Linton, Patrick - Dissertation

The use of data in international
humanitarian responses to the 2010
earthquake in Haiti
Patrick Linton

2 Patrick Linton
Abstract
On 12 January 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti, causing severe
destruction in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas. Individuals,
organisations, and governments donated over US$6 billion of aid to Haiti.
However, the international humanitarian response to the earthquake was
characterised by western media as a logistical disaster. Years after the
earthquake, hundreds of thousands of Haitians still inhabited “temporary”
camps where they sought refuge after the earthquake, rather than returning to
their neighbourhoods. Why did the international relief and recovery effort fail?
This author argues that the international humanitarian community’s failure to
collect, utilise, and share data led to shortcomings in aid delivery. Based on de
Ville de Goyet’s hypothesis that supply and personnel distribution is largely
driven by the discursive framework of the media rather than by evidenced
need, I conducted an analysis of the American and Canadian media’s discourses
following the earthquake. This study identified a strong correlation between
media discourse and aid distribution, confirming that it is probable that donors
and international humanitarian aid workers made decisions based on an
understanding of the situation gleaned from western media. The international
community’s fears of Haitian corruption, inefficiency, and poor governance
meant that rather than supporting the Haitian government, the international
community circumvented it. Implementing their own agendas without the
input of Haitians, they infringed upon the sovereignty of the Haitian state.
Keywords: data, disaster recovery, disaster relief, earthquake, Haiti,
humanitarian aid, information management, international development, media
discourse, USAID

The use of data in international humanitarian responses
to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti
3
Acknowledgements
I would like to Jessica Hope and John Birchall for their helpful comments.

4 Patrick Linton
Table of Contents
Abstract.................................................................................................................... 2
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. 3
Introduction.............................................................................................................6
Background.........................................................................................................10
Chapter Outline..................................................................................................14
Chapter 1. The discourses of the media and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti .........16
Literature Review................................................................................................17
Methodology and Method .................................................................................21
Findings.............................................................................................................. 24
Material needs................................................................................................ 24
Logistics.......................................................................................................... 25
Governance .................................................................................................... 26
Violence.......................................................................................................... 27
America and Canada...................................................................................... 28

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Religion .......................................................................................................... 29
Discussion and analysis..................................................................................... 30
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................33
Chapter 2. The allocation of resources and personnel after the earthquake ......35
What kind of aid was dispatched?.................................................................... 38
How was aid distributed?...................................................................................41
Who decides?..................................................................................................... 45
What data were available? ................................................................................48
Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 52
Chapter 3. The efficacy of the humanitarian response to the earthquake ......... 54
Three paradigms................................................................................................ 56
The use of data...................................................................................................60
Whose data?....................................................................................................... 62
Beneficiary Feedback.........................................................................................64
Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 67
Conclusion .............................................................................................................68
Recommendations..............................................................................................71
Future Research................................................................................................. 75
Closing Remarks................................................................................................ 76
Bibliography........................................................................................................... 77

6 Patrick Linton
Introduction
“When I came in, Haiti was not governed by Haitians anymore.
Probably mostly by NGOs. And that has done what to Haiti? It
has weakened our institution.”
- Michel Martelly, president of Haiti
On 12 January 2010, at 4:53pm, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake, known by
Haitians as Goudougoudou, struck Haiti for 35 seconds in what was the third-
most fatal natural disaster in recent history (Gros, 2011, pp. 131-132; Bellegarde-
Smith, 2011, p. 265). The earthquake, whose epicentre was a shallow 16
kilometres below the town of Léogâne, caused severe destruction in Léogâne,
Port-au-Prince, Gressier, Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve, Jacmel, and Miragoâne,
killed approximately 222,570 people, injured 300,000 people and left 1.5 million
people homeless (Benjamin, Bassily-Marcus, Babu, Silver, & Marin, 2011, p. 307;
UN Office of the Secretary-General, 2010, p. 1). The destruction of infrastructure
in Port-au-Prince, including the headquarters of most government ministries,
the Parliament, the courts, and the National Palace, significantly undermined
the capacity of the Haitian government. Homes and businesses collapsed, roads

7
were blocked by debris, communications systems were down, and the port for
which the city is named was closed. Damages and losses due to the earthquake
were estimated to be equivalent to 120% of Haiti’s 2009 GDP. Over one million
Haitians moved into 460 temporary settlement sites (or “camps”) in Port-au-
Prince. An unknown number moved into camps elsewhere (UN Office of the
Secretary-General, 2010, pp. 1-2). Cholera, which had already been a public
health issue in Haiti due to inadequate water sanitation infrastructure, spread
rapidly through camps and refugee settlements (Ivers, Farmer, Almazor, &
Léandre, 2010, pp. 2048-2049).
There was an immediate outpouring of aid from the international
community, surpassing the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami to become the largest
ever humanitarian response to an acute natural disaster (Altay & Labonte, 2014,
p. S50). Within 72 hours, the United States, Canada, Cuba, and several other
countries had begun sending emergency relief personnel to Haiti. The United
States and Canada sent military troops, and Cuba sent medics (UN Office of the
Secretary-General, 2010, p. 2; Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 269-270). The World
Food Programme, which had emergency rations stored in a warehouse in Port-
au-Prince, provided initial food assistance to 3.5 million people (UN Office of
the Secretary-General, 2010, p. 3). Aid workers distributed emergency tents and
other supplies to hundreds of thousands of families. In an emergency appeal by
the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN
OCHA), $5.5 billion was pledged by various countries and intergovernmental
organisations for earthquake relief and recovery. (UN Office of the Special
Envoy for Haiti, 2012).
The western media’s response to the earthquake was problematic,
containing much incorrect information and speculation (Lundy, The Haiti

8 Patrick Linton
Earthquake of 2010: The Politics of a Natural Disaster, 2011a, p. 128). First, the
media paid significant attention to those public figures with sensationalist
explanations of the earthquake—for example that it was the result of God’s
punishment for the Haitian slave revolt and revolution of 1804 or a United
States military exercise—rather than those questioning issues of planning and
infrastructure. Secondly, the media was often blatantly racist, speculating that
Haitians would begin to loot and become violent. On several occasions, stories
were published stating that looting and violence had actually begun, only to
later be found to be untrue or exaggerated (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 271-272).
Finally, the media presented a paternalistic image of the situation which
situated westerners as heroes and Haitians as victims. This positioned it to
speculate on the needs of those affected by the earthquake, often with little or
no evidence of that need. In this dissertation, I suggest that the media’s
influence affected the kind of aid that was received by Haiti. This is in line with
Claude de Ville de Goyet’s (Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and
Reconstruction in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, 2008a) theory that the
media has a greater influence on the direction of aid than does evidenced need,
and will be further investigated in the first chapter.
Much of the press coverage regarding the earthquake was in regards to
logistical problems faced by international aid workers in Haiti, which stemmed
in part from an unfortunate lack of data collection, sharing, and usage in the
relief and recovery efforts. Data were often not collected because NGOs did not
consider it to be a priority, because they believed that they had a sufficient
grasp of the situation, or because they simply did not have adequate means to
carry out data collection (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S63). Data that did exist
were rarely shared by organisations, especially large ones, or were often

9
nonstandard or incompatible with other data. Most importantly, there was no
official central coordinating body to maintain data, delegate tasks, and regulate
the aid that was dispatched in Haiti. Collecting and sharing information about
locations of buildings and survivors, hospital capacity, needs for secondary
care, stocks of supplies, unidentified bodies, disease, and housing between aid
organisations is essential for coordinating disaster relief (de Ville de Goyet,
Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction in the Aftermath of
Natural Disasters, 2008a, pp. 33-52). Just as many Haitians viewed the aid
community as one collective agency (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012), the aid
community should have functioned as one collective agency in order to
effectively and efficiently implement disaster relief and recovery aid; data
collection, sharing, and usage is essential in order to make this happen.
International disaster relief and recovery aid (also known as
international humanitarian aid) is similar to international development aid, in
that foreigners—whether for attention-seeking, public image-minded or kind-
hearted reasons—see a need and feel a desire to assist. Both present outsiders
with the difficulty of determining where there is a need, and both often involve
feeding and housing a large number of people, providing medical care, and
installing infrastructure. On 20 January 1949, President Truman brought the
term “underdevelopment” into popular usage (Esteva, 1992, pp. 6-7; Sachs, 1992,
p. 2), and governments, NGOs, and IGOs rushed to aid the “underdeveloped”
countries in modernising their economies and alleviating poverty. However, the
gap between developing and industrialised countries widened, more than
doubling between 1960 and 1980 (Sachs, 1992, p. 3). Given that in almost seven
decades long-term international development aid, which has the benefit of
longer time scales, has been unsuccessful in its goals of meeting the needs of

10 Patrick Linton
people living in poverty, it is not surprising that international disaster relief and
recovery aid, a kind of “emergency development,” struggles even more to meet
the needs of its beneficiaries. The media buzz around an acute incident such as
a natural disaster can have a positive effect, as it prompts an influx of resources,
whereas traditional international development aid may have difficulties
attracting donors for more long-term projects. However, given the quick
response time necessary in the wake of acute disasters, there is an extra layer of
complexity in international disaster relief aid, magnifying the need for good
data.
Background
In order to understand why Goudougoudou had such a devastating
impact on Haiti it is important to situate it within Haiti’s history, which is one
of colonialism and authoritarian rule. The Haitian people have been repeatedly
stripped of their right to self-determination: first, as slaves under French
colonialism; then, as indentured servants paying a debt to the French Republic;
later, living under authoritarian regimes such as those of “Papa Doc” and “Baby
Doc” Duvalier; finally, under a new form of imperialism in which NGOs take on
roles that the Haitian government should hold, thus de-democratising and de-
politicising the development of Haiti. Each of these stages has contributed to
Haiti’s inability to prevent the devastation of the earthquake and to manage the
relief and recovery efforts.
Haiti’s problems had already begun at the time of independence. In
1804, La Perle des Antilles (the Jewel of the Caribbean) fought a bloody
revolution to become the first black republic in the Western Hemisphere
(Pierre-Louis, 2011, pp. 187-188). However, Haiti’s freedom came at great cost.

11
Not only was its infrastructure completely destroyed by the war, but in 1825,
when its independence was finally recognised by France, Haiti was forced to
pay reparations to France (Fatton Jr., 2011, p. 160). During the 80 years it took to
pay the 150 million French francs in reparations (about US$21 billion in today’s
money) that France had demanded, none of its tax revenue could be used to
build schools and infrastructure (Pierre-Louis, 2011, pp. 188-189). Haiti was
essentially trapped in a new form of colonialism, its status in relation to France
transformed from slave to indentured servant. Scholars often attribute Haiti’s
modern-day poverty to the decision to pay this debt to France more than a
century ago (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 189).
Post-independence, Haiti was plagued by despotism as French
colonisers were replaced by Haitian authoritarian regimes. Most notable of
these were the regimes of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who ruled from 1957
until his death in 1971, and his Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, who succeeded
him until 1986 when he was overthrown by a popular uprising (Pierre-Louis,
2011, pp. 189-190). During the dictatorships, the Haitian government invested
very little outside of Port-au-Prince. Its rural towns served as satellites to the
capital, much as how Haiti had once served as a satellite of the French
Republic, and so remained in a less developed state (Frank, 1966).
Centralisation of resources meant that Haitians were likely to find a better life
in the capital than in rural areas, so Haitians began migrating to the city.
Beginning during Papa Doc’s rule, Port-au-Prince, a city built to hold 250,000
people at most, ballooned to a population of almost three million inhabitants
(Gros, 2011, p. 141). By the time Jean-Claude Duvalier inherited power, Haiti had
become increasingly dependent on foreign aid, as the Haitian government was
unable to collect sufficient revenue. However, around the same time, the

12 Patrick Linton
international community decided to limit aid to the Haitian government on the
basis of claims of corruption (Pierre-Louis, 2011, pp. 189-190); according to a
1983 World Bank report, at least 40% of aid given to the Haitian government
could not be accounted for (Gros, 2011, p. 142).
Instead, aid was outsourced to NGOs, a pattern that has continued into
the 21st
century. There are currently between 10,000 and 11,000 NGOs working
inside Haiti, an increase from 200-300 in 1984 and 800 in 1994; only
Afghanistan has a greater number of NGOs. (Gros, 2011; Pierre-Louis, 2011;
Fatton Jr., 2011; Bellegarde-Smith, 2011). Of these, 51% are headquartered in the
United States (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 17). These NGOs fulfil many of
the roles that the state should, but cannot, fulfil; though certain important
roles—such as policing, politics, and bureaucracy—are necessarily outside of
their scope.1
Development aid thus serves as a sort of modern-day replacement
for the colonialism and authoritarian rule of the past, in which outside actors
not only decided that the Haitian government was corrupt (which it may have
been) and underdeveloped, but they also determined which projects were
necessary in order to improve the wellbeing of the Haitian people. The
discourse of development created a structure of paternalism, with aid agencies
making decisions that should be made in a democratic manner by politicians,
such as how to educate children, where and how to build infrastructure, or how
to fix the economy. Development, then, performs all sorts of political
operations while “depoliticising everything it touches” (Ferguson, 1990, pp. xv,
25). Development aid also reinforced the unequal investment of the Duvaliers;
CARE’s Food for Work programme damaged the agricultural industry by
1
According to Peter Evans (Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, 1995),
the roles of the state are making war, enforcing internal order, and economic transformation.
While NGOs attempt the third role, only the state possesses the power to create economic
policy.

