Haiti After Action Report_2011

Independent Review of the U.S. Government
Response to the Haiti Earthquake
Final Report
March 28, 2011

1
Independent EvaluationTeam:
Debarati Guha-Sapir, M.S., Ph.D.
Thomas Kirsch, M.D., M.P.H., F.A.C.E.P.
Shayna Dooling, M.P.H.
Adam Sirois, M.P.H.
with assistance from Maral DerSarkissian
Subcontracted under:
Contract # DFD-I-00-06-00170-00
Task Order# AID-OAA-TO-10-00020
Contractor: Macfadden & Associates, Inc.
Funded by:The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake • Final Report, March 20112
This independent report is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID).The contents are the responsibility of the independent team and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Macfadden, USAID, or the United States Government.

Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake • Final Report, March 2011 3
Foreword
The 2010 earthquake centered near Port-au-Prince, Haiti, was unique in the nature of the devastation, the scale
and scope of the response (particularly by the United States), and the public interest in its aftermath. Despite its
uniqueness, however, it did present the opportunity for learning about the quality and coordination across key US
disaster response assets that may be deployed in future large disasters. Recognizing this, the US Agency for Inter-
national Development, along with its sister Federal agencies, sought to complement the large number of agency-
specific After-Action Reports with a careful, clear-eyed look at the “whole of government” response.
This report recognizes and applauds the heroic and altruistic measures taken by hundreds of US Government per-
sonnel, from diplomats, aid workers and soldiers on the ground to the highest level officials in Washington, starting
within minutes after the quake. The authors also recognize that in any humanitarian disaster, and particularly one
as large, complex and visible as this one, the rush to respond to human suffering can look – in retrospect – imper-
fect in many ways. This report documents those imperfections so that across the US Government we can create
stronger and more robust systems for coordination and efficient deployment of resources during future responses.
The report on the lessons learned from the first six months of the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake was
prepared by an independent expert team. While the team was contracted by USAID and obtained some logisti-
cal support from USAID’s Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning and Office of Military Affairs, neither USAID nor
any other US government agency was asked to provide clearance on the report’s content. Therefore, the text of
this report represents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the expert team, and does not necessarily
represent the views of the US government.
Broad US government input has been sought throughout the preparation of this study. To provide on-going input
and facilitate contacts within key agencies, a Technical Support Group was convened at the outset of the process, in
June 2010 with multiple representatives from USAID and the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security,
and Health and Human Services. In July 2010, a large interagency workshop was hosted by the National War Col-
lege, at which 130 USG officials were brought together to identify key themes that merited special examination by
the independent experts. More than 168 people, most within the USG, were interviewed (see Annex 10.2). Finally,
each agency was asked to review draft versions of the document and to provide comments, which were considered
by the independent team and, in some cases, led to important modifications. In the final stage, agencies were of-
fered the opportunity to provide comments on the findings, conclusions and recommendations; these are included
in Annex 10.8 of this report for the three agencies that decided to pursue this option (the Department of Defense,
the Department of Health and Human Services, and USAID). Sincere gratitude is due to the many individuals who
contributed to the report.
Ruth Levine
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Bureau of Policy, Planning and Learning
US Agency for International Development

Acknowledgements
This report would not have been possible without the extraordinary cooperation of the many individuals who gave
generously of their time for interviews and provided us with insights into the process with frankness and sincerity.
A large part of the success in the completion of the report is due to those who assisted with the logistical planning
and scheduling of site visits for the team, which were organized with little lead time.
Special thanks are also extended to Maral DerSarkissian for her research and analytical contributions regarding
the impact of humanitarian aid and the quality of care provided in the field, in addition to helping write the report
summary. San Francisco Edit and Sarah Deren must also be acknowledged for copy-editing this extensive and
substantial document in record time.We would like to thank members of the Technical Support Group who
supported this project, assisting promptly when requested. Finally, thanks are due to Macfadden for all their
assistance throughout this review.Their patience, guidance, and commitment to this effort are greatly appreciated.
Lastly, conclusions and recommendations expressed in this document reflect the views of the authors and do not
reflect the views or opinions of USAID, other U.S. Government agencies, or Macfadden.

Opening Note from the Independent EvaluationTeam
Drawing collective lessons from disaster response is a difficult exercise, as individual perspectives can be very
different or even opposing. But each individual perspective can, nonetheless, be defensible on its own merits.
Lessons from disaster responses are also colored by moral imperatives which may override concerns of efficiency.
In the end, decisions on which lessons to keep and which to reject remain in the hands of public policymakers.
Learning the lessons from the Haiti earthquake experience was no different.
For this report, we undertook many interviews and were privy to diverse perspectives, some of which converged
but many did not.There are numerous individuals who we did not meet, due to time constraints and lack of
availability, whose insights would have improved our understanding of the relief process. We also should have
returned to discuss our findings with many of our interviewees.What was clear to us, from the start, was the
extraordinary dedication and hard work of many individuals at all levels of authority.Their collective engagement
in trying their best to help the victims of the Haitian catastrophe is in itself the first lesson in generosity and
commitment to the misfortune of others.
We had hoped to invest greater efforts in measuring more accurately the quality of aid and its impact on
beneficiaries. However, a disquieting lack of data on baselines against which to measure progress or even impact
forced this task to the back burner.We realized that devoting more energy to this task could take up all the time
and human resources we had available.Thus, some useful lessons in that direction remain unclear.
Another issue addressed in this report but lacking in-depth analysis is the relationship between development
goals and disaster relief.While this is widely recognized as an important issue in the international community, the
U.S., other donor governments, and the UN need better common policies and tools to address the matter.This
inadequacy will be increasingly felt as reconstruction progresses in Haiti.
Some of the lessons presented in this report are easier to implement than others, and policy choices will have to
be made to determine which ones can be pushed through and which will require more time and effort.
We emphasize that strengthening U.S. Government response to overseas disaster relief sits squarely in the
territory of the U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID), not only within its Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance, but throughout the agency and its Missions abroad.That is where the first reforms must begin.
Commissioning this study is not only an expression by USAID and other government actors of sincere
commitment to strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. international disaster response, but the
statement of work for the study also shows clarity of thinking and vision.The scope was arguably broad, but we
hope the report responds satisfactorily to the challenge and, at the very least, opens doors for review or reform of
processes in the future.
Finally, we should not lose sight along the way that all of these efforts, at the end of the day, should help the victims
of disasters in the poor countries of the world, whose reserves are small and whose survival often depends on fast,
effective, and equitable aid.
Debarati Guha-Sapir

Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary..........................................................................................................................8
2. Introduction......................................................................................................................................17
3. Quality of Response.........................................................................................................................23
3.1 USAR Results........................................................................................................................................................23
3.2 Potable Water.......................................................................................................................................................23
3.3 Nutrition................................................................................................................................................................24
3.4 Health.....................................................................................................................................................................25
3.5 Migration and Settlement...................................................................................................................................28
3.6 Food Security and Distribution.........................................................................................................................29
3.7 Rubble Removal....................................................................................................................................................31
3.8 Cash-for-work.......................................................................................................................................................31
3.9 SPHERE Standards...............................................................................................................................................32
3.10 Further Examinations........................................................................................................................................34
4. Response in the United States.......................................................................................................35
4.1 Organization of the U.S. Government Response..........................................................................................35
Analysis and Recommendations..............................................................................................................................38
4.2 The U.S.Agency for International Development ..........................................................................................41
4.3 The Department of State...................................................................................................................................44
4.4 The Department of Defense..............................................................................................................................47
4.5 The Department of Homeland Security.........................................................................................................51
4.6 The Department of Health and Human Services..........................................................................................53
4.7 The Management of Donations.........................................................................................................................55
4.8 Management of the Press...................................................................................................................................57

5. Response in Haiti.............................................................................................................................59
5.1 Organization of U.S. Government Response.................................................................................................59
5.2 USAID in Haiti......................................................................................................................................................62
5.3 Civilian-Military Coordination...........................................................................................................................66
5.4 Multilateral Donor Coordination.....................................................................................................................71
5.5 U.S./GOH Coordination.....................................................................................................................................74
5.6 NGO/PVO Coordination...................................................................................................................................76
6. Data/Information Management......................................................................................................78
7. Finance and Budget.........................................................................................................................82
8. Overarching Recommendations....................................................................................................85
9. Limitations.......................................................................................................................................90
10. Annexes............................................................................................................................................91
10.1 Abbreviations......................................................................................................................................................91
10.2 Key Informants...................................................................................................................................................93
10.3 Documents Reviewed.......................................................................................................................................97
10.4 International Response Framework (IRF) Concept...................................................................................99
10.5 Description of the Roles of the GOH....................................................................................................... 102
10.6 Description of the Roles of the UN Agencies......................................................................................... 104
10.7 Scope of Work................................................................................................................................................. 105
10.8 Technical Support Group Comments......................................................................................................... 113

1. Executive Summary
On 12 January 2010, the deadliest natural disaster in modern
history occurred in Port-au-Prince, Haiti: a 7.0 magnitude
earthquake affected over 2 million people, displacing 1.6 million,
injuring 300,000 and killing 230,000. Many reasons have been
identified as to why the earthquake caused such extensive
damage. First and foremost, the Government of Haiti (GOH)
lacked the capacity and resources to mount a swift and effective
response after the event – a consequence of being one of the
poorest countries in the world. In addition, lack of building
codes and absence of building regulation enforcement led to the
collapse of many key government and private buildings, as well
as thousands of homes. Haiti is very prone to natural disasters
and has suffered major human and material losses from storms,
floods, and droughts in the last decade.
Haiti’s geographical and political importance to America led to
an unprecedented response by the United States Government
(USG), supported by the international community who reacted
from far and near.The day after the earthquake, the President of
the United States asked for a “whole of government” response,
mobilizing many agencies and departments in the response.
In addition to the U.S.Agency for International Development
(USAID) and Department of State (DOS), the standard
responders in international disasters, many other U.S. agencies
weighed in with management personnel, equipment, special
expertise, and other forms of support. Many individuals, starting
from the highest levels, devoted themselves to the intervention,
working around the clock without respite and well beyond the
call of duty.The human tragedy brought out the best in the
government team, where all involved were fully and sincerely
engaged in doing their best to help the beleaguered Haitian
community.These efforts were unequivocally extraordinary in
their scope, commitment, and compassion.Whatever mistakes
were made or inefficiencies generated in the process were
clearly largely due to the unprecedented nature of this exercise.
The ultimate objective of the study is to improve the U.S.
Government response to global catastrophes by informing
decision makers about the strengths and shortcomings of the
Haiti response, and by offering recommendations about how best
to organize response to major humanitarian crises.The scope of
the study focused on the U.S. Government’s relief and assistance
to the Haitian Government and people in responding to the
disaster. Due to the circumstances surrounding the magnitude
of the earthquake and the location of the epicenter, additional
humanitarian and diplomatic lines of effort were required by
the U.S. Government, including: providing assistance to the U.S.
Embassy community; providing assistance to American citizens;
and assuring general security and stability were maintained in
Haiti.While this study does not review the additional lines of
effort, it does take into consideration its effect on the broader
U.S. relief and recovery assistance provided in Haiti.
The aim of this review was to examine three broad areas of
action primarily related to relief and recovery assistance to the
Haitian Government and people: (1) internal U.S. Government
coordination; (2) partner coordination; and (3) response
effectiveness.The timeframe of the report is from the date of
the event, 12 January, through 30 June 2010.All data collected
and analyzed correspond to this timeframe.The report draws on
more than one hundred and fifty interviews and several hundred
documents to identify lessons learned in the first six months of
the response. Many of these lessons are shortcomings and need
changes in the system, but many are successes. If the report
focuses on the shortcomings, it is to learn from mistakes and
make the management of catastrophes a little easier in the future
than it was this time around.
The proximity of Haiti to the U.S. and the historical relationship
between the two countries played important roles in
determining the United States Government’s role in responding
to the earthquake. In March 2009, ten months before the
disaster, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared Haiti a
foreign policy priority for the United States and worked closely
with the GOH to strengthen diplomatic and humanitarian
relationships.The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed
between President Preval and Ambassador Merten allowed the
U.S. to rapidly assume responsibility for the sea and airports,
which facilitated the flow of international aid.
In response to the disaster, the U.S. Government contributed
more funding to relief in Haiti than any other foreign
government.The total sum contributed was also greater than
any amount previously pledged by the U.S. Government to a
foreign disaster. Over $1.1 billion was spent during the first six
months following the disaster, mostly through the U.S.Agency for
International Development and Department of Defense (DOD).
U.S. citizens contributed an additional $1 billion to the Haiti
relief effort through private donations.
The response to the earthquake in Haiti introduced several
innovations with implications for future humanitarian responses.

These include new management paradigms, new strategic
planning processes, new operational mechanisms to coordinate
civilian-military activities, and new or emerging information and
communication technologies. However, the most important
positive outcome of the management of the response was that
predictions of ongoing deaths, infectious disease outbreaks, mass
migration, and political insurrection did not occur during the first
six months of the response.While cholera occurred nine months
after the disaster, the overall immediate response saved countless
lives.The following summarizes accomplishments and challenges
faced by the U.S. Government and its partners in providing relief
and recovery assistance in responding to the earthquake in Haiti.
Quality of the Response
Urban Search and Rescue. The U.S. Government deployed six
Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams to Haiti, contributing
more than $35 million towards such efforts.American USAR
teams made 47 live rescues. In total, 43 international USAR
teams rescued 136 individuals in Haiti.The Government of Haiti
terminated search and rescue efforts on 26 January 2010.
PotableWater. Following the earthquake, access to potable
water was identified as a top priority.The Water and Sanitation
(WASH) cluster worked quickly to coordinate water trucks,
provide water bladders, and restore Port-au-Prince’s water
system. By the beginning of February, Port-au-Prince’s municipal
water authority was producing more water than before the
earthquake due to improved access to fuel: water production
had increased to between 120 and 150 million liters per day. By
the end of April, 1.3 million people were receiving treated water.
Nutrition. Many humanitarian organizations were involved
in providing nutritional services to Haitians affected by the
earthquake.Although it took a couple of weeks until a fixed-
point food-distribution system could be implemented, the World
Food Programme (WFP) immediately began food distribution
around Port-au-Prince following the earthquake.According to
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), over 500,000
children aged 6-59 months and pregnant and lactating women
received supplementary feedings, with coverage varying from
52%-87% of the targeted population.
Health. The U.S. Government and entire world’s response to
provide medical care was extraordinary. U.S. Government
civilian agencies and military personnel immediately provided
emergency medical and health-related assistance to Haiti.A
number of American teams and personnel, including Disaster
Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) from Health and Human
Services (HHS), the USNS Comfort, and a MediShare hospital,
provided care to Haitians. The deployment of many specialized
and surgical assets often provided a standard of care far better
than what had been present before the earthquake, but also led
to a number of amputations and complex operative procedures.
This created problems for the long-term care of post-operative
Haitians. Guidance as to the applicable standards of care and
processes for making decisions about standards of care was not
provided consistently to U.S. responders.Thus, medical personnel
on the ground were not adequately prepared to practice in
accordance with local and catastrophic standards of care. Prior
to the earthquake, many of these specialty services were not
available to most Haitians, and the current Haitian health system
could not provide long-term wound and fracture care.Also, many
of the providers rapidly rotated out of the country, so there was
limited continuity of care.The GOH Ministry of Social Affairs
estimates that there are between 4,000-5,000 newly disabled
people due to the earthquake.The U.S. Government strategy
specifically includes monitoring and supporting rehabilitation and
disability care for earthquake trauma patients.
In an effort to monitor disease trends and detect outbreaks,
Haiti’s Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP),
the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and other agencies
launched two reportable surveillance systems: an Internally
Displaced Persons Disease Surveillance System and a National
Sentinel Surveillance System. Since the earthquake, the U.S.
Government has collaborated with the GOH and the MSPP
in reconstructing the Haitian health care system, particularly
emphasizing the importance of disaster preparedness for future
emergencies given the impact of past hurricanes.
Migration and Settlement. Approximately 1.5 million Haitians were
displaced as a result of the earthquake, triggering the creation
of over 1,000 spontaneous settlement sites. In the first two
months of the response, there were 277,000 tarps and more
than 37,000 tents distributed.As the response shifted from the
emergency phase to the relief and reconstruction phase, the
types of shelters distributed shifted from tents and tarpaulins
to long-term transitional shelters.Transitional shelters are more
durable, as they consist of a concrete foundation and a timber or
steel frame, but take longer to build.These shelters offer more
privacy, space, and protection compared to emergency shelters.
As of 2 June, 96,504 transitional shelters had received funding

to be built, including 47,500 shelters funded by USAID/Office of
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). However, by the end
of June, only 5,000 of the USAID/OFDA funded shelters were
actually constructed. Much of the delay stems from the problem
with rubble removal and land rights issues, which serve as key
barriers to non-governmental organization (NGO)-implemented
shelter programs.
Food Security and Distribution. Within a week after the earthquake,
WFP had provided over 200,000 people with over 1,000,000
food rations.Targeted food aid programs were designed to assist
displaced people and host families accommodating displaced
individuals in and outside of Port-au-Prince. By the end of
March, when the Government of Haiti decided to end general
food distribution, about 4 million Haitians had received food
assistance.Within the first six months of the response, USAID/
Food for Peace (FFP) provided $125 million in Title II funds and
delivered 106,110 metric tons of Title II food aid to Haiti. It is
important to note that while the price of most staple foods did
rise after the earthquake, it seems that most prices returned
to pre-earthquake price levels, likely due to large-scale food aid
distributions (see Figure 4 and Figure 5).
Rubble Removal. The removal of rubble was and still remains a
pervasive problem in relief efforts.The earthquake generated 20-
25 million tons of rubble, and much of the debris needed to be
cleared in order to rebuild homes, communities, and livelihoods.
The U.S. Government assisted in these efforts through the U.S.
military and NGO partners. It is estimated by members of the
Project Management Coordination Cell (PMCC) that less than
1% of the total rubble has been cleared from the city at the
time of this report. Plans for removing the rubble are underway;
however, given the current supply of trucks and equipment
available, all plans would require years, not months, to remove all
the debris.
Cash-for-Work. The purpose of cash-for-work (CFW) programs
is to promote economic and political stability by stimulating
the economy through job creation. In initial relief efforts, CFW
rapidly restored purchasing power and stimulated the markets to
re-open. Following the earthquake, USAID provided funding for
many cash-for-work programs in a variety of sectors, including
rubble removal, transitional shelters, agricultural development,
and WASH interventions.As of 15 April, there were 25,691
individuals employed through cash-for-work programs. By mid-
June, USAID provided over $19 million to partners implementing
exclusive cash-for-work programs and $53 million to partners
implementing programs with a cash-for-work component.
The Response inWashington
Unlike the tsunami that struck the Indian Ocean in 2005, the
earthquake in Haiti occurred in America’s backyard, only 600
miles south of Florida. Proximity to the U.S. and the complex
history of U.S.-Haiti relations led to a great commitment from
the U.S. Government to help save lives and relieve suffering
among the Haitian population and among Americans living in
Haiti.This also brought about an increased level of media scrutiny
and Americans’ desire to help. In a post-9/11 and post-Katrina
United States, politicians could ill afford to be seen as ignoring
the Haiti disaster.This led to a level of urgency to respond with
every resource the U.S. Government possessed, beginning with
the White House.
In almost all disasters, the affected country has principal
responsibility for responding to the disaster in partnership with
the United Nations (UN). However, both the Government of
Haiti and the UN were devastated by the earthquake, requiring
greater assistance and leadership from the international
community.Therefore,Washington-based U.S. Government
leadership was critical for and, ultimately, successful in providing
this assistance. Hours after the earthquake, President Obama
pledged full U.S. support for Haiti and called for swift and
coordinated action, leading to a “whole of government” response
for the first time in an international emergency.This approach
brought new resources to humanitarian relief efforts, creating
opportunities for increased capacity, but also for increased
complexity and inefficiency. For instance, during the first few
weeks of the response, policymakers became deeply involved
in tactical decisions in Haiti.This made daily operations in the
field difficult, as responders’ time was diverted from providing
full-time relief efforts in the field to respond to requests from
Washington.
President Obama named the newly appointed USAID
Administrator, Rajiv Shah, as the Unified Disaster Coordinator
and identified USAID as the lead federal agency to coordinate
the response for the U.S. Government.Administrator Shah
was sworn into office on 7 January; only five days before the
earthquake. USAID coordinated the humanitarian response,
provided immediate relief through grants to non-governmental
organizations, and developed strategies for recovery and

reconstruction.Through grants, USAID has provided victims
with food aid, shelter, medical care, and other critical services.
However, the agency lacked the political standing and operational
capacity to completely fulfill its leadership mandate. OFDA was
charged with managing U.S. foreign disaster assistance funds
appropriated to USAID and helping to coordinate the use of
such funds with other international partners to respond to the
disaster.
The Department of State (DOS) supported USAID and served
as the lead diplomatic agency.The DOS worked closely with the
U.S. Embassy in Haiti by providing resources that enabled the U.S.
Embassy to host humanitarian assistance interagency personnel.
Members of the State Department worked closely with the
GOH to develop long-term development and reconstruction
plans.
The DOD launched Operation Unified Response (OUR) to
provide critical support to the humanitarian mission.The U.S.
military applied its unique skills in logistics, transportation,
assessment, and security to re-establish operations at the
seaport and airport, assist in debris removal, provide patient care
on the USNS Comfort and USS CarlVinson, provide general
security for humanitarian activities, and assist in engineering
projects. Due to the unusual circumstances governing the
response, the Joint Task Force (JTF), which was critical to the
rapidity of the response, was set up immediately. Most military
staff indicated that the SOP was flexible enough for the Haiti
emergency and could have been fully applied. Furthermore,
policymakers’ lack of articulated requirements and goals for
standing down the JTF, and the devastating conditions on the
ground, prolonged its mission in Haiti.Additional concerns
have been expressed about the size of the military response
and its technical knowledge in humanitarian operations.While
the military has undisputed expertise for executing large-scale
logistical and security responses, it is less proficient in delivering
direct humanitarian aid.
The main difficulties in Washington arose from the need to adapt
to the reality of a multi-agency response on such a grand scale.
Due to this large-scale response and the involvement of high-
level policy staff, an interagency task force was established to
coordinate the response across all U.S. Government agencies.
This interagency Haiti Task Force was set up concomitantly in
the Response Management Team (RMT) space, which strained
the two management structures.As a result, the coordination
of activities was de facto conducted in parallel through the
Interagency Haiti Task Force and the Response Management
Team, creating a stressful environment for command and control.
The variety of coordinating meeting schedules in Washington
and in Haiti, as well as the different reporting requirements and
schedules for different agencies, further aggravated the operating
conditions for response staff in Washington and Haiti.These
problems were compounded due to a lack of pre-defined roles
and responsibilities among participating agencies, particularly the
role of USAID as the lead agency for the humanitarian response
and the position of DOS in its role as the lead diplomatic and
foreign policy agency.
However, despite these obstacles, the level of cooperation
between agencies in the interagency task force was widely
praised.The use of interagency liaison officers was especially
noted as positive and considered to have played a key role in
communications and coordination.
The Response in Haiti
The U.S. Government response in Haiti was unprecedented in
its size, approach, and scope because of the acute and unique
needs of the country.The earthquake devastated the GOH and
UN and severely limited their capacity to respond to the disaster.
As such, there were important deviations from the standard U.S.
Government response to foreign disasters in order to support
the GOH and UN with the response.These included the use of
the Office of Response Coordinator (ORC); the mobilization of
many U.S. Government agencies that do not normally respond
to international disasters; and the rapid deployment of people,
equipment, and supplies into the field before the embassy or
USAID Mission had determined specific needs. Coordination
among all the various federal agencies was complicated due
to the lack of human and material resources available to the
U.S. Government in Haiti and the significant losses suffered
by U.S. Government personnel working in Haiti at the time
of the earthquake.While providing personnel and supplies to
Haiti was seen as critical to the response by political leaders in
Washington, there is always a need for the rational deployment
of assets and people so that the first responders in-country
have the logistical and infrastructure capacity on the ground to
absorb such large volumes and use them effectively in the overall
response.The proper sequencing of resources provided by the
U.S. Government is critical to effective response management in
the field.

The use of new managerial hierarchies coupled with the need to
adapt to new procedures led to difficulties on the ground for the
USAID Mission and embassy, which struggled to meet their own
mandates while adapting to the unfamiliar and rapidly evolving
management structures. Parallel lines of command and control
within USAID and the absence of clear protocols that defined
responsibilities based on comparative advantages and assets
resulted in time loss, inhibited service efficiency, and decreased
logistical support for relief staff.This situation was aggravated
by the arrival of numerous U.S. Government agencies in Haiti
with unclear terms of reference, and often without appropriate
country clearance by the embassy. Some agencies with disaster
and emergency healthcare expertise in the U.S. but little prior
international humanitarian experience (such as FEMA and certain
departments within HHS) experienced operational problems and
therefore were not maximally utilized. U.S. Government technical
agencies with a narrow disciplinary focus and prior international
experience (such as the CDC, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)
and FFP) had fewer operational issues, were better organized,
and had fewer complaints about how activities and events
unfolded.
Transitioning from relief to long-term reconstruction and
development was initially manifest (in March 2010) through
funding for transitional programs such as cash-for-work
and government support programs. In addition, DOS and
USAID collaborated with the Government of Haiti and other
multi-lateral donors to develop the National Action Plan for
Reconstruction and Development in Haiti.The U.S. worked
closely with the Government of Haiti to establish the Interim
Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) and the Bureau for the
Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).While
the U.S. Embassy and USAID managed the implementation and
execution of these programs,Washington-based policymakers
also provided strategic planning and technical assistance.
U.S. Government agency operations in Haiti were compromised
by rapid staff turnover and multiple waves of staff deployment.
One such example is OFDA, whose staff resources were
stretched to the limit.While widely recognized as highly
competent technically, the depth of the OFDA Disaster
Assistance Response Team (DART) in terms of staffing could not
cope with the demands that were placed on it for assessment,
grant making, civil-military coordination, donor coordination,
reporting, information management, and transitional planning.
Initially, the major US-funded NGOs that were already present
in Haiti took important action independently, which was critical
during the first week of the response when no coordination
mechanisms were functioning.The creative and dynamic response
of the NGOs was fully supported by the USAID and OFDA staff
in country, which rapidly approved changes in the scopes of work
for their NGO partners, allowing for resources to be re-directed
to meet the new needs of their beneficiaries. Following the first
week of the response, the NGOs were coordinated through the
UN cluster system, in which the U.S. Government participated.
The Haiti emergency has demonstrated that there is a need in
USAID to improve the quality and rapidity of disaster response
but also to invest in overall strategic planning. In that context,
a detailed review of USAID’s strengths and weaknesses can
identify cost-effective areas within the Agency that best respond
to its mission of development and humanitarian aid.Additionally,
existing agreements may be broadened with Departments, such
as DOD, whose resources are complementary to that of USAID,
to further rationalize costs as long as these services are less
expensive than those available commercially. USAID should focus
on strengthening its own unique expertise and most importantly,
develop its strategy to fulfill the mandate as a lead agency in
disaster relief and development.
USG Information and Data
Management Systems
During the Haiti response, limitations related to information
management followed two major lines. First, there were limited
data available for tactical and operational decisions; and second,
there were overwhelming requests for data and information
from policy leaders in Washington that made systematic data
collection more difficult.These demands were often driven by
reports in the media. Some recognized that the former (limited
availability of operational data) led to the latter because policy
leaders, the Congress, and the White House all had important
information needs.The latter (frequent requests for information)
detracted from the on-ground response because of the need to
constantly answer questions and “chase down” facts.
The U.S. Government did attempt to coordinate data and
information sharing across the interagency; however, due to the
massive quantity of the data collected by the military, NGOs,
UN, USAID, international donors, and even private citizens, the
creation of a common operating picture for the overall response
coordination was practically impossible to achieve.The main
impediment to establishing an effective common operating
picture was not the amount of data available, but rather the
quality of the data. Since multiple U.S. agencies worked in parallel

to conduct needs assessments and report responses, a number
of different data sets of varying data quality were created.As
a result, there was great difficulty in sharing and standardizing
information.An effective central data management system was
clearly lacking in the response.
Indeed, post-disaster surveys produced unusable results due
to quickly planned surveys and the absence of standardized
data collection methods. Planning of surveys is often done
precipitously, paying little attention to details that are of great
importance to overall data quality.When survey planning is
poorly done, it requires more time to clean the data, which can
impact the quality of the results and cause delays in releasing
the findings. Delays in the release of reports reduce the value
of the survey as data becomes out of date. One clear example
of this from the earthquake response is Rapid Interagency
Needs Assessment in Haiti (RINAH).While the assessment was
conducted from 23 January to 6 February, logistical, security, and
methodological concerns delayed the publication of the report
over one month.
Overarching Recommendations
The following are seven key recommendations drawn on overall
analyses:
1. Structural strengthening of USAID/OFDA as lead federal agency for
international disaster response
USAID should be empowered to lead international disaster
response effectively.There is a need to strengthen USAID’s
institutional structures, increase its staff size and capacity,
broaden its interagency agreements at higher levels, and upgrade
its technological systems.All federal agencies and departments
should adhere to the USAID command and control structures,
if the President appoints USAID as the lead agency. These
measures will enable improvement of USAID/OFDA’s capability
to perform in catastrophes and build its capacity to coordinate
partners in an interagency response.A “whole of government”
approach should not be used in future international disaster
response until a framework is created to manage the full
engagement of the U.S. Government. USAID, as an agency, is best
placed to lead development and humanitarian crisis response,
both of which should be expertise-led initiatives. Indeed, USAID
should continue to take the lead in international disaster
response, but its capacity to respond should be strengthened
and enhanced, and the agency should be given additional political
support to respond.This includes, but is not limited to, the ability
to determine the need for and the deployment of additional
federal resources during an international disaster response.
Strengthening the disaster response expertise and capacity of the
local Mission is essential, especially in disaster-prone countries.
The USAID Mission in the country, under Chief of Mission
Authority and guidance, should head coordination among U.S.
agencies and the host country and with other non-U.S. donors
and players in the response. USAID should expand its official
staff to levels that are appropriate to its mandate of operations.
Reinforcing the USAID Mission staff directly, rather than
setting up new structures such as the Office of the Response
Coordinator, may prove to be a better solution. Other services
of USAID should be able to support the extraordinary needs of
OFDA when necessary, by providing short-term staff who are
trained for action in humanitarian crises. In the same vein, USAID
should reduce its reliance on outside contractors and expand
its staff levels to improve its effectiveness. In addition, USAID’s
budget autonomy will enable rapid action and organization of
its resources for more efficient relief/development.All of this
points to the creation of a special entity within the USAID
Mission to help coordinate and manage the response, rather
than establishing parallel structures with repetitive roles,
responsibilities, and reporting structures.
Agency-wide strengthening of USAID is a short-term goal that
is more tangible than other recommendations, such as the
development of an international response framework.As such,
this recommendation should not be overlooked.
2. Bridging the divide between diplomatic response and humanitarian
relief
Most international disasters involve elements of diplomacy,
emergency relief, and development; Haiti was no exception. DOS
primarily covers the diplomatic and foreign relations side of
disaster response, as well as American Citizen repatriation, while
USAID is responsible for the immediate relief, rehabilitation, and
long-term development actions needed in-country. Both agencies
have established protocols and procedures for disaster response
and in some areas, these procedures overlap. Given the scope
and scale of the response in Haiti, there was confusion between
DOS and USAID at times about which agency was in charge of
which components of the response.While USAID was appointed
as lead federal agency in the response, many decisions were in
fact made by senior DOS officials.

Therefore, there is a need to clearly separate and delineate the
functions of DOS and USAID for future large-scale disaster
responses. Mechanisms to strengthen the coordination and
collaboration between the political/diplomatic service and
those of the humanitarian and development agencies need to
be fostered.This will improve the understanding and coherence
to meet both the short-term emergency response and the
longer-term development aims in the affected country.These
mechanisms should be made permanent so that diplomatic and
development services can be mutually beneficial for all future
disaster responses. S/CRS is a relatively new entity that has
potential to bridge the span between DOS and USAID. S/CRS
should be reviewed by both DOS and USAID to determine
whether it can serve as a platform to begin working towards
improving coordination among the political/diplomatic and
humanitarian/development arms of the U.S. Government in the
area of large-scale international disaster response. Should it be
determined that S/CRS is not the appropriate vehicle to achieve
increased interagency coordination between DOS and USAID,
then the two agencies need to work together to establish a
mechanism or set of procedures to accomplish this necessary
measure.
3. Convene an interagency committee on global humanitarian crises
coordinated by the NSC for “whole of government” response situations
When responding to catastrophes, high-level leadership is
needed to coordinate response across the U.S. Government.
We recommend the creation of an interagency committee on
global humanitarian crises, led by the National Security Council
Staff, to coordinate response to catastrophes such as the Haiti
earthquake.Transparent criteria that define “extraordinary
circumstances” or “catastrophes” should be prescribed.The
committee would set priorities and call upon specialists from
U.S. Government agencies and other institutions (such as
universities and technical institutes) in order to coordinate
humanitarian policy across the executive branch.This will ensure
a unified approach amongst the diverse agencies.The USAID
Administrator should be a member of this NSC-led committee.
This committee should focus on making policy- and strategy-
related decisions, rather than providing operational and technical
guidance, in order to ensure it does not interfere with daily field
operations.
4. Strengthening of an International Response Framework
In the case of Haiti, the existing inter-service agreements and
protocols between different departments and specialized
technical agencies were not sufficiently clear and comprehensive
to manage a “whole of government” response.The weaknesses
of the protocols and agreements, whether related to staff
exchanges, budgetary responsibilities or operating procedures,
significantly compromised the efficiency of the whole operation
and created tensions between groups who were all prepared to
do their best within their own frame of reference.
The difficulties in the management of the response in Haiti
revealed the need for a detailed management framework which
defines responsibility, the command and control hierarchy,
and reporting relationships, especially addressing the rapid
mobilization of U.S. Government staff, specialized capabilities, and
assets that can be utilized to their maximum effectiveness in the
most efficient manner.
Existing framework agreements, liaison structures, budgetary
provisions, staff deployments, and other key components should
be reviewed in depth and a reformed management structure
should be established for future “whole of government”
responses.A well thought out, detailed management framework
for international disasters which draws upon wide-ranging
experience and expertise will not only help USAID to
coordinate federal interagency participation in overseas disaster
relief response, it will set out the structures, guidelines, and roles
for all other actors for a “whole of government” response, where
coordination and policy guidance will need to ramp up to larger
scales and more wide-ranging areas compared to a standard
large-scale disaster.The framework should develop a unified
command structure, designate roles, and be scalable, flexible,
and adaptable. It should reinforce the existing U.S. Embassy,
USAID Mission, and USAID/OFDA structures in addition to
strengthening and modernizing pre-existing agreements between
agencies. Most importantly, the framework should address
issues related to the mobilization of resources, the upgrading of
information systems and communications, and the establishment
of common terminology throughout agencies, reporting, and
management.The National Response Framework (NRF) used
for domestic disaster response could be a fruitful starting
point for the development of an international framework. It is
a framework that has been developed over years and tested on
the ground and provides effective functional guidance.The NRF
also has a permanent team which re-evaluates its relevance and

keeps it updated continuously.This constant update and review
function is key for effective action frameworks of this type and,
thus, our recommendation would also include dedicated staff
to ensure such a framework represents the latest available
information and incorporates all recent institutional changes. In
Annex 10.4, we suggest possible components of an International
Response Framework (IRF) that could be used to manage all U.S.
Government foreign disaster response.
Finally, we would like to underline that while the IRF may
solve some of the problems of interagency management and
coordination, it should not be seen as a solution for USAID’s
capacity to respond when staffing in the field and in Washington,
DC is insufficient to meet the ever increasing demands.
5. Civil-military collaboration in humanitarian crises
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HADR) has evolved
as an important mission of the DOD.“The Department of
Defense should be prepared to lead stability operations
activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore
essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and
deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible
to transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government
agencies.”1
This requires improving the DOD’s capacity and
expertise to meet this mission. Integrating the U.S. military into
humanitarian response activities is both important and complex.
Military activities can best focus on humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief such as logistics, assessment, security, and, in
limited areas, the direct provision of humanitarian assistance
when no other option is available, such as local government
agencies, NGOs, or private sector providers. However, this
scenario is extremely rare and, hence, the use of DOD
capabilities for direct humanitarian assistance needs to be better
controlled and monitored by civilian authorities.
While the military has task-specific resources for disaster
response that are unmatched, its role in humanitarian response
is controversial. In contrast to its logistical expertise, the military
has limited experience in delivering humanitarian aid, and it is
a costly alternative to other response organizations. Military
leaders felt that better policy guidance from Washington may
have limited the military response, which was broader than
anticipated.We recommend that a careful review of the role of
the military in disaster response be conducted.This will enable
more specific policies and guidance to be created that will
prescribe specific activities for the U.S. military.
In order to maximize the benefit of military involvement in
HADR operations, the mandate and role of the military should
be clearly defined by policymakers before deployment, to
delineate an exit strategy with condition-based end points.
As disaster response is an internationally managed event, such
policies must take into account these pre-existing structures.
Military activities should focus on HADR such as on logistics,
assessment, and security, but not the direct provision of
humanitarian assistance.There also needs to be closer
collaboration with the NGO and international communities.All
of this should be done as early as possible to avoid potential
for over-utilization of U.S. military assets and dominance over
humanitarian operations in the field.
To meet its important HADR mission in supporting civilian-led
humanitarian responses, the military should retain institutional
knowledge and expertise.The DOD should continue to
support their “HADR Center of Excellence” and create HADR
career paths that allow for personnel to develop and maintain
appropriate knowledge and skills.There is also a need to create
HADR-related training programs for staff and leadership for
both long-term development and “just-in-time” deployments.
6. Monitoring quality of aid and its impact
Data collection and information management in Haiti was
complicated, difficult, and limited.This led to policy-level
decisions that were often driven by media reports rather than
tactical and strategic information from the field.Also, it prevented
the assessment of the overall quality and efficiency of the U.S.
response.
From within the DART, dedicated staff should be deployed
exclusively to collect, centralize, validate, and report findings to
partners and authorities as appropriate. Specific methods and
standard reports should be developed to meet the operational
needs of the on-ground response, as well as the strategic
needs of Washington and the media.This information should
be systematically shared between U.S. Government agencies
in the field and in Washington. In addition, NGOs receiving
U.S. Government funds through OFDA’s granting process
should be required to conduct assessments using standard
1
Department of Defense. 2009. DODI 3000.05. 16 September.

reporting methods and forms. Finally, internationally agreed upon
guidelines (e.g. sample questionnaires, indicators, methodology,
and reporting templates) for rapid needs assessments should
be developed.All donors should agree on this approach and
avoid funding fragmented initiatives that compromise the
overall process, raise expectations, and frustrate beneficiaries.
Tools for rapid evaluation of impact of relief aid on the victims
should be developed to ensure effectiveness of aid and correct
targeting. Ultimately, such tools will enhance the quality and
effectiveness of U.S. Government aid, as well as produce robust
and relevant data for planning and management.The Interagency
Needs Assessment Task Force is a good start to this endeavor
and should include technical institutions, as well as the UN and
NGOs.
An effective common shared information portal is needed
to establish situational awareness among all responding
organizations and governments. Information managers and
specialists should be assigned to manage these websites.Their
responsibilities should include verifying the validity and reliability
of the data before uploading it onto the site. It is better to
have several high-quality reports and datasets than to have vast
amounts of questionable information.
7. Deployment of USG assets to international disasters
Deployment of relief resources to an international disaster
location without requests from the host government, the
UN system, and/or the U.S. Embassy is generally unadvisable.
However, there are catastrophic events that can incapacitate one
or more of these structures, making it necessary to deploy relief
supplies to the country without the benefit of rapid assessments
or specified needs.The earthquake in Haiti demonstrated the
need for immediate response without adequate ground-sourced
information on which to base the amount and type of resources
required to meet the immense demand for assistance.
In these rare cases, the U.S. Government must respond as
quickly and effectively as possible. However, efficiency is also
a key element in disaster response, especially so as to avoid
logistical bottlenecks and ensure that the maximum utility of
relief supplies and manpower are able to be used immediately in
country.“More” does not necessarily mean “better” in disaster
response. Sequencing of the shipment, delivery, and utilization of
relief supplies and personnel must be done in a rational manner.
The chaotic nature of the response in Haiti exemplifies the need
to include efficiency in the planning and execution of large-scale
disaster responses by the U.S. Government.
In order to achieve increased effectiveness and maximize
efficiency in future large-scale disaster responses, USAID and
the DOS need to develop a menu of packages available from
the DOD, since it is primarily the DOD which has the unique
capabilities of lift, logistics, manpower, technical assets, and
equipment needed to respond to catastrophic emergency
situations within 24 hours.This menu would include engineering
packages, medical packages, security packages, assessment
packages, logistics packages, and intelligence packages, among
others. Each package would be scalable with built-in flexibility,
depending on the magnitude and complexities of the disaster.
Depending on current needs of the U.S. military to conduct its
on-going war operations, the use of military resources for HADR
operations would have to take into account force readiness and
military demands in its conflict theaters.
Similarly, other federal agencies that have special capacities
for response in international disasters could design packages
to be used in response.These measures could be directed by
USAID and DOS, in concert with each federal agency and the
DOD. It would serve as a precursor to the IRF and help in its
development, since it is a necessary step regardless of whether
the IRF moves forward or not.
All packages would be designed by experts in international
disaster response together with key staff from each agency so as
to avoid any unnecessary components and ensure each package
contains adequate types of resources.
Based on the vast experience of the combined staff at USAID,
the DOS, and the DOD, an essential set of packages could
be identified for immediate response needs in catastrophic
situations.There is sufficient evidence from past emergencies to
identify a minimum package of services, assets, and supplies that
should be mobilized in response to large-scale disasters.These
could be tailored for different types of natural disasters and
mobilized rapidly without the need for assessments so that the
initial response is conducted within hours of the emergency and
supplies can reach the disaster site as quickly as possible.
Knowledge of the assistance packages in advance will assist the
U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission in the field to plan for the
arrival and distribution of relief supplies and personnel. Once
the initial packages are in place, additional resources can be
requested as required, following rapid assessments.

