IAFF6101Interna-onalAffairsCornerstone Lecture4Co.docx
- 1. IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone Lecture 4: Construc.vism September 20, 2016 Today’s Class • Review Liberalism • Introduc.on to Construc.vism • Structural Construc.vism • Norms and Construc.vism – Effects of Norms – Causes of Norms • Iden.ty and Status Concerns Neoliberal Ins-tu-onalism • Primarily a structural theory – Keohane emphasized that neoliberalism is built on the same core assump.ons as structural realism • Anarchy, states, ra.onal unitary actors • Different conclusions
- 2. – Significant coopera.on is possible under anarchy – Interna.onal ins.tu.ons are the key • Ins.tu.ons: “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain ac.vity, and shape expecta.ons” (Keohane 1989, 3) • Key func.on of ins.tu.ons = informa.on and monitoring Economic Interdependence Theories Interna.onal commerce and tradeè Fewer incen.ves for conflict and war • Nosingle theory, but rather a lot of poten.al causal mechanisms linking interdependence and peace – Opportunity costs – Crea.onof domes.c cons.tuencies opposed to war – Signaling mechanism – Globaliza.on of produc.on reduces benefits of conquest – Middle ground: expecta.ons about future trade Democra-c Peace Theories Stable, mature democracies do not fight wars against
- 3. each other • Again, no single theory, but lots of theories o Costs o Norms • Respect for individual rights/autonomy • Non-violent conflict resolu.on o Ins.tu.ons • Public/group constraint • Slow mobiliza.on/surprise a_ack • Democra.c war-figh.ng Liberal Theories and Levels of Analysis 1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image Liberalism Democra.c Peace Interdependence Ins.tu.onalism Interdependence 3 Philosophical Tradi-ons
- 4. • Construc.vism – Emphasizes role of ideasand iden.ty – as opposed to material power and interests – Norms of appropriate behavior Ra-onal Choice Theory • Desire (interest) + Belief (idea) è Ac.on • Hunger + Belief that hunger can be sa.ated è Go to 7/11 • Desire/interest = Key driver of behavior Realism Example • Anarchy • States = main actors = like units • States want to survive • Interests = fixedand unchanging (exogenous) = maximize security • Iden.ty nowhere to be found
- 5. Neoliberalism Example • Anarchy • States = main actors • States want to survive • Interests = fixedand unchanging (exogenous) = maximize absolute gains from coopera.on • Coopera.on does not change state interests or iden..es The Construc-vist Take • Few interests actually based in material needs; most are learned/socialized into us • Most interests are in fact ideas– ideasabout how to meet needs – Most ideasabout how to meet needs dictated by iden.ty • “Rela.vely stable, role-specific understandings and expecta.ons about self” (Wendt 1992, 397) – Iden..es= basisof interests • Iden.ty è Interests/Desires è Belief/Idea
- 6. è Ac.on The Construc-vist Take, Pt. 2 • Iden..es have norms associatedwith them – prescrip.ons for behavior – Example: “civilized” states don’t use weapons that cause superfluous harm, like Dum Dum bullets • Iden.ty è Norms è Interests/Desires è Belief/Idea è Ac.on The Construc-vist Take, Pt. 2 • Our views of others’ iden..es also affect our behavior – Example: Policeman, President Knapp Wendt vs. Waltz • Waltz: Anarchy has a single logic, forces states to compete, rely on self-help • Wendt: Self-help does not flow from anarchy
- 7. Wendt vs. Waltz • Waltz: Anarchy has a single logic, forces states to compete, rely on self-help • Wendt: Self-help does not flow from anarchy • First encounter – Aliens – Not ra.onal to assume the worst just because you don’t have 100% certainty about inten.ons • Same goes for first encounters in the state of nature • “Predators” (i.e., greedy states) can generate self- help and compe..on– but this is not an inevitable product of anarchy Wendt and Structure • Waltz’s concep.on of structure = underspecified • Adds iden.ty and interests: knowledge and ideas that states have about each other • Material capabili.es don’t speak for themselves – given meaning by ideas – North Korean (enemy) nukes vs. Bri.sh (friend)
- 8. nukes Different Kinds of Anarchies • Anarchy of “enemies”looks very different from anarchy of “friends” • Hobbesian/Compe..ve: Self-help (Realism) • Lockean/Individualis.c: Self-help (Neoliberal) • Kan.an/Coopera.ve: NOT Self-help – Collec.ve security – A world of all liberal democracies? Structural Change • Prospects for change: not easy,but possible • Big example = Gorbachev – Transforma.ve prac.ces • Try to convince West that Soviet iden.ty was changing – Try to persuade West to adopt more coopera.ve stance • “Altercas.ng” Structural vs. otherConstruc-visms