13
introducing cheaper, foreign surplus food, causing Haitian farmers to abandon
their farmland for the city and to fall into dependency (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p.
196).
Thus when the earthquake struck in 2010, Haiti was left unable to
recover on its own due to policies that predate the earthquake (Lundy, The
Haiti Earthquake of 2010: The Politics of a Natural Disaster, 2011a). According to
Max Weber, the purpose of the state is to protect citizens against certain
adverse conditions for which there are not individual solutions (Gros, 2011, p.
136). Because the Haitian government had centralised its resources primarily in
the capital, when Port-au-Prince was destroyed the government was left unable
to respond to the emergency and send resources from other parts of Haiti
(Gros, 2011, p. 143). In coordinating disaster relief, governments are the most
legitimate actor. But as the Haitian government was left unable to respond, the
humanitarian response to the earthquake was uncoordinated. The coordination
of the distribution of aid received by thousands of NGOs is not a role that any
NGO possesses the capability or authority to handle; nor were NGOs ready to
respond immediately after the disaster.
The extreme centralisation of Haiti also contributed to the immensity of
the disaster caused by the earthquake. The fact that most resources were spent
on Port-au-Prince is what led to the city becoming home to nearly a third of the
country’s population. Homes were built everywhere, from mountainsides to
riverbeds, often by unqualified builders with disregard to building codes; the
government did not have the resources to enforce these regulations. Patrick
Bellegarde-Smith (A Man-Made Disaster: The Earthquake of January 12, 2010—
A Haitian Perspective, 2011) was correct in calling this earthquake a manmade

14 Patrick Linton
disaster. While seismic activity is a natural phenomenon, the toll that it took on
the lives of Haitians was due to human causes.
Chapter Outline
This chapter outline will divide my research question into three smaller
sub-questions: How was the 2010 earthquake in Haiti reported upon by the
international media and by international humanitarian aid organisations? How
were resources and personnel actually allocated in Haiti in the wake of the
earthquake? How effective was the response, and how could data have helped
to determine what kind of aid response was necessary?
In the first chapter, I explore the discourses of the media and NGOs with
regards to the disaster. Based on de Ville de Goyet’s (Information Gaps in
Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters,
2008a) theory that the pressure of the media, rather than evidenced need,
influences the direction of humanitarian aid, I will conduct a discourse analysis
of newspapers and television broadcasts from donor countries regarding the
earthquake and relief efforts. This will allow me, in the following chapter, to
analyse whether there is a correlation between media discourses around the
2010 earthquake in Haiti and the humanitarian aid distribution that followed.
The second chapter examines what actually happened during the relief
and recovery efforts in Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake in contrast to
how the earthquake was reported internationally. In this section I discuss how
resources were allocated; the politics of control between NGOs, IGOs, and
governments; and how communication networks functioned between them. In
addition to addressing questions of the kind of aid dispatched and the
distribution of resources and personnel, I consider who determined the

15
direction of aid and why they appropriated this authority. Finally, I examine the
kind of information that was available at the time and how it was used, such as:
how many people were affected (displaced, injured, unemployed) by the
earthquake? How much food and water was available in Haiti and was it
accessible? What were the medical needs of those affected by the earthquake?
Using the advantage of hindsight, the third chapter critically examines
the efficacy of the humanitarian aid response to the earthquake. In this section,
I explore what worked (and why), what could have been better, what was
neglected (and why), and how the use of data could have helped aid
organisations to more efficiently and effectively provide aid. In answering these
questions, I address whose data were used (and why), what data were used (and
why), and why data were not used in certain instances. I also discuss studies on
aid beneficiary feedback, as the input of beneficiaries is essential to evaluating
the efficacy of humanitarian aid. Finally, I suggest solutions for more useful
data collection.
This project embarks on an exploration of the use of data in determining
the need for resources and personnel in Haiti following the earthquake in 2010,
but it has wider implications. It is of utmost importance to question how to
determine the needs of those affected by natural disaster. By examining the
shortcomings in the humanitarian response to this particular natural disaster, it
will be possible to take a more critical approach to preparedness for the next
natural disaster. This project has relevance along several lines: it will provide an
insight into the rationale behind disaster relief allocation, it will provide
information on the kinds of data needed prior to dispatching international
disaster relief and recovery aid, and it will offer some foundations upon which
disaster recovery may be made more sustainable long-term.

16 Patrick Linton
Chapter 1. The discourses of the
media and the earthquake in Haiti
I think Haiti is a place that suffers so much from neglect that
people only want to hear about it when it’s at its extreme. And
that’s what they end up knowing about it.
- Edwidge Danticat, Haitian-American author
Given the billions of dollars of aid in the form of food, water, supplies,
and workers that flowed into Haiti after the earthquake, it seems inconceivable
that the needs of those affected remained largely unmet. Yet in the wake of the
2015 earthquakes in Nepal, there have been a number of news stories concerned
with learning lessons from Haiti’s mismatched and misguided aid effort.
Newspaper editorials suggested that media coverage of natural disasters often
guides aid to the wrong places (Katz, 2015) and that humanitarian aid workers
often have no idea whether their work is effective (Kirsch T. D., We have too
little data to know how to help countries like Nepal recover from natural
disasters, 2015). This is not a new concept, but is in line with Claude de Ville de
Goyet’s (Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction in the

17
Aftermath of Natural Disasters, 2008a, p. 53) suggestion that the priority given
to speed over information in urgent situation means that supply and personnel
distribution is largely driven by the discursive framework of the media rather
than by evidenced need.
Based on de Ville de Goyet’s assertions that the pressure and rhetoric of
the international media has a greater impact on the flow of humanitarian aid
than does data-based evidence of need, I will conduct a discourse analysis in
this chapter that examines the language used in several major newspapers and
television news channels from the United States and Canada, where the
greatest amount of donations originated (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 6),
with regards to the earthquake. The purpose of this analysis is to explore how
this discourse regarding the earthquake and the subsequent relief efforts in
Haiti compares with the actual allocation of resources and personnel, and with
evidenced need. I hypothesise that there will be a greater correlation between
the discourses of the media and the aid received than between the evidenced
need and the aid received or between the media discourse and the evidenced
need.
Literature Review
Existing academic literature on the media’s coverage of the earthquake
indicates that media narratives were often misinformed. Garvey Lundy (The
Haiti Earthquake of 2010: The Politics of a Natural Disaster, 2011a, p. 128) states
that media coverage of the Haitian earthquake was full of speculation,
misinformation, and racial caricature, and adds that while experts were
sometimes called upon to comment, they were given inadequate time, often
under one minute, to explain the situation, even on twenty-four hour news

18 Patrick Linton
networks. Other academics noted that the earthquake coverage in American
media focused more on Americans than Haitians, often portraying Haitians and
Haitian culture as inferior.
Patrick Bellegarde-Smith (A Man-Made Disaster: The Earthquake of
January 12, 2010—A Haitian Perspective, 2011, pp. 267-272) discusses several
problematic issues with the Western media’s coverage of the 2010 earthquake in
Haiti. One is the presence of a narrative of cultural inferiority. Bellegarde-Smith
compares the discourse of New York Times columnist David Brooks to Times
narratives of “black savages” in the late 19th
century and of “tribal rule and
superstition” the 1950s. After the earthquake, Brooks blamed the “progress-
resistant” Haitian culture for the destruction caused by the earthquake and
suggested that “intrusive paternalism” is the only solution to Haiti’s problems
(p. 268). Bellegarde-Smith argues that Brooks is masking racism with
culturalism, citing the fact that the arguments that have been made for
generations have remained the same but have simply substituted race for
culture.
Murali Balaji (Racializing Pity: The Haiti Earthquake and the Plight of
"Others", 2011) takes a linguistic approach to argue that the words and images
presented in the media following the 2010 earthquake, as in other disasters,
were racialized. The coverage of the earthquake was characterised by words
such as ‘chaos’, ‘dysfunction’, ‘violence’, and ‘hopelessness’, designed to evoke
pity (and consequently power over the pitied) rather than empathy toward the
black victims (Balaji, 2011, p. 51). This racism was further manifested in an
expectation of violence, which was expressed almost hopefully by the media;
several reports made speculative comments such as “Haitians were expected to
riot because of the delays in providing them with water and food after the

19
earthquake, hence the delay in providing them with water and food”
(Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 271-272). However, they did not riot. Bellegarde-
Smith compares this to media expectations that black people in New Orleans
would riot following Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
Another issue discussed by both Balaji and Bellegarde-Smith is how the
story of the earthquake was altered by Western media, which focused on the
generosity of American and European NGOs and individuals as the subjects of
stories, while Haitian earthquake victims were merely the targets of their good
deeds (Balaji, 2011, pp. 55-57). While the first foreign responders to the
earthquake were Cuban, not American, this was not acknowledged by the U.S.
media. In fact, the U.S. media misidentified Cuban doctors as Spanish; likewise,
light-skinned Haitian doctors were misidentified as French (Bellegarde-Smith,
2011, pp. 269-270). Bellegarde-Smith notes that when the U.S. military arrived in
Port-au-Prince, they took control of the airport against the wishes of the
Haitian government, who was unable to respond. The United States military
blocked Venezuelan (and sometimes even French) attempts to deliver aid, as it
controlled the only major airport in Haiti (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 269-270).
Meanwhile, the U.S. military was presented in the American media as the
coordinator of international humanitarian relief aid.
This west-as-rescuer discourse was also present in the narrative that
surrounded “quake babies”; Bellegarde-Smith notes that the Canadian media
presented American and Canadian “adoptions” of Haitian babies as rescues,
when in fact thousands of Haitian children were taken without knowledge of
the location or wellbeing of their parents (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 270-271).
Most notably, Laura Silsby of New Life, an Idaho-based Christian group, was
arrested by Haitian authorities for kidnapping and trafficking Haitian children

20 Patrick Linton
under the guise of ‘the Lord’s plan’ to rescue them. Many in the media
defended her actions. Balaji also notes that while self-congratulatory stories
focused on the donors, they never showed how the donations were actually
used by the victims, citing the fact that many donations are often of little use to
disaster victims (Racializing Pity: The Haiti Earthquake and the Plight of
"Others", 2011, pp. 58-63).
One prominent narrative present in the media following the earthquake
was that of American Christian televangelist Pat Robertson (and other
Protestants), who blamed the earthquake on a “pact with the devil” allegedly
made by the Haitian people in exchange for freedom from French slave-owners
in the early 1800s. Jean-Germain Gros (Anatomy of a Haitian Tragedy: When
the Fury of Nature Meets the Debility of the State, 2011, pp. 132-133) notes that
the majority of Haitians are Christians (albeit mixed with some Vodou
influence) and dismisses Reverend Robertson’s theory as bigotry and
theological revisionism. Felix Germain (The Earthquake, the Missionaries, and
the Future of Vodou, 2011, p. 250) adds that blaming the destruction, injury, and
loss of life caused by the earthquake and other natural disasters on Haitian
Vodou conveniently ignore the role that the US, France, and other countries
play in Haiti’s economic dependency. He also notes that the Western media
selectively displayed the Christian faith of many earthquake survivors,
displaying Haitians singing hymns and praying, while largely ignoring the
survival of Houngans and Mambos of Vodou (Germain, 2011, p. 255). This is
ironic given that Vodou in Haiti is typically an obsession in Hollywood and the
media.
Media coverage of the earthquake was not only misinformed, but at
times deliberately so. Speculation on violence suggests a desire to confirm

21
preconceived views about Haitians held by the American and Canadian publics.
Blaming a “pact with the devil” for the earthquake pushes blame onto the
Haitian people, undermining the ability of the public to empathise. Meanwhile,
misrepresentation of the needs of the Haitian people led supposedly well-
meaning groups to traffic children out of Haiti under the guise of rescuing
them. Finally, paternalistic representations of Haiti as a nation that cannot care
for itself allowed the U.S. military to present its takeover of Port-au-Prince’s
airport as a rescue story.
Methodology and Method
I will begin the discourse analysis by gathering information about the
producer of each newspaper or television broadcast, including political
position, target audience, genre, and layout. I will then analyse how specific
words and images are used, and the ideas with which these words and images
are associated, coding data into categories based on the themes that emerge
from the media. It is important to pay particularly close attention to the images
and title, as these have a particularly strong impact on the audience (Mautner,
2008, p. 38). Most importantly, I will note any calls to action or references to
specific needs made by the news report, as these would be most likely to
influence actions taken by individuals and organisations if de Ville de Goyet
(Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction in the Aftermath of
Natural Disasters, 2008a, p. 53) is indeed correct in his assertion that aid and
supply distribution is driven by media pressure.
It is important to note a limitation of this type of research: this discourse
analysis is unable to show what readers of these newspapers and viewers of
television broadcasts thought or whether readers and viewers responded in the