2. Introduction
The 7.0 magnitude earthquake that struck Port-au-Prince, Haiti
at 1653 on 12 January 2010 was the worst natural disaster in
the country’s history.As the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC) reports,“the underlying poverty and vulnerability
across Haiti renders the qualification of ‘directly affected by the
earthquake’ somewhat irrelevant in any case, considering that
everyone in the country has been affected in some way.” The
earthquake affected almost all areas of Haiti, with 1.5 million
displaced, 230,000 killed and 300,000 injured.2 3
The earthquake
collapsed buildings throughout Port-au-Prince and surrounding
areas. Over 60% of the government infrastructure was destroyed,
including 28 of 29 Ministry headquarters.An estimated 97,000
dwellings were destroyed and 188,000 buildings were
damaged.4 5
Based on data compiled by the Inter-American
Development Bank (Figure 1), the earthquake in Haiti was the
deadliest natural disaster in history, causing the greatest number
of deaths on a per capita basis. It was also the most devastating
economically, with damages of up to 117% of Haiti’s annual GDP.
It is estimated that reconstruction will cost about $11.5 billion.6
The U.S. established its presence in Haiti immediately, with the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S.Agency for International
Development Disaster Assistance Response Team (OFDA
DART) arriving within 24 hours and the U.S. military securing
the airport by 14 January. Other countries and international
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) quickly followed suit
(see Figures 2 and 3 for a detailed timeline of the response).
This disaster presents a unique opportunity to rebuild improved
Haitian systems and to improve living conditions in Haiti.As such,
reconstruction and rebuilding should be planned and carried
out carefully in order to ensure that the needs of the host
community are met and that social tensions are not created
between recipients of humanitarian assistance and Haitians still
lacking access to basic services.This report will be important
for guiding forthcoming U.S. actions in Haiti and future U.S.
government responses to foreign disasters.
2
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. 2010. Haiti Earthquake Response: Context Analysis. July.
3
USAID/DCHA. 2010. Haiti Earthquake Fact Sheet #57. 4 June.
4
Joint Center for Operational Analysis. 2010. Operation Unified Response: Haiti Earthquake Response. May.
5
FEMA. 2010. Haiti Earthquake Response: Quick Look Report. 3 June.
6
Cavallo, E., Powell,A. and Becerra, O. 2010.”Estimating the Direct Economic Damage of the Earthquake in Haiti.” Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series
No.163. February.
Figure 1: Deadliest Natural Disasters since 1979 (Source: IDBWorking Paper Series No. IDB-WP-163)

Haiti
Haiti has existed in a state of chronic, low-level disaster for the
past 30 years. Geographically, it is located in a disaster-prone
area, especially vulnerable to hurricanes. In 2008, Haiti was
struck by four severe hurricanes in a little over a month. Haiti
is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere; 75% of the
population survives on less than $2 per day.7
Since 1982, the
population of Port-au-Prince has expanded by 42%8
, reaching an
estimated 3 to 3.5 million inhabitants.9
Before the earthquake,
more than 85% of the urban population was living in slums.10
Its
public infrastructure was in terrible condition, lacking adequate
hospitals, schools, roads, electricity, and water for its citizens.
Roughly 40% of the population in Haiti did not have access to
health care. In 2006, 42% of the population lacked access to safe
water and 81% did not have access to adequate sanitation.11
More than 2.4 million people were food-insecure.12
Many
important public services, such as education, sanitation, and
health care, were run by subsidized private sector institutions
or non-governmental organizations, funded through years of
international donor programs that further marginalized the
role of the government.As a result, the government was in a
weakened state when the earthquake struck, lacking the means
to respond effectively on its own. Following the removal of
President Aristide, in 2004 the United Nations established
MINUSTAH as a peacekeeping force to support the government
and provide for civil protection and stability.13
The loss of senior
UN staff crippled its ability to respond quickly and left the
government without its key technical and financial partner.
U.S. Government
Hours after the earthquake struck Haiti, President Obama
pledged full support to the country and called for a swift and
coordinated response to the disaster.This led to a “whole of
government” response for the first time in an international
emergency. More than 12 major federal agencies were mobilized
and sent staff and resources to Haiti within the first week.The
U.S. Government thus became one of the first responders to
the disaster in Haiti and has had the largest presence there of
any country in the world.The U.S. Government has contributed
the largest amount of funding to Haiti (see Figure 21, Section 7),
totaling over $1.1 billion in humanitarian funding. Most of the
funding has been channeled through USAID and the Department
of Defense (DOD). USAID has coordinated the humanitarian
response, provided immediate relief through grants to non-
governmental organizations and worked toward developing long-
term strategies for reconstruction and recovery. Department
of State (DOS) maintained strong diplomatic ties to Haiti and
directed foreign policy. DOD launched Operation Unified
Response (OUR) and deployed Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-Haiti)
to restore operations at the port and airfield, assist in debris
removal, coordinate patient care aboard the USNS Comfort
and USS CarlVinson, provide general security for humanitarian
activities, assist in engineering projects, and assist in the
evacuation of U.S. citizens to the United States.The dedication of
all those that responded, their unrelenting commitment to saving
lives and helping the Haitian people, and the cooperation and
creative problem-solving to reach these ends was widespread.
The disaster in Haiti was unique. In the majority of these
cases, the host government and UN will take the lead role in
the response. However, for many reasons, the disaster in Haiti
required a more robust response from the U.S. Government. In
that context, it is important for the U.S. Government to address
policy questions that are germane to these types of emergencies,
including:
(1) Strengthening the capacity of the U.S. Government,
through the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA), to respond to international disasters;
(2) Translating the concept of “whole of government”
response to better manage the U.S. Government response
to international catastrophes;
(3) Clearly identifying the role of foreign policy in international
disaster response for both humanitarian assistance
and long-term strategic and structural support to foreign
governments; and
(4) Better defining the role of the U.S. military in responding
to international humanitarian crises and the provision of
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
7
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. 2010. Haiti Earthquake Response: Context Analysis. July. London.
8
We have calculated an increase in population size based on Port-au-Prince census information in 1982 and 2009. Calculation: (1,551,792/3,664,620)*100=42%
9
Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d’Informatique. 2010.“Haiti: Departments, Major Cities,Towns & Agglomerations.” City Population Website. Last modified March 15, 2010.
Available from: http://www.citypopulation.de/Haiti.html.Accessed on 15 September 2010.
10
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. 2010. Haiti Earthquake Response: Context Analysis. July. London.
11
PAHO. 2010. Haiti: Population Health Assessment prior to the 2010 earthquake. 21 January.
12
WFP. 2010.“Haiti Overview.” World Food Programme Website.Available from: http://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti.Accessed on 20 September 2010.
13
MINUSTAH.“Restoring a secure and stable environment.” United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti Website. Available from: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/
minustah/.Accessed on 20 September 2010.

Figure 2:Timeline of Events

Study Methodology and Objectives
This review was undertaken by a group of independent experts
to draw lessons from the U.S. Government experience in Haiti
and recommend strategies that would strengthen a future
response of the U.S. Government to humanitarian crises
overseas.The methodology for preparing this review was based
on information regarding the humanitarian action in Haiti, drawn
from multiple primary and secondary sources.This included: (1)
facilitation of the Haiti Earthquake Interagency Lessons Learned
Workshop with over 130 participants; (2) 163 key informant
interviews including representatives from the U.S. Government,
Government of Haiti, U.S. military, UN, NGOs, and other
multilateral donors;14
(3) literature review and desk-top research
of 279 documents;15
(4) 14 focus group discussions; (5) site visits
to the UN Headquarters in NewYork, Joint Force Command
(JFCOM) inVirginia, a Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in
Miami, and Port-au-Prince, Haiti; and (6) qualitative analysis.The
period covered by this report is from the date of the event, 12
January, through 30 June 2010. Data and information that relates
to events after this period are not included in this report, even
if they are now available. For the detailed scope of work, please
see Annex 10.7.
An Executive Dinner was organized by the USAID Administrator
to convene a meeting of the key deputies from the interagency
to discuss the major accomplishments and challenges of the
response. Participants included senior representatives from
USAID, the Department of State, the Department of Defense,
and the National Security Council (NSC).The Executive Dinner
provided an informal venue where senior policymakers and
leaders of the response could talk openly to raise important
issues for the forthcoming report.The Haiti After Action team
was invited to participate in the Executive Dinner and give a brief
Figure 3: Summarized timeline of humanitarian action in Haiti (Source:Adapted from Grunewald and Renaudin 2010)
14
Please see Annex 10.2 for a complete list of key informants.
15
Please see Annex 10.3 for a list of documents reviewed.

presentation of the major findings and recommendations to date.
The discussion allowed for the team to gain clearer insight into
the high-level policy issues and political decisions that were made
during the response.The team was impressed with the frankness
of the discussion and the transparency with which the deputies
spoke of the challenges faced by their respective agencies.
In order to prepare for the interagency Haiti After Action review,
USAID organized a technical support group (TSG) comprised
of representatives from multiple USAID bureaus, DOD, and the
Department of State.The TSG was instrumental in elaborating
the Scope of Work for the After Action Review as well as
providing clear guidance to the research team throughout the
process of the review.
The subject of the study was to review coordination within
the U.S. Government, as well as examine coordination between
the U.S. and international community, in its response to the
earthquake near Léogâne, Haiti.There were three principal
objectives to this effort, each with corresponding key questions:
1. Internal U.S. Government coordination: How well
did U.S. Government agencies coordinate with each
other in providing policy guidance and in
implementing the relief response?
2. Partner coordination: How well did U.S. Government
elements coordinate with the GOH, the UN family of
agencies, the NGO community, and other donors?
3. Response effectiveness: How well did the response
meet the needs of the Haitian people? Was it
conducted in accordance with international standards?
The report is organized by thematic areas, each consisting of
a description of an action followed by analysis (findings) and
recommendations specific to that theme.The report concludes
with a chapter on the overarching recommendations, which are
the key conclusions of the report.
Innovations in the Haiti Response
The response to the earthquake in Haiti introduced several
innovations with implications for future humanitarian responses.
These include new management paradigms, new strategic
planning processes, new operational mechanisms to coordinate
civilian-military activities, and new and emerging information and
communication technologies.As with most innovations, these
had both positive and negative effects on the response.
The “whole of government” response marked the first time
when many federal agencies were mobilized to assist in an
international humanitarian emergency.This led to a complex new
managerial environment for the lead federal agency and brought
new resources to the humanitarian response that had not
been used previously, creating opportunities for both increased
assistance and decreased efficiency.
Both military and civilians introduced new operational
mechanisms to improve coordination.The early decision by the
U.S. military to use unclassified communications systems for all
humanitarian action allowed a more unified response among
the UN, NGOs, and military units working in the field. Military-
civilian coordinating bodies such as the Joint Operations Tasking
Center (JOTC) and Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating
Cell (HACC) were used by NGOs, UN agencies, GOH, and
U.S. agencies to coordinate with the military in the delivery
of assistance so that services were matched with needs in a
timely manner. Management structures such as the Office of the
Response Coordinator (ORC) and Haiti Task Team (HTT) served
an important role in the coordination of the Haiti response.
New information technologies were tried in Haiti, with varying
degrees of success.The Department of State created the site
Wehaveweneed.org in order to coordinate donations and
identify specific needs.According to the DOS, the response
in Haiti witnessed “the emergence of a new humanitarian
information environment: one with unprecedented availability
of raw data in all forms, the growing usage of new information
communication technology (ICT), and the emergence of … a
new group (ICTVolunteers) comprised of virtually-connected
academics, humanitarians, corporate foundations and ICT
professionals… enormous amounts of digital information [were]
made available on a variety of web portals, platforms, and new
social networking media, such as Short Message Service (SMS)
feeds,Twitter, [and] Facebook.”16
U.S. SOUTHCOM quickly mobilized and developed a Haiti
page on the All Partners Access Network (APAN), a platform
developed originally by U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) to share
16
US Department of State Humanitarian Information Unit. 2010.“Haiti Earthquake: Breaking New Ground in the Humanitarian Information Landscape” White Paper. July.

unclassified information and enhance the common operational
picture.The UN set up a similar site,“OneResponse,” and several
UN clusters set up Google Groups to facilitate information
sharing, collaboration, and coordination.The American Red
Cross created the Haiti Text Campaign that allowed people to
contribute small donations through their cell phone providers.
Ushahidi provided crisis mapping to relief efforts, which
allowed people on the ground to report emergencies and
missing persons after the disaster.17
Columbia University and
the Karolinska Institute of Sweden analyzed the locations of
all mobile phones in Haiti before and after the earthquake to
track migration patterns of displaced persons, introducing a new
technique in population and migration research.18
The role of these new information communication technologies
in improving the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance is yet to
be determined.There are still many needs to strengthen existing
data management systems so that the results of humanitarian
assistance programming can be better measured and responses
better managed.
17
http://haiti.ushahidi.com/
18
Bengtsson, Linus, et al. 2010. Internal Population Displacement in Haiti: Preliminary analyses of movement patterns of Digicel mobile phones: 1 January to 11 March 2010. 14 May.
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-85TS4Z-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf. Accessed on 9 September 2010.

3. Quality of Response
3.1 USAR Results
As with any disaster, search and rescue efforts by the local
population—who usually make more than 95% of live rescues—
began the moment of the earthquake. International urban search
and rescue (USAR) teams rapidly deployed to Haiti to assist in
these efforts.
The U.S. Government deployed a total of six USAR teams to
Haiti.19
On 13 January, the first team arrived in country, and by
16 January, all teams had arrived, bringing the total number of
USAR members to 511 individuals. USAID/OFDA contributed
more than $35 million towards USAR efforts in Haiti.20
Two
international teams were deployed by USAID (Fairfax County
and Los Angeles County) and four domestic teams were
deployed by FEMA.21 22
There were 47 live rescues by American
USAR teams.
International USAR teams also deployed from Iceland, Chile,
Spain, France, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and China.23
In total, 43 international USAR teams deployed to Haiti and
rescued 136 individuals. 24 25
On 26 January, the GOH called off
search and rescue efforts and all major USAR teams departed
Haiti.26
On 30 January, a rapid response USAR team, deployed by USAID,
was on standby in Haiti to provide further assistance if needed.27
In addition to search and rescue efforts, the USAR teams
conducted building assessments to evaluate structural integrity
and donated materials to two orphanages in Port-au-Prince.28
3.2 PotableWater
Prior to the earthquake, Haitians had very limited access to safe
drinking water, with less than half of Port-au-Prince’s population
having access to tap water.29
Many people sought water from
springs, rivers, and wells which were contaminated with
microorganisms, leading to diarrhea, dysentery, and hepatitis.The
Pan American Health Organizations (PAHO) listed water-borne
diseases as one of the leading causes of death in Haiti.30
Following the earthquake, access to potable water was one of
the top priorities of the international community’s response
efforts.The Water and Sanitation (WASH) cluster worked
quickly to coordinate water trucks, provide water bladders, and
restore Port-au-Prince’s water system. Over the objections of
some experts, the DOD transported more than 1,000 pallets
of bottled water to Haiti.31
By the beginning of February, Port-
au-Prince’s municipal water authority was producing more
water than before the earthquake due to improved fuel access.
Pre-earthquake water production averaged 80 to 90 million
liters per day; a month into the response, water production had
increased to between 120 and 150 million liters per day.32
By the
end of April, 1.3 million people were receiving treated water.33
Also, water delivery extended to locations out in Léogâne, Petit
Goâve, Grand Goâve, and Jacmel. Overall, providing access to
clean water went well and prevented countless deaths.
19
Ibid.
20
USAID. 2010. Draft USG Earthquake Response Report. May.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
USAID/OFDA. 2010.“USAID Haiti EarthquakeTaskforce (SBU) Situations Report #2.” US Government Internal Situation Report. 14 January, 1800 Hours EST.
24
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti-Earthquake. Fact Sheet: 5; 17 January.
25
USAID/Haiti. 2010. Success Story: USAID Supports Urban Search and Rescue Operations in Haiti.
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/haiti/template/files/usar_success_story.pdf.Accessed on 15 September 2010.
26
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti-Earthquake. Fact Sheet: 14; 26 January.
27
USAID/OFDA. 2010.“USAID Haiti EarthquakeTaskforce (SBU) Situations Report #36.” US Government Internal Situation Report. 31 January. 0400 EST.
28
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti-Earthquake. Fact Sheet: 26; 7 February.
29
Desvarieux, Jessica. 2010.“Drinking Water Flows More Freely for Haitians.” Time. 12 July. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2003216,00.html.Accessed on 16
September 2010.
30
PAHO.“Haiti: Health Situation Analysis andTrends Summary.” PAHO Website. http://www.paho.org/english/dd/ais/cp_332.htm.Accessed on 16 September 2010.
31
U.S. Southcom. Southcom Haiti Reflections. 31 March 2010.
32
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti Earthquake: Fact Sheet: 39; 23 February.
33
USAID. 2010. Haiti Relief and Recovery: Office of the Response Coordinator Weekly Slide Update. 4 May.

3.3 Nutrition
Many humanitarian organizations were involved in providing
nutrition services to Haitians affected by the earthquake.These
activities have aimed at both preventing and treating malnutrition.
The World Food Programme (WFP), a U.S. Government partner,
immediately began food distribution around Port-au-Prince,
although it took a while for a fixed-point food-distribution
system to be implemented. Blanket supplementary feedings were
provided to children under five and to pregnant or lactating
women. 34
According to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee,
over 500,000 children aged 6-59 months and pregnant and
lactating women received supplementary feedings, 3,000 babies
received ready-to-use infant formula, and about 2,000 severely
malnourished children were treated.35
Different data sources
show that estimates of supplementary feeding coverage vary
from 52%36
to 87%37
of the targeted population. USAID and
other American NGOs, including Save the Children U.S., were
part of the Nutrition Cluster and were therefore intimately
involved in policy and program development and implementation
of feeding programs.
Aire Métropolitaine 0.56* 5.00*
(Port-au-Prince)
1.8 4.9 0.20 3.90
0.54** 3.22**
Ouest (sans aire metro.) 2.3 6.9 0.30 4.00
0.75* 3.01*
0.47** 2.64**
Sud-Est 1.5 5.1 1.10 5.00 -- --
Nord 1.1 7.8 0.30 4.00 -- --
Nord-Est 1.4 7.0 0.30 2.80 -- --
Artibonite 3.1 18.0 0.40 4.30 0.86** 5.04**
Centre 2.0 7.6 2.20 4.70 -- --
Sud 4.4 12.1 0.00 4.30 -- --
Grande-Anse 1.0 7.5 1.90 5.70 -- --
Nord-Ouest 2.0 6.7 2.20 6.20 -- --
Nippes 0.8 8.5 0.40 3.10 -- --
By May, a total of five nutrition
assessments had been conducted
to identify and better respond to
needs. 38 39
These surveys, which
have been focused on children
living in spontaneous settlements
around Port-au-Prince and in the
ArtiboniteValley, have shown that
the nutrition status of children
remains under emergency
thresholds and close to pre-
earthquake levels, as seen in
Figure 4 below.
DEPARTMENT
2005-2006 DHS 2008-2009 ACF-IN 2010 Nutrition Cluster Survey

SAM GAM SAM GAM SAM GAM
Figure 4: Pre- and post-earthquake nutritional status of children in Haiti (based on NCHS 1977 standard)
*indicates measure for displaced population
**indicates measure for resident population
The grey shaded box represents measures for Léogâne, Petit and Grand Goâve, Cressier (which are all located in the West Department) and Jacmel (which is in the South Department)
Source: Guha-Sapir and DerSarkissian,Working Paper, 2010.
34
Inter-Agency Standing Committee. 2010. Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti: Following the 12 January 2010 Earthquake.
35
Ibid.
36
We have calculated a denominator using estimates from OCHA (12 April 2010 Sit Rep).We arrive at a total of 692,440 at-risk individuals, which includes children
under five and pregnant and lactating women. Calculation: 360,000/692440=.5199
37
WFP estimates of the situation 6 months after the earthquake were used. Calculation: 563,000/650.000=.8662
38
39
Sheltering Cluster. 2010. Sheltering Cluster Achievements. Port-au-Prince, June.

USAID has been extensively involved in developing infant and
young child feeding programs, especially for infants who lost their
mothers as a result of the earthquake. Such programs aim to
encourage changes in child feeding practices, as these changes
are necessary to address underlying causes of malnutrition in
Haiti.Activities have included promotion of breastfeeding as the
safest option for infants during an emergency and avoidance of
breast milk substitutes. However, U.S. Government-supported,
ready-to-use infant formula (RUIF) programs were also in
place for infants who could not be breastfed. In addition, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) collaborated with
the national government on a study regarding the use of RUIF
in emergencies; the results will be extremely useful for Haiti and
other disaster settings. 40
3.4 Health
Haiti’s health care system was in a fragile state long before the
earthquake struck, and health care facilities were ill equipped
to respond to a large-scale disaster.The health care sector was
completely devastated as a result of the earthquake. Not only
did the Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP)
building collapse, but 60% of hospitals in the Ouest, Sud-Est and
Nippes Departments were severely damaged and incapable of
providing needed services. Facilities that remained in operation
and, later, health clinics and hospitals set up by international aid,
became overwhelmed very quickly due to a lack of preparedness.
Figure 5 shows how post-disaster morbidity and mortality are
expected to evolve based on previous research.
Figure 5: Predicted patterns of post-disaster mortality and morbidity
(Source:Adapted from Grunewald and Renaudin 2010)
40
United Nations Children’s Fund. 2010. UNICEF Haiti Situation Report: 23 July 2010.Washington, July.

Medical care
In the critical first days following a disaster, local and national
resources respond to the need for emergency medical care
within the affected country. Haiti was unique because of its
already weak health infrastructure, the presence of so many
health care NGOs, and its proximity to the U.S.These factors
allowed for the rapid deployment of medical assets from the
United States.
The U.S. Government’s and the entire world’s responses
to providing medical care were extraordinary. Prior to the
earthquake, Haiti’s health care system barely reached 50% of the
population and the health indicators of the country were the
worst in the Western hemisphere. Much of the health care was
provided by NGOs who had been working in the country for
years.
With the earthquake, most of the already limited health
infrastructure of the country also collapsed.The Ministry of
Health (MOH) and many of the hospitals in Port-au-Prince
were destroyed. Hundreds of health care workers lost their
lives, including the entire nursing class at the University Hospital
when it collapsed during their exams.The limited remaining staff
struggled with the avalanche of an estimated 300,000 injured
people in a relatively small geographic area.
U.S. Government civilian agencies and military personnel
immediately provided emergency medical and health-related
assistance to Haiti. Local providers, international NGOs, and U.S.
and other government military assets initially provided medical
care, but were quickly overwhelmed.Additional medical assets
were moved into the area, including Disaster Medical Assistance
Teams (DMAT) from Health and Human Services (HHS) and
military medical assets, including the USNS Comfort, the USS
Bataan, and USS CarlVinson.The international community also
deployed field hospitals and medical specialty volunteers from
many nations, especially general and orthopedic surgeons who
responded in large numbers.With leadership from the U.S.
Government and the University of Miami, the MediShare hospital
was established at the Logistics Base.The USNS Comfort treated
over 800 patients during its seven-week stay off the Haitian
coast.41
This increased capacity helped to ease the burden on
overwhelmed medical systems.While this initial response was
important to save lives, the Haitian Government’s decision to
only allow the provision of free health care severely undermined
the ability of local providers to make a living and many left Port-
au-Prince and Haiti.
The deployment of many specialized and surgical assets led to
a number of amputations and complex operative procedures.
This created the problem of long-term care for post-operative
Haitians. Guidance as to the applicable standards of care and
processes for making decisions about standards of care was not
provided consistently to U.S. responders. Medical personnel
on the ground were not adequately prepared to practice in
accordance with local and catastrophic standards of care, and the
response lacked a unified approach with regard to the standard
of care provided. Prior to the earthquake, many of these specialty
services were not available to most Haitians, and the current
Haitian health system could not provide long-term wound and
fracture care.Also, many of the providers rapidly rotated out of
the country, so there was limited continuity of care.The GOH
Ministry of Social Affairs estimates that there are between
4,000-5,000 newly disabled people due to the earthquake.The
U.S. Government strategy specifically includes monitoring and
supporting rehabilitation and disability care for earthquake
trauma patients. Upon its arrival off the coast of Haiti on 20
January, the USNS Comfort quickly filled up with post-operative
patients and found that it was very difficult to repatriate them
back to the city, where the hospitals were still overwhelmed and
housing was not available.Within the first week or two after the
event, it became urgent to make resources available for complex
injuries because there was an implicit decision made about the
standard of care provided.Various solutions were tried within
Haiti, but because of a pre-existing lack of healthcare capacity,
there was limited success. Patients were transported to hospitals
in the U.S., plans were made for additional U.S. Government field
hospitals, and NGOs began providing these services.
A special representative for health care was sent to Haiti by
USAID.A committee was formed, led by Haitian personnel,
who included the special representative from USAID and
additional U.S. Government personnel, who spent a great deal
of time trying to arrange transport and long-term care for these
41
Huffington Post. 2010.“US Military Hospital Ship USNS Comfort Leaving Haiti.” 9 March.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/10/us-military-hospital-ship_n_492809.html.Accessed on 12 September 2010.

patients. Haitian hospitals, NGOs, the USNS Comfort, or other
facilities referred Haitian patients when they met criteria for
evacuation to the U.S.These evacuations were reserved for the
rare patients with life-threatening conditions that could not be
handled within Haiti or by evacuation to a nearby country.These
patients had to demonstrate a reasonable chance of survival for
the flight to the U.S. and for subsequent treatment in the United
States.The plans for a large Navy hospital were hotly debated
within the U.S. Government and were ultimately rejected.The
Governor of Florida made public statements about his concern
that hospitals in the state were filling with injured Haitians and
that the state could lose millions of dollars on uncompensated
care.As in a domestic disaster, HHS/National Disaster Medical
System (NDMS) was called on to establish a patient distribution
system and provide reimbursement to hospitals.
A major weakness in emergency health services provided to the
victims was the absence of data on acute surgical interventions,
which resulted in poor planning, especially of post-operative
care.Although some patient logs were maintained, no systematic
monitoring on a daily or weekly basis was undertaken to allow
for adequate follow-up. Many lessons on post-operative care
had been learned in previous earthquake catastrophes, but Haiti
experience shows that they are not always applied.
Public Health Activities
After the initial emergency health response, the humanitarian
community’s attention turned to addressing fundamental
health needs and conducting epidemiologic surveillance.
Since the majority of the population in Port-au-Prince was
displaced to overcrowded settlements, lived in extreme
poverty, and often lacked basic sanitation services, it faced the
increased risk of diseases affecting high-density populations,
as well as water-related vector-borne diseases such as acute
respiratory infections and dengue fever.The U.S. Government
and its partners provided technical support in planning and
managing an aggressive immunization program to control
disease in temporary settlement areas. In addition to the
successfully completed immunization program in these
temporary settlements, the CDC is now working closely with
PAHO and the Ministry of Health on a two-year strategy to
improve national coverage (both inside and outside temporary
settlements) to at least 80% for all six Expanded Program of
Immunization (EPI) antigens, as well as to introduce new EPI
antigens.This supported child survival program will also provide
resources for improved vaccine coverage.
Before the earthquake, Haiti did not have a surveillance system
that was capable of providing timely information on a wide range
of health conditions. In an effort to monitor disease trends
and detect outbreaks, Haiti’s Ministère de la Santé Publique et
de la Population, the Pan-American Health Organization, the
CDC, and other agencies launched two reportable surveillance
systems.These systems include an Internally Displaced Persons
Disease Surveillance System (IDPSS) and a National Sentinel
Site Surveillance (NSSS) System.The IDPSS works closely with
NGOs providing primary health care in camps, and the NSSS
is integrated into the health information system developed
across MOH care and treatment sites supported by the (U.S.)
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). 42 43
Data
collected between 25 January and 24 April 2010 demonstrated
that no major epidemics were detected during that time. Both
systems continue to collect information, and plans are underway
to transition both systems into the national Health Management
Information System.44
Mobile clinics are working to provide care
to persons in hard-to-reach areas and to collect information for
surveillance purposes.
Since the earthquake, the U.S. Government has collaborated
with the GOH and the MSPP in reconstructing the Haitian
health care system, particularly emphasizing the importance of
disaster preparedness, given the impact of hurricanes.Activities
to strengthen the health care system that began in collaboration
with the GOH prior to the earthquake will continue to
emphasize primary and secondary care.The country’s major
needs, however, are at the primary level of care.
A plan for setting up a Centralized Patient Record Centre for
hospitals and medical teams for high-trauma disasters should
be developed.This center should be capable of managing
patient data from all participating medical units and monitoring
availability of beds or facilities for post-operative care.The
system should incorporate all U.S. Government facilities and its
partner NGOs and open its facility to visiting medical teams.
A proposal for a joint effort with other donors through the
Interagency Standing Committee may be an effective strategy for
this collaboration.
42
CDC. 2010.“Rapid Establishment of an Internally Displaced Persons Disease Surveillance System After an Earthquake -- Haiti, 2010.” MMWR.
August 2010. 59 (30); 939-940.
43
CDC. 2010.“Launching a National Surveillance System After An Earthquake - - - Haiti, 2010”. MMWR. 6 August. 59(30); 933-938.
44
CDC. 2010.“Launching a National Surveillance System After An Earthquake - - - Haiti, 2010”. MMWR. 6 August. 59(30); 933-938.

3.5 Migration and Settlement
Approximately 1.6 million Haitians were displaced as a result
of the earthquake, triggering the creation of over 1,000
spontaneous settlement sites. Initially, there was a large-scale
migration of 661,000 individuals from Port-au-Prince and the
West Department when the government advised people to
seek refuge outside the city.The mass migration out of the
city relieved some over-crowding but put great pressure on
rural communities.The 1 February 2010 Settlement Strategy
addressed the need to develop alternative sites for growth
outside Port-au-Prince and relieve the burden placed on rural
communities.An estimated 30% of displaced people are
living with a host family. Figure 6 summarizes information
on sheltering.
Emergency shelters consist of tents, tarpaulins, and salvaged
materials that provide little protection against heavy rains and
hurricanes. In the first two months of the response, there were
277,000 tarps and more than 37,000 tents distributed.45
By 7
May, USAID/OFDA provided more than 22,400 rolls of plastic
sheeting to meet shelter needs, and by the beginning of June,
more than 1.3 million individuals had received two
plastic sheets. 46 47
As the response shifted from the emergency phase to the relief
and reconstruction phase, the types of shelters distributed
shifted from tents and tarpaulins to long-term transitional
shelters.Transitional shelters are more durable, as they have a
concrete foundation and a timber or steel frame, but take longer
to build.These shelters offer more privacy, space, and protection
than emergency shelters.The Shelter Cluster estimates that on
average, it reached 100,000 people per week during the first
four months of the response.As of 2 June, 96,504 transitional
shelters were funded, including 47,500 shelters funded by
USAID/OFDA.48
However, by the end of June, only 5,000, or
10.5%, of the USAID/OFDA funded shelters were actually
constructed. Much of the delay stems from the problem with
rubble removal and land rights issues, which serve as key barriers
to NGO-implemented shelter programs. By the end of June,
USAID/OFDA provided nearly $80 million to partners providing
transitional shelters and emergency shelter materials.49
Among
other non-food items being distributed are blankets, buckets/
jerry cans, hygiene kits, kitchen sets, mats, mosquito nets, and
rope.50
45
USAID/OFDA.“USAID Haiti EarthquakeTaskforce (SBU) Situations Report #72.” US Government Internal Situation Report. 17 March. 1730 Hours EST.
46
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti-Earthquake Fact Sheet: 53; 7 May.
47
Office of the Response Coordinator. 2010.“Weekly Slide Update: Phase II/III Analysis and Planning.” Haiti Relief and Recovery. 2 June.
48
Ibid.
49
USAID/OFDA. 2010. USAID/OFDA FiscalYear 2010 Shelter and Settlements Sector Activities in Haiti. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/
disaster_assistance/countries/haiti/template/files/haiti_shelter_programs_070110.pdf.Accessed on 10 September 2010.
50
Sheltering Cluster. 2010. Sheltering Cluster Achievements. Port-au-Prince. June.
INFORMATION FIGURES SOURCE
EQ affected Over 2 Million
population people affected GOH
Destroyed or
partially damaged 188,383 houses GOH
houses
212,482 buildings, including
Assessed 186,766 residences have been Ministry of
Buildings assessed by the Ministry of Public Works
Public Works. 49% (104,681) (UNOPS)
Green 27% (58,418)Yellow 23% 26 July
(49,383) Red
Displaced people
in settlement sites
1.5 Million people GOH
People migrating 661,000 people
from West (majority living with host families) GOH
Department
Spontaneous 1,368 sites DTM Analysis,
settlement sites 28 July
Sites registered: 373 across
Camp management affected area; Number of IOM 12 July
households:190,518
146 sites have now been
assessed for vulnerability
Camp assessment to storms and flooding. IOM 28 July
and mitigation The target is now 250. 71
have committed agencies
to carry out mitigation.

6,868 transitional shelters
Transitional constructed, housing more than Shelter
shelter 34,000 people.An additional Cluster 26
construction 16,100 transitional shelters July
are already in country.

Flash Appeal Financial
Funding 67% funded Tracking Service
(FTS)
Figure 6:Aftermath of the earthquake as of 30 July 2010
(Source: Haiti Humanitarian Bulletin No. 8)

3.6 Food Security and Distribution
The initial response to the earthquake in Haiti involved the
distribution of ready-to-eat-meals, food rations, and rice to
affected communities to prevent the development of a hunger
crisis.Within a week,WFP had provided over 200,000 people
with over 1,000,000 food rations.51
A rapid food security
assessment in February showed that 52% of households in Haiti
were food insecure, while 69% of Haitians in camps were food
insecure (including both chronic and transitory food insecurity).52
Targeted food aid programs were designed to assist displaced
people and host families in and outside of Port-au-Prince. By the
end of March, when the Government of Haiti decided to end
general food distribution, about 4 million Haitians had received
food assistance.53
Within the first six months of the response,
USAID/FFP provided $125 million in Title II funds and delivered
106,110 metric tons of Title II food aid to Haiti.54
By June, over 618,000 children had received school meals.55
Food-for-work and cash-for-work projects were established as a
transition from food distribution programs to promote long-
term food security and stability. In addition, a number of market
analyses were conducted to monitor the impact of food aid on
local markets, food production, and accessibility.56
These results
are not yet available.
One important issue was ensuring that the mass distribution
of rice and other food stocks would not negatively impact
the rural economy and weaken ties between consumers and
producers.While the price of most staple foods did rise after
the earthquake, it seems that most prices have returned to
pre-earthquake price levels, likely due to large-scale food aid
distributions (see Figure 7 and Figure 8).A major concern was
the sale of food aid on local markets. Food aid distributions have
not had a major impact on the price of rice, the most important
51
WFP. July 2010.“Haiti: Six months on from the 12 January earthquake.” WFP Website. http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/
wfp222277.pdf.Accessed on 14 August 2010.
52
Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire. March 2010. Haiti: Rapid post-earthquake emergency food security assessment. http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/
public/documents/ena/wfp221395.pdf.Accessed on 7 August 2010.
53
WFP. July 2010.“Haiti: Six months on from the 12 January earthquake.” WFP Website. http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/communications/
wfp222277.pdf.Accessed on 14 August 2010.
54
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti Earthquake. Fact Sheet: 57; 4 June.
55
Agriculture Cluster. 2010. Food and Agriculture Sector Update. Port-au-Prince, June.
56
FEWS NET, USAID. 2010. HAITI Food Security Outlook No. 24.Washington, May.
Figure 7:Trends in staple food prices in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

staple food in Haiti. In general, it is difficult to determine the
extent to which food aid affected prices, since other factors, such
as decreased purchasing power and increased transactions costs,
were also present.57
The 2010 growing season is reported to be better than 2009.
Food security conditions have stabilized and are expected to
improve.58
As shown in Figure 9, the most likely scenario for
July-September is a considerable improvement on May-June 2010.
The UN Agriculture cluster has worked closely with the GOH
Ministry of Agriculture on seed procurement and distribution.
By the end of March, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) had distributed over 28 tons of bean seed in mountainous
areas of Léogâne and Petit Goâve and distributed 49 tons of
maize to beneficiaries in earthquake-affected areas.59
57
FEWS NET, CNSA. 2010. Haiti Food Security Update: June 2010. Washington, Port-au-Prince. June.
58
USAID & FEWS NET. 2010. Executive Brief: Impacts of food aid rice distribution in Haiti on the rice market and production. Washington.April.
59
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti Earthquake. Fact Sheet: 46; 18 March.
Figure 8:Trends in food prices in Jeremie, Haiti
Figure 9: Food Security in Haiti over time

3.7 Rubble Removal
The removal of rubble remains a pervasive problem in relief
efforts. Rubble blocks roads and impedes reconstruction and
shelter efforts.Almost every UN cluster spoke about rubble
removal in meetings, having had to actively work around the
rubble problem during response efforts. Estimates of the amount
of rubble produced by the earthquake range from 20-25 million
tons.
The international community, with the assistance of the
DOD and U.S.Army Corps of Engineers, created the Project
Management Coordination Cell (PMCC).This cell was
responsible for addressing the rubble problem in Port-au-Prince.
Although rubble removal beyond that of clearing throughways
to deliver humanitarian assistance does not typically fall under
DOD’s HADR authority, both conditions on the ground and
interagency requests dictated this mission.The U.S. military
continued to be involved in rubble removal after the initial
phase of the response, specifically clearing culverts to improve
drainage, due to a legal determination that improving drainage
in light of the impending rainy/hurricane seasons was critical
disaster mitigation.The U.S.Army Corps of Engineers provided
equipment and technical expertise to the PMCC to assist in
rubble removal.
The PMCC worked well during the first three months of
the response in coordinating rubble removal and identifying/
creating debris sites. However, as the response transitioned
from relief to recovery and responsibility for the PMCC shifted
from MINUSTAH and DOD to the GOH, the PMCC grew
less coordinated and effective. Issues of eminent domain and
private land-ownership slowly impeded the work of the PMCC
and slowed the progress in removing rubble.Additionally,
some NGOs involved in rubble removal did not make efforts
to coordinate with local leaders.This led to mayors informing
NGOs they could not work to clear rubble in their areas of
control.All of these issues have compounded the problem of
rubble removal and severely slowed efforts by the international
community.
It is estimated by multiple sources, including the Ministry of
Public Works, Solid Waste Management Unit, OXFAM’s Disaster
Waste Recovery, and experts from the PMCC, that less than 1%
of the total rubble has been cleared from the city at the time of
this report.
3.8 Cash-for-work
Many organizations and donors were involved in cash-for-
work (CFW) programs.The purpose of these programs was
to promote economic and political stability by stimulating the
economy through job creation. Cash-for-work was a versatile
program that was implemented in all phases of the disaster
response. In initial relief efforts, CFW rapidly restored purchasing
power and stimulated markets to re-open. In the transition to
long-term development, CFW programs were implemented in
specific areas, such as infrastructure development, in order to
improve roads and reconstruct dwellings.
Following the earthquake, USAID provided funding for many
cash-for-work programs in a variety of sectors, including rubble
removal, transitional shelters, agricultural development, and
WASH interventions. By mid-June, USAID had provided over $19
million to partners implementing cash-for-work programs and
$53 million to partners implementing programs with a cash-for-
work component.60
As of 15 April, there were 25,691 individuals
employed through cash-for-work programs.61
These programs
successfully cleared drainage canals to mitigate flooding and
removed rubble.
Problems arose with the implementation of cash-for-work
programs.This was due to certain donors not establishing
specific requirements needed by the NGO partners who
managed the CFW programs. It was important to establish
guidelines, such as equal payment across programs and the
distribution of meals, in order to ensure these CFW programs
were not competing against each other or interfering with the
local market.The two offices within USAID responsible for
funding CFW programs were the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).
Disagreements arose amongst OFDA, OTI, the USAID Mission,
and the U.S.Ambassador on the principle of establishing and
adhering to an equitable payment structure for local recipients.
Subsequently, this created tensions among Haitians and job
competition between CFW programs.
60
USAID/OFDA. 2010. USAID/OFDA FiscalYear 2010 Cash-for-work (CFW) Activities in Haiti.Available from:
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/haiti/template/files/cfw_programs_062410.pdf.Accessed on 10 September 2010.
61
Office of the Response Coordinator. 2010.“Weekly Slide Update: Phase II/III Analysis and Planning.” Haiti Relief and Recovery. 21 April.

3.9 SPHERE Standards
The SPHERE Project is an initiative to define and uphold the
standards by which the global community responds to the
plight of people affected by disasters, principally through a set
of guidelines that are set out in the Humanitarian Charter and
Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, also known as the
SPHERE Handbook.These guidelines describe what should be
done when responding to a specific need (e.g. shelter, nutrition,
etc.) and the minimum standard and level of response that is
required to meet that defined need.The SPHERE project began
in 1997 and was launched by a group of humanitarian NGOs and
the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement.62
The response in Haiti was examined against the international
SPHERE standards.The table below presents the results.
However, the use of these minimum standards must be tempered
by an examination of the operational context pertaining to Haiti.
Although SPHERE standards are essential to providing quality
humanitarian assistance, they may not be realistic given
conditions on the ground.The guidelines should be adapted
to specific emergencies and should not encourage unrealistic
expectations.The below calculations have been made without
taking into account existing resources and infrastructure, which
should then be subtracted from the total need.
62
SPHERE Project. 2010. About Us.Available from: http://www.sphereproject.org/content/view/91/58/lang,english/.Accessed on 30 December 2010.

