Hebron-AContestedSpace

S i x t i n e
B e r q u i s t

S e n i o r
S e m i n a r

A p r i l
3 0 ,
2 0 1 4

Now
That
I
have
Seen,
I
am
Responsible:

Hebron,
a
Contested
Space

2

A
HISTORY
OF
THE
ISRAELI-‐PALESTINIAN
CONFLICT

In 1897, Theodor Herzl organized the First Zionist Congress and published a pamphlet
titled The Jewish State aimed at spreading the message of the Zionist movement for a Jewish
homeland. The Zionist movement aspired to live in Palestine “without fear of persecution and a
right to live without an air of distrust.”1
The 200 delegates present at the Congress organized
behind a plan to secure the Palestinian territory legally, organize the Jewish people behind their
cause, and gain international recognition.2
It was not until events following the Sykes-Picot
Agreement of 1916 that the Zionist cause would gain a foothold among the international
community. The Agreement divided the land controlled by the Ottoman Empire between the
English and the French. The French were promised control of Palestine at the end of World War
I, to the dismay of the British government. In the following year, the British troops found
themselves at the Palestinian border while the toils of warfare weakened the French troops.
Looking for a reason to enter the country, the Balfour Declaration was published and the
Agreement with France was broken. Therein, the British found an excuse to enter the country
without breaking an alliance and the Zionist movement gained Western support for their cause.3
In the year following WWI, a British Mandate was established in Palestine and Jewish
immigration began; albeit with significant restrictions on the number of immigrants allowed.
During the same period, the Arab world was organizing behind a movement of Pan-
Arabism to organize the umma.4
Feeling what can only mildly be described as discontent

1
Deviellier,
John
Michael
The
Balfour
Declaration
and
Its
Legacy
(Dominguez
Hills:

California
State
University,
1997),
7

2
Fishman,
Louis
Andrew
Palestine
Revisited:
Reassessing
the
Jewish
and
Arab
National

Movements,
1908-‐1914
(The
University
of
Chicago,
2007),
48

3
Devillier,
52-‐61

4
Muslim
term
used
to
describe
the
Muslim
community
at
large.
It
is
often
used
in
discourse

of
religious
unity
across
territorial
borders.

3

towards previous Western and Ottoman control, the Arab revolts began in the name of Arab
sovereignty and independence.5
Ultimately unsuccessful, the countries surrounding Palestine
found themselves vehemently opposed to the creation of Israel as it was seen as an extension of
Europe on Arab soil. Thus, they opposed negotiations when the United Nations recognized the
sovereignty of Israel in 1948. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Six-Day 1967 War was in further
opposition to the legitimacy of the Israeli state. However, this was not simply due to the mere
existence of Israel as a nation-state but because of the hardships felt by the neighboring countries
that had to accommodate for the influx refugees to their land.
The creation of the Israeli government opened the doors for mass Jewish immigration
fleeing from persecution around the world and hoping to reconnect with the diaspora in the
Promise Land. Thus, the previous Palestinians inhabitants of the territory were forced to
evacuate their homes and relocate. Many went to the West Bank where refugee camps from the
first wave of relocation still exist. After the 1967 war, many more were forced to relocate with
the new territorial boundaries drawn. Today, the West Bank is divided into three zones (A, B, C)
and the Israeli government shares control with the Palestinian Authority.
The Oslo Accords and the Camp David Summit, facilitated by the United States, aimed at
commencing/resuming negotiations and discussions between the Palestinians and Israelis.
Following the 1967 War, several peace talks occurred but did not come to any resolution. The
discussions that took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s were centered on the possibility of a
two-state solution with the issues of settlements, security from terrorism, and the right of return
at the forefront. Both sides agreed to make concessions on settlements and terrorism yet neither
met the standards they had previously agreed upon. Settlements continued to be built in the West

5
Choueiri,
Youssef
M.
Arab
Nationalism
–A
history:
Nation
and
State
in
the
Arab
World

(Oxford:
Blackwell
Pub.,
2000),

68

4

Bank and Arafat did not stop Hamas from attacking Israelis through bombings.6
The failed
negotiations, paired with the increased discontent of Palestinians led to the second intifada. From
2002-2006, bombings and retaliations from both sides created a state of terror for all people
involved. At its end, both sides were left even more threatened and ostracized from the other.
From this historical narrative, the position of Palestinians in the West Bank today
unfolds. Many still live in refugee camps, most have restricted movements within the
checkpoints, and most do not have the same access to basic resources like the Israelis do. They
are often live in a state of terror created by the IDF soldiers. There are indisputably Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and Jordan today from the first waves of Jewish immigration and those that
followed. Those refugees are given limited visibility on the global stage, yet arguably can at
least be constituted as refugees. While these external refugees face their own, legitimate
hardships, less voice or agency is given to the refugees still living within the West Bank as
internally displaced.
Outline
of
the
Paper

To understand the conflict in Hebron, the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be
understood. However, the city varies from the larger conflict on one key aspect: the claims over
Hebron began over religious identities principally, not ethnic ones. The religious assertions made
to Hebron has lead to a geopolitical struggle between Jews and Arabs, which has also lead to the
internal displacement of the Arab population in the city. This paper will examine the conditions
that have contributed to the internal displacement of Palestinians in Hebron through the
geopolitical contestations. First, the history of the city will be introduced to understand the origin
of the claims to the city, then the contested spaces will be examined from both narratives and

6
Shelef,
Nadav
G.
Evolving
Nationalism:
Homeland,
Identity,
and
Religion
in
Israel
,1925-‐
2005
(Ithaca:
Cornell
UP,
2010),
30

5

international decrees regarding internally displaced persons (IDP) and human rights will be put
in conversation with the conditions of Palestinians. Finally, the voice and agency of Palestinians
will be discussed in relation to the wall, the graffiti on it, and the international recognition it has
received. Responses to several questions will be examined: Are Palestinians in Hebron IDPs?
Have they contributed to this dislocation? Does this speak to the broader condition of
Palestinians in the West Bank? However, the ultimate goal of this paper is to examine whether
the geopolitics of Hebron have contributed to the internal displacement of Palestinians in the
city. If so, what is the outcome of the geopolitical conditions in regards to popular responses of
Israeli settlers and Palestinians? These questions will include discussions on human rights
infringements, the international recognition of the displaced, and the voice they are given.

