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Introducing
GLOBAL ISSUES
edited by
Michael T. Snarr
D. Neil Snarr
LYN N E
R I E N N E R
I'UIU [SMI RS
n o u i i) I i;
I O N [1 O N

Published in the United States of America in 1998 by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301
and in the United Kingdom by
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU
© 1998 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Introducing global issues / edited by Michael T. Snarr and
D. Neil Snarr.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-55587-587-4 (hardcover : alk. paper). — ISBN 1-55587-595-5
(pbk. : alk. paper)
1. World politics—1989- 2. International economic relations.
3. Social history—1970- 4. Ecology. I. Snarr, Michael T.
II. Snarr, Neil, 1933- .
D860.I62 1998
909.82—dc21 98-15207
CIP
British Cataloguing in Publication Data
A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book
is available from the British Library.
Printed and bound in the United States of America
„ The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
^ of the American National Standard for Permanence of
i j Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984. Printed on
recycled paper.
5 4 3 2 1

For our wives, Melissa and Ruth,
whose patience and support deserve more credit
than can be acknowledged

Contents
Acknowledgments ix
1 Introduction
Michael T. Snarr 1
• PART 1 CONFLICT AND SECURITY
2 The Global Challenge of Weapons Proliferation
Jeffrey S. Lantis 11
3 Nationalism
John K. Cox 29
4 Human Rights
D. Neil Snarr 45
5 Peacekeeping and Peacemaking
Carolyn M. Stephenson 61
• PART 2 THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
6 Controversies in International Trade
Bruce E. Moon 81
7 International Capital Flows
Gerald W. Sazama 99
8 Poverty in a Global Economy
Don Reeves 117
• PART 3 DEVELOPMENT
9 Population and Migration
Ellen Percy Kraly 137
Vll

viii Contents
10 Women and Development
Elise Boulding 157
11 Children
George Kent 173
12 Health
Marjorie E. Nelson 187
• PART 4 THE ENVIRONMENT
13 Protection of the Atmosphere
Mark Seis 209
14 Cooperation and Conflict over Natural Resources
Karrin Scapple 225
15 Environmental Protection and the Earth Summit:
Paving the Path to Sustainable Development
Stephen Collett 241
• PART 5 CONCLUSION
16 Future Prospects
Michael T. Snarr 261
Bibliography 269
The Contributors 279
Index 283
About the Book 293

Acknowledgments
We would like to express our appreciation to those who made this book
possible. Jeffrey Lantis, John McLaughlin, Stephen Poe, Gerald Sazama,
Amanda Dobbs, Michael Ebbert, Kimberly Hawk, Alison Johnson, Sekou
Ade Mark, Christina Ralbovsky, and Kim Pavlina assisted us by reading
and commenting on parts of the manuscript. Special thanks go to Margaret
Degenhardt and Rena Hutton, who proofread several chapters. We are in-
debted to Connie Crecion for providing outstanding secretarial help and to
Divya Thadani for technical assistance.
We would like to thank Lynne Rienner for her support of this project
and Sally Glover who promptly answered the multitude of questions we
asked. Of course, we also owe a great deal of thanks to the contributors to
this book, who were patient with what must have seemed like a never-
ending stream of requests.
We are also grateful to our institutions for support. Special thanks go
to Wheeling Jesuit University, which provided release time through its
Scholar-in-Residence program, and to the Social Science Department at
Wheeling Jesuit, which offered unwavering support.
Most important, we would like to thank our families for bearing with
us throughout this demanding process. Both our wives read significant
portions of the manuscripts and gave valuable comments. The book would
not have been possible without them.
Michael T. Snarr
D. Neil Snarr
IX

1
Introduction
Michael T. Snarr
• Approximately 230,000 people are added to the world's population
every day; that is the equivalent of 84 million people per year
(Crossette 1996b).
• People in more than 130 countries have access to Cable News Net-
work (CNN) (Barber 1996).
• In one region of Australia, a majority of the people over sixty-five
years of age have skin cancer (Gore 1992).
• The number of individuals suffering from lack of food has declined
over the past two decades (FAO 1996).
• Each year nearly 80,000 square miles of forest are depleted
(with only a fraction of it being reforested). This is equal to the
total territory of Maine, Massachusetts, and Virginia (Rourke
1997).
• Over the past two decades, the lives of 3 million children per year
have been saved by immunization programs (UNDP 1996).
• More civilians have died this century as a result of war than in the
four previous centuries combined.
• McDonald's and Kentucky Fried Chicken served more customers
than any other restaurants in Japan in 1992 (Barber 1996).
• Tens of thousands of species are becoming extinct every year, and
the rate is increasing.
• More than 1 billion people live in absolute poverty (UNDP 1996).
• Global military expenditures have decreased over the past decade
(UNDP 1994).
• At the end of the century, 90 percent of the market for Coca-
Cola will be outside the United States (Hauchler and Kennedy 1994).
1