1 Maximum need calculations are based on the assumption that 1.5 million displaced persons will require aid for 180 days.
2 Mid-level need calculations are based on the assumption that 1.5 million displaced persons will require aid for 90 days.
3 Low-level need calculations are based on the assumption that 1.5 million displaced persons will require aid for 45 days.
4 Maximum need calculations are based on the assumption that 2.0 million displaced persons will require aid.
5 Mid-level need calculations are based on the assumption that 1.3 million displaced persons will require aid.
6 Low-level need calculations are based on the assumption that 1.0 million displaced persons will require aid.
Sphere Standard Max. Need Mid-Need Low-Need Available Data Usg Contribution
15L of water/person/day 4050 2025 1012.5 OCHA indicates that water USG provided funding to partners who worked
million L1
million L2
million L3
provision haas recently been in WASH to achieve this goal (e.g. UNICEF, IRD)
increased to 10L/person/day
Maximum 20 people/toilet 100,0004
65,0005
50,0006
The little information available USG provided funding to partners who worked
indicates that this standard is in WASH cluster to achieve this goal
far from met (IRC, GOAL)
Measles vaccination coverage WHO Anthropometric Survey USG provided funding to partners who worked
of 90% (Apr-Jun) in the health cluster to schieve this goal (e.g.
• Artibonite residents: 56.67% Medishare, PIH,WHO, IMC)
• Gressier, Lógane, Petit-
Goâve, Grand Goâve
residents: 55.69%
• Gressier, Lógane, Petit-
Goâve, Grand Goâve
displaced: 57.58%
• P-a-P residents: 66.70%
• P-a-P displaced: 64.43%
Levels of moderate and WHO Anthropometric Survey USG provided funding to partners who worked
severe malnutrition are stable (Apr-Jun): Post-earthquake in the nutrition cluster to achieve this goal (e.g.
at, or declining to, acceptable GAM and SAM levels are very UNICEF, FFP)
levels close to pre-earthquake levels
Each person has access to 2.25 1.13 0.56 Information unavailable USG provided funding to partners who worked
250g of bathing soap per million million million in the NFI cluster to achieve this goal (e.g.
month kg1
kg2
kg3
World Vision)
Early warning system ensures Developed and supported by USG provided funding to partners who worked
timely detection of and WHO, CDC, MSPP, CIDA, MSF in health cluster to achieve this goal (e.g.WHO
response to disease outbreaks CDC)
Pregnant and breastfeeding Different sources indicate USG provided funding to partners who worked
women have access to different coverage levels. in the nutrition cluster to achieve this goal (e.g.
additional nutrients and • Food and agriculture sector UNICEF,WFT)
support June update: 52%
• WFP estimate: 87%
Increased information and While the price of most staple USG provided funding to partners who worked
local awareness of market foods did rise after the in the nutrition cluster to achieve this goal (e.g.
prices and availability, market earthquake, it seems that most CHF, IOM)
functioning and governing prices have returned to pre-
policy earthquake price levels
Temporary planned or self- 90 67.5 58.5 While there is little information USG provided funding to partners who worked
settled capms are base on a million million million about the amount of space in the shelteringcluster to achieve this goal
minimum m24
m25
m26
available for each person, (e.g. ARD, IOM)
45m2
person generally the camps are
overcrowded

3.10 Further Examinations
The following are important areas of consideration regarding the
quality and impact of relief aid in Haiti. However, due to time and
resource constraints, we were unable to explore these topics in
great detail.
Gender Issues
Even before the earthquake, women comprised a vulnerable
population in Haiti for a variety of reasons, including under-
education and violence. In this context, emergency-related cash-
for-work or other livelihood programs should specifically target
women and be established in ways that ensures their future
sustainability.The main focus should be to increase the number
of opportunities available to women to improve their quality
of life and support themselves and their families through safe
activities. Considering the fact that fertility rates among younger
women are very high in Haiti, reproductive health education
and outreach is another area that will need to be explored and
addressed.This is an important lesson that has emerged from
Haiti and that is applicable to future emergencies elsewhere.
Furthermore, while the media reports on sexual violence and
humanitarian organizations focus on protection of women, our
first impressions seem to indicate that these issues are not
related specifically to the earthquake. Rather, they are pre-
earthquake problems that continue to persist. Post-earthquake
reconstruction and rehabilitation programs should take the
vulnerability of women into consideration and work toward
sustainable solutions for sexual violence against women in Haiti
instead of approaching it as a problem directly related to the
emergency situation.
Psychosocial Health
Psychological trauma experienced by Haitians during and
after the earthquake is an important and indisputable cause
of concern that has not been well addressed.While further
research in this area is needed, a few points should be brought to
attention.Approaches endorsed by Western cultures are neither
always appropriate nor necessary. Haitians could draw upon
their own resilience and coping strategies, and the international
community should respect, support, and be sensitive to these
alternative approaches. Here, it is important to invoke the
principle of “do no harm.”
Beneficiary Involvement
Lack of beneficiary involvement was a major problem with the
response in Haiti. Indeed, beneficiaries were not involved as they
should have been:“the international humanitarian community did
not adequately engage with national organizations, civil society,
and local authorities. These critically important partners were
therefore not included in strategizing the response operation
and international actors could not benefit from their extensive
capacities, local knowledge, and cultural understanding.”63
This
was problematic, as many of the NGOs that arrived in Haiti had
no local experience there.There was little dialogue with the
affected population, who was generally excluded from planning
and carrying out response activities even though few barriers
prevented access.
The working middle class was identified as a main segment of the
population that is largely ignored.The humanitarian community
must better engage beneficiaries and civil society in Haiti and
include local initiatives in their programs and agendas.This is the
only way in which capacity building can be achieved in Haiti.
63

4. Response in the United States
4.1 Organization of the U.S.
Government Response
The primary responsibility for disaster response rests with
the government of the affected country. However, due to the
overwhelming severity of the earthquake and its effect on UN
and Haitian Government capacity, the U.S. President gave clear
direction for a “whole of government” response.Additionally, a
disaster of this magnitude requires a broader response, including
not only humanitarian resources, but also political and diplomatic
resources.Therefore, it was imperative that high-level officials
manage U.S. Government involvement. Pre-existing personal
relationships were recognized as key to the success of the
response and were further strengthened by the widespread use
of liaisons.
In response to the Haiti earthquake, President Obama named the
newly appointed USAID Administrator, Rajiv Shah, as the Unified
Disaster Coordinator and identified USAID as the lead federal
agency to coordinate the response for the U.S. Government.
Administrator Shah was sworn into office on 7 January; only five
days before the earthquake.
The White House and the Department of State took special
interest from the beginning in the response, playing large roles
in coordination, planning, and execution.The Secretary of State
appointed the Counselor and Chief of Staff to be the lead for the
response from the Department of State due to the Counselor’s
work in Haiti over the previous year.This position took an active
role in the response management that lent a more pro-active
dimension of foreign policy to humanitarian assistance, especially
during the immediate disaster response phase.
The organization of the Haiti disaster response in Washington,
DC was consistent with current government policy, drawn
from the concept presented in the Project on National Security
Reform’s report, Forging a New Shield, known as “whole
of government.”64
The “whole of government” approach was
actually developed to strengthen integration among federal
agencies to promote security of the American homeland.
However, it was used as a new paradigm for international
disaster response to meet the massive needs in Haiti.The early
response in Washington evolved rapidly, as various agencies
tried to address the “whole of government” response mandate
individually and then combine their responses into one unified
response. International responses are fundamentally different
than domestic responses; while there are important analogies
and lessons for international response, these must be carefully
applied to the unique complexities of such an event.The “whole
of government” response, combined with the magnitude of
the event, required changes in the way the U.S. Government
approached disaster management.
Figure 10 presents the “whole of government” disaster
management paradigm. USAID, DOD, and HHS have specialized
staff, management procedures, and standing interagency
agreements to facilitate their cooperation for international
disaster response. In Haiti, they led the response at the
operational and tactical levels, receiving policy direction from
senior political officials at the White House, National Security
Council, and Department of State.The white boxes are the
additional federal agencies that were called into the response
under the “whole of government” approach.All of the agencies
that took part in the Haiti disaster response are listed in Figure
10.
64
Locher, James R. 2008.“Forging a New Shield”. Center for the Study of the President and the Project in National Security Reform. November.
Figure 10:“Whole of government” structure. Boxes in blue represent the
key offices within the US Government that set the policy guidance and
strategic direction of the response: theWhite House, National Security
Council, and Department of State. Boxes in orange represent the federal
agencies that normally lead the USG international disaster response.

Leadership from Washington was critical, but both helped and
hindered the response.The clear direction from the President
to commit the resources of the U.S. Government was important
to create a unity of mission and purpose. However, the strategic
leadership from Washington was slow to develop due to
implementation of the new “whole of government” response
and limited availability of accurate information from Haiti. In
the first weeks of the response, policy leaders became deeply
involved in tactical and operational decisions in Haiti that made
daily operations in the field somewhat difficult. OFDA and
embassy staffs both describe frequent daily calls from different
policy officials in Washington and literally “thousands” of emails
asking for information or giving direction. In the early phase of
the response (through mid-February), there were numerous
meetings and teleconferences daily, seven days a week. Most of
these calls and meetings had a regular schedule; however, the
schedules of different agencies did not match, so that meetings
or teleconferences were scheduled from 0400 to as late as
2100. Most persons interviewed considered the meetings to be
useful, but found it difficult to get work done due to numerous
meetings or phone calls.This was true in both Washington and
Haiti.
Physical space became an issue during the response.The
main Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was the USAID
Operations Center, located on the ninth floor of the Ronald
Reagan Building. Its physical structure was not large enough to
manage a response of this size and meetings were crowded,
often with overflow into adjacent areas.The USAID EOC lacks
the modern facilities that can be found at other EOCs, such
as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the
American Red Cross.There were technological constraints,
especially with video and audio conferencing, which limited the
participation of some interagency staff. In addition to USAID,
EOCs were also at FEMA (National Response Coordination Center
(NRCC)), HHS (Secretary’s Operation Center (SOC)), and the
Department of State (State Department Operations Center), with
attempts to coordinate between each.
Chain of Command
The management response to foreign disasters is typically led
by USAID/OFDA, with the Disaster Assistance Response Team
(DART) in the field and the Response Management Team in
Washington (RMT). Due to the complexities of the disaster in
Haiti and the large number of American citizens that needed
to be evacuated, there was a need to expand the management
team to include the Department of State and other key U.S.
Government agencies as decision makers in the response.This
led to a “whole of government” response, which ultimately
modified the normal U.S. Government chain of command,
introducing new roles for many agencies that do not usually
participate in international disaster response.
The DART was deployed to the disaster scene to conduct
on-the-ground assessments, make recommendations, and
oversee the provision of assistance.The RMT’s stated role
was to “coordinate U.S. government strategy and activities
in Washington.” Historically, the RMT provides operational
support to the DART and serves as the focal point for OFDA/
Washington-based coordination among USAID leadership, the
interagency community, Congress, and other key stakeholders.
For larger responses, a Response Director (RD) leads the RMT
and DART, as was done for the Haiti response.
With the involvement of so many U.S. agencies in the response,
as well as the involvement of high-level policy staff, the
Interagency (IA) Task Force was created to coordinate activities
across all U.S. agencies.The establishment of the Interagency
Task Force in the space designated for the RMT and the
involvement of additional U.S. agencies in the response created
friction between the IA Task Force and the RMT.As a result, the
coordination of activities was conducted in parallel through the
Interagency Haiti Task Force and the RMT, creating a stressful
environment for command and control. Concerns about the
USAID RMT/DART structure managing a massive response effort
led to the establishment of the USAID Office of the Response
Coordinator (ORC) in Haiti on 15 January to coordinate the
response on the ground.The ORC worked from the USAID
offices located at the U.S. Embassy and was expected to act as
a bridge to support OFDA and USAID management efforts and
to coordinate with the U.S. military. It was also charged with
coordinating the multiple federal agencies on the ground.The
head of the ORC was the Coordinator for Disaster Response
and Reconstruction, and he arrived in Haiti within the first week
of the response.This newly created position reported directly
to the U.S.Ambassador in Haiti and the USAID Administrator in
Washington, DC.The introduction of the ORC and its response
coordinator at this early stage of the disaster added to the
complexity of decision making on the ground which already
consisted of the U.S.Ambassador, USAID Mission Director, and
DART team leader, all of whom had clearly defined decision
making roles as per standard operating procedures.The primary
source of reporting dysfunctions was the role of the ORC, which

was not well described or communicated to the U.S. Embassy,
USAID/Haiti Mission, or the DART. During the initial weeks of
the response, the ORC lacked consistent organization, clear
staffing structure, and clear scopes of work. In addition, it had
no separate budget to manage its own logistics or implement
any activities, thereby requiring vehicles and logistic support
from USAID and the DART team. OTI, which had an important
role in the response, was a major player in the ORC. Better
coordination and accountability of OTI and the ORC to the
USAID Mission would have increased the efficiency of their
actions.
As the management structure evolved in Washington and
Haiti, the DART no longer coordinated the overall in-country
response but continued to fulfill its usual capacity working within
the cluster system, with the UN, GOH, international donors,
and NGOs to provide immediate relief assistance.The RMT
continued in its role of managing the activities of the DART in
Haiti, but had little authority over other federal agencies or the
military.Within USAID/Haiti, there was the Mission Director,
the ORC Response Coordinator, and the OFDA DART team
leader.All three reported in various ways to the U.S.Ambassador
in Haiti and the RMT in Washington, DC (which later evolved
into the Haiti Task Team), as well as the interagency.All three
also responded to direct requests for information and action
requests from senior officials at the Department of State, the
NSC, and the White House.
Figures 11 and 12 display two different organizational diagrams,
detailing the reporting structure of the ORC and its relationship
with the USAID mission and the U.S.Ambassador.A comparison
of the diagrams reveals reporting conflicts, as one diagram lists
the ORC reporting directly to the Chief of Mission, but the
second diagram shows the ORC reporting directly to the USAID
Administrator.A second comparison displays reporting conflicts
for the USAID Mission Director.The first diagram displays the
USAID Mission Director reporting only to the ORC, but the
second diagram shows the USAID Mission director reporting to
both the U.S.Ambassador and USAID/ORC. Lack of clarity in the
chain of command created inefficient communication structures
and internal stresses that hampered coordination through
duplication of effort.
Figure 11: ORC organizational and reporting diagram (Source: USAID HaitiTaskTeam)

Another factor that affected the USAID chain of command
was the role of senior government officials in the tactical
operations of the DART team. In addition to contacting USAID
in Washington, senior policy officials contacted the DART team
directly, making inquiries about the response and, at times,
providing direction in the relief effort.
The White House and National Security Council, via a Principals
Committee, ultimately led the organization of the response
in Washington.The Deputies Committee and an Interagency
Planning Committee (IPC) conducted strategic planning and
policy articulation.The National Security Staff (NSS) convened
the Principals and Deputies committees for the Haiti disaster.
These committees included senior officials from NSS, the
Department of State, USAID’s Office of the Administrator,
the Department of Defense, and the Department of Health
and Human Services. Daily meetings among the Principals and
Deputies were important during the beginning of the response.
By day three, however, it was necessary to establish video
teleconference calls (VTCs) to complement the daily meetings
and interagency telephone calls to assist in overall coordination
of the response. Joint Staff hostedVTCs that were conducted
twice daily. Starting on the night of the earthquake, the DOS
convened twice-daily teleconferences, hosted by senior officials.
Because the “whole of government” response was an
unprecedented departure from the normal response and
involved many federal and executive agencies, the Interagency
Planning Committee was formed within two to three weeks into
the response to assist in the coordination of these key agencies.
Responding agencies included the Departments of Homeland
Security, Defense, State, Health and Human Services,Agriculture,
Treasury,Transportation (DOT), and Commerce (DOC); and
USAID, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the
Department of Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Analysis and Recommendations
4.1.1 The use of the “whole of government” approach
led many federal agencies to send staff and resources
to Haiti within the initial weeks of the response without
an assessment of needs. Policymakers did not wait for
the U.S. Embassy and USAID to request specific types of U.S.
Government support. Many of the federal and executive agencies
that responded had no experience in international disaster
situations and had limited or no independent legal authority and
funding to carry out activities overseas.This led to inefficiencies
in the response and further burdened the overstretched
Figure 12: ORC organizational and reporting diagrams(Source: USAID Office of Military Affairs)

capacities of the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince to provide
support.
R4.1.1: All international disaster responses must truly be
led by a single federal agency appointed by the
President. Only resources and assistance requested
by the lead agency should be sent to the theater
of operations under a system led by experts
in foreign disaster assistance who will identify
appropriate resources for deployment. Deployment
of resources without requests from the field should
be considered only in exceptional circumstances.
A “whole of government” approach should be
used only in exceptional circumstances in future
international disaster response and within a
framework that enables USAID to manage Federal
interagency participation in overseas disaster relief
efforts or specify the lead agency which will
coordinate all government actors.The roles
and responsibilities of all agencies must be
understood by all personnel prior to engaging in
disaster response.
4.1.2 Initiating deployment of relief resources without
a field-based needs assessment or allowing the ground
staff to formulate specific requests based on actual
needs are decisions that need to be taken within
the context of the specific disaster. While some cost
inefficiencies are inherent in emergency situations, these
should be minimized as far as possible by prior arrangements,
preparation, and forward thinking. In the most immediate phase
(less than 72 hours), it is sometimes necessary to move supplies
and personnel into a disaster area prior to an assessment. But
this initiative should be based on pre-existing knowledge of the
impact of specific disaster types and the known needs of the
affected country or region.
R4.1.2: A small unit (such as an interagency task group)
should be established when disaster strikes, with
clearly defined responsibilities.The structure of this
task group should include representatives from
USAID, DOS, and DOD, as these are the agencies
whose resources are most engaged in any response
scenario.
This task group should be informed, inter alia, by a
pre-existing, updated list of appropriate relief
resources available for different disasters
(e.g. natural, complex humanitarian, and
socio-economic emergencies). This should include
details of what is immediately accessible (stockpiled)
and what can be obtained using an established,
efficientprocurement procedure (both interagency
and commercial).This task group should be able to
provide information and guidance on the location
and availability of experts and other human
resources.
A decision to send resources based on well-
prepared scenarios will minimize wasted resources
and reduce the inevitable risk of creating
bottlenecks on the ground, where logistical
infrastructure is likely to be compromised.
4.1.3 Senior decision makers in government need to
recognize the well-established processes that exist
for USAID to lead and coordinate international
humanitarian assistance operations. Regardless of the
scale of the disaster, USAID has standard policies in
place, as well as interagency agreements with HHS.
These agencies are experts in international emergencies
and have the existing capacity to respond in a timely and
appropriate manner.
R4.1.3: A brief training program should be designed for all
senior government officials at each department
and executive agency to provide them with
background and knowledge on USAID’s and USAID/
OFDA’s disaster response mechanisms.This training
should also be provided to newly appointed
Ambassadors before they post. USAID already
participates in Ambassadorial seminars and should
include whatever it deems important during their
designated time period.
4.1.4 Although USAID was appointed the lead agency,
specific reporting structures in the U.S. Government
response remained unclear. More importantly, most of those
interviewed noted that USAID, and particularly OFDA, lacked
sufficient human resources to manage a response of this
scale.There were also concerns that USAID did not have the
necessary management staff or the political standing to lead a
“whole of government” response.

R4.1.4: USAID should continue to take the lead in
international disaster response but needs the
capacity and support to respond, including, but
not limited to, the ability to determine the need for
and deploy additional Federal resources during an
international disaster response.
4.1.5 U.S. Government agencies did not always
communicate and report to the lead agency. Rather than
working through USAID structures, senior government officials
at the Departments of State, Defense, Health and Human
Services, Homeland Security, and other departments directly
contacted their agency staff as well as USAID staff in Haiti for
information and, at times, to give direction.This disturbed the
command structure and weakened the ability of USAID to
function as the lead agency.
R4.1.5: USAID must be empowered to effectively lead
international disaster response, and all federal
agencies and departments must adhere to the
command and control structures as set forth
by the President.
4.1.6 Involvement in the tactical operations and decision-
making process on the ground in Haiti by Washington,
DC came at a cost to strategic policy guidance from
there during the initial response phase. USAID and
U.S.military leaders in Haiti were constrained by the need to
respond to multiple requests for information from Washington
policymakers on an hourly basis during the initial weeks of the
response.The attention of policy leaders on tactical management
issues decreased their capacity to provide long-term policy
guidance and detracted from the ability of the U.S. Government
to engage in effective planning for transition from military to
civilian authorities and from relief to recovery and development.
R4.1.6: To encourage the most innovative and agile
response during disaster situations, authority must
lie with the field office. Policy leaders in Washington
should establish the overall strategic direction to
allow the experts in international disaster response
to run the operational and tactical actions.This
is particularly true during the initial response period,
when lifesaving activities and critical disaster
response actions are needed. Decentralized
command and decision-making capacity must be
strengthened when “whole of government”
approaches are applied.
4.1.7 Redeployment of U.S. military from Haiti required
clearer policy guidance and conditions-based milestones.
Because of concerns about security issues, the U.S. military
remained in Haiti until June.This was several months after the
JTF and others advised the stand down of U.S. military forces to
allow MINUSTAH and the Government of Haiti to resume full
responsibility for security.
R4.1.7: Policy decisions on force use should be based on
on-the-ground recommendations from military
intelligence services, as well as the situation
reports provided by USAID, in conjunction with
other data and cross-checked resources by policy
experts and political decision makers. Unless clear
evidence exists to counter field recommendations,
on-the-ground intelligence and situation reports
should be the primary driver in policy decision
making.When possible, redeployment decisions
should be conditions-based.
4.1.8 Teleconferences were critical to ensure a common
operational picture among the interagency, providing all
key stakeholders access to unified information. They also
served as an important management tool for translating policy
issues to operations.After the initial few days of the response,
the DOS successfully organized and led the daily teleconferences.
R4.1.8: Teleconferences could be improved in several
ways. First, technologically, systems need to be
installed that can service large numbers of
participants. Second, the establishment of an agenda
during the first conference will assist in addressing
all topics during the meeting.

4.2The U.S.Agency for International
Development (USAID)
Over the past ten to fifteen years, USAID has faced staffing and
resource constraints.When the earthquake struck Haiti, key
leadership positions at USAID and its Office of U.S. Foreign
Disaster Assistance were either vacant or newly appointed.The
key positions of Deputy Administrator for USAID,Assistant
Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), and Director for OFDA were
all vacant.The USAID Administrator was sworn into office on 7
January 2010, five days before the earthquake struck. In Haiti, the
new USAID Mission Director arrived on 11 January at 1700, just
24 hours before the earthquake hit.
The USAID Administrator responded to the earthquake
by mobilizing the DCHA’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance, which deployed a DART to Haiti within hours. In
USAID, the DCHA Bureau is responsible for providing technical
leadership and expertise in coordinating USAID’s international
disaster assistance, democracy programs, emergency and
developmental food aid, aid to manage and mitigate conflict,
volunteer programs, and civilian-military relations.The Deputy
Assistant Administrators (DAAs) within DCHA managed
the Haiti response in Washington and reported directly to
the Administrator.A pivotal role of the DCHA Bureau was
to organize the Interagency Task Force at USAID. DCHA
is comprised of nine offices: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA);Transition Initiatives (OTI); Military Affairs
(OMA); Civilian Response (OCR); Democracy and Governance
(DG); Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM);American
School and Hospitals Abroad (ASHA); Program, Policy and
Management (PPM); and Food for Peace (FFP). Each office
manages a specific set of tasks, and most of them took part in
assisting the Interagency Task Force and OFDA to coordinate the
response in Haiti.65
The role of each office is described below.
OFDA
On the evening of 12 January, USAID/OFDA Washington
set up the Haiti Response Management Team and deployed
a 17-member DART that arrived in Haiti within 24 hours
of the earthquake.The interagency created an ad hoc task
force in response to the U.S. President’s speech calling for
an integrated approach to relief efforts.The Interagency Task
Force was established on 13 January and co-led by the USAID
Administrator and DCHA’s Deputy Assistant Administrator.The
Task Force augmented the standard RMT with representatives
from the NSS; Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Interior
(U.S. Geological Survey),Transport (FAA),Treasury, Health and
Human Services, Homeland Security, Defense (Joint Staff, Special
Operations Command,Transportation Command, Southern
Command), and State (Office of Global Women’s Issues);
the Environmental Protection Agency; and NASA.The RMT
and Interagency Task Force operated out of the emergency
operations center (EOC) in USAID.The EOC was divided into
two sections, the OFDA-staffed RMT and the Interagency Task
Force.The RMT and Interagency Task Force each had a section
of the EOC, with communications and computer equipment.
These two sections held daily meetings as well as many ad hoc
discussions to coordinate the response in the field and with
their own agencies.There was, however, a perceived separation
between the two groups, primarily due to differences in work
cultures among emergency responders and development
managers.The EOC ran on a 24/7 basis but worked with only
two daily rotations of staff from USAID bureaus as well as from
the Interagency Task Force.
Other USAID Office Involvement
To support the massive response, USAID staff from various
offices provided skills and expertise.
In order to mobilize enough professional staff to respond to
personnel needs in Haiti and Washington, USAID used the
Office of Civilian Response, established in response to National
Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44).66
USAID’s OCR
served as the agency’s coordinating body that oversaw the
deployment of mission-ready civilian experts. It had some
successes in identifying and placing appropriate, experienced staff
but struggled to do so rapidly.Additionally, it was difficult to have
other agencies release staff, as they were already assigned to
important functions.
Food for Peace provides food assistance to vulnerable groups
through implementation partners. In the Haiti response, FFP
deployed a total of three people on the DART and partnered
65
USAID.“Congressional Budget Justification FY2005: Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance.” USAID Website. Modified 24 May 2004.
Available from: http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/cent_prog/central_dcha.html.Accessed on 29 August 2010.
66
The White House. 2005. NSPD-44. 7 December.

with the WFP, Catholic Relief Services (CRS),ACDI/VOCA, and
WorldVision to deliver emergency food assistance.
The Office of Transition Initiatives worked with implementation
partners via “Indefinite Quantity Contracts” (IQCs) to set
up short-term innovative programming targeted in three key
sectors: community stabilization; media and public outreach;
and Government of Haiti stabilization. OTI supplied multiple
staff to support the ORC in Haiti. Community stabilization
was by far its largest sector and was focused on cash-for-work
programs to support employment and economic stabilization
to improve livelihoods and reduce the risk of civic unrest in
Haiti. Programming targeted rubble removal and flood mitigation
activities such as canal clearance, riverbed maintenance, and
riverbank strengthening, which promoted safe resettlement to
original communities.
The Office of Military Affairs was established in 2005 to support
national security through establishment of a strong relationship
between development, diplomacy, and defense. OMA serves
as the principal point of contact and liaison between USAID
and DOD on civilian-military engagement. During the Haiti
response, OMA facilitated civilian-military communication and
operations by sending staff to augment the work of the USAID
Senior Development Advisor in SOUTHCOM: an additional
advisor to work directly with the Senior Command Group;
a civilian-military planner to help with transition planning;
and a health officer to help with planning for DOD medical
support.The Office also sent officers to Haiti to facilitate
civilian-military operations in the areas of health, transition
planning, communications, and the movement of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) to safe camps. OMA convinced
the Joint Staff to establish a cell within the Ronald Reagan
Building to help coordinate DOD operations with the rest of
the U.S. Government agencies and to set upVTC links that
allowed senior USAID staff to participate in daily Joint Chiefs’
synchronization briefs with all DOD elements involved in the
response.An OMA-hostedVTC held three times per week
allowed civilian planners to synchronize efforts with Joint Staff,
OSD, SOUTHCOM, JTF-Haiti, and USAID/ORC planners,
facilitating U.S. military-to-civilian transition planning. Existing
liaisons and previous activities between USAID and the DOD,
managed by OMA, were important in coordinating the response.
The Program, Policy and Management Office provided technical
assistance and management strategies to various bureaus within
USAID to support the overall response in Haiti.
USAID’s Office of the General Counsel (GC) provided legal
guidance to USAID’s programs in Haiti, including legal advice
on cooperation with foreign governments and implementation
partners.The GC ensured that USAID programs were
administered in accordance with legislative authorities. For Haiti,
the GC composed all legal documents and Memorandums of
Agreements (MOAs) between USAID and U.S. Government
agencies.Additionally, through the writing of the MOAs, the
General Counsel was tasked with coordinating the roles and
responsibilities for all U.S. Government agencies involved in the
relief efforts.
The Legislative and Public Affairs Bureau (LPA) was responsible
for coordinating all legislative affairs and communication
strategies for USAID. It provided counsel on the status and
history of pending legislation and the concerns and views of
Congress in regards to Haiti.
The Bureau for Global Health (GH) supported field health
programs through the USAID mission. GH provided technical
expertise in the areas of child and maternal health and nutrition,
HIV/AIDS, infectious disease, populations, family planning and
related reproductive health, and health system strengthening.
The Economic Growth and Trade Bureau (EGAT) helped
facilitate sustainable economic growth planning and program
development in Haiti. EGAT supplied staff to USAID’s ORC in
Haiti and focused on planning transitional shelters, developing
efficient markets, enabling vulnerable populations’ access to
markets, and strengthening economic policies.

USAIDTransition from Relief to
Development
At the height of the emergency response phase, the DART
team consisted of 34 core staff, augmented by 511 USAR team
members.67
Based on proposals received from the DART team,
USAID/OFDA Washington approved over 20 large-scale grants
to NGOs, UN agencies, and international organizations within
the first three weeks of the response.68
On 28 February 2010,
the RMT stepped down in Washington, and the USAID Haiti
Task Team (HTT) took over as the lead group to coordinate the
transition from relief programming to medium- and long-term
development. On 28 April 2010, the DART transitioned to a
USAID/OFDA program office in Haiti.69
The HTT was housed within the Latin American and Caribbean
(LAC) Bureau, which oversees all USAID missions and programs
in the LAC region. Due to the scale of the disaster, the HTT was
established to handle all USAID/Haiti programs in Washington
and continue to lead and coordinate the interagency response. It
was to serve as the bridge to support the USAID/Haiti mission
and the OFDA DART on the ground, to plan and coordinate
the transition from emergency programs to longer-term
reconstruction and development projects.The HTT also handled
inquiries and correspondence from the public and Congress. It
worked with its counterparts in the field (USAID/Haiti and its
newly merged OFDA and ORC) to design and fund multiple
grants and contract awards to implementation partners either
through competitive requests for applications or Indefinite
Quantity Contracts (IQCs).
The HTT faced many obstacles as it struggled to fulfill its tasks.
Firstly, the HTT was established without a budget.This limited
its capacity to hire staff and purchase resources, resulting in
a reliance on other bureaus within USAID, and the greater
interagency, to second personnel to staff the Task Team. Secondly,
the HTT received strategic direction from different sources,
including the Department of State, leading to a lack of internal
focus.
4.2.1 USAID is under-resourced. Years of budget cuts have
led to an agency with minimal staffing, especially of full-time staff.
R4.2.1: Full-time staff must be increased in USAID and
OFDA, while reliance on contractors be decreased.
Country-specific relief funds must also ensure
that there is adequate response staff in the country
and in Washington to manage the response. USAID
funding should be increased on an annual basis
to expand its operations and capabilities to deliver
critical development resources to countries or
regions in need of assistance. By strengthening
USAID, offices within the agency will ultimately be
supported, including OFDA. USAID, DOD HADR,
and the DOS Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) resources
should be better aligned so that their capacities can
be employed synergistically.
4.2.2 USAID did not possess sufficiently extensive
operational agreements or MOAs with U.S. agencies
that participated in the response. Current USAID
agreements with other U.S. Government departments need to
be expanded to additional departments and agencies, be more
detailed, and specify reimbursement.
R4.2.2: MOAs related to international disaster response
need to be elaborated through the interagency and
signed at senior policy levels.This process could be
included in the development of the IRF.
4.2.3 Instruments for rapid staff mobilization within
USAID Bureaus and the interagency for bodies such as
the RMT or DART were inadequate to meet needs for
augmentation. There is a need for stronger interagency staff
deployment to serve as technical advisors on the RMT.There is
also a need to improve the sharing of staff within USAID Bureaus
during disaster responses to staff entities such as the RMT, HTT,
or DART.
67
USAID/OFDA. 2010.“Success Story: USAID Disaster Assistance ResponseTeam: Haiti Earthquake.” USAID Website. Modified on 7 September 2010.Available from: http://
www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/haiti/template/files/DART_success_story.pdf.Accessed on 8 September 2010.
68
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti Earthquake. Fact Sheet: 25; 6 February.
69
USAID/OFDA. 2010. USAID’s Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA): Chronology of Response to the Haiti Earthquake. May.

R4.2.3: USAID should review its current staffing structure
and develop mechanisms for staff sharing between
Bureaus in critical disaster response situations. More
flexible hiring processes could identify qualified
employees or Personal Services Contractors (PSCs)
to fill gaps.Alternative sources of staff from
outside USAID—including other federal agencies,
retired U.S. Government civilians and military and
outside contractors—should be explored for
short-term large-scale disaster response as a means
to augment USAID personnel.
4.2.4 Liaison officers within the interagency and with the
UN were critical to coordinate the response effectively.
Liaison officers were important at the strategic level, such as UN
liaisons, and at the operational level, such as OFDA liaisons at
SOUTHCOM, for coordinating U.S. military shipping assets and
donated relief supplies.
R4.2.4: The use of liaison officers needs to be expanded
and formalized. Ongoing liaisons that exist between
the Combatant Commands (COCOMS) and
USAID should continue.
4.2.5 USAID/OFDA does not have the most appropriate
technology and equipment to assist in its response
mission. The RMT EOC located at the Ronald Reagan Building
was not adequately equipped for the size of the response in
Haiti. It lacked physical space, communications equipment, video
conferencing capabilities, and technical capacity to properly
oversee the coordination of the response.
R4.2.5: USAID/OFDA should be provided with resources
to set up a RMT EOC in Washington, equipped with
the latest technology and based on best practices
established by FEMA EOCs as well as OFDA’s
unique experience.The EOC should have the
capacity to coordinate one large-scale response as
well as two medium-size (regular) responses
simultaneously.
4.3The Department of State
When the earthquake struck, Secretary Clinton appointed
the Counselor and Chief of Staff to lead the response for the
Department of State, rather than the Western Hemisphere
Affairs Bureau.The Counselor was an obvious choice, as she had
been working to develop a long-term development strategy for
Haiti during the prior nine months and was very familiar with
the Haitian Government and key institutions of the country.
This long-term strategy was to be released in mid-January, but
when the earthquake struck, release was postponed. Due to the
appointment of the Counselor, rather than someone within the
Western Hemisphere Bureau, there was a lack of clarity with
regard to the roles and responsibilities shared between USAID
and DOS during the initial phase of the disaster response.
The first action to be taken by the Department of State was to
set up a Haiti cell at the DOS Operations Center and establish
the Haiti Task Forces (HTF) to coordinate different aspects of
the response. Of the eight task forces that were stood up by
DOS, five key units are described below.
Task Force I Established within the State Department
Operations Center, this TF was dedicated to the
Haiti response on a 24/7 basis to: provide
situation reports to the Secretary and other
Principals; coordinate the evacuation of 16,800
American citizens (AMCITs); liaise with the
interagency through liaison officers from DOD,
HHS, DHS, FEMA, USAID, and CBP; answer
foreign government queries; coordinate assistance
for official casualties and embassy, Port-au-Prince;
and support U.S. diplomatic efforts.
Task Force II Consular affairs responded to inquiries from
private American citizens and handled queries
regarding Haitian orphans already in process for
adoption by American citizens.
Task Force III Principals’ information task force, which supplied
analysis for the Counselor and other Principals.
Task Force III morphed into the Public
Diplomacy Task Force, which was responsible
for responding to international media and
providing strategic messaging to diplomatic
posts worldwide.

Task Force IV Forward planning for recovery, reconstruction,
and stabilization.This TF was set up three days
after the earthquake and staffed primarily by the
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization.The TF brought together expertise
from 42 offices and agencies from throughout the
Federal Government, including the Western
Hemisphere Affairs Bureau and members of the
interagency professional Civilian Response Corps.
Task ForceV Orphans andVulnerable Children Group.This
group worked closely with DHS, USAID, HHS,
and appropriate international organizations to
focus on the health and welfare of orphans and
vulnerable children (OVC) in Haiti during the
crisis period and to respond to public inquiries
regarding the status of children without families
immediately following the earthquake. USAID
eventually assumed leadership of this Task Force
and was successful in providing assistance to
OVCs.
Foreign Assistance Office and the Under
Secretary for Management
Two other offices within the Department of State played key
roles in the response in Haiti: the Director of U.S. Foreign
Assistance and the Under Secretary for Management.The
Foreign Assistance Office was created in 2006 to coordinate
assistance activities between the Department of State and
USAID.Authorization and approval of funding for DOS foreign
assistance falls under the control of State/F, except for the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and Food
for Peace. It is the responsibility of State/F to align policies,
locate funding, and coordinate resources to implement any new
policies. State/F tracks all DOS spending for foreign assistance
and works closely with the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). State/F does not track funding for the DOD directly,
but monitors spending through the OFDA fact sheets. State/F
provided one staff member to help set up the Haiti Task Force. It
also shepherded the supplemental budget request to Congress
on behalf of the Department of State and USAID.
The Under Secretary for Management had a lead role in the
response and managed several key Bureaus. He organized the
agenda and led the daily telephone conference calls with the
interagency, which were critical for coordinating the response.
The Under Secretary for Management’s Bureau of Resource
Management (RM) coordinated resource requirements to enable
the Secretary of State to present integrated international affairs
resource submissions for Haiti to the Office of Management
and Budget and to Congress.The Office of the Under Secretary
provided operational and logistical support to personnel that
deployed to Haiti.This was achieved by modifying the country
clearance approval process to ease pressure on the U.S. Embassy
as well as tracking and consolidating information regarding
interagency personnel who deployed. Other key management
bureaus directly involved in the Haiti response included
Administration, Consular Affairs, Diplomatic Security, Information
Resource Management, Overseas Building Operations, Medical
Services, and Human Resources.
DOSTransition, Reconstruction, and
Long-Term Development Planning
Task Force IV was set up to lead recovery and reconstruction
planning and brought together a working group of 152 people
from the interagency.A core staff and the capabilities of the
interagency Civilian Response Corps were provided by S/CRS
and the TF and Forward Planning Team (FPT), including staff and
subject matter experts from USAID; the Departments of State,
Commerce,Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services; and
other agencies to: (1) conduct situational analysis; (2) identify
key challenges at three, six, and twelve months; (3) identify key
objectives; and (4) ask important policy questions for future
planning.The aim of Task Force IV was to draft strategy and
identify potential resources available for the reconstruction and
stabilization of Haiti depending on different scenarios and levels
of funding.Through the Civilian Response Corps, S/CRS also
sent one staff member to Haiti embedded in JTF-H to support
longer-term planning in TF IV and to assist with civilian-military
coordination.Task Force IV was functional for five weeks. It had
little interaction with the RMT at USAID during its operation
and, although there was liaison between the RMT and Task Force
IV, coordination was minimal, as the RMT focused on immediate
response and TF IV was looking at everything but humanitarian
assistance (HA) and disaster response (DR).At week five,Task
Force IV was transformed into the Haiti 2020 group. Haiti 2020
consisted of a group of six to seven people and was tasked
to assist the GOH in developing the national action plan for
reconstruction and development in Haiti as preparation for
the International Donor’s Conference to be held on 31 March
2010.A ten-person team from TF IV remained operational
and supported the 2020 group with information, research, and

strategy assistance.Task Force IV represented one of the first
times that such comprehensive strategic development planning
was begun so soon after a disaster. However, despite all the work
achieved by TF IV over its five week span, little was used to assist
in the response.
The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) was brought in to support Task Force IV
because of its mandate to serve as a focal point to coordinate
and strengthen efforts of the U.S. Government to prepare, plan
for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance
and related activities in a range of situations that require the
response of multiple U.S. Government entities and to harmonize
such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations. S/CRS was
established under National Security Presidential Directive #44
in 2005 and made permanent by PL 110-417 section 1605 in
2008. However, these directives are related to improving political
stability and capacity, particularly in areas affected by conflict or
civil strife.
S/CRS conducted one of its first “whole of government” planning
processes on Haiti in 2005 and launched its first pilot program
there in 2007, known as “the Haiti Stabilization Initiative” (HSI),
which focused on stabilizing Cite Soleil, a shantytown located
in Port-au-Prince, through tightly coordinated and targeted
security and development assistance.Therefore, its staff had good
ground knowledge of the situation in Haiti and could lend their
experience and expertise to the task force and later to Haiti
2020.
The correct policy guidance from the Department of State
during the initial weeks of the response was to “build back
better.” An initial operational strategy and budget estimates for
the reconstruction produced by Task Force IV were largely based
on this policy. But financial implications of “building back better”
generated debate early in the process within the DOS and other
key policy-making agencies as the definition of better and the
expected quality in building back better were not specified.
4.3.1The Haiti response was unique because the local
government capacity was very limited. The need for
political stabilization and reconstruction following a natural
disaster, and not a civil conflict, is rare.
R4.3.1: The application of NSPD-44 to disaster response
should be used only in situations where the affected
country’s government does not have the functional
capacity to manage the response and provide
resources to its citizens or there is an existing
political conflict.
4.3.2 Task Force IV combined staff from USAID (LAC
& DCHA), DOE, USDA, DOJ, DHS, SOUTHCOM, and
DOS (Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
(PRM), Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, Policy
Planning Staff, Foreign Assistance Office, and S/CRS)
to provide planning, information, and technical support
to the Counselor’s mission to craft the longer-term
U.S. Government response to reconstruction and to
raise the key policy issues for discussion and decision
internally and with the GOH. TF IV provided critical
technical assistance to help the GOH design the National Action
Plan for Reconstruction and Development. It also provided
support to the GOH to prepare for the international donor
conference and assisted in the establishment of the Interim
Haiti Recovery Commission. USAID staff from the ORC and
Mission also provided extensive technical support to the GOH
for the National Action Plan, international donor conference
and establishment of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.
Task Force IV represents the first time that DOS took an active
role in planning the long-term recovery and re-development of
a country so soon after a disaster.While this support was useful,
coordination between DOS and USAID in the development
of a transition plan from the relief phase to long-term aid
investments could have been stronger.There are organizational
and philosophical barriers that exist between DOS and USAID
with regard to development aid, which could be addressed
through increased dialogue and exchanges of staff to strengthen
the interagency approach between the two.
R4.3.2: The DOS and USAID should establish interagency
meetings on humanitarian assistance and long-
term development to produce unified policy
guidance on collaboratively integrating strategic
development aims.At a minimum, these meetings
should involve USAID, USAID Bureaus, DOS
regional offices, and S/CRS.