METHODOLOGY

This paper aims to examine the state of the Palestinian inhabitants of Hebron and
determine if their situation may be described as one of internally displaced refugees. To this end,
the policies of the United Nations and the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees will
be discussed. Statistics on the number of IDPs have been taken from the Internal Displacement
Monitoring Centre, an organization that aims to present the facts regarding IDPs worldwide.
Furthermore, the works of Michel Agier and Terrence Wright will be utilized to further quantify
the position of Palestinians in Hebron.
In 1948, the United Nations published an International Bill of Human Rights as a part of
their larger charter. This document, signed by all member countries and to be followed by new
members hereafter lists thirty articles with the purpose of ensuring the protection of all human
rights globally. The articles 2, 3, 7, 12,13, 17, and 26 will be used in the discussion of the status

6

of Palestinian Hebronites.7
These articles discuss issues surrounding equal rights, discrimination,
as well as the freedom to privacy, pursuit of happiness, movement, property, and education. This
bill will be used as a base in contextualizing the lives of Palestinian Hebronites in regards to
international expectations of universal rights. Have their lives been consistently disrupted in
favor of Jewish settlers? Do they have claims to discrimination and oppression, or are their
conditions exaggerated?
The UNHCR has published a Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced
Persons that, for the purpose of this paper, will be used to qualify who can be regarded as an
internally displaced refugee (IDP). The general definition of an IDP is
Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee of to
leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or
in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and
who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border8
Furthermore, they are to be facing “displacement into inhospitable environments, where they
suffer stigmas, marginalization, discrimination, or harassment.”9

7
Article
2:
Equal
rights
“without
discrimination
on
the
basis
of
the
political,
jurisdictional

or
international
status
of
the
country
or
territory
to
which
a
person
belongs,
whether
it
be

independent,
trust,
non-‐self-‐governing
or
under
any
other
limitation
of
sovereignty.
Article

3:
Everyone
has
the
right
to
life,
liberty
and
the
security
of
person.
Article
7:
All
are
equal

before
the
law
and
are
entitled
without
any
discrimination
to
equal
protection
of
the
law.

Article
12:
No
one
should
be
subjected
to
arbitrary
interference
with
his
privacy,
family,

home
or
correspondence,
nor
to
attacks
upon
his
honour
and
reputation.
Article
13:

Everyone
has
the
right
to
freedom
of
movement
and
residence
within
the
borders
of
each

state”
“Everyone
has
the
right
to
leave
any
country,
including
his
own,
and
to
return
to
his

country.
Article
17:
No
one
shall
be
arbitrarily
deprived
of
his
property.
Article
26:

Everyone
has
the
right
to
education

From:
UN
General
Assembly
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights
(1948,
217
A
III)

8
Global
Protection
Cluster
Working
Group
Handbook
for
the
Protection
of
Internally

Displaced
Persons
(Global
Protection
Cluster,
2010),
8

9
Global
Protection
Cluster
Working
Group,
1

7

In 2004, the UN published Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. This document
aimed to increase the awareness regarding IDPs, support, and help governments in assuring their
security. This document describes IDPs as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced
or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence” 10
The principles in the
guidelines will be discussed in relation to the treatment of Palestinians by the Israeli government
and settlers. Principles 6, 8, 12,14,16,18, 19, 20, 21, and 23 will be focused on.11
The qualifications presented in these two legal documents outline the basic rights that all
persons are entitled to, as well as a contextualization of the argument that will be presented in
qualifying Palestinian Hebronites as IDPs. The contested spaces within the city will be put in
discussion with these documents to determine the effect of the geopolitics on the lives of Jews
and Muslims alike.

10
UN
Economic
and
Social
Council
(ECOSOC)
Guiding
Principles
on
Internal
Displacement

(2004),
1

11
Principle
8:
Displacement
shall
not
be
carried
out
in
a
manner
that
violates
the
rights
to

life,
dignity,
liberty
and
security
of
those
affected.
Principle
12:
Every
human
being
has
the

right
to
liberty
and
security
of
person.
No
one
shall
be
subjected
to
arbitrary
arrest
or

detention.
Principle
14:
Every
internally
displaced
person
has
the
right
to
liberty
of

movement
and
freedom
to
choose
his
or
her
residence.
In
particular,
internally
displaced

persons
have
the
right
to
move
freely
in
and
out
of
camps
or
other
settlements.
Principle

16:
All
internally
displaced
persons
have
the
right
to
know
the
fate
and
whereabouts
of

missing
relatives.
Principle
18:
At
the
minimum,
regardless
of
the
circumstances,
and

without
discrimination,
competent
authorities
shall
provide
internally
displaced
persons

with
and
ensure
safe
access
to
a)
Essential
food
and
potable
water.
d)
Essential
medical

services
and
sanitation.
Principle
19:
All
wounded
and
sick
internally
displaced
persons
as

well
as
those
with
disabilities
shall
receive
to
the
fullest
extent
practicable
and
with
the

least
possible
delay,
the
medical
care
and
attention
they
require,
without
distinction
on
any

grounds
other
than
medical
ones.
When
necessary,
internally
displaced
persons
shall
have

access
to
psychological
and
social
services.
Principle
20:
1)
Every
human
has
the
right
to

recognition
everywhere
as
a
person
before
the
law.
2)….the
authorities
concerned
shall

issue
to
them
all
documents
necessary
for
the
enjoyment
and
exercise
of
their
legal
rights,

such
as
passports….