2 Introduction
• Nearly 20 million people are HIV-infected (UNDP 1996).
• Smallpox has been wiped out.
Each of the items above is related to a global issue discussed in this
book. But what is a global issue? The term is used in the book to refer to
two types of phenomena. First, there are those issues that cross political
boundaries (country borders) and therefore affect individuals in more than
one country. A clear example is air pollution produced by a factory in the
United States and blown into Canada. Second, there are problems and is-
sues that do not necessarily cross borders but affect a large number of in-
dividuals throughout the world. Ethnic rivalries and human rights viola-
tions, for example, may occur within a single country but have a far wider
impact.
Our primary goal is to introduce several of the most pressing global
issues and demonstrate how strongly they are interconnected. We also
hope to motivate the reader to learn more about global issues and in turn
to be a positive force for change.
• IS THE WORLD SHRINKING?
There has been a great deal of discussion in recent years about globaliza-
tion, which can be defined as "the intensification of economic, political,
social, and cultural relations across borders" (Holm and S0rensen 1995: 1).
Evidence of globalization is seen regularly in our daily lives. In the United
States, grocery stores and shops at the local mall are stocked with items
produced abroad. Likewise, Chicago Bulls, New York Yankees, and Dallas
Cowboys hats and T-shirts are easily found outside of the United States. In
many "foreign" countries, Madonna, Michael Jackson, Metallica, and
other U.S. music groups dominate the airways; CNN and Baywatch are on
televison screens; and Arnold Schwarzenegger is at the movies. Are we
moving toward a single global culture? In the words of Benjamin Barber,
we are being influenced by "the onrush of economic and ecological forces
that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world with
fast music, fast computers, and fast food—with MTV, Macintosh, and Mc-
Donald's, pressing nations into one commercially homogenous global net-
work: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communication,
and commerce" (Barber 1992: 53).
Technology is perhaps the most visible aspect of globalization and in
many ways its driving force. Communications technology has revolution-
ized our information systems. "CNN . . . now reaches more than 140 coun-
tries" (Iyer 1993: 86); "computer, television, cable, satellite, laser, fiber-
optic, and microchip technologies [are] combining to create a vast
interactive communications and information network that can potentially

Introduction 3
give every person on earth access to every other person, and make every
datum, every byte, available to every set of eyes" (Barber 1992: 58). Tech-
nology has also aided the increase in international trade and international
capital flows and enhanced the spread of Western, primarily U.S., culture.
Of course the earth is not literally shrinking, but in light of the rate at
which travel and communication speeds have increased, the world has in a
sense become smaller. Thus, many scholars assert that we are living in a
qualitatively different time, in which humans are interconnected more than
ever before. "There is a distinction between the contemporary experience
of change and that of earlier generations: never before has change come so
rapidly . . . on such a global scale, and with such global visibility" (CGG
1995: 12).
This concept of globalization and a shrinking world is not without its
critics. Some skeptics argue that while interdependence and technological
advancement have increased in some parts of the world, this is not true in
a vast majority of the South. (The terms the South, the developing world,
the less developed countries, and the third world are used interchangeably
throughout this book. They refer to the poorer countries, in contrast to the
United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New
Zealand, which are referred to as the North, the more developed
economies, the advanced industrial economies, and the first world.)
"'Global' is not 'universal'" (Mowlana 1995: 42). Although a small num-
ber of people in the South may have access to much of the new technology
and truly live in the "global village," the large majority of the population
in these countries does not. In most African countries there are fewer than
four televisions for every 100 people (UNDP 1996). There are fewer phone
lines in sub-Saharan Africa than there are in Manhattan (Redfern 1995),
and "of the 600 million telephones in the world, 450 million of them are
located in nine countries" (Toffler and Toffler 1991: 58).
Even those in the South that have access to television or radio are at a
disadvantage. The globalization of communication in the less developed
countries typically is a one-way proposition: the people do not control any
of the information; they only receive it. It is also true that worldwide the
ability to control or generate broadcasts rests in the hands of a tiny minority.
While lack of financial resources is an important impediment to glob-
alization, there are other obstacles. Paradoxically, Benjamin Barber, who
argues that we are experiencing global integration via "McDonaldization,"
asserts we are at the same time experiencing global disintegration. The
breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as well as the great number
of other ethnic and national conflicts (many of which are discussed in
Chapter 3), are cited as evidence of forces countering globalization. Many
subnational groups (groups within nations) desire to govern themselves;
others see threats to their religious values and identity and therefore reject
the secular nature of globalization. As a result, globalization