4.4The Department of Defense
The Department of Defense regularly works in concert with
USAID to respond to international disasters. DOD possesses
unique capabilities in logistics, transportation, assessment, and
security that USAID coordinates to support humanitarian
response. Because Haiti had no military, except for a small Coast
Guard, and the UN and MINUSTAH were initially incapacitated,
the U.S. military played a much larger role than usual in the
initial response, as well as in the medium term.The role of the
U.S. military was widely praised—by the Haitian Government,
the UN, and NGOs—especially for re-opening the airport
and seaport, fully using its logistical capacities, and taking a
low-key approach in providing security.There were, however,
concerns about the size of the military response and its technical
knowledge in specific humanitarian operations.
The normal process for disaster response supported by
DOD follows a predetermined set of steps that include:
(1) Ambassador makes a disaster declaration; (2) USAID/
OFDA determines whether response requires unique military
capabilities; (3) DOD transmits a formal Executive Secretary
request; (4) Secretary of Defense approves the mission and
delegates authority to the appropriate Geographic Combatant
Commander to conduct humanitarian assistance (HA)
operations and expend Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and
Civic Aid (OHDACA) up to a pre-set limit; and (5) Execute
Orders are issued by the Joint Staff. DOD and OFDA then work
with the host country government to coordinate a Mission
Tasking Matrix (MITAM), providing clear direction to the military
for their specific humanitarian missions. Daily situation reports
covering all daily operations are provided to the Combatant
Command (COCOM) so that costs and resources can be
calculated.
Because of the overwhelming nature of the earthquake in Haiti
and the early direction of the President to “respond with a swift,
coordinated, and aggressive effort to save lives,” the way the
response was organized in SOUTHCOM was unprecedented
and did not completely follow these standard operating
procedures.When the earthquake struck Haiti, the SOUTHCOM
deputy military commander was in Port-au-Prince with the
U.S.Ambassador. Having received clearance from the USAID
Administrator to take action as required, DOD did not wait for
specific direction to begin its operations, and a Humanitarian
Assistance Survey Team (HAST) assessment was not done prior
to planning.The SOUTHCOM commander’s review was not
performed.Verbal Commands (VOCOs) were used in place
of written Operational Orders (OPORDs).This, combined
with the need to rapidly deploy resources in-theater due to
security concerns, led to a large military footprint that required
substantial resources as well as significant time to put into place.
National policies and legislation are in place to provide guidance
to the DOD when it conducts humanitarian assistance or foreign
disaster relief operations in support of USAID/OFDA.The
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is the program
manager for the OHDACA appropriation, which funds DOD’s
HA programs and DR operations.70
OHDACA appropriation
funds have built-in flexibility and may be used to support a wide
range of humanitarian relief, benefiting issues such as: economic
or infrastructure deficiencies; endemic conditions including
disease, hunger, or pain that threaten human life; damage to or
loss of property; and social or political stability in developing
nations.They are designed to support efforts of host nation
civil authorities or agencies that have primary responsibility
for providing humanitarian assistance.The Title 10 of the U.S.
Code contains two key sections that were used extensively by
the J directorates in SOUTHCOM to justify the planning and
implementation of HADR missions in Haiti.These include section
2561 on humanitarian assistance71
and section 404 on foreign
disaster assistance.72
Due to the enormous scope of mission and
vast humanitarian requirements, the OHDACA appropriation
was broadly interpreted at the direction of NSS and other DOD
leadership to give maximum flexibility to operations on the
ground.
Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy
The Secretary of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, and Joint Chiefs of Staff played important
roles in coordinating the policy-level response, in cooperation
with the White House, Principals Committee, and Deputies
70
DSCA Website. C12. CHAPTER 12 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND MINE ACTION PROGRAMS. DOD 5105.38-M, October 3, 2003. http://www.dsca.mil/samm/
Chapter%2012%20-%20HA%20and%20MA%20Programs.pdf.Accessed on 10 September 2010.
71
10 USC 2561 - Sec. 2561. Humanitarian assistance
(a) Authorized Assistance. - (1)To the extent provided in defense authorization Acts, funds authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for a fiscal year for
humanitarian assistance shall be used for the purpose of providing transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. Ref- vLex website.
http://vlex.com/vid/sec-humanitarian-assistance-19221827.Accessed on 10 September 2010.

Committee.The mission of the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy is to consistently provide responsive, forward-
thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the Secretary
of Defense, in alignment with national security objectives.73
As such, it played the key role in coordinating the policy
and operational response for DOD in partnership with the
Department of State.Within the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, the Office of Partnership Strategy and
Stability Operations and the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs)
were involved in the Haiti response.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership
Strategy and Stability Operations (PSO) was appointed the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) lead, due in large part
to the consolidation of HADR, Global Health, Peacekeeping,
and Stability Operations portfolios under this office. PSO
collaborated with the office of Western Hemisphere Affairs,
Defense Support to Civil Authorities, and the OSD Crisis
Management team to provide policy recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense.
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland
Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs) (OASD (HD&ASA))
worked in three key areas, unprecedented until recently, since
the Office focused upon domestic homeland defense and
homeland security matters within the U.S.This was the first
time that the Office was involved in a humanitarian disaster
response mission within the Western Hemisphere.The first
area of involvement, by the direction of the White House, was
the OASD (HD&ASA) coordinating with the Department of
Health and Human Services in the recovery of American citizen
remains in Haiti, repatriation to the U.S., DNA identification,
autopsy (when applicable), and mortuary processing. DOD
paid for the recovery, identification, repatriation, autopsy and
DNA identification, and processing of non-military human
remains.The U.S. Government had high expectations of DOD
for the recovery of American remains and repatriation, and this
consumed the attention of key policymakers at DOS, DOD, HHS,
the NSC, and the White House for several weeks.
The second area of OASD (HD&ASA’s) involvement was for the
transportation of American and Haitian patients to the U.S. for
more definitive care in U.S. hospitals, using U.S.Transportation
Command (TRANSCOM).
Third, because of airport congestion and the desire not to
inject U.S. Government-chartered aircraft and thereby reduce
the number of available landing slots for aircraft carrying relief
supplies,TRANSCOM assisted the evacuation of American
citizens from Haiti to the U.S. using military aircraft that were
otherwise returning to the United States empty.The DOD had
to coordinate this process with the Departments of Homeland
Security and Health and Human Services, since Americans
were arriving at designated airports, sometimes without
documentation or proper clothing. On 19 February, commercial
air flights resumed and the DOD no longer needed to assist with
AMCITs evacuations.
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
The PSO crisis management group also worked closely with
the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) at DOD to
determine financing of the humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief efforts conducted by the U.S. military.The Defense Security
Cooperation Agency manages the Overseas Humanitarian,
Disaster, and Civic Aid appropriation and its sub-activities of
humanitarian assistance, foreign disaster relief, and emergency
response.Additionally, DSCA provides oversight for the
Commanders’ humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) projects,
as well as managing the Denton Program, a space-available
transportation program for donor humanitarian relief supplies
and material. DSCA activities in Haiti were accomplished
pursuant to the following legislative authorities:Title 10, U.S.
Code, sections 404 and 2561. 74
72
10 USC 404 - Sec. 404. Foreign disaster assistance
(a) In General. -The President may direct the Secretary of Defense to provide disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to manmade or natural disasters
when necessary to prevent loss of lives or serious harm to the environment. (b) Forms of Assistance. - Assistance provided under this section may include transportation,
supplies, services and equipment. (c) Notification Required. - Not later than 48 hours after the commencement of disaster assistance activities to provide assistance under
this section, the President shall transmit to Congress a report containing notification of the assistance provided and proposed to be provided, under this section and a
description of so much of the following as is then available: (1)The manmade or natural disaster for which disaster assistance is necessary. (2)The threat to human lives or
the environment presented by the disaster. (3)The United States military personnel and material resources that are involved or expected to be involved. (4)The disaster
assistance that is being provided or is expected to be provided by other nations or public or private relief organizations. (5)The anticipated duration of the disaster assistance
activities. (d) Organizing Policies and Programs. - Amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic
Aid (OHDACA) programs of the Department shall be available for organizing general policies and programs for disaster relief programs for disasters occurring outside the
United States.
Ref- vLex website. http://vlex.com/vid/sec-foreign-disaster-assistance-19221773.Accessed on 10 September 2010.
73
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. http://policy.defense.gov/index.aspx.Accessed on 9 September 2010.

Interagency Coordination with DOD
The DOD made an early decision to use unclassified
communications for the JTF and its HADR operations.This made
for much faster sharing of information among the interagency, as
well as with international and NGO partners at all levels, both
in the U.S. and in Haiti.The DOD also set up an internal portal
using the non-classified Internet protocol router (NIPR) system
for cooperation and understanding of the activities of other
agencies.
Due to staffing constraints, OSD was not able to send staff
to the State TFs or the USAID RMT.At times, the reliance of
the TFs on liaisons made interagency coordination difficult,
particularly with the RMT.Though the crisis management group
communicated regularly with the Department of State Executive
Secretariat military advisor, Department of State Task Forces
and Principals, including the Bureau of Consular Affairs, it did not
have adequate communications with USAID or the RMT. It also
lacked adequate communications with HHS to coordinate the
NDMS, especially during the first five weeks of the response.
U.S. Southern Command - SOUTHCOM
SOUTHCOM is one of ten Unified Combatant Commands
in the Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing
contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for
Central and South America and the Caribbean. SOUTHCOM
is comprised of more than 1,200 military and civilian personnel
representing the Army, Navy,Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, and several federal agencies.75
For “Operation Unified
Response,” the U.S. military set up a Joint Task Force within 24
hours of the earthquake.The JTF-Haiti was established with
support from the Joint Forces Command and Joint Enabling
Capabilities Command (JECC), and augmentation from other
COCOMs such as Northern Command (NORTHCOM),
TRANSCOM, and SOCOM as well as about 50 staff from the
interagency.Within a few weeks, the JTF had established a strong
presence, which included over 22,000 personnel. Initial priorities
for the U.S. Military were logistics, relief supplies, medical
response, and support to MINUSTAH for maintaining law and
order.
SOUTHCOM responds to more humanitarian disasters than any
other Combatant Command in the U.S. military. Because of this,
SOUTHCOM has developed a very close working relationship
with USAID, as well as with other members of the interagency
community. It has also established units tailored for emergency
response that have specialized capabilities for international
disaster response, such as Joint Task Force Bravo, which has a
rotary wing element stationed in Central America that provides
helicopter airlift capacity, and other logistical and operational
capabilities for HADR.
A four-star general combatant commander leads SOUTHCOM
along with two deputy commanders, one military and one
civilian.The military deputy commander is responsible for
the military operations and day-to-day administration of the
joint directorates.The civilian deputy commander serves as
the foreign policy advisor and also works closely with the
joint directorates.There are nine joint directorates within the
combatant command.These include manpower and personnel
(J1); intelligence (J2); operations (J3); logistics (J4); plans, policy,
and strategy (J5); communications (J6); training exercise and
engagement (J7); resources and assessments (J8); and partnering
(J9). Due to SOUTHCOM’s unique geographical position, it had
adapted its standardized structure to better liaise with local
leaders and accommodate special local needs.76
However, due to
the massive nature of the Haiti earthquake and the mandate that
military involvement beyond SOUTHCOM’s remit be included,
the relief efforts highlighted the incompatibilities between the
standard structures of the other COCOMs and SOUTHCOM’s
modified structure.This led to SOUTHCOM reverting back to
SOP and the established nine joint directorates.
SOUTHCOM’s J7 directorate houses the Command’s HA
program and manages OHDACA-related expenses.The J9
Partnering Directorate is also a player in HADR since it
is responsible for interagency coordination, private sector
partnerships with NGOs and businesses, and coordination with
multilateral development partners such as the United Nations
and regional bodies such as the Organization of American States.
Within the J9 in Miami is a USAID Senior Development Advisor
who works across the Command.An USAID/OFDA Advisor sits
in the J7 who works closely with the J3 and J4.These positions
74
Smith,Tom.“Roles and Responsibilities: Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action (HDM).” DSCA Website.
Modified on 3 October 2005. http://www.dsca.mil/programs/HA/HDM%20Roles%20and%20Responsibilities.pdf.Accessed on 13 September 2010.
75
US Southern Command.“About Us”. US Southern Command Website.
Modified on 6 January 2009. http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/about.php.Accessed on 30 August 2010.
76
These needs included response to disaster and humanitarian crises.ccessed on 9 September 2010.

played pivotal roles in the disaster response by coordinating
with the military and developing the response plan between
SOUTHCOM and its civilian-military counterparts in Washington
and in the field. NORTHCOM also managed domestic aspects
of the response, including reception at domestic bases and
domestic intake of medical evacuation patients.
Other Commands responding to the
Haiti Disaster
NORTHCOM provided key support to SOUTHCOM, especially
in the areas of planning (J3 and J5) and technical capacity via the
601 Regional Air Movement Control Center that re-opened the
airport and managed the incoming and outgoing fixed-wing flight
volumes until SOUTHCOM air units could take over.
JFCOM serves to coordinate and manage the U.S.Armed Forces.
Within JFCOM is the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
(JECC), which provides immediate, short-term support to
establish a Joint Task Force headquarters based on requests
from any Combatant Command.The JECC provides support
to COCOMs by sending joint deployable teams and support
elements to their headquarters. For the Haiti response,
SOUTHCOM received support from the JECC for operations,
planning, logistics, knowledge management, and information as
well as joint communications public affairs support to set up the
JTF-Haiti.
The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) supported
the earthquake response, first by deploying a Combat
Controller team to open and manage the Port-au-Prince
airfield, enabling the arrival of disaster assistance from around
the world. Subsequently, SOCOM provided communications
and information support to Haitians seeking relief, through
radio programming from command air assets delivered via
solar-powered radios procured by the command. SOCOM
also supported the JTF through the provision of a 22-person
element from the Civil Affairs unit, with assistance from
logistics and security units.The Civil Affairs element established
the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell (HACC) to
coordinate civilian-military operations with the OFDA DART
through the use of MITAMs. SOCOM Special Operations
Support Teams (SOSTs) assisted in coordinating the “whole
of government” response in Washington, DC with USAID’s
Response Management Team, and in Port-au-Prince with the
ORC.
The U.S.Transportation Command provided critical support
for moving humanitarian supplies from the United States as
well as from other donor countries.Working on a reimbursable
basis,TRANSCOM moved large quantities of relief goods
and equipment, as well as people, by contracting commercial
transportation companies for both air and sea transport or
through the use of military aircraft or sea-going vessels. In this
case,TRANSCOM was reimbursed via the OHDACA account
and by USAID. In addition to logistical support,TRANSCOM
also sent a special Port Opening Unit to Port-au-Prince.This unit
assessed the damage and conducted operations to re-open the
port, which proved a critical component in the logistics bridge to
send humanitarian supplies to Haiti.
Transition from Military to Civilian
Authorities
Transition planning for the eventual withdrawal of the JTF
was a critical planning challenge.There was a clear need for
“conditions-based” plans rather than simple timetables, to ensure
that U.S. capacities would only be withdrawn when there were
sufficient Haitian and MINUSTAH capacities and when their
specialized services were no longer required.The JTF worked
closely with USAID, DOS, the Haitian Government, MINUSTAH,
and UN humanitarian agencies to develop a transition plan for
the JTF to hand off its responsibilities to the U.S. and other
partners.The conditions-based approach facilitated an orderly
withdrawal, ensuring that critical capacities were not prematurely
withdrawn. SOUTHCOM planners initially looked to Task Force
IV for guidance on future requirements for DOD and transition
criteria, but received little information.
The DSCA made multiple requests to USAID and the DOS
for the six-month and twelve-month plan for Haiti so that they
could develop budgets for different scenarios. However, USAID
and the DOS did not provide clear guidance for the DSCA to
plan for the funding or military support that would be required
by the military.
4.4.1 The DOD’s decision to use unclassified
communications for the JTF and its HADR operations
greatly facilitated its response and improved its
effectiveness. Otherwise, the information collected by the
military would not have been available to USAID and other U.S.
Government agencies, the UN, and NGOs, thus hampering the
response.

R4.4.1: Future large-scale disaster responses should
consider the use of unclassified communications
by the military, security conditions permitting.
Unclassified communications should be a best
practice, conditions permitting, and be applied as
standard operating procedure for international
disaster response.
4.4.2 As a quick response was imperative to save lives,
the JTF was set up without strictly following the SOP.
This led to the deployment of military forces to Haiti that were
larger than required. If circumstances had allowed the standard
operating procedure to be employed, the force would have been
leaner and better prepared to meet the demands of the situation
at a much smaller cost.
R4.4.2: The military and USAID should adhere to standard
operating procedure for all disaster events,
regardless of the size and scale of the event.The U.S.
military should work closely with the USAID/OFDA
DART team on the ground to obtain appropriate
forces as required.
4.4.3 Policymakers’ lack of articulated requirements
and goals for disbanding the JTF, and the devastating
conditions on the ground, prolonged its mission in Haiti.
The majority of military and government officials stated the JTF
could have stood down much earlier without causing any change
in the situation in Haiti.The military was ready to leave by mid-
April.The Canadian military left on 18 February. Military planners
at the J3 and J5 in SOUTHCOM and in Washington repeatedly
requested guidance from policymakers in order to plan for the
return of JTF forces to the U.S. Key policymakers felt that the
military should remain as a “safety blanket” to provide ambient
security or to assist in the case of hurricanes, but without a clear
articulation of its mission.
R4.4.3: The U.S. military should only be deployed in HADR
operations with a clear mission and defined end
states and approved interagency process for
redeployment. Conditions-based timetables should
be used from the beginning with conditions-based
planning.
4.4.4 Lifesaving activities under the OHDACA account
were more broadly interpreted for the Haiti response
than ever before due to a lack of clear policy guidance
on strategic end states. The ODHACA legislation sections
404 and 2561 include language that pertains to the military’s
role in humanitarian and foreign disaster response. In Haiti, the
military performed activities that were not strictly “lifesaving.”
This involved establishing IDP camps outside of Port-au-Prince,
relocating IDPs to the camps, and removing rubble through the
use of local contractors.
R4.4.4: Standard operating procedures are in place for the
military to conduct HADR activities through the
MITAM system. If employed properly, the MITAM
system ensures that military HADR operations
are led by civilian authorities and match the relief
and recovery needs of the population. However,
due to the high demand for assistance and the
lack of personnel to process the MITAM requests,
this system was not always employed to handle
HADR operations. It is important that the MITAM
system be adaptable to the changing environments
of disasters and response demands.
R4.4.5: Policymakers must provide clear and direct policy
guidance to the military regarding their proper
responsibilities for humanitarian operations and
ensure that they follow standard operating
procedures.
4.5The Department of Homeland
Security
The Department of Homeland Security usually works
domestically, but played an important role in the response in
Haiti.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was
officially established in 1979 by Executive Order 12127. It was
absorbed into the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
in 2003.77
FEMA is designated as the lead federal agency for
response to domestic disasters.
77
FEMA.“FEMA History.” FEMA Website. Last modified on 11 August 2010.
http://www.fema.gov/about/history.shtm.Accessed on 1 September 2010.

Early in the response, the FEMA Administrator provided guidance
and support to the Interagency Task Force in Washington, and
FEMA placed a staff member on the RMT. FEMA activated the
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) to Level II
operations and deployed an Incident Management Assistance
Team (IMAT) to Haiti to provide on-the-ground management
assistance. For the first time, FEMA also deployed four domestic
USAR teams to assist the rescue efforts of trapped victims,
and Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) personnel
to provide tactical communication equipment to the embassy,
USAID, and USAR teams in Haiti.The agency established
and provided the initial leadership for the Joint Interagency
and Information Center (JIIC). In Florida, FEMA’s Logistics
Management Directorate established an Incident Support Base
to facilitate the transport of emergency supplies to Port-au-
Prince.78
It is important to note that some services provided by
FEMA, such as IMAT, were not requested by USAID nor included
in USAID’s interagency agreement.This led to tensions and
miscommunication in the field.
The FEMA IMAT found that it was difficult to integrate
management activities into the DART operations and there was
friction between the two groups.The IMAT then focused on
providing support for the other FEMA components, especially
the USAR teams; providing situational awareness to their
leadership in Washington; and establishing the JIIC.The IMAT
rapidly reduced its numbers until the first week of February,
when a single member with debris management experience
remained to serve on the “Debris Committee” that became the
Project Management Coordination Cell (PMCC).
United States Coast Guard
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) operates as part of the
Department of Homeland Security.The USCG is responsible
for enforcing maritime laws, protecting the U.S. coastline and
ports, and saving lives.79
The USCG was the first American
agency to arrive in Haiti following the earthquake.The Coast
Guard conducted initial rapid assessments, provided support to
military air traffic control, facilitated the delivery of supplies, and
helped to open Haiti’s ports.80
The USCG played an important
role in the evacuation of earthquake victims and the repatriation
of American citizens following the disaster.The Coast Guard
deployed three Cutters to Haiti: Forward; Mohawak; andValiant.
These Cutters transported relief supplies, including water
and medical supplies, as well as disaster response personnel
and heavy equipment to help repair damages caused by the
earthquake.The Coast Guard Cutter Oak, which is a buoy
tender with a crane, arrived in Haiti to aid debris removal in
the commercial harbor at Port-au-Prince to provide access to
additional relief vessels.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) deployed 122
Customs and Border Protection Officers and 25 Agricultural
Specialists to Miami, Florida.The Customs officials conducted
pre-departure activities for people traveling to the U.S., as well
as assisting with the movement of foreign government assets
through the U.S. to Haiti.81
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement
The Department of Homeland Security personnel assisted
DOS’ Bureau of Diplomatic Security in providing security for
fuel trucks, convoys of relief supplies, and convoys of evacuees
between Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic and Port-au-
Prince. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents
assisted Diplomatic Security in moving adoptees from the
U.S. Embassy to the Port-au-Prince airport.The ICE Office of
Intelligence assisted in identifying escaped criminals in Haiti
following the collapse of the jail.82
Transportation Security Administration
In Haiti, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
assisted DOS’ Bureau of Diplomatic Security in providing
aviation security for U.S. citizen evacuees, as well as disaster and
humanitarian aid.TSA provided technical assistance to airport
personnel and aided in the rapid resumption of commercial air
carrier flights to Port-au-Prince.83
78
79
US Coast Guard.“US Coast Guard History.” US Coast Guard Website. Modified on 23 August 2010. http://www.uscg.mil/history/.Accessed on 30 August 2010.
80
81
Ibid.
82
83
Ibid.

U.S. Citizen and Immigration Service
The U.S. Citizen and Immigration Service (USCIS) assisted in
the establishment of procedures that allowed children approved
for humanitarian parole to depart Haiti. USCIS authorized
1,100 children to leave Haiti and travel to the U.S.The office
also handled the applications for Temporary Protected Status
of Haitian nationals in the U.S.; nearly 43,000 applications were
accepted for processing by the end of April.84
4.5.1 FEMA’s deployment of additional urban search and
rescue teams had little impact and was expensive. The
FEMA USAR teams are not International Search and Rescue
Advisory Group (INSARAG)-qualified and had little experience
working in international disaster environments.The additional
teams arrived without the ability to use their equipment and
did not have enough supplies to support themselves without
assistance from the U.S. Embassy.Their deployment cost $26
million.
R4.5.1: Additional USAR teams for international disasters
should only be sent under the direct request of
USAID/OFDA. If FEMA teams are to be deployed
outside of the U.S., they should be trained to be
INSARAG-qualified for international deployment.
The decision to use FEMA teams internationally
should be weighed carefully to evaluate costs and
benefits within the broader framework of the
global INSARAG system.
4.6The Department of Health and
Human Services
The Department of Health and Human Services played six major
roles in the response: (1) public health; (2) medical response in
Haiti; (3) state reimbursement for medical assistance to Haitians
who were evacuated to the U.S. for earthquake-related care; (4)
services for repatriated Americans; (5) services for humanitarian
parolees and orphans or unaccompanied minors; and (6) fatality
management.
To meet public health needs, HHS used the resources of the
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and the CDC.The
NDMS is a partnership between the HHS, DOD, DHS, and
Veterans Affairs (VA), originally designed as a mechanism for
DOD to bring back mass casualties from a large-scale conflict
or to respond to a large domestic disaster. HHS activated the
NDMS on 13 January and was asked by USAID to deploy field
medical components, including Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
(DMATs), a Disaster Mortuary Operational Response (DMORT)
Assessment Team, and International Medical Surgical Response
Team (IMSuRT) units. Members of these teams are civilian, non-
federal professionals who are activated as intermittent federal
employees when needed for a domestic disaster.
These teams encountered significant difficulties early on. Unlike
international teams, HHS teams are not equipped to be entirely
self-sufficient for two weeks and had to rely on the DOD
for transport, as well as the embassy for support and overall
response coordination. HHS was assured that DOD would be
responsible for transportation and security of the NDMS teams.
Delays in obtaining this support from DOD led directly to delays
in deployment and engagement in the field.The teams were
also not necessarily properly immunized or trained for foreign
work.This led to days of delay for these teams in the U.S. and
at the embassy before being able to deploy to provide care, and
ultimately led to the medical evacuation of a few team members.
Despite the difficulties, they provided important services, and
by 2 February, these teams had seen more than 24,500 patients,
performed over 100 surgeries, and delivered 28 babies since they
began providing care in Haiti on 17 January. 85
The Centers for Disease Control worked closely with the
Ministry of Health to augment the existing surveillance system’s
HIV/AIDS sentinel points so they could track other infectious
diseases.To support this project, the CDC also developed the
capacity of the national laboratory, rebuilding and equipping
some sections of the lab and providing critical technical
assistance to its staff. Furthermore, the CDC worked with the
Ministry of Health and USAID on an immunization program that
reached over two million people.
HHS coordinated with DHS and DOS to provide services for
orphans and refugees coming to the United States. Specifically,
it’s Administration for Children and Families’ Office of Refugee
84
85
HHS.“National Disaster Medical System Helping US HospitalsTreat Survivors of Earthquake in Haiti.” HHS Website.
http://www.hhs.gov/haiti/ndms_ushospitals.html.Accessed on 30 August 2010.

Resettlement (ACF/ORR) provided care to Haitian orphans who
arrived in the U.S. after the earthquake.As of 30 September
2010, 697 Haitians had passed through ORR’s care since 12
January 2010. Of these 697 Haitians, 682 were orphans released
to sponsors. During the Haiti Emergency Repatriation,ACF/ORR
worked in collaboration with New Jersey, South Carolina, Florida,
and Maryland to lead the reception and provision of temporary
services to eligible citizens returning to the U.S. During the
38-day operation, over 28,000 individuals were evacuated from
Haiti. Of these, approximately 7,800 American citizens received
HHS temporary assistance, such as payments for travel to final
destinations, cash loans, clothing, lodging, children’s services, and
medical care.These individuals arrived on 835 flights into seven
authorized Emergency Repatriation Centers at military and
international airports.
Medical evacuations became a difficult issue early in the
response. Because of the limited resources on the ground
and the devastating injuries caused by the earthquake, there
was pressure to provide a higher level of care for the injured
using the USNS Comfort and hospitals in the United States.
HHS announced on 1 February that it would utilize additional
components of the NDMS to help fund U.S. hospitals providing
care to Haitians. Using these additional components, NDMS
reimbursed participating U.S. hospitals that treated Haitian
patients who had been evacuated with life-threatening injuries.
To support this effort, HHS activated two Federal Coordinating
Centers (FCCs), in Atlanta and in Tampa.These two centers were
staffed by teams from the Department ofVeterans Affairs who
met the flights and arranged ground transport of patients from
Haiti to appropriate U.S. hospitals.
Several local Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) units assisted
in receiving medical evacuations.The Hillsborough and Polk
County MRC units (near Tampa) responded to Haitian
evacuations, receiving 72 patients via airlift. MRC volunteers
provided emergency trauma care, management of patient flow,
logistics support, and general assistance to the county health
department, helping the community integrate the patients into
the medical system.The Lowcountry MRC (North Charleston,
SC) worked alongside local health department staff to conduct
health screenings and operate a medical station at the Haiti
Repatriation Center, sponsored by the county emergency
management division. More than 700 returning U.S. citizens
were screened and referred as needed for on-site medical and
behavioral health care.
HHS was asked to help coordinate U.S. citizens who were
interested in spontaneously volunteering.This proved to be a
difficult task because there were no pre-existing mechanisms to
screen, credential, manage, or deploy these volunteers.Volunteer
recruitment and management lacked clarity and was not
consistent. Multiple messages were distributed by a variety of
U.S. Government agencies.Volunteer information and registration
were not centralized; instead, potential volunteers were directed
to numerous individual agency websites and information varied
from agency to agency. Many people looked to their local
government with questions about volunteer opportunities,
but local and state governments were unsure of how to direct
individuals seeking information.
4.6.1 The National Disaster Medical System was not
activated quickly enough for patient movement and
definitive care components to assist Haitian patients
and mobilize hospitals to participate in the emergency
relief program. While the NDMS was activated on 13 January
to provide DMATS, DMORTS, and IMSuRTs to Haiti, the patient
movement and definitive care components were not activated
until three weeks after the earthquake, in response to the State’s
request assistance, as is the established policy. Initially, Florida
hospitals provided uncompensated care to seriously injured
Haitian and American patients until the Governor of Florida
refused to accept more patients for uncompensated care. HHS
then initiated NDMS components two and three and established
centers of care in Florida and Georgia, where hospitals agreed
to accept Haitian patients and be reimbursed by Medicaid.The
refusal to accept patients and confusion between NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM as to who was the main liaison in the U.S.
caused some delays in care.This could have been avoided if
HHS was able to activate the patient movement and definitive
care components of NDMS sooner and better communication
existed within the interagency to identify responsibilities.
R4.6.1: NDMS components two and three should be
activated as soon as possible in large-scale disaster
responses to avoid delays in patient movement
and the receipt of definitive medical care for
seriously injured patients. However, this activation
should be coordinated with the lead agency, and
the state receiving the patients, for the response to
ensure it is appropriate and timely for the host

country’s medical system as well as the state
medical system that will receive patients.
4.6.2 HHS was asked to register health care workers
interested in volunteering to respond to Haiti.This
did not work for several reasons: (1) there were no prior
protocols for this; and (2) the NGOs and American Medical
Association already have mechanisms to identify and screen
volunteers.
R4.6.2: In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the U.S.
Government should not organize spontaneous
unaffiliated volunteers for deployment, except
for those working directly for the government.
If a need for volunteer health professionals exists,
the U.S. Government should use existing HHS
programs and protocols specifically designed for this
purpose.The U.S. Government can also help NGOs
and other organizations manage volunteers by
creating the right legal and regulatory framework.
4.7The Management of Donations
Private donations became a politicized issue as the American
public looked for ways to help the Haitian people. In the
disaster response community, it has been widely recognized for
more than 20 years that donations of goods often cause more
problems than benefits.Therefore, the State Department, UN,
UNICEF,American Red Cross, OFDA, FEMA, and most NGOs
recommend that only cash be donated to aid disaster victims.
Unfortunately, that message was often ignored and requests for
the U.S. Government to assist with the collection, transport, and
distribution of goods took up scarce time, effort, and resources.
Given that more than half of all American families donated to
the Haiti relief effort, elected officials became involved with
coordinating their constituents’ goods to Haiti through USAID
and military personnel.Websites normally employed to handle
donations proved inadequate due to the influx of private
contributors.
There were many types of donations that were filtered through
the U.S. Government, from money to volunteers to goods. In
the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, President Obama
requested the assistance of former Presidents Bill Clinton and
George Bush to lead a fundraising effort to assist the Haitian
people. 86
The Clinton Bush Haiti Fund (CBHF) collected
monetary donations and directed them towards immediate relief
and emergency assistance programs.The Fund worked primarily
through partnerships and collaborations with non-profit and for-
profit organizations, including Haitian organizations.87
In response to the vast number of inquiries about private
donations received by the U.S. Government, working groups on
private and international donations were initially set up as part
of DOS Task Force IV.Also, the State Department created “Help
Haiti,” which collected information on private donations for
the response.The management of private donations eventually
shifted to USAID, and a new interagency team was created to
coordinate contributions.The team included representatives
from the Departments of State and Commerce and from FEMA.
All inquiries on monetary donations were referred to the
Clinton Bush Haiti Fund and the interagency team managed
in-kind donations.The group coordinated with the U.S. Mission
and USAID to assess supply needs of NGOs and private
organizations in the field so that the team could coordinate
in-kind donations accordingly.Additionally, USAID established
a daily conference call with NGOs to discuss where in-kind
donations should be directed.
HHS was asked to manage the registration of medical volunteers.
Those wanting to donate their time to the response efforts were
encouraged not to self-deploy, but to register as a volunteer
with HHS.A database was created to handle the registration
of medical volunteers, which included biographical details and
credentials. However, HHS and USAID had never formally
deployed registered medical volunteers and existing deployment
mechanisms for medical volunteers were not implemented.
Foreign nations were also interested in contributing in-kind
donations. In the initial response phase, this was handled by the
Department of State, since the GOH and UN had little capacity
to manage these contributions.The interagency team acted as a
liaison between the foreign government and the GOH to channel
donations to those most in need, depending heavily on the
USAID teams on the ground to inform those decisions. DOD
86
Clinton Bush Haiti Fund.“About the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund.” Clinton Bush Haiti Fund Website.
Available from: http://www.clintonbushhaitifund.org/pages/about/.Accessed on 15 September 2010.
87
Ibid.

TRANSCOM provided transportation for donor nations’ in-kind
contributions.TRANSCOM retrieved donations from different
countries and worked closely with the interagency donation
team to deliver these supplies to Haiti.This became political and
controversial, as countries had competing priorities and there
was limited transportation capacity for these goods.
Two websites were used to register private in-kind donations
in the U.S.The first was a USAID-funded information center,
the Center for International Disaster Information.This was
established before the earthquake and is the usual apparatus
employed by USAID to register in-kind donations. Due to the
influx of private contributions, this site was unable to handle the
rapid registration and crashed.A second site was developed to
assist with donation tracking and registration.This site, known
as the AID Matrix, was developed based on the FEMA matrix
used for domestic emergencies.The AID Matrix also experienced
technical difficulties handling the large number of registrations.
In response to the failure of these websites, the DOS launched
wehaveweneed.org to handle the contributions and requests of
donations.
Donation transportation efforts were handled through
SOUTHCOM’s Partnering Directorate, Private-Public
Cooperation Division. In 2007, SOUTHCOM had established
the Partnering Directorate (currently the J9) to provide
outreach, coordination, and support to interagency partners,
international partners, non-governmental organizations,
and private organizations.88
“It serves as a coordinating unit
between nongovernmental and private organizations, with the
Division providing information to organizations on activities
and conferences and connecting the organizations with
SOUTHCOM’s components for activities.”89
This directorate
worked with the Washington interagency donation team
to transport in-kind donations to Haiti. Private donations
processed by the interagency group required validation of
need from USAID/OFDA before items could be shipped. Once
USAID/OFDA approved, the Partnering directorate facilitated
transportation of the in-kind donations to Haiti and confirmed
that all items shipped had a consignee in Haiti to pick up supplies.
SOUTHCOM worked with USAID/Dominican Republic (USAID/
DR) to facilitate the transportation of significant volumes of
private sector donations across the border to Port-au-Prince.90
The DOD was also responsible for sending excess military
equipment to Haiti as part of the Excess Property Program.The
materials donated by the DOD included medical relief supplies
and equipment.
Congressmen and senior officials in state governments directly
contacted SOUTHCOM and the interagency team to transport
specific donations to Haiti. Due to these political interventions,
some items were shipped without validation from USAID and
without a consignee in Haiti.Without these requirements,
donations sat in shipping containers, clogging the ports until
someone could catalogue the donated items and decide who
would handle distribution.
Many in-kind donations arrived in Haiti without the assistance of
the U.S. Government. Private contributors contracted carriers
to transport supplies to Haiti. Cruise ships and private vehicles
were hired to transport items to Haiti through the Dominican
Republic or Northern Haiti.
4.7.1 For more than 20 years, the disaster response
community has widely recognized that donations of
goods often cause more problems than benefits, and
therefore, the State Department, UN, UNICEF,American Red
Cross, OFDA, FEMA, and most NGOs recommend that only cash
be donated to aid disaster victims. Unfortunately, that message
was often ignored, and requests for the U.S. Government to
assist with the collection, transport, and distribution of goods
took up scarce time, effort, and resources. Elected officials
pressured the U.S. Government and military personnel to have
their constituents’ goods included in the limited transportation
space.
R4.7.1: The public and elected officials should be educated
regarding donations after a disaster so that they
understand the importance of cash donations.
Efforts to educate the public have been explored by
USAID/OFDA, but LPA’s strict rules for public
information on their website limit these efforts. If
88
US Government Accountability Office. 2010.“Defense Management: US Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response
Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation.” GAO Report. July.
89
Ibid.
90
USAID/DR. 2010. USAID/Dominican Republic Response to Haiti Earthquake.

better communication were established between
USAID and the public, it may be possible to inform
people on preferred donations and proper relief
supplies.
4.7.2 Although in-kind donations have been
discouraged by the U.S. Government, they continue
to be donated. For this reason, the U.S. military and USAID/
OFDA, through the J9 partnering directorate as well as the
USAID Office of Development Partners, have strengthened
relationships with the private sector and NGO community
to develop mechanisms for the organization and delivery of
appropriate in-kind donations.
R4.7.2: Existing public-private partnerships should be
developed and expanded by USAID to ensure that
only appropriate donations are provided by the
private sector. Programs to raise the awareness
of American citizens should be designed by USAID
and promoted through mass media to educate
the population on the importance of cash donations
as well as appropriate types of in-kind donations.
This should include information on the proper
procedures to donate cash or in-kind materials.
R4.7.3: In-kind goods should not be shipped with U.S.
Government resources without prior validation
from USAID/OFDA.
4.7.4 Although USAID has established agreements
with major businesses to provide relief commodities
and has designed websites to coordinate donations for
international emergencies, these mechanisms proved
incapable of managing the scale of donations provided
by the American public. Websites crashed due to the volume
of donation requests. In some instances, high-level government
officials used their influence to have their constituents’
shipments sent to Haiti without proper validation, despite
rigorous control procedures.
R4.7.4: Clear guidelines are required to provide the public
with procedures for emergency response.A new
process for managing donations should be
established that includes the design of websites that
are capable of receiving large numbers of requests
to donate as well as ensuring that timely responses
are provided to donors concerning the approval or .
refusal of their donation. This process must take
into account financial and in-kind donations.
4.8 Management of the Press
The organizational structure established in Haiti to create a
unified interagency message and disseminate information was
the Joint Interagency and Information Center (JIIC).The JIIC was
located in the U.S. Embassy and staffed by personnel from the
interagency, including DOD, USAID, DOS, DHS, and HHS.The
JIIC collected information about the U.S. Government’s response
in Haiti and coordinated all U.S. Government media operations.
It ensured that all U.S. Government officials in Haiti were
speaking with one voice about the unified effort.
FEMA and the DOD Joint Public Affairs Coordination Element
(JPACE) were instrumental in initially setting up the center. FEMA
provided the initial leadership and JPACE provided equipment,
such as portable satellite systems and cameras.The interagency
was able to deliver a formal message to the Haitian public 96
hours after the earthquake. Once the JIIC was operational,
coordination meetings were held twice daily to synchronize
messages across the interagency. JPACE created a daily one-page
document of talking points for the U.S. Military Commander in
Haiti, which reinforced and unified the U.S. message across the
interagency.
The establishment of the JIIC was instrumental in coordinating
a unified U.S. Government message. Media briefings were held
three times a day, both in-person and by telephone. However,
the location of the JIIC at the U.S. Embassy made it difficult to
engage the press, as this was not a central location for the press
to access information.
There were other public outreach activities.Additional social
media sources were used to disseminate information, including
Facebook, Ushahidi crisis mapping and Twitter. E-mail was
also used to share information, although only one person
was assigned to respond to e-mail inquiries and there was no
tracking mechanism established to ensure that media inquiries
were answered.The DOD launched “Commando Solo” to
transmit radioVoice of America 12 hours daily, in Creole. During
this transmission, public service announcements (PSAs) were
broadcast, detailing locations of food distribution sites and
other earthquake-related information.“Commando Solo” was
successful in sharing important information with the Haitian
public, but its necessity is unclear, as one local radio station was

operational a day after the earthquake and at least two more
were operational within two weeks of the earthquake.91
The management of the message and media were less successful
in Washington. Many in Haiti felt, and leaders in Washington
acknowledged, that policy decisions were sometimes driven by
a news story, which resulted in specific requests for action by
the U.S. Government to address these stories (widely described
as the “CNN-effect”).As one official said,“It was like we were
in campaign mode and trying to ‘stamp out’ stories rather than
managing the message and facts on the ground.” Intelligence
reports from the military and from USAID/OFDA were
provided daily to policymakers in Washington.These reports
briefly described the situation on the ground and detailed
relief programs. Negative media coverage on minor situations
resulted in directing resources to those areas listed in the news.
An example of the media driving operational decisions was the
shipment of large quantities of bottled water, despite reports
from USAID/OFDA that the water situation was stable.
4.8.1 The U.S. Government did not respond effectively
enough to the mass media coverage of the disaster relief
and recovery efforts in Haiti. Despite the delivery of huge
amounts of humanitarian assistance through the interagency,
journalists found stories that could exploit individual deficiencies.
While these stories were compelling and revealed unmet needs
among isolated pockets of the population, the larger picture
of the positive impact of the U.S. Government’s response in
Haiti was obscured.The U.S. Government failed to respond
appropriately to the media coverage, allowing assertions to go
unchecked and leaving the American public as well as politicians
concerned that the U.S. Government was not doing all that
it could to help the people of Haiti.Therefore, the media had
undue influence on strategic policy and operational activities, as
senior government officials came to rely on the networks’ news
rather than reports from military intelligence and USAID field
staff.
R4.8.1: Develop interagency legislation and government
capability to ensure outreach and responsiveness to
all stakeholders. Pre-existing relationships with the
media should be fostered, as they are important
for reporting the message and can influence
perceptions to accurately reflect the realities on the
ground.
4.8.2 A Joint Interagency and Information Center will
be necessary in any disaster response with multiple U.S.
Government agencies responding.
R4.8.2: Create an interagency communication concept of
operations to improve and institutionalize the JIIC
model used in Haiti.
4.8.3 USAID had little capacity to coordinate and
respond to all the communication needs after the
earthquake.
R4.8.3: USAID should be resourced to improve the
capacity of the agency for long-term communication
and media management needs.This could also
be beneficial for USAID to improve Congressional
and media relations in general.
4.8.4 There was often a lack of spokesperson availability
and expertise relating to catastrophic disaster.
R4.8.4: Plan and fund exercises and training as the key to
relationship building for successful communication
in future crises. JIIC spokespersons need to be
included in any disaster exercise, with specific
training aimed at media and press management.
91
Reuters. 2010.“Quake-hit Haiti radio stations broadcast from Street.” AlertNet Website. 25 January.
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N25237556.htm.Accessed on 16 September 2010.