Principle
21:
No
one
shall
be
arbitrarily
deprived
of
property
and

possession.
Principle
23:
Every
human
being
has
the
right
to
education

8

Michel Agier’s work in On the Margins of the World will further be utilized to define the
boundaries of persons found as refugees. His work is not particular to IDPs but must be regarded
for the precarious definitions of a refugee. More importantly, his work regarding ‘fame’ will be
discussed in the final section of this paper when examining the agency of Palestinian Hebronites
and the presence of the international community. Agier states that a refugee exists in a state of
limbo and has lost ability to define his identity. Limbo is explained as a physical and
metaphysical status where “the refugees are certainly alive, but they no longer ‘exist.’”12
This is
due to the physical relocation, often in the midst of a violent conflict, where a refugee loses “the
minimal symbols of community: material goods…social status…familiar environments…and
commonplace identity that lies at the basis of the everyday humanity of each inhabitant.”13
His
theory of fame revolves around the basic call for refugees to gain recognition in their plight.
Agier states that “testimonies are the premise for a collective voice, a stammered return to life.”14
He calls for the need of voice and agency to be given to refugees in order to remediate their
precarious existence in limbo. This entails contextualized recognition from the international
community in order for appropriate aid to be created for and received by the refugee.
Limitations
and
Disclaimers

It must be acknowledged that the research done for this paper was set back due to a
limitation on the material available. The principal problem came from acquiring significant
material on the Arab narrative regarding Hebron. Certainly, opinion pieces were available, but
few academic sources were available. Therefore, the statistics provided for the life of

12
Agier,
Michel
On
the
Margins
of
the
World:
The
Refugee
Experience
Today
(Cambridge,
UK:

Polity,
2008),
49

13
Agier
15

14
Agier,
75

9

Palestinians in Hebron and their dislocation, comes from one source. It also must be noted that
the Jewish perspective was well represented in first and secondary sources.
Furthermore, while researching works on IDPs in a broad sense, most dissertations found
on the subject would examine IDPs worldwide, while dedicating portions of their research on
various areas. Those sections discussing the Middle East, would not acknowledge the internal
displacement of refugees in Palestine or Israel.
Finally, this paper does not aim to propose a solution but to provide an argument for the
IDPs, in regards to the geopolitics and in order to expose the conditions in an internationally
invisible city. Hebron is prevalent in the Israeli discourse and has gained a considerable amount
of leftist support. Still, just as the conditions of Palestinians in general must be given more
attention abroad, so must the condition of Muslims in Hebron. This paper serves as a starting
point to the larger work I hope to do after graduation.
HEBRON:
A
CONTESTED
HISTORY

To examine the conditions of life in Hebron, a brief history will first be presented. In this,
the cultural and religious significance of the place will unfold, as well as why the claims to the
land are so precarious and central to the identity of both sides. The city, known as al-Khaleel to
Muslims and Chebron to Jews, can be traced back to biblical times, at the onset of the Jewish
tradition. Mentioned up to fifty times in the Old Testament, it was then called Kiriath Arba. 15
According to Jewish and Muslim tradition, Abraham arrived to Hebron and purchased the Cave
of Machpelah to be a burial ground for himself and his descendants. It is believed to be the place

15
Bishop,
Eric
F.
F.
Hebron,
City
of
Abraham,
the
Friend
of
God
(Journal
of
Bible
and
Religion,

1948),
14

10

where Isaac, Rebekah, Leah, Jacob, and Abraham are buried.16
Moses is said to have promised
control of the city to Caleb while King David saw it as the ‘City of Refuge’ and used it as the
capital of his kingdom before Jerusalem. For Muslims, the city is sacred because of its history
with Abraham and the Prophet Muhammad passed through the city on his night journey to
Heaven.17
With the change of rule over the city, Jews in Hebron face expulsion policies by both
Christian crusaders and Muslim rulers. However, there were still a fair number of Jews in
Palestine and Hebron during Ottoman rule of the territory. The internal clash of the city can be
marked as beginning the 1929 massacres, shortly after Jewish migration began to take hold. In
August 1929, the Western Wall riots began in Jerusalem and spread to Hebron and Safad.
Palestinian rioters began the violence as a way to “reinforce, redefine, or reestablish boundaries
marked in geographical space” 18
when the newly arrived Jews sought access and custody to the
Western Wall and Temple Mount. The riots killed 133 Jews and 116 Palestinians.19
The
population of Hebron was then 500-600 Jews and 16,000-17,000 Muslims. According to the
Muslims of Hebron at the time, the violence was not aimed at the traditional Jewish communities
they lived with but the new immigrants that aimed at changing the makeup of the country. Still,
it was also a reaction of Jewish expansion and territorial infringement on Muslim space from the
Jewish Quarter.20
Following the riots, the British Mandate and Jewish leadership elected to
evacuate all Jewish population from Hebron for the safety of the nation as a whole.

