Intelligence Report: What Works, What Doesn't and How to Fix It

INTELLIGENCE REPORTING: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T
AND HOW TO FIX IT

Douglas C. Bernhardt

Wits Business School

Johannesburg, South Africa

Prepared for the Brunel University Centre for Intelligence and Security
Studies (BCISS) forum, RAF Club, London, 12 and 13 July, 2012.

© COPYRIGHT 2012 DOUGLAS BERNHARDT BCISS FORUM -1-

It should come as no real surprise to ‘seasoned’ intelligence professionals that many
of the key factors necessary for success in competitive intelligence (CI) – a discipline which
exists almost exclusively within a commercial, or private sector context – are equally
important in the field of national security intelligence. In this paper we will focus on two of
these factors in particular: (1) the so-called ‘intelligence-policy’ disconnect; and (2) the
‘packaging’ of finished intelligence products, or deliverable. Our central proposition is
simply stated: without effective working relationships, including mutual understanding,
between the corporate CI function and its consumers – mainly senior decision-makers – the
collection, analysis and production of information for intelligence purposes become
irrelevant, and therefore a waste of energy, time and money.

Increasingly, large-scale enterprises, as well as leading business schools, in Europe,
North America and parts of Asia recognise that Competitive Intelligence has come of age as
it steadily expands “into mainstream business practices.”1 In the words of Kristan Wheaton,
Associate Professor of Intelligence Studies at Mercyhurst University, Erie, Pennsylvania, the
“business and competitive intelligence communities”2 are up-and-coming. But what is
Competitive Intelligence? How does it differ, say, from the role and practice of intelligence
within the national security context? We define CI as the application of the theory and
practice – with certain operational exceptions – of national security intelligence to the
corporate domain. Whereas national security intelligence is largely concerned with the wide
array of issues which have, or may have, an impact on foreign policy related decisions and
actions, CI concentrates on problems (including warning) regarding the driving forces and
trends in a firm’s competitive environment. These issues include social, technological,
economic and political factors, in particular the capabilities, intentions, and future plans of
key players (existing and emerging competitors, major customers, suppliers, etc.). As a
result, we would argue that many of the lessons learned in the respective experiences of CI
and national security intelligence can be carried over into the other.

Consumer-policy relations.

This phenomenon has been explored at some length by a number of intelligence
scholars3 (almost exclusively within the context of national security intelligence), who appear
to share the view that the barriers to strong, interdependent relationships between intelligence
and its consumers are powerful impediments to the influence intelligence has (or should
have) on organisational policy and strategies. As Joshua Rovner puts it, “Intelligence
agencies need to cultivate good relations with policymakers, and not just because they risk
becoming irrelevant if policymakers doubt that they provide any special information or
insight.”4 This caution, we suggest, applies no less to companies in the private sector.


If corporate decision-making is not informed by intelligence, it ultimately risks
becoming a free-for-all of conflicting, emotionally-charged opinions between various
departments, functions and personal interests within a company’s bureaucracy. In practice,
these relationships (or lack of them) between intelligence producers and consumers determine
the very effectiveness and value of the intelligence function; a dilemma which has long been
understood in government. While routine improvements in tradecraft (collection methods,
analytical training, skill sets, processes, etc.) are important, they simply do not matter if CI
isn’t embedded globally in a company’s decision-making culture, systems, and organisational
architecture. The random, often ad hoc reporting of raw information and news within
corporate settings does not, as is often assumed, constitute intelligence; at best it reinforces
the dangerous ‘flying by the seat of the pants’ decision-making endemic in so many firms.

So what gets in the way? What are the stumbling blocks? Here are just a few:

• The de facto clash of the basic makeup, or personalities of analysts and their
consumers (‘geeks versus ‘suits’?), or what Stephen Marrin refers to as “a
personality self-selection bias between analysts and decisionmakers”5);
• The very different perspectives CI staff and their internal customers have toward
their respective missions. While CI analysts are tasked with collecting and
interpreting often ambiguous information about the firm’s external environment,
corporate executives are far more comfortable with certainty and a ‘let’s get it
done’ action orientation;
• Bureaucracy. As Gary Hamel, Visiting Professor of Strategic and International
Management at London Business School notes, almost every company “is being
managed right now by a small coterie of long-departed theorists and practitioners
who invented the rules and conventions of ‘modern’ management back in the
early years of the 20th century”6. Many executives are more at ease planning their
retirements rather following through on new information that may lead to igniting
revolutionary change;
• Deficiencies in clearly defining and agreeing upon front-end intelligence
requirements (Key Intelligence Topics) in the ‘planning and direction’ phase of
the intelligence cycle – what is needed? who needs it? why is it needed (what
decisions is the intelligence meant to support?);
• A wide array of deep seated cognitive biases (e.g. unchallenged assumptions, and
obsolete mental models of the world)7, mainly on the part of company decision-
makers. Indeed, it’s no secret that managers at all levels “tend to disregard
intelligence when it clashes with their own expectations”8 and world views;
• Endemic failures of imagination by analysts and decision-makers alike (it’s hard
work thinking outside institutional templates);
• Groupthink (or the quest for consensus);
• The ever present spectre of politicisation, possibly the most significant pathology
of intelligence – i.e., the attempt, whether direct or indirect, “to manipulate
intelligence so that it reflects policy preferences.”9


Most of the firms we have studied or worked with would have little option but to
plead guilty to all of the above charges.

But perhaps the biggest – albeit least explored – contributing factor to the so-called
intelligence-policy disconnect is the fact that most corporate managers have no background
in, or with, intelligence in any capacity, whether in government or the military. We have, for
example, never seen in the business arena an explanatory handbook similar to National
Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide, published in 2009 by the office of the US Director of
National Intelligence. Executives, in fact, typically tend to dismiss CI as a subset of market
research (which it isn’t)10, and in general view it with underlying suspicion. After all,
intelligence produced by a team of 20- to 30-something MBAs which does not conform to the
expectations, plans and policy preferences of ‘seasoned’ 50+ year old executives is seldom
embraced with open arms, and certainly doesn’t play well in boardrooms comprised of men
and women who have already made up their minds about policy and strategy. In short,
intelligence is not an easy sell. In the business world, it’s still open season on the ‘shooting
the messenger’.

One of the first things we teach our MBA students and executive education clients
is that, to be of actionable value, the presentation of intelligence products must be fully
aligned with the needs and preferences of the decision-maker – i.e., how he or she prefers to
receive and digest information. Intelligence units must therefore develop a deep
understanding of each of their company’s top decision-makers as individuals. Quite simply,
what decision-makers care about at any given point in time is, to put it bluntly, all they really
care about, even if they themselves are uncertain about, or possibly unaware of, the full array
of issues that matter, or should matter, as they try to come to grips with the changing
dynamics of environmental complexity. Some prefer the ‘short version’, while decision-
makers who may be more contemplative routinely want the ‘whole story’. Some are happiest
with text. Others are more visually oriented. Thus Competitive Intelligence staffs must not
“base [their] long-range planning primarily on high-level policy maker-defined requirements
because policy makers, by their very nature, tend to concentrate on immediate problems and
do not think long-term”.11 CI managers and analysts should, therefore, make every effort
possible to understand individual decision-makers’ abilities, agendas, biases, professional
objectives and responsibilities, and much more. A finance director, for example, will have a
very different set of concerns and perspectives than those of the marketing director. Quite
simply, there is seldom any similarity between the ways in which each views the world and
the challenges their companies face. One size does not fit all.


In order to strengthen the relationship, to reduce the inherent friction between
executives and intelligence analysts, we have found that it is important to determine how the
intelligence consumer can be most effectively involved in the overall process. This means,
wherever possible, regular face-to-face dialogue, even if this takes the form of video
conferencing or the use of tools such as Skype™ video calling. ‘Fleshing out’ an intelligence
requirement can be hard work, takes time, and usually involves a number of iterations before
producers and consumers can realistically agree on the requirement. Ask any executive what
his or her intelligence requirements are, and you’re likely to be met with the same
incredulous look your teenage daughter or son might give you if you ask them why they like
Facebook (parents “just don’t understand”). If, on the other hand, intelligence analysts sit
down with executives to help them anticipate, formulate and develop a requirement or set of
requirements that will ultimately make their decision-making more effective and efficient – in
other words, smarter! – they’re off to a good start.

In addition, to help accomplish improved consumer-producer interaction, we
recommend that CI directors assume a role that most executives are already familiar with;
that of an internal consultant. Ideally, formal intelligence dissemination should be augmented
with on-going informal communication between CI and its internal customers. This can lead
to greater openness and mutual respect between analysts and their internal customers, thereby
reinforcing credibility of the product and the very function itself.