5. Response in Haiti
5.1 Organization of U.S. Government
Response
The U.S. Government response in Haiti was unprecedented in
its size, approach, and scope because of the acute and unique
needs in the country.To meet these urgent needs, there were
important deviations from the standard U.S. Government
response to a foreign disaster.The most important of these
included the use of USAID’s Office of Response Coordinator,
the mobilization of many U.S. Government agencies that are
not traditionally involved in foreign disasters, and the rapid
deployment of people, equipment, and supplies into the field
before specific needs had been determined by USAID.
Historically, when the U.S. Government responds to a foreign
disaster, specific needs are identified and then resources are
requested to meet those needs. In domestic responses, to
protect American lives and property, resources are often pre-
positioned or rapidly deployed into the response.The resources
are not based on needs assessments, but rather on a general
understanding of the impact of specific disasters after years of
experience in known environments.The rapid deployment of
resources may be more effective for saving lives, but also very
expensive because of the duplication and inefficiencies inherent
to the process.
In Haiti, the greatest initial difficulty with delivering assets was
that the logistics and infrastructure capacity on the ground
were not sufficient to absorb the massive volume of equipment,
personnel, and supplies being sent to the country.The embassy
was utilized as the base of operations for the interagency,
hindering its ability to maneuver and make substance-based
decisions about who should come down, when, and for what
purpose, and how they should organize.There were times when
supplies arrived without any proper consignee or distribution
mechanism, which occurred with private donations.The limited
infrastructure support and storage space available prevented
many of these resources from being used in a timely manner.
In regards to transporting resources to Haiti, one respondent
stated,“It was like pushing a bowling ball through a hose.” Also,
transportation was limited within Port-au-Prince.The first few
days of the response, hundreds of people, including DMAT and
FEMA teams, were unable to move about because of a lack of
available cars and Haitian drivers to transport them.
The vast majority of relief commodities arrived at the airport
and seaport in Port-au-Prince and remained concentrated
in the capital. Few relief supplies made it to surrounding and
outlying departments, where there was increased need of public
services-because of those displaced from Port-au-Prince such
as education, health care, water, and electricity, as well as those
areas where departments were already stretched to the limits.
Overall, the response was very successful at rapidly mitigating
the impact of the earthquake. However, it came at some cost,
which testifies to the generosity and concern of the U.S.
Government and its people towards a massive catastrophe that
occurred in its neighborhood.The effectiveness of the rapid aid
is indisputable but it brought with it some inevitable process
inefficiencies.
The response in Haiti combined resources from the Haitian
Government, the U.S. Government, the United Nations and
other multilateral donors; many donor nations; and both the
domestic and international private sector. It was truly a global
response.This section of the report will detail the role of each
major stakeholder in the Haitian relief effort, followed by an
analysis of how the U.S. Government coordinated its response
with these stakeholders.
The United States “Whole of
Government” Approach and its
Application in Haiti
Figure 13 (page 60) provides the organizational framework for
the U.S. Government response in Haiti and its interaction with
the Government of Haiti, the United Nations, and donor nations.
USAID, as the lead federal agency, coordinated the response of
the interagency (FEMA, HHS, military JTF, etc.).The Department
of State, USAID, and JTF-Haiti all worked with the Government
of Haiti and the UN to conduct joint implementation of the
relief effort and then longer-term strategic planning for the
reconstruction and recovery phase.There were difficulties
early in the response regarding the relationships and reporting
structures, especially between the USAID Mission, ORC, and
DART.

The U.S. Embassy in Haiti
Within hours of the earthquake, the U.S.Ambassador declared
a disaster and requested assistance from the U.S. Government.
Both the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission
immediately began to reach out to the President and Prime
Minister of Haiti.The embassy’s initial focus was coordination
with and support for the Haitian Government, the health of
its own staff, and the safe evacuation of over 16,800 American
citizens to the United States. It also supported U.S. Government
responders deploying to the country. One-third of the embassy
staff decided to leave Haiti due to the impact of the earthquake.
The U.S. Embassy in the Dominican Republic sent replacement
staff within two days to help support embassy operations.These
included consular officers, physicians, psychiatrists, and public
affairs officers.
The Ambassador and embassy staff maintained close working
relations with the USAID/OFDA DART team and USAID
Mission throughout the response period.The Ambassador
played a critical supporting role in the response, due to his years
of experience in Haiti and prior work with USAID and DOD
in the 2008 hurricane season. On the day of the earthquake,
the Ambassador was able to speak with the Justice Minister,
Minister of the Interior, and the head of the Police.The following
day, contact was made with President Preval, who requested
immediate assistance from the U.S. Government to reopen the
sea and airports.The open lines of communication between
the Ambassador and the Haitian President and Prime Minister
were critical to enabling the response efforts and creating an
environment where the U.S. Government and military could
respond effectively.
The U.S. Embassy served as the physical focal point for the
coordination of the relief effort by the U.S. Government.A
year before the earthquake, the U.S. Embassy moved to its new
compound, located outside of the center of Port-au-Prince
and with facilities constructed to withstand major geological
and meteorological events.Although the embassy stood up to
the earthquake, over 50% of the staff housing was completely
destroyed. Embassy staff, both American and Haitian, lost
everything they owned and many also lost friends and relatives;
they were victims as well as first responders. However, the staff
had no time to grieve or rest: within 48 hours, hundreds of U.S.
Government personnel from myriad agencies arrived at the
embassy seeking support from its staff, and using the embassy
compound as both their base of operations and living quarters.
The commitment and compassion of embassy personnel was
exceptional and deserves recognition and praise.
The day after the earthquake, the OFDA DART team and the
first international USAR team arrived in Haiti.The U.S. Embassy
served as the headquarters for these teams as well as for all of
the federal agency teams that arrived. However, the number of
responders that arrived soon overwhelmed the embassy; most
were not requested by the Ambassador.Within the first week
of the event, hundreds of staff arrived from the Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, State,Agriculture,Transportation,
and Treasury; HHS; the Federal Communications Commission;
and the United States Geological Survey.The U.S. military also
moved many personnel into the embassy grounds, and took
office space for their work and used embassy vehicles for
transportation.A small tent city developed within the embassy
walls, complete with living quarters and sanitation facilities.
These interagency staff, that had not been officially requested
and arrived with no advanced notification, placed a tremendous
burden on the logistical infrastructure of the embassy.This led
to limitations of many resources, such as food, water, shelter,
transportation, and interpreters. Even the embassy sanitation
facilities were almost overwhelmed, but according to the
Ambassador,“Waterless urinals saved us.” Because most federal
agencies do not specialize in international disaster response,
their personnel arrived without clear mandates, scopes of
work, or assigned roles and were not self-sufficient.They often
lacked adequate resources to carry out their mission without
support and relied on the embassy to provide vehicles, drivers,
translators, guides, and security coordination.
The embassy was involved in the daily 0700 and 1900 calls with
interagency and senior government officials, led by the Under
Figure 13: Organizational framework of the U.S. Government and its
interaction with international partners

Secretary of State for Management.The calls were managed
with the first 10 minutes providing an update from the field
and the next 40 minutes addressing specific items based on an
agenda and the last 10 minutes or more devoted to American
Citizen Services.To prepare for these calls, the embassy held
at-post meetings at 0600 and in the early afternoon in order
to compile information from USAID, DOD, and other agencies.
With close cooperation from the DOS and the DOD, embassy
staff evacuated more than 16,000 American citizens within
several weeks of the event. Moreover, thousands of visas were
processed for Haitians seeking assistance from friends and family
in the United States, and hundreds of Haitian patients with life-
threatening injuries were transported to hospitals in Florida and
Georgia.
For the embassy, the crisis phase resolved after about two
weeks. By the last week of January, the majority of AMCITS
were already evacuated. Finally, many federal agencies returned
to the U.S. as they realized they lacked the capacity to respond
to the immediate needs in Haiti.This allowed the embassy and
USAID staff to focus attention on the response coordination
and implementation with the UN and the GOH, which began to
function more effectively after the first week of the response.
Transition from Relief to Long-term
Reconstruction and Development
In Haiti, the embassy and Department of State had a limited
role in planning the transition from relief to reconstruction and
development, as that occurred mostly in Washington.Through
the Civilian Response Corps, S/CRS sent one staff member to
Haiti embedded in JTF-H to support longer-term planning at Task
Force IV in Washington and civilian-military coordination.A team
of advisors and long-term strategists was offered by S/CRS but
did not receive permission to deploy to Haiti due to the limited
capacity of the U.S. Embassy to support additional personnel
and uncertainty of the team’s added value to operations in Haiti.
However, the S/CRS team from the Haiti Stabilization Initiative,
which was already working in Haiti, did provide long-term
planning assistance to Task Force IV and cooperated with the
UN in its reconstruction and development strategy.Although
Task Force IV was stood down after five weeks, members of
the task force assisted in preparing the Government of Haiti for
the International Donor’s Conference at the end of March by
providing ground-checked information to the Haiti 2020 group in
Washington.
5.1.1 The initial response to all disasters is local, and
the embassy and USAID Mission were critical to the
response in the first days. Local Missions, particularly in
disaster-prone areas, are essential for identifying needs,
working with the local government, and coordinating the
response.
R5.1.1: Embassies and USAID missions need to have specific
disaster-response expertise and training to ensure
a rapid and efficient relief effort.Training programs
and SOPs for positions should be created to reach
this goal.
5.1.2 The Department of State in Washington and the
embassy in the Dominican Republic acted swiftly to
provide relief and support to the embassy in Port-
au-Prince. Based on lessons learned from previous events
that affected U.S. embassies, such as the Nairobi bombing, the
Department of State applied best practices to immediately
relieve staff and rapidly repatriate them to the U.S., as well as
to send additional staff to support on-going embassy operations
and to offer breaks to those who had been present on the day
the quake struck.These actions were key for the successful
repatriation of 16,800 U.S. citizens within two weeks.
R5.1.2: The U.S. Department of State should strengthen
its capacity to rapidly reinforce or replace staff at an
embassy that has been directly impacted by an event.
This could include the creation of a “DART-like”
team that can be deployed within 24 hours to
ensure the continuity of key roles.The DOS should
also develop policies and guidelines to ensure that
embassy staff is assisted as needed and that
additional support is provided for the safety of staff
and continuity of embassy operations.
5.1.3 Many federal agencies (USAID and CDC being
notable exceptions) may not have possessed adequate
experience to prepare them for work in international
disaster settings. Though these agencies had good disaster
response skills, they possessed little international training or
experience. On occasion, their presence needed extensive
support from the Embassy and USAID, who were themselves
stretched to conduct their roles effectively. Some domestic
agencies possess small international sections, but they are not
prepared to provide essential humanitarian services in a rapid
manner.

R5.1.3: If domestic disaster response assets are to be
deployed, they must be properly trained and
equipped and have the necessary international
experience to function unsupported in a foreign
setting.
5.2 USAID in Haiti
USAID has maintained an extensive program portfolio in Haiti
over the last 30 years, with significant funding to support its
development strategy. In 2008, USAID provided over $246
million for various development programs in the areas of conflict
mitigation, security, democracy and governance, humanitarian
assistance, health service delivery, education, food security, and
economic growth.92
Typically, USAID has engaged civil society
and the NGO sector to implement development programs
in Haiti. However, since the release of the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) by the World Bank in 2009, USAID, with
the support of the Obama administration, has adopted more
partnership programs with the Government of Haiti.93
USAID had three main management structures for its relief
effort in Haiti.These included the USAID Mission, USAID/OFDA
DART team, and the Office of the Response Coordinator.
USAID Mission
Despite personal losses, the USAID Mission was up and running
again within a short period of time.The primary task of the
Mission was to re-orient its current programs to quickly respond
to the new needs of the population.The Mission attempted to
coordinate with OFDA to integrate their emergency programs
with its on-going programs in country, but there was insufficient
time or staff to effectively achieve this aim.
The USAID Mission in the Dominican Republic provided
important staff and financial support to USAID/Haiti to assist
with its response. USAID/DR re-channeled its funding to
support four Ministry of Health hospitals by providing them with
pharmaceuticals, supplies, and equipment. It also awarded small
grants to international and local NGOs to address acute medical
needs, especially infectious diseases, along the Haiti/DR border.
In addition to monetary support, USAID/DR supported a daily
shuttle bus for embassy personnel traveling to Port-au-Prince.94
OFDA DART
USAID/OFDA Washington mobilized the DART, which arrived
in Haiti within 24 hours of the earthquake, initially with 17
members.At the height of the emergency response phase,
the DART team consisted of 34 core staff augmented by 511
USAR team members.The DART team was comprised of a
cross-section of technical specialists with expertise in disaster
response operations. Similar to the Domestic Incident Command
System (ICS) on which it is based, the DART is organized into
six major functional areas: Management, Operations, Planning,
Logistics,Administration, and Communications.All members
perform a functional task in support of this organization, with
defined scopes of work. For the response in Haiti, the DART
included safety and security officers, food and nutrition experts,
shelter and settlements advisors, search and rescue officers,
logisticians, communications experts, technical experts,WASH
specialists, civilian-military liaisons, information coordinators, and
operations specialists.
USAID/OFDA DART is responsible for providing technical
expertise in disaster response and management, helping the U.S.
Embassy and USAID Mission to: (1) coordinate the response,
particularly with the international humanitarian assistance
community and the host country response institutions; and
(2) oversee the USAID-appropriated U.S. disaster assistance
resources used in the response. DART activities on the ground
can be divided into five core functions: assessment; coordination
and technical support for the response; delivery of relief
commodities; grant making; and monitoring and evaluation.
The DART conducted assessments of the disaster impacts and
humanitarian needs as soon as it arrived. It analyzed the existing
capacity of Haiti’s infrastructure and of the participating relief
agencies to target U.S. Government assistance and suggest
funding for the response. Based on these assessments, the DART
helped develop and implement a U.S. Government response
strategy for USAID/OFDA and provided an operational presence
for OFDA capable of carrying out key response activities.
The DART’s role in coordination and technical support was
key to the proper integration of relief capabilities among the
various stakeholders involved in the response.The DART
provided technical assistance to the cluster system, working
closely with each cluster’s lead agency, as well as the Presidential
93
Schaaf, Bryan. 2008.“USAID Programs and Priorities in Haiti.” Haiti Innovation: Choice, Partnership, Community Website. Modified 13 July.
http://www.haitiinnovation.org/en/2008/07/13/usaid-programs-and-priorities-haiti.Accessed on 15 September 2010.
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USAID/DR. 2010. USAID/Dominican Republic Response to Haiti Earthquake.

Commissions and Ministries, to coordinate response activities
and priorities. It organized the food distribution, nutrition, and
breast-feeding programs and the emergency medical and primary
health care services, and coordinated the urban search and
rescue operations.The OFDA DART Shelter and Settlements
advisor organized a joint conference, in cooperation with the
U.N. Human Settlements Program (UN-HABITAT) staff and the
GOH Shelter Commission urban planning officials, to design
policies for the GOH emergency master plan for Port-au-Prince.
The meeting was held on 19 February, with representation
from the GOH, the DART team, and Haitian and international
agency planners, architects, and engineers and was critical to
developing a consolidated shelter master plan for Haiti.The
meeting also produced important results, emphasizing debris
management as a key element of recovery and redevelopment.
In addition to coordinating the U.S. Government’s relief efforts
with the Haitian Government and the United Nations, the
OFDA DART team also cooperated with other donors, such as
the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the
European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO),
and the World Bank, to coordinate the response in the field
strategically and operationally.The DART team worked closely
with the JTF to coordinate MITAMs through the HACC that was
set up within days of the earthquake.
Finally, the OFDA DART was tasked to assist with the
coordination of the interagency response that included over 25
federal and executive agencies with hundreds of staff.
The DART coordinated the delivery of more than 40 planeloads
of relief commodities, including more than 111,000 water
containers, nearly 75,000 hygiene kits, more than 10,000 rolls
of plastic sheeting, and 5,000 kitchen sets. In addition, the six
USAID-funded USAR teams saved the lives of 47 people trapped
in collapsed structures.The role of the USAID/OFDA Liaison
in SOUTHCOM was vital to coordinate the validation of relief
commodities for Haiti and organize their shipment using U.S.
Government resources.
Based on proposals received from the DART team, USAID/
OFDA Washington approved over 20 large-scale grants to
NGOs, UN agencies, and international organizations within
the first three weeks of the response.95
By the sixth week of
the response, USAID programmed more than $400 million to
address immediate food, water, health, and shelter needs.The
DART team conducted on-going monitoring and evaluation of
all its grant activities by partnering to ensure proper execution
of their objectives. Monitoring and evaluation included reporting
on the evolving disaster situation, transition, and recommended
follow-up actions.
On 28 April, the DART team in Haiti stood down and transferred
all programming to the USAID program office at the Mission
in Port-au-Prince. USAID program staff continues to assess
and identify humanitarian needs and coordinate delivery of
emergency relief supplies to Port-au-Prince and surrounding
areas affected by the earthquake.
The DART encountered many difficulties and some criticism.A
number of U.S. Government responders in Haiti perceived a lack
of cooperation in its operation immediately after the disaster.At
the same time, DART members were struggling to focus on their
routine response functions and felt overwhelmed by all of the
agencies and individuals trying to add their resources, through
the DART, to the response.The unclear role of the DART within
the greater U.S. response in Haiti added to the confusion and led
the DART to further focus on its own activities to the exclusion
of others.Another problem was the relatively small size of the
DART and the rapid turnover of its members, making continuity
and consistency difficult. Nonetheless, the DART, particularly the
DART leaders who worked tirelessly, was widely appreciated
and recognized by UN partner agencies and NGOs for its
competence during the response.
Office of the Response Coordinator
Due to the scale of the response, USAID deployed additional
support to the USAID Mission through the Office of the
Response Coordinator. On 16 January, the special Coordinator
arrived to direct the ORC.The purpose of the ORC was to
provide support such as staffing, transitional program planning,
information management, and program administration to assist
the Mission and the USAID/OFDA in relief programming and
the transition to longer-term reconstruction and development.
However, the ORC remained critically under-staffed and under-
resourced until 19 February, when additional staff arrived
through the Civilian Response Corps.
95
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti-Earthquake. Fact Sheet 25; 6 February

The ORC’s role and the scope of work for the special
Coordinator were not well communicated to the leadership
in the embassy or the in-country staff of USAID.The lack of
clear role definition led to friction with the USAID Mission,
U.S. Embassy, and DART.The ORC was under-resourced, with
no logistical capacity, few staff members, and no independent
budget for organizing or implementing plans and projects until
late February.The office was reliant (as were almost all U.S.
Government personnel going to Haiti) on the embassy for the
basics of food, water, transportation, and interpreters.
By the end of February, the ORC was fully operational and
provided support to the USAID Mission and DART Team.This
allowed the Mission to manage its on-going programs and then
plan their reintegration.
Transition from Relief to Reconstruction
and Development
As of March, the ORC began to fund transitional development
programs such as cash-for-work and government support
programs. It also designed programming to link ORC-and
OFDA-funded grants and to integrate them into the longer-
term programming of the Mission.Additionally, the ORC
provided support to coordinate the extensive civilian-military
operations.The passage of the supplemental bill by Congress had
significant impact on the ability of the ORC to fund transitional
programming.As the USAID Mission ramped up its capacity over
time, the ORC’s plan was to hand over tasks on information
management, program administration, and civilian-military and
donor coordination.When the ORC stands down its operations,
the Mission will assume responsibility for all programming and
coordination.
Staff at USAID and the ORC provided technical assistance to
the Government of Haiti in cooperation with other multilateral
donors such as the World Bank, DFID, CIDA, the UN, and
the European Union to develop the National Action Plan for
Reconstruction and Development in Haiti.The ORC worked
closely with the Government of Haiti to establish the Interim
Haiti Reconstruction Commission, which was ratified by the
parliament in April. USAID also assisted the government in
creating the Bureau for IDP Resettlement, which was launched
in May at the request of the Haitian President, to focus more
attention on removing rubble and returning people to their
communities, as well as relocating some internally displaced
persons to newly re-developed areas.
Personnel and Staff Augmentation for
USAID in Haiti
In total, 36 Civilian Response Corps personnel deployed to Haiti
through the Office of Civilian Response between 12 January and
1 June 2010.The agencies that supplied civilians for deployment
included the Environmental Protection Agency and USAID in
Washington.The ORC’s staffing was almost entirely comprised
of CRC personnel mobilized by USAID in Washington through
the ORC at USAID to augment the capacity of the Mission.The
CRC was useful for deploying professional staff to complement
the staffing roster at USAID in Haiti, but there were difficulties in
identifying and freeing up appropriate staff and deploying them in
a timely manner.
USAID/OFDA staff resources were stretched to the limit.
While widely recognized as highly competent technically, the
staffing depth of the OFDA DART team could not cope with
the demands for assessment, civilian-military coordination,
donor coordination, reporting, information management, and
transitional planning. DART staff rotated out of the field every
two to three weeks, having worked 20-hour days on a non-stop
basis.This caused coordination failures, inconsistency in planning
and cooperation with Haitian Government counterparts, and
challenges in working with the UN.
It is the pre-existing relationships among staff that are greatly
responsible for the success of the mission, as was widely
recognized in this event and reported in after action reports
(AARs) from many agencies. No amount of planning can account
for all variables in a disaster, so it is up to individuals to identify
problems and find solutions.
Command and Control in Haiti
Given the magnitude of the disaster, the lack of normal local and
international response leadership and the enormous number
of responders, coordination in Haiti was a critical challenge.
The unprecedented number of U.S. Government resources and
personnel allowed a more robust response, but increased the
demands on USAID for coordination.Although USAID was the
lead agency in charge of the response coordination, there were
different command structures within USAID.The initial lack
of a clearly delineated management hierarchy created friction,
complicated the response, and weakened the coordination.
Within USAID, there were three different potential chains of
command that worked, sometimes in parallel, with varying

degrees of cooperation and collaboration as the response
evolved.These include the DART/RMT, the Office of the
Response Coordinator, and the USAID Mission.
Few federal agencies that arrived in Haiti followed the chain of
command and reported to USAID, instead maintaining some
autonomy in their efforts and internal lines of command.There
was also a lack of information sharing among the various federal
agencies, which led to confusion when USAID/OFDA reported
on the response to Washington.This issue was compounded by
the fact that the USAID/OFDA DART team simply could not
manage the large number of federal agencies that all arrived at
once.Though some agencies did attempt to coordinate with
OFDA, there were problems caused by a lack of timely response,
mainly due to the extreme demands that were placed on the
USAID/OFDA DART team during the initial response phase.
The organization of the response in Haiti was also affected
by the degree of involvement of senior officials of the U.S.
Government in Washington. Many policymakers became
enmeshed in the day-to-day running of the disaster response,
detracting from the responders’ ability to perform their
jobs while tracking down minute details to provide data and
information to high-level policymakers in Washington to prepare
for daily Deputies and Principles meeting.
5.2.1 USAID had parallel chains of command, which
emanated from Haiti and ran along separate lines of
reporting to USAID in Washington. These included the
OFDA DART team, the ORC, and the USAID Mission in Haiti.
In Washington, USAID was divided by OFDA within the DCHA
Bureau and the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau.After
February, the Haiti Task Team was introduced in an effort to
promote and continue interagency coordination for transition
and long-term development and bridge the divide between
OFDA and LAC Bureau staff.The lack of clear guidance from
Washington as to the role of the ORC and the responsibilities
of its director vis-à-vis the DART team, USAID Mission director,
and U.S. Embassy made management more difficult.
R5.2.1: Clear lines of authority and reporting need to be
established in disaster management, both within
USAID and across the government.An IRF
management framework will correct this, but
roles and reporting should always be clearly defined
for all positions. HHS has drafted an International
Emergency Response Framework (IERF), written in
conjunction with an interagency working group,
that can inform the creation of an “IRF” and be
considered as a “public health and medical
response” annex or appendix.
5.2.2 The USAID Mission successfully implemented
rapid changes to its existing program portfolio in Haiti
to allow its implementation partners to modify their
programs and to meet the needs of the population
in Haiti after the earthquake. Implementation partners
acknowledged the professionalism and teamwork that was
demonstrated by the USAID Mission staff in working together
to modify existing contracts and grants so that their resources
could be re-targeted to the direct needs of the people in Haiti.
However, there was not sufficient time or staffing at the Mission
or on the DART to ensure that the USAID/OFDA emergency
programming was designed to match up effectively with the
revised USAID Mission development programs.
R5.2.2: Ramping up staff at the USAID Mission, through
special instruments such as the OCR, should be
available to assist Missions and USAID/OFDA DART
teams in designing integrated programs that blend
emergency response activities with transitional
activities and link them with development programs
following the immediate response period of
approximately six to nine months.
5.2.3 OFDA DART and other U.S. Government staff
rotated rapidly and undermined the continuity of
the response and coordination with key national and
international partners. The turnover of staff impacted
coordination between the U.S. Government, the UN, NGOs,
other donors, and the GOH.The limited OFDA DART staff for a
response of this magnitude meant that they worked 16-20 hours
per day, leading to exhaustion and rapid rotation.All personnel in
the Interagency, in both Haiti and Washington, experienced this.
The number of staff that USAID/OFDA could mobilize was too
small and the demands they faced were too large; there were
few mechanisms to incorporate additional U.S. Government
personnel to augment the OFDA DART team.The small number
of staff made it hard for other agencies to effectively interface
with them. It also reduced the ability of the DART to coordinate
their emergency programs with existing USAID Mission
programs to ensure smooth transitions between the two.

R5.2.3: Mechanisms to augment the capacity of the OFDA
DART teams should be established for large-scale
disasters. It is critical that the augmentation includes
only staff with OFDA qualifications.
R5.2.4: Adequate staff should be deployed to allow for
more routine work and break hours.As per
accepted guidelines, staff should work 12-hour shifts
and be guaranteed time off regularly (1/2-1 day
per 7 days).This will allow for longer deployments
and more continuity in staffing.
5.2.5 The USAID/OFDA DART team did not have access
to the latest technology and equipment to assist in its
response mission. The DART continues to use simple low-
tech equipment and supplies to conduct its emergency response
assessments, data collection, management, and communications.
The use of more appropriate technology will improve the
efficiency of the DART’s response and perhaps serve as a
mechanism to “augment” its limited staffing.
R5.2.5: USAID should identify appropriate, innovative
technology to upgrade the technological capacity of
OFDA.Technology must be tough and capable of
withstanding austere conditions. New technology
could be linked to well-designed databases that
would allow for rapid use of information for
decision making, reporting, and monitoring.
5.2.6 The immediate emergency response should have
targeted more resources for humanitarian assistance
programs outside of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan
area. The response did not focus enough resources on areas
outside of Port-au-Prince, drawing thousands of people back to
the capital looking for assistance.
R5.2.6: USAID should develop policy on the wider
implications of massive relief operations in poor
settings.
5.2.7 The ORC’s role, responsibilities, and reporting
structure were not well defined in Haiti in the first
weeks. Ambiguities in the role of the ORC and its added values
on the ground to the DART team, USAID Mission director, and
U.S. Embassy made management more difficult.This was not
resolved until late February with the arrival of additional staffing
through the Office of Civilian Response to strengthen the ORC.
R5.2.7: If an “ORC-level” position is to be used in
catastrophic response, the role of the ORC should
be better defined before deployment and be
coordinated with the USAID Mission and USAID/
OFDA. Reporting lines for the director of the ORC
must be clear, including the relationship to the
OFDA DART team leader and the USAID Mission
Director.The organization of the ORC in terms of
its staffing and technical competencies must be
framed prior to deployment, with clear scopes of
work for its members.
5.3 Civilian-Military Coordination
The military played a pivotal role in the humanitarian response
in Haiti. Its full capacity was channeled through the Southern
Command’s Joint Task Force-Haiti to rapidly deploy logistical,
assessment, and security capabilities, certainly saving many lives.
In a situation where time was critical and the national capacity to
respond was incapacitated at the governmental and commercial
levels, as well as at the UN, the use of the U.S. military was
necessary and appropriate to fill the vacuum, especially
during the initial response phase.Vital services such as airport
management; seaport repair; road clearance to deliver essential
humanitarian material; airlift and sealift capabilities to bring in
critically needed relief supplies; organizational capacity to manage
the supply chain; aerial reconnaissance; and manpower and
equipment to support HADR operations, logistics, and security,
could not have been accomplished by any other international or
host country agency.
Coordination between the U.S. Military
and the Government of Haiti and the
UN
The JTF command in Haiti stressed cooperation with the
Government of Haiti, USAID, UN OCHA clusters, and its
UN counterparts at MINUSTAH to plan and conduct its
humanitarian assistance actions. U.S. military advisors and
technical experts, such as engineers from the Army Corps of
Engineers, were important in the international coordination
architecture set up by the UN and Government of Haiti.
This included sending officers to the Coordination Support
Committee, the Project Management Coordination Cell, and the
UN/NGO clusters to assist in the planning of humanitarian and
development operations. In many cases, these meetings had more
U.S. military officers than civilian personnel.

From the beginning of the response, the U.S. military and
MINUSTAH agreed that American forces were there to support
and coordinate with MINUSTAH’s mission.This meant that
MINUSTAH would take the lead on general security operations
and that the U.S. military would maintain a low profile, providing
tactical security for humanitarian assistance activities.The close
relationship between the U.S. deputy commander and General
Peixoto, the head of MINUSTAH, was an important source of
JTF-MINUSTAH cooperation.The JTF command also appointed a
liaison to the Haitian President’s office.
The U.S. military’s humanitarian operations in Haiti included two
types of missions.The first was to provide tactical security for
NGOs to accomplish their humanitarian missions, particularly
food distributions.The second mission included the military’s
own humanitarian assistance/disaster response operations, such
as air and seaport operations, logistical support, debris clearance
projects, technical support for engineering projects to prevent
flooding, and the relocation of IDPs to the resettlement camp at
Corail.These HADR operations were planned and performed by
JTF forces in concert with the UN and GOH. However, many of
the HADR operations were not conducted with USAID/OFDA
involvement, especially during the first phase (initial three weeks)
of the emergency.
The JTF civil affairs team set up the Humanitarian Assistance
Coordination Cell (HACC) within days of the earthquake.The
purpose of the HACC was to: (1) coordinate, synchronize,
track, and assess humanitarian assistance operations; (2) create
and maintain a humanitarian common operational picture; (3)
integrate with all stakeholders and develop a prioritized list of
support requirements; (4) serve as the primary JTF interface
with OFDA; and (5) coordinate all HADR missions conducted by
the military.
The U.S. military set up its HACC at the U.S. Embassy and
established a forward operating unit based at the UN’s newly
formed Joint Operating Tasking Center (JOTC) for the purposes
of coordinating HACC/JOTC humanitarian support missions.
The HACC was to coordinate U.S. military HADR support
operations and coordinate with NGOs to provide tactical
security for food distributions. MINUSTAH and UN OCHA set
up their Joint Operating Tasking Center (JOTC) at the UN log
base.While the HACC focused on coordinating U.S. military
HADR missions, the JOTC concentrated on provision of tactical
security to NGOs through the cluster system so that they could
perform their wide-ranging humanitarian assistance activities.
Although some NGOs did attempt to work directly with the
HACC to support their humanitarian activities, meetings and
coordination were difficult due to security clearances at the
HACC because of its co-location at the U.S. Embassy. However,
given that NGOs had full access to the UN compound at the log
base, they could more easily work with the JOTC to coordinate
their humanitarian support needs.
The HACC’s 17-person forward element at the JOTC was
established to promote communication and coordination
between the two mechanisms (HACC and JOTC); however, this
was limited for the first few weeks while U.S. military personnel
became familiar with the UN and its operations.After a short
period of time, a de facto understanding emerged between the
HACC and JOTC.The HACC would support primarily U.S.
military-led HADR operations and the JOTC would support
NGO-led humanitarian assistance missions via the cluster
system. However, there was a great example of coordination
between the HACC and JOTC, which was the successful
planning, coordination, and implementation of security support
for the largest food distribution ever conducted in an urban
setting.The careful coordination between the U.S. military
planners, UN/WFP staff, GOH officials, and NGO community
represented the pinnacle of civil-military coordination and
proved to be an outstanding accomplishment, feeding more than
one million people over a period of two months.
Figure 14 outlines the international coordination architecture
(provided by the JTF command in their presentation at the
NDU Peacekeeping Conference), specifically highlighting the
relationships between the JOTC and the HACC. It is clear that
the HACC worked directly with the JTF command and US
Military units, while the JOTC worked directly with the UN
Cluster system and NGO community.
Ordinarily, when the U.S. military is needed to support
international disaster response, they conduct all HADR
operations under the Mission Tasking Matrix system.The MITAM
system was established by the military and USAID to facilitate
coordination for humanitarian assistance operations and ensure
they are conducted appropriately. MITAMs are orders based on
requests for assistance. Normally, the requests for assistance
(RFAs) are issued by civilians working at OFDA, the UN, and
NGOs or by military officers in the field. In the case of Haiti, the
RFAs were collected by the JOTC and then distributed to the
various agencies, to be implemented based on the ability of the
agency to respond to the type of assistance requested.As shown

in the diagram, USAID was one of the agencies to which RFAs
were provided. It was then the responsibility of USAID to issue
MITAMs to the JTF-H HACC for the HACC to then coordinate
HADR support provided by the U.S. military. Normally, no
military HADR missions are conducted without the issuance of
a MITAM.
However, the situation in Haiti was far from normal. Due to the
intense demands for assistance and the huge number of RFAs
that were generated, there was a need for the U.S. military to
respond more rapidly than usual.This was especially true during
the initial emergency phase of the response, when the UN,
NGOs, and OFDA resources were stretched to the limit and
could not effectively coordinate the MITAM system. Because
the MITAM system could not keep pace with the demands for
assistance, the U.S. military performed many HADR missions
without MITAM instruction.This meant that field officers directly
ordered HADR missions without any civilian authorization.
According to USAID and military logistics officers, during the
period 12 January 2010 until 1 June 2010, approximately 7% of
all HADR missions conducted by the U.S. military were under
MITAMs. In order to facilitate the high level of HADR operations
by the military, the 410th Contracting Brigade was deployed
to assist in making contracts with local commercial entities
to conduct operations such as rubble removal, drainage canal
clearance, and campsite construction for relocation of IDPs.
While there can be no argument that many of the field-ordered
HADR missions were necessary and led to many lifesaving
actions by the U.S. military, these types of non-MITAM missions
were primarily needed during the initial response phase of three
to four weeks. By 23 January, the JOTC was established, and by
early February, MITAMs could have and should have been used
to coordinate and provide proper command and control of U.S.
Figure 14: International Coordination Architecture
(Source: USSOUTHCOM – NDU Peacekeeping Conference: U.S. Perspective JTF Haiti, 2010)

military HADR missions to be sure they complied with best
practices in disaster relief situations.This would have also had
the effect of reducing the number of HADR missions by the
military and led to cost savings in the response, as some of the
military’s HADR missions were not deemed necessary by the
UN and NGO community.
Transition from Relief to Recovery and
from U.S. Military to MINUSTAH and
Civilian Authorities
On 22 January, the seaport was reopened, and by 23 January,
the Government of Haiti declared an end to search and rescue
operations. On 19 February, commercial air service to Port-
au-Prince resumed, reestablishing a link with the international
community and allowing private sector transport to begin
assisting in the relief effort. By 20 February, the Canadian
military stood down in Haiti and handed over its mission to
civilian authorities from the UN, NGOs, and the Government
of Haiti. On 19 January, the UN passed Resolution 1908 to
send an additional 2,000 troops and nearly 1,000 police officers
to augment MINUSTAH in Haiti.96
By the end of February,
all additional personnel had arrived. By 16 March, 68% of the
targeted 1.3 million IDPs had received emergency shelter
materials97
, and by mid-March, the food security situation had
been stabilized and access to potable water had been significantly
improved.
Figure 15: Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell
(Source: USSOUTHCOM – NDU Peacekeeping Conference: U.S. Perspective JTF Haiti, 2010)
96
America. 2010.“U.N. Security Council Resolution 1908 on Haiti” American.gov Website. Modified 19 January 2010.
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/January/20100119153403eaifas0.1554028.html.Accessed on 11 September 2010.
97
Office of the Response Coordinator. 2010.“Weekly Slide Update: Phase II/III Analysis and Planning.” Haiti Relief and Recovery. 16 March.