22 Patrick Linton
way suggested. This study will merely attempt to gauge whether there is a
greater correlation between need identified by the media and where aid was
actually dispatched, or between need identified by data and where aid was
dispatched. Thus this research is not meant to be explanatory, but descriptive.
Even if a correlation is found, it does not necessarily mean that the media was
the cause of, or a factor in, the mismatching of aid; in fact, it is entirely possible
that a confounding factor played a role in what journalists believed to be
necessary and in how earthquake relief aid was distributed in Haiti. However, if
a correlation is found, a quantitative study looking into the causality would
provide a compelling direction for future research. The presence of any
discrepancies should be taken into account both in humanitarian aid
evaluation and in future planning.
For this analysis, after reviewing approximately 150 news reports and
tracking themes, 22 news reports were chosen from eight American and five
Canadian news media outlets, for a total of fifteen American reports and seven
Canadian reports. These twenty-two were chosen because they were
representative of the media outlets, topics, and tone of the greater set of media
reports. Due to syndication, reports by wire services such as AP and Reuters
might be published on 35 different news sites. To account for this, news reports
that were very similar to others were not included. The news media outlets
chosen included eight newspapers (New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Los
Angeles Times, New York Daily News, New York Post, Toronto Star, Globe
and Mail, and La Presse), four television news stations (Fox News, CNN, CBC
News, and CTV News), and one radio station (NPR News). These sources were
selected because they are among the most read, watched, and listened to news
outlets in the United States and Canada. They include a mixture of right-

23
leaning (such as Fox News, the Wall Street Journal and New York Post) and
left-leaning media (such as the New York Times and Los Angeles Times).
Other popular news outlets such as the Washington Post, USA Today,
MSNBC, and Le Journal de Montréal were not included either because of a lack
of earthquake coverage or archives that were not easily accessible.
The media reports were selected conducting a Google search with the
terms "Haiti earthquake" (or "Haïti séisme" for news sources in French),
restricted to dates between 12 January 2010 and 12 February 2010, the time
during which most articles about the earthquake were written, and restricted to
the domain name of the news source (e.g. "Haiti earthquake site:nytimes.com
daterange:2455209-2455240"). From these results, media reports were selected
based on their relevance to the earthquake and relief efforts. Selecting first-
page results from Google ensured that the most widely-viewed and widely-
shared reports from each news source are included in the study, rather than
reports that may have received a limited audience. A limitation to this method
is that the results are restricted by the Google algorithm, whose inner workings
are not open to the public, though as Google is the most-used search engine in
the United States and Canada, this is likely to mirror the way in which news
was accessed and shared by readers. Another limitation to this method is that
media outlets may have made some pages unindexable. Finally, 24-hour news
networks such as Fox News and CNN do not make all reports available online
in the format in which they were initially presented.
These news reports were uploaded into the NVIVO software and tagged
with the emergent themes found in the reports. This software was used because
it allows for coding and tagging of text, images, and other multimedia used in
qualitative research.

24 Patrick Linton
Findings
Within the American and Canadian news reports, I identified six
emergent themes: the material needs of the survivors of the earthquake;
logistical problems encountered in distributing aid among the earthquake
survivors, either because of the damage caused by the earthquake, the
bottleneck created by the volume of international aid suddenly flowing into the
country, or by pre-existing infrastructural problems; corruption or the lack of
ability to govern; reports of looting and of the potential for violence; stories
that present Americans or Canadians as heroes in Haiti and stories of how the
earthquake affected Americans or Canadians in Haiti; and religion. Most of
these themes point either directly or indirectly to perceived needs within Haiti.
Reports of the lack of water, food, and shelter suggest the need for particular
aid supplies to be brought to Haiti from donor countries. Reports of logistical
problems suggest the need for humanitarian aid experts to be brought in to
assist in untangling the mess in Haiti. A focus on corruption and poor
governance in the Haitian government suggests a need for an alternative
decision-making body for aid coordination. Stories of looting and the potential
for violence suggest the need for order in the form of an outside policing body.
Material needs
Most media reporting in the aftermath of the earthquake included either
explicit or implicit descriptions of the material needs of the people in Port-au-
Prince. Of those needs, water and food were mentioned most frequently,
appearing in two-thirds of the news reports that explicitly stated a material
need (Woods, 2010; Pasztor, et al., 2010; De Córdoba & Luhnow, 2010; CNN,
2010b; Schapiro, 2010; Romero, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; CTV News, 2010).
However, by 27 January US military officials were reporting that food was no

25
longer a critical need, stating that it could be found in markets (Burnett, 2010).
Another frequently mentioned material need was medical supplies and doctors,
mentioned in one-half of all reports that explicitly stated a material need
(Woods, 2010; CTV News, 2010; De Córdoba & Luhnow, 2010; CNN, 2010b;
Schapiro, 2010; Romero, 2010). CNN (Haiti appeals for aid; official fears 100,000
dead after earthquake, 2010b) included a direct appeal from former US
President Bill Clinton, the UN Special Envoy to Haiti, highlighting the need for
donations to organisations supplying food, water, shelter, and medical supplies.
Other material needs mentioned in news reports were shelter (CNN, 2010b;
CBC News, 2010), basic sanitation (Woods, 2010; Schapiro, 2010; Romero, 2010),
electricity (Pasztor, et al., 2010; Paperny & Ibbitson, 2010; CNN, 2010b; Schapiro,
2010; Wilkinson, 2010), communications infrastructure (Paperny & Ibbitson,
2010; Wilkinson, 2010), body bags (Fox News, 2010a), helicopters (CTV News,
2010; CNN, 2010b), aircraft fuel (Pasztor, et al., 2010), and heavy machinery
(CNN, 2010b).
Media reports also reported heavily on the types of material aid flowing
into earthquake-affected areas. Among the material aid distributed in Haiti
were food and water (CTV News, 2010; Romero, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; Smith,
2010), medical supplies (CTV News, 2010; Romero, 2010), women’s sanitary
products (Smith, 2010), helicopters (Fox News, 2010a), and heavy machinery
(Fox News, 2010a).
Logistics
Many news reports noted problems in the distribution of aid resources
to those affected by the earthquake. These included titles such as “Clogged
airport, ruined seaport delay aid after Haiti earthquake” (Pasztor, et al., 2010)

26 Patrick Linton
and “Good intentions gone wrong” (Waldie, 2010). Approximately a third
mentioned problems in the distribution of aid resources (CNN, 2010a; Woods,
2010; Pasztor, et al., 2010; CNN, 2010b; CBC News, 2010; Fox News, 2010a;
Burnett, 2010; Waldie, 2010). One NPR News report stated that “information is
confusing and contradictory in post-earthquake Haiti” and claimed that there
were, in fact, sufficient water and medical supplies, but that the problem was in
the distribution of these resources (Burnett, 2010). One article in The Globe and
Mail begins with the frustrations of a Canadian woman who noticed nearly 100
pallets loaded with bottled water sitting idly on the tarmac of the airport in
Port-au-Prince while hundreds of thousands of earthquake-affected Haitians
waited thirsty (Waldie, 2010). Anecdotes such as this were typical of news
reports involving logistics.
Areas in which the media suggested there were logistics and aid
distribution problems were water (CNN, 2010a; Waldie, 2010), food (Fox News,
2010a; Burnett, 2010), and medical supplies (CNN, 2010a; Woods, 2010). Reasons
listed for these problems included clogged runways at the airport (Woods, 2010;
Pasztor, et al., 2010; Waldie, 2010; CBC News, 2010; Fox News, 2010a), a lack of
coordination between aid agencies (Waldie, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; Waldie,
2010), the destroyed seaport (Woods, 2010; Pasztor, et al., 2010; CBC News,
2010), blocked roads (Woods, 2010), corruption (Burnett, 2010; Woods, 2010),
and the Haitian government’s inability to coordinate aid (Waldie, 2010; Woods,
2010).
Governance
Corruption in Haiti and the government’s incapacity to coordinate aid
were oft-mentioned themes in news reports involving Haiti. One editorialist
recommended that the United States government should not provide aid to the

27
Haitian government because it would be subsidising Haitian corruption
(Whiton, 2010). In his editorial, former US Department of State official
Christian Whiton (Don't Subsidize Haitian Corruption, 2010) pointed out that
Haiti was ranked as one of the world’s most corrupt countries by Transparency
International, and suggested that since the US had no interests in Haiti and no
fault in its poverty, the US government had no reason to be in Haiti.
Other media reports suggested that the key to successful disaster relief is
a strong national government that can coordinate aid, but that Haiti lacked this
(Woods, 2010; Waldie, 2010). Any capacity that the Haitian government had
prior to the earthquake had been diminished when its ministerial headquarters
were destroyed. Instead, they suggested, NGOs had taken charge of the
country, which was problematic because of the lack of a single, central
coordinating force for the distribution of aid (Waldie, 2010).
Violence
Much media attention was paid to earthquake survivors who searched
for food in the rubble of supermarkets and other places of business, calling
them “looters” (CNN, 2010a; Montero, 2010; Fox News, 2010a; Smith, 2010).
News reports had titles such as “’A frenzy of looting’ seen in Haiti’s capital”
(CNN, 2010a), “Desperados are spreading fear in quake-ravaged Haiti”
(Montero, 2010), “Haiti nears breaking point as aid is snarled, looters roam”
(Fox News, 2010a), and “Mob justice in Haiti” (Smith, 2010). Reporters, such as
CNN’s Anderson Cooper, speculated that looters were stealing items in order to
sell them later (CNN, 2010a). Early reports had incorrectly stated that looters
had cleared out the UN World Food Programme’s long-term food storage from
its Port-au-Prince warehouse, rendering the WFP unable to distribute food.

28 Patrick Linton
Corrections showed this to be mostly untrue (Fox News, 2010a). This was met
with editorials demanding that the media stop calling earthquake victims
“looters,” drawing comparisons between the media response to the Haitian
earthquake and that of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, where black people
taking food from flooded supermarkets were said to be looting while white
people doing the same were ‘finding food’ (Charles, 2010).
Reports of looting were often coupled with reports of the potential for
an outbreak of violence, especially over a lack of food or water (De Córdoba &
Luhnow, 2010; Fox News, 2010a), or with reports of news correspondents
hearing gunshots in the distance (Montero, 2010; CNN, 2010b). One article
described people as “almost fighting” over water distributed by aid workers
(Fox News, 2010a). It is worth noting that the media that dedicated the most
time and space to looting and potential violence were the Murdoch-owned,
conservative news broadcaster Fox News and the Murdoch-owned,
conservative newspaper The New York Post. However, with one exception of
“mob justice” wherein a group beat a thief with a stick (Smith, 2010), none of
the news reports listed any actual eyewitness accounts of violence.
America and Canada
Within the American media there was significant focus on Americans.
This was divided between stories of the experiences of American citizens who
survived the earthquake in Haiti (McKinley, Jr. & Skipp, 2010) and coverage of
the generosity of the American people and government (Pasztor, et al., 2010;
Montero, 2010; Whiton, 2010; McKinley, Jr. & Skipp, 2010; CNN, 2010b; Fox
News, 2010a). Six of the 22 media reports included in this study included direct
mention of American aid (not including mentions of aid by US-based NGOs).
Americans, both earthquake survivors and those who had come to provide

29
emergency aid, were generally portrayed as heroes coming to the rescue of
hopeless Haitians. A Fox News (Haiti Nears Breaking Point as Aid Is Snarled,
Looters Roam, 2010a) report, entitled “Haiti nears breaking point as aid is
snarled, looters roam” repeatedly jumped back and forth between stories of
Haitian earthquake victims looting for food and stories of how the United
States government was coordinating aid and providing food, water, and
security, portraying Americans as saviours and Haitians as savages.
Likewise, the Canadian media focused on the generosity of Canadians.
One article in the Quebec-based, Canadian newspaper La Presse, entitled
“Haïti: les Canadiens, les plus généreux?” [“Haiti: Canadians, the most
generous?”] highlighted the fact that Canadians gave an average of $7.51 per
person (figures in Canadian dollars) compared to an average of $2.56 per person
in the United States and $0.73 per person in France (Dion-Viens, 2010).
One strange event that garnered media attention was the claim by
Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez that the earthquake could be blamed on a
United States military experiment. Chavez argued that the United States was
testing a system that could create “weather anomalies” such as earthquakes,
hurricanes, droughts, and floods, and that the US was using this as an excuse
for its military occupation of Haiti (Fox News, 2010b).
Religion
Hugo Chavez was not the only public figure to cast blame for the seismic
events that occurred in Haiti. Pat Robertson, a prominent evangelical leader
and host of The 700 Club, suggested that the earthquake was God’s
punishment for the Haitian slave rebellion over two-hundred years ago.
Robertson claimed that the reason for Haiti’s poverty and natural disasters is