4 Introduction
has produced not uniformity, but a yearning for a return to non-secular
values. Today, there is a rebirth of revitalized fundamentalism in all the
world's major religions, whether Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Shintoism,
or C o n f u c i a n i s m . At the same time the global h o m o g e n e i t y has reached
the airwaves, these religious tenets have reemerged as defining identities.
( M o w l a n a 1995)
None of these criticisms mean that globalization, as we have defined
it, is not occurring to some extent; they do, however, provide an important
caution against overstating or making broad generalizations about the ef-
fects of globalization.
• IS GLOBALIZATION GOOD OR BAD?
There are some aspects of globalization that most will agree are good (for
example, the spread of medical technology) or bad (for example, increased
global trade in illegal drugs). But other aspects are more complex.
The first column of Table 1.1 identifies three areas that are affected by
globalization: politics, economics, and culture. A key aspect of political
globalization is the weakened ability of the state to control both what
crosses its borders and what goes on inside them. In other words, global-
ization can reduce the state's sovereignty (the state's ability to govern
matters within its borders). This can be viewed as good, because undemo-
cratic governments are finding it increasingly difficult to control the
flow of information to and from prodemocracy groups. Satellite dishes and
electronic mail are two examples of technology that have eroded state sov-
ereignty. But decreased state sovereignty also means that the state has
difficulty controlling the influx of illegal drugs, nuclear materials, un-
wanted immigrants, and terrorists.
In the realm of economics, increased globalization has given consumers
more choices. Also, multinational corporations are creating jobs in poor areas
where people never before had such opportunities. Some critics reject these
points, arguing that increased foreign investment and trade benefit only a
Table 1.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of Globalization
Realm of Globalization
Political
Economic
Cultural
Advantages
Weakens power of
authoritarian
governments
Jobs, capital, more
choices
Offers exposure to
other cultures
Disadvantages
Unwanted external
influences are
difficult to control
Exploitative; only benefits
a few
Cultural imperialism

Introduction 5
small group of wealthy individuals and that, as a result, the gap between rich
and poor grows both within countries and between countries. Related to this
is the argument that many good-paying, blue-collar j o b s are moving from the
North to the poor countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
At the cultural level, those who view increased cultural contact as pos-
itive say that it gives people more opportunities to learn about (and pur-
chase goods f r o m ) other cultures. B u t critics o f cultural globalization
argue that the wealthy countries are guilty o f cultural i m p e r i a l i s m — t h a t
their multibillion-dollar advertising budgets are destroying the cultures o f
non-Western areas, as illustrated by Avon's aggressive sales strategy in the
A m a z o n region (Byrd 1994).
T h e degree to which cultural values can be " e x p o r t e d " is the subject o f
some debate. Samuel Huntington argues that "drinking C o c a - C o l a does not
m a k e R u s s i a n s think like A m e r i c a n s any m o r e than eating sushi m a k e s
A m e r i c a n s think like Japanese. Throughout human history, fads and mate-
rial goods have spread from one society to another without significantly
altering the basic culture o f the recipient s o c i e t y " (Huntington 1 9 9 6 :
2 8 - 2 9 ) . Similarly, others argue that globalization brings only superficial
change. " M c D o n a l d ' s may be in nearly every country, but in Japan, sushi
is served alongside hamburgers. In many countries, hamburgers are not
even on the m e n u " ( M o w l a n a 1995: 4 6 ) .
It is left to the reader to determine whether globalization is having a
positive or negative effect on the issues discussed in this book. Is global-
ization enhancing our capability to deal with a particular issue? O r is it
making it more difficult? It is left to the reader to determine whether glob-
alization is having a positive or negative effect on the issues discussed in
this book. Is globalization enhancing our capability to deal with a particu-
lar issue? Or is it making it more difficult? O f course, each individual's
perspective will be influenced by whether he or she evaluates these issues
based on self-interest, national interest, religious views, or from a global
humanitarian viewpoint.
• I N T E R C O N N E C T E D N E S S A M O N G I S S U E S
As mentioned above, a primary purpose o f this book is to explore how the
issues introduced in the various chapters are interconnected. T a b l e 1.2 is
designed to illustrate this notion o f linked issues. E a c h cell in the table
represents the interaction o f an issue in the first c o l u m n with an issue in
the top row. F o r example, Cell 2 ( C 2 ) should be read as follows: conflict
(see the left column) can lead to negative consequences in the international
e c o n o m y (see the top row) as a result o f war disrupting the free flow o f
goods between two countries or within an entire region.