16
Bishop,
95

17
Bishop,
95-‐96

18
Winder,
Alex

“The
Western
Wall”
Riots
of
1929:
Religious
Boundaries
and
Communal

Violence
(Journal
of
Palestine
Studies,
2012),
8

19
Winder,
6

20
Winder,
8,
17

11

Until the Six-Day War, the city was largely free of Jewish influence while still living
under the control of developing Israel. Hebron was first re-entered by Jews during the war and
revoked the memory of the space for Jews within Israel proper. In 1968, a group of ten Gush
Emunim Jews were allowed to rent a hotel in the city during Passover, after which they were to
return to their homes in Israel. At the end of the ten days however, they refused to leave,
claiming that they were the rightful inhabitants of the territory. After extensive negotiations, they
were allowed to build a settlement on the outskirts of the town, it is today known as Kiryat Arba
and one of the most controversial settlements in the occupied territories.
The years that followed were wrought with tension and violence between both religious
groups. In the 1980s, Arab terrorists killed six Yeshiva students and in February 1994, Baruch
Goldstein, an inhabitant of Kiryat Arba, killed 30 Arabs at the Ibrahimi Mosque. This massacre
occurred during the Jewish tradition of Purim and Muslim tradition of Ramadan. Goldstein is
venerated by some of his Jewish followers. They believe his actions were in defense of scripture
that stated “the Jews smote all their enemies with the sword, slaughtering, and destroying them,
and did as they pleased to those who hated them.”21
Both of these violent massacres, in which
the two groups played key parts, are not only imbedded in the contested local narratives, but also
had real policy implications which shifted the power relations of the city and its inhabitants.
CONTESTED
SPACES

Hebron is divided into H1 (18 sq. km. with 115,000 Palestinians), controlled by the
Palestinian authority, and H2 (4.3 sq. km. with 35,000 Palestinians), controlled by the Israeli

21Excerpt
from
Esther
9:5
in
Paine,
Robert
Behind
the
Hebron
Massacre,
1994

(Anthropology
Today,
1995),
8

12

government.22
While H1 is much larger than H2, the latter includes the city center, the economic
hub of the city. Hebron is compromised by several territorial spaces that face contestation by
both groups.23
These include the Cave of Machpelah or al-Ibrahimi Mosque, the Kiryat Arba
Settlement, al-Shahada Street, and checkpoints. These will be discussed to construct the clashing
narratives along the geopolitical lines and claims to the spaces.
Cave
of
Machpelah
or
al-‐Ibrahimi
Mosque

The initial claim to the city, for both Jews and Muslims, begins at the burial ground of
Abraham. Jews believe Abraham’s purchase of the Cave provides them with the ultimate
religious right, as the Jewish faith largely developed around this site. While Muslims also lay
claim to the sanctity of a building purchased by ‘Ibrahim al-Khaleel Allah.’24
Today, both
Muslims and Jews share the Cave/Mosque in order to ensure some peaceful stability between the
two sides. It is important to note that while Palestinians have previously prohibited Jews from
entering the Cave, only allowing them to go up to the seventh step, IDF soldiers still allow
Muslims to attend services in their portion of the Mosque.

For Jews, their return to Hebron following the Six-Day war was to reconnect with this
sanctimonious space. Today, it is still used as a central part of the narrative. “For the Hebron
settlers, it became the core of their identity….the struggle over the Cave is not only about control
over the sacred site; it is in fact about the control over the history and, consequently, the future of

22
Fueurstein,
7

23
See
Figure
1
for
a
map
of
Hebron
and
the
division
of
space

24
In
Arabic,
al
Khaleel
is
a
term
signifying
the
highest
level
of
friendship
that
there
can
be

between
two
men.
This
supersedes
current
terms
of
best
friends
and
cannot
fully
be

translated
into
English.
Abraham
and
the
Prophet
Muhammad
both
have
“al-‐Khaleel
Allah”

following
their
first
names.
This
further
signifies
the
religious
importance
of
Abraham
and

the
mosque
to
Muslims
in
Hebron.

13

Hebron.”25
The Israeli settlers came to Hebron, and used the Cave of Machpelah as the center of
their identity with the city. This, however, was not a new identity according to them; instead they
were reconstructing their identity from that of the evicted Jews in 1929. They were building a
new place, within the old place to further legitimize their presence and continuing prosperity in
the area.26
This idea of reconstructing a new identity and a new future from the old Jewish
community was and continues to be central to the narrative claim of Jewish settlers.
For the Muslim community, the Mosque holds significant religious importance to their
narrative and constructed identity. The 1994 Goldstein massacre lies at the middle of the feeling
of oppression from Israeli occupation. However, the primary concern towards space for Muslim
Hebronites is not with the Mosque but with movement and homes, as will later be discussed.
Kiryat
Arba

The Jewish constructed identity surrounding the Cave of Machpellah explains the
creation and controversy of the settlement created to reconnect the Jewish people to the space.
The settlement of Kiryat Arba, was occupied by 7,5000 Jewish settlers as of 2012 and occupies a
precarious space of existence. Figure 2 features a map of Hebron; on it the placement of Kiryat
Arba is depicted as being on the outskirts of the town. This positioning of the settlement is
central to the identity of the settlers and the upcoming descriptions of Israeli actions to protect
Israeli interests and people as a primary objective. The location of the settlement was negotiated
alongside the larger negotiation of allowing Jews to inhabit Hebron. It was seen as being closer

25
Feige,
Michael
Jewish
Settlement
of
Hebron:
The
Place
and
the
Other
(The
Ben
Gurion

Research
Center,
2001),
326

26
Feige,
328

14

to the city than other settlements usually are, while still not occupying the city itself.27
The
settlement and the Cave of Machpelah are the principle motivators to reconstruct the old
community. In fact, settlers “symbolically re-engraved the tombstones of those who had died in
the 1929 massacre, and began to bury their own dead beside these historical markers as if to
demonstrate the continuity of the two communities.”28
A woman from Hadassah house, a small
settlement within the city stated, “we started at the Park Hotel and left the government building
intending to settle in Hebron, but we settled for Kiryat-Arba, which is actually Hebron, but not
really living inside the city of the Patriarchs.”29
This shows the ultimate goal to reconnect with
the ancient religious history and presence in the city. It also suggests that to gain control of the
space and ensure their security within, the settlers it will do anything. The combination of the
Cave of Machpelah and the settlement is ultimately a large reason for the displacement of the
Muslim populations in the city. From this, the shaping role of geopolitics into the conditions
present in the city today become, not only apparent, but extremely problematic in the contested
narratives of opposing sides.
Al-‐Shahada
Street