In short, “The hard truth is that despite the presumably common goal of advancing the
firm’s interests, relations between consumers and producers of intelligence are not naturally
harmonious”, and can lead “to counterproductive arguments about ‘what’s right’ or ‘who’s
right’ as the lines between evidence, facts, and opinions become even more blurred.”12 Good
actionable intelligence and the policy guidance which should result are based on evidence
and rigorous analysis, not bullying predicated on rank or who shouts the loudest.

The ‘packaging’ of intelligence. In today’s hyper-competitive business
environment, regardless of the depth of findings and critical thinking that underpins a first-
class intelligence deliverable, it will, nevertheless, often fail to achieve its principle objective;
that is, to support decision-makers with product that they find both compelling and relevant
to their individual and collective concerns. Unfortunately, many CI departments are known
to distribute finished intelligence products that take the form of dry, colourless epistles of
largely regurgitated facts and news; or, put differently, cocktails of tasteless stirred (not
shaken), mostly open source based, information. Is it any wonder that intelligence is often
ignored or otherwise disregarded by management?


Consider the case of Hewlett-Packard (H-P), the once innovative company that many
now claim has ‘lost its way’. The company today cannot boast a single hit consumer product;
there are no iPhones or iPads in HP's bland array of products despite the growing uptake in
consumer markets globally for ‘smartphones’ and tablet computing devices. Where, one
might ask, have H-P’s CI teams been looking for the past five years or so? The trends cannot
have been clearer, especially since the launch of Apple’s iPhone and iPad products, or
Samsung’s relentless drive to grow and sustain their position as the world’s largest
smartphone maker. So, wherever HP’s CI department were focusing their attention, either it
wasn’t in the right direction, or possibly they didn’t understand the ‘so what’ of what they
were looking at (did their CI reports focus on the impact of the expanding smartphone and
tablet businesses on H-P’s competitive landscape?). Or, perhaps, they simply failed to make
their intelligence deliverables sufficiently compelling. Of course, H-P’s leadership may have
regarded themselves as irrevocably ‘married’ to their ‘tried and tested’ business model which
dictated that strategic success was mainly a matter of ratcheting up competition in the
laptops, desktops, printers and monitors markets. Or, alternatively, were H-P simply too busy
concentrating on their current restructuring plans (in which approximately 27’000 employees
– 8% of their workforce – will “exit” the company by the end of fiscal year 2014)? Similar to
Kodak’s once stubborn insistence on remaining the world leader in film as it ignored the shift
to digital photography, H-P’s intelligence was insufficiently persuasive, or the company’s
management were simply not prepared to listen to the ‘drumbeats’ of a changing global
marketplace.

Another problem which plagues many CI deliverables: future-oriented analysis (e.g.
alternative futures analysis or analysis of competing hypotheses) that spring from company-
wide coordination by a CI department is seldom on offer. The result is that analysing “what
happened” – standard fare in CI reporting – just doesn’t resonate with, and as a consequence
is not useful to, corporate decision-makers. What they need are judgments focusing on what
could, or is likely to, happen (including discussions of competitor intent) with explanations of
why analysts think so. Otherwise, senior executives may just as well search for the insight
they require from the volumes of mind-numbing analysts’ reports published by major
investment banks, from their trusted personal advisors and friends (who usually have their
own agendas), or, for a ‘quick news fix’, from CNN or Bloomberg. The question we urge CI
professionals to ask themselves is: when was the last time that the intelligence you delivered
caused your company’s management to modify their behaviour, their strategy, or their plans?

So what can intelligence learn from other professional disciplines that might help us
improve its effectiveness? Consider advertising. Commercial advertising aims to persuade
customers and potential customers to buy, or buy into the offering. To be effective good ads
will therefore have:


• The ability to capture the buyer’s attention. The German car maker Audi build
their promotional campaigns around the tag line "Vorsprung durch Technik" (roughly,
"advancement through technology"). This apparently strikes a chord with buyers
interested mainly with the engineering and technical attributes of a motorcar.
Cosmetics companies, on the other hand, have traditionally directed their campaigns
at women (and now men) wishing to improve (resurrect?) their appearance. While the
extent to which advertisers impart “the truth” about their products and services may at
times be questionable, the impact advertising has on consumers is not in any doubt.
Ultimately, an effective ad must stand out from the competition and grab the attention
of the target market or segment. Within the context of CI, this means moving to the
head of the queue of competing information streams and conflicting demands on
users’ time and attention. The difference between an intelligence product and an
advertising message should essentially be one of form rather than content.
Intelligence is concerned with the truth, not the ‘sale’ per se.