6 Introduction
Of course, when two global issues interact, the result is not necessarily
negative. Cell 8 (C8) shows that an increase in a country's gross national
product (GNP, or total of goods and services produced by a country's citi-
zens in a given year) can mean a decline in its poverty rate. But also note
that a possible linkage will not always occur: as Chapter 8 points out, an
increase in GNP does not always lead to a decline in poverty.
Table 1.2 does not cover all possible linkages but points out a few basic
ones. Also, the table understates the multiple nature of the linkages. For in-
stance, the fall in poverty rates suggested in C8 would affect the environ-
ment, which in turn would affect international economic issues like trade,
which in turn would affect poverty, and so on. Thus, each variable in Table
1.2 not only has multiple consequences, but also creates a ripple effect.
Table 1.2 Connections Between Global Issues
Conflict
Conflict
CI
X
International
Economics
C2
war —
»
disruption of
trade patterns
Poverty
C3
war —•
destruction of
food crops
Population/
Migration
C4
conflict —
»
emigration
Environment
C5
nuclear
war —
>
environmental
damage
International
Economics
C6
trade
disputes —
>
trade wars
CI
X
C8
increase in
GNP —
>
decrease in
poverty
C9
decrease in
jobs —
»
emigration
CIO
increase in
GNP -»
increased
pollution
Poverty
C l l
increase in
poverty
conflict
C12
poverty
increases -»
more foreign
investment
sought
CI 3
X
C14
decrease in
poverty -»
less
emigration
C15
poverty —
»
environmental
destruction
Population/
Migration
C16
illegal
immigrants -»
domestic
conflict
C17
migrant
labor —
»
increase in
low-wage
jobs
C18
population
increase —
»
increase in
number of
poor
C19
X
C20
increase in
population —
»
strain
on natural
resources
Environment
C21
scarce
resources —
»
conflict
C22
abundant
natural
resources —
»
wealth via
exports
C23
unsustainable
use of
environment
—• poverty
C24
unsustainable
development
—•
emigration
C25
X

Introduction 1
• OUTLINE OF THE BOOK
This book has been organized into four parts. The first, which focuses on
conflict and security issues, considers some of the primary sources of con-
flict and some of the many approaches to establishing and maintaining
peace. Part 2 concentrates on economic issues ranging from international
trade and investment to one of the major concerns that confronts the global
economy—poverty. Part 3 deals with issues that, although not confined to,
tend to plague the poorer countries. And Part 4 focuses on environmental
issues and cooperative attempts to solve them. A concluding chapter dis-
cusses possible future world orders, sources of hope and challenges that
face us in the coming century, and things individuals can do to have a pos-
itive impact on global problems.
• QUESTIONS
1. What examples of globalization can you identify in your life?
2. Do you think globalization will continue to increase? If so, in what
areas?
3. Do you think globalization has more positive attributes or more nega-
tive attributes?
4. Can you think of additional examples that could be included in Table
1.2?
• SUGGESTED READINGS
Barber, Benjamin R. (1996) Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine Books.
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (1995) 51, no. 4 (July-August).
Hauchler, Ingomar, and Paul M. Kennedy, eds. (1994) Global Trends: The World
Almanac of Development and Peace. New York: Continuum.
http :Hwww.monde-diplomatique .fri md! dossier stft!
Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) "The West: Unique, Not Universal," Foreign Affairs
75, no. 6.
Iyer, Pico (1993) "The Global Village Finally Arrives," Time 21, no. 142 (special
issue).
King, Alexander, and Bertrand Schneider (1991) The First Global Revolution. New
York: Pantheon Books.
New Perspectives Quarterly (1995) 12, no. 4.
United Nations Development Programme (1996) Human Development Report.
New York: Oxford University Press.

2
The Global Challenge of
Weapons Proliferation
Jeffrey S. Lantis
The proliferation of weapons is one of the most serious challenges to inter-
national security today. Arms races, regional competition, and the spread of
weapons technology to other countries are all important dimensions of the
proliferation challenge that could contribute to long-term global instability.
Proliferation is best understood as the rapid increase in the number
and destructive capability of armaments. Evidence of the impact of prolif-
eration on world affairs can be seen in the arms race between Germany
and Great Britain that helped to spark World War I; the nuclear arms race
between the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, that
brought us to the brink of a World War III; and the clandestine arms
buildup in Iraq that helped it fight the Gulf War.
It is important to remember, however, that proliferation is not simply
a problem for politicians and military leaders. When governments choose
to use weapons in conflict in the twentieth century, they are exposing both
soldiers and civilians to danger. In fact, the proliferation of weapons has
contributed to higher civilian casualties and greater destruction this cen-
tury than in the previous four centuries combined (Small and Singer 1982).
When governments devote funds to build up large armies and weapons of
mass destruction, they are also choosing to divert funds from other pro-
grams like education and health care. Clearly, citizens of the world expe-
rience these direct and indirect effects of proliferation every day.
• TYPES OF PROLIFERATION
This chapter examines four different types of weapons proliferation. As il-
lustrated in Table 2.1, there are two broad categories to consider: vertical
11

