Implementing and auditing security controls part 1

Implementing &
Auditing 20 Critical
Security Controls.
D e f e n s i a
2 0 1 2
Rafel Ivgi
This book introduces the 20 most critical security
controls that any CIO must implement in his network
environment in order to survive the current cyber-
attacks of this era.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction to Security Controls.................................................................................................... 9
Insider versus outsider threats ..................................................................................................... 9
Insider attacks Sophistication vs. Motivation Matrix:........................................................... 10
General Risk Threat Agents, Distribution and Motives ............................................................ 16
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 26
US federal Guidelines, Recommendations & Requirements..................................................... 26
FISMA - Federal Information Security Management Act..................................................... 26
FISMA’s RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RMF)................................................. 27
United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB).................................................. 28
The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)................................................................. 28
NIST: FIPS 200 AND SP 800-53 - IMPLEMENTING INFORMATION SECURITY
STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES......................................................................................... 30
The 20 critical controls.............................................................................................................. 38
Most commonly implemented controls..................................................................................... 38
Least commonly implemented controls..................................................................................... 39
The Process.................................................................................................................................... 39
How to create strategy for data protection and prioritize the implementation of security ........ 39
The common inventory of Information Security Threats to an Organization: ...................... 40
The Organizational Data Lifecycle: ...................................................................................... 40
Creating a security strategy to protect the data per system: .................................................. 41
Creating an organizational scale data security strategy:........................................................ 42
Controls based on the likelihood of security threats.................................................................. 45
Risk Management.................................................................................................................. 45
Calculating Risks, Security Metrics and Risk Measurement Tools ...................................... 45
Implement specific techniques and tools to protect data and systems....................................... 47
Protecting Data...................................................................................................................... 47
Common DRM techniques.................................................................................................... 48
Technologies DRM is used to Protect:.................................................................................. 48

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DRM and documents............................................................................................................. 48
Watermarks ........................................................................................................................... 49
Laws regarding DRM............................................................................................................ 49
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ........................................................................................ 49
Audit the identified and implemented controls to ensure that they operate effectively and that
they comply with established standards .................................................................................... 58
Preventing physical intrusions....................................................................................................... 59
Using Mantraps ......................................................................................................................... 59
Spinning Glass Doors............................................................................................................ 59
Turnstiles............................................................................................................................... 60
Combining man traps with security cameras and facial recognition......................................... 61
Using swipe based biometric authorization devices.................................................................. 63
Strong Authentication................................................................................................................ 64
Combining Fingerprint swipe with PIN code:....................................................................... 64
Fingerprint Swipe + Magnetic Card...................................................................................... 64
Keyboard with Security......................................................................................................... 65
Not Secure............................................................................................................................. 65
Secure.................................................................................................................................... 65
Extremely Secure................................................................................................................... 66
Using white noise generators to disturb eavesdropping............................................................ 66
Low Cost Hardware Solutions............................................................................................... 66
IPhone Applications .................................................................................................................. 68
Studio Six Digital - AudioTools - Generator......................................................................... 68
Rabble Noise Generator ........................................................................................................ 69
Features ..................................................................................................................................... 69
Distortion & Reverberation Generator .................................................................................. 70
Laptop & PC Configurations......................................................................................................... 71
VDI............................................................................................................................................ 71
Motivations for VDI.............................................................................................................. 71
Poll Results: Is VDI More Expensive Than PC?................................................................... 72
Annual Facilities Costs PC vs. VDI ...................................................................................... 72
Comparing Endpoint PC Security to VDI Security............................................................... 73

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VDI Security Comparison: Citrix XenDesktop vs. VMWare View...................................... 74
Data as a service........................................................................................................................ 76
Benefits.................................................................................................................................. 76
Security.................................................................................................................................. 77
PC Metal Locking ..................................................................................................................... 77
Disabling Internal/External USB, DVD, CD-ROM Boot ......................................................... 78
Setting Bios Passwords ............................................................................................................. 81
User Account Control............................................................................................................ 81
Internet Explorer’s 9 Protected Mode ................................................................................... 84
Memory Protection Mechanisms............................................................................................... 84
Security Cookie (Canary)...................................................................................................... 84
SafeSEH ................................................................................................................................ 85
Address space layout randomization (ASLR) ....................................................................... 87
Visualization of ASLR Changes to system Memory per Boot.............................................. 88
NX (No eXecute – Hardware DEP) ...................................................................................... 88
DEP and ASLR Protection Activation State: ........................................................................ 90
Data Execution Prevention - DEP ......................................................................................... 92
DEP, ASLR, IE Protected Mode and UAC’s Impact on Security in Windows: ................... 92
Encrypting Laptops ................................................................................................................... 93
Managed Solution – Mcafee / Symantec............................................................................... 93
Encryption Product Comparison for Apple Macintosh ......................................................... 93
Product Feature Comparison Table....................................................................................... 94
Layering & Partition Type Support............................................................................................... 95
Modes of operation........................................................................................................................ 96
Non-Managed - TrueCrypt.................................................................................................... 97
Setting Laptops “Out of Organization Personal Firewall Policy” ......................................... 99
Network Equipment .................................................................................................................... 102
Understanding Layer 2 & 3 Security....................................................................................... 102
Layer 3+ Security.................................................................................................................... 155
An example of the right way to divide VLANs to matching logical business units............ 157
Maximizing Your Network Security with Private VLANs (PVLAN) .................................... 158

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Configuring PVLAN ........................................................................................................... 161
Upgrading Router/Switch Firmware ....................................................................................... 163
Buying new equipment, new security features........................................................................ 165
Secure Configuration Management (SCM)................................................................................. 167
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 167
Maintenance systems........................................................................................................... 167
Mapping supported devices..................................................................................................... 170
Inventory Scanner................................................................................................................ 171
Completing the gaps with scripts ............................................................................................ 176
Creating Device Groups (Security Level, Same Version…)................................................... 177
Creating Policies...................................................................................................................... 177
Attachments and Guidelines................................................................................................ 179
Auditing to verify security in practice..................................................................................... 187
Case Studies Summary: Top 10 Mistakes - Managing Windows Networks............................... 192
“The shoemaker's son always goes barefoot”...................................................................... 192
Domain Administrators on Users VLAN............................................................................ 192
Domain Administrator with a Weak Password ................................................................... 193
Domain Administrator without the Conficker Patch (MS08-067) ...................................... 194
(LM and NTLM v1) vs. (NTLM v.2)...................................................................................... 195
Pass the Hash Attack............................................................................................................... 197
Daily logon as a Domain Administrator.............................................................................. 198
Using Domain Administrator for Services.......................................................................... 198
Managing the network with Local Administrator Accounts ............................................... 199
The NetLogon Folder .......................................................................................................... 199
LSA Secrets & Protected Storage........................................................................................ 201
Cached Logons.................................................................................................................... 205
Password History................................................................................................................. 206
Users as Local Administrators............................................................................................. 206
Forgetting to Harden: RestrictAnonymous=1 ..................................................................... 207
Weak Passwords / No Complexity Enforcement ................................................................ 207
Guess what the password was? (gma )............................................................................. 207

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Firewalls...................................................................................................................................... 208
Understanding Firewalls (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 generations)................................................................. 208
First generation: packet filters............................................................................................. 208
Second generation: "stateful" filters.................................................................................... 209
Third generation: application layer...................................................................................... 209
Application firewall............................................................................................................. 209
The Common Firewall’s Limits .......................................................................................... 211
Implementing Application Aware Firewalls ....................................................................... 212
Securely Enabling Applications Based on Users & Groups................................................ 214
High Performance Threat Prevention.................................................................................. 216
Checkpoint R75 – Application Control Blade..................................................................... 218
Utilizing Firewalls for Maximum Security ............................................................................. 220
Implementing a Back-Bone Application-Aware Firewall....................................................... 220
Network Inventory & Monitoring ............................................................................................... 220
How to map your network connections?................................................................................. 220
How to discover all network devices?................................................................................. 221
How to discover all cross-network installed software?........................................................... 221
NAC ............................................................................................................................................ 222
The Problem: Ethernet Network......................................................................................... 222
What is a NAC originally? .................................................................................................. 223
Today’s NAC?..................................................................................................................... 223
Why Invent Today’s NAC?................................................................................................. 223
Dynamic Solution for a Dynamic Environment.................................................................. 224
Did We EVER Manage Who Gets IP Access?.................................................................... 224
What is a NAC?................................................................................................................... 224
Simple Explanation ............................................................................................................. 225
Goals of NAC...................................................................................................................... 225
NAC Approaches................................................................................................................. 226
General Basic NAC Deployment ........................................................................................ 228
NAC Deployment Types:.................................................................................................... 228
NAC Acceptance Tests........................................................................................................ 229

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NAC Vulnerabilities............................................................................................................ 230
The common attack – Bypassing & Killing the NAC......................................................... 231
Open Source Solutions ........................................................................................................ 232
SIEM - (Security Information Event Management).................................................................... 238
SIEM Capabilities ............................................................................................................... 238
SIEM Architecture .................................................................................................................. 239
SIEM Logics........................................................................................................................ 242
Planning for the right amounts of data .................................................................................... 243
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 243
SIEM Benchmarking Process.............................................................................................. 244
The Baseline Network......................................................................................................... 246
SIEM Storage and Analysis................................................................................................. 249
Baseline Network Device Map............................................................................................ 251
EPS Calculation Worksheet ................................................................................................ 252
Common SIEM Report Types................................................................................................. 252
Custom Reports ................................................................................................................... 253
Defining the right Rules – It’s all about the rules.................................................................... 253
IDS/IPS........................................................................................................................................ 254
IPS Types ................................................................................................................................ 255
Detection Methods .................................................................................................................. 255
Signature Catalog:................................................................................................................... 256
Alert Monitoring: .................................................................................................................... 257
Security Reporting:.................................................................................................................. 258
Alert Monitor:.......................................................................................................................... 259
Anti-Virus:............................................................................................................................... 260
Web content protection & filtering.............................................................................................. 260
Session Hi-Jacking and Internal Network Man-In-The-Middle.............................................. 260
XSS Attack Vector .............................................................................................................. 260
The Man-In-The-Middle Attack Vector.............................................................................. 261
HTML5 and New Client-Side Risks ....................................................................................... 266
Cookie/Repository User Tracking....................................................................................... 266

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User TraceBack Techniques................................................................................................ 268
MAC ADDRESS Detection Of All Network Interfaces via JAVA .................................... 269
XSS + Browser Location Services ...................................................................................... 270
Use your power to protect and enforce – GPO........................................................................ 273
Choosing, Implementing and Testing Web Application Firewalls ......................................... 280
Detecting Web Application Firewalls ................................................................................. 280
Bypassing Web Application Firewalls ................................................................................ 283
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) ....................................................................................... 283
Examples:............................................................................................................................ 284
Circumvention of default WAF filtering mechanisms ........................................................ 286
High Level Distributed Denial of Service............................................................................... 296
Protecting DNS Servers & Detecting DNS Enumeration Attacks .......................................... 300
Detecting Sub Domains....................................................................................................... 303
Securing Web Servers ................................................................................................................. 304
Components of a generic web application system................................................................... 305
Multi-tier architecture.............................................................................................................. 306
Securing Virtual Hosts – Preventing Detection of Virtual Hosts........................................ 307
Protecting against Google Hacking..................................................................................... 308
Securing IIS 7/7.5 + Microsoft SQL Server 2008................................................................... 310
IIS Dynamic IP Restrictions Module: The mod_evasive of IIS.......................................... 310
Hardening IIS SSL with IISCrypto – Disabling Weak Ciphers .......................................... 311
Hardening IIS 7.5 on Windows 2008 Server R2 SP1.......................................................... 312
Apache Hardening............................................................................................................... 316
Mod_Evasive – Anti-D.O.S Apache Module...................................................................... 317
SELinux – Optional Hardening:.............................................................................................. 318
SELinux Apache Hardening................................................................................................ 318
SELinux for other services (Experts Only) ............................................................................. 319
Enable Hardened HTTP ...................................................................................................... 319
Email protection & filtering ........................................................................................................ 322
Sending Spoofed Emails – Bypassing SPF with a 8$ Domain............................................ 325
VPN Security............................................................................................................................... 326