Beginning soon after the earthquake, the J5 directorate (future
planning) started to draft plans for withdrawal of the JTF, with
projected end states and target dates by which this could be
accomplished.
It was agreed that these target dates for JTF stand down would
be conditions-based. During the course of the response, the JTF
commander remained in close contact with the Government
of Haiti and MINUSTAH to coordinate its withdrawal. JTF
command also stayed in daily contact with Washington
policymakers to provide information on the security situation
and receive direction on the end states for withdrawal. Clear
conditions for the stand down of the JTF were not established.
Although MINUSTAH was ready to resume full responsibility for
the security situation and humanitarian support in Haiti by early
March, the U.S. military did not withdraw its operations until 1
June because it was determined by the interagency leadership
that conditions were not met.
5.3.1 The U.S. military’s rapid deployment of key
expertise to restore critical airport functions and air
traffic control was critical for allowing the rapid build-up
of humanitarian aid. This was equally true for the seaports,
where the USCG and TRANSCOM deployed and/or contracted
highly specialized capacities—both human (e.g. divers) and
equipment/machinery (e.g. floating docks)—to restore port
operations.The importance of such deployment of specialized
capacities to rehabilitate and temporarily replace critical
transport infrastructure cannot be overstated.
R5.3.1: The U.S. military should develop best practices
from its air traffic control and seaport control
operations, in cooperation with the UN and
Department of Transportation, for use in future
disaster response scenarios.
5.3.2 Transition planning for the eventual withdrawal of
the JTF was among the most critical planning challenges.
There was a clear need for condition-based plans and targeted
timetables to ensure that U.S. capacities would only be
withdrawn when there were sufficient Haitian and MINUSTAH
capacities and when their specialized services were no longer
required. However, policymakers did not define tactical and
strategic end states at the start of Operation Unified Response,
nor were they defined during the six-month period following the
earthquake.
R5.3.2: Policymakers should provide clear direction to the
military for end states and processes that allow
for the transition of U.S. military responsibilities to
civilian authorities.This should be done as early as
possible to avoid potential over use of U.S. military
assets and dominance over humanitarian operations
in the field.
5.3.3 The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell
established by the JTF provides an important lesson
learned and potential for best practices that should be
applied for future large-scale disaster responses. While
the MITAM system has been shown to work well without the
need for a HACC under normal disaster response situations,
the formation of a HACC could prove useful for large-scale
catastrophic events where there is need for wide-ranging military
HADR support.
R5.3.3: The HACC has potential for coordinating civilian-
military relief operations and can be viewed
as a lesson learned for possible application in future
large-scale disaster responses. Specific scopes of
responsibility and organizational mechanisms should
be designed for future HACC deployments.These
mechanisms should be flexible and scalable to meet
the specific needs of the disaster context.The
aim of the HACC should be to conduct all HADR
operations through the MITAM system.The HACC
should review the JOTC mechanism to determine
if any lessons can be applied for direct coordination
with NGOs and the UN.The location of the HACC
should be reviewed so that it is accessible to the
widest possible range of humanitarian agencies
possible while maintaining its own security.The
forward coordinating unit of the HACC is a valuable
mechanism, but it should be strengthened and
encouraged to conduct effective coordination with
civilian counterparts.
R5.3.4: The MITAM system is critical to coordinate, monitor
and evaluate assistance provided by the U.S. military
in disaster response situations.The MITAM system
should be revised for large-scale catastrophic events
so that it can be employed even under extreme
circumstances with limited USAID/OFDA, UN, or
NGO capacity. It must be an easily managed

mechanism that is adaptable for command and
control of all HADR operations.
5.3.5 During the initial days of the response, the
U.S. military provided humanitarian aid directly to
communities in the absence of NGOs and the UN
because of the overwhelming needs. The military initially
operated based on broad direction from the USAID/OFDA.
While this flexibility was important at that time, direction and
required action need to be more specific as a response evolves.
This type of humanitarian assistance is not a usual role for the
military and requires specific humanitarian expertise such as
registration systems, needs-based allocation of aid to avoid
social and economic disruptions, and proper targeting of relief
to at-risk populations.This led to missions such as food airdrops
in urban settings, which can cause rioting, and the establishment
of IDP camps without clear support of the local authorities and
other partners.
R5.3.5: The military should coordinate all direct
humanitarian relief activities through USAID/OFDA
and delivery-based NGOs. U.S. military commanders
should be educated to not engage in HADR
operations without the direction of USAID or
the UN.
5.4 Multilateral Donor Coordination
The U.S. Government worked closely with donor partners,
foreign governments, and NGOs to support relief efforts.
Multilateral collaboration reinforces response efforts, minimizes
duplication of efforts, and presents a unified response from the
international community.The roles of the United Nations, DFID,
World Bank, and ECHO are discussed in this section.
Within the first week of the response, the international donor
community established daily donor meetings to coordinate
efforts.These meetings included representatives from all major
donors, including the UK, the European Union, Canada, Spain,
Norway, Ireland, and the World Bank, as well as a USAID/DART
member who worked directly with the donor community.
Donors coordinated budget decisions based on priorities
established by the UN Flash Appeal released three days after the
earthquake. Further tuning of the funding coordination was done
through participation in UN cluster meetings and integrated
donor planning sessions.These meetings helped to produce the
revised UN Flash Appeal issued on 18 February.The USAID/
DART representatives were liaisons between major donors
and USAID to coordinate budgets and minimize duplication of
efforts. Major contributors, such as DFID and ECHO, provided
emergency response funding to key NGOs in the cluster system.
As fiscal agent for the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) that
was established following the UN Donor Conference in March,
the World Bank supported reconstruction and long-term
development programs in Haiti. In addition to managing the
HRF, the World Bank collaborated with the U.S. Government
to provide funding to the Government of Haiti for emergency
response projects, which included rebuilding the state’s capacity
to operate, clearing drainage canals, rebuilding roads, and
assessing housing damage.
Within days of the earthquake, the World Bank took over the
payroll functions of government employees and encouraged
their return to government offices.They also conducted detailed
damage estimates of government buildings with the Army Corps
of Engineers and successfully and rapidly issued contracts to
private building firms for reconstruction efforts.They retrieved
databases from the destroyed buildings and, working with USAID,
partially reconstructed government financial data.The World
Bank’s collaboration with the U.S. Government was handicapped
by the number of U.S. agencies and individuals temporarily
working for the U.S. Government. Discussions on major
rebuilding, housing, or transport projects were held with persons
whose status and decision-making authority was unclear; some
time was lost in this process.World Bank coordination with the
U.S. Government in Washington, in contrast, was efficient; the
single point of contact was an interagency committee through
which all joint planning for relief and recovery were channeled.
United Nations
The coordination between United Nations’ and United States’
efforts in Haiti presented challenges, but worked well. Initially
the UN struggled to provide leadership after the devastating
losses of their leaders on the ground. MINUSTAH has had a UN
mandate for long-term peacekeeping operations in Haiti since
2004, while the U.S. and other international military forces were
deployed at the invitation of the Government of Haiti. Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Mulet and
Ambassador Merten signed a Statement of Principles between
the U.S. Government and the United Nations on 22 January
that recognized the primary responsibility of the Government
of Haiti for the response and the supporting role of the UN

and U.S. Government, with the UN coordinating international
assistance.
UN-U.S. coordination also occurred in Washington and New
York City. Early on, bilateral liaisons were appointed by the
U.S. and UN to work at the respective organizations to assist
in coordinating activities. However, because of the number of
agencies involved, there was often confusion due to the multiple
lines of communication.These included the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to USUN in NewYork,
SOUTHCOM to the UN Office of Military Affairs, SOUTHCOM
to MINUSTAH, and Department of State Task Force to the
United Nations Peacekeeping Situation Centre.
The UN and Government of Haiti launched the overall
coordination mechanisms on 23 January, ten days after the
earthquake. Figure 16 portrays the international coordination
architecture designed by UN and the Government of Haiti.
Figure 16: International Coordination Architecture

In-Theater Strategic Coordination98
The lead coordinating body for relief and humanitarian aid was
the High Level Coordination Committee (HLCC).The HLCC
was co-chaired by the Haitian Prime Minister and the Acting
UN Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG)
and included key Ambassadors and mission heads.The HLCC,
which met five times between February and March, provided the
overall political umbrella for in-country coordination of the relief
effort and played a critical role in validating decisions reached at
the operational level in the context of the Coordination Support
Committee (CSC), described below.
In-Theater Operational Coordination99
At the operational level, the HLCC was supplemented
with a Coordination Support Committee chaired by the
Haitian Minister of Tourism (as the initial coordinator of the
government’s response), the UN Principal Deputy SRSG, and the
Deputy SRSG/RC/HC of MINUSTAH.The CSC was comprised
of the in-country heads of the military and political responding
organizations and of the major bilateral and multilateral donor
aid programs in Haiti.The CSC considered priority thematic
(e.g. sanitation, shelter, debris management) or geographic (e.g.
assessments of regional situations beyond Port-au-Prince)
issues to help inform a more coherent view on those response
priorities and to help focus donor and military operational
support around those priorities.The selection of issues was
based on: (i) priority; (ii) complexity; and (iii) the involvement of
multiple actors.
The CSC also established subsidiary planning and working
groups, such as debris management and camp planning, to
produce concrete recommendations.A key component of the
CSC was the Project Management Coordination Cell (PMCC)
to facilitate a coordinated approach to the development and
implementation of project plans between the government,
donors, NGOs, UN agencies, MINUSTAH, and the U.S. military.
The PMCC’s main areas of focus included: debris management;
canals and drainage; temporary sites for displaced persons;
registration; and movement of IDPs to safe sites.The U.S.
military, especially staff from the Army Corps of Engineers and
MINUSTAH, provided critical technical assistance to the PMCC.
In-TheaterTactical Coordination100
MINUSTAH and OCHA created and jointly staffed the Joint
Operations Tasking Center on 23 January, based on terms of
reference jointly developed with the Government of Haiti.The
JOTC was built upon the peacekeeping mission’s pre-earthquake
Joint Operations Centre (JOC) and was rapidly expanded by
temporary peacekeeping staff from other field missions to better
address the unprecedented and complex need for coordination.
Initially driven by the urgent need to improve coordination of
the wider UN system’s assistance to the humanitarian relief
operation, JOTC was soon adapted to provide coordination
support to international military partners.The JOTC was
comprised of representatives from UN Mission components
(military, police, and relevant civilian sections), OCHA, and WFP,
as well as liaison officers from the U.S. JTF and Canadian TF, the
European Union Situation Centre cell, and the UN’s Caribbean
Community Secretariat military contingent.
OCHA also supported the establishment of the Humanitarian
Country Team (HCT), established during the first week
of February, that met twice weekly throughout the initial
emergency phase to address key strategic issues.101
The UN
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), who also served as Resident
Coordinator (RC) and Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General (DSRSG), led the HCT. Strategic coordination
was strengthened with the establishment of the positions
of Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) and Senior
Humanitarian Advisor to the HC.
For more details on the role of the MINUSTAH, OCHA, PAHO,
and other UN agencies in the response in Haiti, please refer to
Annex 10.6.
5.4.1 The JOTC and MINUSTAH were critical to
coordinate the provision of humanitarian assistance
98
NDU. 2010. Lessons Learned during the Crisis Response to the 12 January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti.
99
Ibid
100
NDU. 2010. Lessons Learned during the Crisis Response to the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti.
101

with the GOH, NGOs, and international community
in Haiti. Notwithstanding the multiple bilateral arrangements
that occurred, the JOTC demonstrated the value of co-
location, coordination, and joint planning between government,
humanitarian organizations, MINUSTAH, and international
military partners in a large-scale humanitarian emergency. It also
served as a confidence-building tool between the international
community and the Government of Haiti.
R5.4.1: The JOTC offers a potential best practice for
peacekeeping missions and the humanitarian cluster
system in the context of complex emergencies.
It also offers a useful facility for international
partners to voluntarily coordinate their efforts,
although the concept is yet to be tested within
a non-permissive environment.The U.S. Government
should explore opportunities to learn from the
JOTC for applications in disaster response or
potential use in the IRF.
5.4.2 Multilateral donor coordination was successful
for the Haiti response and represented unprecedented
cooperation in the development of consolidated funding
plans and the strategic alignment of resources.There was
widespread praise for the strategic coordination of the response
with the U.S. Government representatives on the ground in Haiti
as well as in Washington by major international donors.This was
the first time that multiple donor agencies formed an in-country
committee to coordinate funding activities.
R5.4.2: Multi-donor collaboration mechanisms/committees
should be formed at the beginning of the disaster
response to coordinate donor activities.
5.5 U.S./GOH Coordination
The Response of the GOH
The Government of Haiti was severely impacted by the
earthquake: 28 of 29 Ministry buildings collapsed; many
government workers died or lost family; and almost everyone
was personally affected by the tragedy. Despite the devastation,
the government acted quickly to coordinate relief efforts.The
Haitian President and Prime Minister led the government’s
response at both the policy and operational level.While this was
helpful for achieving a committed level of involvement at the
highest levels of government, it also created delays in decisions
concentrated at the top.
The DOS played a critical role immediately following the
earthquake by signing a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with President Preval’s government concerning the U.S.
management of the airport and seaports and the presence of
the U.S. military in Haiti to provide assistance to the country.
Within 36 hours, the President and Prime Minister developed
an initial government framework to manage the response and
coordinate with the international community. By 15 January, the
GOH established the Presidential Commission on Recovery and
Reconstruction, which was comprised of four sub-commissions.
These commissions included health, food and water, energy
and fuel, and shelter/reconstruction. Government officials and
Haitian civilians, working as volunteers, led these commissions.
The Presidential Commissions were to lead the OCHA cluster
groups and coordinate needs and priorities for the relief phase
of the response. Over time, the commissions and clusters began
to work on transitional issues, moving from immediate relief
and humanitarian assistance to medium- and longer-term IDP
resettlement and community re-establishment. By 23 January,
the government and UN created the international coordination
architecture (see Figure 16), which created the framework for
the government to interface with multilateral development
agencies, international militaries, and bilateral donors to design
relief and recovery strategic priorities as well as operational
plans to address them. Figure 17 depicts the Presidential
Commissions and UN cluster system.
Ministry staff worked closely with the President and Prime
Minister to aid the response efforts, including staff from
the Ministries of Interior,Agriculture, Health, Environment
and Planning, and External Cooperation.The tragedy of the
earthquake and the loss of so many lives meant that government
services and employees needed time to recover and grieve
before being capable of returning to work.That said, many civil
servants, civilian volunteers, police, and senior ministerial staff
began working on the response within days of the earthquake.
For details on each of the GOH agencies role’s in the response,
please refer to Annex 10.5.
U.S./GOH Coordination
The Government of Haiti widely praised the U.S. Government’s
role in the response.With the assistance of the DOS, embassy
and the DOD, the GOH established daily morning meetings
at Haitian Police headquarters for the first two months of the
response.The American Ambassador, the Response Coordinator,

and senior U.S. military personnel attended these meetings
to discuss priorities for emergency relief and to review U.S.
Government efforts.These meetings were instrumental in
developing Memorandums of Understanding regarding U.S.
Government management of the airport and seaport.
The U.S. Government worked closely with the Presidential
Commissions through the UN cluster system.The earthquake
marked a new approach for USAID in coordinating with
the GOH. Over the last thirty years, USAID has had limited
contact and consultation with the GOH on development
issues, but supported development efforts by funding NGO
partners. Since the release of the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSP) by the World Bank and the new U.S. Presidential
Administration, direct coordination between USAID and the
Government of Haiti has increased significantly.The OFDA
DART worked closely with the Presidential Commission on
Recovery and Reconstruction, focusing on the health, food, and
shelter commissions. USAID representatives provided insightful
recommendations to the Commissions, especially regarding the
construction of transitional shelters. However, the high turnover
of USAID representatives strained coordination efforts.
Transition from Relief to Reconstruction
and Development
The U.S. Government focused attention on the issue of IDPs,
property rights, eminent domain, land use, and debris clearance,
while the GOH was more challenged to focus on recovery and
reconstruction issues. Rubble removal was a critical step in
the resettlement process. However, serious challenges around
locations for debris placement emerged early.The Government
and international development agencies could not agree on
where to place the debris and rubble. Initially, the municipal and
solid waste site at Tretiers was used. However, this site was not
suitable for rubble removal, as it mixed household waste with
rubble, making it difficult to reclaim the rubble for use in future
reconstruction efforts. Other problems with land ownership
and private property arose. Since the Government of Haiti
does not own land in the area of Port-au-Prince, it negotiated
with private landowners to rent land for use as rubble removal
locations. However, because this would increase the value of the
land, which was usually in marshy areas, by allowing it to be used
for future construction, the issue became highly contentious
Figure 17: Haitian Presidential Commission and the UN Cluster System

(because the owner would not only benefit from rental fees
but would also gain from the increased value of the land).As of
June, the debris and rubble removal issue was still unresolved.
Best estimates by the Disaster Waste Recovery Project put the
total rubble removed by June 2010 at less than 1%.Additionally,
USAID and the UN have funded large cash-for-work projects to
pay communities to remove rubble.
To assist in the transition from relief to reconstruction and
development, the U.S. Government worked closely with the
GOH to establish the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.
On 15 April, the Lower House and Senate of the Parliament
approved the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission
(IHRC) as part of an amendment to the Law on the State of
Emergency. 102
On 5 May, President Preval and the Council of Ministers of the
Government of Haiti signed a Presidential Decree officially
establishing the IHRC.The IHRC is co-chaired by the Prime
Minister and former (U.S.) President Bill Clinton and will
be guided by a Board that includes Haitian and non-Haitian
stakeholders for a period of 18 months.The IHRC is charged
with continuously developing and refining Haiti’s development
plans, assessing needs and gaps for investments, and ensuring
that the implementation of these plans is well coordinated,
effective, and adhering to the highest standards of transparency
and accountability.103
The IHRC is modeled on successful
reconstruction agencies elsewhere in the world, including the
Badan Rehabilitasidan Rekonstruksi (BRR), which operated in
Indonesia after the 2004 tsunami.The first meeting of the IHRC
was held on 2 June in the Dominican Republic.
In addition to the development of the IHRC, the U.S.
Government worked closely with the GOH to establish the
Bureau for the Resettlement of IDPs.The resettlement issue has
been one of the top priorities of the international community
and the GOH. On 9 May, the government formed a high-
level working group on IDP resettlement.The group included
the GOH, community leaders, UN, USAID, DOS, and other
international community participants. On 20 May, President
Preval requested that the Presidential Task Force develop a
larger and more permanent Bureau for Resettlement of IDPs
to plan for wide-scale IDP relocation. Since that time and until
the end of May 2010, USAID was supporting the Task Force to
design an effective structure, organization, and staffing plan for
the new Bureau.As of late May, USAID was working with the
GOH IDP Task Force to develop scopes of work for Short-Term
Technical Assistance and to establish bureau positions, including
two program assistants, one program manager, and an advisor on
secondary cities.
5.6 NGO/PVO Coordination
For decades, Haiti has depended on NGOs and private
enterprises to deliver social services throughout the country.
Before the earthquake, it was estimated that up to 3,000 NGOs
were working in the country. In the wake of the disaster, it is
believed that the number of NGOs rose substantially, with most
organizations concentrated in the Port-au-Prince area.
The UN cluster system organized NGOs based on sector-
specific areas, such as health, nutrition, and security, and held
daily meetings at the Logistics Base.The UN was thinly staffed
for running a cluster system and NGO coordination proved
difficult due to the sheer number of organizations that arrived to
assist the response. In the health cluster, more than 300 NGOs
participated in the meetings, when normally this number would
be 15-20.A result was the formation of sub-clusters, which met
after the main health cluster session, ultimately leading to a more
manageable, decentralized cluster structure. However, this also
made coordination efforts between NGOs and donor partners
difficult.
In the initial response, coordination between NGOs and the
U.S. Government was facilitated through the UN cluster system.
The OFDA DART team worked closely with the clusters to
support relief efforts and provide grants to implementation
partners. USAID/OFDA rapidly responded to funding requests
and awarded grants to projects within two weeks of proposal
submissions.The USAID mission also allowed NGOs with
existing grants or contracts in Haiti to re-direct funds to
respond to emergency relief efforts. Difficulties arose between
USAID and NGOs in the development of transition strategies
and long-term development programs. No clear baseline or
reporting mechanism was established to assess the progress of
programs implemented in emergency relief efforts. Numerous
NGOs, the UN, and the military all commented that the rapid
102
Office of the Response Coordinator. 2010.“Weekly Slide Update: Phase II/III Analysis and Planning.” Haiti Relief and Recovery. 21 April.
103
Haiti Interim Recovery Commission. 2010.“Frequently Asked Questions.” HIRC Website. http://www.cirh.ht/index.jsp?sid=1&id=8&pid=2.Accessed on 16 September 2010.

rotation of OFDA personnel in the field and lack of USAID
staffing at the ORC and the USAID Mission until late February
hindered the initial planning for transition from relief projects to
longer-term development programming.
InterAction, an umbrella organization of U.S.-based international
NGOs, was funded immediately after the earthquake to work
in Haiti to assist in coordination efforts.This represented the
first time that InterAction was deployed internationally as part
of a humanitarian response.The USAID Administrator directed
InterAction to work with USAID/OFDA and coordinate efforts
among the NGOs through the cluster system, as well as to build
local capacity.
As of 23 January, NGOs began submitting requests for
support to the JOTC for security and logistical assistance from
MINUSTAH to carry out their humanitarian objectives. Prior to
this, NGOs were coordinating humanitarian assistance activities
with the JTF-Haiti on an ad hoc basis, usually through contacts at
cluster or other meetings.
5.6.1 Implementation partners universally acknowledged
that the USAID Mission and OFDA DART team
cooperated closely to ensure that humanitarian
assistance could be delivered as quickly as possible.
This involved the revision of existing grants and contracts for
implementation partners that were already on the ground in
Haiti so that they could re-align their budgets and work to meet
the needs of beneficiaries. New grants were also awarded quickly
so that NGOs could launch operations in a timely manner given
the urgent need.
R5.6.1: USAID should continue to use its authority to
revise grants and contracts in response to disaster
situations. It should also continue to authorize
use of non-competitive contracting to augment
awards to implementation partners already in the
country to more rapidly meet response needs.
5.6.2 NGOs expressed concern that USAID focused on
input-based results rather than outcomes. The focus of
USAID monitoring and evaluation was on numbers as opposed
to the quality of the response. Given the constraints of the
environment and the dire conditions on the ground, it was
difficult to collect data on outcomes. However, NGOs felt that
too much emphasis was placed by USAID on quantitative results,
such as the number of temporary shelters constructed, rather
than the sustainability of these shelters.
R5.6.2: Implementation partners should emphasize
outcome-based results that are quantitatively valid
and reliable in order to better monitor the quality
of programs. In order to do this, they should
work with USAID to develop more robust reporting
for data collection and interpretation.A single,
coordinated monitoring and evaluation strategy
could help to ensure the quality of U.S.
Government programs.

6. Data/Information Management
Data that can be translated into usable information is critical
to managing a disaster response and to informing policymakers
of important issues. Quantifiable data are also essential for
measuring the quality of the response. During the Haiti response,
there were frequent comments about information management
limitations that followed two major themes. First, there were
limited data available for tactical and operational decisions;
and second, there were overwhelming requests for data and
information from policy leaders in Washington that made
systematic data collection more difficult.These demands were
often driven by reports in the media. Some recognized that the
former (limited availability of operational data) led to the latter
because policy leaders, the Congress, and the White House all
had important information needs.The latter (frequent requests
for information) detracted from the on-ground response because
of the need to constantly answer questions and “chase down”
facts.
The collection of management data (assessments) following a
disaster is extremely difficult because of environmental and time
constraints. It is also a process that is fragmented by data type
(different clusters), collection methods, and information needs.
Data needs and quality also change rapidly as the response
progresses and more resources are available.Within the U.S.
Government, data were collected by the DART, the military, and
other agencies, and additional data were collected directly by
the UN and NGOs.This led to different data sets, qualities of
data, and difficulties with sharing and standardizing information.
The varying data and information needs of different agencies, as
well as their different analysis and reporting structures, further
complicated this system.The information needs of different
leadership groups in Washington were also not consistent
and led to frequent and sometimes conflicting requests for
information.
Most groups noted that these complex relationships of data
needs and collection difficulties made response management
more difficult at all levels.There was general agreement that a
new information management system be created, perhaps even a
separate unit devoted only to data management and sharing.
Data Collection in Haiti
Data collection, through surveys and assessments, is an essential
component for managing a disaster response. Surveys and
assessments are used to identify the needs of the affected
population to direct the response. Ideally, these types of data
can be used to measure the overall impact of the humanitarian
response.The normal data collection/assessment system uses
the very limited DART staff, who is more often managing the
response than collecting and analyzing data.The UN OCHA is
the focal point of information collection and assessment, but
their staff and budget are also very limited.The system relies
on NGOs to collect and report through the UN clusters and
then to OCHA. However, NGO staff often has had little or no
assessment training or skills, and the data that are collected are
not consistent in content or collection methods.
The U.S. Government was one of the first responders to
conduct a rapid needs assessment when the U.S. Coast
Guard conducted aerial surveys of Port-au-Prince to evaluate
structural damage to the airports and seaports.The results
from this assessment were released less than 48 hours after the
earthquake. 104
For the first week of the response, systematic assessments were
extremely difficult due to the extensive infrastructure damage in
Port-au-Prince. Roads were blocked by debris, communication
systems were non-operational, and access to transportation was
limited. In a time when the demand for information was greatest,
these constraints delayed data collection and slowed assessment.
As access and logistics improved, needs assessments were
conducted regularly by multiple agencies within the U.S.
Government and by the UN and NGOs.The U.S. military and the
OFDA DART worked, sometimes in parallel, to conduct these
appraisals.The U.S. military regularly assessed the needs on the
ground and reported to SOUTHCOM, while the OFDA DART
reported their findings to USAID/Washington.The OFDA DART
worked with the UN cluster system to coordinate partners
and continuously re-assess needs throughout the response in
an effort to identify gaps in the provision of relief supplies. By
identifying gaps, the OFDA DART could draw specific resources
into the country to address the apparent deficiencies.The U.S.
military contracted with the MIT Lab to conduct on-going
104
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti-Earthquake. Fact Sheet: 2; 14 January

surveys of need and to monitor the effects of relief over time;
unfortunately, the lack of expertise with disaster-related surveys
severely limited the utility of the information.
The UN OCHA generally coordinates assessment activities and
leads the initial rapid needs assessment for the international
community with the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
(UNDAC) team.A very preliminary assessment based on
expert assumptions was completed in three days to allow the
UN make its “flash appeal” to donors for the relief efforts in
Haiti.105
A more formal, survey-based rapid needs assessment
was conducted by the inter-cluster RINAH (Rapid Interagency
Needs Assessment in Haiti).The assessment cost $3 million
and was conducted from 23 January to 6 February, but the
results were not released until March 2010.106
This assessment
provided information on each major sector, including shelter,
water and sanitation, food distribution, and health, but was far
too delayed to be of use to direct the response.107
However,
like other aspects of foreign disaster response, assessments are
decentralized, with multiple organizations, agencies, and even
governments conducting them.This makes the standardization,
sharing, and overall interpretation of information difficult.
The UN, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), the World Bank, and the European Commission
conducted a large-scale Post Disaster Needs Assessment
(PDNA) in Haiti.The assessment was conducted between
18 February and 24 March; the results were published at the
end of March 2010.The PDNA was intended to help direct
reconstruction and document the damage and loss incurred in
each sector from the earthquake.An action plan was created
for recovery and reconstruction in Haiti over the short term
(eighteen months), intermediate term (three years), and long
term (ten years).108
Information Management and Sharing
In an effort to promote information sharing and coordinate
response efforts, the UN and the U.S. military established
Internet portals for data sharing.The United Nations used the
“OneResponse” website to coordinate information sharing
and data management within the cluster system and among
NGOs. 109
It was designed to enhance humanitarian cooperation
within the clusters and support the exchange of information in
emergencies.The U.S. military established the All Partners Access
Network (APAN), which was created to facilitate unclassified
information sharing among NGOs, multinational partners, and
various U.S. Federal and Department of State agencies.110
This
website allowed stakeholders to upload assessment results,
locate relief supplies, and communicate different activities
undertaken by various partners.Though APAN was not very
effective for evidence-based data sharing/report sharing and was
not used for decision making at the tactical or strategic levels,
it was one of the better tools for communication, and it did
prove to be a good source for networking and basic information
sharing among personnel working on the response.
Although these sites allowed access to a wide variety of
information, they were criticized as “dumping grounds” for
data.The sites were not actively managed, nor were the data
aggregated or analyzed in any way, so the sites essentially became
just a large collection of files.This limited usefulness and kept the
data fragmented. Some of the files were open source and could
be edited by anyone, so multiple, non-validated versions of a
single file could exist.
In addition to creating the APAN portal, the U.S. military
operated on an unclassified system.The military has never
conducted all operations on an unclassified network.This new
open approach allowed the U.S. military to share information
with all partners on the ground, including NGOs, the GOH, and
the UN, thus enabling greater communication and coordination
efforts.
The management and sharing of information internal to the U.S.
Government is vital to developing a coherent operating picture
and coordinating efforts.The website developed by DOS, known
as Intellipedia, garnered 50,000 hits within the interagency
community and hosted internal situation reports from DOS,
105
United Nations. 2010. Haiti Earthquake: 2010 Flash Appeal.
106
Rencoret, N., Stoddard,A., Haver, K.,Taylor, G. and P. Harvey. 2010. Haiti Earthquake Response: Context Analysis. ALNAP. July.
107
OCHA. 2010. Key Findings from the Multi-Cluster Rapid Initial Situational Assessment for Haiti. United Nations.
108
GOH. 2010. Haiti Earthquake PDNA:Assessment of damage, losses, general and sectoral needs.
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAC/Resources/PDNA_Haiti-2010_Working_Document_EN.pdf.Accessed on 12 September 2010.
109
OneResponse. 2010.“Ongoing Emergencies.” OneResponse Website. http://oneresponse.info/Pages/default.aspx.Accessed on 1 September 2010.
110
All Partners Access Network. 2010. https://community.apan.org/.Accessed on 30 June 2010.

USAID, HHS, DOD, Coast Guard, and others. It was accessible
to all U.S. Government personnel. Although this website was
not utilized to its full potential, it is a good example of internal
communication and successfully kept U.S. Government personnel
within the Interagency apprised of the situation and news on the
response.
The Quality of the Response
It is difficult to evaluate the quality of the Haiti response using
hard data.There is a great deal of information available on output
indicators, such as liters of water or tons of food delivered, but
limited information on the actual impact or outcomes of these
interventions.The UN and the CDC recently conducted a survey
to assess the nutritional status of the Haitian population, but
its results are not yet available. USAID/FFP collected data on
food aid, as their grantees are required to report on number
of beneficiaries and percentage of planned versus reached.
The reports containing this information for Haiti are due in
November. One positive sign was that there were no major
outbreaks of communicable disease immediately after the
earthquake. However, this group was unable to find useful data
to understand the outcomes of the response:
• What percentage of people received the food and shelter
that they needed?
• And at what point?
• Were deaths prevented?
• How many?
• Has the affected population been restored to the same
standard of living as before the event?
• Or is their standard of living worse?
• Better?
The lack of standard outcome measures limits our ability to
measure the success of any disaster response, to compare the
quality of different responses, to measure the quality of the
work of different contracted NGOs, and, ultimately, to continue
to improve our disaster response systems. Steps have been
taken by USAID and the international community to rectify this
issue through the development of Standardized Monitoring and
Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART).This initiative has
established standardized measures and methodology for data
collection and analysis of complex nutrition and mortality data.111
6.1 Data collection and data management were not
coordinated across the interagency, thus limiting the
creation of a common operating picture for the overall
response coordination. Multiple U.S. agencies worked in
parallel to conduct needs assessments and report results to
their respective headquarters.This led to different data sets,
varying data quality, and difficulties in sharing and standardizing
the information.This limited coordination efforts and reinforced
“stovepipes” within the chain of command.Additionally, since
there was no single reliable data source, U.S. Government
agencies “pushed” resources into Haiti in order to meet the
unidentified needs in the field.
R6.1: Standardized reports, schedules, and methods
are required across agencies.A new information
management system should be created,
devoted only to data management and sharing.This
will make reporting easier, more accurate, and more
consistent across the interagency and will promote
coordination efforts. Extending such a solution
to include international partners and governments
would also benefit the overall response and limit
duplicative results.
6.2 An effective central data management system was
lacking in the response. Data portals, such as OneResponse
and the APAN website, were not effective.The magnitude
of information collected on the sites made them difficult to
navigate.Additionally, the quality of the data posted was not
reliable and there was no clear structure that directed access to
specific information.
R6.2: An effective common shared information portal is
needed to establish situational awareness among
all responding organizations and governments.
Information managers and specialists should be
assigned to manage these websites.Their
responsibilities should include verifying the validity
and reliability of the data before uploading onto the
site and formatting the webpage so that is it easy to
navigate and access information.
111
USAID.“Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief andTransitions (SMART).” USAID Website.
Available from: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/smart/.Accessed on 18 October 2010

6.3 Post-disaster surveys produced unusable results
due to quickly planned surveys and the absence of
standardized data collection methods. Survey planning
is often done precipitously, with little attention to details that
are critical to overall data quality.When survey planning is
poorly done, it requires more time to clean the data, which can
impact the quality of the results and cause delays in releasing
the findings. Delays in releasing reports reduce the value of the
survey as data become dated. One clear example of this from
the earthquake response is RINAH.While its assessment was
conducted from 23 January to 6 February, logistical, security, and
methodological concerns delayed the publication of the report
for more than one month.
R6.3: A handbook on disaster survey methodologies
should be developed to help field agencies or
others undertake robust post-disaster surveys.
Standardized questionnaire instruments should
be developed to assess the survival needs of
the population. Standard rapid surveys can be used
to assess essential post-disaster survival factors
across emergencies.The application of proper
sampling methodologies will allow analysts to
quickly examine the data and share results.The
release of survey results in a timely manner
ensures that the information is relevant and may
be used by the humanitarian community to plan
appropriate programs for the affected population.
6.4There are limited usable data available to assess
the quality of the response. The measures that are available
are process indicators such as money spent, or food and
tents delivered, but there are few outcome indicators.These
would include measures such as “deaths averted” or “percent
of population in need receiving food,” for example.This is a
recurrent problem with disaster response.The lack of consistent,
measurable, and comparable information makes it difficult—if
not impossible—to accurately assess the quality of a disaster
response, or to compare the activities of different agencies
and NGOs.The result is that most responses are assessed by
the semi-formal structure of an “after action report” (AAR)
that does not allow ongoing assessments of the impact of
implementing the recommended changes.
R6.4: A quality of response survey should be conducted
to assess whether the needs of the Haitian people
were met.
R6.5: Quality assessment measures should be routine
tools used in all responses to better understand
the impact of aid and to improve services during
the response and for future responses. Such surveys
or measures can be conducted periodically through
the entire response-to-recovery period (e.g. one
month, three months, or six months) to track
improvements and redirect efforts. Such surveys
or measures should use consistent methods and
content to be comparable across many responses
and between agencies and NGOs.

7. Finance and Budget
The financial support provided by the United States from January
until June 2010 represented one of the largest investments in
foreign disaster assistance in U.S. history. During the first six
months of the response, the total U.S. financial contribution
was $2.3 billion.This figure roughly translates to every Haitian
affected by the earthquake receiving $1,150.112
Of the total
amount contributed, the U.S. Government provided $1.1
billion, and American families and businesses, through cash and
in-kind donations, contributed $1.2 billion. Figure 18 presents
the monthly cumulative and relative totals of U.S. Government
spending by each agency for the first six months of the response;
USAID provided $621 million, DOD provided $461 million, and
DOS/PRM provided $11 million.
For the past three decades, the U.S. Government has played a
significant role in financing Haiti’s development.The total USAID
budget for Haiti in 2007 was $246 million. 113
According to an
internal assessment conducted by the Obama administration,
the U.S. Government has provided $4 billion in aid to Haiti since
1990, but “struggled to demonstrate lasting impact.” 114
Total U.S. Government spending peaked at nearly $400 million
in January 2010 and decreased each month as the relief mission
transitioned to recovery and long-term development. Spending
significantly decreased from over $100 million in April to $19
million in May. Figure 19 presents total monthly expenditures by
USAID, DOD, and DOS/PRM.
Figure 18: USG Funding Assistance in Haiti
112
This figure was calculated by dividing the total sum contributed to the Haiti response ($2.3 billion) by the number of Haitians affected (~2,000,000).
Calculation: 2,300,000,000/2,000,000 = 1,150.
113
USAID/Haiti. 2008. Operational Plan: FY 2007 Performance Results. Available from: http://www.usaid.gov/ht/achievement.html.Accessed on 15 September 2010.
114
Sheridan, Mary. 2010.“In US plan for Haiti, rebuilding government is key.” The Washington Post Online. 31 March 2010.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/30/AR2010033003586.html.Accessed on 15 September 2010.

On average, the U.S. Government responds to 20-30
international disasters per year.A recent disaster that was similar
in terms of destruction and loss of life was the Indian Ocean
earthquake and tsunami in 2004 that led to 226,000 deaths in
twelve countries.115
The total aid package provided by USAID
was $120 million over seven months in eight countries. 115
In
Haiti, the U.S. Government spent almost ten times as much over
roughly the same period of time. The political, diplomatic, and
disaster context in Haiti was fundamentally different from that of
the tsunami and, therefore, the two events are not comparable.
On 29 July 2010, a supplemental bill to amend the budget for
the fiscal year was approved so that emergency aid could be
provided to Haiti.The supplemental bill “would provide for
costs associated with relief and reconstruction support for
Haiti following the devastating earthquake of 12 January 2010,
including reimbursement of obligations that were already
incurred by these agencies.”117
Table 20 provides a breakdown of
appropriations for the Haiti supplemental request.
The supplemental spending bill was important to assist in
interagency burden sharing to pay for the response. Prior to the
supplemental bill, the federal agencies and military were sharing
costs as a way to distribute the expenses to their budgets.The
arrival of the supplemental funds meant that agencies, including
the military, would be reimbursed for their expenditures.This led
to greater cooperation among the interagency.
Figure 19: USG Humanitarian Funding Month 12 January - 1 June
115
Cavallo, E., Powell,A. and Becerra, O. 2010.”Estimated the Direct Economic Damage of the Earthquake in Haiti.”
Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series No.163. February.
116
USAID/DCHA. 2005. Indian Ocean – Earthquakes andTsunamis. Fact Sheet: 39; 7 July.
117
Obama, Barack. 2010.“Letter from the President Regarding Budget Supplemental on Haiti.” Office of the Press Secretary. 24 March.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/letter-president-regarding-budget-supplemental-haiti.Accessed on 15 September 2010.
Source:White House. FY 2010 Supplemental Proposal in the FY 2011 Budget. 2010.
Appropriation FY 2010 Haiti
Supplemental Request
Department of Agriculture 150,000
Department of Defense 655,000
Department of Health and Human Services 220,000
Department of Homeland Security 60,000
U.S.Agency for International Development 1,491,000
Department of Treasury 219,800
Broadcasting Board of Governors 5,200
Total Supplemental Budget 2,801,000
Figure 20: Supplemental Budget Request ($ in thousands)

According to the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment led by the
World Bank, the earthquake caused a total of $7.8 billion in
damages and losses, amounting to 120% of Haiti’s 2009 GDP.
To “build back better,” the World Bank estimates that Haiti
requires at least $11.5 billion from all sources (public, NGO, and
private).118
On 31 March, an international donor conference was
held in NewYork to coordinate funding for the reconstruction of
Haiti, where nations pledged a total of $9.9 billion of assistance
to rebuild Haiti over the next three years. 119
Figure 21 provides
a breakdown of total funding support and obligations committed
by the international community as of 16 September 2010,
according to OCHA and the Financial Tracking Service.
118
United States Department of State & US Agency for International Development. 2010. FY 2010 Haiti Supplemental Budget Justification.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/141243.pdf.Accessed on 1 September 2010.
119
Clinton, Hilary. 2010. Remarks After the Haiti Donor Conference. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/139336.htm.
Downloaded on September 20.Accessed on 15 September 2010.
Figure 21:Total Humanitarian Assistance per Donor (as of 16 September 2010)

8. Overarching
Recommendations
We present seven key recommendations, the first four for
immediate consideration.These recommendations draw on the
overall analyses undertaken for the whole report. R8.1 – R8.4
are presented according to their increasing depth of institutional
change and, therefore, time required.The recommendations
are also in line with the clear and important orientation of U.S.
aid policy, presented by President Obama to the UN General
Assembly this past November.
We believe that repeated disasters and other types of
humanitarian crises not only undermine development, but also
directly compromise national and international security issues in
many different ways.A prime example is the massive rural-urban
migration in many countries due to catastrophic floods and
droughts (both climate-related phenomena), increasing social and
political tensions.
Humanitarian policy reform and close monitoring of program
efficiency is an important and central component of overall U.S.
development aid—and not just because of the Haiti experience.
The extraordinary efforts made by so many response personnel
in Washington, DC and in Haiti were applauded across the board
by all interviewees, both in the U.S. and abroad. In June 2010,
these efforts were widely recognized at the Interagency Lessons
Learned Workshop held at the National Defense University in
Washington.The many successes of the Haiti response, which
faced unprecedented situations both in Haiti and DC, were
entirely due to the devoted and relentless energy of many
officers involved in its management. Sheer hard work, personal
relationships, and an admirable sense of responsibility down the
ranks helped overcome many barriers.
R8.1 Structural Strengthening of
USAID/OFDA as Lead Federal
Agency for International Disaster
Response
USAID should be empowered to lead international disaster
response effectively.There is a need to strengthen USAID’s
institutional structures, increase its staff size and capacity,
broaden its interagency agreements at higher levels, and upgrade
its technological systems.All federal agencies and departments
should adhere to the USAID command and control structures,
if the President appoints USAID as the lead agency.These
measures will enable improvement of USAID/OFDA’s capability
to perform in catastrophes and build its capacity to coordinate
partners in an interagency response.A “whole of government”
approach should not be used in future international disaster
response until a framework is created to manage the full
engagement of the U.S. Government. USAID, as an agency, is best
placed to lead development and humanitarian crisis response,
both of which should be expertise-led initiatives. Indeed, USAID
should continue to take the lead in international disaster
response, but its capacity to respond should be strengthened
and enhanced, and the agency should be given additional political
support to respond.This includes, but is not limited to, the ability
to determine the need for and the deployment of additional
federal resources during an international disaster response.
Strengthening the disaster response expertise and capacity
of the local Mission is essential, especially in disaster-prone
countries.The USAID Mission in the country, under Chief of
Mission Authority and guidance, should head coordination
among U.S. agencies and the host country and with other non-
U.S. donors and players in the response. USAID should expand
its official staff to levels that are appropriate to its mandate
of operations. Reinforcing the USAID Mission staff directly,
rather than setting up new structures such as the Office of
the Response Coordinator, may prove to be a better solution.
USAID should be able to support the extraordinary needs of
OFDA when necessary, by providing short-term staff who are
trained for action in humanitarian crises. In the same vein, USAID
should reduce its reliance on outside contractors and expand
its staff levels to improve its effectiveness. In addition, USAID’s
budget autonomy will enable rapid action and organization of
its resources for more efficient relief/development.All of this
points to the creation of a special entity within the USAID
Mission to help coordinate and manage the response, rather
than establishing parallel structures with repetitive roles,
responsibilities, and reporting structures.
Agency-wide strengthening of USAID is a short-term goal that
is more tangible than other recommendations, such as the
development of an international response framework.As such,
this recommendation should not be overlooked.