Due to the aforementioned claims to the Cave of Machpelah and the location of Kiryat
Arba, the central street in H2 has been the cause for dislocation and unrest. Al-Shahada Street is
quintessential to the discussion on Hebron’s geopolitics because of the restrictions placed upon
who may enter, but also because of the use of a massacre to further strengthen the Jewish
identity. The issues found on and surrounding this street that occupies a large space within the

27
Neuman,
Tamara
Reinstating
the
Religious
Nation:
A
Study
of
National
Religious

Persuasion,
Settlement,
and
Violence
in
Hebron
(Ann
Arbor:
The
University
of
Chicago,

2000),
5

28
Neuman,
6

29
Feige
from
Hevruta,
1986

15

city limits, can be used to contextualize the quintessential problem between Muslims and Jews.
For the settlers, Arabs do not have a justified reason for their presence within the city. Theirs “is
well explained, while the Palestinians presence is an enigma and a theological issue.”30
Instead,
the presence of Arabs is “seen as an historical accident, based on the contingency of the present
rather than on divine rights and historical grandeur.”31
This stands to reason that, since Arabs
have no legitimate right to presence, to force relocation and restrictions on movement is not
breaking their basic human rights. Instead, it is ensuring the safety of the rightful people in the
area. This is the reasoning that can be traced throughout the oncoming statistics of physical
relocation forced upon Arabs on and surrounding al-Shahada Street. In 2007 a study was
conducted by the Minister of Development Cooperation, Representative Office of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands, and associated with the organizations of B’Tselem and the Association for
Civil Rights in Israel. The study, titled Ghost Towns: Israel’s Separation Policy and Forced
Eviction of Palestinians from the Center of Hebron, looks at the forced displacement of
Palestinians in Hebron due to the aforementioned historical violence and claims to the space. The
findings were as follows.
Following the Goldstein Massacre of 1994, the Israeli government was afraid of the Arab
retaliation on Israeli settlers. Al-Shahada Street runs next to numerous internal settlements32
and
was the primary hub for economic activity and residential housing in the old part of the city.
Immediately after the massacre, vehicular travel by Palestinians was forbidden on the street.
Several years later and at the coming on the second Intifada, pedestrian movement was also
forbidden on the street. To ensure this policy was followed, checkpoints and roadblocks were put

30
Feige,
330

31
Feige,
330

32
See
Figure
2
(settlements
Beit
Hadassah,
Beit
Romano,
and
Avraham
Avinu)

16

in place with only Jewish inhabitants and foreign tourists allowed to pass through if proof of
identity if given. This separation is meant to ensure Jewish safety but the “area is the heart of the
Palestinian city, covers main streets, and includes thousands of Palestinian dwelling and
hundreds….of businesses.”33
The closing of the street goes beyond mere physical restriction. It
has “infringed their [Palestinians’] right to work and earn a livelihood, to health, education,
family life and social life, and to obtain basic services.”34
The closing of the street has closed
businesses, caused a loss of income, halted commercial activity. Furthermore, dislocation has
occurred from the closing of “all the entrances to the houses of residents along al-Shahada
Street.”35
Residents of the streets were forced to find alternate paths from rooftops of
neighboring houses or move out. In a 2006 study conducted by the researchers of the report,
1,014 housing units (41.9%) have been vacated since the Goldstein massacre and 65% of those
were from the second Intifada. 1,828 shops (76.6%) have been vacated since the Goldstein
massacre and 62.4% of those were from the second Intifada.36
With the option of moving out
being inaccessible to many of those residents due to economic circumstances, some still live in
apartments on the street and face daily difficulty in returning home.
The restrictions on movement have caused further problems with the health and
education of Palestinians. Checkpoints prohibit easy access to hospitals or exit from the city to
appropriate medical centers. Therefore, people are left to fend for themselves in instances of
medical emergency. For example, for an ambulance to cross from H1 to H2 to reach a patient, it
must coordinate entry with IDF soldiers, this “takes an average of forty-seven minutes to reach

33
Fueurstein,
Ofir
Ghost
Town:
Israel’s
Separation
Policy
and
Forced
Eviction
of
Palestinians

from
the
Center
of
Hebron
(B’Tselem
and
the
Association
for
Civil
Rights
in
Israel,
2007),
24

34
Fueurstein
,
25

35
Fueurstein,
25

36
Fueurstein,
14

17

the patient.”37
Restriction of municipal vehicles exists as well. Therefore, to repair problems with
electricity, water, or sewage can take several days and leave families without access to basic
amenities. Access to schools often requires the passing through checkpoints or finding an
alternate route to al-Shahada Street. Therefore, “pupils have had no choice but to use a long,
steep, and dangerous dirt road to reach the school.”38
Against the UN Human Rights Declaration and confirming their place as IDPs,
Palestinians in Hebron do not have access to privacy, to their person or their home. There are
regular searches of their person when passing checkpoints. Furthermore, searching of housing
has become routine. “The soldiers surprise the occupants at various hours, day and night, destroy
their daily routine, invade their privacy, and comb their private cabinets and personal
belongings.”39
According to the International Bill of Human Rights, Israelis are infringing upon
the human rights of Palestinians by not guaranteeing them equal rights without discrimination
through the restrictions on movement. Articles 12 and 17 are directly opposed by the forced
relocation of Palestinians through the legal barriers enacted. Palestinians are “subjected to
arbitrary interference with [their] privacy, family, [and] home….[and they are] arbitrarily
deprived of [their] property.”40
Meanwhile, on a broader sense, article 3 is opposed, as they do
not have a basic “right to life, liberty, and the security of person” by way of reduced economic
opportunity and limited access to basic amenities such as health, water, electricity, and
education. More specifically, the geopolitics surrounding al-Shahada Street qualify Palestinian
Hebronites affected as IDPs through opposition of the Guiding Principle of Internal
Displacement. In principle 6, they were “arbitrarily displaced from [their] home.” For principle

