some sort of control over
the institutions that affect their communities.
Community organization is encouraged.
Headstart
Meals on Wheels
Literacy training
Job training schemes

Incomes approach Individuals are encouraged to work while
they
receive government assistance. As their job-
related income increases, their level of benefits’
decrease. The idea behind this is that an individual
is better off working than not working.
Negative income tax
Earned income tax credit
Supplementary security
income
All industrialized nations have provided a variety of social
welfare programs to citizens
as a right of citizenship. The governments’ objective with these
programs is to establish a
social safety net—social welfare programs that provide
minimum assistance—with the
hope that the safety net will alleviate poverty among the
chronically poor. Government
provision of economic assistance to individuals involves three
basic questions:

• Who is eligible for assistance?
• How redistributive is the program that provides assistance?
• How is the assistance provided?
To determine eligibility, governments can take one of two
approaches. In the public
assistance model of social welfare policy, eligibility for
benefits is means-tested, mean-
ing that recipients must demonstrate need in order to qualify for
benefits. The United
States’ individualist heritage has resulted in social welfare
policies that are predominantly
means-tested. Proponents of this approach argue that means-
testing allows governments
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 316 11/21/12 1:02 PM
to alleviate extreme poverty without unnecessary spending on
those who are not truly
needy. But critics of means-testing say that, too often, the truly

needy struggle to prove
their eligibility, whereas others who are not in need qualify for
benefits by cheating the
system. Means-testing is also criticized because it often leads to
stigmatization. Few peo-
ple want to be labeled as poor, so building public support for
social policy can be difficult.
Indeed, negative perceptions of the poor shared by government
and the public play a
significant role in the formulation of U.S. social welfare policy.
Under a social insurance model of social welfare policy, all
individuals in a given circum-
stance are eligible for assistance regardless of their degree of
need. For example, all unem-
ployed individuals are eligible for benefits because they pay
taxes to support these
programs. The public supports social insurance policies because
people realize that they
will get back some of their taxes in government benefits of
some kind. Yet, this model
receives criticism because protecting benefit levels without
increasing taxes is difficult—
government revenues can be strained if the number of recipients
increases, and taxpayers

generally oppose raised taxes.
Governments that employ the public assistance
model adhere to a policy that is redistributive,
meaning that all taxpayers support the program
but many of them never qualify for benefits. In
contrast, the social insurance approach allows for
the possibility of all citizens’ benefitting in some
way. Consequently, governments may limit the
redistributive element in social insurance pro-
grams. In some nations this means that programs
are based on the principle of individual equity so
that citizens receive benefits in accordance with
their level of contributions. In other nations gov-
ernments choose to base programs on basic needs
so that benefit levels are set at a certain stan-
dard and citizens receive a common benefit. This
approach combines entitlements and a redistribu-
tive element. All citizens receive benefits of some
kind, but the wealthy—by paying higher taxes
and receiving fewer benefits—subsidize benefits
paid to the needy.
Finally, the types of assistance governments
provide are determined by their choice of policy

instruments. Policy instruments used by the
United States are discussed later in this chapter.
Government provision of social welfare programs has stirred
heated debate for several
reasons. First, many critics, like libertarian political theorist
Charles Murray, claim that
welfare encourages social dependency, with recipients choosing
to become dependent on
government support and remain unemployed. Another source of
criticism is the pres-
ent and future costs of such provision. From the 1980s on,
nation after nation has faced
conflict not only about the types of social welfare provision, but
also about the increasing
Jim West/Age Fotostock/Superstock
Meals on Wheels is an example of a
program that uses a curative approach to
poverty.
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 317 11/21/12 1:02 PM