• The ability to sustain buyers’ (i.e. users’) attention. An effective ad involves the
consumer in the details of the ad and carries his or her attention through the ad. When
trying to persuade, logic and reason are not enough; they appeal to the intellect, not
the spirit or passion. This is exactly what the President’s Daily Brief (PDB) of 6
August 2001 (five weeks before 9/11) – with the headline “Bin Ladin Determined To
Strike in US” – did not do for President George Bush or National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice. Dr Rice later insisted, in April 2004 at her appearance before the
commission investigating the September 11th terrorist attacks, that the Brief “did not
warn of attacks inside the United States. It was historical information based on old
reporting. There was no new threat information.” In essence, she discounted the PDB
as a valid current warning. Clearly it, as well as earlier warnings to the Clinton and
Bush administrations of the Al Qaeda threat of terrorist action on US soil, did not grab
her attention; nor, apparently, did it capture the attention of President George Bush.
At the time of the 9/11 attacks both Bush and Rice had other priorities. His, it seems,
was reading a children’s book with second graders at an elementary school in
Sarasota, Florida.

• The ability to transmit the message. Clarity is important if the consumer is to
understand the message, given the limited attention span usually available. Again,
this involves a deep understanding of the internal consumer of intelligence on the part
of analysts and the CI director or manager. Ad agencies and their clients customarily
carry out extensive, systematic research on who their customers are before promoting
their products or services. Because many analysts suffer as much from inflated –
albeit intellectually based – egos as do senior corporate managers, this type of
research is often overlooked, or given rather short shrift. Experts tend to assume that
conveying their expertise is enough; it isn’t.


• The ability to convince the potential consumer to accept the message of the ad
and the ad brand. In other words, the ability of the ad to persuade the consumer to
accept the ‘product’ and to buy. If the decision-maker fails to buy into the
intelligence product, even if he or she may have otherwise been persuaded by its
conclusions, its production will have been pointless, a waste of money and time.

This is what one freelance ‘creative’ in the London ad industry told us:

“What creativity [the essence of a good story] is, is the ability
to connect the dots, draw connections between two existing things
you never saw connected. But what the [agency] creatives manage to
do is make them come together seamlessly.

People don’t need a [big] budget to tell a compelling story.
There is one more key ingredient to effective communication:
simplicity. People’s attention spans are short, especially in today’s
world. Things need to be short, succinct, in as simple a language as
possible. If we can’t tell you what the idea is in a sentence, it’s not
going to work, period. Another fundamental aspect of effective
communication is originality. Never say the same thing in the same
way twice. We’ve all been exposed to PowerPoint slides, graphs,
tables since childhood. Our minds switch off to them because we’ve
seen them millions of times before. I suggest you look into
infographics13– a set of techniques that encourage creativity in the
way we talk about numbers and statistics.”14

Companies typically devote many millions (Dollars, Euros, Pounds, etc.) to above-the-
line advertising and public relations. Your company is probably one of them. If a central
aim of intelligence is to support smarter strategic choices, doesn’t it make sense to do what is
necessary to ensure that its presentation, or packaging matches the quality, and reinforces the
urgency, of the analysis? In a paper first published 15 years ago, Dr Ronald Garst and Dr
Max Gross, each veterans of America’s Joint Military Intelligence College, remind us of four
sets of skills that serve as the hallmark of a capable analyst; one of which is competence and
experience “in presenting analysis, both orally and in writing.”15 Sculpting the product is
only the first step; ensuring that it is ‘well received’ by the consumer is the second.


Robert McKee, a widely known screenwriting lecturer16, offers another important
lesson. He argues that although “Persuasion is the centrepiece of business activity … despite
the critical importance of persuasion, most executives [and, we would add, analysts] struggle
to communicate, let alone inspire.”17 He believes that listeners can be engaged “on a whole
new level if [we] toss [our] PowerPoint slides and learn to tell good stories instead.”18 What
can a story do? Again according to McKee, “Essentially, a story expresses how and why life
changes.”19 A good story will incite interest, excitement and emotions on the part of the
listener in a way that static graphs, spreadsheets and lists of data simply can’t. Think: when
was the last time you promised yourself a good ‘bedtime read’ of a Credit Suisse, Goldman
Sachs or RBS research report? Last month? Last week? Never?