37
Fueurstein,
27

38
Fueurstein,
27

39
Fueurstein,
62

40
UN
General
Assembly
Universal
Declaration
of
Human
Rights
(1948)

18

14, they do not have freedom of movement or to choose their residence. While restrictions on
food, water, electricity, and education do not limit complete access, the constraints placed on al-
Shahada Street has limited the ease of access to these amenities and therefore slightly opposed
principles 18 and 23. More essentially, the amount of time an ambulance needs to reach ill
Palestinians in H1, directly opposes principle 19 that states all IDPs must “receive to the fullest
extent practicable and with the least possible delay, the medical care and attention they require.”
Finally and more succinctly, the geopolitical disputes opposes principles 8 and 21 which states
that peoples may become IDPS if they are “arbitrarily deprived of property and possession” and
if displacement occurs “in a manner that violates the right to life, dignity, liberty, and security of
those affected.” To address the status of IDPs more succinctly from these points and in
accordance to the definition given by the UNHCR; Palestinians have been obliged to leave their
homes as a result of armed conflict.41
They face violations of human rights and have not crossed
international borders. Therefore, if the parameters listed by the UN in regards to human rights
and IDPs are followed, the geopolitics of al-Shahada Street have created a life of internal
displacement for Palestinians in Hebron, more specifically and particularly, to the Palestinians
that lived and live on the Street itself.
The
Relationship
of
the
Spaces

The Cave of Machpelah/Ibrahimi Mosque, Kiryat Arba settlement, and al-Shahada Street
must be understood in relation to each other. To put it simply, the Cave/Mosque is at the center
of the constructed identity of Jews and Muslims. It was used by Jews to return to the space and
create the settlement on the outskirts of the city. Therefore, after Baruch Goldstein murdered 23

41
Specifically
this
conflict
can
be
regarded
as
the
1994
Massacre,
but
many
violent
acts

should
be
considered
to
be
contributing
factors.
They
are
the
1929
Massacres,
random
acts

of
violence
against
Jews,
and
the
first
and
second
Intifadas.

19

Arabs, not only did many Jews feel his actions warranted from their religious perspectives, but
they restricted access to al-Shahada street to ensure their own safety. Settlers do not feel moral
qualms for this limitation, but instead feel their actions are warranted, for the same reasons that
they have a greater right to inhabit the space. Therefore, their constructed identity has lead to
severe infringements on the human rights of Palestinians, as well as altered their lives into that of
internally displaced persons. While religion is the overarching reasoning for the conflict and its
outcome in the city today, the geopolitics of the space has created the inevitable changing of
circumstance for the Palestinians as the identities of both groups are largely grounded on the
spatial relationships to faith and community.

VOICE
AND
AGENCY

Michel Agier has stated that the ultimate form of liberty and regaining life for a refugee is
to reach fame. Fame is a term coined to signify the voice or agency that a refugee receives on his
or her plight is recognized. According to Agier, the displacement of refugees reduces their
humanity and identity as they are no longer surrounded by the same identification factors and,
therefore, no longer exist. Through the wall, Palestinians throughout the West Bank have tried to
regain a sense of control and make their voices heard. Once again, a spatial entity or territory is
used as a tool in the conflict to oppose the other side. Both Israelis and Palestinians try to
ascertain their own power through the wall, though ultimately, the Israelis continue to have the
upper hand.
The
Wall:
Separation
and
Voicelessness

Perhaps the greatest source of displacement and restriction comes from the Green Line
Wall on the outskirts of the city. Often compared to the Berlin Wall, this barrier is present

20

throughout the occupied territories as a way of restricting entering and exiting the city. This is
justified by citing numerous security infringements by the Palestinians, towards Israelis. The
wall represents a separation of Palestinians from what they regard as Palestinian land, not Israeli.
It separates them from the religious sites of Jerusalem, from reconnecting with their families,
from adequate educational and medical institutions, etc. There have been countless cases of
women giving birth at the checkpoint, sick children waiting in line for hours, men losing their
jobs for not being able to cross in a facile manner, and general unjust treatment by the IDF
soldiers.
These findings outlines the mentality of the Israeli government and show the ways in
which the UN decrees of international have been broken time and again, in the specialized
context of Hebron. It must be acknowledged that Hebron can be used to be more representative
of the West Bank as a whole, though it holds its differences. From a legal perspective, Israel’s
policy towards Hebron has been that of “ensuring the legitimate security interests of the
occupying power…[and] ensuring the needs of the civilian population in the occupied
territories.”42
Furthermore, the High Court in Israel has stated that the government “may infringe
the human rights of protected residents to protect the settlements or to enable various actions of
settlers in the occupied territory, and even destroy Palestinian property.”43
The Green Line Wall exists as a point of contention for Palestinians throughout the West
Bank. There are currently 99 fixed checkpoints44
and 643 checkpoints or military obstructions
(this includes trenches, roadblocks, and metal gates under Israeli control). 45
The Israeli
government began building the wall in 2002, due to the violence of the second Intifada. It has

42
Fueurstein,
68

43
Fueurstein,
71e

44
B’Tselem
Checkpoints,
Physical
Obstructions,
and
Forbidden
Roads
(2011)

45
Welcome
The
Wall,
www.stopthewall.org/the-‐wall

21

been build along the Green Line border from the 1948 armistice agreement and is approximately
180ft long.46
The project of the Wall is to be 400 miles long and encircle the whole area of the
occupied territories.47
The Palestinian opposition to the wall is more than its symbolic separation
but the limitations it creates for prosperity. According to the aforementioned UN Human Rights
Declaration, Article 13 is broken by the prevention of free movement. Arguably, Article 3 and 7
as well.48
More specifically, the principle difficulties lie around increase unemployment from
limited movement, prevention of harvesting olive trees and citrus, as well as increased difficulty
of accessing water resources.49
Political
Graffiti:
Assuming
control
over
marginalization