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Identifying VPNs & Firewalls (Fingerprinting VPNS)........................................................... 326
Offline password cracking................................................................................................... 327
VPN IKE User Enumeration ............................................................................................... 330
VPN PPTP User Enumeration............................................................................................. 331
VPN Clients Man-In-The-Middle Downgrade Attacks........................................................... 332
Downgrade Attacks - IPSEC Failure................................................................................... 332
Downgrade Attacks – PPTP ................................................................................................ 332
PPTP:................................................................................................................................... 333
PPTP Brute Force................................................................................................................ 333
Hacking VPNs with “Aggressive Mode Enabled”.................................................................. 334
Endpoint Security........................................................................................................................ 341
Penetration tests and red team exercises ..................................................................................... 341
Implementing identity & access management creating backups, BCP & DRP .......................... 341
Security Metrics .......................................................................................................................... 342
Incident Reponses........................................................................................................................ 342
Creating an audit ......................................................................................................................... 342
Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 343

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Introduction to Security Controls
Insider versus outsider threats
 External: external threats originate from sources outside of the organization and its
network of partners. Examples include former employees, lone hackers, organized
criminal groups, and government entities. External agents also include environmental
events such as floods, earthquakes, and power disruptions .Typically, no trust or privilege
is implied for external entities.
 Internal: Internal threats are those originating from within the organization. This
encompasses company executives, employees, independent contractors, interns, etc. ., as
well as internal infrastructure. Insiders are trusted and privileged (some more than
others).
 Partners aka “External Insiders”/”Trusted Business Partners (TBP)”: Partners include any
third party sharing a business relationship with the organization. This includes suppliers,
vendors, hosting providers, outsourced IT support, etc... some level of trust and privilege
is usually implied between business partners
External – Internal – Partner Incident Distribution from the Last 8 Years:
As we can see, the rise in the amount of external attacks is rising every year, whereas the amount
of internal attacks is reduced along the years.
It is critical not to confuse the reference for “internal” as the factor the malicious intension comes
from and not the source of the attack. For example, a remote external attacker can take over one
machine and use it to execute internal network attacks. In this example, the attacker is still
external, even though the type of attack is an internal network attack.

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Insider attacks Sophistication vs. Motivation Matrix:
Examining Six Cases of Insider Originated Incident:

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Organizational Divisions – Influence vs. Interest in inspected Incidents:

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Types of internal Agents by Percent:

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General Risk Threat Agents, Distribution and Motives
Threat Categories in Practice Over time:

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Distribution of threat agent type by stolen records:
Distribution by motive:

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Distribution by origin organization type:
Distribution by origin geo-location:

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Malware Functionality:

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Hacking Methods Used:
Hacking Vectors Used:

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Social Engineering Types Percentage:
Social Engineering Vectors Percentage:
Social Engineering Targets Percentage:
Compromised Assets Percentage:

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Targeted vs. Opportunistic in All vs. Large Organizations:
Time from initial attack to data exfiltration until compromise discovery:

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Breach Discovery Methods:
Breached Organizations Information Security vs. PCI-DSS and Common Standards:

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Conclusions
1. Attacks are aimed at all companies, large companies are targeted with more attacks
2. External attacks mainly originates from organized crime groups
3. Most attacks originate from east Europe
4. Attacks mostly involve personal or financial gain
5. The rise in the last years is in external hacking and malware infiltration
6. Hacking software were mostly Keyloggers and backdoors
7. Hacking methods were mostly password guessing and use of stolen credentials
8. Hacking Vectors were mostly remote access and backdoors
9. social engineering attacks were mostly by pretexting & bribery on the phone and in
person of regular employees and cashiers
10. Hacked machines were mostly Point-Of-Sale and desktop workstations
11. Most organizations were attacked randomly, large ones were targeted
12. It mostly took minutes to successful penetration, minutes for data exfiltration and months
to discover the incidents
13. Most breaches were reported by law agencies and third party fraud detection
14. Most organization were very far from being compliant to security standards
US federal Guidelines, Recommendations &
Requirements
FISMA - Federal Information Security Management Act
FISMA final requirements specification is available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/drivers/documents/FISMA-final.pdf
FISMA’s Vision
To promote the development of key security standards and guidelines to support the
implementation of and compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act
including:
 Standards for categorizing information and information systems by mission impact
 Standards for minimum security requirements for information and information systems
 Guidance for selecting appropriate security controls for information systems
 Guidance for assessing security controls in information systems and determining security
control effectiveness
 Guidance for the security authorization of information systems

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 Guidance for monitoring the security controls and the security authorization of
information systems
FISMA’s Objectives
 The implementation of cost-effective, risk-based information security programs
 The establishment of a level of security due diligence for federal agencies and contractors
supporting the federal government
 More consistent and cost-effective application of security controls across the federal
information technology infrastructure
 More consistent, comparable, and repeatable security control assessments
 A better understanding of enterprise-wide mission risks resulting from the operation of
information systems
 More complete, reliable, and trustworthy information for authorizing officials--
facilitating more informed security authorization decisions
 More secure information systems within the federal government including the critical
infrastructure of the United States
FISMA’s RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RMF)

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United States Government Configuration Baseline
(USGCB)
United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) evolved from the “FDCC - Federal
Desktop Core Configuration”.
USGCB is a Federal government-wide initiative that provides guidance to agencies on what
should be done to improve and maintain an effective configuration settings focusing primarily on
security.
The USGCB offers the latest revisions of the most hardened windows environment security
settings, which have been tested to enable sufficient usability:
Hardened and Compliant Microsoft Windows Group Policy Collection
http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb/content/gpos/USGCB-GPOs.zip
Hardened and Compliant Microsoft Windows Security Settings Specification Excel
http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb/documentation/USGCB-Windows-Settings.xls
The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP)
The Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) is a suite of specifications that standardize the
format and nomenclature by which software flaw and security configuration information is
communicated, both to machines and humans.
SCAP is a multi-purpose framework of specifications that support automated configuration,
vulnerability and patch checking, technical control compliance activities, and security
measurement. Goals for the development of SCAP include standardizing system security
management, promoting interoperability of security products, and fostering the use of standard
expressions of security content.
SCAP version 1.2 is comprised of eleven component specifications in five categories:
1. Languages. The SCAP languages provide standard vocabularies and conventions for
expressing security policy, technical check mechanisms, and assessment results. The
SCAP language specifications are Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format
(XCCDF), Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL®), and Open Checklist
Interactive Language (OCIL™).
2. Reporting formats. The SCAP reporting formats provide the necessary constructs to
express collected information in standardized formats. The SCAP reporting format
specifications are Asset Reporting Format (ARF) and Asset Identification. Although

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Asset Identification is not explicitly a reporting format, SCAP uses it as a key component
in identifying the assets that reports relate to.
3. Enumerations. Each SCAP enumeration defines a standard nomenclature (naming
format) and an official dictionary or list of items expressed using that nomenclature. The
SCAP enumeration specifications are Common Platform Enumeration (CPE™),
Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE™), and Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE®).
4. Measurement and scoring systems. In SCAP this refers to evaluating specific
characteristics of a security weakness (for example, software vulnerabilities and security
configuration issues) and, based on those characteristics, generating a score that reflects
their relative severity. The SCAP measurement and scoring system specifications are
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and Common Configuration Scoring
System (CCSS).
5. Integrity. An SCAP integrity specification helps to preserve the integrity of SCAP
content and results. Trust Model for Security Automation Data (TMSAD) is the SCAP
integrity specification.
SCAP utilizes software flaw and security configuration standard reference data. This
reference data is provided by the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), which is managed
by NIST and sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The latest full specification of SCAP is available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-126-rev2/SP800-126r2.pdf
The latest SCAP content for Windows 7, Windows 7 Firewall, and Internet Explorer 8
http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb/content/scap/USGCB-Major-Version-1.2.x.0.zip
Obtaining FISMA, NIST and SCAP compliant Security Checklists:

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Example download link:
http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/os/windows/u_windows_2008_r2_dc_v1r3_stig_benchmark_201201
27.zip
NIST: FIPS 200 AND SP 800-53 - IMPLEMENTING
INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS AND
GUIDELINES
NIST’s SP 800-53 focuses on the selection and implementation of appropriate security controls
for an information system or a system-of-systems. These are important tasks that can have major
implications on the operations and assets of an organization as well as the welfare of individuals
and the Nation.
Security controls are the management, operational, and technical safeguards or countermeasures
employed within an organizational information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of the system and its information. There are several important questions that
should be answered by organizational officials when addressing the security considerations for
their information systems:

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• What security controls are needed to adequately mitigate the risk incurred by the use of
information and information systems in the execution of organizational missions and
business functions?
• Have the selected security controls been implemented or is there a realistic plan for their
implementation?
• What is the desired or required level of assurance (i.e., grounds for confidence) that the
selected security controls, as implemented, are effective in their application?
The answers to these questions are not given in isolation but rather in the context of an effective
information security program for the organization that identifies, mitigates as deemed necessary,
and monitors on an ongoing basis, risks arising from its information and information systems.
SECURITY CONTROL ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE
Security controls described in this publication have a well-defined organization and structure. For
ease of use in the security control selection and specification process, controls are organized into
seventeen families.
Each security control family contains security controls related to the security functionality of the
family. A two-character identifier is assigned to uniquely identify each security control family.
In addition, there are three general classes of security controls: management, operational, and
technical.
Table 1-1 summarizes the classes and families in the security control catalog and the associated
security control family identifiers:

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NIST 800-53 Risk Management Framework and the information security standards
and guidance documents associated with each activity:

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NIST 800-53 Security Control Selection Process:

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NIST 800-53 Security Control Baselines:

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NIST 800-53 Security Control Priority & Baseline Allocation Examples:

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NIST 800-53 Mapping Specified Security Controls to ISO 27001:
NIST 800-53 Controls Table is available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fasp/documents/security_controls/SP800-53Table.xls
Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E) Plan Template is available at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fasp/documents/security_controls/App_CA_STE_Plan_Templat
e_030408.doc

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The 20 critical controls
1. Live Monitoring and Real-Time Alerting of security events and anomalies (SIEM
integrated into AD, IPS, Automatic Inventory and etc…)
2. Data Recovery Capability
3. Effective network segmentation and compartmentalization of management and
administration networks
4. Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches
5. Applying suitable, different reoccurring automatic update/patching policies for all
software on all asset types (endpoint, server, laptop, mission critical, internet exposed…)
6. Revoking and limiting local administrator privileges in all systems, especially endpoints
7. Boundary Defense
8. Policy Hardening – Utilizing Group Policy For Security
9. Implementation of an IDM (Identity Management) & SSO for all users, combined with a
strong authentication (two-factor).
10. Implementing a Back-Bone Application-Aware Firewall (Limitation and Control of
Network Ports, Protocols, and Services by User * MAC * IP)
11. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
12. Data Loss Prevention
13. Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps
14. An incident response policy to minimize all potential risks during a breach
15. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software
16. Device Control Management – MDM (Mobile Device Management), Wireless/Cellular
Modems, Mobile Storage, Digital Cameras
17. Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
18. Malware Defenses (AV, HIPS)
19. Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
20. Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
Most commonly implemented controls
Most commonly implemented controls
1. Firewall on External Network (Internet)
2. Endpoint Security (Anti-Virus + Basic Device Control)
3. Boundary Defense
4. Data Recovery Capability
5. Malware Defenses
6. Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
7. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
8. Controlled Use of Administrative Network Privileges
9. Network Account Monitoring and Control
10. Controlled Access Based on Need to Know

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Least commonly implemented controls
1. Protect equipment from unauthorized access
2. Secure offices and rooms
3. Secure the physical perimeter of the organization’s buildings (internally)
4. Track the location of removable computer media
5. Manage visitor access to secure areas within the buildings
6. Measure security compliance at a third-party facility
7. Restrict access to the facility from the delivery or loading area
8. Protect unattended equipment
9. Apply digital signatures to protect the authenticity and integrity of electronic information
10. Detect unauthorized access to physical facilities
The Process
How to create strategy for data protection and
prioritize the implementation of security

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The common inventory of Information Security Threats to an
Organization:
The Organizational Data Lifecycle:

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Creating a security strategy to protect the data per system:
1. Defining the organizational approach to security
a. Organization’s “Risk Appetite”
b. Current/Future Insurance coverage plans
2. Mapping all the organizational data systems
a. Inspecting Documentations
b. Requesting Information from Team Leaders and System Mangers
c. Network Scanning – Mapping “Forgotten” systems
3. Inspecting the regulations the organization must comply to
a. Government Regulations (DoD, CC, FIPS, NIST SP 800-37,NIST 800-53(A),
FISMA)
b. Industry Standards and Regulations (ISO17799/BS7799, ITIL/ISO-IEC 20000
and COBIT)
c. International Regulations (ISO 27001, PCI-DSS, SOX, COSO, HIPPA , BITS
(banking industry standards))
4. Assigning numerical values to systems data by importance
Data
Acquisition/
Creation
Data
Storage
Data Use
Data
Sharing/Mo
difying
Data
Destructing

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a. System/Asset quantified value by regulation requirements (by what the
regulation considers sensitive data, i.e. customer names, address, email DB)
b. Identifying The Critical Data Of Each Data System - System/Asset quantified
value by system’s customer availability requirements (i.e. customer,
minor/major business partner, internal use, backup/DR)
i. System/Asset quantified value by data sensitivity defined by System
Manager/Data Owner together with the CISO
c. Identifying The Data Usage, accessibility and Usability Requirements Of Each
Data types of each System
5. Analyzing system threats and attack vectors to the data
a. Is the data encrypted? Where is the key located? Who has access to the key?
b. Is the system under real-time security monitoring?
c. What are the availability requirements of the system?
d. Which networks the system is exposed to?
e. Does the system get security updates automatically?
f. Which services does the system listen on?
g. How many people have privileged access to the system?
h. Is the system integrated with a strong authentication mechanism?
6. Prioritizing work process and defining Data Protection Requirements by data value and
regulation requirements
a. Data Protection Requirements of Most enforced regulations
b. Data Protection Requirements of Most business enabling regulations
c. Aligning to the management’s organizational approach to security
d. Researching remediation solutions and determining their TCO for 5-10 years
7. Confronting the results with management
a. Setting up recurring meetings with management regarding information security
(Yearly Plan, Strategic Plan, Current & Emerging Threats, Discovered Incidents)
b. Presenting the calculated risk (by ALE, ARO)
c. Presenting the potential set of remediation solutions vs. costs required
d. Establishing decisions per threat or/and per system
e. Requesting corrections to the current budget
Creating an organizational scale data security strategy:
1. Defining the organizational approach to security
a. Organization’s “Risk Appetite” and Data Leakage approach
b. Current/Future Insurance coverage plans

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2. Mapping the major organizational data systems
3. Inspecting the regulations the organization must comply to
a. Government Regulations (DoD, CC, FIPS, NIST SP 800-37,NIST 800-53(A),
FISMA)
b. Industry Standards and Regulations (ISO17799/BS7799, ITIL/ISO-IEC 20000
and COBIT)
c. International Regulations (ISO 27001, PCI-DSS, SOX, COSO, HIPPA , BITS
(banking industry standards))
4. Assigning numerical values to major systems data by importance
a. System/Asset quantified value by regulation requirements (by what the
regulation considers sensitive data, i.e. customer names, address, email DB)
b. Identifying The Critical Data Of Each Data System - System/Asset quantified
value by system’s customer availability requirements (i.e. customer,
minor/major business partner, internal use, backup/DR)

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i. System/Asset quantified value by data sensitivity defined by System
Manager/Data Owner together with the CISO
5. Identifying and Detecting the highest common denominator in data attributes:
a. Highest intersecting Data Accessibility (Setup Complexity, Training Complexity,
Access Complexity, Client/Clientless, OS, Networks, Entities, Formats, Time
Frames, Access Level)
b. Highest intersecting Data Sharing requirements (Setup Complexity, Training
Complexity, Sharing Complexity, Networks, Entities, Formats)
c. Highest intersecting Data types of each System (DOC, XLS, PPT, PDF,TXT,
Data in Databases, i.e. Credit Card Information)
d. Most common size of a single data unit/file
6. Analyzing system threats and attack vectors to the data
a. Is the data encrypted? Where is the key located? Who has access to the key?
b. How is the data used? Over which networks?
c. Where is the data stored permanently? Temporarily? (Clients Outlook? Laptops?
Are laptops encrypted?)
d. How is the data shared? With whom?
e. What types/formats is the data used with? Modifiable/Writable (DOC, XLS) or
Read Only (PDF, XPS)?
f. Does the data contain identifying information? (Authors, Watermarks, Digital
Signature)
g. Does each single copy of the data is generated and marked for each specific
entity it is shared with?
h. Are the major systems providing the data under real-time security monitoring?
i. What are the availability requirements of the data/system?
j. How many people have privileged access to the data/system?
k. Is the data access system integrated with a strong authentication mechanism?
l. Is the data protected with a DRM (Digital Rights Management) solution?
m. Is the data protected with a DLP (Data Leakage Prevention) solution?
n. What are the possible data exfiltration vectors for the specific data types and
existing environments? (Internet , Cellular Internet, Wireless, Bluetooth, Mass
Storage (DOK, Camera, USB HDD), CD, DVD, Screen Capture, Physical Screen
Photo)
7. Prioritizing work process and defining Data Protection Requirements by data value and
regulation requirements
a. Data Protection Requirements of Most enforced regulations
b. Data Protection Requirements of Most business enabling regulations
c. Aligning to the management’s organizational approach to security
d. Considering the major usability requirements collected from data owners

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e. Researching remediation solutions and determining their TCO for 5-10 years
8. Operating the management
a. Setting up recurring meetings with management regarding information security
data protection strategy (Yearly Plan, Strategic Plan, Current & Emerging
Threats, Discovered Data Security Incidents)
b. Presenting the overall cross-organizational calculated risk (by ALE, ARO)
c. Presenting the potential set of cross-organizational remediation solutions vs.
costs required
d. Establishing decisions per threat or/and per major data system
e. Requesting corrections to the current budget
Controls based on the likelihood of security threats
Risk Management
Calculating Risks, Security Metrics and Risk Measurement
Tools
1. BITS Key Risk Measurement Tool

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Implement specific techniques and tools to protect data
and systems
Protecting Data
DRM - Digital Rights Management
Digital rights management (DRM) is a class of access control technologies that are used by hardware
manufacturers, publishers, copyright holders and individuals with the intent to limit the use of digital
content and devices after sale.
DRM is any technology that inhibits uses of digital content that are not desired or intended by the content
provider. Copy protections which can be circumvented without modifying the file or device, such as serial
numbers or key files are not generally considered to be DRM.
DRM also includes specific instances of digital works or devices. Companies such
as Amazon, AOL, Apple Inc., the BBC, Microsoft and Sony use digital rights management protections.
Works can become permanently inaccessible if the DRM scheme changes or if the service is
discontinued. Proponents argue that digital locks should be considered necessary to prevent "intellectual
property" from being copied freely, just as physical locks are needed to prevent personal property from
being stolen.

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Digital locks placed in accordance with DRM policies can also restrict users from doing something
perfectly legal, such as making backup copies of CDs or DVDs, lending materials out through a library,
accessing works in the public domain, or using copyrighted materials for research and education under fair
use laws.
Common DRM techniques
1. Restrictive Licensing Agreements: The access to digital materials, copyright and public domain
are controlled. Some restrictive licenses are imposed on consumers as a condition of entering a
website or when downloading software.
2. Encryption
3. Scrambling of expressive material
4. Embedding of a tag (digital watermarking): This technology is designed to control access and
reproduction of online information. This includes backup copies for personal use.
Technologies DRM is used to Protect:
1. DRM and film
2. DRM and television
3. DRM and music
4. Audio CDs
5. Internet music
6. Computer games
7. E-books
DRM and documents
Enterprise digital rights management (E-DRM or ERM) is the application of DRM technology to the
control of access to corporate documents such as Microsoft Word, PDF, and AutoCAD files, emails,
and intranet web pages rather than to the control of consumer media.
E-DRM, now more commonly referenced as IRM (Information Rights Management), is generally intended
to prevent the unauthorized use (such as industrial or corporate espionage or inadvertent release) of
proprietary documents. IRM typically integrates with content management system software.
DRM has been used by organizations such as the British Library in its secure electronic delivery service to
permit worldwide access to substantial numbers of rare (and in many cases unique) documents which, for
legal reasons, were previously only available to authorized individuals actually visiting the Library's
document Centre at Boston Spa in England.

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Watermarks
Digital watermarks are features of media that are added during production or distribution. Digital
watermarks involve data that is arguably steganographically embedded within the audio or video data.
Watermarks can be used for different purposes that may include:
 recording the copyright owner
 recording the distributor
 recording the distribution chain
 identifying the purchaser of the music
Watermarks are not complete DRM mechanisms in their own right, but are used as part of a system for
Digital Rights Management, such as helping provide prosecution evidence for purely legal avenues of
rights management, rather than direct technological restriction.
Laws regarding DRM
Digital Millennium Copyright Act
In 1998 the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was passed in the United States to impose criminal
penalties on those who make available technologies whose primary purpose and function is to circumvent
content protection technologies.
IRM – Information Rights Management
Information Rights Management (IRM) is a term that applies to a technology which protects sensitive
information from unauthorized access. It is sometimes referred to as (E-DRM) or Enterprise Digital Rights
Management. This can cause confusion because Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies are
typically associated with business to consumer systems designed to protect rich media such as music and
video. IRM is a technology which allows for information (mostly in the form of documents) to be ‘remote
controlled’. This means that information and its control can now be separately created, viewed, edited &
distributed. Some existing IRM systems have been ongoing development of DRM style systems; however a
true IRM system will have some important differences and is typically used to protect information in a
business to business model, such as financial data, intellectual property and executive communications.
IRM currently applies mainly to documents and emails.
IRM technologies allow for several levels of security. Functionality offered by IRM usually comprises:
 Industry standard encryption of the information.
 Strong in use protection, such as controlling copy & paste, preventing screen shots and printing.
 A rights model/policy which allows for easy mapping of business classifications to information.
 Offline use allowing for users to create/access IRM sealed documents without needing network access
for certain periods of time.

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 Full auditing of both access to documents as well as changes to the rights/policy by business users
An example of IRM in use would be to secure a sensitive engineering document being distributed in an
environment where the document's recipients could not necessarily be trusted. Alternatively, an e-mail
could be secured with IRM, so if it accidentally is forwarded to an untrusted party, only authorized users
would gain access. Note that a well-designed IRM system will not limit the ability for information to be
shared; rather rules are only enforced when people attempt to gain access. This is important as often people
share sensitive information with users who should legitimately have access but don't, and the technology
needs to facilitate the easy request of access back to the business owners.
IRM is far more secure than shared secret passwords; key management is used to protect the information
whilst it is at rest on a hard disk, network drive or other storage device. Crucially IRM continues to protect
and control access to the document when it is in use. Functionality such as preventing screen shots,
disallowing the copying of data from the secure document to an insecure environment and guarding the
information from programmatic attack, are key elements of an effective IRM solution.
Seclore Technology from India has made very promising and authentic tools for IRM. Zafesoft Inc., a
Silicon Valley (California) company has created a solution for securing documents and the information in
them as well as images (including medical images).
Information Rights Management is also known by the following names:
 Enterprise Rights Management
 Enterprise DRM or Enterprise Digital Rights Management
 Document Rights Management
 Intelligent Rights Management
Common IRM Solutions:
1. Covertix SmartCipher - Information Rights Management solutions
2. Seclore Technology - Information Rights Management solutions
3. Zafesoft Inc. - Information Security and Rights Management solutions
4. Microsoft - Rights Management solutions
5. Secure Islands - Rights Management solutions

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Product Example: Secure Islands IQPROTECTOR FILE PROTECTION
System Architecture:
Feature Set:
Feature Benefit
Automatic classification at content creation
100% content identification accuracy, simple deployment,
no repository scanning required
Automatic protection based on central policy
Enterprise has complete control over what, why, when and
how to protect data, completely transparent to the end user
Content marking – classification-driven
addition of visual labels to documents
Increase security awareness by visualizing document
classification, raise both compliance and user
accountability
Scanner Mode Server
Classification and encryption of pre-existing content on
file servers, NAS, SAN, and ECM repositories
Optional user classification – enabling the Increased user accountability, added classification