Section 10.2 A Historical Overview of Social Welfare Policy
CHAPTER 10
drain on national revenues. For example, in recent years
numerous welfare states, particu-
larly in Europe, have confronted the need for so-called austerity
measures, or deep cuts
in government-funded agencies and public programs. In these
cases governments face a
true political dilemma: Should they decrease or eliminate social
welfare benefits to control
costs, or should they protect those benefits, either by cutting
government programs in
other policy sectors or by asking citizens to pay more taxes?
The political dilemma is further exacerbated by deep-seated
ideological views surround-
ing the issue of social welfare. Underlying these positions are
two fundamentally different
views of human nature, broadly categorized as liberal and
conservative. Each perspective
shapes opinions regarding the role of government, the issue of
poverty itself, and the
extent to which policy may effectually resolve the problem. In

the liberal view, people
are basically at the mercy of their circumstances, and
alleviating or solving the problem
of poverty requires ensuring equal resources and opportunity for
all. Liberals believe
poverty is a significant problem in society, one that government
has both the ability and
responsibility to address. This government assistance may take
many forms, including
redistribution of resources.
In the conservative view, responsibility for particular situations
and economic status
largely rests with individuals. For conservatives, poverty is a
problem that no amount
of government intervention is going to solve. They also
consider it a less pervasive prob-
lem in society than do liberals. Although conservatives do not
rule out some government
responsibility in the provision of social welfare, they largely
believe it should be limited in
scope and that redistribution of resources is not an acceptable
policy approach (Stewart,
Hedge, & Lester, 2007).

10.2 A Historical Overview of the U.S. Government’s
Approach to
Social Welfare Policy
The United States implemented social welfare policy relatively
late, mainly because U.S. political culture has traditionally
emphasized self-reliance and rugged indi-vidualism. Such
values encourage individuals to seek remedies from themselves,
rather than from government or society. For much of the
country’s early history, society
blamed poverty on the faults of the individual and not the
system. Welfare in the 18th
through the early 20th centuries relied primarily on private
funding and local political
groups, and those responsible for social welfare took a punitive
approach to alleviating
poverty. Until the Great Depression, only a minority of
individuals—called “the worthy
poor” in the literature of the day—received assistance.
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 318 11/21/12 1:02 PM

CHAPTER 10
The Early Years of Social Welfare in the United States
The New Deal program, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
response to the economic
hardships brought about by the Great Depression in the 1930s,
changed social welfare
policy arrangements in the United States. This program
established the tradition of fed-
eral government provision of social welfare. As the Depression
wore on for several years,
Americans called on the Roosevelt government to address
widespread, sustained levels
of poverty. From that point, the idea became acceptable to many
Americans and some
policy makers that some individuals were poor through no fault
of their own and that
systemic causes of poverty go beyond some individuals’ ability
to manage.
The 1935 Social Security Act was the centerpiece of the New
Deal. It combined the
preventive and alleviative approaches to dealing with poverty. It
established a system

of social insurance in the form of Social Security and
unemployment compensation to
prevent people from slipping into poverty, and it provided
payments from the govern-
ment to a specified population in order to alleviate existing
poverty. The major program
of social insurance under the Social Security Act was
established to help low-income
families with children—this program is now known as Aid to
Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC).
After Roosevelt’s groundbreaking legislation, social welfare
dropped from the institu-
tional agenda with the advent of World War II and did not
return to the agenda in the
immediate postwar years of economic growth (Piven &
Cloward, 1971). Decreased pov-
erty rolls created a general perception among both voters and
policy makers that fewer
people needed government help. Not until the 1960s did welfare
and issues of poverty
resume a central place on the federal policy agenda.
An Increased Need for Social Welfare: The 1960s

In 1960 poverty rates had once again climbed (Figure 10.1), as
well as social disor-
der associated with such poverty, such as increases in crime,
homelessness, and sub-
stance abuse. The Kennedy administration formulated several
programs that were later
endorsed and passed as legislation. Most of these programs
formed President Lyndon B.
Johnson’s War on Poverty, the unofficial name for the
legislation supporting his Great
Society initiative of 1964. Johnson’s Great Society led to
programs aimed at eliminating
poverty and social injustice. In reality, what these programs did
was extend the New
Deal social welfare programs.
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 319 11/21/12 1:02 PM
CHAPTER 10
Figure 10.1: U.S. poverty rate, 1960–1965