Due to its restrictive nature, the wall has become a way for the Palestinian people to gain
a voice in the international sector. Along the wall, there are messages from Palestinians and the
international community alike. The graffiti promotes peace, solidarity, and resistance. The
messages are largely written in English and signify that it is aimed at an international audience,
while other messages are used to “unify and inform local residents of resistance opportunities
such as weekly rallies of peace marches.”50
Reportedly, 90% of the messages are in English, 5%
from a European language, and 5% in Arabic or Hebrew.51
The themes of the graffiti range from
peace and freedom, to geopolitical messages, to terrorist claims.52

46
Olberg,
Steven
T.
Political
Graffiti
on
the
West
Bank
Wall
in
Israel/Palestine
(University
of

St.
Thomas,
2011),
7

47
Olberg,
8

48
Article
3:
Everyone
has
the
right
to
life,
liberty
and
the
security
of
person.
Article
7:
All

are
equal
before
the
law
and
are
entitled
without
any
discrimination
to
equal
protection
of

the
law.
Article
13:
Everyone
has
the
right
to
freedom
of
movement
and
residence
within

the
borders
of
each
state

49
Olberg,
10

50
Olberg,
13

51
Footnote,
53

52
See
figures
3-‐5
at
end
of
document

22

Michel Agier argues that refugees exist in a state of limbo, without identification factors
in their surroundings, and require fame to acquire agency and a change of status. Does the
graffiti on the wall give Palestinian Hebronites such fame? Over the years, have they gained
agency and changed their condition? What is the exact role of the graffiti? How should it be
regarded internationally now? Figures 4 and 5 feature an Arab pointing towards a jailed prisoner
caught in between the Arab and an Israeli Jew. It may be presumed that the Arab signifies an
extremist with the fashion of his kofiah while the Israeli is portrayed as an extremist from his
Ultra-Orthodox garment. The prisoner is caught in chains with a dove attempting to lift him out
of his position. Perhaps the most memorable part of the picture is not the political message of
the graffiti art and the recognition of wrong doing on each side, but the transposed graffiti on the
bottom half of the picture. It reads, “Now that I have seen I am responsible.” Herein lies the
importance of the wall and its graffiti. It shows citizens of the international community finding
solidarity with the Palestinians in Hebron and the other major cities blocked by the wall. It
exemplifies that the Palestinians are not completely mute in their struggle in general. However,
is this enough?
International
Recognition

Has the graffiti reached the international community and has it been effective in
transmitting the struggle and achieving change? The wall is well known internationally, but has
the messages affected or promoted change? In 2004, the International Court of Justice officially
decreed that the wall has “imposed substantial restrictions on the freedom of

23

movement…agricultural production…[and] access to health services, educational establishments
and primary sources of water.”53
The ICJ concluded that
“Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law;
it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the
wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and
around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated,
and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory
acts relating thereto…”54
However, the Israeli government elected to only “dismantle and relocate 30 miles of the most
contentious and encroaching portions of the Wall closer to the Green Line.”55
Upon the
completion of the wall, 78 Palestinian villages, with a population of 266,442 will be
dislocated.56
There are numerous articles on the subject of, and opposing, the wall. However, these are
mostly from Israeli newspapers such as Haaretz or Jerusalem post. Palestinian websites such as
stopthewall.org or electronicintifada.net strongly oppose the wall, describing it as an apartheid
wall. Basic google searches for ‘The Israeli wall’ do not yield any initial findings from Western
media. Searches for ‘The Israeli wall CNN’ provides two relevant articles from 2011 and 2004,
a search for ‘The Israeli wall BBC’ provides one relevant article from 2005. These simple
searches suggest that popular knowledge of the wall, outside of the Middle East, is minimal.
However, the ICJ ruling of 2004 and the TIPH program beginning in 1996, suggest that foreign
governments are aware of the problem surrounding the wall and the city of Hebron.
TIPH, or Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron, was established in
May 1996 as a result of the Oslo talks. The countries participating in this agreement are

53
International
Court
of
Justice
Legal
Consequences
of
the
Construction
of
a
Wall
in
the

Occupied
Palestinian
Territory
(The
Hague,
Netherlands,
2004),
11

54
International
Court
of
Justice,
15

55
Olberg,
11

56
Stop
the
Wall,
2

24

Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Still present within the city today,
TIPH personnel are to promote security and an environment conducive “to the enhancement of
the well-being of the Palestinians of Hebron and their economic development.” Furthermore, the
personnel are responsible for observing “the enhancement of peace and prosperity among
Palestinians.”57
Today, TIPH monitors are civilians employed by their respective countries to
promote peace in the city. However, according to the violence reports published by B’Tselem,
there is still a significant amount of violence within the city.
The actions listed by Western governments and organizations, suggest that Palestinians
have achieved some level of fame, in part due to the wall. However, there doesn’t seem to be
any results. The UN and other European countries have attempted to give recognition to the
struggle, principally through discussions on the wall. The US partook in the Oslo Accords and
the Camp David talks but was not able to come to any decisive solution. It seems that the
alliance between Israel and the US, even President Obama’s outspoken support through several
visits, has strengthened the Israeli resolve to maintain control in the same manner.
What
Comes
Next?