12 Conflict and Security
Table 2.1 The Proliferation Matrix
Vertical Proliferation Horizontal Proliferation
Conventional Weapons
Weapons of Mass Destruction
versus horizontal proliferation; and conventional weapons versus weapons
of mass destruction. Vertical proliferation is the buildup of armaments in
one country. Horizontal proliferation is defined as the spread of weapons
or weapons technology across country borders. Conventional weapons are
those systems that make up the vast majority of all military arsenals—in-
cluding most guns, tanks, planes, and ships. Weapons of mass destruction
are those "special" weapons that have a devastating effect even when used
in small numbers and kill more indiscriminantly than conventional
weapons; they include nuclear, chemical, and biological systems.
• Type I: Vertical Proliferation of Conventional Weapons
The buildup of conventional weapons arsenals in many countries is the
oldest form of proliferation in human civilization and represents the foun-
dation of the proliferation threat. At first glance, one might view this cat-
egory of proliferation as the least threatening or most benign of all forms.
Vertical conventional proliferation, however, can be a threat to interna-
tional stability for at least two major reasons. First, arms buildups provide
more weaponry for governments and groups to engage in more conflicts.
At the same time, conventional weapons have become more sophisti-
cated—from breech-loading rifles to precision-guided munitions—and
more destructive—from mortar shells to multiple-launch rocket systems.
Vertical conventional proliferation in an unregulated world market may
provide determined leaders with enough incentive to order aggressive ac-
tion and to actually spark conflicts. A second important danger of conven-
tional arms buildups in one country is the social cost, which often includes
serious reductions in social welfare spending by governments for citizens
who can ill afford such deprivations.
More weapons means more violence. Government programs to build up
conventional armaments ensure that there are more weapons available for
countries to engage in more conflict. Some experts believe that the simple
availability of weapons systems and the development of military strategy
increases the chances that a country will engage in conflict. They have
argued that advances in conventional weaponry and offensive military
strategies were contributing factors to the outbreaks of numerous conflicts,
Type I Type II
Type III Type IV

Weapons Proliferation 13
including both world wars and the Vietnam War. In this context, arms
buildups are seen as one potential cause of war in the international system
(Sagan 1986; Sivard 1991).
In traditional forms, conventional arms buildups focus on weapons
systems that are considered to be most effective for the times. In the period
leading up to World War I, Germany and Great Britain engaged in a race
to build the most powerful and awesome warships. In the period leading
up to World War II, Adolf Hitler ordered research and development of
rudimentary surface-to-surface missiles and jet aircraft as a way to gain
military advantage. During the Cold War, President Ronald Reagan called
for the creation of a 600-ship U.S. naval fleet, with an emphasis on strong
aircraft carrier battle groups and advanced submarines. More recently, at-
tention has turned to the latest technology of warfare, including stealth
planes and ships, remote-controlled surveillance aircraft, antisatellite
weapons, and computer technology that would give mobility and advan-
tage to the fighting forces of the twenty-first century.
The relationship between arms buildups and the likelihood of conflict is
multiplied by the fact that conventional weapons have become more sophisti-
cated and destructive over the years. "Smart" conventional bombs and preci-
sion-guided munitions have improved both accuracy and the capability to do
the kind of damage intended by the attacker. The increase in destructive ca-
pacity of conventional weapons such as fuel-air explosives and the faster and
more accurate M1A1 tank also poses a greater threat to soldiers and civilians.
Finally, it is important to remember that conventional arms have been
used repeatedly in conflict over the past fifty years. From landmines to
fighter jets, conventional weapons have been blamed for roughly 50 mil-
lion deaths around the globe since 1945. Individuals, groups, and govern-
ments have all built and used conventional weapons to achieve their goals.
The social costs of arms buildups. In the late twentieth century, many
governments have built sizable conventional arsenals. The average level of
U.S. government defense expenditures has topped $250 billion annually in
the past two decades, with the majority of these funds going to support
high levels of conventional weaponry and troops. In 1994, the Clinton ad-
ministration sought a total defense budget request of $263.7 billion, which
supported an active-duty military strength of 1,525,700 soldiers and a
force structure composed of ten army divisions, twelve navy aircraft car-
rier task groups, and thirteen air force combat wings (Aspin 1994). An-
other way to interpret defense spending in 1994 is to say that the U.S. gov-
ernment spent about $1,000 on defense for every citizen. Or in relative
terms, U.S. defense expenditures in 1994 were more than four times that of
its nearest potential competitor, Russia (USG 1995). Figure 2.1 illustrates
the broader context of changing levels of global defense expenditures.

Figure 2.1 Global Defense Expeditures, 1987-2000
Source: John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage (Guilford, CT: Dushkin
Publishing Group/Brown and Benchmark Publishers, 1995), p. 270.
Note: Expenditures are calculated in billions of 1991 U.S. dollars. Dollar amounts for all
years are not shown.
While Figure 2.1 shows a decline in global defense spending, it is
clear that countries continue to spend hundreds of billions of dollars every
year on the military. This has led many critics to charge that there are dan-
gerous social costs in the trade-off between "guns and butter," and the end
of the Cold War has drawn new attention to this difficult balance between
military and social spending.
In the 1990s, the United States is first in the world in terms of military
spending but ranks relatively low against other countries on various social
indicators. International relations experts Charles Kegley and Eugene Witt-
kopf (1997) point out that the United States is only fourth in the world in
terms of literacy rates, ninth in per capita public expenditures for educa-
tion, thirteenth in average scores of students on science and math tests,
twenty-first in infant mortality, and twenty-fifth in percentage of popula-
tion with access to sanitation. A related study found that when military ex-
penditures rose in developing countries during the past few decades, the
rate of economic growth declined and government debt increased (Nincic
1982). Kegley and Wittkopf conclude that it is a sad truth that many countries
have become more concerned with defending their citizens from foreign

