Wisr2011 en

Arbor Special Report

Worldwide Infrastructure
Security Report
2011 Volume VII

About Arbor Networks
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Arbor Special Report: Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report

Table of Contents
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Demographics of Survey Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Survey Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Most Significant Operational Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Scale, Targeting and Frequency of Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Attack Detection, Classification and Traceback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Attack Mitigation Techniques and Average Time to Mitigate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Managed Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Observations on OPSEC Groups, Law Enforcement, CERTs and CSIRTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Infrastructure Protection Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
IPv6 Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Data Center Operator Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Mobile and Fixed Wireless Operator Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
DNS and DNSSEC Migration Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
VoIP Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Respondent Survey Feedback . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

List of Figures
Figure 1 Organizational Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 2 Geographic Distribution of Organizational Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 3 Geographic Coverage of Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 4 Role of Respondent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 5 Services Offered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 6 Most Significant Operational Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Figure 7 Application-Layer DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Figure 8 Application-Layer DDoS Attack Methodologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Figure 9 Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Figure 10 Concerns Regarding Integrity of Infrastructure Vendor Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Figure 11 Influence of Integrity Concerns on Product Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Figure 12 Influence of Geopolitical Origin of Network Traffic on Threat Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Figure 13 DDoS Threat Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 14 Factors Impacting DDoS Threat Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 15 Largest Bandwidth Attacks Reported . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Figure 16 Target of Highest-Bandwidth DDoS Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Figure 17 Average Number of DDoS Attacks per Month . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 18 Tools Used to Measure Highest-Bandwidth DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 19 Multi-Vector DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Figure 20 Attack Motivations Considered Common or Very Common . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Figure 21 Experienced IPv6 DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Figure 22 Detection of Outbound/Crossbound DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 23 Mitigation of Outbound/Crossbound DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 24 Use of Network Traffic Detection/Classification Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Figure 25 Tools Used to Measure Highest-Bandwidth DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Figure 26 Deployment of Event-Correlation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Figure 27 DDoS Mitigation Tools Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Figure 28 Average Time Required to Mitigate DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 29 Tools Used to Mitigate Outbound/Crossbound DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Figure 30 Proactive Blocking of Botnet Command-and-Controls, Malware Drop Sites and Phishing Servers . . . 27
Figure 31 Offer Managed Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 32 Type of Managed Security Services Offered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Figure 33 Self-Initiated DDoS Mitigation for Clean Pipes Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Figure 34 Managed Security Service Head Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Figure 35 OPSEC Team Head Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Figure 36 Systemic OPSEC Team Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 37 NOC Presence by Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 38 SOC Presence by Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 39 Frequency of DDoS Defense Rehearsals/Drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Figure 40 Maintain Current Contact Information for Peers/Transits/Customers/OPSEC Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Figure 41 External Sources of Operationally Relevant Security Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 42 Participation in Vetted OPSEC Groups/Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 43 Efficacy of Global OPSEC Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Figure 44 Systemic Challenges to Participation in Vetted OPSEC Groups/Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Figure 45 Attacks/Incidents Referred to Law Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

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Figure 46 Systemic Challenges in Law Enforcement Referrals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 47 Confidence in Law Enforcement Investigative Efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 48 Perceived Changes in Law Enforcement Investigative Efficacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Figure 49 Internal CERT Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 50 Engagement with National/Government CERT/CSIRT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 51 Desirability of National/Government CERT/CSIRT Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 52 Concerned with Government Efforts for Critical Infrastructure Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 53 Network Infrastructure BCPs Implemented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Figure 54 Layer 2 Infrastructure BCPs Deployed in Data Center Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 55 Explicit Filtering of Customer Routing Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 56 Explicit Filtering of Inbound Peer/Upstream Routing Advertisements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Figure 57 Concerns Regarding IPv4 Address Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Figure 58 IPv6 Currently Implemented on Network Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 59 IPv6 Deployed Currently or Within Next 12 Months . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 60 IPv6 Used for Infrastructure Addressing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 61 Criticality of IPv6 Network Traffic Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Figure 62 Network Infrastructure Support for IPv6 Flow Telemetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Figure 63 Anticipated IPv6 Traffic Volume Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Figure 64 IPv6 Security Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Figure 65 Current and Planned IPv6 DDoS Attack Mitigation Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Figure 66 Data Center Present in Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 67 Observed DDoS Attacks Targeting Data Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 68 DDoS Attacks Exceeding Data Center Bandwidth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 69 Targets of DDoS Data Center Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Figure 70 Average DDoS Attacks per Month on Data Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Figure 71 Impact from Data Center DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Figure 72 Failure of Stateful Firewall/IPS Due to DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Figure 73 Failure of Load Balancers Due to DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Figure 74 Primary Mechanism for DDoS Attack Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Figure 75 Mobile/Fixed Wireless Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 76 Number of Wireless Subscribers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 77 Deployed Wireless Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 78 Anticipated Deployment Dates of Forthcoming 4G Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 79 Security and Visibility in Mobile Packet Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

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Figure 80 Security and Visibility at Mobile Gi Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Figure 81 Attacks Explicitly Targeting Wireless Network Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 82 DDoS Attacks per Month on Wireless Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 83 Security Incidents Leading to Customer Outages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Figure 84 Wireless Network Infrastructure Affected by DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Figure 85 Observed DDoS Attacks Against Stateful Firewalls and/or NAT Devices in Wireless Networks . . . . . . 53
Figure 86 Application-Layer DDoS Attacks Against Wireless Network Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Figure 87 Outbound/Crossbound Attacks from Wireless Subscribers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 88 Percentage of Wireless Subscriber Nodes Participating in Botnets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Figure 89 DDoS Attacks Targeting Gi Demarcation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Figure 90 Security Measures Deployed on Wireless Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Figure 91 IPv6 Addressing Deployed for Wireless Subscribers/Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Figure 92 DNS Server in Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Figure 93 DNS Security Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Figure 94 DNS Recursive Lookups Restricted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Figure 95 Customer-Visible DNS Outages Due to DDoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Figure 96 DNS Cache-Poisoning Attacks Observed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Figure 97 DDoS Attacks Against Recursive DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Figure 98 DDoS Attacks Against Authoritative DNS Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Figure 99 DNSSEC Deployment Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Figure 100 DNSSEC Infrastructure Support Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Figure 101 Concerns Regarding DNSSEC Response Sizes Enabling DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Reflection/Amplification DDoS Attacks
Figure 102 Offered VoIP Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 103 VoIP Security Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 104 Toll Fraud Observed on VoIP Services/Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 105 Brute-Force Attack Techniques Observed in VoIP Toll Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Figure 106 Concerns Regarding Caller ID Spoofing on VoIP Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 107 Tools Used to Detect VoIP Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Figure 108 Primary Tool Used to Mitigate DDoS Attacks Against VoIP Services/Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 109 SBCs Deployed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 110 SBCs Protected Against DDoS by Additional Tools/Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

4


Overview
Arbor Networks, in cooperation with the broader operational security
community, has completed the seventh edition of an ongoing series of
annual security surveys. This survey, covering roughly a 12-month period
from October 2010 through September 2011, is designed to provide
industry-wide data to network operators.

This data is intended to enable more informed decisions about the use of network security technology to protect
mission-critical Internet and other IP-based infrastructure. The survey output serves as a general resource for the
Internet operations and engineering community, recording information on the employment of various infrastructure
security techniques and other trends. It also provides the direct observations, insights and anecdotal experiences
of respondents that may be of value to others.

Operational network security issues—the day-to-day aspects of security in commercial networks—are the primary focus
of survey respondents. As such, the results provided in this survey are intended to more accurately represent real-world
concerns rather than the theoretical and emerging attack vectors addressed and speculated about elsewhere.

Key Findings
Ideologically-Motivated ‘Hacktivism’ and Vandalism Are the Most Readily-Identified DDoS
Attack Motivations
A new and extremely important finding in the 2011 Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report points to the ‘why’
behind DDoS attacks. Ideology was the most common motivating factor for DDoS attacks in 2011, followed by
a desire to vandalize. When this is coupled with the fact that anyone can be attacked, and anyone can initiate an
attack, it is clear a sea-change in the risk assessment model for network operators and end-customers is required.
Today, increased situational awareness has become a necessity for all Internet-connected organizations.

• 35% reported political or ideological attack motivation
• 31% reported nihilism or vandalism as attack motivation

10 Gbps and Larger Flood-Based DDoS Attacks Are the ‘New Normal’
During the survey period, respondents reported a significant increase in the prevalence of flood-based DDoS
attacks in the 10 Gbps range. This represents the “mainstreaming” of large flood-based DDoS attacks, and indicates
that network operators must be prepared to withstand and mitigate large flood attacks on a routine basis.

The largest reported DDoS attack during the survey period was 60 Gbps, in contrast with the 100 Gbps attack
reported in the previous report. Attacks of this magnitude continue to constitute an extremely serious threat to
network infrastructure and ancillary support services such as DNS, not to mention end-customer properties.

5


Increased Sophistication and Complexity of Application-Layer (Layer 7) DDoS Attacks and
Multi-Vector DDoS Attacks Are Becoming More Common
Application-layer (Layer 7) DDoS attacks continue to grow in both prevalence and sophistication. Respondents
indicated that sophisticated application-layer DDoS attack methodologies have become commonplace, and that
complex multi-vector DDoS attacks with both flood-based and application-layer attack components are rapidly
gaining in popularity with attackers.

Visibility and Security of Mobile and Fixed Wireless Networks Are an Ongoing Concern
A significant minority of mobile and fixed wireless operators report continuing challenges to detection of security
threats on their networks. The majority of respondents indicated that their network visibility was much stronger
than it was in 2010; however, their general lack of ability to detect infected hosts and the wide-spread data
concerning attacks point to significant blind spots still resident in their capabilities.

First-Ever Reports of IPv6 DDoS Attacks ‘in the Wild’ on Production Networks
For the first time, respondents to this year’s survey indicated that they had observed IPv6 DDoS attacks on their
networks. This marks a significant milestone in the arms race between attackers and defenders, and confirms that
network operators must have sufficient visibility and mitigation capabilities to protect IPv6-enabled properties.

Rarity of IPv6-Enabled Attacks Indicates Low IPv6 Market Penetration and Lack of Critical Mass
Even though IPv6 DDoS attacks are now being reported, IPv6 security incidents are relatively rare. This is a clear
indication that while IPv6 deployment continues to advance, IPv6 is not yet economically or operationally significant
enough to warrant serious attention by the Internet criminal underground. This also indicates that much of the
IPv6 network traffic may be un-monitored, masking the real threats on IPv6 networks.

Stateful Firewalls, IPS and Load-Balancer Devices Continue to Fall Short on DDoS
Protection Capabilities
Respondents continue to report that stateful firewalls and IPS devices are failing under DDoS attacks due to
state-table exhaustion, and report similar findings with regard to load-balancer devices. Network operators must
have the capability to defend these stateful devices against DDoS attacks if they are deployed in front of Internet
facing services.