- 9. • Wendt = structural (3rd image) construc.vist – Interac-on è Iden.ty è Interests è Behavior • Leaves open the possibility that things inside states are more important driver of iden..es and interests than interac.on between states • Hard to put into prac.ce Norms • Shared expecta.ons about behavior • Standards of right and wrong • Prescrip.ons or proscrip.ons for behavior, for actors with certain iden.ty Norma-ve Effects, 1 • Regula-ve – Viola.ng norms imposes a cost – S.ll follows logicof consequences – Only type of norma.ve effect you can have in realism or neoliberalism Norma-ve Effects, 2 • Substan-ve/cons-tu-ve – normhas taken-
- 10. for-granted character, cons.tutes iden.ty – “This is just wrong” – “We don’t do things like this” – Logic of appropriateness • Norm è Iden.ty è Interest è Behavior Norma-ve Effects, 3 • Permissive – normagainst one thingcreates more permissive environment for another thing Effects of Norms: Tannenwald • “Taboo” against the use of nuclear weapons • Reasonsfor doubt? – Wars of choice – low interests engaged – U.S./NATO first use doctrine in Europe – Li_le evidence of taboo among public Origins of Norms • Power + Principle – Norm vs. assassina.on (Ward Thomas) – Convergenceof principle with interests of powerful states – Leadersnot appropriate targets – Norm under stress?
- 11. • Graoing – Norm adopted against the wishes of powerful states (Richard Price) – Graoing of effects of weapons onto normagainst “indiscriminateness” – Appeal to “civilized” iden..es vs. “barbarism” • Chemical weapons post-WW1 • Land mines – highlights role of individuals Status Seeking • What’s the problem for China and Russia? – They seek recogni.on as greatpowers – Goal = “to restore both countries’ greatpower status” (p. 66) • In otherwords, they have an “iden.ty crisis” – Either they used to be GPs and seek to restore that status… – …or they self-iden.fy as GPs and seek recogni.on of that status • Iden.ty/status is understood as posi.onal – There is a hierarchy, and you want to move up in the world
- 12. Why Seek Status? • Individuals (states) desire self-esteem • Individuals (states) derive self-esteem from group membership • Individuals (states) want their group to have a posi.ve iden.ty • Posi.ve iden.ty is obtained via comparison to others Status-Seeking Strategies • Social mobility – Seek acceptance into the elite group by imita.ng its norms, prac.ces, joining its ins.tu.ons – Only possible if boundaries are permeable • Social compe..on – Compete with leader(s) in area on which its superiority rests (e.g., arms race) – When boundaries are impermeable • Social crea.vity – Don’t try to change exis.ng hierarchy, but seek pres.ge in a different area altogether • Turn a nega.ve into a posi.ve
- 13. • Find a new dimensionon which you are superior – Has to be recognized as validby dominant group • If not recognized, compe..onensues China and Status • Compe..ve up to mid-1990s • Social crea.vity – Responsible greatpower – Recognized by U.S.:“responsible stakeholder” • What about now? Russia and Status • Social mobility into mid-1990s • Social compe..on, 1996-1999 – NATO expansion – But too weakto ma_er – “Zaire with permafrost” • Social crea.vity, 1999- – 9/11: Pu.n cooperates with U.S. – But not recognized by U.S. as an equal • Return to social compe..on, mid-2000s
- 14. IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone Lecture 3: Liberalism September 13, 2016 Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism • Introduc;on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism • Economic Interdependence • Democra;c Peace Theory Structural (Neo) Realism • Key assump;ons: anarchy, states, survival, uncertainty • Structure of the system induces compe;;ve behavior, balancing, imita;on • Even defensively mo;vated states can end up in compe;;on
- 15. • Maximize security, not power, because: – States balance against power – Security dilemma Offensive Realism • Same basicstar;ng assump;ons • Different key predic;on: states maximize rela;ve power • SD = unavoidable; states have no choice but to compete • All GPs bid for regional hegemony • But isn’t maximizing power irra;onal if you know the SD exists? Defensive Realism • Same star;ng assump;ons, but portrays a less compe;;ve world where coopera;on is not only possible, but some;mes a beTer routeto security than compe;ng • Emphasis on the SD, but SD can vary in intensity
- 16. • Offense-defense balance causes the SD to vary • ODB determined by technology and geography Mo-va-onal Realism Builds on defensive realism in two ways: • Introduces varia;on in state type – Greedy/revisionist – Security-seeker/status quo • Introduces informa;on variables – Your informa;on about adversary’s type – Your informa;on about adversary’s beliefs about your type – Informa;on is generated through signaling Hegemonic Realism • Preponderance = peace • Balance = war • “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.”