Karen Rothwell, a director of the CI consultancy Outward Insights, agrees that “To
capture the attention of senior management, CI practitioners must effectively distribute
intelligence deliverables that contain compelling analysis and unique judgments.”20 She adds
that “Some options for capturing the attention of your audience can include inventing new:

• Language
• Terminologies
• Images
• Icons
• Acronyms”21

Are these some of the options you incorporate in your intelligence reporting?


Now consider this fictional case from the corporate environment:

A fast growing, overseas competitor of the giant
biotechnology company Amgen tasks its CI unit to prepare an
updated assessment of Amgen’s strategic intent, i.e. their long-term
ambition for market dominance. A typical competitor profile might
list Amgen’s key strengths (e.g. revenues of approximately $16-
billion; a worldwide workforce of some 17’000 in the US and 39
other countries; leading market positions in therapeutic areas such as
cancer, kidney disease, rheumatoid arthritis, bone disease, and other
serious illnesses; the declared aim of building the best R&D
organisation in the industry; and so on). But what of the company’s
culture and leadership? The US government, for example, has long
“recognised the importance of monitoring the physical and mental
fitness of world leaders and other key foreign actors.”22 While
cultural and psychological analyses may often seem far removed from
the quantitative measures that business executives are most
comfortable with, personality assessments can add convincing value
to an otherwise unremarkable CI product. Qualitative assessments of
Amgen’s corporate culture, combined with personality profiles of the
firm’s top management team (in particular its chairman and CEO for
over 10 years, Kevin Sharer), especially when bolstered by a strong
and indispensable element of human source intelligence (HUMINT),
would contribute significantly to developing a much more powerful,
and indeed much more captivating story regarding Amgen’s likely
future moves. In a recent interview with a member of McKinsey
Publishing, Mr Sharer revealed the following about himself:

“For most of my career, I was an awful listener in almost
every possible way. I was arrogant throughout my 30s for sure —
maybe into my early 40s. My conversations were all about some
concept of intellectual winning and “I’m going to prove I’m smarter
than you.” It wasn’t an evil, megalomania-driven thing; it was mostly
because I was a striver, I wanted to get ahead, and getting ahead
meant convincing people of my point of view.

So I shifted, by necessity…. As a senior executive —
particularly if you’re responsible for a big function or division — you
operate in a very complicated ecosystem with many sources of
information that matter. In your mind, you need a picture of what
reality is right now, with the knowledge that the picture is dynamic
and ambiguous. That’s why it’s important to focus on what I call
strategic listening: a purposeful, multifaceted, time-sensitive listening
system that helps you get the signals you need from your
ecosystem.”23

© COPYRIGHT 2012 DOUGLAS BERNHARDT BCISS FORUM - 10 -

Sharer’s self-appraisal would easily fit as a key strand in the fabric of an intelligence
‘story’ about Amgen, and would serve as a strong indicator of what a competitor initiating
strategic moves against Amgen might expect in response. It also points to the many
competing “sources of information” that senior decision-makers must sift through as they
determine what is important and what isn’t.

A good story can also leverage film to considerable advantage. We show our MBA
students clips from documentaries and Hollywood productions to support specific lessons. In
one such clip from the 2001 Touchstone Pictures film Pearl Harbour, we show students a
scene set at the Pentagon in November 1941, just days before the attack, where a Captain
Thurman of Naval Intelligence is explaining his theory to an admiral and vice admiral about
where and why the missing Japanese fleet might attack the US. This is a transcript of the
dialogue:

Thurman: Sir [to the Admiral], I believe they'll try to hit us where it'll hurt us the most–Pearl
Harbour.
Admiral: It's over 4’000 nautical miles from Japan to Pearl. That's a long distance to steam a
navy, Captain. Your theory is based on what?
Thurman: Well, it’s what I would do.
Admiral: That’s not exactly hard evidence, Captain Thurman
Thurman: Well, Admiral, if I had hard evidence we'd already be at war… Sir, we can read their
diplomatic codes faster than they can type them.
Vice Admiral: But Captain Thurman's cryptology team is still trying to crack the naval codes.
Thurman: The intercepts have missing words and garbled lines, so to explain the decrypts we
have to try to interpret what we think they're trying to do.
Admiral: Interpret? You mean guess
Vice Admiral: They use their informed intuition, sir.
Thurman: We guess. It's like playing chess in the dark. Any rumour, troop movement, ship
movement... spine-tingle, goose bump, we pay attention to it. When I was in the
Asiatic Fleet the locals used to try to get outside of a problem, to try to see the inside.
Well, I see a strike on Pearl. It's the worst thing that could happen. A blow to Pearl
would devastate the Pacific Fleet's ability to make war.
Admiral: So, sir, you would have us mobilize the entire fleet at the cost of millions of dollars
based on this spine-tingling feeling of yours?
Thurman: No, sir. My job is to gather and interpret material. Making difficult decisions based
on incomplete information from my limited decoding ability is your job, sir.
Admiral: Then break the damn naval code, Captain, so I can make a better decision.
Thurman: Aye, sir. We are trying…