The Overwhelming Majority of Network Operators Do Not Engage Law Enforcement for Security
Incident Response and Follow Up
The perennial disengagement of most network operators from law enforcement continues, with network
operators continuing to lack confidence in law enforcement’s capabilities and willingness to investigate online
attack activity. Respondents also continue to evince strong dissatisfaction with current governmental efforts to
protect critical infrastructure.

6


Demographics of Survey Respondents
Survey participants included 114 self-classified Tier 1, Tier 2 and other IP
network operators (Figure 1) from the U.S. and Canada, Latin/South America,
EMEA, Africa and Asia (Figure 2).

This year’s respondent pool shows roughly the same demographic distribution of service provider categories
as last year’s report.

Organizational Type

40% Tier 2/3 Provider or Regional ISP
Tier 1 Service Provider
35%
Hosting/Data Center/Colo Services
30% Educational/Research
Survey Respondents

Mobile/Fixed Wireless
25%
DNS Registrar/DNS Service Provider
20% Wireline Broadband
Enterprise/ASP
15%
CDN/Content Delivery

10% Cloud Service Provider
Government
5% Managed Service Provider
Other
0%

Figure 1 Source: Arbor Networks, Inc.

While the number of respondents increased slightly from the 2010 survey, geographical diversity (Figure 2)
and operational focus diversity (Figure 3) remained relatively the same year over year.

Geographic Distribution of Organizational Headquarters

19% 11%
Asia Pacific/Oceania
Latin America (including Central and South America)
7%
Middle East and Africa
1%
US and Canada
Western, Central and Eastern Europe

28% 34%


7


Geographic Coverage of Network

60% Asia Pacific/Oceania
Latin America (including Central and South America)
50% Middle East and Africa
US and Canada
Survey Respondents

40% Western, Central and Eastern Europe

30%

20%

10%

0%


All survey participants are directly involved in network security operations at their respective organizations
(Figure 4) and/or make direct contributions to the global operational security community. Once again, the diversity
of geographical presence and operational focus has an impact on various results and observable trends over the
seven-year survey lifetime—something we attempt to highlight accordingly where considered pertinent.

Role of Respondent

50% Network Engineer
Security Engineer
Manager/Director
40%
Operations Engineer
Survey Respondents

Vice President
30% Officer
Other

20%

10%

0%


A strong plurality of respondents self-identified their specific job role as that of network engineer, while security
engineers and managers were represented in second and third places, respectively. In addition to the titles listed
in Figure 4, other job categories included security architects, security analysts, security researchers and managed
security services product managers.

8


Figure 5 illustrates that nearly 32 percent of respondents offer mobile/fixed wireless broadband access and more
than 42 percent offer managed security services. In addition to the specific services described in Figure 5, some
respondents also offer video-on-demand (VOD) services, e-government-focused services, IPv6 tunnel-broker
services and Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) registry services.

Services Offered

70% Hosting/Colocation
Direct Internet Access to Business
60%
DNS Services
Consumer ISP
Survey Respondents

50%
Cloud Services

40% Managed Security Services
CDN/Content Services
30% Mobile Services
Satellite Services
20% No Internet Services Offered
Other
10%

0%


Survey Methodology
The survey consisted of 132 free-form and multiple-choice questions,
representing the array of issues facing network operators today. Questions
addressed such topics as threats against backbone infrastructure and individual
customers; techniques employed to protect network infrastructure itself; and
mechanisms used to manage, detect and respond to security incidents.

The survey also included questions specific to data center operators, IPv6 security evolution, managed services,
VoIP, DNS, as well as mobile and fixed wireless operators. All data is presented in an aggregated and anonymous
manner and provided with the permission of the respondents. Standard mathematical methods to weight responses
have been applied where incomplete answers were provided for a given question. Several refinements occurred in
this edition of the survey, primarily based on respondent feedback. Some questions were deleted, some added and
many simply honed in an attempt to capture the most pertinent data sets.1

1 As in previous reports, several survey questions included multiple selections.

9


Several questions were added based upon suggestions by respondents to a previous survey, or as a result
of direct feedback from one of the many network security and operations forums from which survey review was
expressly solicited.

Arbor Networks intends to continue conducting this survey annually and sharing the results with the global Internet
security and operations communities. Our goals are:

1. To continually refine the questionnaire in order to provide more timely, detailed and relevant information
in future editions.

2. To increase the scope of the survey respondent pool to provide greater representation of the global
Internet network operations community.

Most Significant Operational Threats
More than 71 percent of respondents indicated that DDoS attacks toward
end customers were a significant operational threat encountered during this
12-month survey period (Figure 6).

Most Significant Operational Threats

80% DDoS attacks towards your customers
Infrastructure outages due to failure/misconfiguration
70%
Botted/compromised hosts on your network
60% Infrastructure outages due to DDoS
Survey Respondents

DDoS attacks towards your infrastructure
50%
DDoS attacks towards your services
40% New vulnerabilities
Zero-day exploits
30%
Under-capacity for bandwidth

20% Hacktivism
Other
10%

0%


Over 62 percent also identified misconfigurations and/or equipment failures as contributing to outages during
the survey period. Botnets and their unwanted effects (including DDoS attacks) were rated highly, as were DDoS
attacks targeted at operators’ network infrastructure and ancillary support services, such as DNS, Web portals
and email servers. Spam and VoIP-related attacks were included in the “Other” category.

10


With regards to application-layer attacks (Figure 7), respondents listed HTTP, DNS and SMTP as the most-frequently
targeted applications, with HTTP/S and SIP/VoIP coming in at fourth and fifth place, respectively. The percentage of
HTTP and IRC increased slightly year over year since 2010. DNS, SNMP, HTTP/S and SIP/VoIP decreased slightly
over the same period. Targeted applications in the “Other” category include SSH, online gaming, FTP, Telnet, RDP,
SQL databases, IRC, PHP and TCP port 123.

Application-Layer DDoS Attacks

90% HTTP
DNS
80%
SMTP
70%
HTTP/S
Survey Respondents

60% SIP/VoIP
IRC
50%
Other
40%

30%

20%

10%

0%


Figure 8 shows that while HTTP GET and HTTP POST were the most common application-layer DDoS attack
vectors, more sophisticated mechanisms such as Slowloris, LOIC, Apache Killer, SIP call-control floods, SlowPost
and HOIC are increasingly prevalent.

Application-Layer DDoS Attack Methodologies

80% HTTP GET flood
HTTP POST flood
70%
Slowloris
60% LOIC or variants
Survey Respondents

Apache Killer
50%
SIP call-control flood
40% SlowPost
HOIC or variants
30%
nkiller2 (TCP Persist)

20% Recoil

10%

0%


11


Top security concerns for the next 12 months (Figure 9) include: attacks against end customers; attacks against
operators’ network infrastructure devices and ancillary support services such as DNS and Web portals; botnet
activities, which include DDoS attacks; and, as in last year’s report, new vulnerabilities.

Security Concerns

60% DDoS attacks towards your customers
DDoS attacks towards your infrastructure
50% DDoS attacks towards your services
Infrastructure outages due to DDoS attacks
Survey Respondents

40% Infrastructure outages from failure
New vulnerabilities
30% Botted/compromised hosts on your network
Zero-day exploits

20% Hacktivism
Under-capacity for bandwidth

10%

0%


Based upon responses described later, we believe that the prominently highlighted concern over new vulnerabilities
continues, at least in part, to be related to the deployment of IPv6. Other forward-looking security concerns
expressed include VoIP-specific attacks and data loss or leakage due to botnet and/or malicious insider activity.

While there has been much speculation in the press surrounding possible concerns about the integrity of network
infrastructure equipment sourced from various countries, these concerns are not strongly reflected in our findings.
Figures 10 and 11 indicate that the overwhelming majority of respondents do not view this as a serious issue, and
it appears to have little impact on product procurement decisions, echoing last year’s findings.

Concerns Regarding Integrity of Influence of Integrity Concerns
Infrastructure Vendor Products on Product Procurement

33% 67% 25% 75%
Yes Yes
No No

Figure 10 Source: Arbor Networks, Inc. Figure 11 Source: Arbor Networks, Inc.

12


Respondents who indicated concerns regarding product origins offered the following comments:
• “We are not directly concerned, but our customers are.”
• “Recently, word-of-mouth advice from regulators suggests we avoid equipment originating from nations
perceived as hostile.”
• “‘Intelligence’ is being built into what used to be low-level equipment, like media converters and so on.
Couple this with the ubiquity of Internet access, and it makes backdoor access a lot more of a risk.”
• “Will not buy boxes with hard-coded support passwords.”
• “There are certain vendors that from a global view are either not preferred from a security perspective
or have to achieve specific internal accreditation.”

By way of contrast, nearly 75 percent of respondents (Figure 12) indicated that the purported geopolitical origin
of traffic ingressing and traversing their networks has a significant impact on their perception of the threat that
this traffic may pose to their organization and/or end customers.

Influence of Geopolitical Origin of Network
Traffic on Threat Perception

25% 75%
Yes
No


13


Figure 13 indicates that awareness of DDoS attacks amongst end-customer organizations has greatly increased
over the last 12 months. Unfortunately, as seen in Figure 14, the most common reason for this raised awareness
is that they have been the target of a DDoS attack. This emphasizes the point that many network operators are
ignoring the news about increased attack activity until they themselves fall victim.

DDoS Threat Awareness

60% Higher level of awareness
Same level of awareness
50% I do not know
Lower level of awareness
Survey Respondents

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%


Factors Impacting DDoS Threat Awareness

80% Experienced a DDoS attack
Highly-publicized DDoS attacks
70%
Business continuity planning risk assessment
60% Brand reputation concerns
Survey Respondents

Financial/legal liability assessment
50%
Legislative/regulatory requirements
40%

30%

20%

10%

0%


14


Scale, Targeting and Frequency of Attacks
During the survey period, respondents reported a significant increase in the
prevalence of flood-based DDoS attacks in the 10 Gbps range. This represents
the “mainstreaming” of large flood-based DDoS attacks, and indicates that
network operators must be prepared to withstand and mitigate large flood
attacks on a routine basis.

As illustrated in Figure 15, the highest-bandwidth attack observed by respondents during the survey period was
a 60 Gbps DNS reflection/amplification attack. This represents a 40 percent decrease from the previous year in
terms of sustained attack size for a single attack.

Largest Bandwidth Attacks Reported

100 2002

90 2003
2004
80
2005
70
2006
60 2007
Gbps

50 2008
2009
40
2010
30
2011
20

10

0


Based upon our experiences working with operators over the last year and data collected using Arbor’s ATLAS®
portal, we believe that this apparent decrease in attack magnitude at the high end does not represent a significant
reduction of risk from flood-based DDoS attacks. Sixty Gbps is a very large attack, and the increased prominence
of 10 Gbps and higher attacks reflected in survey responses indicates that the volume of traffic in large-scale
flood attacks remains a significant risk.

Over 74 percent of respondents reported that the highest-bandwidth DDoS attack they experienced during
this survey period was directed at their end customers, while nearly 13 percent reported that their own ancillary
support services such as DNS and Web portals were targeted (Figure 16). Almost 11 percent indicated that their
own network infrastructure was the target of the highest-bandwidth attack they experienced.