30 Patrick Linton
that the Haitian people made a “pact with the devil” in order to secure their
independence from French colonisers over two-hundred years ago (CNN,
2010c). Other stories involving religion focused on the faith of the Haitian
people and its significant role in their lives, especially in the wake of the
earthquake. They portrayed Haitians singing hymns (Montero, 2010) and
praying (CBC News, 2010) or feeling abandoned by God (Charles, 2010).
However, none of the news reports analysed in this study made any mention of
the Vodou religion.
Discussion and analysis
Existing scholarship on the media’s representation of the earthquake in
Haiti was reflected and reinforced by my findings. There was a large media
focus on poor logistics and Haiti’s lack of ability to govern. There was also a
significant focus on violence and looting, despite the lack of actual occurrences.
These provided the international community with a rhetorical ‘probable cause’
to effectively take over the Haitian state and occupy Haiti under humanitarian
auspices. The media also prioritised American and Canadian experiences and
interests over Haitian ones. One theme identified in the literature review, the
adoption/kidnapping of “quake babies” was not found in this study. However,
this study is concerned with some main themes and is not representative of the
full range of topics covered by the media in relation to the earthquake.
News reports on the needs of post-earthquake Haiti were rather
straightforward. However, they focused primarily on short-term needs, rather
than long-term recovery. This is likely due to the short time frame of this study,
which focuses on the first month after the earthquake. While they did at times
identify the source of requests for certain supplies [e.g. Haitian President Rene

31
Preval requested help clearing streets and Bill Clinton requested food, water,
shelter, and medical supplies (CNN, 2010b)], there was no information about
whether surveys or needs assessments had been carried out, or how sources
had identified particular needs. Certain needs tended to be taken by the media
as given, while logistical problems were emphasised as the main problem in aid
distribution.
Widespread belief in the Haitian government’s inability to govern had
implications beyond the media audiences to the international community.
American and Canadian journalists reported at length on corruption,
inefficiency, and a lack of capacity in the Haitian state. The presentation of a
foreign country as unable to govern itself is perhaps likely to elicit sympathy
toward efforts to assist that country. For instance, prior to (and during) the war
in Iraq in 2003, reports of human rights atrocities committed by Saddam
Hussein’s regime proliferated in the Western media. Human rights violations,
widely considered a result of poor governance, allowed popular support (by
both conservatives and liberals) for invasion when the threat of weapons of
mass destruction was not sufficiently shown. Similarly, media portrayal of a
Haitian state that could not care for itself helped create conditions by which
Western support for governments and NGOs to enter Haiti and take control of
institutions formerly in the hands of the Haitian government could be
rhetorically justified. The United States military’s takeover of the Port-au-
Prince airport was uninvited by the Haitian government, yet was not protested
by the American public. It was, however, seen by the French government as an
intrusion (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, pp. 269-270). Similarly, unconfirmed (and
later shown to be incorrect) reports of looting and violence may have been
related to the United States military’s decision to send thirty thousand troops

32 Patrick Linton
to Haiti after the earthquake (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 9). Therefore,
rather than allowing the Haitian government to direct the flow of aid according
to its own priorities, it was the international community who decided how aid
should be managed and how Haiti should be rebuilt.
The literature review was accurate regarding representations of
Americans and Canadians in Haiti. Balaji (Racializing Pity: The Haiti
Earthquake and the Plight of "Others", 2011) wrote that the media focused on
black, Haitian victims and American saviours. The Fox News (Haiti Nears
Breaking Point as Aid Is Snarled, Looters Roam, 2010a) report that oscillated
back and forth between Haitian “looters” and American aid was a perfect
example of this. Also of note were an American article telling the story of an
American volunteer injured in the quake (McKinley, Jr. & Skipp, 2010) and a
Canadian article that suggested that Canadians were the world’s most generous
people (Dion-Viens, 2010). The fact that each national media focused on its
own country is particularly significant because it could foster popular support
for foreign aid to Haiti; when Canadians see themselves as more generous, they
may be more likely to support Canadian government aid to Haiti in order to
maintain a reputation of generosity (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, pp. 936-941).
However, while the La Presse article found that Canadians gave, on average,
more than people from other countries, it failed to mention that the most of
the aid given by Canada went to Canadian companies and was spent on
Canadian survivors (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 266). Similarly, the American
press dedicated much space to profiling the experiences of Americans that had
either been injured in the earthquake or were helping with the recovery effort.
Seeing other Americans in Haiti made the situation more relatable for
Americans than it would have been had the stories only focused on the lives of

33
Haitians; people who can relate to the subjects of news stories are more likely
to continue reading or watching (Balaji, 2011, pp. 58-59), and might be more
likely to support aid to Haiti (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011, pp. 938-940).
Religion was often mentioned in media coverage of the earthquake, as
Bellegarde-Smith, Gros, Asante, and Germain have suggested. However, while
the media’s coverage of Pat Robertson’s statements about Vodou and the
Haitian revolution was discussed by many academics, it did not dominate the
media as suggested by Gros and Bellegarde-Smith. In fact, neither of the
narratives discussed by Gros received a great deal of media attention. Although
Christianity was mentioned in multiple news reports (including mentions of
Haitian Christians’ faith and of American and Canadian missionaries), none of
the news reports in this study mentioned Vodou, a religion of great historic and
modern importance to Haiti, with the exception of Pat Robertson’s statements.
Conclusion
This discourse analysis found six emergent themes in the media
coverage of Haiti: the Haitian people’s needs, logistical problems in distributing
aid, poor governance in Haiti, the expectation of violence, a focus on non-
Haitians in Haiti, and religion (Christianity, not Vodou). It is possible that
misconceptions about the disaster spread by the media, coupled with over-
coverage of certain aspects may have contributed to the mismatched aid
response in Haiti. However, it is equally possible that the media portrayal of
Haiti may have been influenced by the aid response in Haiti, or that both were
influenced by some external factor. The following chapter will discuss what
actually happened in the wake of the earthquake, examining both the

34 Patrick Linton
evidenced need in Haiti, and the kind of data the international humanitarian
community collected and/or utilised in the relief and recovery efforts.

35
Chapter 2. The allocation of resources
and personnel after the earthquake
“True compassion is not flinging a coin to a beggar; it
understands that the edifice that produces beggars is in need of
restructuring”
- Juan Arévalo, former Guatemalan president
Following the 2010 earthquake, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC), founded in 1992 by UN resolutions A/RES/46/182 and A/RES/48/57 as
the primary mechanism for coordinating humanitarian assistance, conducted a
multi-cluster Rapid Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti (RINAH) between 23
January and 06 February (ACAPS, 2010). The report did not give information on
a detailed, disaggregated level, such as the individual- or household-level, but
on a per-camp level (e.g. 36% of sites within Port-au-Prince reported outbreaks
of influenza). The report noted that temporary shelters provided little privacy
or protection from the elements (Stoianova, 2010, p. 11), that access to water
was difficult and time consuming, that food prices had increased, and that most
Haitians ate fewer meals per day than they had prior to the earthquake. The

36 Patrick Linton
report also suggested that food availability should be better adapted to the
needs of vulnerable populations in particular, such as children, the elderly, and
the disabled (ACAPS, 2010, pp. 37-38, 41-43, 46, 50-57). There were high rates of
flu, diarrhoea, and malaria (yet few households possessed mosquito nets);
access to medical care was especially difficult outside of Port-au-Prince
(Stoianova, 2010, p. 11).
While the RINAH focused on the immediate needs of Haitians after the
earthquake, academic literature focused more on the long-term needs of Haiti.
François Pierre-Louis (Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and
Governance in Haiti, 2011, pp. 199-200) suggested that Haiti’s biggest post-
earthquake need was the coordination of the distribution of aid. Haiti’s NGOs
lacked the ability to coordinate disaster relief needs such as the establishment
of order, the distribution of food, and ensuring citizens’ safety. This, he argued,
was because outside neoliberal influences on Haiti had encouraged the
minimisation of government (p. 198) in favour of the private and non-profit
sectors, leading to a weakened state unable to respond to national emergencies.
Robert Fatton Jr. (Haiti in the Aftermath of the Earthquake: The Politics
of Catastrophe, 2011, pp. 171-173) argued that for real recovery to occur,
humanitarian aid must focus on the long-term needs of Haiti. He suggested a
focus on infrastructural development, agricultural transformation, and food
self-sufficiency in order to create employment, alleviate poverty, and bridge the
wealth gap. He also suggested that this must be led by government in a
democratic manner, rather than by NGOs, as they are undemocratic, not
accountable to the Haitian public, and infringe on the sovereignty of the
Haitian state when they make decisions without public consultation. Fatton
argued that narratives of the corrupt nature of Haitian government, whether

37
true or false, have caused aid to Haiti to flow into NGOs rather than in the form
of assistance to the government. Reliance on NGOs has led to further
urbanisation of Haiti and its dependence on imports for food (pp. 173-175).
Shifting foreign aid to the government rather than NGOs could strengthen the
Haitian government to the point that it would be capable of coordinating
development.
In this chapter, I will examine the aid that was dispatched in Haiti by the
international community (food, water, medical care, security, etc), in relation
to evidenced need (that is, compared to available data) and to the various
discourses of the media. I will discuss where and how aid was distributed in
Haiti, as well as the problem of organisations failing to maintain accurate
records. I will also discuss how the decision-making process left the Haitian
government essentially disempowered. Finally, I will examine the amount and
nature of data that were actually available at the time in relation to these issues.
Aid was primarily distributed in Port-au-Prince, largely ignoring other
cities and towns affected by the earthquake and leading to discrepancies in
unmet needs. The humanitarian aid that was disbursed was distributed at
temporary settlement camps in and around Port-au-Prince. Vulnerable
populations such as children and the elderly were generally not prioritised in
the distribution of aid.
Responses to the Haitian government’s plan for recovery indicate the
influence of funding source on aid distribution and the associated undermining
of governmental authority. Several countries and intergovernmental
organisations pledged donations to Haiti in an emergency appeal held at the
United Nations in March 2010, where the Haitian government presented a

38 Patrick Linton
hopeful budget detailing how it would like to proceed with the recovery
process. However, donor countries and intergovernmental organisations
donated funds to specific parts of the budget, far exceeding the requested
amount in some areas, and coming far short of what was required in other
areas. As Haiti relied on the international community to provide the disaster
relief and recovery aid it needed, this response of donations-with-conditions
meant that the international community essentially decided how aid would be
distributed in Haiti.
Outside the government’s requests, insufficient data regarding the needs
of the Haitian people characterised the recovery process. The RINAH report
provided information about initial needs in Haiti, but due to a “lack of
understanding of partners,” “organisational difficulties,” and “security
restrictions,” it was too little and too late (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor, &
Harvey, 2010, p. 25). There was even less information available regarding the aid
distributed. Country-wide reports, such as those conducted by UN agencies,
contained seemingly conflicting information. Reports by NGOs used measures
that presented the NGO’s work in a positive light in order to please donors, and
lacked more comprehensive indicators. Even where post-earthquake data were
available, baseline data from before the earthquake were unavailable, making
comparison impossible.
What kind of aid was dispatched?
It is difficult to estimate exactly how much and what kind of aid was
dispatched in Haiti. Most of the dispatched aid was distributed in the 500+
temporary settlement camps. This is especially noticeable in the RINAH report,
which differentiated aid provided to camps and non-camp locations. One such

39
distinction is apparent in terms of access to protected water sources. While 72%
of water sources in camps were protected, only 47% of water sources in non-
camp locations were protected (Stoianova, 2010, p. 11). However, camps did not
always keep accurate records and unsolicited goods and individuals unaffiliated
with NGOs could not be accurately tracked. In addition, most NGOs in Haiti
were not registered with the government and did not keep full information on
their work. Much of the untraceable aid distribution took place in the early
stages of the relief effort, in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. In
contrast, there is more data available regarding the aid given by governments
and intergovernmental organisations.
Unlike in Guatemala, where all disaster relief aid organisations are
required to register all of their disaster relief supplies with the logistics support
system or be denied customs clearance (Amin, Data Management Systems after
the Earthquake in Pakistan: The Lessons of Risepak, 2008, p. 12; de Ville de
Goyet, The Use of a Logistics Support System in Guatemala and Haiti, 2008b,
pp. 83-84), the 10,000+ NGOs working in Haiti seemingly kept little record of
supplies and workers. Moreover, thousands of individuals unaffiliated with any
organisation sent supplies (or themselves), unsolicited, to assist in the relief
effort. Unsorted, unsolicited supplies occupied valuable space and added to the
logistical problem when there was no one to coordinate distribution of those
supplies once they had arrived in Port-au-Prince (Pierre-Louis, 2011, pp. 199-
200). The needs of unaffiliated, though well-meaning, individuals compounded
the housing shortage that already existed in Port-au-Prince due to the
earthquake (Sauer, Catlett, Tosatto, & Kirsch, 2014, pp. 65-66).
According to the secretary-general’s report on the United Nations
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to the Security Council

40 Patrick Linton
(S/2010/200), UNOCHA reported that as of April 2010, three months after the
earthquake, 376,000 tarpaulins and 45,000 family-sized tents had been
distributed by various organisations as temporary housing for Haitians living in
camps. Also distributed were hygiene products, kitchen equipment, ropes,
blankets, and mosquito nets. This accounted for 90% of those in need (p. 3).
Three and a half million Haitians had received food assistance from the World
Food Programme and its partners, 4 million litres of drinking water had been
distributed and 5,347 latrines had been installed (p. 3). The World Health
Organisation and the Pan-American Health Organisation deployed 60 medical
personnel to provide medical services and vaccinations to 300,000 Haitians (p.
3).
The 2010 United Nations report Haiti: 6 months after reported that as of
the time of the report, a further 257,000 tarpaulins and 25,000 family-sized
tents had been distributed (p. 5). In addition, over three thousand traditional
shelters had been built (with another 122,000 planned) (p. 5). More than
916,000 vaccines had been administered, 345,000 boxes of essential medicines
had been distributed, 4,000 amputations had been carried out, and 2,500 units
of blood had been imported (p. 9). Within the first two months after the
earthquake, 18,700 metric tonnes of food had been distributed, and 87,500
Haitians were enrolled in “Food for Work” programmes2
(p. 13). 1.2 million
Haitians received five litres of water per day from the WASH cluster (p. 25).
Additional supplies included 1,300 trucks driven from the Dominican Republic
(p. 29); 1,800 tonnes of seeds and 87,500 hand tools for farmers (p. 33); 1,600
school tents for 200,000 students (p. 15); training for 2,300 teachers and 3,000
2
The 2011 United Nations Development Programme report Haiti: 1 year later reports that
240,000 Haitians were employed by UNDP and WFP in “Cash for Work” or “Food for Work”
programmes (United Nations Development Programme, 2011, p. 6).