- 17. • Preven;ve war The Bargaining Model • Three ra;onal explana;ons for war: – Private info and incen.ves to misrepresent – Credible commitment problems – Issue indivisibility 1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image Realism Human nature/ Classical Mo;va;onal/ Neoclassical Neorealism Offensive Defensive
- 18. Hegemonic Bargaining model Realism and Levels of Analysis What Unites Realists? • Emphasis on structure of system, defined in material terms • Emphasis on states as main actors • Ra;onality • Security dilemma • Ins;tu;ons – interna;onal or domes;c – play liTle role What Divides Realists? • What comprises structure – Power – Power + ODB • Interpreta;on of the security dilemma – Highly constraining – Not constraining • System structure most conducive to peace, stability – Unipolar/hegemonic vs. bipolar vs. mul;polar
- 19. • Varia;on in state type – All seek security – Some seek only security, someseek things beyond security Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism • Introduc-on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism • Economic Interdependence • Democra;c Peace Theory The Kan-an Triad • Republican cons;tu;ons (liberal democracy) • Interna;onal law and organiza;on • Cosmopolitan law (free trade) Wilsonian Liberalism • Make the world safe for democracy
- 20. • League of Na;ons • Removebarriers to trade The Liberal Tradi-on in America • U.S. presidents tend to be liberal interna;onalists – Promote democracy • More or less forcefully – Work with mul;lateral ins;tu;ons • Bush excepted – Support free trade • NAFTA, TPP • Hillary Clinton? • Donald Trump? Dueling Anarchies Realism • Anarchy: life is nasty, bru;sh, and short Liberalism • Anarchy: individuals have rights, should not violate
- 21. rights of others Liberal Assump-ons • Anarchy, but state of nature ≠ state of war • Interstate rela;ons not zero-sum • Coopera;on is possible • States differen;ated by internal characteris;cs • States have aims that go beyond security è In sum, anarchy does not preclude beneficial coopera;on and stable, peaceful rela;ons. Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism • Introduc;on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins-tu-onalism • Economic Interdependence • Democra;c Peace Theory Neoliberal Ins-tu-onalism
- 22. • Primarily a structural theory – Keohane emphasized that neoliberalism is built on the same core assump;ons as structural realism • Anarchy, states, ra;onal unitary actors • Different conclusions – Significant coopera;on is possible under anarchy – Interna;onal ins;tu;ons are the key Defini-ons and Types • Ins;tu;ons: “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain ac;vity, and shape expecta;ons” (Keohane 1989, 3) – a.k.a., regimes • Possible forms/types – Can include a formal organiza;on (NATO, WTO, IMF), but need not – Alliances – Arms control agreements – Trade deals – Regimes, which can include broader understandings, norms, decision-making procedures • NPT regime: includes NPT, but also addi;onal ins;tu;ons, normagainst prolifera;on
- 23. Player 2 KeepQuiet (Cooperate) Rat (Defect) Player 1 KeepQuiet (Cooperate) Good, Good Worst, Best Rat (Defect) Best,Worst Bad, Bad By doing what is individually ra;onal, both players get a worse outcome than they could have goTen by coopera;ng Prisoner’s Dilemma
- 24. Coopera-on in a Neoliberal World • Chief obstacle to coopera;on = (fear of) chea;ng • How to alleviate this obstacle? • Itera;on • Reciprocity • Monitoring and verifica;on Providing Informa-on: Chea-ng • A key func;on played by ins;tu;ons is providing informa;on • Ins;tu;ons usually lack enforcement capability • Anarchy is lem unchanged • Provide informa;on about state behavior • Reduces barriers created by collabora;on problems, poten;al for chea;ng • Effec;ve monitoring reduces the risks of being cheated • Examples: U.S.-Soviet arms control; NPT—IAEA inspec;ons; Iran nuclear agreement Providing Informa-on: StateType
- 25. • Ins;tu;ons can also provide informa;on about state type • Uncertainty about type = key problem in realism, helps fuel the SD • State can gain a reputa;on via coopera;on in an ins;tu;ons of being a trustworthy type • Mechanism: costly signaling • Forego threatening forces • Reducing your ability to cheat à security seeker • Constrain ability to use forces you have – seeking UN authoriza;on • Enhance credibility of commitments Establishing a Nego-a-ng Forum • Reduces costsof beginning nego;a;ons • Create shared set of understandings, terminology • Arena to learnabout/resolve others’ concerns • Help resolve issues that arise later, unforeseeable at the ;me ins;tu;on is created