Welfare reforms during the 1960s aimed to reduce poverty rates.
US Census Bureau. (2011). Income, poverty, and health
insurance coverage in the United States: 2010. Washington, DC:
US
Department of Commerce, Table A-1-3.
In 1965 Medicare was introduced as a program for health
insurance for the elderly. In the
same year, Medicaid, a program for health insurance for the
poor, was also established.
Other programs passed by the Johnson administration included
housing subsidies, school
food programs, and special programs for pregnant women. Most
of the established pro-
grams were either preventive or alleviative in their approach.
However, the administra-
tion also employed a curative approach. For example, the 1964
Equal Opportunity Act
was the federal government’s attempt to break the poverty cycle
at an early age by provid-
ing a wide range of educational and job training programs, such
as Head Start. The wel-
fare reforms of the 1960s attempted to reduce poverty in the

United States by extending
eligibility and increasing the levels of benefits individuals
could receive. The result was
increased government spending on welfare.
Changing Course on Social Welfare Policy: The 1970s and
1980s
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, President Richard Nixon
attempted to change social
welfare by establishing programs that could be identified with
the Republican Party
and were inexpensive to fund. Nixon and his fellow critics of
the Great Society program
labeled much of the War on Poverty a failure. Influenced by the
work of the conservative
economist Milton Friedman, they urged moving away from the
alleviative approach to
adopt an incomes model. They believed that the alleviative
approach encouraged welfare
0
5

10
15
20
25
196519641963196219611960
Poverty Rate
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
Year
22.2 21.9
21.0

19.5 19.0
17.3
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 320 11/21/12 1:02 PM
CHAPTER 10
dependency through its promotion of welfarism, in which the
government takes respon-
sibility for the financial security of those who cannot manage
their own resources. In
effect, Nixon changed the focus of the social welfare debate
from poverty itself to how
the government should provide welfare. The 1970s were years
of economic uncertainty,
and Nixon and his supporters believed that welfare was a luxury
the government and the
middle class could not afford. They consequently championed
the notion of workfare, a
social welfare model based on the view that the poor need work,

not welfare.
By President Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election, hostility to
welfare among all sections of the
population was high. This opposition was fueled in part by a
public perception that John-
son’s Great Society programs primarily assisted urban minority
populations, leaving
other groups underserved. In addition, critics like Charles
Murray charged that existing
welfare programs failed to address underlying causes of
poverty, instead creating a “cul-
ture of poverty,” or chronic dependence on social aid (Murray,
1984).
Influenced by Murray and others with similar views,
government positions on just how much assistance
the federal government should provide were also
beginning to shift. Many conservatives advocated
extensive government cutbacks. Reagan and his sup-
porters argued that social welfare policy was a fail-
ure, it cost too much, and it discouraged individuals
from working. The phrase “welfare queen” came
to represent this overarching view: a broad charac-
terization of welfare recipients as individuals given

to self-destructive behavior, relying on government
handouts, and exploiting the system to avoid work.
Critics argued that any rational individual would
choose public assistance over a low-paying, dead-
end job with few benefits.
To further their point, critics argued that the
nation’s economic woes were attributable to the
burdensome costs of welfare. Many conservatives
argued that the Great Society and War on Poverty
programs were directly responsible for much of the
economic slowdown and the growth of the federal
budget deficit. In essence, these critics were return-
ing to the philosophy that individuals—not the
system—were to blame for their own poverty.
Reagan and his supporters provided a vocal, ideological
resistance to active government,
placing welfare reform firmly on the institutional agenda. The
administration’s aims were
rolling back what they perceived to be the expansion of the
welfare system since the intro-
duction of the War on Poverty and reducing aid to the working
poor. Government benefits
were to be limited to the truly needy. The goals were clearly

laid out: reduce the num-
bers receiving welfare, decrease government spending on
welfare, and emphasize work
requirements for those seeking welfare.
Jim West/Age Fotostock/Superstock
Some argue that the poor needed work
and not welfare. Others argue that public
assistance is better than a dead-end job
with few benefits.
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 321 11/21/12 1:02 PM
CHAPTER 10
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the Reagan
administration attempted
to achieve its goals by introducing stricter eligibility
requirements and benefits calculation.
By 1983 approximately 14% of all beneficiaries had been
removed from AFDC rolls, and