41
education personnel (p. 15); 8,500 peacekeepers (p. 35), and 2,775 police officers
(p. 35). The peacekeepers distributed food and water, removed debris, and
paved roads (p. 35).
Following the earthquake, there was an overemphasis on security. One-
half of the United States government’s aid went to sustaining the thirty-
thousand American troops that arrived, uninvited, during the response to the
earthquake (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p. 9; Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 266).
The United States was not unique in this regard; of the relief funding from all
donors, 39% went to the donor’s own military (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, p.
9). Although crime tends to decrease after a major disaster, contrary to popular
belief, the time and resources that could have been spent on rescue and
medical relief are often instead spent on excessive security (Benjamin, Bassily-
Marcus, Babu, Silver, & Marin, 2011, p. 314). The governmental focus on security
matches the media’s focus on violence, as referenced in the previous chapter,
where American and Canadian media spoke of looters, violence, and gunshots.
How was aid distributed?
Despite the fact that over $6 billion in aid had been distributed in Haiti
by 2012 (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, pp. 5-7) and earthquake damages and
losses were estimated at $7.8 billion (United Nations Development Programme,
2011, p. 2), Haiti has not recovered as fully as might be expected. Instead, aid
distribution was uneven. Aid was concentrated, leaving large areas of affected
Haitians without assistance. Aid was also distributed haphazardly, without
regard to special needs groups, such as the elderly. Aid was also distributed
selectively to contractors from the donors’ own countries, rather than to the
Haitian government, leaving the Haitian economy unstimulated after the

42 Patrick Linton
earthquake. This is especially significant because Haitians wanted jobs, income,
and access to credit more than they wanted food (Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, &
Doocy, 2012a, pp. 85-86).
In addition to Port-au-Prince, the earthquake destroyed Léogâne,
Gressier, Petit-Goâve, Grand-Goâve, and Jacmel (Benjamin, Bassily-Marcus,
Babu, Silver, & Marin, 2011, p. 307). However, aid was primarily distributed in
the capital (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S60). Areas outside of Port-au-Prince, and
even some areas within it, were neglected. This was largely for logistical
reasons, as those areas were more difficult to access due to debris and road
conditions. However, centralised earthquake relief matched the centralised
nature of the Haitian state and replicated its problems.
Aid was also often distributed without prioritising certain groups, such
as the pregnant, elderly, or disabled, over others (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S63).
Aid workers argued that this was because almost everyone had similar needs.
However, this could neither be proved nor disproved, as there was a lack of
accessible collected data. Organisations such as the British Red Cross and
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) did not prioritise data collection in their
camps, claiming that lifesaving activities must take priority (Altay & Labonte,
2014, p. S63). This is in line with de Ville de Goyet’s assertion that speed takes
priority over information during emergency operations. Because of this, many
organisations lack information on who is in their camps, what kind of injuries
they have sustained, how many pregnant and breastfeeding women there are,
or how much medical care was given, resulting in ad hoc allocation of
resources.
It is a possibility that aid organisations use simple measures of output,
such as the number of people served, rather than more complex performance

43
measures because of how they are funded (Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, & Doocy,
2012a, p. 85; Kirsch, et al., 2012b, pp. 280-281). The development sector is unique
in that it is not funded by its beneficiaries. In the food and beverage sector,
customers who are unsatisfied with the quality of the products they consume
can choose to take their business elsewhere. Businesses that consistently
perform poorly lose market share and eventually go bankrupt (Kirsch, et al.,
2012b, p. 281). Aid recipients who are unsatisfied with aid are not typically
provided with an opportunity for feedback (Kirsch, et al., 2013, p. 565). Instead,
NGOs create reports on simple outputs. More complex measures focused on
quality may show less attractive results, and NGOs whose performance is seen
as sub-par are not attractive to donors.
Very little of the aid money distributed went to the Haitian government
or to Haitian organisations and companies. Of the aid that Canada gave three-
fourths went to Canadian companies in Canada, and was spent on Canadian
survivors (Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 266). Of all the aid given by all donors,
only about one percent was given to the government of Haiti; donors were
reluctant to give to the Haitian government due to concerns of corruption,
inefficiency, and lack of capacity. International NGOs and contractors received
57% of the aid given. The remainder went to the donor country’s own
militaries. While the private contracting process was a gold rush for
international NGOs, Haitian-led NGOs tended to be excluded, receiving only
$9.45 million in USAID contracts while three-fourths of USAID funding went to
private contractors headquartered in the Washington, DC area. Many of those
DC-area contractors, such as Chemonics, Development Alternatives Inc (DAI),
CH2M Hill Constructors, Flour Enterprises, The Shaw Group, MHW Americas,
and Agility Logistics have been involved in controversies in Iraq, Afghanistan,

44 Patrick Linton
or Hurricane Katrina relief.3
However, USAID does not have data on how the
money given to contractors was spent (Ramachandran & Walz, 2012, pp. 9-13,
24-27). The fact that donors held a deep mistrust of the Haitian government
reflects the same mistrust of the Haitian government held by the American and
Canadian media, where journalists wrote of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of
capacity.
It is unsurprising that the vast majority of USAID funding for earthquake
relief in Haiti went to American companies. While USAID is the international
development arm of the United States government, its mandate, the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, was enacted in the context of American security and
economic interests (Weisenfeld, 2011, p. 1103). It therefore should come as no
surprise that the United States military and American contractors took the
opportunity to rush into Haiti immediately following the earthquake. The
American military’s presence in Haiti provided not only security for American
citizens in Haiti (many of whom were housed on US embassy grounds before
being flown out of the US-military-run airport in Port-au-Prince immediately
after the earthquake), but also provided an extra military base for the United
States. As in Canada, American economic interests were also served with the
use of American contractors. The Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) has a similar mandate to that of USAID. Just as the American and
Canadian media focused a great deal on their own citizens affected by the
earthquake rather than on Haitians, American and Canadian government aid
focused a great deal on their own economic interests, rather than the economic
wellbeing of Haitians affected by the earthquake.
3
See corruption, inefficiency, and lack of capacity.

45
It is conceivable that Haiti would look quite different today if aid had
been distributed differently. If aid focused on all affected areas, rather than
focusing primarily on the easy-to-access areas in Port-au-Prince, there would
not be hundreds of thousands of Haitians still living in nearly 500 “temporary
camps” (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S64). Had organisations such as the Red
Cross and MSF prioritised data collection and documentation, and focused on
complex performance measures, such as impact, quality, and satisfaction, they
may have been able to more efficiently and effectively distribute aid to the
Haitian people (Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, & Doocy, 2012a, p. 85). In addition,
those data would have been invaluable in deciding how to approach future
disasters, such as the 2015 earthquakes in Nepal. And had USAID, CIDA, and
other aid agencies given aid directly to the Haitian government or used more
Haitian contractors, it is possible that the Haitian economy could provide those
jobs that the Haitian people needed.
Who decides?
According to a recovery sector analysis by the United Nations Office of
the Special Envoy for Haiti, the Government of Haiti had in place an 18-month
budget that detailed those areas in which they wanted to focus the recovery. As
the Haitian government could not fund the recovery itself, it had to rely on
donations by individuals, NGOs, and governments. At the International
Donor’s Conference in New York in March of 2010, $5.5 billion was pledged by
countries and intergovernmental organisations. However, donor pledges and
disbursement did not match the recommendations of the budget. In certain
sectors, such as reconstruction, financial and economic recovery, and

46 Patrick Linton
institutional rebuilding, pledges and disbursements were only a fraction of
what the Haitian government had requested.
For reconstruction, the Haitian government had requested $780 million
(UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012). Finland, France, Germany, the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Luxembourg, Qatar, Spain, and
Switzerland pledged $128.8 million; between 2010 and 2012, $100.1 million of
that was disbursed (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012). For
financial and economic recovery, the Haitian government requested $200.0
million; of that, $64.9 million was pledged, but only $12.8 million was disbursed
(UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012). In other sectors, such as
transport, and water and sanitation, the pledges and disbursements had far
exceeded the requests of the Haitian government. For the transport sector, the
Government of Haiti only requested $180 million; however, Brazil, Canada,
France, the European Commission (EC), the IDB, Japan, the United States,
Venezuela, and the World Bank pledged $998.1 million, and had disbursed
$512.8 million between 2010 and 2012 (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti,
2012). For water and sanitation, the Haitian government requested $160 million;
$261.4 million was pledged and $224.4 million was disbursed (UN Office of the
Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012).
Likewise, where Haiti requested $372 million for strengthening the
administration, $155 million for democratic institutions, and $20 million for
support to parliament, only $46.3 million, $23.9 million, and $2.2 million
respectively were disbursed (UN Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, 2012).
The lack of support for institutional rebuilding highlights the international
community’s distrust in the governance capabilities of the Haitian government.

47
Figure 1. Recovery grant activities by sector as of December 2012 in USD millions. Government of Haiti 18-
month budget vs. pledges made at flash appeal at New York donors' conference vs. total disbursed 2010-2012.
Source: UN Office of the Special Envoy to Haiti
0 200 400 600 800 1000
TERRITORIAL REBUILDING
Disaster management and prevention
Energy
Reconstruction
Regional hubs and urban development
Transport
General
ECONOMIC REBUILDING
Agriculture
Financial and economic recovery, jobs
Job creation
Industry and commerce
General
SOCIAL REBUILDING
Culture
Education
Food security
Health
Housing
Social protection
Water and sanitation
Women and children
General
INSTITUTIONAL REBUILDING
Strengthening the administration
Democratic institutions
Justice and Security
National planning and local development
Support to parliament
PILAR NOT SPECIFIED
GoH 18-month budget Total allocation Disbursed 2010-2012

48 Patrick Linton
The donors, which included the governments of several countries such
as the US, Canada, Spain, Brazil, and France, and intergovernmental
organisations such as the EC, IDB, the World Bank, and the Organisation of
American states, were clearly directing the distribution of recovery aid. Had
these governments and IGOs given their aid directly to the government of
Haiti, the aid distribution would have looked very different. The donor
countries and organisations directed the flow of recovery aid because they
provided the funding, and the funding they provided was directed at specific
areas. The actor best suited to lead disaster recovery is the state (Amin, Cox, &
Goldstein, Using Data Against Disasters: Overview and Synthesis of Lessons
Learned, 2008, pp. 17-18; de Ville de Goyet, Information Gaps in Relief,
Recovery, and Reconstruction in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, 2008a, pp.
24-25); the removal of this capacity is disempowering to the state. In addition,
the inability of the Haitian government to direct the earthquake recovery effort
left aid organisation with no central government coordinator, and placed it
under the control of multiple actors working independently of each other. The
lack of a central coordinator meant that no master planning could occur.
What data were available?
The 2010 earthquake in Haiti killed either 222,570 people (Fatton Jr.,
2011, p. 164; Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 187; Orelien, et al., 2013, p. 29), 230,000 people
(Bellegarde-Smith, 2011, p. 265), 250,000 people (Lundy, Transnationalism in
the Aftermath of the Haiti Earthquake: Reinforcing Ties and Second-
Generation Identity, 2011b, p. 204; Gros, 2011, p. 132), 316,000 people
(Weisenfeld, 2011, p. 1099), or somewhere between 230,000 and 316,000 people
(Benjamin, Bassily-Marcus, Babu, Silver, & Marin, 2011, p. 307), according to
different academic sources . Some of these different estimates are from the