- 26. IssueLinkages • Creates linkages across issues that make deals more feasible • States may have incompa;ble preferences over a single issue • Broadening the issues being bargained over,linking them, can facilitate agreements • Side payments: climate change example Neoliberal-Realist Debate • There was—and con;nues to be—debate between realists and neoliberals • Some debate was unproduc;ve b/c it was based on argumentsthat were wrong • Realismpredicts only compe;;on, not coopera;on • Some debates ini;ally seemed stark, but evolved as both sidesmoderated their posi;ons • Rela;ve gains Neoliberal-Realist Debate, 2 • The big debate con;nues to be over establishing the independent effect of ins;tu;ons
- 27. • The standard realist response is that ins;tu;ons are an effect, not a cause • Ins;tu;ons reflect the balance of power • The same factors that make coopera;on likely also cause ins;tu;ons Ins;tu;ons Structure Coopera;on • Ins;tu;ons are “endogenous” to structure – NATO example 王钊 Neoliberal-Realist Debate, 3 • Defensive/mo;va;onal realist response – Yes, signaling is important, but ins;tu;ons are not especially important for this • Signaling can some;mes be done unilaterally • Under somecondi;ons, ins;tu;ons might help, but are by no means the only (or most important) method of signaling Neoliberalism and the Rise of China
- 28. • Mostly op;mists • China has joined someimportant ins;tu;ons – WTO – NPT – 6-party talks on DPRK nukes • Westernliberal order open to China and capable of accommoda;ng it (Ikenberry) Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism • Introduc;on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism • Economic Interdependence • Democra;c Peace Theory Economic Interdependence Interna;onal commerce and tradeè Fewer incen;ves for conflict and war • Nosingle theory, but rather a lot of poten;al causal mechanisms linking interdependence and peace
- 29. Opportunity Costs • High levels of interdependence è High opportunity costsfor war – Not only have to pay the costsof figh;ng – Also lose the benefits you would have gained from trade – Develop a stakein trading partner’s well-being Domes-c Cons-tuencies • High levels of interdependence è Crea;on of domes;c cons;tuencies that oppose war – Exporters will lobby the government to resolve disputes peacefully Costly Signals • High levels of interdependence è Costly signal of state’s resolve – If war is caused by private informa;on, threatening to hurt your own well-being by
- 30. cuqng off beneficial tradeis a way to signal resolve in a dispute Globaliza-on of Produc-on • Globaliza;on of produc;on è Great power peace (Brooks 2005) – Supply chain is spread around the world – Aggressors cannot capture and exploit modern MNCs – Reduces cumula;vity of resources, discourages aggression Realist Responses • Trade dependence creates vulnerability – States are inclined to expand to reduce it, which increases probability of war – States are especially concerned to control key resources, e.g., oil • Security concerns dwarf economic ones – Even if tradebrings largebenefits, it will not outweigh benefits of a war that increases security • Trade that results in rela;ve losses (even if absolute gains)
- 31. is undesirable b/c it reduce state’s rela;ve power Synthesis:Trade Expecta-ons Theory • What maTers is not current levels of trade, but expecta;ons about future trade • States with high levels of tradecan s;ll go to war – if they expect tradecut off in future • Key = costsof adjustment – Once you specialize, become dependent, costsof cut off increase, worse than if you remained autarkic • For China – Trade currently high with U.S.—but what if Trump wins? – Increasing dependence on imported natural resources Today’s Class • Quick Review of Realism • Introduc;on to Liberalism • Neoliberal Ins;tu;onalism • Economic Interdependence
- 32. • Democra-c Peace Theory Democra-c Peace • Democracies fight just as many wars as otherregime types • But democracies don’t seemto fight each other Democra-c Peace? • Controversial cases • U.S. CivilWar, 1861-65 • Spanish-American, 1898 • Anglo-Boer, 1899-1902 • U.S.-Filipino, 1899-1902 • World War I – was Germany a democracy? • Finland in World War II • Kargil, 1999 • Russo-Georgian, 2008 • Data problems • Few democracies + few wars, esp. pre-WW2 • Alterna;ve explana;ons for inter-democra;c peace during Cold War • Does democracy cause peace, or does peace cause democracy?