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Feature Benefit
user to decide the type of classification
required for a given document or mail
accuracy
Extends AD-RMS file format support (multi
format)
Protection for additional file formats, without application
integration
Protection of client- or application-based
content
Applies RMS protection on files and data exported from
applications without integration
Metadata labeling for DLP, FCI, eDiscovery,
archiving
Lowers the burden on DLP by accurately identifying,
classifying and tagging sensitive enterprise data early in
the data lifecycle to allow effective DLP enforcement
Protect documents upon access Apply AD-RMS protection on pre-existing content
Extendable to other encryption schemes
Conversion of AD-RMS protected data to other protection
schemes
Audit and report on every action on files
everywhere
Monitoring and audit mechanisms operate throughout the
information lifecycle

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Management Panel:
DLP - Data Leakage Prevention
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is a computer security term referring to systems that enable organizations to
reduce the corporate risk of the unintentional disclosure of confidential information. These system identify,
monitor, and protect confidential data while in use (e.g. endpoint actions), in motion (e.g. network
actions), and at rest (e.g. data storage) through deep content inspection, contextual security analysis of
transaction (attributes of originator, data object, medium, timing, recipient/destination and so on) and with
a centralized management framework.
Vendors Semantics:
1. Data Leak Prevention
2. Information Leak Detection and Prevention (ILDP)
3. Information Leak Prevention (ILP)
4. Content Monitoring and Filtering (CMF)
5. Information Protection and Control (IPC)
6. Extrusion Prevention System
7. Identification & Prevention of Data Exfiltration
Deployment and Coverage
Network DLP (aka Data in Motion <DiM>)

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Typically a software or hardware solution that is installed at network egress points near the
perimeter. It analyzes network traffic to detect sensitive data that is being sent in violation of
information security policies.
Storage DLP (aka Data at Rest <DaR>)
Data-loss prevention of stored data typically involves a Data Security Software installed on your
computer to prevent unauthorized access to the data stored on your hard drive and USB/External
drives.
Endpoint DLP (aka Data in Use <DiU>)
Such systems run on end-user workstations or servers in the organization. Like network-based
systems, endpoint-based can address internal as well as external communications, and can
therefore be used to control information flow between groups or types of users (e.g. 'Chinese
walls'). They can also control email and Instant Messaging communications before they are stored
in the corporate archive, such that a blocked communication (i.e., one that was never sent, and
therefore not subject to retention rules) will not be identified in a subsequent legal discovery
situation.
Endpoint systems have the advantage that they can monitor and control access to physical devices
(such as mobile devices with data storage capabilities) and in some cases can access information
before it has been encrypted.
Some endpoint-based systems can also provide application controls to block attempted
transmissions of confidential information, and provide immediate feedback to the user. They have
the disadvantage that they need to be installed on every workstation in the network, cannot be used
on mobile devices (e.g., cell phones and PDAs) or where they cannot be practically installed (for
example on a workstation in an internet café).

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Open Source Solutions:
OpenDLP

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MyDLP Community Edition

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Audit the identified and implemented controls to ensure
that they operate effectively and that they comply with
established standards
1. Feature and Acceptance Testing
1.1. Verify the features designed in the controls work properly.
For example, verify that only the specifically defined websites are protected by the Web
Application Firewalls and that the ones which are not compatible are not harmed.
2. Recurring Vulnerability Assessment
2.1. Verify Patching Systems work properly in practice
2.2. Verify passwords match complexity requirements in practice
2.3. Recurring verification of personnel alertness to security events
3. Penetration Testing
3.1. Verify logs quality in practice
3.2. Verify Real-Time Protection/Response Systems work properly in practice
3.3. Verify Real-Time/Scheduled Alerting mechanisms work properly in practice

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Preventing physical intrusions
Using Mantraps
A man trap aka “interlock” aka “air locks” is a small space having two sets of interlocking doors such that
the first set of doors must close before the second set opens. Identification may be required for each door,
sometimes even possibly different measures for each door. For example, a key may open the first door, but
a personal identification number entered on a number pad opens the second.
Other methods of opening doors include proximity cards or biometric devices such as fingerprint readers
or iris recognition scans. Metal detectors are often built in in order to prevent entrance of people carrying
weapons. Such use is particularly frequent in banks and jewelry shops.
Mantraps may be configured so that when an alarm is activated, all doors lock and trap the suspect between
the doors in the "dead space" or lock just one door to deny access to a secure space such as a data center or
research lab.
An Effective man trap will only physically contain one person at a time in order to avoid Tail-Gating
or Piggy-Backing.
Spinning Glass Doors

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Combining man traps with security cameras and facial
recognition
It is very effective to combine a man trap with a close camera, this results in a time stamped close-up face
picture of everyone who entered and left the secure area.
In addition, it is extremely effective to combine the man traps camera results with facial recognition
solutions in order get a full protection and detection security system.

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Using swipe based biometric authorization devices
Not Secure
When you use a fingerprint biometrics device, after its scans your fingerprint, the fingerprint
stays on the device, can be re-used and also replicated and stolen.
Secure
Fingerprint Swipe-Scanners, are secure, since you physical delete/“run-over” your own
fingerprint when you swipe your finger.
Extremely Secure – Full Hand Swipe
Full Hand Fingerprint is very hard to obtain and extremely challenging to spoof. Notice that this
solution is also swipe based and doesn’t risk the user’s fingerprint.

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Strong Authentication
Combining Fingerprint swipe with PIN code:
Fingerprint Swipe + Magnetic Card
Not Secure

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Secure
Keyboard with Security
Not Secure
Secure

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Extremely Secure
Using white noise generators to disturb eavesdropping
Low Cost Hardware Solutions
1. Make other noise coming into an area less distracting or
2. To reduce the chance of overhearing adjacent conversations or
3. To reduce the chance of having your conversation overheard by someone else.
4. to aid in alleviating the effects of tinnitus by providing a low-level broad-band noise to help
achieve the "habituation" of tinnitus.

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Common Technical Specifications:
 Weight: 12 oz. (340.2 g)
 Audio Frequency Range: 300Hz - 3KHz
 Output Sound Level: MAX 92 dB @ 4 ft.
 Power: two 9 volt alkaline batteries or AC transformer (120 or 240 VAC)

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IPhone Applications
Studio Six Digital - AudioTools - Generator
Sine Wave
1000Hz 6.85dBu
10k 6.87dBu
31Hz 6.75dBu
Pink Noise
Full bandwidth -20.0dBu
Octave band 1k -31.0dBu
octave band 125 -31.0dBu
Octave band 31 -31.0dBu
Octave band 16k -31.0dBu
White Noise
Full band -28.9dBu
Octave bands vary
Square Wave
63Hz 3.43dBu
1000Hz 3.44dBu

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Rabble Noise Generator
Features
Was designed by TSCM/counter-surveillance professionals and will protect you against all types of
eavesdropping when used in correspondence with the recommendations.
Employs a new approach to the problem of conversation protection. Uses a new, speech-like noise
which, in the most of cases, has proven to be more efficient when compared to white noise.
The noise has been 'compiled' using real human conversations and is similar to the noise of a 'rabble'
in busy public places. This type of noise is the most effective when creating interference to voice
recorders and listening devices, especially when the size of the protective device is critical.
Kinds of listening devices rendered useless by the new “Rabbler”:
 Voice recorders
 Radio microphones
 GSM/3G “bugs”
 Body-carried video cameras - watches, ties, etc. (jamming of acoustics) Wired microphones
 Any other type of audio surveillance
The Rabbler creates additional barrier interference which masks your speech. It is when a certain
noise level is reached that listening devices will record or transmit information, it is extremely
difficult, or impossible, to extract the speech component. Since the generator creates a 'speech-like'
noise, the cleaning of this sound is extremely difficult or most likely impossible, if the level of noise is
sufficient.

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Distortion & Reverberation Generator
DRUID D-06
Top-of-the-line protection system. This is the only device in the world which can give 100%
protection to your conversations against interception or recording. The DRUID D-06 creates powerful
interference against all kinds of listening devices! Even if a person is standing next to the participants,
they will not be able to understand what is being said. The headsets allow the users to hear each other
clearly while the DRUID's central unit produces interference. Powered from 220V or the internal
rechargeable battery with a resource time of 3—6 hours. The unit is supplied in a carry case.
Not all listening devices can be detected by existing methods. The DRUID D-06 is a unique system
for providing protection of human's speech.
Remotely controlled radio microphones, wired microphones, passive resonators, miniature voice
recorders practically all these devices cannot be detected by conventional methods. Even a modern
cellular phone may contain a digital voice recorder; this means that any phone lying on the desktop
could be used by an adversary to record a conversation.
The generated audio interference cannot be cleared by any noise-clearance methods. At the same time
the produced interference does not create any inconvenience to the participants of the negotiation
thanks to the special headsets. The DRUID headset allows users to hear each other with crystal clear
quality.

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Laptop & PC Configurations
VDI
Motivations for VDI

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Poll Results: Is VDI More Expensive Than PC?
Annual Facilities Costs PC vs. VDI

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Comparing Endpoint PC Security to VDI Security
Parameter PC VDI Thin Client/Chip PC
Allows working locally if
network is down
Easy to maintain security
Hardware Renewal
Complete Hardware should be
renewed every (~800$) 5 years
Complete Hardware should be
renewed every (~400$) 8+
years
Privilege Escalation Allows Taking Over Endpoint Taking Over An Entire Server
Full Compatibility with
External devices, Smart Cards
Physical Security Is NOT A
Risk
No Hard Disk Encryption Is
Required
Endpoint Backup & Roaming
Profiles is not a must
Not Vulnerable to Boot Kits
and MBR/Bios Viruses

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VDI Security Comparison:
Citrix XenDesktop vs. VMWare View
Security Feature VMWare View 4.6 Citrix XenDesktop 5
Client Authentication
Methods
Active Directory
Kerberos Realm in
mixed AD/MIT
Kerberos environments
RSA SecurID
X.509 Certificate
Active Directory
Kerberos Realm in mixed AD/MIT Kerberos environments
RSA SecurID
X.509 Certificate
Support for 2-factor
authentication?
Yes Yes
Control
redirection/mapping of
local host hard drives
Yes Yes
Control Host Clipboard
redirection for text
copy/paste
Yes Yes
Control Host Clipboard
redirection for files and
folders?
No, files and folders
cannot be copied
between host and view
using PCoIP
Yes
Full Screen only mode
with no toggle to local
host OS
Yes, but only with
hardware thin client
Yes, but only with type 1 deployment
Single sign-on support Yes Yes
Granular USB
redirection control
No, just basic usb
redirect on or off
Yes, very granular criteria including: VID, PID, REL,
Class, SubClass, Prot tags in the USB device descriptor
field
Alow Read-only access
to USB Hard drives
No, but you can use
GPO MSFT policies to
accomplish this
Yes, very granular criteria including: VID, PID, REL,
Class, SubClass, Prot tags in the USB device descriptor
field
Communication Protocol
Used
RDP or PCoIP ICA
Are communications
encrypted natively
Yes, if using PCoIP to
a Windows 2008
security server. AES
128-bit SSL
Yes, if connecting to a Citrix security gateway. AES 128-
bit SSL
VDI communications can
run over a 3rd party
SSLVPN connection?
Yes Yes
VDI can USB sync iOS
devices like iPhone and
iPad
Yes Yes
Ability to run VDI client
in offline or local mode
Yes, as a type 2
hypervisor (i.e.
application on an
existing OS)
Yes, as a type 1 bare metal hypervisor (i.e. boot directly
into VDI client) The install of XenClient offline mode
requires you to destroy or overwrite your current host OS. It
also requires hardware virtualization found only on Intel