attack in the twentieth century than they are with protecting them from so-
cial, educational, and health insecurities at home.
s?. Type II: Horizontal Proliferation of Conventional Weapons
A second category of proliferation is the horizontal spread of conventional
weapons and related technology across country borders. The main route of
the spread of conventional weaponry is through legitimate arms sales. But
the conventional arms trade has become quite lucrative and many experts
are concerned that the imperative of the bottom dollar is driving us more
rapidly toward global instability.
Arms dealers. The conventional arms trade has become a very big busi-
ness, and the great powers—the United States, France, Russia, Great
Britain, and China—are major dealers of conventional arms. In 1987, the
Soviet Union was at the top of the arms trade, dominating the market with
46 percent of all sales. But as Soviet and (later) Russian sales levels plum-
meted, the United States quickly emerged as the new leader. In 1994, the
Congressional Research Service reported that the United States had cap-
tured true dominance in the global arms market with 47 percent of all
sales. Seven years after the end of the Cold War, it was the United States
government and defense industries that were marketing advanced conven-
tional weapons around the world. In the wake of the successful demon-
stration of the effectiveness of U.S. weapons through the Gulf War, mili-
tary contractors made large shipments of F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi
Arabia, sold hundreds of M I A 1 tanks to Kuwait, and finalized many other
similar deals. In the 1990s, conventional arms sales have earned U.S.-
based defense contractors about $8 billion annually, and in 1995 U.S. com-
panies actually produced more fighter jets for export than for purchase by
the U.S. military (Boston Globe 1996).
Arms customers. The sales figures for the top arms merchants are signifi-
cant in themselves, but it is also important to identify key customers. Gen-
erally speaking, U.S. defense contractors have sold a great deal of hard-
ware to allies. U.S. arms deliveries to Israel from 1984 to 1993 were an
estimated $9.5 billion, which included 450 armored combat vehicles, fifty
used F-16s, and twenty-five new F-15s. In southern Europe, Greece pur-
chased $4 billion worth of U.S. arms from 1991 to 1994. In Asia, allies, in-
cluding Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, have purchased large numbers of
U.S. conventional weapons systems (Hartung 1995).
Arms sales are not always made to countries considered traditional al-
lies. however. From 1984 to 1989, the People's Republic of China pur-
chased some $424 million in U.S. weapons, and these arms deals were
stopped only after the Tiananmen Square massacre of prodemocracy

activists in the summer of 1989. Through legitimate means, Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein purchased a massive conventional arsenal on the interna-
tional arms market. In 1990, estimates of the arsenal included a total of
5,500 tanks, 4,000 heavy artillery, 7,500 armored personnel carriers, and
700 planes. Arms sales to Iraq by friends and allies came back to haunt the
United States, however, in the Gulf War, and the sale of conventional
weapons raises real concern about the potential for "deadly returns" on
U.S. investments (Laurance 1992).
9 Type III: Vertical Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
The vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is an-
other serious threat to international security. There are several important
dimensions of this problem, including the range and variety of modern
W M D systems, incentives for states to build nuclear weapons, and the pat-
terns of vertical W M D proliferation.
Types of weapons of mass destruction. There are three different types of
weapons of mass destruction in existence today: nuclear, biological, and
chemical. These are often examined as a group, but it is important to note
that their effects and their potential military applications are quite different.
Nuclear fission was discovered in 1938, and scientists like Albert Ein-
stein soon called on governments to sponsor an exploration of its potential.
Atomic weapons were first developed by the U.S. government through the
five-year, $2 billion secret research program during World War II known
as the Manhattan Project. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped a
12.5-kiloton atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. This weapon produced an
explosive blast equal to that of 12,500 tons of conventional high explo-
sives (like TNT) and caused high-pressure waves, flying debris, extreme
heat, and radioactive fallout. A second bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on
August 9, 1945, and the Japanese government surrendered one day later
(Schlesinger 1993).
The use of atomic bombs to end World War II in 1945 was actually the
beginning of a very dangerous period of spiraling arms races between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime immediately
stepped up its atomic research and development program. In 1949, they
detonated their first atomic test device and joined the nuclear club. By the
1980s, the Soviet Union had accumulated an estimated 27,000 nuclear
weapons in its stockpile. Both superpowers also put an emphasis on diver-
sification of their weapons systems. The symbolic centerpiece of each
side's nuclear arsenals was their land-based inter-continental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), which as their name implies can be launched from one