R8.2 Bridging the Divide Between
Diplomatic Response and Humanitarian
Relief
Most international disasters involve elements of diplomacy,
emergency relief, and development; Haiti was no exception. DOS
primarily covers the diplomatic and foreign relations side of
disaster response, as well as American Citizen repatriation, while
USAID is responsible for the immediate relief, rehabilitation, and
long-term development actions needed in-country. Both agencies
have established protocols and procedures for disaster response
and in some areas, these procedures overlap. Given the scope
and scale of the response in Haiti, there was confusion between
DOS and USAID at times about which agency was in charge of
which components of the response.While USAID was appointed
as lead federal agency in the response, many decisions were in
fact made by senior DOS officials.
Therefore, there is a need to clearly separate and delineate the
functions of DOS and USAID for future large-scale disaster
responses. Mechanisms to strengthen the coordination and
collaboration between the political/diplomatic service and
those of the humanitarian and development agencies need to
be fostered.This will improve the understanding and coherence
to meet both the short-term emergency response and the
longer-term development aims in the affected country.These
mechanisms should be made permanent so that diplomatic and
development services can be mutually beneficial for all future
disaster responses. S/CRS is a relatively new entity that has
potential to bridge the span between DOS and USAID. S/CRS
should be reviewed by both DOS and USAID to determine
whether it can serve as a platform to begin working towards
improving coordination among the political/diplomatic and
humanitarian/development arms of the U.S. Government in the
area of large-scale international disaster response. Should it be
determined that S/CRS is not the appropriate vehicle to achieve
increased interagency coordination between DOS and USAID,
then the two agencies need to work together to establish a
mechanism or set of procedures to accomplish this necessary
measure.
R8.3 Convene an Interagency
Committee on Global Humanitarian
Crises Coordinated by the NSC for
“Whole of Government” Response
Situations
When responding to catastrophes, high-level leadership is
needed to coordinate response across the U.S. Government.
We recommend the creation of an interagency committee on
global humanitarian crises, led by the National Security Council
Staff, to coordinate response to catastrophes, such as the Haiti
earthquake.Transparent criteria that define “extraordinary
circumstances” or “catastrophes” should be prescribed.The
committee would set priorities and call upon specialists from
U.S. Government agencies and other institutions (universities and
technical institutes) in order to coordinate humanitarian policy
across the executive branch.This will ensure a unified approach
amongst the diverse agencies.The USAID Administrator should
be a member of this NSC-led committee.This committee should
focus on making policy- and strategy-related decisions, rather
than providing operational and technical guidance, in order to
ensure it does not interfere with daily field operations.
R8.4 Strengthening of an International
Response Framework
In the case of Haiti, the existing inter-service agreements and
protocols between different departments and specialized
technical agencies were not sufficiently clear and comprehensive
to manage a “whole of government” response.The weaknesses
of the protocols and agreements, whether related to staff
exchanges, budgetary responsibilities, or operating procedures,
significantly compromised the efficiency of the whole operation
and created tensions between groups who were all prepared to
do their best within their own frame of reference.
The chaos in the management of the response in Haiti revealed
the need for a detailed management framework which defines
responsibility, the command and control hierarchy, and reporting
relationships, especially addressing the rapid mobilization of U.S.
Government staff, specialized capabilities, and assets that can
be utilized to their maximum effectiveness in the most efficient
manner.
Existing framework agreements, liaison structures, budgetary
provisions, staff deployments, and other key components should
be reviewed in depth and a reformed management structure
should be established for future “whole of government”
responses.A well thought out, detailed management framework
for international disasters which draws upon wide-ranging
experience and expertise will not only help USAID to
coordinate federal interagency participation in overseas disaster
relief response, it will set out the structures, guidelines, and roles

for all other actors for a “whole of government” response, where
coordination and policy guidance will need to ramp up to larger
scales and more wide-ranging areas compared to a standard
large-scale disaster.The Framework should develop a unified
command structure, designate roles, and be scalable, flexible,
and adaptable. It should reinforce the existing U.S. Embassy,
USAID Mission, and USAID/OFDA structures in addition to
strengthening and modernizing pre-existing agreements between
agencies. Most importantly, the framework should address
issues related to the mobilization of resources, the upgrading of
information systems and communications, and the establishment
of common terminology throughout agencies, reporting, and
management.The National Response Framework (NRF) used
for domestic disaster response could be a fruitful starting
point for the development of an international framework. It is
a framework that has been developed over years and tested on
the ground and provides effective functional guidance.The NRF
also has a permanent team which re-evaluates its relevance and
keeps it updated continuously.This constant update and review
function is key for effective action frameworks of this type and,
thus, our recommendation would also include dedicated staff
to ensure such a framework represents the latest available
information and incorporates all recent institutional changes. In
Annex 10.4, we suggest possible components of an International
Response Framework (IRF) that could be used to manage all U.S.
Government foreign disaster response.
Finally, we would like to underline that while the IRF may
solve some of the problems of interagency management and
coordination, it should not be seen as a solution for USAID’s
capacity to respond when staffing in the field and in Washington,
DC is insufficient to meet the ever increasing demands.
R8.5 Civilian-Military Collaboration in
Humanitarian Crises
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief has evolved as an
important mission of the DOD.“The Department of Defense
should be prepared to lead stability operations activities
to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential
services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver
humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to
transition lead responsibility to other U.S. Government
agencies.”120
This requires improving the DOD’s capacity and
expertise to meet this mission. Integrating the U.S. military into
humanitarian response activities is both important and complex.
Military activities can best focus on HADR such as logistics,
assessment, security, and, in limited areas, the direct provision of
humanitarian assistance when no other option is available, such
as local government agencies, NGOs, or private sector providers.
However, this scenario is extremely rare and, hence, the use of
DOD capabilities for direct humanitarian assistance needs to be
better controlled and monitored by civilian authorities.
While the military has task-specific resources for disaster
response that are unmatched, its role in humanitarian response
is controversial. In contrast to its logistical expertise, the military
has limited experience in delivering humanitarian aid, and it is
a costly alternative to other response organizations. Military
leaders expressed concern with the lack of policy guidance from
Washington, which resulted in a much broader response for the
military than anticipated.We recommend that a careful review of
the role of the military in disaster response be conducted.This
will enable more specific policies and guidance to be created that
will prescribe specific activities for the U.S. military.
In order to maximize the benefit of military involvement in
HADR operations, the mandate and role of the military should
be clearly defined by policymakers before deployment, to
delineate an exit strategy with condition-based end points.
As disaster response is an internationally managed event, such
policies must take into account these pre-existing structures.
Military activities should focus on HADR such as on logistics,
assessment, and security, but not the direct provision of
humanitarian assistance.There also needs to be closer
collaboration with the NGO and international communities.All
of this should be done as early as possible to avoid potential
for over-utilization of U.S. military assets and dominance over
humanitarian operations in the field.
To meet its important HADR mission in supporting civilian-led
humanitarian responses, the military should retain institutional
knowledge and expertise.The DOD should continue to
support their “HADR Center of Excellence” and create HADR
career paths that allow for personnel to develop and maintain
appropriate knowledge and skills.There is also a need to create
HADR-related training programs for staff and leadership for
both long-term development and “just-in-time” deployments.
120
Department of Defense. 2009. DODI 3000.05. 16 September.

R8.6 Monitoring the Quality of Aid and
its Impact
Data collection and information management in Haiti was
complicated, difficult, and limited.This led to policy-level
decisions that were often driven by media reports rather than
tactical and strategic information from the field.Also, it prevented
the assessment of the overall quality and efficiency of the U.S.
response.
From within the DART, dedicated staff should be deployed
exclusively to collect, centralize, validate, and report findings to
partners and authorities as appropriate. Specific methods and
standard reports should be developed to meet the operational
needs of the on-ground response, as well as the strategic
needs of Washington and the media.This information should
be systematically shared between U.S. Government agencies
in the field and in Washington. In addition, NGOs receiving
U.S. Government funds through OFDA’s granting process
should be required to conduct assessments using standard
reporting methods and forms. Finally, internationally agreed upon
guidelines (e.g. sample questionnaires, indicators, methodology,
and reporting templates) for rapid needs assessments should
be developed.All donors should agree on this approach and
avoid funding fragmented initiatives that compromise the
overall process, raise expectations, and frustrate beneficiaries.
Tools for rapid evaluation of impact of relief aid on the victims
should be developed to ensure effectiveness of aid and correct
targeting. Ultimately, such tools will enhance the quality and
effectiveness of U.S. Government aid, as well as produce robust
and relevant data for planning and management.The Interagency
Needs Assessment Task Force is a good start to this endeavor
and should include technical institutions, as well as the UN and
NGOs.
An effective common shared information portal is needed
to establish situational awareness among all responding
organizations and governments. Information managers and
specialists should be assigned to manage these websites.Their
responsibilities should include verifying the validity and reliability
of the data before uploading it onto the site. It is better to
have several high quality reports and datasets than to have vast
amounts of questionable information. It is important that this
website be easy to navigate, with clear access to the information.
R8.7 Deployment of U.S. Government
Assets to International Disasters
Deployment of relief resources to an international disaster
location without requests from the host government, the
UN system, and/or the U.S. Embassy is generally unadvisable.
However, there are catastrophic events that can incapacitate one
or more of these structures, making it necessary to deploy relief
supplies to the country without the benefit of rapid assessments
or specified needs.The earthquake in Haiti demonstrated the
need for immediate response without adequate ground-sourced
information on which to base the amount and type of resources
required to meet the immense demand for assistance.
In these rare cases, the U.S. Government must respond as
quickly and effectively as possible. However, efficiency is also
a key element in disaster response, especially so as to avoid
logistical bottlenecks and ensure that the maximum utility of
relief supplies and manpower are able to be used immediately in
country.“More” does not necessarily mean “better” in disaster
response. Sequencing of the shipment, delivery, and utilization of
relief supplies and personnel must be done in a rational manner.
The chaotic nature of the response in Haiti exemplifies the need
to include efficiency in the planning and execution of large-scale
disaster responses by the U.S. Government.
In order to achieve increased effectiveness and maximize
efficiency in future large-scale disaster responses, USAID and
the DOS need to develop a menu of packages available from
the DOD, since it is primarily the DOD which has the unique
capabilities of lift, logistics, manpower, technical assets, and
equipment needed to respond to catastrophic emergency
situations within 24 hours.This menu would include engineering
packages, medical packages, security packages, assessment
packages, logistics packages, and intelligence packages, among
others. Each package would be scalable with built-in flexibility,
depending on the magnitude and complexities of the disaster.
Depending on current needs of the U.S. military to conduct its
on-going war operations, the use of military resources for HADR
operations would have to take into account force readiness and
military demands in its conflict theaters.
Similarly, other federal agencies that have special capacities
for response in international disasters could design packages
to be used in response.These measures could be directed by
USAID and DOS in concert with each federal agency and the

DOD. It would serve as a precursor to the IRF and help in its
development, since it is a necessary step regardless of whether
the IRF moves forward or not.
All packages would be designed by experts in international
disaster response together with key staff from each agency so as
to avoid any unnecessary components and ensure each package
contains the adequate types of resources.
Based on the vast experience of the combined staff at USAID,
DOS, and the DOD, an essential set of packages could be
identified for immediate response needs in catastrophic
situations.There is sufficient evidence from past emergencies to
identify a minimum package of services, assets, and supplies that
should be mobilized in response to large-scale disasters.These
could be tailored for different types of natural disasters and
mobilized rapidly without the need for assessments so that the
initial response is conducted within hours of the emergency and
supplies can reach the disaster site as quickly as possible.
Knowledge of the assistance packages in advance will assist the
U.S. Embassy and USAID Mission in the field to plan for the
arrival and distribution of relief supplies and personnel. Once
the initial packages are in place, additional resources can be
requested as required, following rapid assessments.

9. Limitations
This study, like most, has several limitations.The first is its
methodology. Basing a lessons learned report on personal
interviews has pitfalls that are inherent to its approach. Distilling
facts from opinions are difficult and requires several iterations
of interviews, which we were unable to do. A mixed method
approach that complements objective, data-based evidence to
personal reports would have made for sounder analyses. Given
the circumstances, the time available did not allow for the
collection and analyses of field data. Indeed, much of the data
that would have been useful for this study was not available
during the time of our work.
Another limitation of this study relates to its focus, which leaned
increasingly towards institutional issues and less on beneficiary
impact.This weakness is also related to the availability of data,
even six months after the catastrophe.The report, had its
scope been narrower, would have been more data or objective
evidence-based, but then it would have lost its relevance for
many of the institutional issues that came to surface in this
exercise.
The timeframe was relatively short for a study of this size and
scope.The need to conduct meetings in a sequential order to
build up relevant core knowledge in preparation to interview
senior officials compounded the problem.The team was able to
accomplish all objectives as defined in the scope of work, and
meetings were held or written feedback was received from 98%
of the targeted senior government officials, both in Haiti and the
United States.
Finally, the findings and conclusions of this report must be
considered with judgment and contextual knowledge, as not all
information, understandably, was shared completely with the
team.The recommendations have selectively addressed issues
that are institutional, technical in nature, and generally actionable.

ACF/ORR Administration for Children and Families
Office of Refugee Resettlement
AMCITS American Citizens
APAN All Partners Access Network
ASHA American School and Hospitals Abroad
CBHF Clinton Bush Haiti Fund
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CDC Center for Disease Control
CFW Cash-for-work
CMM Conflict Management and Mitigation
COCOM Combatant Command
COIN Counter Insurgency
CRC Civilian Response Corps
CRS Catholic Relief Services
CSC Coordination Support Committee
DAA Deputy Assistant Administrator
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team
DCHA Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance
DFID UK Department for International
Development
DG Democracy and Governance
DHC Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
DMORT Disaster Mortuary Operational Response
Teams
DOC Department of Commerce
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
DOS Department of State
DOT Department of Transportation
DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DSRSG Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid
Department
ECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean
EGAT Economic Growth and Trade
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EPI Expanded Programs of Immunization
ESF Emergency Support Function
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization
FAST Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team
FCC Federal Coordinating Center
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FFP Food for Peace
FFW Food for Work
GAM Global Acute Malnutrition
GC General Counsel
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GH Global Health
GOH Government of Haiti
HACC Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell
HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HAST Humanitarian Assistance Surveillance Team
HC Humanitarian Coordinator
HCA Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
HD Homeland Defense
HD&ASA Homeland Defense & Americas’ Security
Affairs
HHS Health and Human Services
HIS Haiti Stabilization Initiative
HLCC High Level Coordination Committee
HRF Haiti Reconstruction Fund
HTT Haiti Task Team
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICS Incident Command System
ICT Information Communication Technology
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IDPSS Internally Displaced Persons Disease
Surveillance System
IHCR Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission
IMAT Incident Management Assistance Team
IMSuRT International Medical Surgical Response Team
IQC Indefinite Quantity Contracts
IRC International Rescue Committee
IRT Incident Response Team
JCOA Joint Center for Operational Analysis
JECC Joint Enabling Capabilities Command
JFCOM Joint Force Command
JIIC Joint Interagency and Information Center
JOC Joint Operations Cell
10.Annexes
10.1 Abbreviations

JOTC Joint Operations Tasking Center
JPACE Joint Public Affairs Coordination Effort
JTF Joint Task Force
LAC Latin American and Caribbean Bureau
LPA Legislative and Public Affairs
MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MITAM Mission Tasking Matrix
MOA Memorandums of Agreements
MOH Ministry of Health
MOU Memorandums of Understanding
MRC Medical Reserve Corps
MSF Medecins sans Frontieres
MSPP Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la
Population
NDMS National Disaster Medical System
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NIPR Non-classified Internet Protocol Router
NORTHCOM Northern Command
NRCC National Response Coordination Center
NSC National Security Council
NSPD National Security Presidential Directive
NSS National Security Staff
NSSS National Sentinel Site Survey
OASD Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs
OCR Office of Civilian Response
ODP Office of Development Partners
OFDA Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHD Office of Homeland Defense
OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid
OMA Office of Military Assistance
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPORD Operational Orders
ORC Office of the Response Coordinator
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTI Office of Transition Initiatives
OUR Operation Unified Response
PACOM Pacific Command
PAHO Pan American Health Organization
PDNA Post Disaster Needs Assessment
PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PMCC Project Management Coordination Cell
PPM Program, Policy and Management
POTUS President of the United State
PPL Policy, Planning and Learning
PRM Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
PSA Public Service Announcement
PSO Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations
PVC Private andVoluntary Cooperation
RC Resident Coordinator
RD Response Director
RINAH Rapid Interagency Needs Assessment in Haiti
RM Resource Management
RMT Response Management Team
RUIF Ready-to-use Infant formula
S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization
SAM Severe Acute Malnutrition
SIPR Secret Internet Protocol Router
SMS Short Messaging Service
SO/LIC Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
SOCOM Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM Southern Command
SRSG Special Representative for the Secretary
General
State/F Foreign Assistance Office
TF Task Force
TRANSCOM Transportation Command
TSA Transportation Security Administration
UN United Nations
UNDAC UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team
UNICEF United Nations Children Fund
USAID United States Agency for International
Development
USAID/DR USAID/Dominican Republic
USAR Urban Search and Rescue
USCG United States Coast Guard
USCIS U.S. Citizen and Immigration Service
USDA Department of Agriculture
USG United States Government
USGS U.S. Geological Survey
USUN United States Mission to the United Nations
VA Veterans Affairs
VfP Volunteers for Prosperity
VOCO Verbal Commands
VTC Video Teleconference Calls
WASH Water and Sanitation
WFP World Food Programme
WHA Western Hemisphere Bureau
WHO World Health Organization

Prefix Last Name First Name Organization
USAID
Beers Mia OFDA/DART
Brause Jon DCHA
Brineman Elena OMA
Callaghan Tim OFDA/DART
Chan Anthony USAID/Haiti
Chan Carol OFDA
Cohen Harold GC
Dei Carleene USAID/Haiti
Drummond Corrie USAID/Haiti
Dworken Jonathan FFP
Fleming James OFDA
Fox Elizabeth GH
Jenkins Rob OTI
Amb. Lucke Lew USAID/Haiti/ORC
Miles Aaron HTT
Milligan Chris USAID/Haiti/ORC
O’Neill Maura AID
Osterman Allison OFDA/DART
Porter Russell HTT
Reichle Susan DCHA
Rosser Melissa HTT
Dr. Shah Rajiv AID
Sink Amy OFDA/DART
Turner Karen ODP
Waldman Ron USAID/Haiti/ORC
Ward Chris USAID/Haiti/ORC
Ward Mark OFDA
Waskin Leon USAID/Haiti/ORC
DOS
Angelic Young Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Archer Merrie S/CRS
Barks-Ruggles Erica USUN
Brigety Ruben PRM
Kennedy Patrick DOS
Kranstover Peter S/CRS
Lindwall David U.S. Embassy Haiti
Lynch Paula Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Amb. Merten Kenneth U.S. Embassy, Haiti
Mills Cheryl DOS
Mengetti Anita Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Reynoso Julissa DOS
Rowland George Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance
Amb. Smith Dan DOS
Tuma Carol S/CRS
Zareski Karen S/ES-O
10.2 Key Informants

DOD
CAPT Abbott Spencer USAID
Ms. Alvirez Shelly SOUTHCOM, J5
Mr. Bryars Joseph SOUTHCOM
CDR Campbell Jim JECC
Mr. Cheadle Bruce SOUTHCOM, J9
COL Cintron Norberto SOUTHCOM
Mr. Clark W.I. SOUTHCOM, J7
Mr. Dahlgren Kirk SOUTHCOM, J9
COL Dewhurst Mark JECC
COL Drew Rodger SOUTHCOM, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
HON Flournoy Michele OSD
GEN Fraser Douglas SOUTHCOM
COL Gehler Christopher SOUTHCOM, J3
Ms. Gurwith Niki OSD, DSCA
Ms. Halvorsen Diane DSCA
Ms. Hancock Michelle SOUTHCOM,Surgeon’s Office
Ms. Hanlon Melissa OSD SO/LIC&IC
Dr. Hannan Robert SOUTHCOM
Mr. Harvey Todd SOUTHCOM, J9
Mr. Hulslander Robert JCOA
COL Hurley SOUTHCOM
BG Jamieson Dash SOUTHCOM, J2
MAJ Johnson Dani JPACE
Mr. Jones Gregg OSD HD&ASA
LTG Keen Kenneth H. SOUTHCOM
Mr. Kirpes Mike OSD HD&ASA
CDR Klein Bob OSD, SO/LIC
Ms. Legates Kate OFDA
CDR Loundermon Christoper JPACE
Mr. Marvill SOUTHCOM
MAJ Milstrey SOUTHCOM, Surgeon’s Office
Ms. Music Francesca OASD HA&ASA
CDR Nobrega Norman SOUTHCOM, J9
MAJ Pascall Patrick DoD - Civil Affairs
COL Perez Angel SOUTHCOM, J5
CDR Pollitt Ian JECC
Mr. Puls Keith SOUTHCOM, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate
Dr. Reeves James OSD SO/LIC&IC
Ms. Richardson Ashley OSD HD&ASA
COL Riedler Kevin SOUTHCOM, J5
MAJ Ross Betsy SOUTHCOM
Ms. Rutledge Lynda SOUTHCOM, J8
COL Ryan Tim JCOA
COL. Salmon SOUTHCOM, J3
Ms. Samson Lisa SOUTHCOM, J9
Mr. Saumur Dan SOUTHCOM, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate

Mr. Schafer Todd SOUTHCOM, Senior Executive Service
Dr. Schear James OSD
CPT Senft Michael JCSE
COL Shun Ronald JFCOM
LTC Smith Russel JCSE
Mr. Staley Kevin SOUTHCOM, J7
LTC Stevens Josh JTF
COL Toney Kimberely SOUTHCOM, J1
CPT Townsend John SOUTHCOM, J5
Mr. Trigilio John OSD SO/LIC&IC
CPT Trinidad Frank JCSE
Amb. Trivelli Paul SOUTHCOM
COL Uyehate SOUTHCOM, J8
MAJ Vitor Bruce SOUTHCOM, J5
COL Vohr J.Alex SOUTHCOM, J4
Wilson Thomas JCSE
ADM Winnefeld James NORTHCOM
COL Wolff James DOD - Civil Affairs
DHS
Byrne Michael FEMA
Fugate Craig FEMA
Hall Mike FEMA
Melsek Rodney FEMA
Slaten Andrew FEMA
HHS
Cosgrove Sandra HHS
Gerber Michael CDC
Koch Michala Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
Minson Matthew HHS
Dr. Yeskey Kevin Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
NSC
Restrepo Daniel Deputies Committee
Smith Gayle Deputies Committee
UN
Bevan John MINUSTAH
Buescher Gabrielle UNICEF
Dahrendorf Nicola MINUSTAH
Gilbert Shayne MINUSTAH
Griekspoor Andre WHO
Huck Catherine OCHA
Mercado Doug USAID-UN mission
Naidoo Jordan UNICEF
Nandy Robin UNICEF
Pires Clara MINUSTAH
Rosendahl Heiner MINUSTAH
Segaar Derk OCHA
Suzuki Ayaka MINUSTAH

Thiry Benoit WFP
Van Alphen Dana PAHO
GOH
Bien-Aime Paul Antoine Ministry of Interior
Boutroue Joel Office of the Prime Minister
Brun Gerald Presidential Commission on Recovery and Reconstruction
Chancy Michel Ministry of Agriculture
Clermont Charles Presidential Commission on Recovery and Reconstruction
Etienne Wilston Golder Construction Services
Dr. Henry Ariel Ministry of Health
Jean Yves-Robert Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation
Ms. Jean-Baptist Alta Ministry of Interior, Department of Civil Protection
Dr. Lassegue Alix Ministry of Health
Muscadin Jessie State Secretary for Integration of Handicapped
Pean Michel State Secretary for Integration of Handicapped
Petit Edwige Ministry of Public Works - Municipal Solid Waste
Remarais Ludner Ministry of Environment
Surena Claude Ministry of Health
NGOs
Campbell Scott CRS
D’Harnocourt Emmanual IRC
DiFrancesca Jim Project Concern
Donahue Joseph iMMAP
Finney Elizabeth MSF International
Garfield Richard Columbia University
Lyon Evan Partners in Health
Montpetit Audree CARE
Poteat Linda InterAction
Purdin Susan IRC
Scott Ivan OXFAM GB and ALNAP Chair
Wilde Alberto CHF Int’l
Zissman Marc MIT Lincoln Laboratory
Donors
Abrantes Alexander World Bank
Berrendorf Damien ECHO
Brouant Olivier ECHO
Conlay Tony DFID
Ghesquire Francis World Bank

10.3 Documents Reviewed
In addition to the following documents, we have also used different after action reports, personal discussions, and other informal
sources of information to prepare this report.
Government AARs, Quick Look Reports, and Lessons Learned:
601 Air and Space Operations Center/Air Mobility Division. 2010. Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center:After Action Report.
February.
Center for Joint and Strategic Logistics. 2010. Haiti Hotwash Session Report. March 12.
FEMA. 2010. Haiti Earthquake Response: Quick Look Report. June 3.
Health and Human Services: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. 2010. 2010 Haiti Earthquake: Quick Look
Report. Draft. June.
Health and Human Services: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. 2010. Haiti ResponseTimeline.
JCOA. 2010. Operation Unified Response: Haiti Earthquake Response. May.
Government Documents:
USAID/OFDA. 2005. Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response. Version 4.0. September.
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Haiti – Earthquake. Fact Sheets: 1 – 58.
USAID/OFDA. 2010. Latin America and the Caribbean: Humanitarian Assistance in Review, FiscalYear (FY) 2000 – FY 2009.
USAID/OFDA. 2010. OFDA: Chronology of Response to the Haiti Response.
USAID/OFDA. 2010. USAID Haiti EarthquakeTaskforce: (SBU) Situation Report No. 1 – 86.
USAID/FFP. 2010. Food for Peace FY 2010 Emergency Food Aid Programs in Haiti.
USAID/FFP. 2010. Haiti: Food for Peace Fact Sheet. 19 July.
USAID/Haiti. 2010. Success Story: Helping Families in Fort National and Avenue Poupelard.
USAID/ORC. 2010. Haiti Relief and Recovery: Office of the Response CoordinatorWeekly Slide Update – Phase II/III Analysis and Planning. 9
March – 2 June.
United States Government Accountability Office. 2010. Defense Management: U.S. Southern Command Demonstrates Interagency
Collaboration, but Its Haiti Disaster Response Revealed Challenges Conducting a Large Military Operation. July.
Additional Documents:
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action.2010. Evaluating the Haiti Response: Encouraging
Improved System-wide Collaboration, Meeting Report. 18-19 May.
Bernstein, C. 2010.A Real-Time evaluation of Christian Aid’s Response to the Haiti Earthquake. May-June.
Collaborative Learning Projects. 2010. Lessons learned from Past Experience for International Agencies in Haiti.
Demographic and Health Survey. 2006. Enquête Mortalité, Morbidité et Utilisation des Services. Ministère de la Santé Publique et de
la Population. Haiti.
Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis. 2010. Market System for Beans – Port-au-Prince, Haiti. February 7-17.
Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis. 2010. Port-au-Prince Rice Markets in post-earthquake Haiti.
FEWS NET,ACF, OXFAM,WFP, CNSA, FAO. 2010. Executive Brief on the Haiti Emergency Food Security Assessment. August.
FEWS NET, CNSA. 2010. Haiti Food Security Outlook No. 24: May-September 2010. Washington D.C. May.
FEWS NET, CNSA. 2010. Haiti Food Security Update: June 2010.Washington, Port-au-Prince. June.
FEWS NET. 2010. Executive Brief: Impacts of food aid rice distribution in Haiti on the rice market and production. Washington.April.

Grunewald, F.A. and B. Renaudin. 2010. Real-time evaluation of the response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010: Mission 9-23
February 2010. Mission Report, Delegation of Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Defence, Republic of France. 4 April.
Independent Evaluation Group. 2010. WBG Response to the Haiti Earthquake: Evaluative Lesson.
International Crisis Group. 2010. Haiti: Stabilization and Reconstruction after the quake. Latin America/Caribbean Report
No. 32. 31 March.
Kristoff, M. and L. Panarelli.2010.“Haiti:A Republic of NGOs?” PB 23. United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C.April.
Overseas Development Institute. 1996. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda: Study III Principal Findings and
Recommendations. London. June.
OCHA. 2010. Humanitarian Bulletin No. 1 – 8.
Pan American Health Organization. 2010. Earthquake in Haiti: PAHO/WHO Situation Report on Health Activities Post Earthquake. May 18.
Pan American Health Organization. 2010. Emergency Operations Center Situation Reports No. 1 – 26: Haiti Earthquake.
Sheltering Cluster. 2010. Sheltering Cluster Achievements. Port-au-Prince, June.
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. 2007. Consolidated lessons fromTsunami Evaluation Coalition.TEC. January.
United Nations Children’s Fund.2010. UNICEF Haiti Situation Report: 23 July 2010. Washington D.C. July.
World Health Organization. 2010. Public health risk assessment and interventions: Earthquake Haiti. January.

10.4 International Response Framework
(IRF) Concept
The need for a new response framework for international
disasters (“IRF”) to coordinate multiple U.S. Government
agencies responding to a global catastrophe was widely discussed
at the Haiti Lessons Learned workshop and during interviews.
There is general agreement that the domestic National Response
Framework (NRF) (http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/)
method and structure could be used to create an IRF, but there
are differing opinions as to the final structure, scope, and roles.
Areas of general agreement include:
• The NRF is simply a model, not a template.There will be
many differences in the final structure of an IRF;
• An IRF needs to be “all-hazards”-based and scalable to
differently sized events;
• The full-scale IRF will rarely be used, only for a “whole of
government” response, but the structure should be scalable
across all levels and types of events;
• An IRF must take into account the capacities of the host
government to manage the response (i.e. the U.S. is not in
charge);
• An IRF must take into account the role and capacities of the
UN agencies and should attempt to mirror the UN cluster
system to ensure integration during international responses;
and
• The process to create an IRF must incorporate all potential
agencies and be driven by experienced disaster responders
(USAID/OFDA).
The key questions regarding the IRF that need to be resolved
are:
• What will be the structure of this organization?
• How will the IRF be developed?
• When and how will the IRF be implemented?
• Who will lead the management of the response? The
reconstruction?
The structure of an IRF
The National Response framework (NRF) that evolved from
the National Response Plan after 9/11 and Katrina is a useful
model for a possible IRF. However, it should not be considered a
template, for there are a great many differences between global
and domestic responses.As stated by FEMA:“The National
Response Framework is a guide that details how the Nation
conducts all-hazards response–from the smallest incident to the
largest catastrophe.The Framework identifies the key response
principles, as well as the roles and structures that organize
national response. It describes how communities, States, the
Federal Government and private sector and nongovernmental
partners apply these principles for a coordinated, effective
national response. In addition, it describes special circumstances
where the Federal Government exercises a larger role, including
incidents where Federal interests are involved and catastrophic
incidents where a State would require significant support. It
lays the groundwork for first responders, decision-makers and
supporting entities to provide a unified national response.”
Applied globally, this general concept can be used to create an
IRF.
In the NRF, there are five key principles of operation that
constitute national response doctrine:
• Engaged partnerships;
• Tiered response;
• Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities;
• Unity of effort through unified command; and
• Readiness to act.
The key points of the NRF are “scalability” and a hierarchical
leadership framework (“unified command,”) with a single agency
in charge of the overall management.The NRF is scalable and can
expand rapidly from a small team organizing search and rescue
to a widespread,“whole of government” response, based on the
needs identified by the state governor and FEMA leadership.
A unified command requires that reporting structures are
pre-established and formal, with ultimate operational authority
resting with the Incident Commander. In the NRF, the specific
tasks necessary for a complete response are described in the
“Emergency Support Functions” (ESFs). Each ESF is led by a
single government agency that reports up through the Incident
Command structure.There are 15 ESFs, including “Health,” led by
HHS, and “Transportation,” led by the DOT.When using so many
agencies, there is a need to have common terminology, stages,
and language for the response.
In an IRF, these support functions could be developed from the
UN “clusters” to better integrate operations into the overall
response structure.The current global response to disasters is
framed around the UN “cluster” system. Each cluster is task-
specific (water-sanitation or shelter, etc.) and led by a pre-

designated UN agency (e.g. the WHO leads the health cluster).
The cluster system has been less than successful due to the
mostly volunteer nature of participation and no direct reporting
responsibilities. OCHA is designated as the lead of the cluster
system, although it acts at the behest of the host government.
Any U.S. Government disaster response must function under the
UN system, with ultimate responsibility and control left to the
host government.The Haiti earthquake response, with the loss of
both Haitian and UN leadership, may never again be replicated,
and our management structure must integrate with the global
response structure.This will require interface between the U.S.
management structure, or IRF, and the UN cluster system.The
effectiveness of the cluster system may vary in responses, but the
application of the IRF will remain supportive of the clusters and
consistent throughout the relief efforts.Again, it is USAID/OFDA
that has the greatest experience and expertise in this area.
The Development of the IRF
The development of an IRF should be a collaborative process,
with input from all the agencies included in the structure.The
most basic requirements are a well-designed management
hierarchy; an understanding of the resources and roles of
different federal agencies; and memoranda of agreement to
specify the resources, roles, and reporting.The writing of the
framework should be led by a single agency – USAID – with
technical assistance on the process from FEMA staff that helped
write the NRF.
It will be necessary to have a high level of involvement from
many agencies to work out the roles and relationships within
the framework. In order to give sufficient political weight to
encourage intra-agency collaboration, a National Security
Presidential Directive regarding the development of the
Framework, with USAID as the lead, should be written. Similar
directives were used for domestic preparedness initiatives with
great success.
The Implementation of the IRF
The need for an IRF-based response will be determined by
the planned role and scope of the U.S. Government response
to a specific event. If the Framework is created to be scalable
and flexible, then it can be used as the management structure
for all international responses.The OFDA DART system alone,
or with one or two additional partners, is sufficient for most
foreign responses and already works well in collaboration
with the UN-based response that relies heavily on NGOs and
contractors to provide services. It is the catastrophic events
that occur every two to five years where a more robust U.S.
Government response is required.This may also be true for
significant events that occur in politically sensitive areas, or in the
Western Hemisphere, particularly in countries with weak central
governments.The use of the full-scale IRF structure will clearly
be necessary for any “whole of government” response in the
future.
When a larger response is needed, additional partners can be
called in to fill the specific additional tasks, for which they have
received training and have existing MOAs.The repetitive use
of the framework allows for a continuous, low-grade testing
and improvement.The decision to expand to a large-scale IRF
is political and will be based on many factors.These decisions
should simply be a matter of adding further functions and
agencies to the response as needs are determined.
Leading the management of the response
Almost all parties interviewed during the study agreed
that USAID should remain the operational lead in the U.S.
Government response to international disasters. Other agencies
were felt to be too political, or too sensitive, or lacking of a
global presence or experience.The strategic lead will remain
with the local U.S. Embassy, or higher Washington levels for
catastrophes and sensitive events.The most compelling reason
for this is that USAID/OFDA will continue to respond to almost
all foreign disasters and, therefore, will maintain the greatest
expertise.Also, USAID has the broadest global experience
and systems within many countries to support their response,
as well as long experience working with NGOs and the UN.
Finally, there is the “humanitarian imperative” that drives global
disaster response that demands neutrality, impartiality, and
no politicization from the responding organizations. OFDA is
recognized by international agencies and the UN as meeting
these requirements.As the response moves from relief to long-
term programs, USAID should continue to lead, but with strong
support from the DOS and S/CRS, particularly with regards to
political stability initiatives.
USAID faces many constraints in being the lead agency for
catastrophes and a “whole of government” response: (1) the
lack of political standing to manage Department-level response;
(2) relative lack of management experience for a “whole of
government” response; and (3) staff size limitations.

Political Constraints
Having OFDA staff, or even the USAID Administrator, manage
a “whole of government” response is made more difficult by
their relatively low political level.This problem could be solved
by a number of solutions.The simplest is that for operational
management of most responses, high political standing is not
necessary, as the level of political involvement is minimal.The
use of an IRF also helps reduce conflicts if it is written so that
when additional agencies are involved in the response, they have
specific roles, responsibilities, and reporting that are clearly
delineated in the structure and spelled out in advance by MOAs
and MOUs, with clear lines of reporting up through the Incident
Commander. Finally, for “whole of government” responses, the
Incident Commander could report to the President through a
committee headed by the NSC.This committee would set policy
to direct response, all of which should pass through the Incident
Commander and not to individual departments or agencies.
Management Constraints
The DART/RMT structure generally coordinates a limited
U.S. Government response within the greater UN response
for foreign disasters.They do not lead large, multi-agency
activities.The problem with the higher level of management
requirements will be partially solved by the creation of a more
formal management structure (the IRF), but further resources,
personnel, training, exercising, and experience will be needed for
such a complex organization.
Size Constraints
OFDA, and even USAID, are acknowledged internally and
externally to be relatively small organizations, with OFDA
having fewer than 300 staff worldwide.There are existing pools
of contractors that the agency can pull from to augment their
response staff, but this is a small group of approximately 60
individuals whose availability is limited.The limited available
staff led to extremely difficult working conditions and a rapid
turnover of staff that received negative comments, especially
from the UN and NGOs. It is difficult to pull staff from other
U.S. Government agencies because of work commitments.The
CRC had very limited success in rapidly providing additional staff
for the response.
In order to meet the needs of a scalable IRF, the USAID/OFDA
DART needs to staff the expanded organizational framework for
catastrophic disaster response.The expansion should come from
increasing the pool of experts available to directly assist with
the RMT/DART and also from structuring the IRF in a modular
manner to allow specific functions to be delivered by other U.S.
Government agencies.
The personnel to augment the RMT/DART can be produced by
expanding the pool of available contractors and/or by working
with other organizations with disaster expertise, such as NGOs,
academic institutions, and possibly even state disaster agencies.
Another pool to augment these resources would be retired
government and military personnel.
Ideally, the IRF structure will be “plug-and-play;” that is, specific
tasks that can be met by specific agencies will be identified.
Interagency agreements (IAAs) will then be created to
describe the tasks, the requirements to meet them, and the
responsibilities of both the requesting (USAID) and fulfilling
agencies.These task-specific roles can be as small as for
additional communications personnel or as large as requesting
another agency to lead an entire branch, or “cluster,” of the IRF.
The key is to have the relationship defined in advance.
Recommendations
An IRF should be developed and must use a unified command;
designate roles; be scalable, flexible, and adaptable; and use
pre-existing agreements between agencies regarding resources,
communications, reporting, and management.
1. USAID should continue to lead foreign disaster response.
2. A National Security Presidential Directive should be issued
that makes USAID the lead on a collaborative process for
the development of an IRF.
3. The USAID/OFDA DART should create an expanded
organizational framework for catastrophic disaster response
to increase the number of people available for existing
positions and increase the RMT/DART positions to staff
critical positions and share the workload.This expanded
team framework should be flexible, scalable, and adaptable,
like the NRF.
4. Political structures need to be created that compliment the
Unified Command and give the response leadership the
necessary support to manage across agencies.

10.5 Description of the Roles of the
GOH
The Executive Branch: President Preval and
Prime Minister Bellerive
The President of Haiti is the head of state elected directly by
popular election.The Prime Minister acts as head of Government
and is appointed by the President, chosen from the majority
party in the National Assembly.121
Executive power is exercised
by the President and Prime Minister, who together constitute the
Government.
Together, the President and Prime Minister led the Haitian
Government’s response at both the policy and operational
level.They were responsible for making all major decisions
related to the rescue and relief phase, as well as the transition
to recovery and reconstruction.They played a key role in
establishing the initial response architecture that was formed
to manage the response for the Government in coordination
with the international community. By 15 January, they established
six presidential commissions which comprised key areas of
the response; health, food, water, reconstruction, fuel and
energy, and temporary shelter.These commissions were led by
government officials or Haitian civilians working as volunteers.
As the humanitarian needs evolved and grew more complex, the
President and Prime Minister worked directly with the OCHA
to establish a structure to coordinate political, operational, and
tactical actions necessary to implement an effective response
and plan strategically for transition from relief to recovery.This
structure is described in detail under Section 10.6, OCHA.
Ministry of Interior
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for managing Haiti’s
domestic relief, national security, and immigration issues. In
past disasters, the Ministry assisted in directing the response
and aided relief efforts by collecting data and building
infrastructure.122
Due to the magnitude of the 12 January 2010
earthquake, the Ministry of Interior was not held responsible
for controlling the relief efforts. Rather, the President and Prime
Minister led the Government of Haiti response effort.The role
of the Ministry of Interior was to assist in the coordination
effort between the Government of Haiti, foreign governments,
the UN, and NGOs.
Critical elements of the Ministry of Interior were destroyed or
sustained heavy losses in terms of material and human resources.
The National Disaster Risk Management System (NDRMS)
and the Port-au-Prince fire station were seriously damaged.
The buildings of the Ministry of the Interior, which housed
the Emergency Operations Centre and the Direction de la
Protection Civile (DPC), were destroyed, and many Government
vehicles were rendered unusable.123
Ministry of Agriculture
The primary role of the Ministry of Agriculture during the six-
month period following the earthquake was to coordinate and
plan the food aid distribution with the WFP and USAID’s Office
of Food for Peace.The Ministry also cooperated with the U.S.
military, MINUSTAH, and NGOs to ensure proper coordination.
The Ministry established local coordination committees at
the municipal level with mayors from each of the areas where
food distribution sites would be located.This coordination was
accomplished for the Government under the auspices of the
Presidential Commission on Food, which was chaired by the
Secretary of State at the Ministry of Agriculture. Staff from this
apparatus attended the cluster meetings on food and water.
Ministry of Health
The Ministry of Health’s response to the earthquake was led by
the Presidential Commission on Health, which was established
on 15 January.Through the cluster on health, the commission
coordinated with the HHS, USAID, PAHO, and NGOs in the
following areas: immunization; coordination of the pharmaceutical
supply chain through the PROMESS system; and establishment
of epidemiological surveillance through a sentinel system. In
April 2010, the Commission released an interim transition plan
for health. It established a registration system for NGOs so
they could be accounted for and encouraged to work under
the cluster system. It also established medical networks to
coordinate service coverage, including a minimum package of
services for the new IDP camps through mobile and fixed points
of care.
121
CIA Factbook; Haiti. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html.Accessed 3 September 2010.
122
Schaaf, Brian.“Taking Stock of the Damage After Ike.” Haiti Innovation. September 11, 2008.
Available at: http://www.haitiinnovation.org/en/2008/09/12/taking-stock-damage-after-ike.Accessed on 3 September 2010.
123

Ministry of Environment
As a cross-cutting agency,The Ministry of Environment works
closely with other GOH Ministries, such as Health and Public
Works.The Ministry of Environment’s immediate focus of
attention following the earthquake was on the disposal of
human remains and the mitigation of dust produced by the
massive destruction that occurred when buildings collapsed.
After the immediate response efforts to remove bodies, the
Ministry began to coordinate with agencies implementing cash-
for-work programs, particularly in the areas of flood mitigation,
waterway management, and road improvement.These activities
included strengthening riverbanks, dredging river beds to remove
sediments, removing debris from drainage canals, and improving
roads to be more resistant to landslides.A key priority for the
Ministry of Environment during the later period of the response
has been to locate suitable sites for rubble, which can be crushed
and re-used for the reconstruction process.
Ministry of Planning and External
Cooperation
The Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation’s mandate
is two-fold: national development planning and managing
international cooperation.The Ministry coordinated with USAID,
the UN, and other multilateral donors to develop the Plan of
Action for the Reconstruction and Development of Haiti in
March in preparation for the international donor’s conference on
31 March 2010.As a result of the conference, the Interim Haiti
Reconstruction Commission (IHRC) was established in April and
located on the grounds of the Ministry of Planning and External
Cooperation.The aim is for the two institutions to coordinate
plans for the re-development of Haiti.