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vPro family of CPU's. The benefit is that it has better
performance because it is access the hardware directly and
not through a guest OS like a type 2 hypervisor. The
potential drawback is that it dedicates that host to being just
a XenClient unless you enable dual booting. In some cases
this is actually a plus since it solves the security issues that
come with having a guest OS that VDI runs on top off.
Ability to manage offline
VDI clients
Yes, you can also force
the user to periodically
check-in their VDI so it
is properly backed up
and updated.
No, but automated backups are performed by the client
Ability to encrypt VDI
files and folders on the
guest OS
Yes
Yes, called XenVault. Uses up to 256-bit AES encryption.
Can be wiped centrally/remotely if needed
Lockout VDI if
communication to server
is lost for X time period?
Yes Unknown
Microsoft Active
Directory is required for
policy settings of VDI?
No Yes
Control mapping to host
drives
Yes, RDP only Yes
Built-in bandwidth
protocol management
Yes, using PCoIP Yes, Limit bandwidth per session
Restrict access based on
time/location/device type
No Yes
Restrict VDI
functionality based on
time/location/device type
No Yes
IPv6 Support No No
FIPS 140-2 Compliant Yes Yes
VDI Security Best
Practices Whitepaper
Published
Yes Yes
Embedded firewall at
VDI headend
Yes, vShield Yes, Citrix Secure Gateway
VDI Anti-virus offload to
virtual appliance
Yes, vShield Endpoint
required. Removes
requirement for AV
clients on each VDI
host.
Yes, using integration with Mcafee MOVE A/V. Removes
requirement for AV clients on each VDI host
Supports multiple AD
forests and multiple AD
domains
Yes Yes
As you can see, both vendors have compelling offers with their own strengths and weaknesses. I
don't see a huge security advantage of one over the other. Instead, your choice will depend on
your specific requirements more than anything else. Technology changes rapidly, especially in
the VDI space, so be sure to validate what I have here with other sources or the vendors

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themselves. If you see something that has become no longer true please post a comment and I will
update this posting. If you know of some security comparisons I should have included please post
them as well.
Data as a service
Data as a service, or DaaS, is a cousin of software as a service. Like all members of the "as a Service"
(aaS) family, DaaS is based on the concept that the product, data in this case, can be provided on demand to
the user regardless of geographic or organizational separation of provider and consumer. Additionally, the
emergence of service-oriented architecture (SOA) has rendered the actual platform on which the data
resides also irrelevant. This development has enabled the recent emergence of the relatively new concept of
DaaS.
Traditionally, most enterprises have used data stored in a self-contained repository, for which software was
specifically developed to access and present the data in a human-readable form. One result of this paradigm
is the bundling of both the data and the software needed to interpret it into a single package, sold as a
consumer product. As the number of bundled software/data packages proliferated and required interaction
among one another, another layer of interface was required. These interfaces, collectively known
as enterprise application integration (EAI), often tended to encourage vendor lock-in, as it is generally easy
to integrate applications that are built upon the same foundation technology.
The result of the combined software/data consumer package and required EAI middleware has been an
increased amount of software for organizations to manage and maintain, simply for the use of particular
data. In addition to routine maintenance costs, a cascading amount of software updates are required as the
format of the data changes. The existence of this situation contributes to the attractiveness of DaaS to data
consumers because it allows for the separation of data cost and usage from that of a specific software or
platform.
Benefits
Data as a Service brings the notion that data quality can happen in a centralized place, cleansing and
enriching data and offering it to different systems, applications or users, irrespective of where they were in
the organization or on the network. As such, Data as Service solutions provide the following advantages:
 Agility – Customers can move quickly due to the simplicity of the data access and the fact that they
don’t need extensive knowledge of the underlying data. If customers require a slightly different data
structure or has location specific requirements, the implementation is easy because the changes are
minimal.
 Cost-effectiveness – Providers can build the base with the data experts and outsource the presentation
layer, which makes for very cost effective user interfaces and makes change requests at the
presentation layer much more feasible.
 Data quality – Access to the data is controlled through the data services, which tends to improve data
quality because there is a single point for updates. Once those services are tested thoroughly, they only
need to be regression tested if they remain unchanged for the next deployment.

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Security
Like any other cloud based service there are several main issues:
1. Network downtime – vendor or client downtime for maintenance, disaster or Denial of
Service attacks completely deny the ability of the user’s to work
2. Data Security – Data is physically stored on the vendor’s remote servers and may read,
modified and deleted by: mistake, bribery, extortion and etc…
3. Data Security – Over the internet - All the information is transferred on the wire and
physically leaves the organizations computers. This enables countries and enemies to record,
decrypt traffic and obtain secret information
PC Metal Locking

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Disabling Internal/External USB, DVD, CD-ROM Boot
Organizations should implement an intensive Endpoint Security Solution for Device Control. The
solution must cover the following aspects:
1. Protected Physical Interfaces
1.1.1.USB
1.1.2.FireWire
1.1.3.PCMCIA
1.1.4.Secure Digital (SD)
1.1.5.Parallel
1.1.6.Serial
1.1.7.Modem
1.1.8.Internal Ports
2. Protected Wireless Interfaces
2.1.1.Wi-Fi
2.1.2.Bluetooth
2.1.3.Infra-Red (IrDA)
2.1.4.Protected Storage Devices
3. External Hard Drives
3.1.1.Removable Storage Devices
3.1.2.CD / DVD Drives
3.1.3.Floppy Drives
3.1.4.Tape Drives

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Security Policy - Flexible Strategy, Simple Implementation
Different organizations have different needs and different corporate cultures. That’s why device
control solutions allows administrators to first choose their endpoint security strategy, and then
implement it in line with their unique organizational needs.
Device control solutions creates forensic logs of all data moving in and out of the organization,
allowing administrators to create policies that don’t necessarily restrict device usage, but allow
full visibility of device activity and content traffic. Through a flexible management console,
device control solutions allow administrators to create comprehensive and granular endpoint
security policies.
Device control solutions - Features and Benefits
 Granular control - detects and restricts devices by device type, device model or unique
serial number.
 Data awareness - control the transfer of files both to and from external storage devices
according to the file types.
 Removable media encryption - encrypts corporate data in motion on removable storage
devices, external hard drives, and CD/DVDs.
 Track offline usage of removable storage - tracks file transfers to/from encrypted devices
on non-corporate computers (offline).
 Built-in compliance policies - includes detailed configurations for achieving security
policies that are mapped to specific regulatory compliance standards such as PCI, HIPAA
and SOX.
 Granular Wi-Fi control - by MAC address, SSID, or the security level of the network
Anti bridging - prevents hybrid network bridging by blocking Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Modems
or IrDA while the PC is connected to the wired corporate LAN.
 Anti-hardware Keylogger - blocks or detects both USB and PS/2 hardware Keyloggers.
 U3 and auto run control - turns U3 USB drives into regular USB drives while attached to
organization endpoints, protecting against auto-launch programs by blocking auto run.
 Flexible and intuitive management - automatically synchronizes with Microsoft
 Active Directory and Novell eDirectory.
If the organization decides to allow USB device usage such as USB Disk-On-Keys and USB
Storage devices, it should use secure solutions. Secure Disk-On-Key solutions are:
4. Encrypted and:
 Requires a password
 Requires a certificate and a password
 Requires a biometric fingerprint
 Requires a certificate and a biometric fingerprint
5. Device has a physical switch between two modes:
 Read Only
 Read and Write

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Biometric Integrated USB Devices:
Biometric Integrated USB Devices:

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Setting Bios Passwords
BIOS passwords can add an extra layer of security for desktop and laptop computers. They are used to
either prevent a user from changing the BIOS settings or to prevent the PC from booting without a
password. Unfortunately, BIOS passwords can also be a liability if a user forgets their password, or
changes the password to intentionally lock out the corporate IT department. Sending the unit back to the
manufacturer to have the BIOS reset can be expensive and is usually not covered in the warranty. Never
fear, all is not lost. There are a few known backdoors and other tricks of the trade that can be used to
bypass or reset the BIOS
Upgrading to Windows 7 + UAC
User Account Control
User Account Control (UAC) helps defend your PC against hackers and malicious software. Any time a
program wants to make a major change to your computer, UAC lets you know and asks for permission.
In Windows 7, UAC is now less intrusive and more flexible. Fewer Windows 7 programs and tasks require
your consent. If you have administrator privileges on your PC, you can also fine-tune UAC's notification
settings in Control Panel.

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User Account Control (UAC) is a feature in Windows that can help you stay in control of your computer by
informing you when a program makes a change that requires administrator-level permission. UAC works
by adjusting the permission level of your user account. If you’re doing tasks that can be done as a standard
user, such as reading e-mail, listening to music, or creating documents, you have the permissions of a
standard user—even if you’re logged on as an administrator.
When changes are going to be made to your computer that requires administrator-level permission, UAC
notifies you. If you are an administrator, you can click Yes to continue. If you are not an administrator,
someone with an administrator account on the computer will have to enter their password for you to
continue. If you give permission, you are temporarily given the rights of an administrator to complete the
task and then your permissions are returned back to that of a standard user. This makes it so that even if
you're using an administrator account, changes cannot be made to your computer without you knowing
about it, which can help prevent malicious software (malware) and spyware from being installed on or
making changes to your computer.
When your permission or password is needed to complete a task, UAC will notify you with one of four
different types of dialog boxes. The table below describes the different types of dialog boxes used to notify
you and guidance on how to respond to them.
Icon Type Description
A setting or feature
that is part of
Windows needs your
permission to start.
This item has a valid digital signature that verifies that
Microsoft is the publisher of this item. If you get this type
of dialog box, it's usually safe to continue. If you are
unsure, check the name of the program or function to decide

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Icon Type Description
if it’s something you want to run.
A program that is not
part of Windows
needs your
This program has a valid digital signature, which helps to
ensure that the program is what it claims to be and verifies
the identity of the publisher of the program. If you get this
type of dialog box, make sure the program is the one that
you want to run and that you trust the publisher.
A program with an
unknown publisher
needs your
This program doesn't have a valid digital signature from its
publisher. This doesn't necessarily indicate danger, as many
older, legitimate programs lack signatures. However, you
should use extra caution and only allow a program to run if
you obtained it from a trusted source, such as the original
CD or a publisher's website. If you are unsure, look up the
name of the program on the Internet to determine if it is a
known program or malicious software.
You have been
blocked by your
system administrator
from running this
program.
This program has been blocked because it is known to be
untrusted. To run this program, you need to contact your
system administrator.
We recommend that you log on to your computer with a standard user account most of the time. You can
browse the Internet, send e-mail, and use a word processor, all without an administrator account. When you
want to perform an administrative task, such as installing a new program or changing a setting that will
affect other users, you don't have to switch to an administrator account; Windows will prompt you for
permission or an administrator password before performing the task. We also recommend that you create
standard user accounts for all the people who use your computer.

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Internet Explorer’s 9 Protected Mode
Memory Protection Mechanisms
Security Cookie (Canary)
• This mechanism was created to avoid successful code execution when overwriting stack
variables.
• The mechanism creates a random value on process runtime, plants it before the functions
return pointer and verifying it before calling the “ret” command.
• While the application is attacked, and the return address is overwritten, this value is also
overwritten, the memory overwrite is being detected and the application does not call the
return command. (it usually closes itself)

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• This way, there is no way to overwrote the return address (EIP) without the software
knowing it and protecting itself
SafeSEH
• This mechanism was invented to prevent attackers from executing code by overwriting
the error handler pointer
• SHE overwrites were used to bypass the Stack’s Security Cookie by overwriting the
exception handler and causing an exception, therefore executing code before the function
returns and before the stack cookie is being verified.

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• SafeSEH denies the ability of an attacker to execute code by overwriting the SHE handler
by maintaining a white-list of allowed SHE function pointers, gathered at compilation
time and there no unauthorized dynamically added/written SHE pointer will be executed.
• The problem with this method is that old unsafe libraries that are loaded into the process
at known addresses can be used as trampolines to execute code.

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Address space layout randomization (ASLR)
Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is a computer security method which involves
randomly arranging the positions of key data areas, usually including the base of
the executable and position of libraries, heap, and stack, in a process’s address space.
Benefits
Address space randomization hinders some types of security attacks by making it more difficult
for an attacker to predict target addresses. For example, attackers trying to execute return-to-libc
attacks must locate the code to be executed, while other attackers trying to execute shellcode
injected on the stack have to find the stack first. In both cases, the related memory addresses are
obscured from the attackers. These values have to be guessed, and a mistaken guess is not usually
recoverable due to the application crashing.
The most critical benefits are:
• ASLR is a mechanism which randomizes the modules addresses in the application’s
memory space, creating an unpredictable process layout and denying attackers from
knowing the memory addresses of useful code and system calls.
• The system calls/APIs addresses are being randomizes with each system reboot
• The application’s modules addresses are being randomizes with process initialization
• ASLR eliminates SafeSEH bypassing with old libraries, stack cookie bypass using return-
to-libc attacks and disabling DEP using return-to-libc.