continent to another. But each side had also deployed nuclear weapons on
submarines; in long-range bombers; as warheads on short-range, battle-
field missile systems; and even in artillery shells and landmines.
Chemical weapons and biological weapons. Chemical weapons, another
class of weapons of mass destruction, work by spreading poisons that can
incapacitate, injure, or kill through their toxic effects on the body. These
clearly antipersonnel weapons can be lethal when vaporized and inhaled in
very small amounts or when absorbed into the bloodstream through skin
contact. Examples of chemical weapons range from tear gas used by riot
police to disperse crowds to nerve agents such as Sarin (recently used by a
radical religious cult in Japan to terrorize civilians in Tokyo).
Many governments and independent groups have funded chemical
weapons research and development programs in the twentieth century. In
fact, chemical weapons are relatively simple and cheap to produce com-
pared with other classes of WMDs. Any group with access to basic chem-
ical manufacturing plants or petrochemical facilities can develop variants
of commonly used, safe chemicals to create dangerous weapons of mass
destruction. The first recorded use of chemical weapons in warfare oc-
curred in the fifth century B.C.E. when Athenian soldiers poisoned their
enemy's water supply with a chemical to make them sick. The last known
wide-scale use occurred during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), where an
estimated 13,000 soldiers were killed by chemical weapons (McNaugher
1990).
As dangerous as chemical agents can be, biological agents are actually
much more lethal and destructive. Biological agents are basically disease-
causing microorganisms such as bacteria, viruses, or fungi that can be de-
ployed to cause massive infections that incapacitate or kill the intended
target after an incubation period. A more lethal derivative of biological
weapons—toxins—can cause incapacitation or death within minutes or
hours. Examples include anthrax, a disease-causing bacteria that contains
as many as 10 million lethal doses per gram.
Like chemical agents, biological and toxic weapons are relatively easy
to construct and have a high potential lethality rate. Any government or
group with access to basic pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities or bio-
logical research facilities can develop biological weapons. And, like the
other classes of WMD systems, information about the construction of such
systems is available in the open scientific literature and on the Internet.
Why build WMD systems? There are two basic reasons why countries
build weapons of mass destruction: security and prestige. First, many gov-
ernment leaders genuinely believe that their state security is at risk with-
out such systems. The standoff between India and Pakistan is an example.
After years of rivalry and border skirmishes between the countries, India

began a secret program to construct an atomic device that might swing the
balance of regional power in their favor. In 1974, the Indian government det-
onated what it termed a "peaceful nuclear explosion"—signaling their capa-
bilities to the world and threatening Pakistani security. For the next twenty-
five years, both Pakistan and India secretly developed nuclear weapons in a
regional arms race. In May 1998, the Indian government detonated five more
underground nuclear explosions and the Pakistani government responded to
the perceived threat with six nuclear explosions of its own. At this writing,
the two governments have acknowledged their nuclear capabilities and have
warned that they may place nuclear warheads on missiles targeted against one
another. Another example comes from the Middle East, where Israel is sus-
pected of having developed dozens of nuclear devices for potential use in
their own defense. There are now reports that the Israeli government threat-
ened to use these systems against Iraq during the Gulf War if Israel came
under chemical or biological weapons attack (Schlesinger 1993).
Second, some governments have undertaken W M D research and de-
velopment programs for reasons of prestige, national pride, or influence. It
became clear to some during the Cold War that the possession of W M D
systems lent a certain level of prestige, power, and even influence to state
affairs. At a minimum, the possession of W M D systems—or a spirited
drive to attain them—would gain attention for a country or leader. North
Korea's drive to build a nuclear device based on an advanced uranium en-
richment process drew the attention of the United States and other Western
powers in the early 1990s. After extensive negotiations, North Korea was
offered new nuclear energy reactors in exchange for a promise not to di-
vert nuclear material for a bomb program.
Other government leaders pursue the development of W M D arsenals
because they believe that it will help them gain political dominance in their
region of the world. To illustrate this dynamic, Gerald Steinberg (1994), an
expert on proliferation, relates the story of clandestine Iraqi government ef-
forts to develop a W M D arsenal. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein ordered the
creation of a secret W M D research and development program and began to
acquire nuclear technology and materials from France, Germany, the United
States, and other countries in the late 1970s. While research scientists in the
program worked on uranium enrichment, Saddam Hussein worked to im-
prove his political profile in the region and to improve relations with key
Arab states. Meanwhile, the Israeli government tried to stop the clandestine
nuclear program by carrying out a devastating air strike against Iraq's nu-
clear research reactor at Osiraq in 1981. But the determined Iraqi drive for
regional influence was really only stopped by the efforts of the U.S.-led in-
ternational coalition in the Gulf War and the dispatch of a United Nations
(UN) special commission to investigate and dismantle the Iraqi W M D de-
velopment program. Broadly speaking, Iraqi proliferation efforts were part
of a larger scheme to gain prestige, power, and influence in the Middle East.