15


Target of Highest-Bandwidth DDoS Attack

80% Customer
Service
70%
Infrastructure
60% Other
Survey Respondents

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

S

Several respondents shared details of the highest-bandwidth attacks they’ve observed during the survey period:

• “We were a primary target of the WikiLeaks/Anonymous incident, experiencing ~100 attacks over 10 days
and covering more or less the full gamut of DDoS attack types. Unrelated 6.5 Gbps attack was IP fragments,
1500-byte packets, highly distributed.”

• “DDoS against UDP/80, 29 Mpps. Do I need to say more?”

• “Slowloris-based attack linked to WikiLeaks.”

• “We faced a side-effect of a spam botnet which tried to resolve nonexistent domain names, causing high
loads of NXDOMAIN answers.”

• “Mostly invalid packets that were stopped at our border routers via ACLs. Sources were mostly from Europe,
target was a Russian Webcam recruitment site. The observed size of the attack was 30 Gbps, but the overall
attack was larger than 50 Gbps and hitting capacity restraints within our providers’ networks.”

• “Attackers leveraging large amounts of insecure game servers to carry out multi-gigabit reflection/
amplification attacks.”

• “Flood of UDP traffic to an unused IP address within our mobile data network.”

• “4.4 Mpps attack was an attack using malformed DNS queries toward our DNS resolvers—payloads included
either a bunch of NULL characters or the string ‘0123456789ABCDE.’ Unknown which of our customers
the attack was aimed at or what the motive was. 3.4 Gbps attack was a DNS reflection/amplification attack
against our DNS infrastructure in which the attacker sent ANY–record queries for isc.org to approximately
3,300 recursive DNS servers, mainly in the U.S.”

16


• “Not sure of the initial exploitation vector (possibly several), but a large number of compromised US-based
Web servers had a Perl script uploaded into /tmp and executed several times over several months. This script
caused the servers to send out large volumes of UDP packets to the targeted host. There was ramp-up
from 200 Mbps up to 12 Gbps as we applied reverse proxy services on a variety of networks. Attack volume
was scaled up over a 3-month period to always slightly exceed our capacity, and the timings of that scaling
seemed to indicate a human was doing this deliberately in response to our defensive moves. After we handled
12 Gbps successfully for about 6 hours, the attacks stopped ‘permanently’—it has now been 6 months since
that last attack of this type. Some of the big US hosts that were running the attackers’ Perl script were
sending upwards of 500 Mbps individually, and it was difficult (read: impossible) to contact their owners to
have them stop it (in many cases it seemed they didn’t even notice it) in a timely manner. So, with that said,
the number of attacking hosts wasn’t the problem—a small number of very large, high-bandwidth attacking
hosts was the main issue (I’d say less than 20 single hosts accounted for 6-8 Gbps of the attack!). Traffic was
not spoofed and was the legitimate source as all web hosts who did end up responding to us found the script
leftover in /tmp, or running at the time they investigated.”

• “Motivation: take down a games Web site. Methodology: pure, old-fashioned bandwidth-based attack.”

• “Attack against a Web server—many unanswered requests which hit the firewall, taking it down.”

• “There was 1.2 Gbps attack towards single host. Varied packet size—mostly 1500-byte packets and quite
a lot of 64-byte packets to bring down the processing power of the customer access router.”

• “Automated system made malformed HTTP requests. It moved with the DNS, but couldn’t handle HTTP/S,
so we moved the site to HTTP/S-only for a month. No motivation understood or known—wasn’t even a
major site of ours. Possibly a miscreant used the target IP address in a PTR-record entry previously, and
an angry criminal rival attacked, thinking it was still in use by the original miscreant?”

• “SYN-flood which peaked an inbound interface, and was measured at ~14 Mpps.”

• “UDP flood towards an online auction site.”

• “Packet-based flood, motivation was immature—site was a community Web forum.”

• “The largest DDoS attacks we’ve seen have been focused on our email infrastructure—i.e., POP3/SMTP.
Not so much large amounts of data, just thousands of individual connections.”

17


As shown in Figure 17, nearly 47 percent of respondents indicated that they experienced 1 to 10 DDoS attacks per
month during the survey period, while over 44 percent experienced 10 to 500 or more DDoS attacks per month.

Average Number of DDoS Attacks per Month

50% 0
1-10
11-20
40%
21-50
Survey Respondents

51-100
30% 101- 500
500+

20%

10%

0%


As illustrated in Figure18, commercial flow-telemetry collection/analysis systems, such as Arbor’s Peakflow® SP
solution (“Peakflow SP”), were the leading tools used to detect and classify the highest-bandwidth attacks experi-
enced by respondents during the survey period. Custom in-house developed tools and various other mechanisms
were the second- and third-most popular solutions in this category, respectively.

Tools Used to Measure Highest-Bandwidth DDoS Attacks

50% Commercial NetFlow analyzers
In-house developed scripts/tools
Open Source NetFlow analyzers
40%
Open Source SNMP-based tools
Survey Respondents

Deep Packet Inspection
30% Commercial SNMP-based tools
Other

20%

10%

0%


18


While the prevalence of complex multi-vector DDoS attacks has steadily increased over the last several years,
Figure 19 indicates that nearly 27 percent of survey respondents have experienced multi-vector DDoS attacks
involving both flood-based and application-layer components during the last 12 months. This represents a
significant escalation on the part of attackers and is consistent with their increased usage of application-layer
attack methodologies.

Multi-Vector DDoS Attacks

41%
Yes
No
I do not know

27%

32%


During the last 12 months, our experiences in working with network operators worldwide in mitigating DDoS attacks
seemingly coincided with an apparent increase in the prevalence of ideologically-motivated “hacktivist” DDoS attacks.
While we noted this trend, it was our belief that this was merely indicative of our subjective experiences and those of
our customers, combined with generally heightened awareness of ideologically-motivated DDoS attacks following the
well-publicized WikiLeaks/Anonymous series of incidents.

When we made the decision to query this year’s survey respondents regarding their assessment of DDoS attack
motivations, we expected “Unknown” to constitute the overwhelming majority of responses, with nihilism/vandalism,
DDoS-enabled extortion and inter-criminal disputes making up most of the remainder.

19


Therefore, the results in Figure 20—which indicate that ideology or ”hacktivism” ranks as the single most commonly
observed motivation for DDoS attacks, with online gaming-related attacks ranked second—were surprising, while
at the same time confirming our subjective observations during the survey period.

Attack Motivations Considered Common or Very Common

35% Political/ideological
Nihilism/vandalism
30%
Online gaming
Criminals demonstrating capabilities
Survey Respondents

25%
Social networking

20% Misconfiguration/accidental
Unknown
15% Inter-personal/inter-group rivalries
Competitive
10% Criminal extortion attempts

5%

0%


We believe this finding may well comprise one of the single most important data points in this year’s report, with
major implications in terms of threat assessment, situational awareness and continuity of operations for network
operators, governmental bodies, law enforcement agencies and end customers alike.

Some additional free-form comments in response to this question follow:

• “As a network operator, we see the traffic, but seldom are privy to the motivation behind the attack.
I think that in many cases, our customers (colleges and universities) don’t know why the attack happened
either—they just deal with it.”

• “[We see] attacks against online auction sites which are similar to attacks against online gaming sites
and attacks intended to manipulate financial markets.”

• “We’ve experienced Quake 3/Source Engine-based exploit attacks. Attackers are abusing legitimate game
servers to send specially-crafted attack packets directing them to attack others, similar to DNS reflection/
amplification attacks.”

In this year’s survey, we asked respondents about the longest-duration DDoS attack they had observed during the
survey period. Responses varied widely, ranging from “a few minutes” to “six months, with bursts and calm stages.”

20


We also asked respondents about the average cost to their organizations of handling a DDoS attack. Several
free-form responses follow:

• “Approximately $250,000 USD/incident.”
• “$8,000 USD/incident.”
• “Approximately 1,000EUR/incident.”
• “Roughly $1M USD to $1.5M USD/incident.”
• “$300,000 USD/incident.”
• “$1M USD/incident.”
• “More than $100,000 USD/month.”
• “Net revenue-generator—we offer commercial DDoS mitigation services.”

In another significant development, Figure 21 reflects what we believe to be the first documented occurrences
of IPv6 DDoS attacks on production Internet networks.

Experienced IPv6 DDoS Attacks

75% 21%
Yes
No

4% I do not know


This is a significant milestone in the arms race between attackers and defenders. We believe that the scope
and prevalence of IPv6 DDoS attacks will gradually increase over time as IPv6 is more widely deployed. It is also
important to note that more than 75 percent of respondents do not have sufficient visibility into IPv6 traffic on
their networks to detect and classify IPv6 DDoS attacks.

At the same time, the small number of reported IPv6 security incidents is an indication of how slowly IPv6 deployment
and market penetration are progressing. There is a strong correlation between the economic significance of a given
technology and criminal activity taking advantage of said technology. In the assessment of the Internet criminal
underground, it is apparent that IPv6-enabled Internet properties simply are not yet worth the time and effort required
to attack them with any frequency.

21


When asked why he robbed banks, career criminal Willie Sutton famously replied, “Because that’s where the
money is.” One can draw a strong analogy between this and the way that modern Internet miscreants think.
They attack where the money is.

Figure 22 indicates that over 57 percent of respondents detected and classified outbound/crossbound DDoS
attacks during the survey period, a 16 percent decrease from last year’s tally. Only 34 percent mitigated these
attacks (Figure 23). We believe that this mitigation deficit is due in part to an almost exclusive focus on technical
means for mitigating inbound attacks, along with some level of misperception that outbound/crossbound attacks
are somehow less serious from an operational point of view.

Detection of Outbound/Crossbound Mitigation of Outbound/Crossbound
DDoS Attacks DDoS Attacks

43% 34%
Yes Yes
No No

57% 66%


Outbound/crossbound DDoS attacks consume end-customer and operator bandwidth and often affect ancillary
operator services such as DNS. This adversely affects peering ratios and results in increased transit costs. These
attacks can also lead to SLA and billing disputes with end customers. Therefore, outbound/crossbound DDoS
attacks warrant the same mitigation actions as inbound attacks as a matter of self-preservation.

22


Attack Detection, Classification and Traceback
The composition of tools used to detect, classify and traceback DDoS attacks
(Figure 24) generally corresponds to responses noted in the section of this
report entitled “Scale, Targeting and Frequency of Attacks” (page 15).

Use of Network Traffic Detection/Classification Tools

60%
Commercial SNMP-based tools
Survey Respondents

50%

40% Deep packet inspection
Other
30%

20%

10%

0%


This section identifies the tools used to detect and classify the single-largest DDoS attack experienced by
respondents during the survey period (Figure 25). Again, commercial flow-telemetry collection/analysis systems
were by far the most commonly used tool. More day-to-day emphasis has been placed by operators on in-house
developed tools, open source NetFlow analyzers, open source SNMP-based tools and deep packet inspection
over commercial SNMP-based tools.