10.6 Description of the Roles of the UN
Agencies
MINUSTAH
MINUSTAH has been present in Haiti since 2004, and prior to
the earthquake, included a military component of up to 7,803
troops, 2,136 UN police, 464 international civilian staff, 1,239
local civilian staff, and 207 UNVolunteers.124
The capacity of
MINUSTAH to respond to the earthquake was severely affected
by the large-scale loss of life within its own institution, with over
100 staff killed and many more injured. MINUSTAH’s original
mandate was to restore a secure and stable environment,
promote the political process, to strengthen Haiti’s Government
institutions and rule of law structures, as well as to promote
and protect human rights.This mission was extended by the UN
Security Council on 19 January to “increase the overall force
levels…to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction
and stability efforts.”125
At this point, MINUSTAH made its
logistics and security resources available to the humanitarian
community, which assisted humanitarian activities.The human
rights component of MINUSTAH also engaged in the earthquake
response operation, specifically focusing on protection concerns
and using established contacts with local authorities and civil
society networks to help identify beneficiaries and engage
with local actors.A pivotal accomplishment of MINUSTAH
was the creation of the Joint Operating Tasking Center
(JOTC) in cooperation with OCHA and the Government of
Haiti.The JOTC was key to ensuring the proper distribution
of humanitarian assistance material through a coordination
mechanism that worked directly with the cluster system.
OCHA
OCHA’s chief role in the response was coordination of
humanitarian action between the Government of Haiti and
international community.The cluster system was re-activated on
15 January, with the response operation organized through 12
clusters and two sub-clusters.126
To the extent possible, the
Government appointed Ministry counterparts to co-lead each
cluster and, by May, had intensified its involvement with clusters
in response planning and implementation at all levels.Within
the first weeks following the earthquake, the OCHA office was
strengthened to provide dedicated support to the humanitarian
community on inter-cluster coordination, information
management and analysis, mapping, civil-military liaison, donor
coordination, advocacy, and media outreach.
OCHA also mobilized a United Nations Disaster Assessment
and Coordination team immediately following the earthquake,
with initial members arriving 36 hours later. UNDAC staff
conducted rapid needs assessments to assemble the flash appeal,
which was accomplished in three days for a total request of
$700 million. UNDAC team members also worked with the U.S.
military to establish rules for landing slot allocation at the Port-
au-Prince airport, apportioning a minimum of one-third of all
incoming flights for humanitarian assistance during the first days
of the response. Finally, the UNDAC team also coordinated the
search and rescue teams that arrived from 67 countries.
PAHO/WHO
PAHO acted as the health cluster lead in Haiti.As such, it
coordinated the health response among 396 NGOs, the UN,
USAID/OFDA, CDC, various militaries, and the Government of
Haiti’s Presidential Commission on Health.The health cluster
was too large, so it was divided into sub-clusters on hospital
needs, medical team and service coordination, medical supply
chain, medical logistics, health surveys and surveillance, and
tasking of health activities to NGOs for specific geographic
regions.
UNDP
The director of UNDP served as the Resident Coordinator (RC)
for all UN operations in Haiti prior to the earthquake. Following
the earthquake, the RC was appointed as the Humanitarian
Coordinator for the UN and led the HCT.
WFP
The WFP led the food cluster and was responsible for organizing
the food distribution program in Haiti.WFP worked closely with
the Presidential Commission on Food, MINUSTAH, and the U.S.
military to plan the food distribution process and determine
distribution sites in Port-au-Prince and other affected areas.WFP
conducted interviews with rice importers and market surveys to
determine their strategy on food aid to avoid any disruption of
the local economy.
124
125
America. 2010.“U.N. Security Council Resolution 1908 on Haiti” American.gov Website. Modified January 19, 2010.
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/January/20100119153403eaifas0.1554028.html.Accessed on 11 September 2010.
126
OneResponse. 2010. http://oneresponse.info/Disasters/Haiti/Pages/Clusters.aspx.Accessed on 27 August 2010.

10.7 Scope ofWork
Scope ofWork
Haiti Earthquake Response Interagency Coordination
After Action and Lessons Learned
April 1, 2010
In the days immediately following the Haiti Earthquake of January
12, 2010, the President tasked the USAID Administrator with
leading the overall USG Haiti Earthquake response efforts. Under
the overall effort several task forces, sub-task forces and working
groups were established.A Haiti Earthquake Response Taskforce
was established under USAID leadership. It was coordinated
by the DCHA Acting Assistant Administrator and the Deputy
Assistant Administrator from USAID’s Bureau for Latin America
and the Caribbean.
This response was unprecedented in several respects.The
geographic proximity of Haiti to the United States, the special
historical relationship between Haiti and the U.S., the degree
of devastation and loss of life, the institutional impact on the
GOH, UN agencies and NGOs on the ground, the number
of interagency partners, the broad use of the Standby Civilian
Response Corp (CRC) to respond to the crisis and the close
coordination between USAID and the military all define this as
a unique event from which valuable lessons may nevertheless be
drawn.
Because of USAID’s leadership role for coordination of the USG-
wide effort, it was deemed appropriate that USAID also lead a
USG-wide effort to capture lessons learned from the experience.
DCHA/AA tasked the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to work
with others to develop an initial concept for organizing the
effort to compile lessons learned from the earthquake response
stretching from the actual event on January 12th, 2010 through
June 1st, 2010.The results of this activity will serve to inform
future disaster responses, interagency planning processes and
dialogue and future deployments of the CRC and will be of
particular use in informing the Quadrennial Development and
Diplomacy Review (QDDR) currently underway.
USAID proposes to engage the services of a team of experts or
firm specializing in after action and lessons learned activities.
Activity to be examined
The subject of the present study is the U.S. Government and
international community’s response to the deadly January 12,
2010 earthquake near Léogâne, Haiti from the event through
June 1st, 2010.There are three principal focuses to this effort,
each with corresponding key questions:
1. Internal U.S. Government coordination: How well did
USG agencies (including the Department of Defense)
coordinate with each other in providing policy guidance
and in implementing the relief response?
2. Partner coordination: How well did the USG elements
coordinate with the GOH, UN family of agencies, the
NGO community and other donors?
3. Response effectiveness: How well did the response
meet the needs of the Haitian people? Was it conducted
in accordance with international standards?
Disasters of the magnitude of the Haiti Earthquake normally
require two parallel lines of work.The first is the actual response
to the disaster and its immediate effect on both the people
and institutions of a country, which includes the immediate
response, relief and recovery phases.The second line of work,
which must start within days of the first, entails the planning for
the post-disaster stabilization, reconstruction and development
of the country.The second generally includes the development
of a request for supplemental assistance funds to help replace
the emergency assistance resources used in the disaster and to
provide the resources for moving from relief to recovery and
reconstruction of the country.
The After Action Review effort should yield two reports: (1) an
interim report approximately one month after the study begins
that identifies major findings on the response and relief phases
and the parallel planning process for supplemental resources
and for stabilization, reconstruction and eventual development
of Haiti; and (2) a final report by August 1, 2010 that looks at
the continuum of the disaster response, relief and recovery
phases and the parallel planning for supplemental resources
and stabilization and reconstruction during this period. In both
cases the reports will include a separate USAID annex that
captures the findings on internal USAID processes, particularly
at the tactical level.These USAID annexes will not be part of
the final interagency reports, but their content will be drawn on
in preparing the interagency report.The purpose is to produce
a timely analysis at critical phases of the response — during
the initial response, relief and recovery efforts, during the

transitions between those phases and during the transition from
the recovery to the stabilization, reconstruction/development
phase when the effects of the response, relief and recovery and
parallel planning for supplemental resources and stabilization and
reconstruction on later reconstruction activities can be more
adequately understood.With submission of the final report, the
contractor will include major findings and a final set of workable
recommendations for consideration by USAID and its USG and
other partners.
Background
The interagency response to the January 12, 2010 earthquake in
Haiti has required an unprecedented degree of collaboration and
integration between disparate branches of the U.S. Government.
In particular, the coordination of USAID and the U.S. military
was better organized at the policy and operational levels than
with other recent responses. In addition this crisis represents
one of the first occasions when the Civilian Response Corps,
particularly the Standby element of the Civilian Response Corps
was broadly used to respond to a crisis.To capture the lessons
from this exceptional whole-of-government endeavor, a uniquely
whole-of-government approach to collecting, analyzing and
incorporating lessons learned is called for.
Purpose
The purpose of this after action and lessons learned activity
is to inform USG decision making about how best to organize
in response to major humanitarian crises. It may also serve as
a timely tool to incorporate lessons and best practices in the
continued interagency response and longer term strategy in
Haiti.
AAR and LL OrganizationalTeam
Structure
The contractor shall work with two small Technical Support
Groups: 1) an internal USAID support group made up of
representatives from the principal units involved in the response;
and 2) a broader interagency support group made up of a
representative from each of the other agencies involved in the
effort.
These two groups will assist the contractor in accessing the
results of agency or unit specific AARs, identifying appropriate
people to be interviewed and other internal coordination
needed.
Questions to be Addressed
The questions to be addressed are listed below, organized
around the key themes of organizational structure and
effectiveness, response effectiveness and integration with
partner activities, programs and plans. Each question is divided
into two parts: a descriptive part, where the objective findings
or facts of the effort are to be laid out and an analytic part,
where the evaluators are asked to analyze the appropriateness
and effectiveness of the effort, draw conclusions or make
recommendations about the findings.
Theme 1:Who was involved?
Description
What were the official and de facto roles of the key actors?
o USAID:
• Administrator
• DCHA (AA/DAA,AA/DAA staff, OFDA, FFP, OTI, OMA,
PPM, OCR, GC)
• LAC, LPA, GH, EGAT
o National Security Council: Principals’ Committee, Deputies
Committee and IPC
o Department of State: (Counselor Mills, Deputy Secretary
Lew,WHA, State/ S/CRS, Undersecretary for Management)
o NSC
o DOD: (SOUTHCOM, NORTHCOM, JFCOM, SOCOM,
OSD, Joint Staff,TRANSCOM)
o HHS
o DHS: (FEMA, Coast Guard)
o U.S. Embassy Haiti
o U.S. Embassy Haiti/Office of the Response Coordinator
o USAID/Haiti
o USAID/DR
o Others (see list provided separately)
Analysis
Were the roles played by each actor appropriate? Did the
official and de facto roles coincide?

Theme 2: How was the response organized in Washington?
Description
o How was the response organized in Washington? How
was the parallel planning for supplemental resources and
longer-term stabilization and reconstruction organized?
Who was in charge of the response? Who was in charge
of supplemental and stabilization and reconstruction
planning? What was the role of the CRC in the
Washington based response?
Analysis
Consider the effectiveness of each of the following organizational
structures in the response and relief effort or the parallel
supplemental and stabilization and reconstruction planning
in terms of appropriate integration of efforts and in terms of
achieving appropriate results.
o Inter-agency Haiti Task Force
o Response Management Team
o State Department Operations Center
o State IA:Task Forces 1-8
o Haiti Task Team
o Haiti 2020 Strategy Effort
o Joint Staff Crisis Management Element (JS CME)
o OSD Crisis Management
How well did the Washington-based Inter-agency Haiti Task
Force/RMT structure work? How well did the Washington-based
planning structures for supplemental resources and for longer-
term stabilization and reconstruction work? Were the major
players adequately represented in decision making in both lines
of effort? What worked well and what could be improved? How
effective was the CRC in the Washington based response?
Theme 3: How was the response organized in the field?
Description
How was the response organized in the field? Who was in
charge? How was the parallel planning for supplemental
resources and longer-term stabilization and reconstruction
organized? What was the role of the CRC in the field based
response?
Analysis
Consider the effectiveness of the U.S. Mission Haiti (U.S.
Embassy/ORC USAID/Haiti, DART) and the Joint Task Force-
Haiti/HACC in the response and relief effort or the parallel
supplemental and stabilization and reconstruction planning
efforts in terms of appropriate integration of efforts and in
terms of achieving appropriate results.What worked well and
what could be improved? Were the major players adequately
represented in decision making? How effective was the CRC in
the field based response?
Theme 4: Chain of Command, Coordination and
Management
Description
What was the overall USG chain of command during the
response, relief and recovery phases? What were the USG
operational chains of command? How was information
communicated between the policy and operational levels? What
lines of operation were put forth by the overall response team
and by each of the sector response teams? What mechanisms
were used to integrate USG efforts?
What was the overall chain of command for planning for
supplemental resources and longer –term stabilization and
reconstruction? How was information communicated between
the policy and operational levels? What mechanisms were used
to integrate USG planning efforts for supplemental resources
and stabilization and reconstruction?
What was the overall chain of command for the Haitian and
international response, relief and recovery efforts? How did the
USG chain of command relate to the Haitian and international
chains of command in the case of both the response, relief
and recovery and in the case of planning for stabilization,
reconstruction and longer-term development? How did
communications work between USG and partners? With what
frequency did principal representatives from the international
response and relief community meet?
Analysis
How effective were the USG chains of command during the
response, relief and recovery? How well integrated were the

civilian and military chains of command at the operational level
(i.e. Haiti Taskforce/RMT and below and COCOM and below)?
How effective was the link and communication between
policy decision makers and operational levels? How well did
policy decisions guide operational levels? How effective were
operational levels at teeing up policy issues for decisions at the
policy level? What were some early policy decisions that affected
response implementation?
How well did communications work between actors at the
operational level, between civilian and military and between
Washington and the field? Did the field representatives have
access to key information as needed? What factors or processes
facilitated or hindered communications at the operational levels?
What was effective and what could be improved regarding the
‘battle rhythm’ of calls and reporting established among the
various actors?
How well did policy decisions guide operational planning during
the response, relief and recovery? How well was planning
integrated across agencies or departments? How well integrated
was civilian-military planning? What are the factors that hindered
or assisted the effective integration of planning across agencies
or implementing units? What factors or processes hindered/
assisted effective integration of activities across units or
agencies? How did the organizational structures or substructures
(i.e. sector working groups) facilitate or complicate coordination,
integration and management of the response effort? How
effectively did the USG manage and coordinate private
donations?
How well did policy decisions guide planning for the
supplemental and for longer-term stabilization, reconstruction
and development? How well was planning integrated across
agencies and departments? What are the factors that hindered
or assisted the effective integration of planning efforts across
agencies?
How effective was USG coordination with partners? What
factors facilitated or hindered effective coordination with
partners? How effective were USG and UN international
management structures in integrating USG efforts with the
contributions of each of the following during the response, relief
and recovery:
o Government of Haiti
o UN and UN Cluster System
o Other international or Intergovernmental Organizations
o NGOs and private donors and private sector
o Other bilateral donors
What factors hindered or assisted effective integration? Could
greater integration have enhanced the humanitarian impacts and
improved the foundation for recovery and reintegration of the
affected population?
Did the Haitian Government and Haitian community have the
opportunity to participate in the design and implementation of
the response, relief or recovery? Did they receive information
and have an opportunity to comment back to the implementing
agencies? Were there clear linkages and coordination with public
and private health and social services in the community?
How well was USG planning synched with Haitian plans for
post-disaster reconstruction, stabilization and development?
How well was USG planning synched with other donors
(intergovernmental, bilateral or private)?
Theme 5:What was quality of the response?
Description
What efforts were taken to provide relief in the principal
categories typical of disaster response: food; shelter; health
and medical; water and sanitation; and physical security? What
steps were taken to ensure this disaster response conformed
to international disaster response standards as set forth in the
Good Humanitarian Donor Principles, SPHERE, Paris Declaration
and similar documents? What steps were taken to ensure the
response design and assumptions match the local conditions? To
what degree was the response shaped by assessment?
Analysis
Did the response conform to international disaster response
standards? If not why not? Were disaster response activities
appropriate for the problems identified in the selected target
areas? Did appropriate assistance reach affected individuals
and communities? To what degree did assessments enhance
effectiveness of the response? What changes can be made
to improve results, either for this response or subsequent
responses?

Theme 6: How well were transitions and handoffs planned
for and implemented?
Description
What mechanisms were put in place to ensure smooth
transitions between each phase?
Analysis
How effective was planning for each follow-on phase while
response, relief and recovery operations were going on? How
smoothly were transitions and handoffs implemented between
the various phases of the response? How effective was civilian-
military planning for transitions? How smoothly and effectively
were the handoffs from military to civilian entities implemented?
How effective was planning for the transition from response,
relief and recovery to stabilization, reconstruction and longer
term development? How well did the disaster response,
relief and recovery phases set conditions for the follow-on
reconstruction program? How effective was planning for a
supplemental while response and relief operations were on-
going? What were the factors that hindered/assisted effective
supplemental request development? How well has USAID at
Washington and Mission levels adapted its existing development
programs to support the relief, recovery and post-disaster
reconstruction effort?
Theme 7:What was routine and what was different?
Description
What were the similarities and differences between the Haiti
Earthquake disaster and other major disasters? How did this
response differ from the USG response to other major disasters?
Analysis
How did these differences affect the response? How did these
differences assist or hinder the effectiveness of the response?
How did these differences enhance or detract from the cost
effectiveness of the response? Are there any unexpected but
important benefits or impacts of the response, relief and
recovery effort that should be documented? Are there any
negative impacts or unintended consequences of the program
that need to be addressed and how?
Theme 8: How well did the Response manage the message,
press and legislative relations?
Description
How did the response manage the message, what processes,
mechanisms and means were used? How did the response
manage the press? How did the response manage legislative
relations? In each case what were the mechanisms for managing
the message, press and legislative relations across agencies?
Analysis
What factors assisted/hindered effective management of the
message? What factors assisted/hindered effective management
of the press? What factors assisted/hindered effective
management of legislative inquiries and relations? How well was
the message coordinated across agencies and implementing units
at the policy level and at the operational level? How well did
the Response manage legislative relations, interest and inquiries?
How well did the Response manage the message and press
relations? How effective was planning and implementation of
strategic communications?
Theme 9: How well prepared was USAID to lead a USG
response to a disaster of the magnitude of the Haiti
Earthquake?
Description
In what ways were USAID and other USG organizations
prepared to respond to this disaster? How did USAID prepare
to lead the USG response in this case? What were the
constraints? How have OFDA and/or SOUTHCOM helped
prepare the Haitians to respond to disasters?
Analysis
Looking across the USG what were the most helpful standing
capabilities applied in the response and why? What impact
did these capabilities have on the response? What capabilities
were used that were less helpful or effective? What impact did
these capabilities have on the response? How effective were
prior disaster preparedness efforts in helping the Haitians deal
with this disaster? Why were they effective? Why weren’t they
effective?

Theme 10: How well are we laying the basis for relief,
recovery, reconstruction and development continuum?
Description
What did the USG do (is doing) to link recovery/development
with disaster response? Was anything done differently this time
to strengthen this approach? Since economic and social impacts
of natural disasters are greater in developing countries, such as
Haiti, what strategic approaches are being used to systematically
integrate vulnerability reduction in recovery and development
plans? What did we do (are doing) to build local and national
capacity and to ensure meaningful participation of affected
communities? What did we do (are doing) to ensure flexible,
adequate funding for recovery and the long term, including all
potential sources such as private-public partnerships? What
did we do (are doing) to ensure multilateral collaboration that
supports host nation development plans?
Analysis
How well does the current arrangement link relief, recovery and
development? How effective is it at prioritizing the reduction
of long-term vulnerability? Does it balance local, national and
international capacities? Does it establish effective mechanisms
for coordinating and set realistic timeframes?
Methods
Because of the breadth and importance of this study, it is
designed to be conducted in two phases and to generate two
written products—the interim and final reports, as described
above.
Substantial after Action Review and Lessons Learned (LL) efforts
are already ongoing within various agencies involved with the
Haiti response and any umbrella effort should avoid duplicating
those processes.The Department of Defense has an extensive
LL infrastructure and currently has assigned 23 individuals from
across DOD to work exclusively on collecting and compiling
LL for the Haiti response.This effort includes a 14-person team
from the Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) which
has been deployed to Haiti along with a military historian. DOD
is planning a conference at Joint Forces Command in Suffolk,VA
on 23-24 March to compile DOD-specific LL.The Office of the
Secretary of Defense has offered to co-sponsor a late April LL
conference with USAID. OSD defers to USAID as to whether
it desires to host the conference; if not, the conference can be
hosted at National Defense University.
Elements of USAID, to include OFDA, have already held events
to begin to capture after action reviews and LL. Other agencies,
such as FEMA and HHS, have also begun to capture LL. USAID,
as the lead federal agency for the Haiti earthquake response,
can serve as the focal point for compilation of interagency LL.
Further, as lead federal agency, USAID has a unique perspective
for comment on strategic-level issues regarding the response
effort.
The after action and lessons learned activity will draw on the
results of completed AARs and a review of the activities of the
agencies involved and will rely heavily on qualitative methods
including, but not limited to, semi-structured interviews,
direct observation, focus groups and secondary data reviews.
Additional information for the project will include monitoring
on-going relief and recovery activities.Therefore the contractor
should seek out the results of these other agency AAR efforts
and incorporate them into the results products. Confidential
information in the reports will not be attributed to specific
individuals. Interview notes will remain the property of the
contract team, not USAID.
Only the specific individuals approved in the task order will have
input into and will be able to review the technical deliverables
under this task order. Macfadden will require the individual
working under this task order to agree that they will not share
information or work products from the task order with other
Macfadden personnel. Involvement of any other Macfadden staff
will be limited to management of the task order budget, schedule
and administrative support.
In addition, Macfadden acknowledges the statement of work
condition that if any of its employees that worked on the Haiti
response effort are interviewed as part of the AAR/LL process, a
member of the Government interagency technical support group
will be part of the interview team.

This deliverable schedule may be revised per written technical
direction from the COTR.
The activity will be conducted in eight stages:
1. Review Existing Documentation:The review team will conduct
a thorough review of existing data and information and the
preliminary results of other agency lessons learned efforts.The
team leader may decide to consult additional documentation
from DOS, DOD, or other sources.The team leader will outline
preliminary field visit plans.
2. Refinement of Review Methods:Team leader will work closely
with the DCHA staff and key IA partners to hone the review
methods and plan the field visits.
3. Field Data Collection: Data collection proceeds. If it is deemed
useful to visit the field, this will occur during this period.
4. Submit Interim Report: Initial report submitted approximately
one month after the study begins. Participate in interagency
lessons learned workshop.The team leader will draft the
interim report listing findings in the form of major themes and
preliminary recommendations.The interim report will include
information gathered from a review of existing data and select
interviews of key participants in the Haiti response effort.
5. Refinement of findings: Further discussions with participants,
lessons learned interviews. Completion of field data collection.
6. Drafting and review of final report.
7. Submit Final Report:Approximately four months after study
initiation.The team leader will meet (in person or virtually) with
USAID and IA staff and advisory groups to present findings,
lessons learned and recommendations.
8. Final Report Outbriefings:To be scheduled by USAID POC.
Provision will be made for outbriefs to interagency partners.
Deliverables and Dissemination Requirements
The interim report should contain initial findings, in the form
of major themes and preliminary recommendations, to inform
the proceedings of the interagency workshop scheduled for the
end of April.The report will also lay out the plans for completing
the final report.An internal USAID specific annex that examines
internal USAID processes, particularly at the tactical level will be
submitted with the interim report.This will not be part of the
IA report but findings from this examination will be drawn on in
compiling the IA report.
The final report must be submitted to USAID four months
after signing the contract.The final report must contain at
least the sections outlined below.Additional sections may be
recommended by the review team.The report will include an
annex with recommendations for future disaster response
structures.A final USAID specific annex that examines specific
internal USAID processes, particularly at the tactical level, will
Deliverables Description Delivery Date
1. Submit Initial report submitted approximately 30 days after the study begins. June 15, 2010, unless
Interim Participate in interagency lessons learned workshop. Upon completion of revised by the COTR
Findings field data collection, the Team Leader will draft the interim report listing through written technical
findings in the form of major themes and preliminary recommendations. direction.
2. Submit Approximately four months after study initiation the Team Leader will September 1, 2010,
Final meet (in person or virtually) with USAID and IA staff and advisory groups unless revised by the
Report to present findings, lessons learned and recommendations. COTR through written
technical direction.
Deliverables Schedule and Logistics

also be included in the deliverables at the time of the final
report.This will not be part of the published IA report but
findings from this examination will be drawn on in compiling the
overall IA report.
1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
a. Objectives of AAR and LL effort
b. Overview of earthquake response from initial response
through recovery phase
c. Overview of parallel planning for supplemental resources
and reconstruction
3. Description of the Response
a. Brief description of interventions in each phase of the
response
b. Brief description of response results
c. Brief description of parallel planning for supplemental
resources and reconstruction
4. Findings
a. Thematic questions examined
b. Findings for each of the thematic questions examined
c. Cross-Cutting Issues
5. Analysis
a. Analysis of each thematic question
6. Recommendations
a. Recommendations for each of the thematic questions
examined
b. Recommendations for further institutional strengthening
actions
7. Annexes
a. Activity SOW
b. Composition of the team
c. Methods
d. List of sites visited
e. List of key informants
f. References
g. Indicator Performance Tracking Tables (IPTT)
h. Survey tools
i. List of abbreviations
Qualifications
Team Leader: Advanced degree in a social science or
equivalent academic preparation; several years’ experience in
managing and in evaluating donor-funded development and
humanitarian response programs in the field (the person should
have experience with development assistance and stabilization
programs in addition to having experience with disaster relief
and humanitarian assistance activities); Haiti or Africa experience
helpful; experience with evaluation of large or complex
interagency efforts desirable.
Team members: undergraduate degree related to
development, political science, economics or a related discipline;
familiarity with USAID or other donor processes both in
Washington and in the field; strong office and organizational
skills.

10.8Technical Support Group Comments
*The page numbers referenced in the following comments correspond to a draft of this report and therefore may not align
with the published text.
U.S.Agency for International Development
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20523
www.usaid.gov
Comments on the “Independent Review of the USG Response to the Haiti
Earthquake” by the U.S.Agency for International Development
As the Agency leading the U.S. Government response to the Haiti earthquake, USAID
commissioned this independent review of the lessons learned from the Haiti relief effort.
The intent was to obtain an independent, fact-based perspective on the U.S. government’s
performance in a major humanitarian disaster to which many federal agencies contributed.
While USAID commissioned this work and coordinated the process of obtaining input from
sister agencies and other stakeholders, this was an independent report and is not formally
cleared by USAID or any other agency. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the
findings and recommendations.
(1) Most of the Report’s recommendations are reasonable and actionable. Implementing
them will substantially improve the U.S. Government’s response to similar disasters in the
future.
(2) USAID disagrees with the need to create “an interagency committee on global
humanitarian crises coordinated by the NSC for “whole of government response
situations” (recommendation 3). In USAID’s view, the NSC already runs a fully adequate
interagency process when a humanitarian crisis occurs. The creation of a new interagency
committee would be duplicative of the existing structure and place unnecessary additional
demands on the small group of responsible officials. Deputies, for example, already met on
a daily basis for the first several weeks of the crisis and regularly for several months after
that, while the operational-level Agency representatives on the IPC continued to meet daily
throughout the crisis. It is unclear why a separate and additional interagency structure
would be more successful or productive. The existing interagency structure did not itself
cause any delays. Dealing with the Haiti earthquake was all consuming in the deputies
committee from the start and day-to-day policy support was quickly delegated to the level
of the IPC.
(3) USAID strongly agrees about the need for “structural strengthening of USAID/OFDA as
lead federal agency for international disaster response” (recommendation 1). This is also a
key recommendation of the recently completed Quadrennial Review of Diplomacy and
Development (QDDR) and USAID is already vigorously pursuing this end.
(4) USAID also very much agrees with the general need for “bridging the divide between
diplomatic response and humanitarian relief” (recommendation 2). However, USAID
disagrees with the proposal that S/CRS serve as the “bridge between USAID and DOS.” As
a result of the QDDR,

www.usaid.gov
USAID is clearly designated as the lead agency for humanitarian crisis and S/CRS is being
restructured. This is also consistent with the 1993 Presidential Policy Directive
appointing the USAID Administrator as Special Coordinator for International Disaster
Assistance.
(5) USAID believes that effectively “strengthening of an international response framework”
(recommendation 4) would, in and of itself, accomplish many of the aims of
recommendations 2 and 3.
(6) USAID believes that many of the innovative and creative practices for planning and
collaboration developed as part of the Haiti relief effort (referenced on page 26) could be
pursued and turned into policy, perhaps as part of the proposed “strengthening of an
international response framework” (recommendation 4).
(7) USAID also sees a need (as highlighted on page 85) to develop a clearer system for
mobilizing and using volunteers and donations as part of an international disaster
response.
(8) While “monitoring quality of aid and its impact” can certainly be strengthened
(recommendation 6), it is important to note that analysis and assessment of progress and
problems, while sometimes difficult, was recognized as a critically important function
throughout the relief effort. For example, despite substantial pressure by some
participants to distribute more “meals ready to eat,” or MREs, in Haiti, USAID continually
assessed and reassessed food prices, distribution mechanisms, and the best alternatives for
meeting the nutritional needs of Haitians.
(9) There is no doubt that the relief effort was expensive. While we will certainly try to
reduce costs in the future, there is little doubt that “the response was successful at rapidly
mitigating the impact of the earthquake,” saving thousands of lives and alleviating
enormous human suffering. Disaster relief is always a difficult undertaking and we do not
think that the response in Haiti can be characterized as “inefficient.”
(10) At various points in the report, the US Embassy and the USAID Mission are referred to as
distinct entities. It is important to note, therefore, that that the USAID Mission is in fact
part of the Embassy.
(11) The report could have provided a fuller discussion of why the ORC was set up and the
origin of the interagency taskforce. The ORC was originally designed to co-locate with

www.usaid.gov
the USAID Mission in the US Embassy to lead on the emergency response in Haiti and
manage the civilian-military relationship. The DART and OTI were folded under the ORC,
while the broader USAID Mission stayed focused on reprogramming the Mission portfolio
and on longer-term planning for recovery and reconstruction. In Washington, the Haiti
Interagency Taskforce (HIT), located on the 9th floor of the RRB, provided the operational
leadership for the interagency. The RMT fell under and was a part of the HIT and its
members participated around the clock. Neither the ORC nor the HIT were designed to
operate in parallel or to duplicate existing structures. They were not “separate chains of
command” (as suggested on page 49 and 104), but were created because the existing
structures (USAID Mission and OFDA) were too understaffed and weak to
adequately lead and manage the massive interagency response while simultaneously carrying
out their more traditional roles of managing and reprogramming the on-going USAID
Mission portfolio or, in the case of OFDA, programming, managing and overseeing the use
of International Disaster Assistance funds.

Date: 2 February 2011
To: United States Agency for International Development
From: Dr. Nicole Lurie, Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response,
United States Department of Health and Human Services
Subject: Independent Review of the United States Government Response to the
Haiti Earthquake: Findings and Recommendations [1 January 2011
Revision]
We appreciate the efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) in developing this After-Action Review (AAR) of the United States
Government (USG) response to the Haiti earthquake that struck near the capital
city of Port-au-Prince on 12 January 2010. This After-Action Review provides
an overview and analysis of the United States Government (USG) response to the
Haiti earthquake. The AAR also proposes a number of recommendations for
future USG-wide international disaster response operations.
The HHS comments of the revised USAID AAR dated 1 January 2011 concentrate
on two issues: 1) United States Department of Health and Humans
Services’ (HHS) public health and medical operations during the Haiti
earthquake response; and 2) the sustained need for the development and
Federal interagency approval of an International Response Framework (IRF).
For the record, on the day the earthquake struck, the HHS Emergency
Management Group (EMG) and the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
were activated to coordinate and provide medical supplies and treatment to
survivors in Haiti as part of a larger USG-coordinated response led by the
Department of State (DOS). In response to a request from USAID on January 14,
2010, HHS deployed seven teams to provide medical humanitarian assistance,
including an Incident Response Coordination Team (IRCT), ﬁve Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams (DMATs), an International Medical Surgical Response Team
(IMSuRT), and a mortuary affairs assessment team. The U.S. Public Health
Service also sent officers to support NDMS and Department of Defense (DOD)
missions. Four medical equipment caches were also deployed. HHS responders
arrived by January 15, 2010, and began caring for earthquake survivors on
January 17, 2010. HHS medical personnel in Haiti cared for 31,265 patients
through February 25, 2010.

HHS worked in an environment where command and control was complex and
in which various elements of response were coordinated by different
commands. In particular, HHS worked with DOS and with DOD in fatality
management, USAID on patient care, and DHS, DOD, and DOS for repatriation
and resettlement.
The AAR’s analysis and conclusions would have benefited from a
comprehensive description of the entire HHS roles in the public health and
medical response. Specifically, in addition to the health response in Haiti, there
was a domestic response that included assisting American citizens, orphans,
and adoptees evacuated from Haiti, providing definitive care for Haitians
evacuated by NDMS, and setting up a Family Assistance Center to assist in the
identification of human remains for American citizens. These efforts were an
integral part of the response.
HHS established two active Federal Coordinating Centers (FCCs) in Georgia and
Florida, to assist with patients evacuated to the U.S. This required close
coordination with interagency partners: the Department of Veterans Affairs,
DHS, and DOD, as well as with the State and local health departments. The
same complexity of interaction was required by the HHS repatriation efforts.
Specific additional comments about the revised AAR include:
• The Overarching Recommendations section includes the
“Strengthening of an International Response Framework” as one of seven
key recommendations stemming from the after-action analysis. We
wholeheartedly agree with this recommendation. We note that in, this
section and a subsequent section entitled “IRF Concept” (Section 10.4) the
need for an International Response Framework, much like the domestic
National Response Framework used to guide domestic response is
proposed. HHS, since 2008, has been working with the interagency
partners on a Public Health and Medical International Response
Framework which can serve as the basis for the proposed IRF
recommendation, particularly since Federal interagency efforts have
contributed to development of the Framework since its inception.
• In Section 4.1, Figure 10 entitled “Whole of Government” Structure
shows the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) as the only
HHS component included in the cadre of Federal agencies that normally
lead USG international disaster response. Three additional HHS offices

have major international responsibilities. The Office of Global Health
Affairs (OGHA), the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) and
the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
(ASPR) are integral to the leadership of the HHS role in international
disaster response. These offices regularly support global health
initiatives, International Health Regulations (IHRs), and play a role in
international assistance. Additionally, Figure 10 should reference the
Office of the Surgeon General (OSG) and the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC)
as offices under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health (OASH).
• In Section 4.6, the HHS public health and medical roles and
resources relied upon during the Haiti earthquake response were not
clearly illustrated (paragraph 2, page 81). The medical and public health
components should be introduced separately so as to avoid confusion
with respect to the specific roles played by the CDC, NDMS, the U.S.
Public Health Service (USPHS), Administration for Children and Families
(ACF), and other HHS assets. Without clear description of the respective
roles played by HHS assets, the report naturally does not discuss the
extensive coordination that occurred between the USPHS, CDC, NDMS and
ACF, and assets external to HHS, including DOD. Furthermore, the report
neglects to mention the operations conducted by the Haiti Health
Facilities Working Group, which was co-led by the HHS Center for Faith-
Based and Neighborhood Partnerships and OGHA.
• Section 4.6 requires a detailed description of the command and
control elements associated with HHS during the Haiti earthquake
response. Specifically, there is a need to describe how DOS initiated and
oversaw the American citizens (AMCITS) fatality management mission,
with HHS and DOD tasked with joint execution of this mission.
• Additionally, section 4.6 only superficially addresses the challenges
associated with the movement and evacuation of patients, repatriated
citizens, and orphans. The statement below does not account for the
complexities of the system and the inference is likely incorrect:
“This [delays in providing medical care in the U.S. ]could have been
avoided if HHS was able to activate the patient movement and
definitive care components of NDMS sooner and better
communication existed within the interagency to identify
responsibilities”
• The NDMS patient movement plan and Definitive Care component
are activated in response to a State request for assistance. During
the Haiti earthquake response, when State-level requests were

made, the patient movement plan and Definitive Care components
were activated. The USAID AAR discussion of the patient
movement plan and the NDMS Definitive Care component is
inaccurate.
• Early in the response and prior to the activation of NDMS, U.S.
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) conducted patient
evacuation missions on its own, without coordinating with HHS.
Patient tracking mechanisms between TRANSCOM operations and
HHS operations were reasonably visible once the Patient Movement
and Definitive Care Components of NDMS were activated. DOD
tracked patient evacuations through the TRANSCOM Regulating and
Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES). Once patient
evacuees reached the U.S., HHS continued to track their movements
through the Joint Patient Assessment and Tracking System (JPATS).
TRAC2ES and JPATS are not interoperable. Patients arriving by
other means, such as through various university hospitals or
through International Non-Governmental Organization (INGO)
mechanisms were not visible to either TRAC2ES or JPATS. Non-
patient attendants accompanying each of the patients transported
by TRANSCOM were not tracked. We agree with the conclusions
that interagency communications need to be better.
• The Medical Volunteer Coordination description under Section 4.6
misrepresents HHS’s coordination of volunteer health professionals,
asserting that there were no pre-existing mechanisms for screening,
managing, or deploying medical volunteers. HHS does have mechanisms
to source appropriate volunteer health professionals based on specific
response needs. However, during the Haiti earthquake response, the
decision to select U.S. volunteers outside of the established volunteer
management systems was made outside of HHS.
• On page 96 (Section 5) the following statement is made:
“Finally, many Federal agencies returned to the U.S. as they realized
they lacked the capacity to respond to the immediate needs in
Haiti.”
HHS worked with USAID to determine when the Haiti patient care mission
was complete, not because they lacked the capacity to respond. Using
real-time epidemiologic data and patient census counts, as well as
working with the local partners to determine when the health care
infrastructure was able to provide care, HHS reduced its medical footprint

in a systematic and transparent way, as requested by USAID. The HHS
capacity for immediate response is well rehearsed in the domestic
setting, and our high domestic operational tempo serves as the basis for
our ability to respond quickly and effectively in any setting.
HHS, like USAID, recognizes the imperative to improve USG-wide
international disaster response operation. In this vein, HHS proposes three
strategic recommendations:
• The USG interagency must familiarize themselves with each other’s
plans and programs.
• A Whole of Government (WOG) Framework must be developed to
illustrate how the USG works together internationally.
• The Federal interagency must establish a formal, integrated AAR
process that looks at the strategic and operational goals of the USG in
a WOG response.
HHS continues to review its role during the Haiti earthquake response to
glean insights into lessons learned and the practical applications of those
lessons. Specifically, HHS is examining and working to address the following
issues:
• International authorities established between the U.S. and Haitian
governments.
• Information flow between USG partners during international disaster
response. During the Haiti earthquake response, HHS and other USG
assets on the ground were to be coordinated through DOS via the U.S.
Embassy and the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA),
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The connection between
USAID, the U.S. Embassy, and HHS was not clear to many responders
on the ground; HHS seeks to collaborate with USAID to address these
issues.
• Significant obstacles due to lack of dedicated HHS patient transport
and movement resources existed. HHS is working to update its plans,
collaborating with relevant Federal departments and agencies to
ensure that a clear way forward is incorporated into the existing plans.

The Haiti Response was a challenging response for all involved. However, HHS
reflects upon this experience with pride in its ability to provide significant
humanitarian assistance, and as an unfortunate opportunity that nonetheless
has provided information necessary to further refine HHS plans and procedures
for international disaster response. HHS greatly looks forward to working
together on such efforts in the future.

U.S. Southern Command
Comments To Haiti Lessons Learned Report
January 2011
Below are SOUTHCOM’s comments to the Haiti Lessons Learned Report:
Comment on 4.4.2: Set up of the JTF did not follow strict SOP due to the direction
by the U.S. President, Department of State and Department of Defense that a quick
and robust response was imperative to save lives. It should also be noted that in the
first days and weeks following the earthquake, there were serious concerns within
the USG and international community that the security situation could sharply
deteriorate, and that the U.S. military might have to provide security broadly in the
affected areas and beyond. These concerns were compounded by the uncertain
prognosis of recovery of the Government of Haiti and MINUSTAH, both of which
had suffered severe losses in the disaster. The "robust" U.S. military response was
in keeping with the President's instructions, and was scaled in anticipation of a
possible broad security role, and an anticipated but yet-undefined (by USAID)
requirement to support humanitarian assistance operations. SOUTHCOM
maintains that the size of the U.S. military response was appropriate based on this
contingency.
Because the DOD response had to be launched in the first hours following the
disaster, no significant USG assessment of requirements was available, nor was
any such USG-defined set of requirements made available during the first weeks of
the response, given the magnitude and complexity of the disaster. Waiting for such
a set of requirements would have unacceptably delayed the military response, and
put thousands of lives at risk.
Adhering to an SOP is a good recommendation if the SOP has the flexibility
and agility to meet the demands of all disaster events – including cataclysmic
disasters. As currently constructed, the current disaster response SOP does not
enable the USG to respond adequately to the magnitude and uncertainty of a "Haiti
earthquake" scenario. As a result, the recommendation should first address the
agility, flexibility and expediency of the disaster response SOP to meet all disaster
events, before any recommendation for adherence in all disaster situations.
Comment on 4.4.5: SOUTHCOM agrees that policymakers must provide clear and
direct policy guidance to the military regarding their proper responsibilities for
humanitarian operations and ensure that they follow standard operating procedures.
However, for cataclysmic disasters, such as Haiti, those policies should also

emphasize the value of flexibility, agility and expediency in the U.S. military
response. The critical factor for all USG agencies in responding to a crisis of the
magnitude of the Haiti earthquake is to leverage the capabilities of each agency
and get them into action rather than limit them to "...their proper responsibilities
for humanitarian operations and ensure that they follow standard operating
procedures." Flexibility, agility and expediency are critical attributes -- policy
makers should enable these attributes, as appropriate to the level of response,
rather than restrict them.
Comment on 5.3.5: The JTF-H in fact coordinated missions directly with the
USAID Response Coordinator and his staff once they were on the ground, and they
attended all the JTF-H's daily updates and briefs. Specifically, the missions cited
(trial airdrop of supplies, support for establishment of IDP camps) were in fact
approved by USAID and were coordinated with the UN. The airdrop of supplies,
while suggested as a possible method to distribute food, was in fact rejected by the
JTF after discussion with the Response Coordinator as not an effective or safe way
to accomplish the mission. However, it was determined that the capability to be
able to airdrop supplies could be necessary if the airfield were to become
inoperable, or if certain zones could not be reached due to rubble-blocked roads;
therefore, JTF-H coordinated two airdrop missions outside of Port au Prince in
coordination with USAID, the GOH, and UN/MINUSTAH to evaluate the concept.
The report finding that the JTF-H had established camps not supported by the
GOH or UN is not accurate. The only IDP camp JTF-H helped UN/MINUSTAH
establish, with the approval of the CSC, was the camp for those IDPs being moved
from flood zones in existing camps with the pending arrival of the rainy/hurricane
season. The JTF-H provided complementary engineering services to mitigate
against flooding in existing camps, to sharply reduce the number of IDPs that
would have to be moved. The establishment of IDP camps was not a JTF-H
mission but rather a UN/MINUSTAH mission that JTF-H supported with limited
engineer support that was requested by the ORC, and which was coordinated with
the GOH. The engineering activity was a major USG success story, enabling the
moving of the entire population of those 7,000 IDPs that were living in vulnerable
areas to safer locations."

A PDF version of this report can be downloaded from
USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse (DocID PD-ACR-222)
or http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdacr222.pdf

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