the percentage of welfare recipients who were not working
increased. By 1988 a bipartisan
consensus in Congress concluded that a broader welfare safety
net should enforce stricter
work requirements. As a result, Congress passed the 1988
Family Support Act (FSA) that
attempted to increase both individual responsibility and
governmental responsibility to
help families with young children. The FSA expanded the
AFDC program for two-parent
families, provided for transitional child care, and added monies
for states to formulate
and adopt programs that would move welfare recipients into
jobs.
For the most part, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed cutbacks in
social policy that solidi-
fied opinion against the notion of welfare. Reagan and his
successor, George H. W. Bush,
took a punitive approach to welfare provision. The net result
was retrenchment in welfare
provision and an increase in poverty levels after 1980 (see
Figure 10.2). By the late 1980s
a general consensus across the political parties and the public
determined that welfare’s

goal should be helping individuals temporarily until they could
find employment that
would replace welfare benefits.
Figure 10.2: U.S. poverty rates, 1976–1989
The 1980s and 1990s had higher poverty rates largely due to
cutbacks in related social policy areas.
US
Department of Commerce, Table A1-3.
0
5
10
15
20
1988 19891985 1986 19871983 19841981 19821979 19801976

1977 1978
13 12.8
14.0
13.5 13.5
15.2
14.4
14.0
15.0
11.6
13.0
11.8 11.5 11.3
Poverty Rate
P
e
rc
e

n
ta
g
e
Year
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 322 11/21/12 1:02 PM
CHAPTER 10
Reforming Welfare to Include Workfare: The 1990s
For most of the 1980s and early 1990s, the question of how
welfare should be reformed
was a subject of deep division. Democrats were split into three
major factions. The first
called for the expansion of current policy into new areas and
new benefit levels, the sec-
ond urged protection of the existing system with minor changes,
and the third demanded
wholesale reform of most programs. Republicans were similarly

divided into those calling
for minor reform and those advocating sweeping changes.
This debate over welfare reform took place in the context of a
divided government.
Republican presidents demanded welfare reform, whereas
Democrat-controlled legisla-
tures advocated expansion of benefits in some programs and
contraction of benefits in
others. Most program expansions were unfunded mandates,
passed only if state govern-
ments were paying. During this period, implementation of
funded and unfunded federal
social programs took place largely at the state level, which led
to conflicting and spotty
implementation. These implementations enabled great program
innovation at the state
level, with both positive and negative outcomes. Many states
were given permission by
the federal government to explore reforms that had been
discussed at the federal level
for a number of years. For example, in some states there was
denial of benefits to certain
categories of individuals, variations in means test and asset test
levels, the introduction of

work requirements for benefits, and time limits on benefit
periods.
By 1992 poverty rates and other conditions of social ill health,
such as homelessness, had
grown. Policy actors and the public more frequently questioned
whether some aspects of
welfare policy, such as looser eligibility requirements and an
increased number of pro-
grams, were contributing factors to persistent poverty. As state
after state began to cut
some welfare programs, the public united behind a desire for
federal welfare reform.
When Bill Clinton was elected president in 1992, he promised
to put an end to welfare.
Some 3 years after his inauguration, the electorate was
rewarded with the reform they
so badly wanted. That reform was made possible by a
Republican-controlled Congress
beginning in January 1995 and a Democratic president who was
committed to changing
social policy arrangements.
The reform enacted was the 1996 Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Rec-

onciliation Act (PRWORA). PRWORA was an example of the
welfare-to-work approach to
social services policy, which aims to move welfare recipients
from dependency into the
workforce. Some argued PRWORA was the most comprehensive
change in federal social
policy since the 1960s. The goal of PRWORA was simple: to
increase personal responsibil-
ity of welfare recipients while decreasing government’s
responsibility for the economic
well-being of low-income individuals.
The adoption and implementation of PRWORA represented a
dramatic change to wel-
fare provision in the United States. The legislation called for
welfare recipients to per-
form communal service and enroll in job-training programs. The
federal government
now requires work as a condition of assistance, limits receipt of
lifetime welfare to
5 years, and expands state discretion over welfare program
administration. In addition,
PRWORA replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF)
and ended cash assistance entitlements. Table 10.3 provides