Tools Used to Measure Highest-Bandwidth DDoS Attacks

60%
Commercial SNMP-based tools
Survey Respondents

50%

40% Deep packet inspection
Other
30%

20%

10%

0%


23


Other tools reported in use by respondents include IDS, syslog-based analysis systems, sinkholes, darknets,
honeypots and NMS.

Figure 26 illustrates that while over 41 percent of respondents indicate they do not employ event-correlation tools
to assist in detecting and classifying DDoS attacks, nearly 59 percent make use of either commercial, in-house
developed or open-source correlation systems.

Deployment of Event-Correlation Systems

50% No
Yes, we use commercial tools
Yes, we use open-source tools
40%
Yes, we use in-house tools
Survey Respondents

30%

20%

10%

0%


24


Attack Mitigation Techniques and Average Time
to Mitigate
As in previous reports, despite their functional and operational limitations,
ACLs continue to be the single most widely used tool to mitigate DDoS attacks
(Figure 27). Destination-based, remotely-triggered blackholes (D/RTBH) and
intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMS) such as the Peakflow® SP Threat
Management System (“TMS”) and the now-discontinued Cisco Guard are the
second and third most widely used mitigation mechanisms, respectively.

DDoS Mitigation Tools Used

70% Access control lists (ACLs)
Destination-based remote-triggered blackhole (D/RTBH)
60%
Intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMS)
Firewall
Survey Respondents

50%
Source-based remote-triggered blackhole (S/RTBH)

40% Load-balancer
IPS
30% Content delivery network (CDN)
FlowSpec
20% DPI systems
None
10%
Other

0%


Approximately 53 percent of respondents indicated that D/RTBH is still in common use—despite the fact that
D/RTBH blocks all traffic to the target and essentially completes the DDoS attack for the attacker, penalizing the
victim. Other techniques utilized by respondents include custom-coded application-layer classification tools, CDNs,
DPI systems, load-balancers and GeoIP-based blocking of attack traffic purportedly emanating from specific
geopolitical localities.

Once again this year, no respondents indicated that QoS is still in general use as an attack mitigation technique
for inbound DDoS attacks. Rate-limiting inbound traffic to attack targets invariably has the unintended side effect
of enabling attack traffic to “crowd out” traffic from legitimate sources.

25


Nearly 47 percent of respondents indicated that they are able to successfully mitigate DDoS attacks within 20 minutes
(Figure 28), a slight decrease from last year. Nearly 33 percent indicated mitigation times in excess of 30 minutes,
more than double the number of operators reporting longer mitigation times than last year. This may be a result of
the increasing popularity of complex application attacks that are often more difficult to detect and mitigate.

Average Time Required to Mitigate DDoS Attacks

35% Automatically through scripts/tools
Less than 10 minutes
30%
More than 10 minutes but less than 20 minutes
More than 20 minutes but less than 30 minutes
Survey Respondents

25%
More than 30 minutes

20% We do not mitigate attacks

15%

10%

5%

0%


Focusing specifically on outbound/crossbound DDoS attacks (Figure 29), ACLs once again are the single most
widely utilized tool to mitigate attack traffic. Over 29 percent of respondents indicated that firewalls were used
to mitigate outbound/crossbound attacks, raising the specter of firewall state-table depletion as a possible DDoS
vector. Meanwhile, nearly 28 percent indicated that they do not mitigate outbound/crossbound attacks at all.

Tools Used to Mitigate Outbound/Crossbound DDoS Attacks

50% Access control lists (ACLs)
Firewall
None
40%
Destination-based remote-triggered blackhole (D/RTBH)
Survey Respondents

Source-based remote triggered blackhole (S/RTBH)
30% Intelligent DDoS mitigation systems (IDMS)
IPS
Quarantine system
20%
FlowSpec
Load-balancer
10% DPI systems
Content delivery network (CDN)

0% Other

S

26


Other tools and techniques utilized to mitigate outbound/crossbound DDoS attacks include D/RTBH, S/RTBH,
IDMS, IPS, FlowSpec and in-house-developed quarantine systems.

The overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that they do not proactively block known botnet C&C servers,
malware drop servers and phishing servers at this time (Figure 30). Nearly 24 percent indicated that they do in
fact attempt to block these undesirable hosts on a proactive basis.

Proactive Blocking of Botnet C&Cs, Malware
Drop Sites and Phishing Servers

24%
Yes
No

76%


27


Managed Security Services
Forty-five percent of respondents indicated that they offer managed security
services (Figure 31), with the most popular being managed router, managed
VPN and CPE firewalls (Figure 32). Of this pool of respondents, more than
58 percent offer Clean Pipes managed DDoS mitigation services, a slight
increase over last year.

Offer Managed Security Services

45%
Yes
No

55 %


Type of Managed Security Services Offered

80% Managed router
Managed VPN
70%
On-premise firewall
60% DDoS attack detection
Survey Respondents

DDoS attack mitigation (Clean Pipes)
50%
Traffic visibility
40% In-cloud firewall
Unified threat management (UTM)
30%
Data loss prevention (DLP)

20% Other

10%

0%


28


Of the respondents offering Clean Pipes managed DDoS mitigation services, 54 percent offer end customers the
option of self-initiating DDoS mitigation (Figure 33), a significant increase over previous reports. This year-over-year
continuity in the availability of self-mitigation options indicates that network operators view Clean Pipes as a
mature service and that end customers may safely be provided with the ability to mitigate incoming DDoS attacks
upon demand.

Self-Initiated DDoS Mitigation for Clean Pipes Customers

50% No, we do not allow customers to initiate mitigations
Yes, with a portal user interface
We do not offer a managed DDoS service
40%
Yes, with changes to DNS records
Survey Respondents

Yes, with a BGP announcement
30%

20%

10%

0%


Respondents offering managed security services reported a small head count of dedicated managed security
services personnel, with nearly 28 percent employing more than 10 dedicated staff members (Figure 34), an
11 percent increase year over year.

Managed Security Service Head Count

50% None
1-3 employees
4-6 employees
40%
7-10 employees
Survey Respondents

11-15 employees
30% 16-20 employees
20+ employees

20%

10%

0%

S

29


Observations on OPSEC Groups, Law Enforcement,
CERTs and CSIRTs
Figure 35 identifies the numbers of network engineering personnel, network
operations personnel and dedicated OPSEC personnel employed by
respondents. The majority of respondents employ 10 or fewer dedicated
OPSEC staff members.

OPSEC Team Head Count

50% None, no dedicated security resources
1-5
6-10
40%
11-15
Survey Respondents

16-20
30% 21-30
30+

20%

10%

0%

S

As in previous reports, lack of head count and/or resources topped the list of operational security challenges
faced by respondents (Figure 36). Other significant challenges reported by this year’s respondents include the
difficulty of finding and retaining skilled personnel, lack of management support, lack of stakeholder support
and CAPEX/OPEX funding. Free-form responses to this question included the following:

• “Customers do not want to pay for it.”
• “Size of organization insufficient to warrant a dedicated team.”
• “Cost of good people.”
• “Lack of awareness on the part of managers and business decision-makers. In our region, many
organizations are just starting to become cognizant of information security risks.”

30


Systemic OPSEC Team Challenges

60% Lack of headcount/resources
Difficulty of finding/retaining skilled personnel
50% OPEX funding
Lack of internal stakeholder support
Survey Respondents

40% Lack of management support
CAPEX funding
30% Other

20%

10%

0%

S

Figures 37 and 38 illustrate that approximately 90 percent of respondent organizations operate a NOC, and only
46 percent operate a SOC—the latter representing a 9 percent increase year over year.

NOC Presence by Organization SOC Presence by Organization

11% 46%
Yes Yes
No No

89% 54%


31


OPSEC teams response readiness saw a marked improvement over last year. Over 58 percent of respondent
organizations never rehearse their operational security plans and procedures or conduct OPSEC drills (Figure 39),
while in the last survey, 72 percent of respondents indicated that they did not exercise their plans. We believe this
improvement is directly related to the increasing number of victims combined with the fact that the DDoS problem
is now a top-of-mind concern for IT executives and their security teams. One comment from this section follows:

• “We don’t practice, but we do have basic plans that we would implement. We also maintain close relationships
with external upstream network providers for rapid escalation of problems.”

Frequency of DDoS Defense Rehearsals/Drills

60% Never
Yearly
50% Quarterly
Monthly
Survey Respondents

40% Weekly
Daily
30% Other

20%

10%

0%

S

Nearly 81 percent of respondents indicated that their OPSEC organizations make it a point to maintain current
contact information for the OPSEC teams and/or other empowered groups within their peer, transit provider and
customer organizations (Figure 40).

Although this seems like a very basic requirement for any Internet-connected organization, we continue to observe
numerous instances in which outage-inducing DDoS attacks are unnecessarily prolonged due to the lack of this
basic contact information by the relevant parties.

Maintain Current Contact Information for
Peers/Transits/Customers/OPSEC Teams

19%
Yes
No

81%


32


Security-related email lists remain the single most popular way of staying aware of relevant security information
from outside sources (Figure 41). Other popular methods reported by this year’s respondents include industry
conferences, vendor-specific email lists and blogs, and social networking systems such as Twitter, Facebook, etc.

Other primary sources of security-related information utilized by respondents include closed and vetted operational
security groups, FIRST, and various CERT and CSIRT organizations. These responses are in line with findings from
last year’s report.

External Sources of Operationally Relevant Security Information

90%

80%
Security mailing lists

70% Security conferences
Weblogs/syndication feeds
Survey Respondents

60% Vendor mailing lists
Social networking services
50%
Security-focused publications
40% Other

30%

20%

10%

0%

S

Forty-one percent of respondents indicated that they participate in closed or vetted global operational security
groups (Figure 42), while nearly 87 percent indicated that they believe these groups are highly effective in
handling operational security issues on an inter-organizational basis (Figure 43).

Participation in Vetted OPSEC Groups/Systems Efficacy of Global OPSEC Communities

41% 13 %
Yes Yes
No No

59% 87%


33


As with OPSEC teams in general, significant systemic challenges to full participation in closed/vetted global
OPSEC groups persist (Figure 44). Lack of time/resources is the most frequently cited challenge, along with
lack of management support, policy barriers, unclear benefits and legal concerns.

Systemic Challenges to Participation in Vetted OPSEC Groups/Systems

80% Not enough time/resources
Management/policy
70%
Benefits unclear
60% Legal concerns
Survey Respondents

My organization is very active in global OPSEC
50%
Concerns surrounding participant vetting
40% Other

30%

20%

10%

0%

S

Nearly 74 percent of respondents indicated that they do not refer security incidents to law enforcement (Figure 45),
a marked increase from last year. This is due to a variety of reasons, including lack of resources and time, low
confidence in law enforcement investigative efficacy and corporate policy (Figure 46). Some free-form comments
from respondents who do not currently make law enforcement referrals follow:

• “Attacks we see are sourced from foreign jurisdictions.”
• “Responsibility and decision rest with our customers.”