49
same issue of one journal, highlighting the significant lack of confidence in
available data. Official government reports say 222,570 people were killed in the
earthquake (UN Office of the Secretary-General, 2010, p. 1). Over one year post-
earthquake, mortality estimates still varied by over 40 percent. This highlights
the fact that there were serious impediments to collecting sufficient
information for decision-making and coordination in the earthquake’s
aftermath.
Impediments to decision-making included a lack of prioritisation of data
collection, which was linked to the urgency of the initial relief response in the
earthquake’s aftermath. The inaccessibility of areas both within and outside of
Port-au-Prince meant that data were not collected in those areas, making the
provision of adequate aid problematic. Data were often unreliable, especially
with regards to the time-sensitive operations necessary within the first few
hours and days of the disaster relief operation; often, aid agencies did not
prioritise the collection of data, claiming that their time and resources were
more efficiently used in saving lives. By the time needs assessments were
conducted, compiled, and released, they were outdated. For example, the Rapid
Initial Needs Assessment for Haiti (RINAH), conducted between 25 January and
6 February, was released so late that the information was no longer usable
(Grünewald & Renaudin, 2010, p. 30; Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor, &
Harvey, 2010, p. 25). Crowdsourcing and social networks were a cheap, quick
method of gathering data post-disaster in the aftermath (Barbier, Zafarani, Gao,
Fung, & Liu, 2012, pp. 258-259; Gao, Barbier, & Goolsby, 2011, p. 10; Yang, et al.,
2014, p. 2025), however, they lacked a ‘common information system’ that could
coordinate information for all response groups (Barbier, Zafarani, Gao, Fung, &
Liu, 2012, p. 259). Furthermore, crowdsourced data were also unreliable, as it

50 Patrick Linton
was difficult to verify the source of the data (Barbier, Zafarani, Gao, Fung, &
Liu, 2012, p. 262; Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S62; Gao, Barbier, & Goolsby, 2011,
pp. 11-12).
Where data did exist, the relief effort was hampered by a failure to make
it accessible. Many decision-making meetings were held at the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) base, which was difficult to access from certain
parts of Port-au-Prince and was kept under tight security, leaving many NGOs
unable to participate in information sharing. Furthermore, meetings were held
in English rather than French (or Haitian Creole), the official language of Haiti,
which effectively excluded those Haitian NGOs whose employees did not speak
English (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S60). Some organisations that had collected
data (especially large, well-funded organisations) were unwilling to share that
data with other organisations (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S63). As these
organisations had seemingly unlimited funds, they did not see the need to
share their data with other organisations because they did not need anything in
return. This led to overlaps and redundancies, as multiple organisations would
survey the same areas and collect the same information, while other areas
remained un-surveyed and unserved.
When data were shared, it was often inconsistent. Data collection and
analysis often did not use uniform definitions across agencies (or sometimes
even within agencies themselves) (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S62). Concepts
such as ‘affected populations’ were ambiguous, lowering the reliability of
information (Rencoret, Stoddard, Haver, Taylor, & Harvey, 2010, p. 26).
Agreement on definitions, codes, and categories is essential for good
information management (Amin, Cox, & Goldstein, Using Data Against
Disasters: Overview and Synthesis of Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 13-14).

51
Furthermore, NGOs that did share data often used different information-
sharing systems. While UN OCHA uses the OneResponse website for aid
coordination, many NGOs often used Google Groups and Google Docs, storing
their information on simple spreadsheets (Altay & Labonte, 2014, pp. S62-S63),
rather than a purpose-built database.
These impediments to disaster relief decision-making and coordination
meant that there was not a great deal of information available in the immediate
aftermath of the earthquake. The lack of data affected disaster relief efforts at
every stage. The World Health Organisation and the US Federal Emergency
Management Agency both identify four stages of a disaster. They are:
mitigation (prevention), preparedness (planning), response, and recovery
(Benjamin, Bassily-Marcus, Babu, Silver, & Marin, 2011, pp. 306, 308). Mitigation
and preparedness are essential, clearly evidenced by the difference in the
impacts of the 7.0-magnitude earthquake in Port-au-Prince in 2010, a similar
earthquake in San Francisco in 1993, which killed fewer than 100 people, and
the 8.5-magnitude earthquake in Concepción, Chile, in 2010, which killed fewer
than 1000 (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 187). The response phase is the most crucial
phase after a disaster occurs. The first 24 to 48 hours after a disaster is when
lifesaving attempts are both most effective and most difficult, as infrastructure
is often destroyed and roads are blocked by debris. It is because of this that
most survivors are saved by their neighbours (Benjamin, Bassily-Marcus, Babu,
Silver, & Marin, 2011, p. 309). The recovery phase describes the attempt to
return to normalcy, but is also an opportunity to rebuild in a way that may
prevent or mitigate future disaster.
While mitigation and preparedness fall outside of the scope of this
dissertation, it is important to note that they perform an important role in the

52 Patrick Linton
response stage. Preparedness involves collection of baseline data, such as
accurate maps of communities (especially those in remote areas), demographic
data, and housing information (Amin, Cox, & Goldstein, Using Data Against
Disasters: Overview and Synthesis of Lessons Learned, 2008, pp. 13-14, 18-19).
Lacking this information, first responders in Port-au-Prince did not know who
they were looking for and what their needs might be. For example, relief
workers who were unaware of systems of food and water flow in Haiti prior to
the earthquake made assumptions that led to an influx of food and water from
various humanitarian aid organisations. There was no data, however, to suggest
that there was a food shortage, especially as the earthquake caused only limited
damage to farmland, and the United Nations World Food Programme already
had hundreds of thousands of meals in storage in warehouses in Port-au-Prince
(Katz, 2015). Furthermore, there was no data to suggest that there was a
drinking water shortage; Port-au-Prince lacked the piping infrastructure that
would have been vulnerable to earthquake damage (Katz, 2015). Housing,
however, had taken a disastrous hit, and millions of people were left in poorly-
constructed temporary camps. The cost of food and water aid and the
associated flow of personnel could have been better diverted toward dealing
with this more pressing issue. Instead, relief efforts were characterised by a
problem of logistics and a lack of data regarding what was actually needed.
Conclusion
The allocation of resources and personnel in the relief and recovery
efforts after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti matches, in part, the discourses seen
in the American and Canadian media, especially in the areas of violence,
governance, needs, and Americans’ and Canadians’ interests in Haiti. While
there was very little looting or violence, the United States sent tens of

53
thousands of troops to Haiti in order to ‘secure’ the country. When Haiti
appealed to the international community for funds for institutional rebuilding,
such as strengthening the administration and support to parliament, they were
largely ignored due to fears of corruption and bad governance, matching the
discourses of Haitian governance as portrayed in the media. Distribution of aid
was clumsy, and many of those affected by the earthquake reported
dissatisfaction with the aid received. Finally, just as many of the stories in
American and Canadian media focused on American and Canadian experiences
in Haiti, with Haitians as a backdrop, much of the their aid to Haiti was focused
on American and Canadian survivors. Furthermore, the vast majority of this aid
also went to American and Canadian contractors.4
4
This is not all to say that the international humanitarian effort in Haiti was directed by the
American and Canadian media. I simply note a correlation. It is entirely possible that the
American and Canadian media, USAID, CIDA, and the thousands of American and Canadian
NGOs operating in Haiti are influenced by the another factor, or that the media is influenced
by the aid typically sent by their countries. This was not a quantitative study, although a
quantitative study would make an interesting future project.

54 Patrick Linton
Chapter 3. The efficacy of the
humanitarian response to the
earthquake
You can have data without information, but you cannot have
information without data.
- Daniel Keys Moran, American science fiction author
This chapter will discuss the efficacy of the humanitarian response to
the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, examine three paradigms suggesting why this was
not as effective as it could have been, consider whose data were used, and look
at beneficiary feedback as an alternative means of evaluation of the
humanitarian response. In order to evaluate the efficacy of the humanitarian
response to the earthquake, it is essential to take into consideration whether
the goal of recovery is to restore pre-disaster levels of service (that is, to return
Haiti to what it was on 11 January 2010) or to seize the opportunity to develop
(de Ville de Goyet, Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction in
the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, 2008a, p. 33). As Haiti was the least

55
developed country in the Western Hemisphere as well as a republic of NGOs—
purportedly working toward development—prior to the earthquake, the goal of
recovery should have been to redevelop Haiti to a greater state than it had been
in before; this would ensure a better standard of living for the Haitian people
and mitigate the potential damage of a future earthquake or other natural
disaster. By either standard, the humanitarian response was deeply flawed.
Haiti has failed to return even to pre-earthquake conditions in the five years
since the disaster.5
Humanitarian aid workers in Haiti were somewhat successful in the
immediate response to the earthquake in that they were able to relocate
hundreds of thousands of earthquake-affected Haitians to camps away from the
danger caused by structural damage. Although they provided food, water,
medical attention, and supplies to families, it could have been done with
greater efficiency. The relief effort in Haiti was plagued by logistical problems
and a lack of organisation, as has been outlined above.
Haiti, however, failed to graduate from the relief stage to the recovery
stage. Six months post-earthquake, over a million Haitians still resided in
camps, despite the more than one billion dollars in aid that had been given by
that time (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p. 199). One year later, almost half of all Haitians
who had moved into camps after the earthquake still resided in camps, rather
than returning to their neighbourhoods (Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, & Doocy,
2012a, p. 91). Even a full three years post-earthquake, hundreds of thousands of
Haitians still lived in nearly 500 camps across Port-au-Prince (Altay & Labonte,
2014, p. S64). It is of little surprise that the recovery process in Haiti has been
5
Disaster recovery is not a quick process. After Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2005,
the city took nearly a decade to return to normalcy. Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas
had significantly less preparation and governmental resources available than did New Orleans.

56 Patrick Linton
significantly slower than the immediate response. For the “business of aid”
(Birdsall, 2008, p. 516) to be sustainable, humanitarian aid must be required for
the long term. When disaster victims no longer need the assistance of
humanitarian aid workers, those workers no longer have a job; thus, rather
than moving into recovery as soon as possible, humanitarian aid agencies
remain in the relief phase until relief funds have run out (de Ville de Goyet,
Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction in the Aftermath of
Natural Disasters, 2008a, p. 32).
Three paradigms
Most existing academic literature relevant to Haitian disaster recovery
fall into three camps: The academics in a special edition of the Journal of Black
Studies (JBS) from one year after the earthquake in Haiti cited an over-
intrusion by NGOs and foreign agendas as the reason that Haiti failed to
recover from the earthquake (Lundy, The Haiti Earthquake of 2010: The Politics
of a Natural Disaster, 2011a; Gros, 2011; Fatton Jr., 2011; Pierre-Louis, 2011;
Bellegarde-Smith, 2011; Germain, 2011). The contributors to a 2008 World Bank
compilation, Data Against Disasters: Establishing Effective Systems for Relief,
Reconstruction, and Recovery believed that NGOs’ lack of use of (or
underutilisation of) data is the critical shortcoming in humanitarian aid efforts
(Amin, Cox, & Goldstein, Using Data Against Disasters: Overview and Synthesis
of Lessons Learned, 2008; de Ville de Goyet, Information Gaps in Relief,
Recovery, and Reconstruction in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, 2008a;
McDonald & Gordon, 2008). A group of researchers from Johns Hopkins
University Bloomberg School of Public Health, who published a series of
articles on humanitarian aid evaluation, argue that humanitarian aid efforts fail
because they are being assessed incorrectly, therefore appearing as successes in

57
yearly reports, and that more nuanced assessments including the feedback of
aid beneficiaries and complex measures would lead to more successful
humanitarian aid; another argument that emphasises the importance of data
(Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, & Doocy, 2012a; Kirsch, et al., 2012b; Kirsch, et al.,
2013; Weiss, Kirsch, Doocy, & Perrin, 2014).
The Journal of Black Studies contributors suggest that the intrusion of
foreign NGOs, governments, and international financial institutions led Haiti
into dependency, holding it in a cycle of poverty, and that continuation of these
policies post-earthquake pushes Haiti further into dependency. JBS contributor
Jean-Germain Gros (Anatomy of a Haitian Tragedy: When the Fury of Nature
Meets the Debility of the State, 2011) believes that much damage could have
been prevented if Haiti had been able to enforce existing building codes and
provide emergency care, but internationally-imposed anti-state policies dating
from the 1980s, which channelled development aid through NGOs instead of
state-building, allowed Haiti to become a failed state (pp. 133-134). The very
same NGOs and governments that created Haiti’s problems were now taking
charge of its redevelopment. He suggests that the only adequate solution is a
reorganisation of the government, focusing on decentralisation but not
devolution, and a military capable of deploying quick aid; only the Haitian
government can sufficiently rebuild Haiti (Anatomy of a Haitian Tragedy:
When the Fury of Nature Meets the Debility of the State, pp. 148-154).
Like Gros, Robert Fatton Jr (Haiti in the Aftermath of the Earthquake:
The Politics of Catastrophe, 2011) writes that the earthquake’s effects on Haiti
were the result of over-intervention from foreign NGOs and international
financial institutions (IFIs). For the past three decades, more than ten thousand
NGOs, undemocratic and unaccountable to the Haitian public, have been