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Visualization of ASLR Changes to system Memory per Boot
NX (No eXecute – Hardware DEP)
• NX is a bit in each the PageEntry which tells the CPU/Operating System if the bytes in
this memory page is code and is meant and allowed to be executed.
• This bits purpose is denying attackers from executing code while attacking applications
• When the attacker executes the attack, he makes a jump into his own code, when DEP is
enables the application closes right after the jump, since it is not allowed to execute code
from user/attacker influenced memory locations such as the Stack and the Head.

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DEP and ASLR Protection Activation State:

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Data Execution Prevention - DEP
When DEP detects that code data is trying execute from a data memory region:
DEP, ASLR, IE Protected Mode and UAC’s Impact on
Security in Windows:
1. All the following statements ignore the possibility of privilege escalation and remote kernel
exploits aside. These will only be fully mitigated once the entire kernel memory space will be
completely randomized by ASLR.
2. The potential damage of all social engineering attacks automatically downgraded to accessing
information at the current user’s level. Attacker cannot take over the machine, cannot install
malicious software and drivers that are required to attack and take over the network. (clicking a
inserting a malicious CD, USB, Clicking a virus, infected cracks)
3. Combination of Internet Explorer 9 “Protected Mode” with UAC reduces the risk of internet
exploits to the bare minimum possible. When a successful exploitation may only achieve guest
privilege and rights.
4. Integration of DEP and ASLR results in mitigation 99% of the known exploitation techniques as
of today. Therefore, they provide the ultimate protection, better than any external software such as
Smart Anti-Virus or HIPS memory patches.
5. Combination of Windows 7/2008, SafeSEH, DEP, ASLR, UAC and Internet Explorer Protected
Mode provides a security baseline 100 times stronger than Windows XP and 2003 Server.

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Encrypting Laptops
Laptops are a growing practice in most organizations. As the amount of employees who use
laptops grown, so does the amount of sensitive data stored on them. The common attacker is fully
aware that it is fairly easy and possible to steal a laptop and:
1. Obtain all of the sensitive data on it.
2. Use stored credentials on it to connect to the company’s VPN and online systems
Besides the risks for a laptop’s data when it is stolen, there are few other reasons to use Full disk
encryption:
1. Full disk encryption protects the data itself
2. Full disk encryption protects the operating systems data and avoid “Winlogon Bypass”
with well-known boot-CDs such as “ERD Commander”
Managed Solution – Mcafee / Symantec
On windows, the solutions are pretty much the same. When it comes to encrypting and managing
operating systems other than windows, Mcafee is much more grown as a product. As MAC
adoption to enterprise has grown, it cannot be disregarded in the comparison.
Encryption Product Comparison for Apple Macintosh
Product Name Company Name First released Maintained?
BestCrypt Jetico 1993 
SecureDoc WinMagic Inc. 1997 
PGPDisk PGP Corporation 1998 
Check Point FDE Check Point Software 1999 
FileVault Apple Inc. 2003 
TrueCrypt
TrueCrypt
Foundation
2004 
Bloombase Keyparc Bloombase 2007 
McAfee Endpoint Encryption McAfee, Inc. 2007 
SafeGuard Enterprise Sophos (Utimaco) 2007 
Symantec Endpoint
Encryption
Symantec 2008 
FileVault 2 Apple Inc. 2011 

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Relevant Features for Full Disk Encryption Product Comparison
1. Hidden containers: Whether hidden containers (an encrypted container (A) within another
encrypted container (B) so the existence of container A cannot be established) can be
created for deniable encryption. Note that some modes of operation like CBC with a plain
IV can be more prone to watermarking attacks than others.
2. Pre-boot authentication: Whether authentication can be required before booting the
computer, thus allowing one to encrypt the boot disk.
3. Custom authentication: Whether custom authentication mechanisms can be implemented
with third-party applications.[clarification needed]
4. Multiple keys: Whether an encrypted volume can have more than one active key.
5. Passphrase strengthening: Whether key strengthening is used with plain text passwords to
frustrate dictionary attacks, usually using PBKDF2.
6. Hardware acceleration: Whether dedicated cryptographic accelerator expansion cards can
be taken advantage of.
7. Trusted Platform Module: Whether the implementation can use a TPM cryptoprocessor.
8. Filesystems: what Filesystems are supported?
9. Two-factor authentication: Whether optional security tokens (hardware security modules,
such as Aladdin eToken and smart cards) are supported (for example using PKCS#11)
Product Feature Comparison Table
Name
Hidden
container
s
Pre-boot
authenticatio
n
Custom
authenticatio
n
Multipl
e keys
Passphrase
strengthenin
g
Hardware
acceleratio
n
TP
M
Filesystems
Two-factor
authenticatio
n
BestCrypt        OS 
Bloombase        ? ?
Check Point FDE ?     ? ? ? 
FileVault 2        HFS+ 
PGPDisk   ?   ?  ? 
McAfee
Endpoint
       OS 
SafeGuard Ent.        OS 
SecureDoc        ? 
Symantec Endpoi
nt
      
NTFS,FAT3
2

TrueCrypt 
only on
Windows
     OS 

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Aloaha Secure
Stick
      
NTFS,FAT3
2

Layering & Partition Type Support
1. Whole disk: Whether the whole physical disk or logical volume can be encrypted, including the
partition tables and master boot record. Note that this does not imply that the encrypted disk can
be used as the boot disk itself; refer to "pre-boot authentication" in the features comparison table.
2. Partition: Whether individual disk partitions can be encrypted.
3. File: Whether the encrypted container can be stored in a file (usually implemented as
encrypted loop devices).
4. Swap space: Whether the swap space (called a "pagefile" on Windows) can be encrypted
individually/explicitly.
5. Hibernation file: Whether the hibernation file is encrypted (if hibernation is supported).
Name
Whole
disk
Partition File
Swap
space
Hibernation file
BestCrypt     
Bloombase Keyparc     
Check Point Full Disk
Encryption
  ?  
FileVault 2     
PGPDisk     
McAfee Endpoint
Encryption (SafeBoot)
    
SafeGuard Enterprise     Each sector on disk is
encrypted
SecureDoc     
Symantec Endpoint
Encryption
    
TrueCrypt     

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Modes of operation
Different modes of operation supported by the software. Note that an encrypted volume can only
use one mode of operation.
1. CBC with predictable IVs: The CBC (cipher block chaining) mode where initialization
vectors are statically derived from the sector number and are not secret; this means that
IVs are re-used when overwriting a sector and the vectors can easily be guessed by an
attacker, leading to watermarking attacks.
2. CBC with secret IVs: The CBC mode where initialization vectors are statically derived
from the encryption key and sector number. The IVs are secret, but they are re-used with
overwrites. Methods for this include ESSIV and encrypted sector numbers (CGD).
3. CBC with random per-sector keys: The CBC mode where random keys are generated
for each sector when it is written to, thus does not exhibit the typical weaknesses of CBC
with re-used initialization vectors. The individual sector keys are stored on disk and
encrypted with a master key. (See GBDE for details)
4. LRW: The Liskov-Rivest-Wagner tweak able narrow-block mode, a mode of operation
specifically designed for disk encryption. Superseded by the more secure XTS mode due
to security concerns.
5. XTS: XEX-based Tweaked Codebook mode (TCB) with Cipher Text Stealing
(CTS), the SISWG (IEEE P1619) standard for disk encryption.
Name
CBC w/
predictable IVs
CBC w/
secret IVs
CBC w/ random per-
sector keys
LRW XTS
BestCrypt     
Bloombase Keyparc ?  ? ? ?
Check Point Full Disk
Encryption
? ? ? ? ?
FileVault     
FileVault 2     
PGPDisk ? ? ? ? ?
McAfee Endpoint Encryption
(SafeBoot)
    
SafeGuard Enterprise ? ? ? ? ?
SecureDoc ? ? ? ? ?
Symantec Endpoint Encryption     

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TrueCrypt Legacy support  
Legacy
support

Non-Managed - TrueCrypt
TrueCrypt is a free software application used for on-the-fly encryption (OTFE). It can create a virtual
encrypted disk within a file or encrypt a partition or (under Microsoft Windows except Windows 2000) the
entire storage device (pre-boot authentication).
Operating systems
TrueCrypt supports Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X, FreeBSD, and Linux operating systems
(using FUSE). Both 32-bit and 64-bit versions of these operating systems are supported, except
for Windows IA-64 (not supported) and Mac OS X 10.6 Snow Leopard (runs as a 32-bit process).
The version for Windows 7, Windows Vista, or Windows XP can encrypt the boot partition or
entire boot drive. There is an independent, compatible implementation, tcplay, for Dragonfly
BSD and Linux.
Cryptographic algorithms
Individual algorithms supported by TrueCrypt are AES, Serpent, and Twofish. Additionally, five
different combinations of cascaded algorithms are available: AES-Twofish, AES-Twofish-
Serpent, Serpent-AES, Serpent-Twofish-AES and Twofish-Serpent. The cryptographic hash
functions used by TrueCrypt are RIPEMD-160, SHA-512, and Whirlpool.
Modes of operation
TrueCrypt currently uses the XTS mode of operation. Prior to this, TrueCrypt used LRW mode in
versions 4.1 through 4.3a, and CBC mode in versions 4.0 and earlier. XTS mode is thought to be
more secure than LRW mode, which in turn is more secure than CBC mode.
Although new volumes can only be created in XTS mode, TrueCrypt is backward compatible
with older volumes using LRW mode and CBC mode. Later versions produce a security warning
when mounting CBC mode volumes and recommend that they be replaced with new volumes in
XTS mode.

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First Time Full Disk Encryption Takes Just a Few Hours
Typing Password Is Required On Boot:

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Hidden Volumes Supported
Setting Laptops “Out of Organization Personal Firewall
Policy”
The Threats of Using a Laptop outside of the organization
1. Attacking the laptop via hostile networks by connecting to communication ports it is
listening on, such as file sharing and remote desktop.
2. User unknowingly or malicious user intentionally downloading hostile files such as:
Malware, Spyware, Virus, Worm, Trojan horse, Keylogger, Fraudware, RansomWare. So
that in the user’s next connection to the organization’s network, he project risk on the
users and servers he can access on the network level.
The complexity of choosing the methods of blocking potentially hostile
communication:
1. The ideal solution to defense the organization’s laptops outside of its perimeter is
defining a list of approved communication ports and protocols. (Port & Protocol
Whitelist)
2. The problem in choosing the ideal solution is that limiting the communication to specific
services (while listing) breaks the normal functioning of any software which uses ports or
protocols that were not defined. Some of this software might be low risk applications
such as Computer games, video Streaming Servers and etc…

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3. Therefore, the recommended method at this point is blocking the communication using
Black List method while we select a list of applications and protocols of applications with
high risk such as: Remote Control, File Sharing, VPN Clients and the most commonly
used Trojan horses.
CommentLocal PortsRemote PortsApplicationPurpose
3389
(TCP/UDP)
3389 (TCP/UDP)Microsoft RDP
Remote Control
Software (With File
Sharing)
3283
(TCP/UDP)
5900, 5988
(TCP)
3283 (TCP/UDP)
5900, 5988 (TCP)
Apple Remote
Desktop
None80, 5938 (TCP)TeamViewer
2002 (TCP)80, 443 (TCP)LogMeIn
443 (TCP)
5800/5900
(TCP)
6800/6900
(TCP)
443 (TCP)ShowMyPC
5632
(TCP/UDP)
5632 (TCP/UDP)PCAnywhere
5500, 5900,
5901, 5800
(TCP)
5500, 5900, 5901, 5800
(TCP)
VNC
RealVNC
TightVNC
UltraVNC
None80, 443 (TCP)
Bomgar
Zoho Meeting/Assist
5279, 4279
(TCP)
5279, 4279 (TCP)Anyplace Control
None80, 443 (TCP)TouchMyPC
None80, 443 (TCP)RSupport RemoteCall
None80, 443 (TCP)BeamYourScreen
None
80, 443, 7612, 7616,
7617 (TCP)
ISL Online / ISL Light
139, 445139, 445 (TCP)NetBIOSNetwork File