Attacks/Incidents Referred to Law Enforcement

80% None
1-5 referrals
70%
6-10 referrals
60% 10+ referrals
Survey Respondents

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

S

34


Systemic Challenges in Law Enforcement Referrals

40% No trust that something will be done
Lack of resource/time
35%
Corporate policy
30% Law enforcement non-responsiveness
Survey Respondents

It is not my problem
25%
Other
20%

15%

10%

5%

0%


Overall, confidence in law enforcement efficacy is quite low (Figure 47). However, a plurality of respondents
does in fact see evidence of positive change in law enforcement efficacy year over year (Figure 48).

We also note that a relatively small number of respondents have apparently forged successful and mutually
beneficial relationships with their respective law enforcement agencies, and consequently made a significant
number of incident referrals to those agencies during the survey period. It is our hope that this formula can be
replicated elsewhere, leading to greater and more fruitful law enforcement involvement in the identification and
prosecution of Internet criminals.

Confidence in Law Enforcement Perceived Changes in Law Enforcement
Investigative Efficacy Investigative Efficacy

41% 44%
Yes More useful
No Less useful
Sometimes No change
noticeable

38% 37%

21% 19 %


It is also our understanding that in some jurisdictions, legislation and/or regulation require security events to
be reported by network operators, irrespective of the ability of the relevant law enforcement agencies to take
further action.

35


Figures 49 and 50 illustrate that over 40 percent of respondent organizations have established an internal CERT,
and nearly 66 percent are actively engaged with their respective national or regional CERTs and/or CSIRTs.

Engagement with National/Government
Internal CERT Organization CERT/CSIRT

40 % 34%
Yes Yes
No No

60 % 66%


Nearly 82 percent of respondents believe that government CERTs/CSIRTs have a positive role to play in
operational security incident response and welcome their involvement (Figure 51). Respondents who do not
engage with national or regional CERT/CSIRT organizations cite lack of time and resources; lack of information
about their national/regional CERT/CSIRT organizations; lack of management support; and, in some cases, the
fact that no national/regional organization of this type exists within their respective geographies. Additionally,
73 percent of respondents are concerned that governments are not doing enough to protect critical network
infrastructure (Figure 52).

Desirability of National/Government Concerned with Government Efforts
CERT/CSIRT Engagement for Critical Infrastructure Protection

18 % 27%
Yes Yes
No No

82% 73%


36


Infrastructure Protection Techniques
Figure 53 illustrates that a majority of respondent organizations have
implemented best current practices (BCPs) in critical network infrastructure
security, representing significant progress over last year. These BCPs include
routing protocol authentication; iACLs to keep undesirable traffic away from
their network infrastructure devices; and anti-spoofing measures at the edges
of their networks.

A plurality of respondents have implemented out-of-band management networks (also called data communication
networks or DCNs) that enable them to retain visibility into and control of their networks even during network
partition events. More than 38 percent perform IRR registration of their customer routes.

Network Infrastructure BCPs Implemented

80% Authentication for BGP, IGPs
Separate out-of-band (OOB) management network
70%
iACLs at network edges
60% BCP38/BCP84 anti-spoofing at network edges
Survey Respondents

IRR route registration of customer prefixes
50%
Generalized TTL security mechanism (GTSM)
for eBGP peers
40%
Other
30%

20%

10%

0%

S

37


Based on survey responses, 72 percent of data center operators have implemented various Layer 2 BCPs (Figure 54).
These include loop guard; root guard; BPDU guard; IP source guard/DHCP snooping (which also works with fixed IP
addressing); pVLANs; VACLs; PACLs; and other useful Layer 2 infrastructure security techniques.

Similar good news exists on the route-filtering front, with 79 percent of respondent organizations explicitly filtering
customer route announcements (Figure 55).

Layer 2 Infrastructure BCPs Deployed Explicit Filtering of Customer Routing
in Data Center Environments Advertisements

28% 21%
Yes Yes
No No

72% 79%


Meanwhile, only 61 percent of respondents explicitly filter inbound routing advertisements from peers and
upstream transit providers (Figure 56).

Explicit Filtering of Inbound Peer/Upstream
Routing Advertisements

29%
Yes
No

61%


38


IPv6 Observations
In the 2010 Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report, operators indicated
serious concerns regarding visibility and control parity of IPv6-enabled networks
with IPv4 networks, as well as anxiety about future address allocations. These
trends continue to be reflected in this year’s report.

Nearly 57 percent of respondents indicated that they believe IPv4 address allocations will not prove to be a serious
problem during the next 12 months (Figure 57), reflecting no change year over year. We’re still unsure as to whether
this continued majority view is indicative of extreme confidence in forthcoming IPv6 deployments; a sufficiency of
current IPv4 address allocations that will last for some time into the future; a lack of awareness of the impending
exhaustion of available IPv4 address space; or the belief that carrier-grade NAT will be sufficient in the medium term
for addressing end-customer needs.

Concerns Regarding IPv4 Address Availability

43%
Yes
No

57%


Respondents who indicated concerns regarding IPv4 address allocations and availability provided the
following comments:

• “Competitors are sitting on large IPv4 allocations, and lack of industry adoption of IPv6 is problematic.”

• “It’s harder to get space from the RIRs, slow movement towards IPv6.”

• “We are running short of IPv4 addresses and may be forced to implement NAT on a portion of our network.”

• “Businesses are asking for more and more IPv4 space to hoard, and are reluctant to use IPv6.”

• “Too many of our /24 CIDR blocks allocated to customers that don’t actually need them; and IPv6
upgrade is very slow, due to some internal company policies.”

• “Customers continuing to request large amounts of address space for non-technical reasons (bulk emailing
on the rise), sales under pressure to close deals, senior management not thinking long term.”

• “We extensively utilize globally unique addressing in connecting over VPNs to third parties, and are likely
no longer able to justify further allocations from our RIR.”

39


More than 74 percent of respondents stated that their production network infrastructure currently supports IPv6
today (Figure 58), representing a 10 percent increase over last year, while an additional 15 percent indicated that
they plan to implement production support within the next 12 months (over 89 percent cumulative, Figure 59).

IPv6 Currently Implemented IPv6 Deployed Currently
on Network Infrastructure or Within Next 12 Months

26% 11%
Yes Yes
No No

74% 89%


More than half of respondents indicated that they are presently making use of IPv6 on their management networks
to handle interaction between their internal OSS or NMS and their network infrastructure devices such as cable
modems and other commonplace elements (Figure 60). Figure 61 summarizes that over 70 percent of respondents
view visibility into IPv6 traffic on their networks as critical.

IPv6 Used for Infrastructure Addressing Criticality of IPv6 Network Traffic Visibility

48% 30%
Yes Yes
No No

52% 70%


40


Figure 62 illustrates that more than 36 percent indicated full network infrastructure vendor support for
IPv6 flow telemetry today, and nearly 27 percent indicated their current network infrastructure offers at least
partial support for IPv6 flow telemetry.

Network Infrastructure Support for IPv6 Flow Telemetry

40% Yes, fully supported today
Partial, some vendors support IPv6 flow telemetry today
35%
Will soon, they will support Flow for IPv6 in the next
12 months
30%
Survey Respondents

New hardware, supported on new hardware only
25% No, support is on long-term roadmap
No, will not support
20%

15%

10%

5%

0%


While nearly 42 percent of respondents project that their IPv6 traffic volume will increase 20 percent over the
next 12 months, almost 18 percent forecast greater than a 100 percent IPv6 volume increase over the same
period (Figure 63).

Anticipated IPv6 Traffic Volume Growth

50% None, we do not plan to expand IPv6 traffic
20% growth expected
40% growth expected
40%
60% growth expected
Survey Respondents

80% growth expected
30% 100% or greater growth expected
Other

20%

10%

0%


41


Figure 64 shows that over 65 percent of respondents stated that the lack of IPv4/IPv6 feature-parity is their foremost
security concern related to IPv6. Sixty percent indicated that they have little or no visibility into their IPv6 traffic today,
and thus have no ready way to detect, classify and traceback IPv6 attack traffic on their networks. Nearly 59 percent
cited misconfigurations resulting in outages as a key concern. Fifty-two percent expressed concern regarding IPv6
DDoS attacks, with almost 47 percent expressing concern regarding IPv6 stack implementation flaws that may lead
to security vulnerabilities in their network infrastructure elements.

IPv6 Security Concerns

70% Inadequate IPv4/IPv6 feature parity
Visibility, I cannot see the data today
60%
Misconfiguration
Traffic floods/DDoS
Survey Respondents

50%
Stack implementation flaws

40% Botnets
Host scanning
30% Subscribers using IPv6 to bypass application rate limiting

20%

10%

0%


The relative lack of industry operational experience with IPv6 and the length and complexity of IPv6 addresses as
compared to IPv4 addresses should motivate network operators to make use of automated provisioning systems
whenever possible.

Despite the previously mentioned limitations of ACLs, nearly 63 percent of respondents reported that they use or
intend to use such lists to mitigate IPv6 DDoS attacks (Figure 65). Half stated that they use or intend to use IDMS,
an 11 percent increase year over year. Approximately 33 percent indicated they use or intend to use D/RTBH as
an IPv6 mitigation tool, even though it has the net result of completing the DDoS on behalf of the attacker.

42


Current and Planned IPv6 DDoS Attack Mitigation Tools

70% Access control lists (ACL)
60%
Destination-based remote triggered blackhole (D/RTBH)
Survey Respondents

50%
No plans to mitigate IPv6

40% FlowSpec
Other
30%

20%

10%

0%


Twenty percent of respondents indicated that they have no plans to mitigate IPv6 DDoS attacks. We suspect that
priorities within these organizations may evolve rapidly as IPv6 network traffic becomes more prevalent—especially
given the first reports of IPv6 DDoS attacks on production networks as described earlier in this report.

It is an unavoidable consequence of IPv4 address depletion and the move to IPv6 that large amounts of undesirable
state will be inserted into service provider networks in the form of 6-to-4 gateways and CGN devices. DDoS attacks
are essentially attacks against capacity and/or state. The large amounts of state present in these devices make
them especially vulnerable to both deliberate and inadvertent DDoS attacks.

Network operators should take this state vector for DDoS into account when incorporating 6-to-4 gateways
and CGNs into their networks. We continue to recommend that operators do everything possible to minimize the
amount of state concentrated in any individual device, and make use of reaction tools (such as S/RTBH) and
IDMS to protect these stateful DDoS chokepoints against attack.

As more stateful 6-to-4 and CGN infrastructure devices are installed in operator networks, the risk of attacks
will increase. The use of vigilance—combined with the employment of sound network infrastructure BCPs and
operational security practices—can ameliorate the harmful effects of such attacks on the network.