more detail about the provi-
sions of the legislation.
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 323 11/21/12 1:02 PM
CHAPTER 10
Table 10.3: Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
Major Provisions of the 1996 PRWORA
• AFDC was eliminated as a nationally funded federal-state
contract that ensured cash payments to fami-
lies and households supporting children.
• Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) was created.
This is a block grant that provides discre-
tionary funding to individual states. States then provide for
families in need with these funds. Thus, the
1996 act eliminates a national entitlement. Under TANF, cash
support to the needy is limited. Recipi-

ents are limited to public assistance for a total of 2 years with
lifetime benefits limited to 5 years.
• Teenage mothers can be denied benefits if they do not live in
their parental home and do not attend
school.
• The act also restricts childless adults, ages 18 to 50, to 3
months of food stamps during a 3-year period.
• The policy also requires at least half of all single parents on
welfare in any state to work or be in work-
related activities by 2002 or the state will lose some of its
federal block grants.
• The formula for food stamps was changed to reduce benefit
levels almost 20% by the year 2002.
• Denies to legal immigrants most welfare benefits until a 5-
year residency period has been fulfilled.
• In 1997 food stamps eligibility for noncitizens was eliminated,
as were disability payments.
The Clinton reform may be classified as a punitive approach
fused with an incomes
approach. Clinton (1996) stated when he announced his decision
to sign the legislation,

“Today we have a historic opportunity to make welfare what it
was meant to be: a second
chance, not a way of life.” During the Clinton administration,
the national poverty rate
decreased, welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP fell, and
the number of welfare
caseloads was reduced by 60% (Haskins, 1996) (see Figure
10.3).
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 324 11/21/12 1:02 PM
CHAPTER 10
Figure 10.3: U.S. welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP
and poverty
rate, 1990–1998
It was argued that welfare was the cause of increased poverty
rates in the 1990s because some
individuals had chosen welfare instead of employment.

US
Department of Commerce, Table A-1-3; and US Census Bureau
Statistics Reports, 1990–2002.
Policy theorists make the following observations about the
consequences of PRWORA
and the aftermath of its enactment:
• The move to federal block grants further decentralized cash
assistance to needy
families.
• The federally mandated work requirements and time limits
presented state
governments with the problem of providing meaningful work
opportunities for
low-income individuals.
• How successful implementation would be achieved was
unclear, as uncertainty
about how cities would meet funding needs became a reality
(Bernstein, 2001).
• The decade’s booming economy and the political compromises

of the late 1990s
led almost all states to receive more funds than they did prior to
the reform, yet
the numbers living in poverty did not decrease significantly
(Nightingale & Bren-
nan, 1998).
As a result of these consequences, many families did poorly and
the number of children
in extreme poverty (living at less than half the poverty rate)
increased (Sherman, 1999).
Between 1995 and 1997, the mean income of the poorest 20% of
female-headed households
fell by an average of $580 per family. This decrease was due
mainly to loss of benefits such
0
8
6
4
2

10
12
14
16
2000 20011998 19991996 19971993 1994 199519921990 1991
Poverty Rate % Welfare Expenditure as a % of GDP
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
Year
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 325 11/21/12 1:02 PM

CHAPTER 10
Case Study: The Formulation and Legitimation of Social
Welfare Policy Under
President Bill Clinton
The negotiations that led to PWORA’s passage in 1996 provide
a good case study in the dynamics of policy formulation and
legitimation. Four sets of actors clearly dominated the policy
formulation process around social welfare policy reform in
the 1990s: elected officeholders at the federal and state level,
bureaucrats, interest groups, and policy experts.
The Formulation of Welfare Reform
For several years Clinton and congressional Republicans strug-
gled to reach an agreement on welfare reform. In 1994 Clinton
originally submitted a proposal for welfare reform that died in
Congress. In early 1995 a new Republican majority submitted
its Contract with America, including the Personal Responsibil-
ity Act, designed to cut spending for welfare programs and
promote individual responsibility.