58 Patrick Linton
carrying out the development work normally done by a state; IFIs contributed
to the problem by prompting a transition from agriculture to garment
manufacture, causing Haiti to urbanise and became dependent on imports for
food (pp. 171-175). Haitians see the failed recovery effort as a missed opportunity
to develop Haiti and a continuation of the status quo (p. 171). François Pierre-
Louis (Earthquakes, Nongovernmental Organizations, and Governance in Haiti,
2011) notes that NGOs had taken on the social, political, and economic roles
normally handled by the state, including democracy enhancement, conflict
resolution, and economic projects (pp. 190-193). However, certain roles could
not or were not filled by NGOs. At the time of the earthquake, Haiti lacked any
emergency management system; foreign neoliberal influence to minimise
government could have been the cause of this (p. 198). NGOs were unable to
address needs such as establishing order, distributing food, and ensuring
citizens’ safety after the earthquake, and there was insufficient coordination
between NGOs to distribute aid (pp. 199-200).
Like the JBS contributors, the authors of the World Bank compilation
believe that national authorities are the appropriate principal actors in disaster
relief, and thus capacity building is essential (Amin, Cox, & Goldstein, Using
Data Against Disasters: Overview and Synthesis of Lessons Learned, 2008, pp.
17-18; de Ville de Goyet, Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and
Reconstruction in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, 2008a, pp. 24-25).
However, they argue that failures in disaster relief and recovery primarily stem
from failures to utilise data before, during, and after a natural disaster
(McDonald & Gordon, 2008; Amin, Cox, & Goldstein, Using Data Against
Disasters: Overview and Synthesis of Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 2; de Ville de
Goyet, Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction in the

59
Aftermath of Natural Disasters, 2008a). They emphasise that it is essential to
have a disaster information management system in place with baseline data
available in advance of any potential disaster (Amin, Cox, & Goldstein, Using
Data Against Disasters: Overview and Synthesis of Lessons Learned, 2008, pp.
18-19). Claude de Ville de Goyet argues that although information gathering is
fundamental to addressing the needs of those affected and displaced by a
disaster, time pressure constrains the ability of aid workers to collect data in
the aftermath. He also notes that while acting quickly is necessary,
organisations do not take time to gather information even after the most
critical time period has passed (de Ville de Goyet, Information Gaps in Relief,
52-53). Many inappropriate disaster responses may have been avoided had data
been collected and analysed.
The team from Johns Hopkins University identify the use of the correct
indicators as a key factor in disaster relief and recovery. They argue that while a
great deal of money was spent on humanitarian aid in the wake of the
earthquake, the impact of relief and recovery efforts were poorly documented,
and generally focused on measurement of outputs, such as number of meals
served, number of amputations performed, and quantity of tarpaulins
distributed, rather than more complex measures that indicate the overall
wellbeing of populations under the care of NGOs, such as the time spent daily
to collect water from a protected source after the earthquake compared to
before the earthquake (Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, & Doocy, 2012a, p. 85). They
emphasise that this is because disaster relief is an unregulated industry and
humanitarian agencies are accountable to donors rather than beneficiaries;
they stress that “accountability to donors should not be mistaken for quality

60 Patrick Linton
assurance” (Kirsch, et al., 2012b, p. 281). Instead, they suggest that beneficiary
satisfaction surveys be taken into account when evaluating the effectiveness of
humanitarian aid (Doocy, Cherewick, & Kirsch, 2013; Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, &
Doocy, 2012a; Kirsch, et al., 2012b; Kirsch, et al., 2013; Weiss, Kirsch, Doocy, &
Perrin, 2014). Qualitative and quantitative assessments of beneficiaries would
ensure greater accountability to beneficiaries as well as to donors.
The use of data
As it was one of the first major disasters in the new age of big data, there
were several attempts to collect and utilise data in the humanitarian efforts
following the earthquake. The Rapid Needs Initial Assessment for Haiti
(RINAH) report, mentioned in the previous chapter, attempted to gather rough
estimates of earthquake damage and displacement, but it was released in an
untimely fashion. Crowdsourced Crisis Camp “Hackathons for Haiti” were
another attempt to collect and utilise data for humanitarian aid in Haiti, but
were plagued with issues of incompatibility, meaning that humanitarian aid
workers were unable to manipulate and make use of the data in the manner
they saw fit. Finally, there were hundreds of evaluations made by international
humanitarian organisations;6
however, many evaluations used overly simple
indicators, as discussed in the previous chapter.
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) conducted RINAH from
23 January to 06 February 2010. However RINAH was not as rapid as its name
would convey; it began almost two weeks after the earthquake and was
published almost a month after the earthquake. The data that it provided was
outdated and unreliable by the time it was disseminated, as it concerned the
6
Many of these may be found at Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
in Humanitarian Action’s website, via http://www.alnap.org/current/haitiportalresources

61
short-term needs of those affected by the earthquake (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p.
S65). An initial needs assessment is essential following any disaster. However,
as time is of the essence, it should be deployed immediately, conducted and
compiled quickly, and disseminated without hesitation.
There was significant media attention regarding “Hackathons for Haiti”
wherein tech-savvy individuals gathered with the intention of using data-
centric solutions to help with humanitarian efforts, despite not actually
knowing what they were attempting to create in advance of the hackathon
(Brewer, 2010; Pool, 2010). In collaboration with Ushahidi, a non-profit software
company with the slogan “crowdsourcing crisis information”, ‘hackers’ used
OpenStreetMap (OSM) to overlay crowdsourced data onto a map.
Unfortunately, OSM and Ushahidi’s software were not fully interoperable,
meaning that data were not searchable, lists could not be generated, and the
hackathon’s efforts were of little use to those aid workers who would have
benefitted from these data (Heinzelman, Sewell, Ziemke, & Meier, 2011, p. 2).
Despite these early issues, the hackathon was an innovative idea that has great
potential for future use in humanitarian aid. Crowdsourcing has the potential
to involve many more remote international humanitarian workers assisting in
disaster relief and recovery without many of the problems associated with
spontaneous volunteers, such as the need to feed, house, and train them. It also
has the potential to include local residents, allowing them to express needs,
offer local knowledge, and provide feedback about existing aid. In the future,
greater consideration must be given to the goal of the hackathon, the platform
that will be used by humanitarian workers (Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S62), and
the reliability of crowdsourced data (Barbier, Zafarani, Gao, Fung, & Liu, 2012,
p. 262; Altay & Labonte, 2014, p. S62; Gao, Barbier, & Goolsby, 2011, pp. 11-12).

62 Patrick Linton
The collection, utilisation, and sharing of data could have helped aid
organisations to more efficiently and effectively provide aid. Maintaining data
on survivor locations and checked buildings/neighbourhoods could have
avoided the redundancy of double- and triple-checking locations during the
time-critical search and rescue operations in the crucial first 72 hours after the
earthquake. This would have allowed teams to work faster to ensure that every
building in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas was accounted for.
Sharing these data with other aid organisations could have prevented doubling
up of efforts (de Ville de Goyet, Information Gaps in Relief, Recovery, and
Reconstruction in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters, 2008a, p. 35). Tracking
supplies entering Haiti at customs, in conjunction with maintaining a central
list of supply needs, would have been a practical means of matching supplies,
especially unsolicited ones, with the people in need of them. As the
international humanitarian response to the earthquake was characterised by
western media as a logistical nightmare, a system of tracking supplies and
needs could have avoided situations such the incident described in The Globe
and Mail where dozens of pallets loaded with bottled water remained idly on
the tarmac of the Port-au-Prince airport as hundreds of thousands of people
went thirsty (Waldie, 2010).
Whose data?
When considering the use of data in disaster relief and recovery, it is
important to consider whose data were used, whose data were not used, and
the reasons for this. Most of the data that were used by individual humanitarian
actors in Haiti were produced by foreign entities rather than Haitian
organisations or Haitian government ministries. Furthermore, most of the data
used by humanitarian actors were produced by the organisations themselves, as

63
a result of a low level of data sharing. These organisations assumed, from the
beginning, that no data were readily available. Had there been greater data
sharing and coordination among organisations, some redundant data collection
may have been avoided, and many organisations that had not utilised data
because of the difficulty or cost of data collection may have been able to utilise
data in their operations.
Data from local Haitian NGOs (or from the Haitian government itself)
were not widely used. As many decision-making meetings were held in English
at the difficult-to-access MINUSTAH base, many Haitian NGOs were not able
to participate, either because their personnel could not access the site or
because they only spoke French or Haitian Creole7
(Altay & Labonte, 2014, p.
S60). This kept Haitian earthquake efforts separate from the international
community’s efforts, limiting the potential of local institutional knowledge to
contribute to planning and organisation. Many aid workers do not find it
necessary to know the society and culture in which they work; for many, it is
simply enough to “know development” (Ferguson, 1990, p. 260) or, in this case,
to “know disaster relief,” and do what they know how to do, rather than
utilising the best strategy for the local culture and climate (Altay & Labonte,
2014, p. S64). However by not prioritising local institutional data and
information, and using only imported knowledge, humanitarian aid workers
may have had a damaging impact.
It is possible that local institutional knowledge was ignored for many of
the same reasons that data, in general, was underutilised: it was considered too
difficult and too time-consuming. Utilizing local institutional knowledge
7
It is worth noting, however, that the despite the English-language title, the Rapid Initial Needs
Assessment for Haiti (RINAH) report was released in French (ACAPS, 2010).

64 Patrick Linton
requires foreign aid workers to liaise with local aid workers. Most foreign aid
workers spoke English, as the majority of them came from the United States
and Canada and used English as a lingua franca. Liaison would require finding
local personnel, hiring translators, and holding information-sharing meetings, a
time-consuming process. Alternatively, aid workers could rely on assumptions
based on prior knowledge from other projects. While this may prove to be
advantageous for the short-term, it can have a long-term detrimental impact,
may take longer (and therefore add greater financial cost) and beneficiaries
may not be satisfied with the aid received.
Beneficiary Feedback
It is important to include the feedback of beneficiaries at all stages of the
humanitarian aid process. Much like the utilisation of local institutional
knowledge, it can both empower the local population and provide useful data.
Of course, feedback alone is by no means transformative or a sign of
empowerment;8
it is, however, representative, giving a voice to those
communities that receive aid (Michener, 1998, pp. 2106-2107), and is also a
means of keeping humanitarian aid agencies accountable to the communities
in which they work.
A team of researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of
Public Health have conducted a series of medium-term surveys of beneficiaries
of humanitarian aid following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Kirsch, Leidman,
Weiss, & Doocy, 2012a), the 2010 floods in Pakistan (Kirsch, et al., 2013), and
other disasters (Kirsch, et al., 2012b). They found that beneficiaries were
8
A community following the will of an NGO certainly is not empowered (Michener, 1998). Nor
is one that is told what they need in order to be empowered; that is disempowering (Rahnema,
1992).

65
generally unsatisfied with the quality of aid that they had received; this is
consistent with trends that de Ville de Goyet (Information Gaps in Relief,
22-23) noted. Significantly, this is in contradiction to reports made by NGOs.
This contradiction can be attributed to differences in methodology.
Nongovernmental organisations rely on the support of donors in order to
continue to stay in business. Therefore, when electing which information to
include in yearly donor reports, NGOs opt to use indicators that represent
themselves in a good light.
The Johns Hopkins team (Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, & Doocy, 2012a)
found that Haitians who were still living in camps in January 2011, one year after
the earthquake, were much slower to recover than those who had returned to
living in neighbourhoods. Those still living in camps experienced a 56%
reduction in income, compared to a 35% reduction in income among those
living in neighbourhoods (p. 87). They also found that those still in camps were
of a lower pre-earthquake socioeconomic status than those who had moved
back to neighbourhoods (p. 87). These in-camp households, while more likely
to have received assistance, were still less economically secure than households
that returned to neighbourhoods (p. 92). Reports from NGOs are likely to have
mentioned that the NGOs continue to house and feed hundreds of thousands
of Haitians, but are unlikely to report that residents of their camps have fared
worse than those outside of the camps. More unsettling is that worldwide, the
number of people in internally displaced persons camps has been increasing, as
has the duration of their stay in these camps.
It is important to note that efficacy evaluations should not be based
solely on beneficiary surveys. Because many Haitians view foreign aid as one

66 Patrick Linton
collective agency, those interviewed may be referring to a combination of
projects rather than the specific project under evaluation (Ramachandran &
Walz, 2012, pp. 31-32). Furthermore, in top-down approaches to development it
is possible that beneficiaries respond in a manner that they believe aid workers
would want to hear, either portraying the aid as overly successful in an effort to
make aid workers look good and to keep them around, or as not successful
enough, to make it seem as though the aid work is not yet finished, in order to
continue receiving it (Michener, 1998, pp. 2112-2114; Johnson, 1999, p. 171).
The International Committee of the Red Cross did survey Haitians to
learn what their priorities were following the earthquake. Haitians were
reported as wanting jobs, income, and access to credit, as labour demand had
decreased (Kirsch, Leidman, Weiss, & Doocy, 2012a, pp. 85-86). Manuel Orozco
and Elisabeth Burgess (A Commitment Amidst Shared Hardship: Haitian
Transnational Migrants and Remittances, 2011, pp. 237-243), whose study
focuses on remittances of Haitians living abroad, suggest that access to
financial services is a key development tool.9
However, the humanitarian effort
did not focus sufficiently on financial and economic recovery. In fact, during
the March 2010 flash appeal at the International Donor’s Conference, Haiti had
requested $200 million in the category of “financial and economic recovery,
jobs”; it only received $12.8 million for this sector. Had beneficiary feedback
been taken into consideration by donor countries, the amount of money given
in this sector would have exceeded $200 million. It is also likely that Haitians,
9
Where the international humanitarian community failed to provide financial services, the
Haitian diaspora was able to step in. Orozco and Burgess found a ten percent increase in
remittances to Haiti in the wake of the 2010 earthquake (A Commitment Amidst Shared
Hardship: Haitian Transnational Migrants and Remittances, 2011, p. 226). Lundy also noted this
increase in remittances (Transnationalism in the Aftermath of the Haiti Earthquake:
Reinforcing Ties and Second-Generation Identity, 2011b, pp. 210-212). Orozco and Burgess see
the Haitian diaspora as playing an important role in the development of Haiti (A Commitment
Amidst Shared Hardship: Haitian Transnational Migrants and Remittances, 2011, pp. 243-245).