43


Data Center Operator Observations
Figure 66 illustrates that more than 63 percent of respondents operate
data centers. Of those respondents, over 56 percent indicated they had
experienced DDoS attacks directed at targets within their data centers
during the 12-month survey period (Figure 67).

Data Center Present in Network Observed DDoS Attacks Targeting Data Centers

37% 44%
Yes Yes
No No

63% 56 %


Figure 68 illustrates that 25 percent of respondents experienced a DDoS attack that exceeded the uplink capacity
from their data center to their core network and/or peering/transit providers during the survey period, a 10 percent
increase year over year.

However, it is important to note that lower-bandwidth, application-layer attacks can be just as effective in
taking down a service or customer. This is substantiated by the high percentage of respondents who reported
application-layer attacks toward services.

DDoS Attacks Exceeding Data Center Bandwidth

25%
Yes
No

75%


44


The data represented in Figure 69 emphasizes the fact that the attack surface of the data center includes the
underlying services and service architecture, as well as customer properties, network-level architecture and overall
capacity. Nearly 55 percent of respondents who operate data centers indicated that they experienced DDoS
attacks directed at ancillary data center services such as Web portals, shared Web hosts, DNS servers and SMTP
servers during the survey period.

Targets of DDoS Data Center Attacks

90% IDC customer
IDC service
80%
IDC infrastructure
70%
Survey Respondents

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%


Thirty-three percent of respondents experienced more than 10 attacks per month towards their Internet Data
Centers (Figure 70).

Average DDoS Attacks per Month on Data Centers

3% 10%
13%
0-10
11-20
7% 21-50
51-100
101-500

67%


45


Figure 71 depicts that more than 59 percent of respondents experienced increased OPEX-related expenditures
as a result of data center-targeted DDoS attacks during the survey period, while over 44 percent experienced
customer churn and 37 percent reported related revenue loss due to these attacks.

Impact from Data Center DDoS Attacks

60% Operational expense
Customer churn
50% Revenue loss
Employee turnover
Survey Respondents

40% Other

30%

20%

10%

0%


Forty-two percent of all respondents experienced stateful firewall and/or IPS failure as a direct result of DDoS
attacks during the survey period (Figure 72). Only 10 percent of respondents to this set of questions indicated that
they follow the data center BCP of enforcing access policy via stateless ACLs deployed on hardware-based
routers/Layer 3 switches capable of handling millions of packets per second.

Failure of Stateful Firewall/IPS Due to DDoS Attacks

48%
Yes
No
These devices are not
deployed in the IDC

10%
42%


46


Firewall and IPS devices are stateful in-line devices and, as such, are innately vulnerable to DDoS attacks. The
highest performance firewall and IPS devices available on the market are vulnerable to even moderate-size DDoS
attacks that can overwhelm the state capacity of these systems. If these devices are deployed within data centers,
it is strongly advisable to place them behind more robust DDoS defenses such as iACLs on hardware-based
routers and dedicated IDMS devices.

The danger of unprotected stateful device failure due to DDoS attack is further highlighted by the nearly 43 percent
of respondents who indicated that they had experienced load-balancer failures due to DDoS attacks during the
survey period (Figure 73). As with stateful firewalls and IPS devices, if load balancers are deployed in data center
networks, they must be protected by DDoS reaction/mitigation tools such as S/RTBH, FlowSpec, and/or IDMS.

Failure of Load Balancers Due to DDoS Attacks

53%
Yes
No
These devices are not
deployed in the IDC
4%

43%


Respondents listed ACLs as a primary mechanism for mitigating DDoS attacks against data centers (Figure 74).
They also identified stateful firewall and IPS devices as primary DDoS defense mechanisms. More than 62 percent
of respondents indicated that they make use of IDMS to mitigate data center-targeted DDoS attacks (a 14 percent
year-over-year gain), and nearly 38 percent employ S/RTBH within their data center environments, an increase of
20 percent over last year.

Primary Mechanism for DDoS Attack Mitigation

80% Interface ACLs (iACLs) on network edge
70%
Separate production and out-of-band (OOB)
management networks
60%
Survey Respondents

Destination-based remote triggered blackhole (D/RTBH)
50% Unicast Reverse-Path Forwarding (uRPF)
40%
Firewalls
30% IPS/IDS
FlowSpec on Gateway or Access Routers
20%

10%

0%


47


Mobile and Fixed Wireless Operator Observations
As indicated in Figures 75 and 76, nearly 27 percent of respondents
operate a mobile or fixed wireless network, and in aggregate, 50 percent of
those respondents serve anywhere from five million subscribers to more
than 100 million subscribers on their wireless networks, a nearly identical
tally with last year’s responses.

Mobile/Fixed Wireless Operator

27%
Yes
No

73%


Number of Wireless Subscribers

30% 0-1 Million subscribers
1-5 Million subscribers
10 -25 Million subscribers
Survey Respondents

50-100 Million subscribers
15% 100+ Million subscribers

10%

5%

0%


48


According to the data in Figure 77, over 95 percent of respondents have deployed 3G networks, approximately
5 percent operate WiMAX networks and nearly 29 percent operate LTE networks, an 18 percent year-over-year
increase. The remaining respondents operate WiFi hotspot networks or self-identify as MVNOs. Figure 78
identifies that approximately 33 percent of respondents plan to deploy 4G in 2012.

Deployed Wireless Technology
D
100% 2G
3G
90%
4G WiMAX
80% 4G LTE
Other
Survey Respondents

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%


Anticipated Deployment Dates of Forthcoming 4G Networks

35% 2010, already deployed
2011, deployed this year
30% 2012
2013
Survey Respondents

25%
2014

20% 2015 or later
Must achieve ROI for 3G first
15%

10%

5%

0%


49


In terms of visibility into the network traffic of their wireless packet cores and their ability to classify core traffic
as potentially harmful, fully 70 percent of respondents indicated that their capabilities in this area are equivalent
to or better than on their wireline networks (Figure 79). Initially, we interpreted this as a significant positive
change from previous reports; however, further analysis of the survey responses did not bear out this preliminary
assessment. The data clearly indicates that mobile respondents have placed more of a focus on visibility than
in the past and have made investments to improve in this area. However, more detailed questions further in the
survey exposed significant gaps in the mobile visibility of some respondents.

Security and Visibility in Mobile Packet Core

40% Excellent, better than fixed line
Equal with fixed line
35%
Medium, some gaps versus fixed line
30% Limited security/visibility
Survey Respondents

No data security/visibility
25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%


Of mobile wireless operator respondents, over 72 percent indicated that they have visibility equivalent to or
better than their wireline networks at the Gi demarcation (Figure 80). Again, this is a nearly 180-degree shift
from previous reports.

Security and Visibility at Mobile Gi Interface

50% Excellent, better than fixed line
Equal with fixed line
Medium, some gaps versus fixed line
40%
Limited security/visibility
Survey Respondents

No data security/visibility
30%

20%

10%

0%


50


Nearly 78 percent of respondents report that they have suffered no direct attacks on their wireless-specific
network infrastructure within the 12-month survey period (Figure 81). We believe this figure to be the result of
significant challenges in detecting, classifying, and tracing back DDoS attacks within their network infrastructure.

Attacks Explicitly Targeting Wireless
Network Infrastructure

22%
Yes
No

78%


Figure 82 indicates that fully 50 percent of wireless operators did not experience any DDoS attacks on their networks
during the last 12 months. The responses to this question were different than expected and provided our first clue
that the visibility into the mobile networks is not actually as pervasive as the results originally led us to believe. The
distribution of answers across this question was very unusual, as a significant number of respondents answered as
having none or very few attacks per month, while another significant quantity answered as having over 50 attacks
per month. This dichotomy of “a lot” versus “a little,” with nothing in between, more likely represents the fact that the
respondents do not have an accurate way of detecting and counting the number of attacks that they actually
experience. We interpret this to be an artifact of the visibility caveats mentioned above.

DDoS Attacks per Month on Wireless Networks

60% 0
1-10
50% 11-20
21- 50
Survey Respondents

40% 51-100
101- 500
30% 500+
Other

20%

10%

0%

S

51


Twelve percent of respondents stated that they have experienced customer-visible outages during the survey
period due to security incidents on their wireless networks (Figure 83).

Security Incidents Leading to Customer Outages

63%
Yes
No
I do not know

12%

25%

As illustrated in Figure 84, 80 percent of respondents indicated that their ancillary support infrastructure such as
Web portals, DNS and other related services have been adversely affected by DDoS attacks over the 12-month
survey period. Forty percent indicated that mobile handsets or end-customer computers with wireless connectivity
have been affected by DDoS attacks.

Wireless Network Infrastructure Affected by DDoS Attacks

50% Subscriber handset/computer
Services (Web, email, DNS)
NAT gateway/firewall
40%
Other
Survey Respondents

30%

20%

10%

0%


52


Nearly 24 percent of respondents indicated that stateful firewalls and/or stateful NAT devices on their networks
have been adversely affected by DDoS attacks during the survey period (Figure 85). As mentioned in the “Data
Center Operator Observations” section of this report (page 44), one can conclude that stateful firewall and/or IPS
failure can be a deliberate or inadvertent result of DDoS attacks.

Observed DDoS Attacks Against Stateful Firewalls
and/or NAT Devices in Wireless Networks

63%
Yes
No
I do not know

13%

24%

Figure 86 indicates that during the survey period, strong pluralities of respondents have experienced application-layer
DDoS attacks directed at their supporting ancillary infrastructure elements. These elements include DNS servers,
Web portal servers, SMTP servers, VoIP infrastructure, mobile IP infrastructure and SMS gateways. It is likely that
at least some portion of the 50 percent of respondents who reported no application-layer DDoS attacks on their
wireless networks during the 12-month survey period were unable to detect and classify such attacks due to
limitations on network visibility.

Application-Layer DDoS Attacks Against Wireless Network Infrastructure

60% No application attacks on mobile networks
DNS
50% Mobile IP
HTTP
Survey Respondents

40% HTTPs
SIP/VoIP
30% SMTP
SMS

20%

10%

0%


53


As illustrated in Figure 87, approximately 36 percent of respondents indicated that they have observed outbound/
crossbound DDoS attacks originating from botted or abused subscriber nodes. This statistic may also be understated
due to the network visibility limitations.

Outbound/Crossbound Attacks from
Wireless Subscribers

36%
Yes
No
I do not know

28% 36%


Figure 88 illustrates that well over 40 percent of respondents are unaware of what percentage of their subscriber
base may be compromised and participating in botnets. A small percentage of respondents believe that more
than 5 percent of their subscriber base is compromised. This finding supports the conclusion that while there have
been significant strides towards improving visibility in mobile networks, the ability to do fine grained analysis and
detection down to the host level is still not where it should be.