The wall has given IDP Palestinians some agency and fame, but has not brought to light
the condition of those in Hebron. The messages are general and call to the plight and occupation
at large but not that of the Hebronites. Furthermore, there may be too much dissimilarity
between the messages of the wall throughout the occupied territory and that of Hebron. The
geopolitics of Hebron are particular to that city as the IDPs within it are largely displaced from
the settlers, and not from the events of 1948 and 1967. While their dislocation and voicelessness

57
Israeli-‐Palestinian
Liberation
Organization:
Agreement
on
the
Temporary
International

Presence
in
the
City
of
Hebron
(TIPH)
and
Memorandum
of
Understanding
Between
Denmark,

Italy,
Norway,
Sweden,
Switzerland
and
Turkey
on
the
Establishment
of
TIPH
(International

Legal
Materials,
1997),
548

25

is apparent when the conditions are closely examined, the graffiti on the wall is not enough to
bring recognition and aid. Instead, the wall may have become a symbol of hope that is ultimately
failing.
CONCLUSION

Hebron is a city that has been at the center of religious discourse since the advent of the
Jewish tradition. Situated within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Hebron has been a marker for
the effects of group conflicts through the settlement of the occupied territories and the shifts in
power between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. The territorial markers
within the city, in relation to the religious narratives, have lead to an internal displacement of
Palestinian Hebronites. These primarily include the Cave of Machpelah/Ibrahimi Mosque, the
Kiryat Arba settlement, and al-Shahada Street. The spatial relations between these markers have
lead to legal restrictions on Palestinians, in order to ensure the continuing safety of Israeli
inhabitants. The relations between religious and spatial claims have internally displaced the
Palestinians in accordance to the UN International Bill of Human Rights and the Handbook for
the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons.
Prior to the discussions from April 23, 2014 surrounding an agreement between Hamas
and Palestinian Authority, it seemed that the possibility of reaching a peace agreement might
have been the necessary action needed for remediation. If a peace agreement were found,
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories would supposedly have been able to control their own
persons, mobility, future, and identity. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that after such a peace
agreement, Palestinians in Hebron would no longer be IDPs, after some time. However,
regardless of the possibility for resolution, the Palestinian people within and out of Hebron need

26

agency. The wall has not given them a strong enough voice to enact change. I cannot propose
the correct avenue to mediate this, however, greater awareness of the general conditions on the
ground must be spread before any change can begin.

27

Works Cited
1. Bishop, Eric F. F. “Hebron, City of Abraham, the Friend of God” Journal of Bibleand
Religion. 16.2 (1948): 94-99. Jstor. Web. 19 Feb. 2014
2. Choueiri, Youssef M. Arab Nationalism-- a History: Nation and State in the Arab World.
Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2000. Print.
3. “Checkpoints, Physical Obstructions, and Forbidden Roads.” B’Tselem. N.p. 16 Jan
2011. Web. 29 Apr. 2014.
<http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_ro
ds>/
4. Devillier, John Michael. The Balfour Declaration and its Legacy. Order No.1387240
California State University, Dominguez Hills, 1997. Ann Arbor: ProQuest. Web.
13 Nov. 2013.
5. Feige, Michael “Jewish Settlement of Hebron: The Place and the Other” The Ben Gurion
Research Centre. 53.3 (2001): 323-333. Jstor. Web. 19 Feb. 2014
6. Fishman, Louis Andrew. Palestine Revisited: Reassessing the Jewish and Arab National
Movements , 1908-1914. Order No. 3262233 The University of Chicago, 2007.
Ann Arbor: Proquest. Web. 27 Oct. 2013
7. Fueurstein, Ofir. Ghost Town: Israel's Separation Policy and Forced Eviction of
Palestinians from the Center of Hebron. Rep. Trans. Zvi Shulman. Association
for Civil Rights in Israel, May 2007. Web. Feb. 2014.
<http://www.btselem.org/download/200705_hebron_eng.pdf>. Also published in
cooperation with B'tselem
8. Global Protection Cluster (GPC), Handbook for the Protection of Internally Displaced
Persons, June 2010
9. “Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization: Agreement on the Temporary International
Presence in the City of Hebron (TIPH) and Memorandum of Understanding
Between Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey on the
Establishment of TIPH” International Legal Materials. 36.3 (1997): 547
550.Jstor. Web. 19 Feb. 2014
10. Neuman, Tamara. "Reinstating the Religious Nation: A Study of National Religious
Persuasion, Settlement, and Violence in Hebron." Order No. 9990579 The
University of Chicago, 2000. Ann Arbor: ProQuest. Web. 12 Feb. 2014.
11. Olberg, Steven T. "Political Graffiti on the West Bank Wall in Israel/Palestine." Order
No. 3447768 University of St. Thomas (Minnesota), 2011. Ann
Arbor: ProQuest. Web. 12 Feb. 2014.
12. Paine, Robert. “Behind the Hebron Massacre, 1994.” Anthropology Today. 11.1 (1995):
8-15. Jstor. Web. 19 Feb. 2014
13. Shelef, Nadav G. Evolving Nationalism: Homeland, Identity, and Religion in Israel,
1925-2005. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2010. Print.
14. UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, 2004
15. UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217
A (III)
16. “The Wall.” Welcome. N.p. n.d. Web. 29 Apr. 2014. <http://www.stopthewall.org/the
wall>.

28

17. Winder, Alex. "The "Western Wall" Riots of 1929: Religious Boundaries and Communal
Violence." Journal of Palestine Studies 42.1 (2012): 6-23. ProQuest. Web. 11
Feb. 2014.

29

Figure
1
-‐
Map
of
Hebron
showing
the
distribution
of
land
between
H1
and
H2

30

Figure
2
-‐
Map
of
Hebron
focusing
on
H2
and
showing
the
restrictions
on
movement

31

Figure
3
-‐
Graffiti
on
the
Wall
outside
the
city
of
Hebron,
West
Bank

32

Figure
4
-‐
Graffiti
on
the
wall
outside
the
city
of
Hebron,
West
Bank

33

Figure
5
-‐
Graffiti
on
the
wall
outside
the
city
of
Hebron,
West
Bank

Hebron-AContestedSpace

More Related Content

What's hot (20)

Viewers also liked (11)

Similar to Hebron-AContestedSpace (6)

Hebron-AContestedSpace