On September 19, 1995, after several compromises between
varying factions of the Republican Party
as well as Democrats in both houses, Congress passed a
modified version of the original bill, which
the president indicated he would sign. However, concerns from
the extreme left and right in Con-
gress persisted, and compromise began to appear less of a
possibility.
The 1996 National Governors Association (NGA) annual
meeting offered welfare reform a second
chance with a less restrictive reform policy proposal. The
governors’ role in the welfare reform for-
mulation process was significant. As chief executives of the
states, they were essentially in charge of
implementing any change.
Meanwhile, many liberal interest groups who opposed reduced
benefits and entitlements—such as
the National Organization for Women—were shut out of the
legislative process because they could not
work with the Republican majority. On the other hand,
conservative groups such as the Heritage Foun-
dation, a think tank, were extremely influential on the

congressional leadership. In May 1996 congres-
sional Republicans put forward new legislation based on the
NGA proposal. Democrats now saw that
Clinton would have no choice but to veto this version because it
tied welfare reform to
Visions of America/Superstock
Former president Bill Clinton
and congressional Republicans
struggled for several years
to reach a welfare reform
agreement.
as food stamps, financial assistance for purchasing food
provided to low-and no-income
Americans by the Food Stamp Program (Primus, Rawlings,
Larin, & Porter, 1999). By
April 1999 exceptions to certain rules of the 1996 legislation
had been enacted. For exam-
ple, states were permitted to continue to provide benefits
beyond 5 years to up to 20% of
recipients, based on hardship or domestic violence.
For more about the formulation and legitimation of social

welfare policy under Clinton,
see the case study in this chapter.
(continued)
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 326 11/21/12 1:02 PM
CHAPTER 10
Case Study: The Formulation and Legitimation of Social
Welfare Policy Under
President Bill Clinton (continued)
Medicaid reform. Republicans knew that Clinton would veto the
bill and that he faced public criticism
for reneging on campaign promises.
The White House continued to express a desire to compromise.
By June the House and Senate com-
mittees began marking up the legislation, meaning they
reviewed the arguments in favor of and
against while considering proposed amendments.

The Legitimation of Welfare Reform
By June 19 all committees had reported back and the bill was
sent to the House Rules Committee,
a usual practice. At the same time, the Senate was considering
the bill. At this point, the legislation
was in trouble, because senators on both sides of the aisle had
problems with the Medicaid proposal.
Many congressional Republicans felt that they would suffer
electorally if legislation was not signed
quickly. Presidential candidate and Senator Robert Dole urged
the Republican congressional leader-
ship to pass the reform (Havemann, 1996).
In July 1996 the Republican leadership announced that changes
to Medicaid would be separated
from welfare reform. The policy window (see Chapter 4) for
welfare reform was now opening up. For
most of July, Clinton and the Republicans faced off over the
bill’s passage.
The Senate received the House bill for consideration. On July
22 Dole again urged Republicans to give
Clinton a welfare reform bill that he could sign. The president

indicated he would sign the legislation,
still hoping that changes he favored could be incorporated. The
Senate and House passed different
versions of the same bill, so it was sent to the Conference
Committee.
Clinton’s welfare proposals mobilized a policy actors on all
sides, each maneuvering to gain the
advantage. By July 29 Congress had come to an agreement, with
a bill that resembled the Senate
version more closely than the House version. Clinton now had
to decide whether to sign it.
Now, a number of liberal interest groups mobilized to pressure
the president to veto. The congressio-
nal vote would not take place until Clinton had announced his
intention. On August 1, 1996, Clinton
met with his cabinet advisers and senior White House Staff for a
final discussion of the proposal.
Those favoring a veto argued that the bill was too stringent and
put holes in the safety net. Those in
favor of signing insisted that the bill represented a rational use
of resources and encouraged work as
a way out of the poverty trap in keeping with Clinton’s
campaign promise to limit welfare benefits.