In less than two minutes the scene deals with questions of intelligence analysis
(specifically probabilities, rather than the certainties associated with 100% predictions), as
well as the respective roles of, and relationships between, analysts and decision-makers.
Because it does so within the context of cinema, it becomes an almost irresistible story. After
watching this short clip, our students are left in no doubt about the role that intelligence –
particularly warning intelligence – might well have played in the build-up to the Japanese
attack on |Pearl Harbour and what the responsibility of US Naval commanders was, or
should have been, in integrating intelligence findings and analysis into their thinking and
planning. We wonder how many CI reports have a similar impact on management.


In a 1971 speech to the Intelligence Forum, Lt. Colonel James Murphy and Dr K.
Wayne Smith, both former members of the US National Security Council staff, outlined six
principles which they argue have a direct bearing on decision-makers’ responses to
intelligence:24

1. Creativity. In a world characterised by complex change “we cannot be
content with familiar ideas, or assume that the future will be merely a
projection of the present and the past.” Business managers tend to expect
that the future will unfold as an extrapolation of the past. Not only does
this reflect lazy thinking, it just isn’t true.

2. The quest for accurate, complete, and relevant factual information.
Analysts are duty bound “to elicit, assess and present to [decision-
makers] all the pertinent knowledge available and necessary to make
policy that is thoroughly grounded in, and relevant to, the facts.” The
aim is to focus on what is right “rather than who is right.”

3. The provision of a full range of feasible options. Intelligence systems
must be “designed to ensure that clear policy choices reach the top so that
various positions and alternatives can be debated fully.”

4. Crisis anticipation. “The better prepared we are in terms of
foreknowledge and options, the more we can be the master rather than
the slave of events once a crisis [or ‘predictable surprise’] breaks.”
Consider how Johnson & Johnson, the giant healthcare company,
responded so quickly and positively to the 1982 scandal which involved
an unknown suspect(s) contaminating Tylenol® capsules with 65
milligrams of cyanide, resulting in seven deaths. Contrast this with
TWA’s very different response to the 19th July 1996 crash of Flight 800
to Paris and Rome from New York, where all 230 people on-board
perished. TWA was accused of incompetence and insensitivity in the
way it responded to the needs of the victims’ families. The company was
not prepared.


5. Systematic analysis. “Policy cannot be allowed to be merely the result
of ad hoc piecemeal tactical decisions forced as kneejerk reactions to the
immediate pressures of events.” Although “capability analysis is
essential to policy making … someone has to make an educated guess as
to intentions.”

6. The intelligence system must provide a means by which policy
implementation can be reviewed, coordinated, and supervised. Put
another way, “the intelligence function carries through the entire policy
process from inception to conclusion, which includes monitoring
implementation.”

As might be expected, there is a counter argument to finding more creative ways to
package and distribute intelligence. In today’s budget-conscious companies it runs something
like this: “we trust you’re not suggesting that we support all our intelligence reporting with
film or other types of multimedia and other ‘creative’ stuff; the money just isn’t there for
that.” Although we propose nothing of the kind, we do insist that if an intelligence product is
worth preparing in the first place, and as long as it meets the generally accepted (and
expected) standards of objectivity and rigour that our craft demands, it should be
disseminated in the most powerful, most convincing way possible. This isn’t necessarily
easy, but CI practitioners do not ‘sign up’ for “easy.” If in the shaping of an intelligence
product a story helps truly capture the interest of the decision-maker, use it. If an internally-
produced or Hollywood film clip helps, use it. If raw HUMINT (within the protocols
governing intelligence source protection) helps, use it. We, in fact, created and built a
consultancy practice in Europe in the 1990s that provided, almost exclusively, HUMINT
collected by our research analysts on behalf of client firms – all major multinationals – in
industries as diverse as passenger aviation, phamaceuticals, telecommunications and tobacco.
The HUMINT dimension to our product was, of course, in each instance unique, and
sometimes explosive in terms of its impact. It never failed to intrigue and significantly
improve our clients’ understanding of our findings and analysis. A strong HUMINT
component in an intelligence report can dramatically improve its overall credibility and
value.