Percentage of Wireless Subscriber Nodes Participating in Botnets

50% None
0-5%
5-10%
40%
10-25%
Survey Respondents

25-50%
30% 50% +
I do not know

20%

10%

0%

S

54


While Figure 89 purports to illustrate that at least 50 percent of respondents have not experienced DDoS attacks at
Gi demarcation points in their network, it is important to note that nearly 38 percent of respondents indicated that they
do not have sufficient visibility into their network traffic to detect and classify DDoS attacks at the Gi demarcation
point. This again supports the point that visibility in mobile networks has still not reached a point of maturity.

DDoS Attacks Targeting Gi Demarcation

50%
Yes
No
I do not know

12 %
38%


In this event, it turned out that we had inadvertently made a hidden assumption in the survey questions. That is,
in framing some of the questions in this portion of the report, we had assumed that respondents had good visibility
into network traffic on the wireline portions of their networks. In actuality, due to limitations in visibility on both the
wireline and wireless portions of their networks, respondents were providing consistent responses. They were saying
that a) they had roughly equivalent visibility between the wireline and wireless portions of their networks and that
b) a significant minority of operators continue to face serious network visibility challenges in both the wireless and
wireline portions of their networks. We also conclude that while having visibility equal to that of the wireline network
is important, there are aspects to the mobile network that are quite unique, including data encapsulation and
mobile-specific command and control protocols. While seeing this data is important, tools are needed to look deeper
into the data and detect threats that operate within individual streams of traffic.

Having resolved this apparent contradiction in survey responses, in future editions of the report we will rephrase
the relevant questions to remove any possibility for ambiguity.

55


Wireless operators listed stateful firewalls as a primary security measure to safeguard their packet cores, despite their
limitations as a security technology, as previously discussed (Figure 90). Approximately 74 percent of respondents
indicated they have deployed stateful firewalls in their networks as a defensive measure, a 17 percent increase year
over year. Some 42 percent of respondents have made use of organic security capabilities built into their data and
signaling gateways, and nearly 37 percent have deployed IDMS, a 13 percent increase over last year.

Security Measures Deployed on Wireless Networks

80% Firewalls in mobile packet core
Interface ACLs (iACLs)
70%
Separate out-of-band (OOB) management network
60% NAT/PAT between Internet and mobile packet core
Survey Respondents

Security features in your data and signaling gateways
50%
40% SMS firewalls/filtering

30%

20%

10%

0%


Figure 91 illustrates that 50 percent of respondents indicated that they intend to deploy IPv6 addressing for wireless
subscriber nodes within the next 12 months, while nearly 41 percent have no plans to do so at this time. Approximately
9 percent of respondents have already deployed IPv6 on their production mobile networks.

In many cases, the security postures of mobile and fixed wireless operators continue to approximate those of
wireline operators a decade or more ago. As discussed in the section of this report entitled “Data Center Operator
Observations” (page 44), the failure of firewall and IPS devices to protect mobile and fixed wireless operators from
DDoS attacks suggests that these devices are not well-suited for this application and that other solutions such as
IDMS should be considered.

IPv6 Addressing Deployed for Wireless
Subscribers/Infrastructure

50%
Yes
No
We plan to implement
within 12 months

9%

41%


56


DNS and DNSSEC Migration Observations
More than 87 percent of respondents operate DNS servers on their networks
(Figure 92). Over 77 percent have either assigned responsibility for their DNS
infrastructure to their main operational security group or to a dedicated DNS
security team (Figure 93).

DNS Server in Operation DNS Security Responsibility

23%
87%
Yes Same security
14% group
13% No
Special security
group for DNS
No security group
is responsible for
securing DNS
infrastructure
63%


Nearly 23 percent of respondents indicate that there is no security group within their organizations with formal
responsibility for DNS security. This may be a contributing factor to the significant number of unsecured, open DNS
resolvers on the Internet today that can be abused by attackers to launch extremely high-bandwidth DNS reflec-
tion/amplification attacks. Such attacks continue to constitute the majority of 10 Gbps and greater DDoS attacks.

Approximately 78 percent of respondents have implemented the BCP of restricting recursive lookups by their DNS
servers to queries located either on their own networks or on those of their end customers, while some 22 percent
have not yet done so (Figure 94).

DNS Recursive Lookups Restricted

22%
Yes, we restrict
recursive DNS
No, we do not have
open DNS resolvers

78%


57


As indicated in Figure 95, approximately 12 percent of respondents have experienced customer-impacting DDoS
attacks on their DNS infrastructure during the survey period, a significant decrease over the last year. This may
be a result of more operators beginning to take the necessary architectural, operational, scalability and attack
mitigation measures to maintain availability in the face of attack. DNS has been both an attack target and vector
of choice for attackers. Attacking the authoritative DNS servers for a given server or domain is often the easiest
way to take it offline. Such an attack renders the relevant records of the DNS resource unresolvable to Internet
users. In many cases, it also requires far fewer attack resources to disrupt service than would attacking the target
servers/applications directly. The reduction in the percentage of customer impacting DDoS attacks is a good sign
that DNS operators are beginning to take DDoS into consideration as they build out their DNS infrastructure.

Unfortunately, the DNS servers themselves are still being used as a means to attack others. The large number of
misconfigured DNS open recursors on the Internet, coupled with the lack of anti-spoofing deployments, allows
attackers to launch overwhelming multi-Gbps DNS reflection/amplification attacks.

Customer-Visible DNS Outages DNS Cache-Poisoning Attacks
Due to DDoS Attacks Observed

14% 25%
Yes Yes
12% No 15% No
I do not know I do not know

74% 60%


Only about 15 percent of respondents reported experiencing DNS cache-poisoning attacks directed to or through
their DNS infrastructures during the survey period (Figure 96). Surprisingly, however, some 25 percent indicated that
they do not know whether or not they have experienced these attacks, which reveals a serious gap in DNS server
operator visibility.

58


As noted in Figures 97 and 98 respectively, 20 percent of respondents indicated that they had experienced
DDoS attacks against recursive DNS servers during the last 12 months, while nearly 24 percent indicated they
had experienced attacks against authoritative DNS servers during the survey period. Over 18 percent noted that
they did not know whether they had experienced such attacks during the survey period; this further reinforced
the notion that DNS server operators should prioritize improvements to their DNS traffic visibility.

DDoS Attacks Against Recursive DDoS Attacks Against Authoritative
DNS Servers DNS Servers

20% 24%
Yes Yes
19% 18%
No No
I do not know I do not know

61% 58%


In a significant positive change over the last 12 months, 37 percent of respondents reported plans to implement
DNSSEC within the next 12 months, while over 22 percent have already begun deployment and nearly 9 percent
indicated full deployment on their networks (Figure 99).

DNSSEC Deployment Status

40% Planning, we plan to implement DNSSEC
No, we have no plans for DNSSEC
35%
Partial, we have begun to deploy DNSSEC
30% Yes, we have DNSSEC fully deployed
Survey Respondents

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%


59


As illustrated in Figure 100, approximately 46 percent of respondents stated that they did not observe any issues
with DNSSEC functionality due to the lack of EDNS0 and/or TCP/53 DNS support on the Internet at large.
However, an alarming 45 percent indicated that they have insufficient visibility to make this determination, which
reveals another very serious gap in DNS operator traffic analysis capabilities.

Concerns Regarding DNSSEC Response
DNSSEC Infrastructure Sizes Enabling DNS Reflection/Amplification
Support Issues DDoS Attacks

46% Yes
38% Yes
No No
I do not know 5% I do not know

9%

45% 57%


Fifty-seven percent of respondents indicated they do not believe that drastically increased DNS response sizes
would present a new and even more easily abused vector for DNS reflection/amplification attacks (Figure 101).
As noted in last year’s report, DNSSEC-enabled DDoS attack amplification has been observed in the wild, in
contrast with respondent views. When asked if they had additional concerns regarding DNSSEC deployment,
respondents provided the following feedback:

• “Deployment is too slow—we need greater adoption! We’re actively working to encourage and assist our
customers in deploying DNSSEC.”

• “Folks don’t generally understand the baggage that comes along with DNSSEC—it’s a learning process.”

• “DNSSEC is very complicated. Will be a mess to operate/support.”

• “Complex to implement, hard to get it working right. People currently implementing seem not to take it too
seriously, and outages have been known at TLD level due to expired keys, misconfigurations, etc.”

• “Not enough people are using DNSSEC. The last-mile hop suffers from a gap in security to stub resolvers
and forwarders.”

60


VoIP Observations
Approximately 47 percent of respondents indicated that they offer VoIP
services to their end customers (Figure 102). Of that respondent pool, nearly
30 percent indicated that there is no security group within their organizations
with formal responsibility for securing the VoIP service delivery infrastructure
(Figure 103), a 10 percent reduction year over year.

Offered VoIP Services VoIP Security Responsibility

47% Yes 13% 30% Main security
No group
Specific security
group for VoIP
No security group
is responsible for
securing VoIP
infrastructure
53% 57%


As noted in Figure 104, over 46 percent of respondents operating VoIP services observed toll fraud taking place in
their VoIP infrastructures during the survey period. Of those who observed VoIP toll fraud, approximately 42 percent
noted that attackers utilized brute-force attack techniques to commit toll fraud (Figure 105). Attackers often use
these techniques in such volume that they constitute an inadvertent DDoS attack on the VoIP infrastructure and
result in service outages.

Toll Fraud Observed on VoIP Brute-Force Attack Techniques
Services/Infrastructure Observed in VoIP Toll Fraud

46% Yes
42% Yes
No No

54% 58%


61


Nearly 63 percent of respondents indicated that caller ID spoofing is a serious concern with regards to their VoIP
infrastructure (Figure 106).

Concerns Regarding Caller ID Spoofing
on VoIP Services

63% 37% Yes
No


As illustrated in Figure 107, approximately 37 percent of respondents stated that they use commercial tools
to detect attacks against their VoIP infrastructure; nearly 32 percent make use of open-source tools; and over
29 percent utilize homegrown detection tools. Meanwhile, almost 27 percent of respondents indicated that they
do not have access to any attack detection tools for use on their VoIP infrastructure.

Tools Used to Detect VoIP Attacks

40% Commercial tools
Open-source tools
35%
Home-grown tools
30% There is nothing in place to detect
Survey Respondents

threats to VoIP infrastructure
25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%


62


Figure 108 illustrates that some 36 percent of this pool of respondents indicated that they use firewalls as their
primary defense mechanism against DDoS attacks. More than 15 percent rely on iACLs, while over 23 percent
utilize IDMS, a 7 percent increase over last year.

Primary Tool Used to Mitigate DDoS Attacks Against VoIP Services/Infrastructure

40% Firewalls
35%
Interface ACLs (iACLs) on network edge
30% SBC/organic security capabilities
Survey Respondents

IPS/IDS
25%
MSSP-based cloud mitigation services
20% Other

15%

10%

5%

0%

Figure 108 S
Source: Arbor Networks, Inc.

Over 63 percent of respondents indicated that they utilize SBCs in their VoIP infrastructure (Figure 109). Nearly
59 percent stated that they use additional tools (such as S/RTBH) and IDMS to protect their SBCs against
DDoS attack (Figure 110).