Underscoring the whole discussion were the political
implications of failing to deliver what Clinton
had promised in 1992: to put an end to welfare.
Within 30 minutes of the end of this discussion, speechwriters
were told to write a “yes” speech. The
president told the public he did not really like the reform, but it
was the best that could be expected
from this Congress.
On August 26, 1996, the president signed the welfare bill. Bill
Clinton had transformed his position on
welfare, and welfare as the country had known it for decades
was effectively ended.
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 327 11/21/12 1:02 PM
CHAPTER 10
Twenty-First Century Welfare Policy
George W. Bush campaigned for and won the 2000 presidency

on a platform of “compas-
sionate conservatism.” This position did not represent a typical
conservative commitment
to wholesale cutting and withdrawal of government from the
provision of social welfare.
Bush advocated for civil society as an alternative to the
bureaucratic welfare state—
society should take care of those in need without formal
governmental intervention
through regulation. In short, he argued that governmental social
programs cannot be
scaled back without something in place to support individuals
and communities that are
falling behind. For Bush, the alternative was to channel more
support and resources to
private charities, both secular and religious, to deal with
poverty. This view put into prac-
tice PRWORA’s Charitable Choice provisions, which permitted
religious groups serving
low-income people to be eligible for government antipoverty
funds.
One of Bush’s first initiatives as president was to create an
office in the White House devoted
to supporting faith-based organizations. The measure boosted

support for religious chari-
ties by making them eligible for more federal grants and by
expanding tax deductions
for charitable donations. It also moved people off
the welfare rolls. Beyond this, the government
passed no major welfare policy initiatives from
2000 to 2008. Yet, although the poverty rate never
matched that of the early 1990s, it grew under
Bush and federal welfare spending increased
(Tanner, 2012). In addition, the Bush presidency
made many shifts in policy. For example, the Bush
White House was far more aggressive in its pur-
suit of certain goals of the 1996 reform of welfare
policy than the original legislation intended. For
example, with the Healthy Marriage Initiative, the
administration emphasized reducing births out-
side of marriage and promoting marriage, as well
as funding programs that supported two-parent
families and responsible fathers. In 2006 Congress
passed a reauthorization of welfare reform that
required stricter, more extensive work participa-
tion requirements at the state level.
Bush’s second-term social welfare policy agenda
focused on Social Security reform. In his 2005

State of the Union Address, the president argued
that Social Security was facing record deficits and
potential bankruptcy, and he urged a reform of
the program. The Bush initiative called for partial
privatization of the system, personal Social Secu-
rity accounts, and options to divert a portion of
individuals’ Federal Insurance Contributions Act
(FICA) tax (a payroll tax that funds Social Security and
Medicare) into secured invest-
ments (Wolk, 2005). Because of low public support and
political fallout from the adminis-
tration’s response to Hurricane Katrina, the initiative never
moved onto the institutional
Fotosearch/Superstock
Social Security benefits those who are
retired or disabled and no longer receive
income. Though Social Security faced
deficits in 2005, Congress opposed Social
Security privatization in 2006.
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 328 11/21/12 1:02 PM

CHAPTER 10
agenda. In addition, Democrats gained control of both houses of
Congress in the 2006
midterm elections and opposed any form of Social Security
privatization.
Barack Obama’s campaign for the presidency clearly articulated
a social-welfare policy
agenda attacking an America where many ordinary citizens were
excluded from a share in
society’s resources. No significant stand-alone welfare policy
was initiated during Obama's
first term. However, since Obama’s election in 2008, spending
on welfare programs has
increased dramatically (see Figure 10.4). Much of this increase
is due to the economic reces-
sion in which the country found itself after 2008, a recession
that dramatically affected living
conditions for many Americans.
Figure 10.4: Government welfare expenditure as a percentage
of GDP,