67
with renewed access to jobs, income, and credit, would have been able to
return to normalcy much more rapidly.
Conclusion
The recovery following the earthquake was largely a failure. While aid
workers did manage to save thousands of lives and provide food and shelter to
hundreds of thousands of Haitians, they failed to revitalise the economy of
Haiti. This can be attributed, at least in part, to three reasons: the overreliance
on NGOs, rather than the Haitian state, to coordinate the recovery process; the
failure to gather, utilise, and share appropriate data; and the failure to include
local institutional knowledge and the input of Haitian people. Improvements to
the timeliness, format, and platform of existing data collection would have
been likely to improve rates of utilisation and sharing of data in the
humanitarian aid response. Finally, the scale of mismatched aid in Haiti
indicates the importance of including beneficiary feedback at all stages in the
humanitarian aid process in order to ensure that disaster recovery is actually
being delivered.

68 Patrick Linton
Conclusion
The future of Haiti must be linked to the respect of the rights of
every single citizen.
- Jean-Bertrand Aristide, former president of Haiti
The 12 January 2010 earthquake known to Haitians as Goudougoudgou
had a devastating impact on Haiti, sending more than a million Haitians to
temporary settlement camps. Following the earthquake, generous individuals,
organisations, and governments donated over $6 billion of aid to the Haitian
people. However, the allocation of resources and personnel was not based on
data of evidenced need. Aid workers claimed that they were too busy saving
lives to worry about collecting data. It is probable that humanitarian aid
workers made decisions based on Western media pressure—this study
identified a strong correlation between media and donations—or based simply
on what aid workers knew how to do. A lack of prioritisation, utilisation, and
sharing of data and information led to the failure of the international
humanitarian effort. This failure is evidenced by the hundreds of thousands of

69
Haitians that remained internally displaced persons for several years after the
earthquake, rather than returning to normal life.
Following the hypothesis that media rhetoric directs aid, a discourse
analysis of the American and Canadian media’s coverage of the earthquake was
conducted. Six emergent themes were found: the needs of the earthquake
survivors, logistical problems in aid distribution, corruption and/or the Haitian
government’s inability to govern, stories focusing on Americans or Canadians
as heroes, reports of alleged looting and the potential for violence, and religion
(praising Christianity and demonising Vodou). The immediate material needs
of Haitians as portrayed by the media were only partially supported by the
RINAH report, and the media’s portrayal of needs matched the type of aid that
was distributed in Haiti in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. The
media’s coverage of logistical problems encountered in aid distribution also
proved to be accurate. The international community’s fears of corruption,
inefficiency, and poor governance mirrored the concerns expressed by the
media. Donor countries and organisations were reluctant to support the
government of Haiti; instead, they created their own plans for recovery and
gave their money to NGOs, completely circumventing Haiti’s 18-month
recovery plan. American and Canadian government aid focused on those
countries’ own economic interests more than the economic wellbeing of
earthquake-affected Haitians; American and Canadian “aid to Haiti” went
mostly to American and Canadian contractors, rather than providing the jobs
that Haitians desired. Unfounded speculation of looting and violence provided
the rhetorical public justification to the United States military to send thirty-
thousand troops to Haiti following the earthquake. Absent from the media (and

70 Patrick Linton
largely absent from the humanitarian effort in general) was the use of data in
the decision-making process and the input of Haitians themselves.
Had decisions about the direction of aid been based primarily on data
rather than on media pressure, assumptions, aid workers’ own knowledge, or
political agendas, Haiti may have had greater success in recovery. However, the
effective use of data requires good baseline data, standardisation of definitions
of terms such as ‘displaced’, consistency in the format in which the data are
held, and reliability of data. In order for this to occur, the collection and
sharing of data must be made a priority. In addition, in order to ensure
beneficiary satisfaction, the international humanitarian community must take
into consideration the input of the affected populations, as these are very
important data.
Throughout history, the Haitian people’s right to self-determination has
been repeatedly stripped away, from French colonial slavery to authoritarian
regimes to occupation by the US to more authoritarian regimes to modern-day
imperialism in the form of aid. Rather than being voted upon by the electorate,
Haitian planning decisions are made by the foreign NGOs that implement
large-scale projects, and thus by the donors that fund the NGOs. In the process,
Haitians are seldom consulted. Therefore, it is of little surprise that Haitians
expressed dissatisfaction with aid received post-earthquake. While Haitians
wanted jobs, income, and access to credit, the international donor community
paid little attention to economic recovery and instead emphasised the short-
term ‘needs’ suggested by the front pages of newspapers.

71
Recommendations
In the earthquake relief and recovery effort, the international and NGO
community’s decisions about the recovery process constituted an infringement
on Haitian sovereignty. In order to avoid this situation, countries should
maintain a record of aid supplies and personnel that enter the country after a
disaster, through their existing customs and immigrations services, by requiring
that all aid be declared upon arrival; this system has already been successfully
implemented in Guatemala since the 1980s. Countries should also require that
all aid organisations be registered with the government, perhaps in an existing
ministry that regulates businesses and non-profit organisations, with robust
reporting requirements that ensure that aid agencies collect standardised,
accurate data about their work.
Haiti was also unprepared to respond to the earthquake. Mitigation and
preparedness are essential in order to ensure minimal loss of life and property
in the event of a disaster. Port-au-Prince had become a death trap due to rapid
“urbanisation without industrialisation” (Gros, 2011, p. 142), was overly
centralised, and lacked sufficient disaster preparation (Pierre-Louis, 2011, p.
198). Thus built into recovery processes must be the establishment of
mechanisms of mitigation (such as enforcing existing building codes more
strictly) and preparedness (such as early warning systems and evacuation plans,
for example). A trained, local military would be the ideal unit to quickly deploy
aid (Gros, 2011, pp. 148-152). Geographic organisation, such as dividing the
country into postcodes or other similarly-sized units and giving street names
and house numbers to every building in the country would be one method of
facilitating the collection of baseline data, such as the number of households
expected to reside in each particular postcode. A collection of such baseline

72 Patrick Linton
data would be useful post-disaster in search-and-rescue efforts and supply
distribution.
Following a major disaster, developing countries, especially least-
developed countries (LDCs), may lack the capacity to respond themselves.
Because there may have been little to no mitigation or preparedness, these
disasters tend to be the worst disasters in terms of the number of lives lost and
the amount of infrastructural damage (Amin, Cox, & Goldstein, Using Data
Against Disasters: Overview and Synthesis of Lessons Learned, 2008, p. 1). In
the poorest countries, otherwise-typical day-to-day tasks may be prohibitively
costly; there is no room in the budget for disaster preparedness when there are
not even sufficient funds to educate and provide medical care for the
population. Instead, these countries live disaster-to-disaster. In such cases, it is
important for the international humanitarian community to intervene in order
to protect life. However, it is essential to intervene without infringing on the
sovereignty of countries.
This author proposes an international organisation responsible for the
collection of data, the storage of data, and the coordination and distribution of
aid, at the invitation of the disaster-affected country. This would not be a new
organisation, but a new function of existing United Nations agencies that
already have legitimacy and recognition in the area of humanitarian aid. The
Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) would be the obvious choice, as it is
the principal humanitarian aid coordinating body between UN organisations
(FAO, UNFPA, UNDP, UNOCHA, UN-HABITAT, WFP and the WHO, among
others) and non-UN partners such as the ICRC and the IFRC (McDonald &
Gordon, 2008, p. 59). Under this new mandate, the IASC (or an organisation
that it delegates) would regularly collect good baseline data in LDCs, such as

73
geography and demographics, at a precise level of disaggregation, before any
sort of disaster occurs. When a disaster does occur, there will be sufficient
information, such as where communities exist and how many people can be
expected to be found there.
When a disaster occurs, the head of government (or the acting head of
government) could request assistance in data collection (such as a rapid initial
needs assessment) to be performed by United Nations Disaster Assessment and
Coordination (UNDAC), data storage (in a central repository), and/or the
coordination of the distribution of aid. If data collection assistance is requested,
the IASC could work with its partners to survey the affected area, while
ensuring the use of consistent methods, measurements, and definitions. The
IASC, UNDAC, or the disaster-affected country would delegate villages or
neighbourhoods to partner NGOs for data collection in order to ensure that no
populated areas are overlooked and that resources are not wasted double- or
triple-surveying areas. These surveys would gather information such as (but not
limited to) building damage, survivor numbers and locations, and availability of
food and water, in a standardised format. This information would be stored in
the repository to be compared against baseline data.
If coordination in the distribution of aid is requested, aid organisations
that wish to help in aid distribution would be required to register with the
IASC, noting their supplies, personnel, and expected aid capacity. The supply-
registration requirement would ensure that it is known precisely what
resources are available and where they are. It would also avoid mismatches in
the donated supplies that arrive in a country after a disaster. Larger
organisations would be allocated villages or neighbourhoods in which to work,
and smaller organisations would be grouped and allocated areas in which to

74 Patrick Linton
work. Each organisation would be required to collect and submit standardised
data on their work, supply levels, and beneficiaries. The data that they would be
required to provide would not be simply measures of output, but more complex
measures such as impact, quality, and satisfaction.
Under this plan, policies must be implemented in order to respect the
sovereignty of the disaster-affected nation (as specified in the IASC’s mandate
by the third point in the “Guiding Principles” section of A/RES/46/182). First,
this assistance must only come at the request of the disaster-affected state.
Neither the IASC nor any states or organisation may enter uninvited, as the US
military did in its takeover of the Port-au-Prince airport. Secondly, the disaster-
affected state may choose those areas in which it desires assistance, and may
reject any proposals. Third, while the IASC may advise on the allocation of
resources, the government decides where it deems assistance necessary. This
would avoid the scenario in which Haiti found itself at the flash appeal,
wherein it had presented an 18-month budget detailing specific areas of focus
for recovery, but donor countries and organisations directed their money
toward other areas.
Giving the IASC the role of emergency surveyor and coordinator would
relieve the government of the disaster-affected country of the burden of
managing disaster relief on its own. Keeping the country’s government in
charge of decision-making regarding the allocation of aid resources and
personnel would ensure that the country’s sovereignty is not infringed upon.
Delegating disaster relief and recovery aid work to NGOs would ensure that
NGOs could continue to use their expertise, albeit more efficiently, with the
help of data. The partnership between the disaster-affected country, the IASC,

75
NGOs, and the international community, with the use of open, easily-accessible
data, would build transparency in the disaster relief and recovery process.
There are certain problems for which this proposal does not yet provide
a solution. This proposal does not solve the problem of NGOs and contractors
bringing in foreign products rather than purchasing local ones (although the
disaster-affected country could restrict or limit the import of food aid if it
determines that the local supply of food is enough, for instance). This proposal
also does not solve the problem of jobs, income, and access to credit for
disaster survivors, although the country could decide that a certain amount of
the resources be directed toward this. It would also be necessary to develop
means of data collection and reporting that would be compatible with the need
for urgency in the initial aftermath of a disaster.
Future Research
An interesting follow-up study would be an examination of the use of
data in the international relief and recovery efforts following the 2015
earthquake in Nepal. In the five years since the earthquake in Haiti, “big data”
and “open data” have become hot topics in business and government, and new
technologies have emerged allowing better analysis of data. It would be
interesting to see whether the actors working in the international humanitarian
response to the 2015 earthquake in Nepal utilised and shared data to a greater
extent than those who aided in the international humanitarian response to the
2010 earthquake in Haiti.
Another important future study would be an examination of ethical
issues surrounding the use of “big data” in the field of international
humanitarian aid. Just as people in the industrialised world have qualms about

76 Patrick Linton
questionable uses of big data, privacy, safety of personal information from
hackers, the characterisation of individuals into categories, et cetera (Martin,
2015), victims of disasters in developing countries may also hold reservations
about having their information stored in a database.
Closing Remarks
This research is of particular importance because as climate change
worsens, natural disasters are becoming increasingly common. When a disaster
strikes, kind-hearted individuals around the world donate their time, money,
and expertise to help those affected by the disaster. In recent years, there have
been great advances in information and communication technology that can
assist in making disaster relief and recovery more efficient, saving lives and
ameliorating outcomes for victims of disaster. However, these tools are being
underutilised in favour of discourse and political agendas. Knowing why data
are underutilised, and where they can be better utilised, is an important first
step in encouraging future humanitarian aid workers to use data to their—and
to their beneficiaries’—advantage.

77
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