- 33. Costs • Becausethe people pay the costsof wars, they are reluctant to fight them – Problem: democracies have fought lots of wars! – Problem: some;mes the people are gung-ho for war! Norms • Leaders socialized to norms of peaceful conflict resolu;on in domes;c society; externalize those norms in foreign rela;ons – Individual rights, non-interven;on – Non-violent conflict resolu;on – compromise, nego;a;on, media;on – “Con;ngent consent” Norms, 2 • Leaders socialized to norms of peaceful conflict resolu;on in domes;c society; externalize those norms in foreign rela;ons • Other democracies warrant trust and respect,
- 34. non-interven;on; autocracies do not – In permanent state of aggression against own people – Aggressive internally, aggressive externally Norms: Problems? • Other democracies warrant trust and respect, non- interven;on; autocracies do not – Problem: Covert Ac;on – Problem: Imperialism Ins-tu-ons • Leaders are accountable to the public via elec;ons, must heed their wishes to get reelected – Public/group constraint • Problem: predicts fewer wars in general – Slow mobiliza;on/surpriseaTack • Problem: democracies have launched surprise aTacks – Democracies fight harder • Problem: why do autocracies aTack democracies?
- 35. Liberal Theories and Levels of Analysis 1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image Liberalism Democra;c Peace Interdependence Ins;tu;onalism Interdependence IAFF 6101 Interna-onal Affairs Cornerstone Lecture 2: Realism September 6, 2016 Today’s Class • Classical (Human Nature) Realism • Structural (Neo) Realism – Offensive – Defensive • MoBvaBonal & Neoclassical Realism – DisBnguishing thesefrom non-realist theories • Hegemonic Realism (a.k.a. power transiBon theory)
- 36. • The Bargaining Model Classical (Human Nature) Realism • Cause of conflict is the lust for power rooted in human nature – Animus dominandi, the will for power • PoliBcs = the compeBBon for power • Acknowledged that internaBonal system = anarchic, but emphasized individual human nature • Problem: conflict varies, but human nature doesn’t – Hard to explain variaBon with a constant Structural (Neo) Realism: Assump-ons • About the System – System = Anarchic • About Units – States = main actors – States = like units – States = unitary raBonal actors – States want to survive … – …but are uncertain about others’ intenBons
- 37. A NeorealistWorld • CompeBBon for power • Self-help • Fear and mistrust • PotenBal for cheaBng makes cooperaBon dangerous • RelaBve gains concerns further inhibit cooperaBon • CooperaBon = temporary – No enduring friends, only enduring interests A NeorealistWorld, cont. • Security Dilemma – Increase in your security decreases security of others • Maximize Security, not power – because states balance, maximizing power triggers SD – Balancing is dominant tendency in the system – States balance against power, don’t bandwagon with it � Seek an “appropriate” amount of power • States balance in two ways: – Internal(arms build-ups)
- 38. – External (alliances) • Balance = good; imbalance = bad • Bipolarity > MulBpolarity Neorealism: Rise of China • Growth in Chinese capabiliBes induces fears in others – U.S.,regional powers • PotenBal for SD • Return to bipolarity • Peace preserved by nuclear weapons, but plenty of compeBBon – a new Cold War Offensive Realism • Similar starBng assumpBons – Anarchy – Offensive capability – Uncertainty – Survival – RaBonality • Predicted behaviors – Fear – Self-help – Maximize rela:ve power
- 39. • Hard to determine what an “appropriate” amount of power is • Best way to survive is to acquire as much power as possible • Power accumulaBon only stopswhen states become hegemons – global or regional? – Work to prevent others from becoming regional hegemons Offensive Realism, cont. • SD = unavoidable; states have no choice but to compete • States don’t always balance – opens the door to try to max. rel. power – Want to get others to pay the priceof containing rising powers – Buckpassing common in mulBpolar systems • How powerful the rising power is • Geographic proximity of balancers Offensive Realism: Rising China • CompeBBon is unavoidable