2005–2012
Some of the increase in funds spent on welfare since 2008 is the
result of an economic recession.
US Census Bureau Statistics Reports, 2006–2012.
Conservative critics argue that Obama’s policies have put a
strain on the government’s
resources. For example, the administration’s policy agenda has
set out to ease eligibility
rules and expand the number of individuals who qualify for
welfare assistance from the
government (Rice, 2012). Additionally, such critics argue that
the Obama stimulus pack-
age and the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(Recovery Act) basically con-
stitute welfare—the Recovery Act combined tax breaks with
extension of welfare benefits,
among other things. In his bid for the 2012 Republican
presidential nomination, former
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich described Obama as the
“most successful food stamp
president in the American history” (as cited in Rice, 2012).
Gingrich’s claim was based on

0
5
10
15
2011 20122008 2009 201020072005 2006
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
Year
Welfare Expenditure as a % of GDP
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 329 11/21/12 1:02 PM

CHAPTER 10
the fact that in 2011, 44.7 million Americans, or 1 in 7,
received food stamps (Luhby, 2012).
However, examining the poverty and unemployment rates
during the Obama administra-
tion makes clear why spending on welfare provision has
increased (see Figure 10.5). Anal-
ysis shows that the percentage of Americans living in deepest
poverty—with incomes
below half of the federal poverty line—is the second highest
since 1965, when the War on
Poverty programs were introduced.
Figure 10.5: U.S. unemployment and poverty rates, 2000–2011
The increase in poverty and unemployment rates since 2008
have impacted funds spent on welfare
provisions.

US
Department of Commerce, Tables A1-3; and US Department of
Labor Statists, US Unemployment Rate, 1960–2011.
Obama’s presidency also endorsed increased contributions to
Social Security through a
new FICA tax on incomes above $250,000. The increase
represented a response to claims
of a possible shortfall in Social Security funding. However, this
increase was offset by two
payroll tax cuts, which critics argue puts Social Security’s long-
term solvency at risk.
0
8
6
4
2
10

12
14
18
16
2010 20112008 20092006 20072003 2004 200520022000 2001
Poverty Rate Unemployment Rate
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
Year
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 330 11/21/12 1:02 PM

Section 10.3 The Policy Process and Social Welfare Policy
CHAPTER 10
Poverty and Politics
Issues of wealth and policy making for the poor become more
important than ever as poverty and
unemployment rise. Presidential candidates must address these
topics and take steps to change the
situation if they wish to be elected or reelected. The following
video discusses poverty and politics in
the United States:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbtV6lu7vXs.
1. How did the issue of the poor play and develop within the
early part of the 2012 election?
2. Why is poverty such a serious issue in 2012?
3. Is the failure in the 1990s a failure of the safety net or the
economy?
10.3 The Policy Process and Social Welfare Policy

As the history surrounding PWORA’s passage makes abundantly
clear, welfare pol-icy formulation and decision making occurs
in a variety of arenas and involves a large number of actors, all
of whom play active roles. Welfare policy involves
an extremely complex, diffuse process because of the diversity
of individuals directly
affected, the wide range of available policy instruments that
allow for input from a large
number of actors, and the overlapping areas of jurisdiction. In
short, the social welfare
policy process closely resembles the general dynamics of policy
making in the United
States. Hence, like all policy making in the United States, social
welfare policy making is
highly decentralized.
The Department of Labor and the Department of Health and
Human Services are respon-
sible for most aspects of social welfare policy. State
governments have a large say in fed-
eral welfare policies because of their ability to execute many
crucial decisions. Any major
reform must gain executive approval and the approval of both
houses of Congress. Within

Congress, a number of committees and subcommittees in both
chambers play an active
role in policy formulation and decision making (see Table 10.4).
Interest groups are heav-
ily involved in social policy formation. As the case study in this
chapter showed, all of
these actors influenced the final shape of the PWORA
legislation.
Table 10.4: Major legislation affecting social welfare
Year Legislation
1935 Social Security Act
1974 Equal Educational Opportunities Act
1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
1988 Family Support Act (FSA)
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
2006 Welfare Reform Reauthorization Act

2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
the80472_10_c10_313-338.indd 331 11/21/12 1:02 PM
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pbtV6lu7vXs
Section 10.4 Policy Instruments Used to Implement Welfare
Policy

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