Conclusion

Decision-makers must be provided with product that they find both
compelling and relevant to their needs and direct concerns. If intelligence does not meet
these tests it will, at best, be ignored. Our obligation is to sharpen up our act, to ensure that
we forge more meaningful, more effective, and generally more robust relationships with our
consumers, and that, in part, we do so by consistently disseminating intelligence in formats
and in a manner that arouses both their minds and their emotions. Finally, where possible,
intelligence should be delivered in person, offering the advantage of almost immediate
review and feedback.


1
Michael S. Hawley and Bradley C. Marden, “FIM: A Business Information System for Intelligence”,
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2006, p. 443.
2
Kristan J. Wheaton, “The Revolution Begins on Page Five: The Changing Nature of NIEs”,
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2012, pp. 330-331.
3
See, e.g., L. Keith Gardiner, “Dealing with Intelligence-Policy Disconnects”, Studies in Intelligence,
Vol. 33, No. 2, 1989, pp., 1-9; Douglas C. Bernhardt, “Consumer versus Producer: Overcoming the Disconnect
between Management and Competitive Intelligence”, Competitive Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1999,
pp. 19-26; Centre for the Study of Intelligence, Intelligence and Policy: The Evolving Relationship, Roundtable
Report, June 2004; Jack Davis, “Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Benefits and Dangers of Tensions in
the Relationship”, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 21, No. 6, 2006, pp. 999-1021; Christopher A. Ford,
Relations between Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Lessons from Iraq (Washington, DC: Hudson
Institute, 2009).
4
Joshua Rovner, “Fixing the Facts or Missing the Mark: Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq”,
Foreign Policy Research Institute E-note, October 2011. See
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201110.rovner.iraq.html.
5
Stephen Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the gap between scholarship and practice
(London: Routledge, 2011), p. 18.
6
Gary Hamel, The Future of Management (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2007).
7
See, for example: Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Centre
for the Study of Intelligence, 1999).
8
Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2011).
9
Ibid.
10
Market research tends to concern itself almost exclusively with the profitable marketing of a firm’s
products or services.
11
See “IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century”, Intelligence Requirements Process,
Staff Study Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives One Hundred Fourth
Congress, 1996, at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-IC21/html/GPO-IC21-3.html
12
Douglas Bernhardt, “Intelligence versus Policy: Healthy Tension or Lost Cause?”, Competitive
Intelligence Magazine, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2009, pp. 24-28.
13
“Graphic visual representations of information, data or knowledge … [which] present complex
information quickly and clearly.” See “Information graphics,” Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_graphics (accessed 2 May 2012).
14
William G.A. Bernhardt, personal interview with the author, 2 May, 2012.
15
Ronald D. Garst and Max L. Gross, “On Becoming an Intelligence Analyst”, Defense Intelligence
Journal, Vol. 6. No. 2, 1997, pp. 47-59
16
Robert McKee claims to have educated and mentored over 55’000 screenwriters, novelists,
playwrights, poets, documentary makers, producers, and directors internationally.
17
Robert McKee, “Storytelling That Moves People”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 81, No. 6, 2003, pp.
5-8.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Karen Rothwell, “Three Words: Communication, Communication, Communication”, Competitive
Intelligence Magazine, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2008, pp. 45-47.
21
Ibid.
22
Jon D. Clemente, “CIA’s Medical and Psychological Analysis Centre (MPAC) and the Health of
Foreign Leaders”, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2006, pp. 385-
423.
23
Thomas Fleming, “Why I’m a listener: Amgen CEO Kevin Sharer”, McKinseyQuarterly, April 2012,
available at
https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Governance/Leadership/Why_Im_a_listener_Amgen_CEO_Kevi
n_Sharer_2956.


24
James Murphy and K. Wayne Smith, “Making Intelligence Analysis Responsive to Policy Concerns”,
Studies in Intelligence, No. 17, No. 2., released in full 22 September 1993. Available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol17no2/pdf/v17i2a01p.pdf.


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