SBCs Protected Against DDoS by Additional
SBCs Deployed Tools/Techniques

63% 37% Yes
59% 41% Yes
No No


63


Respondent Survey Feedback
We asked survey respondents to provide us with their views regarding this
year’s survey, as we do every year.

The feedback we received was generally positive and constructive, as noted below:

• “Thank you very much for the invitation to participate.”
• “Would be nice if the survey asked more specifics about DDoS attack details so that Arbor can compile
and release even more detailed information in the yearly report (i.e., average attack size in bps and pps,
attack type [SYN flood, DNS, ICMP]).”
• “Oh, it’s kind of embarrassing how far behind the curve we are!”
• “Was long. :)”
• “I think you can explore IPS with more detail.”
• “There are too many questions versus responsibility for a company as large as ours.”
• “Nice survey. Thanks!”

As always the responses and information received from survey participants is very appreciated. This open survey
feedback helps us to continually improve the quality of this report.

Conclusions
This seventh edition of the Arbor Networks® Worldwide Infrastructure Security
Report contains several significant data points that highlight important trends
in attacker methodologies and network operator challenges.

In this year’s report, we note that flood-based DDoS attacks in the 10 Gbps range have become increasingly
prevalent, indicating that network operators must be prepared to routinely mitigate such high-volume attacks.
Respondent data also reveals that attackers are more readily making use of sophisticated multi-vector DDoS
attacks and complex application-layer attack methodologies to further their goals.

Respondent organizations provided the first documented evidence of IPv6 DDoS attacks on production networks.
The relative rarity of IPv6 DDoS attacks signifies that the operational and economic significance of IPv6 remains
low, despite increased deployment efforts. Awareness of the threat posed by DDoS attacks has risen significantly
during the survey period, with experience as the target of a DDoS attack being the most common factor behind
this heightened awareness. Data center operators continue to suffer outages related to the failure of stateful
firewalls, IPS devices and load-balancer devices due to DDoS attacks. Mobile and fixed wireless operators should
re-assess their network visibility capabilities in light of the self-contradictory data in this year’s report.

Finally, in what may be the most significant finding in this year’s report, ideology and “hacktivism” have emerged as
the number-one motivating factor behind DDoS attacks, followed by disputes related to online gaming. Network
operators and end-customers alike must ensure that their risk assessment models and situational awareness
capabilities reflect this new reality.

64


About the Authors
Roland Dobbins, Solutions Architect for Asia Pacific, Arbor Networks
rdobbins@arbornetworks.com

Roland Dobbins has 26 years of operational experience in the service provider and large enterprise arenas.
His experience includes designing, deploying, operating, securing, maintaining, troubleshooting and defending
many of the highest-visibility networks in the world.

Mr. Dobbins is a recognized industry leader in the fields of operational security and network telemetry. He has an
extensive background in security product/feature innovation, devising operational security requirements for network
infrastructure devices and protocol design. His focus is on extending the availability, scalability and security of the
network infrastructure and the applications/services it enables, with an emphasis on flexible and resilient global
service delivery capabilities.

Carlos Morales, Vice President, Global Sales Engineering and Consulting, Arbor Networks
cmorales@arbornetworks.com

Carlos Morales is responsible for pre-sales technical support, design, consulting and implementation services for
Arbor customers and partners worldwide. He is also responsible for sales approvals, sales processing, maintenance
contracts, forecasting, data analysis and reporting for Arbor. Mr. Morales works closely with Arbor’s customers and
strategic and integration partners to ensure ongoing product interoperability and to set the direction for new product
features. He has more than 15 years of experience implementing security, routing and access solutions in service
provider, cloud and enterprise networks.

Mr. Morales’ background includes management positions at Nortel Networks, where he served as the director
of systems engineering for Nortel’s access products. Formerly, he was systems engineering director for Tiburon
Networks and held systems engineering roles at Shiva Corporation, Crescent Networks and Hayes Microcomputer.

CONTRIBUTORS
Darren Anstee, Solutions Architect for EMEA, Arbor Networks
danstee@arbornetworks.com

Darren Anstee has over 15 years of experience in the pre-sales, consultancy and support aspects of telecom
and security solutions. Currently in his eighth year at Arbor, Anstee specializes in customizing and supporting
traffic monitoring and Internet threat detection and mitigation solutions for service providers and enterprises in
the EMEA region. Prior to joining Arbor, he spent eight years working in both pre- and post-sales for core routing
and switching product vendors.

Julio Arruda, Senior Manager, Latin American Consulting Engineering, Arbor Networks
jarruda@arbornetworks.com

Julio Arruda has more than 20 years of experience in the networking and telecommunications industry. In his
current role at Arbor, he manages the consulting engineering team for the Latin American region. Arruda brings
an in-depth familiarity with the Caribbean and Latin American Internet and telecom environments, along with
broad knowledge of diverse telecommunication technologies. Prior to joining Arbor, he worked in the professional
services organization at Bay Networks, and later as network engineer at Nortel Networks.

65


Tom Bienkowski, Director of Product Marketing, Arbor Networks
tbienkowski@arbornetworks.com

Tom Bienkowski has more than 20 years of experience in the networking and security industry. At Arbor, he directs
product marketing for the fixed and mobile service provider markets. Prior to joining Arbor, Bienkowski worked for
large enterprises as a network engineer and for multiple network management and security vendors, where he had
roles in sales engineering, technical field marketing and product management.

Michael Hollyman, Manager of Consulting Engineering, Arbor Networks
mhollyman@arbornetworks.com

With more than 12 years in the network, security and telecommunications industries, Mike Hollyman brings
extensive knowledge of service provider and large enterprise network design and security to Arbor. He provides
leadership to the Arbor sales organization through his management of the company’s consulting engineering team
for North American service providers. Prior to joining Arbor, Hollyman was a network and security consultant, both
independently and through his own consulting company. He also worked as a network engineer for OneSecure,
Qwest Communications and the University of Illinois.

Dr. Jose Nazario, Senior Manager of Security Research, Arbor Networks
jnazario@arbornetworks.com

Jose Nazario is senior manager of security research at Arbor Networks. In this capacity, he is responsible for
analyzing burgeoning Internet security threats, reverse engineering malicious code, managing software development
and developing security mechanisms that are distributed to Arbor Peakflow platforms via Arbor’s Active Threat Feed
(ATF) threat detection service. Dr. Nazario’s research interests include large-scale Internet trends such as reachability
and topology measurement; Internet-scale events such as DDoS attacks, botnets and worms; source code analysis
tools; and data mining. He is the author of the books “Defense and Detection Strategies against Internet Worms”
and “Secure Architectures with OpenBSD.” He earned a Ph.D. in biochemistry from Case Western Reserve University
in 2002. Prior to joining Arbor Networks, he was an independent security consultant. Dr. Nazario regularly speaks at
conferences worldwide, with past presentations at CanSecWest, PacSec, Black Hat and NANOG. He also maintains
WormBlog.com, a site devoted to studying worm detection and defense research.

Edwin Seo, Regional Manager, Asia Pacific Sales Engineering, Arbor Networks
eseo@arbornetworks.com

Edwin Seo brings more than 12 years of experience in service provider networking, infrastructure and security.
Based in Singapore, he currently runs Arbor’s systems engineering team for the Asia Pacific region. Prior to joining
Arbor, Seo held various systems engineering leadership roles at Ellacoya Networks, Cisco Systems and StarHub.

Rakesh Shah, Director of Product Marketing and Strategy, Arbor Networks
rshah@arbornetworks.com

Rakesh Shah has been with Arbor since 2001, helping to take the company’s products from early-stage to
category-leading solutions. Before moving into the product marketing team, Shah directed product management
for Arbor’s Peakflow products and managed the engineering group. Previously, he held various engineering and
technical roles at Lucent Technologies, PricewaterhouseCoopers and CGI/AMS.

66


Glossary
A G
ACL access control list Gbps gigabits per second
APAC Asia Pacific GGSN Gateway GPRS Support Node
APNIC Asia Pacific Network Information Centre Gi GGSN-to-PDN
ATLAS Active Threat Level Analysis System GPRS General Packet Radio Service
AUP acceptable use policy Tunneling Protocol
GTSM generalized TTL security mechanism
B
BCP best current practice H
BGP Border Gateway Protocol HA home agent
BPDU bridge protocol data unit HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTP/S HTTP Secure
C
C&C command-and-control I
CAPEX capital expenditure iACL infrastructure ACL
CDN content delivery network IDC Internet data center
CERT computer emergency response team IDMS intelligent DDoS mitigation system
CGN carrier-grade NAT IDS intrusion detection system
CIDR Classless Inter-Domain Routing IGP Internet Gateway Protocol
CPE customer-premises equipment IPS intrusion prevention system
CSIRT computer security incident response team IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4
IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6
D IRC Internet Relay Chat
DCN dynamic circuit network IRR Internet Routing Registry
DDoS distributed denial of service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol L
DLP data loss prevention LAN local area network
DNS domain name system LTE Long Term Evolution
DNSSEC domain name system security extensions
DPI deep packet inspection M
D/RTBH destination-based remotely triggered MVNO mobile virtual network operator
blackholing MSO multiple service operators
DSL digital subscriber line
N
E NAT network address translator
eBGP exterior Border Gateway Protocol NMS network management system
EDNS extension mechanisms for DNS NOC network operations center
EPP Extensible Provisioning Protocol
O
F OOB out of band
FIRST Forum of Incidence Response and OPEX operational expenditure
Security Teams OPSEC operational security
FTP File Transfer Protocol OSS operations support system

67

Corporate Headquarters
6 Omni Way
Chelmsford, Massachusetts 01824
Toll Free USA +1 866 212 7267
T +1 978 703 6600
F +1 978 250 1905

Europe
T +44 208 622 3108

Asia Pacific
T +65 6299 0695

www.arbornetworks.com

Copyright © 2012 Arbor Networks, Inc. All rights reserved. Arbor Networks, the Arbor Networks logo, Peakflow, ArbOS, Pravail (pending), Cloud
Signaling (pending) and ATLAS are all trademarks of Arbor Networks, Inc. All other brands may be the trademarks of their respective owners.
SR/WISR/EN/0212


Glossary (continued)

P T
PACL port ACL TCP Transmission Control Protocol
PAT port address translation TTL time to live
PDN public data network
PHP Hypertext Preprocessor U
POP Post Office Protocol UTM unified threat management
pVLAN private virtual LAN uRPF Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding

Q V
QoS quality of service VACL VLAN ACL
VLAN virtual LAN
R VOD voice on demand
RAN radio access network VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
RDP Remote Desktop Protocol VPN virtual private network
RIR regional Internet registry
ROI return on investment W
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for
Microwave Access
S
SBC session border controller
SGSN Serving GPRS Support Node
SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
SLA service level agreement
SMS Short Message Service
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SOC security operations center
SQL Structured Query Language
S/RTBH source-based remotely triggered blackholing
SSH secure shell
SSL Secure Sockets Layer

68

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