- 40. • China will pursue regional hegemony • China will compete intensely with the U.S. • U.S. will compete to retain its posiBon • War is not unlikely Defensive Realism • Same basicstarBng assumpBons, but portrays a less compeBBve world where more cooperaBon is possible – Anarchy – States – Unitary actors – RaBonality – Survival/security-seeking � Bofom-line: The internaBonal system can drivestates into compeBBon and conflict, BUT it doesn’t always • Puzzle: How does the internaBonal system generate this result? Defensive Realism: Security Dilemma • Emphasis on the security dilemma – Policies a state pursues to increase its security can reduce its adversary’s
- 41. security – The adversary has the ability to respond in ways that could then reduce the state’s own security • SD is logically necessary to generate compeBBon between security seekers • RaBonal security seekers facing an SD can, under some condiBons, choose compeBBon or war • BUT, under othercondiBons, cooperaBon can be best opBon The Compe--on Bias in Neorealism • States seek security • One way to pursue that is to compete – But, compeBng can potenBally reduce your security if the otherside reacts – So, compeBBon is not necessarily smart (or raBonal) • Anotherway to is make the adversary more secure – If the adversary is more secure, you are more secure!
- 42. • Strategy should be designed to reduce the adversary’s insecurity, as well as to deter – The need to strike this balance is another way to understand the SD • CooperaBon can bring benefits – Arms control to reduce military risks – Restraint to send “costly” signals, reducing poliBcal risks • Arms control • Unilateral restraint Varia-on in the Security Dilemma • The SD can vary in intensity – When SD is mild, internaBonal system does not generate strong incenBvesto compete • What causes the SD to vary? • Offense-defense balance – The relaBve ease of afack or defense in war – RelaBve cost of offense vs. defense • ODB determined by: – Technology – Geography
- 43. Offense-Defense Advantage • Military technology – Mobility favors offense – Firepower favors defense Offense-Defense Advantage • Geography – Flat, open terrain favors offense – Obstacles (rivers, mountains, forests) favor defense Offense-Defense Predic-ons • Offensive Advantage è SD more intense è War morelikely • Defensive Advantage è SD less intense è War less likely Defensive Realism: 4 Worlds OFFENSE DEFENSE
- 44. NOT DISTINGUISHABLE DISTINGUISHABLE Offense & Defense DisBnguish- able? Offensive or Defensive Advantage Nuclear Weapons and the SD • Nuclear weapons favor defense – Deterrence is funcBonalequivalent of defense – Secure retaliatory capability is the key requirement for deterrence • Nuclear weapons make offense and defense disBnguishable, at least with largearsenals • Nukes therefore significantly diminish the SD Defensive Realism and Rising China
- 45. • Peaceful rise is possible and intense compeBBon can be avoided • Nuclear weapons provide core security • Geography reduces potenBal for invasion – But U.S. could be pulled into conflict in otherways – allies… • Restraint can be reinforcing – OrcompeBBve policies by either side risk damaging poliBcal relaBons Mo-va-onal Realism: StateType • InternaBonal system = benign, offers few incenBvesfor aggression – States balance – ODB typically favors the defense • Yet aggression someBmes occurs under structural condiBons when it “shouldn’t” • Offensive realist answer = all states are revisionist! • MoBvaBonal realist answer = states vary in type – Greedy – Security-seeker/status quo
- 46. • State type explains aggression, more than structure Mo-va-onal Realism: StateType, cont. • Divides states into greedy states and security- seekers • Doesn’t try to explain where those moBves come from • Example: Schweller, Deadly Imbalances – Puzzle: Why do somestates bandwagon (ally with the stronger side)? – Answer: Revisionist states bandwagon, status quo states balance Mo-va-onal Realism: Informa-on • Recall that SD reflects uncertainty about moBves • But uncertainty itselfis a variable • High esBmates that the adversary is a security seeker reduce the SD – CooperaBon = less risky