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(TCP)Samba (Linux)Sharing
548 (TCP)548 (TCP)Apple File Sharing
Old Emule
Client Port
4672 (TCP)4672 (TCP)
Emule
eDonkey
P2P File Sharing
Old Emule
Client Port
4662 (UDP)4662 (UDP)
Emule
Web
Server
4711 (TCP)4711 (TCP)
1214 (TCP)1214 (TCP)Kazza
None6699 (TCP)iMesh
None6346 (TCP/UDP)Gnutella
None6881 - 6889 (TCP/UDP)Azureus
None
411, 1025 to 32000
(TCP/UDP)
DC++
None6346, 6347 (TCP/UDP)Limewire
None
41170 – 41350
(TCP/UDP)
Blubster
None3689 (TCP/UDP)iTunes
80 (TCP)
443 (TCP)
NoneSkype
P2P Chat/Voice
With File Sharing
None
1863, 5190,
6891-6901 (TCP/UDP)
MSN Messenger
None
5190 (TCP/UDP)
4000 (UDP)
ICQ
None5010 (TCP)Yahoo Messenger
None5190 (TCP/UDP)
AOL Instant
Messenger
None8080, 8090 (TCP)WebcamXPVideo/Voice Sharing
(Streaming Servers) None8000, 8001 (TCP)Winamp Streaming
None
5061, 10000 – 20000
(UDP)
Vonage
VOIP Software
None11675 (TCP/UDP)VPhone

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None
8767, 14534, 51234
(TCP/UDP)
TeamSpeak
1-1024None
FTP, Telnet, SNMP,
IMAP, POP3, SMTP,
HTTP, HTTPS,
HTTP-Proxy…
Common Server
Listening Ports
1194, 5000
(UDP)
1194, 5000 (UDP)OpenVPN
VPN Servers
None1723 (TCP)Generic PPTP
1701, 500
(UDP)
1701, 500 (UDP)Juniper
500, 4500,
10000 (UDP)
500, 4500, 10000 (UDP)Cisco
500, 2746,
18233 (UDP)
500, 2746, 18233 (UDP)
18231, 18232 (TCP)
Check-Point
1224 (UDP)1224 (TCP/UDP)VPNz
2865 (UDP)2865 (TCP/UDP)pit-vpn
Network Equipment
Understanding Layer 2 & 3 Security
1. Layer 2 Attack Landscape
2. Attacks and Counter Measures
a. VLAN Hopping
b. MAC Attacks
c. DHCP Attacks
d. ARP Attacks
e. Spoofing Attacks
f. General Attacks

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Layer 3+ Security
1. Access Control Lists (ACLs)
a. VLANs are the most cost effective solution for Layer 2 security, but they DO
NOT PROVIDE ANY LAYER 3 SECURITY.
b. This means that ANY ATTACK ON AN IP LEVEL CAN BE EXECUTED
WITH VLANS
c. In order to implement Layer 3 security, it is best to change the network design to
have an “Application Aware Back-Bone Firewall” configured as a Trunk before
the backbone router.
d. The low-cost, manual, semi-solution is implementing Layer 3 Access List Rules
(ACLs) which define which VLANs can access which other networks/VLANs.
e. ACLs are very hard to maintain and require constant updates by network
personnel.
2. Utilizing Security Features implemented in major vendors network equipment. These
features include:
a. DDoS Protection

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b. Security ACLs and VACLs
c. QoS Rate Limiting
d. uRPF Check
e. Traffic Storm Control
f. Network Under SYN Attack
g. ARP Policing
h. Recommended Rate-Limiter Configuration
i. Hardware-Based Rate Limiters on the PFC3
j. Configuring Sticky ARP
3. Quality of Service (QoS)
a. Limiting each VLAN to a specific amount of traffic from the entire bandwidth
b. Limiting each User in each VLAN to a specific amount of traffic from maximum
bandwidth limit assigned to that VLAN
c. These allow network stability and clear operation in case of worms and viruses
d. These allow immediate alerts on “VLAN bandwidth QoS capacity hit” that
should be integrated into a SIEM with a response script to shut down the specific
port. Such an alert would clearly notify of an abnormal activity with specific
VLAN label explaining the logical organizational unit and the specific IP in that
VLAN.

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An example of the right way to divide VLANs to matching
logical business units

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Maximizing Your Network Security with Private
VLANs (PVLAN)
As discussed in the "Protected Ports (PVLAN Edge") section, the PVLAN feature prevents
interhost communications providing port-based security among adjacent ports within a VLAN
across one or more switches. PVLAN provides Layer 2 isolation to quarantine hosts from one
another among ports within the same PVLAN.
Access ports in a PVLAN are allowed to communicate only with the certain designated router
ports. In most cases, this is the default gateway IP address. Private VLANs and normal VLANs
can coexist on the same switch. The PVLAN feature allows segregating traffic at Layer 2, thereby
transforming a broadcast segment into a non-broadcast multi-access-like segment. To prevent
interhost and inter-server communication, PVLAN can be used efficiently because the number of
subnets or VLANs is greatly reduced, although the segmented approach within a single network
segment is still achieved. The number is reduced because there is no need to create extra
subnet/VLANs.
NOTE
The PVLAN feature is not available on all Cisco switches. Refer to Table 4-1 for a list of
supported platforms.
Table 4-1. VLAN Support on Catalyst Switches
Platform Software Version Isolated
VLAN
PVLAN Edge
(Protected Port)
Community
VLAN
Catalyst 8500 Not Supported — — —
Catalyst 6500/6000—CatOS
on Supervisor and Cisco
IOS on MSFC
5.4(1) on Supervisor
and 12.0(7)XE1 on
MSFC
Yes N/A Yes
Catalyst 6500/6000—Cisco
IOS System software
12.1(8a)EX,
12.1(11b)E1
Yes N/A Yes
Catalyst 5500/5000 Not Supported — — —
Catalyst 4500/4000—CatOS 6.2(1) Yes N/A Yes
Catalyst 4500/4000—Cisco
IOS
12.1(8a)EW Yes N/A 12.2(20)EW
Catalyst 3750 12.2(20)SE—EMI Yes 12.1(11)AX Yes
Catalyst 3750 Metro 12.1(14)AX No Yes No
Catalyst 3560 12.2(20)SE—EMI Yes 12.1(19)EA1 Yes
Catalyst 3550 12.1(4)EA1 No Yes Not Currently
Supported

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Platform Software Version Isolated
VLAN
PVLAN Edge
(Protected Port)
Community
VLAN
Catalyst 2970 12.1(11)AX No Yes No
Catalyst 2955 12.1(6)EA2 No Yes No
Catalyst 2950 12.0(5.2)WC1,
12.1(4)EA1
No Yes Not Currently
Supported
Catalyst 2900XL/3500XL 12.0(5)XU (on 8MB
switches only)
No Yes No
Catalyst 2948G-L3 / 4908G-
L3
Not Supported — — —
Catalyst 2948G/2980G 6.2 Yes N/A Yes
Catalyst 2940 12.1(13)AY No Yes No
Catalyst 1900 Not Supported — — —
The list that follows describes three types of PVLAN ports, as shown in Figure 4-1a:
 Promiscuous: A promiscuous port can communicate with all interfaces, including the
isolated and community ports within a PVLAN. The function of the promiscuous port is
to move traffic between ports in community or isolated VLANs. It can use access lists to
identify which traffic can pass between these VLANs. Only one promiscuous port is
allowed per single PVLAN, and it serves all the community and isolated VLANs in the
Private VLAN.
 Isolated: An isolated PVLAN port has complete Layer 2 segregation from all the other
ports within the same PVLAN, but not from the promiscuous ports. Traffic from the
isolated port is forwarded only to the promiscuous ports and none other.
 Community: Community ports are logically combined groups of ports in a common
community and can pass traffic among themselves and with promiscuous ports. Ports are
separated at Layer 2 from all other interfaces in other communities or isolated ports
within their PVLAN.

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Figure 4-1a PVLAN Components
It is possible for isolated and community port traffic to enter or leave the switch through a trunk
interface because trunks support VLANs carrying traffic among isolated, community, and
promiscuous ports. Hence, PVLAN ports are associated with a separate set of VLANs that are
used to create the PVLAN structure. A PVLAN uses VLANs in following three ways:
 As a primary VLAN: Carries traffic from a promiscuous port to isolated, community,
and other promiscuous ports in the same primary VLAN.
 As an isolated VLAN: Carries traffic from isolated ports to a promiscuous port. Ports in
the isolated VLAN cannot communicate at Layer 2 with any other port within the Private
VLAN (either another community VLAN port or a port in the same isolated VLAN). To
communicate with other ports, it must go through the promiscuous port.
 As a community VLAN: Carries traffic between community ports within the same
community VLAN and to promiscuous ports. Ports in the community VLAN can
communicate at Layer 2 with each other (only within the same community VLAN) but
cannot communicate with ports in other community or isolated VLANs. To communicate
with other ports, they must go through the promiscuous port. Multiple community
VLANs can be configured in a PVLAN.
Figure 4-1a depicts the basic PVLAN components and the different types of PVLAN ports.
The isolated and community VLANs are also called secondary VLANs. PVLANs can be extended
across multiple devices by trunking the primary, isolated, and community VLANs to other
devices that support PVLANs.
In summary, a Private VLAN contains three elements: the Private VLAN itself, the secondary
VLANs (known as the community VLAN and isolated VLAN), and the promiscuous port.

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Figure 4-1b PVLAN Traffic Flow Policies
Configuring PVLAN
NOTE
When enabling PVLAN, it is important to remember to configure the switch as VTP transparent
mode before you can create a PVLAN. PVLANs are configured in the context of a single switch
and cannot have members on other switches.
Perform the following steps to configure the PVLAN feature:
 Step 1 Create the primary and secondary PVLANs. For example, configure VLAN 101
as a primary VLAN, VLANs 201 to 202 as community VLANs, and VLAN 301 as an
isolated VLAN.
o Hostname(config)# vlan 101
o Hostname(config-vlan)# private-vlan primary
o Hostname(config-vlan)# private-vlan community
o Hostname(config-vlan)# private-vlan community

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o Hostname(config-vlan)# private-vlan isolated
 Step 2 Associate the secondary VLANs to the primary PVLAN. For example, associate
community VLANs 201 to 202 and isolated VLAN 301 with the primary VLAN 101.
o Hostname(config-vlan)# private-vlan association 201-202,301
o Hostname(config-vlan)# exit
NOTE
Only one isolated VLAN can be mapped to a primary VLAN, but multiple community
VLANs can be mapped to a primary VLAN.
 Step 3 Map secondary VLANs to the SVI (Switched Virtual Interface), which is the
Layer 3 VLAN interface of a primary VLAN to allow Layer 3 switching of PVLAN
ingress traffic.
o For example, permit routing of secondary VLAN ingress traffic from VLANs
201 to 202 and 301 to the private VLAN 101 SVI (Layer 3 interface).
o Hostname(config)# interface vlan 101
o Hostname(config-if)# private-vlan mapping add 201-202,301
 Step 4 Configure a Layer 2 interface as an isolated or community port, and associate the
Layer 2 port to the primary VLAN and selected secondary VLAN pair. For example,
configure interface FastEthernet 1/1 as a PVLAN host port in community VLAN 201,
map it to a private-secondary PVLAN pair, configure FastEthernet 1/2 as a PVLAN host
port in isolated VLAN 301, and map it to a private-secondary PVLAN pair.
o Hostname(config)# interface Fastethernet 1/1
o Hostname(config-if)# switchport mode private-vlan host
o Hostname(config-if)# switchport private-vlan host-association 101 201
o Hostname(config-if)# switchport mode private-vlan host
o Hostname(config-if)# switchport private-vlan host-association 101 301
 Step 5 Configure a Layer 2 interface as a PVLAN promiscuous port and map the
PVLAN promiscuous port to the primary VLAN and to the selected secondary VLAN
pair. For example, configure interface FastEthernet 1/10 as a PVLAN promiscuous port,
and map it to a private-secondary PVLAN pair.
o Hostname(config-if)# switchport mode private-vlan promiscuous

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o Hostname(config-if)# switchport private-vlan mapping 101 201-202,301
Use the show interface private-vlan mapping command and the show interface [interface-id]
switchport command to verify the configuration.
Upgrading Router/Switch Firmware
Write Unsaved configurations
ciscorouter# write memory
Building configuration…
[OK]
Check space on Flash Memory
ciscorouter# show flash
Backup Startup Configuration
Setup a TFTP server in the same IP range as the Cisco device to back up the config, IOS image and also for
later to upload the new IOS image.
ciscorouter# copy startup-config tftp
Address or name of remote host []? 192.168.1.50
Destination filename [startup-config]?

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!!
1278 bytes c opied in 0.100 secs
Backup Current IOS Image
ciscorouter# copy flash: tftp:
Source filename []? xxxxx-xx-xx.121-x.XB
Destination filename [xxxxx-xx-xx.121-x.XB]?
Now, we are all set. Load the new IOS image from the TFTP onto the flash
ciscorouter# copy tftp: flash:
Source filename []? xxxxx-xx-xx.121-x.XB
Destination filename [xxxxx-xx-xx.121-x.XB]?
%Warning:There is a file already existing with this name
Do you want to over write? [confirm]
Accessing tftp://192.168.1.150/xxxxx-xx-xx.121-x.XB…
Erase flash: before copying? [confirm]
Erasing the flash filesystem will remove all files! Continue? [confirm]
Erasing device… eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
ee …erased
Erase of flash: complete
Loading xxxxx-xx-xx.121-x.XB from 192.168.1.150 (via Ethernet0): !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
…..
….
…
..
[OK - 3802992/7605248 bytes]
Verifying checksum… OK (0x1ABC)
3802992 bytes copied in 68.236 secs (65568 bytes/sec)
This may error if there isn't enough memory in which case, you need to delete the existing image and copy
the newer image onto the router or switch.
On a Cisco Catalyst 3560
ciscorouter# delete /force /recurssive flash:/c3560-ipbase-mz.122-35.SE5
ciscorouter#sh flash:
Directory of flash:/
3 -rwx 1216 Mar 1 1993 00:10:27 +00:00 config.text
4 -rwx 5 Mar 1 1993 00:10:27 +00:00 private-config.text
15998976 bytes total (15995904 bytes free)
That deletes the existing image and the show command just show that.
Now copy the newer image onto the flash

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ciscorouter#copy tftp: flash:
Source filename []? c3560-ipbasek9-mz.122-40.SE.bin
Destination filename [c3560-ipbasek9-mz.122-40.SE.bin]?
Accessing tftp://10.10.10.2/c3560-ipbasek9-mz.122-40.SE.bin…
Loading c3560-ipbasek9-mz.122-40.SE.bin from 10.10.10.2 (via Vlan1):
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!
[OK - 8295106 bytes]
8295106 bytes copied in 124.571 secs (66589 bytes/sec)
Check if the version is upgraded
ciscorouter# sh flash
Update the system config to boot with new image.
ciscorouter(config)#boot system flash:/c3560-ipbasek9-mz.122-40.SE.bin
If it looks ok. Reload the Cisco Router
ciscorouter# reload
When is back online check if the cisco device has booted with the new Cisco IOS image.
ciscorouter# sh ver
Buying new equipment, new security features
The main reasons to buy new network equipment such as switches and routers are:
1. Today’s network equipment is faster, better, more secure by default, supports latest
security and networking technologies and provides better services.
2. Most of the security features previously discussed is mostly supported on switches from
2007 forward. (BDPU Guard, IP Source Guard, DHCP Snooping, Dynamic ARP
Inspection)
3. The current switches provide better remote management features that are required by
third party security controls such as NAC (Network Access Control) and SIEM (Security
Information Event Management)
4. Latest routers also support SECURE MANAGEMENT with SNMP v3, encrypted
connection requiring username and password to manage the network.

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Secure Configuration Management (SCM)
Introduction
Configuration management (CM) is a process for establishing and maintaining consistency of a
product’s performance, functional and physical attributes with its requirements, design and
operational information throughout its life. The CM process is widely used by military
engineering organizations to manage complex systems, such as weapon systems, vehicles,
and information systems. Outside of the military, the CM process is now used with many domain
models in the civil engineering and other industrial engineering segments such
as roads, bridges, canals, dams, and buildings.
Maintenance systems
Configuration management is used to maintain an understanding of the status of complex assets
with a view to maintaining the highest level of serviceability for the lowest cost. Specifically, it
aims to ensure that operations are not disrupted due to the asset (or parts of the asset) overrunning
limits of planned lifespan or below quality levels.
In the military, this type of activity is often classed as "mission readiness", and seeks to define
which assets are available and for which type of mission; a classic example is whether aircraft on-
board an aircraft carrier are equipped with bombs for ground support or missiles for defense.
A theory of configuration maintenance was worked out by Mark Burgess, with a practical
implementation on present day computer systems in the software Cfengine able to perform real
time repair as well as preventive maintenance.
Preventive maintenance
Understanding the "as is" state of an asset and its major components is an essential element in
preventive maintenance as used in maintenance, repair, and overhaul and enterprise asset
management systems.
Predictive maintenance
Many types of component use electronic sensors to capture data which provides live condition
monitoring. This data is analyzed on board or at a remote location by computer to evaluate its
current serviceability and increasingly its likely future state using algorithms which predict
potential future failures based on previous examples of failure through field experience and
modeling. This is the basis for "predictive maintenance".

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Availability of accurate and timely data is essential in order for CM to provide operational value
and a lack of this can often be a limiting factor. Capturing and disseminating the operating data to
the various support organizations is becoming an industry in itself.
The consumers of this data have grown more numerous and complex with the growth of
programs offered by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). These are designed to offer
operators guaranteed availability and make the picture more complex with the operator managing
the asset but the OEM taking on the liability to ensure its serviceability. In such a situation,
individual components within an asset may communicate directly to an analysis center provided
by the OEM or an independent analyst.
Key Security Configuration Management Features:
1. Security Configuration Management:
1.1. Ensures that endpoint operating systems and applications are securely configured and in
compliance with industry best practices and regulatory standards.
2. Out-of-the-box Checklist Templates:
2.1. Microsoft Windows Security Guides
2.2. NIST Special Publication 800-68
2.3. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security
2.4. Technical Implementation Guides (STIG)
2.5. National Security Agency (NSA)
2.6. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Federal
2.7. Desktop Core Configurations (FDCC)
3. NIST-Validated for Accuracy: NIST validation ensures accurate assessments of policy
Checklists and configurations as defined in the National Vulnerability Database.
4. Continuous Policy Assessment and Enforcement: Delivers ongoing and flexible mechanism
to assess and apply appropriate policies to applicable systems with Content Wizard.
5. Fully Customizable: Open standards implementation ensures policy management via an
extendable and customizable architecture providing the ability to add, create, define, edit and
import/export security configuration policies and checklists based on industry standards in an
easy-to-edit XML format.
6. Centrally managed through the Endpoint Management and Security Suite for improved
visibility and reduced complexity. Security Configuration and Posture Reporting: Automates
security checks including:
6.1. Event log policy settings
6.2. File permission settings
6.3. Local policies group

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6.4. System services group
6.5. Network settings
6.6. System settings
6.7. Windows components
6.8. Local user policy setting
6.9. Security patches
6.10. Firewall settings
6.11. IE settings
6.12. Application settings
Comprehensive Security Configuration Reporting
Secure Configuration Manager provides the industry's first solution that covers all aspects of the
evolving vulnerability management process. It provides you with all of the tools necessary to
effectively manage your information security environment—from notification and advisory
services that provide you with the latest in vulnerability alerts to patch and configuration
remediation that ensures you are protected against those vulnerabilities.
Notification and Advisory
Though security products depend on current, up-to-date knowledge to maximize results;
researching and compiling new vulnerabilities and keeping up with Microsoft patch databases
will give you gray hair. National Vulnerability Database provides the latest information on
vulnerabilities and exploits through AutoSync capabilities in Vulnerability Manager. AutoSync
provides a common pipe for publishing and delivering vulnerability knowledge as well as other
security-related content including patch databases, regulation templates and even sample policy
templates. AutoSync can be configured to pull new updates hourly, daily or in the middle of the
night to ensure that your vulnerability scans aren't using stale knowledge.
Policy and Regulatory Compliance Auditing
Today, companies not only face difficulties enforcing corporate security policies, but now they
must also meet security requirements from vague government regulations. Companies must now
be much more proactive and thorough in their security audits.
Secure Configuration Manager provides the tools necessary to audit security controls across a
heterogeneous environment, ensuring compliance with company policies and regulations.
Provides thousands of out-of-the-box checks to evaluate the most common security controls.
Additionally, Secure Configuration Manager provides templates organized by regulations such as
Sarbanes-Oxley, HIPAA, FERC and GLBA or by best practices such as SANS Top 20, Center for
Internet Security, workstation hardening and other operating system baselines.

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Controls assessments can be run as-needed or scheduled to occur regularly to ensure on going
policy compliance. Risk-based reports highlighting your most critical and most at-risk systems
provide executive-level summaries and supply the information necessary for taking corrective
actions.
Delta reports enable you to quickly and easily know what has changed on a system since the last
audit. This is a great "last step" in a compliance remediation project to verify that the necessary
changes have been put in place.
Vulnerability Scanning
takes a unique approach by not only providing the vulnerability alert content, but also including
actionable vulnerability templates that enable you to immediately assess your environment to
determine which systems are exposed to the vulnerability and which systems have already been
exploited.
As the vulnerability matures, AutoSync will automatically keep you apprised of any updates to
the vulnerability content and the vulnerability signature. Even though you may have prevented
the exploit, you should still periodically check for any regression to your system. Better yet, roll
the vulnerability signatures into your technical standards to optimize your policy compliance
efforts.
Patch and Configuration Management
Reduce the risks in your environment by being sure that your systems are up to date with the
latest vendor security patches. Secure Configuration Manager has the power to identify missing
patches on Windows, UNIX and Linux platforms. Moreover, Secure Configuration Manager
assists patch management efforts on Windows workstations and servers by assessing automatic
update settings and identifying patch installation failures and other events related to patch
deployments—all from a central console. Secure Configuration Manager enables you to
effectively remediate exceptions from policies by providing detailed recommendations and, in
many cases, the ability to take action directly from the console. Specifically, it enables users to
manage user and group accounts, modify security policies or change file and share permissions
directly from the console. Many actions can be taken directly in response to policy violations or
discovered vulnerabilities.
Mapping supported devices
 How can software inventory software help me manage network assets?

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If you’re in the IT space, it's important to have an accurate network inventory. For
instance, keeping track of what software is connected to your network can save you time,
money, and bandwidth. Quality software inventory software will let you keep track of
software licenses to make sure you're in compliance. Knowing who has what licenses can
help with loss prevention.
Convenience plays a role as well: it can be annoying when an employee tells you he has a
problem with software but doesn't provide any information. With a good network
inventory in place, you can look and see what pesky software he installed and quickly
address the issue.
 How is a network inventory collected?
There are two primary ways that network inventory collectors work: by scanning devices
via scanning agent or via an agentless scanner. Scanning agents need to be deployed on
each computer on your network. When in place, these agents scan the computer and
report back to a central database with the information they've gathered.
On the plus side, scanning agents don't have to connect to a device to scan it, so you don't
have to worry about firewalls and antivirus programs blocking the connection. All you
need to do is make sure it’s set at the correct admin level and can connect to the central
installation.
On the down side, you'll have to install the agent on every computer in your network, and
update them all when new versions are released.
Agentless scanners don't require anything to be installed on each device in your network
as all the devices are scanned from a central installation. If your network is set up
correctly and maintained properly, using an agentless scanner can be much easier.
 Can a network inventory include multiple networks?
If your company manages networks at multiple sites, you'll need to make sure you're able
to get an inventory snapshot for each site. This can be done in a variety of ways including
using a simple agentless scanner over a VPN connection, or using remote scanners that
will report back to a central installation. Scanning over a VPN can slow down your
network traffic significantly, so if you like to run a scan during business hours, be sure to
use a remote scanning solution.
Inventory Scanner

Implementing and auditing security controls part 1

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Implementing and auditing security controls part 1