- 47. • InformaBon can offset dangerous material condiBons – Power alone does not determine how threatening others are Mo-va-onal Realism: Variables • End up with 6 variables – Materialvariables • RelaBve power • ODB • O-D disBnguishability – InformaBon variables • Info about adversary’s moBves • Info about the adversary’s info about your moBves – State’s moBves • Security seeker vs. greedy Mo-va-onal Realism: Rise of China • ImplicaBons of China’s rise depends on China’s type, moBves – Peace is possible if China is security-seeking state – Intense compeBBon and possibly war are much more likely if China is a greedy/expansionist state
- 48. • Name of the game is discerning China’s type – Greedy vs. status quo/security seeker – If greedy, limited aims vs. unlimited aims – If limited aims, what does China want? Non-Realist Theories • Some theories are called “realist” when they probably aren’t • Theories that explain raBonal behavior given structural constraints and/or state type = realist • Theories that explain subopBmal (i.e., non- raBonal) behavior – ojen with resort to theories of domesBc poliBcs – are not realist Non-Realist Theories: Examples • Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire – Puzzle: Why do somestates over-expand when thereare no structural incenBvesto do so? – Answer: DomesBc coaliBonal logrolling and naBonalist mythmaking • “Cult of the offensive” – Puzzle: ObjecBve condiBons in 1914 favored defense, yet
- 49. states nevertheless adopted offensive strategies – Answer: European militaries favored offense for organizaBonal reasons + poor civilian control of the military Hegemonic Realism • Preponderance = peace – System is stable if thereis a clear hierarchy of power • Balance = war – Shij awayfrom preponderance towards equality between the leading two powers foreshadows (hegemonic) war • “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable.” The Case For Hegemony/Unipolarity • Huge gap in power = no uncertainty • Nopower transiBons • Unipole can intervene to nip potenBal challenges in the bud
- 50. • Hard for potenBal opponents to coordinate • Bids for regional hegemony likely to be opposed by those in the region Hegemonic Realism: Assump-ons • Law of uneven growth – States growat different rates over Bme – Moves them up (and down) the hierarchy of power • In modern Bmes, industrializaBon = key factor – Triggersconflict between declining hegemon and rising challenger – Outcome of war re-orders system Hegemonic Realism: Causal Mechanisms for War • Disequilibrium in distribuBon of benefits, presBge, territory, etc., in the system – sBll favors the hegemon • Nolonger reflects actual balance of power, which increasingly favors the challenger
- 51. Hegemonic Realism: Causal Mechanisms for War • PrevenBve moBve • Declining power wages war now to prevent challenger from rising and to head off its own decline • Fight war now to avoid possibility of having to fight a war later under worse circumstances • Similarity to commitment problem • Example = Germany vs. Russia, 1914 The Bargaining Model • Key insight: war is costly – States have to pay a cost for fighBng whether they win, lose, or draw • Costs of fighBng = big incenBve to negoBate a seflement • Why not simply skip the fighBng part and go straight to a deal that reflects their relaBve strength? Why does war nevertheless happen?
- 52. Ra-onal Explana-on for War #1 • States have private informa-on about their capabiliBes… • … and incen-ves to misrepresent it Ra-onal Explana-on for War #2 • States cannot credibly commit to abide by bargains agreed to now if condiBons change in future Ra-onal Explana-on for War #3 • States cannot reach a bargain because the issueunder dispute is indivisible The Bargaining Model and China • Private informaBon – China’s moBves – Willingness to fight for territorial expansion – U.S. ability to hit Chinese mobile ICBMs • Commitment – China’s conBnued rise undermines credibility of any deal struck today
- 53. • Indivisibility – “One China” – “Nine dash line” – Status concerns 1st Image 2nd Image 3rd Image Realism Human nature/ Classical MoBvaBonal/ Neoclassical Neorealism Offensive Defensive Realism and Levels of Analysis