^ Type IV: Horizontal Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The horizontal proliferation of WMD systems represents the final dimen-
sion of this challenge to international peace and stability. In fact, the
spread of these weapons and vital technology across state borders is often
viewed as the most serious of all proliferation threats.
Nuclear arsenals. The massive buildup of nuclear arsenals by the super-
powers was not the only game in town during the Cold War. In fact, while
the Soviet Union and United States were stockpiling their weapons, sev-
eral other states were working to join the nuclear club through both open
and clandestine routes.
Today the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and China all
openly acknowledge possessing stocks of nuclear weapons. At the height
of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union supported key allies
by secretly authorizing the transfer of sensitive nuclear weapons technol-
ogy to other research and development programs. In 1952, Great Britain
successfully tested an atomic device and eventually built a nuclear arse-
nal that today numbers about 200 weapons. France officially joined the nu-
clear club in 1960 and built a somewhat larger nuclear arsenal of an esti-
mated 420 weapons. The People's Republic of China detonated its first
atomic device in 1964 and built an arsenal of about 300 nuclear weapons
during the Cold War (McGwire 1994).
The controlled spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology from
the superpowers to key allies was not the only route by which countries might
obtain valuable information and materials. Several less developed countries
began secret atomic weapons research and development projects after World
War II. As noted earlier, states like India, Pakistan, and Israel have pursued
clandestine WMD programs because of concerns about security and prestige.
In some cases, these efforts were facilitated by covert shipments of material
and technology from the great powers, but research and development of WMD
systems was also aided by the availability of information in the open scientific
literature (and by the resourcefulness of scientists and engineers).
When the Indian government detonated its first nuclear explosion in
1974, it symbolically ended the monopoly on nuclear systems held by the
great powers. India actually obtained nuclear material for their bomb by di-
verting it from a Canadian-supplied nuclear energy reactor that had key
components originally made in the United States. Most experts believe that
India now possesses a significant stockpile of about fifty unassembled nu-
clear weapons. The 1974 Indian detonation was, of course, a catalyst for the
Pakistani government to step up its research and development program, and
today most experts believe that Pakistan has an arsenal of dozens of
weapons that could be quickly assembled for use. The test explosions spon-
sored by both governments in 1998 were further evidence of their capabilities.

2 0 Conflict and Security
Finally, Israel may possess as many as 100 nuclear weapons. The Israeli
nuclear program was a derivative of research and development projects in
the United States and, ironically, the Soviet Union. Like India, the Israeli
government proved to be quite resourceful in adapting existing technolo-
gies to construct their arsenal (Forsberg, Driscoll, Webb, and Dean 1995).
Finally, there are former nuclear states that have made political deci-
sions to dismantle their weapons. Included in this group are South Africa
and three former Soviet republics: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The
South African government recently admitted that it had constructed sev-
eral nuclear devices for self-defense in the 1960s. But the government de-
cided to destroy these weapons at the end of the 1980s—unilaterally re-
moving themselves from the nuclear club. The three former Soviet
republics each had strategic nuclear weapons stationed on their territory
after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Soon after gaining their indepen-
dence, however, the three republics agreed to become nonnuclear
weapons states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (or Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). In 1992, they signed on to
the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START),
agreeing to transfer all the nuclear warheads on their territory to Russia in
exchange for economic assistance from the United States (McGwire
1994).
The spread of chemical and biological weapons. Over 100 countries have
the basic capability to develop chemical or biological weapons, and at least
twenty countries have already done so. Figure 2.2 illustrates the range of
actors involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
WMD terrorism. The horizontal proliferation of WMD systems raises an-
other concern about international security in the late twentieth century: the
possibility that nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons systems may be
used in terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, this fear was realized in 1995 when
a Japanese religious cult released Sarin nerve gas into the Tokyo subway
system, killing ten civilians and injuring more than 5,000. This attack con-
firmed the growing concerns about the monitoring and control of terrorist
groups and their weapons capabilities.
Many experts believe that the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons,
material, and know-how has dramatically increased the likelihood that a
group or state will attempt an act of nuclear terrorism in the future. This
is of particular concern given the chaos and instability surrounding the nu-
clear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, and there have been numerous
reports in the past few years of attempts to buy or steal nuclear warheads
in that region. In a 1994 feature story in the Atlantic Monthly, Seymour
Hersh reports that in January 1991, armed Azeri rebels in Azerbaijan pen-
etrated a Soviet base on which tactical nuclear weapons were stored and
gained physical access to a nuclear warhead for a short period before being

Figure 2.2 Countries Suspected of Having Programs to Develop Weapons of
Mass Destruction
Source: Randall Forsberg, William Driscoll, Gregory Webb, and Jonathan Dean, eds.,
The Nonproliferation Primer: Preventing the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
Weapons (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1995). Used by
permission of the editors.
Notes: Iraqi programs reversed by UN.
China is an acknowledged nuclear weapon state.
ejected by Soviet troops. Later that year, a nuclear expert from Greenpeace
actually arranged a secret deal to purchase a Soviet nuclear warhead for
$250,000 from a group of disgruntled Russian soldiers.
The emergence of fifteen newly independent states in the region with
very porous borders also increases the likelihood that nuclear materials and
know-how will be smuggled out of the country. In Germany, for example,
more than 100 arrests have been made in connection with attempts to smug-
gle nuclear materials out of the former Soviet Union in the 1990s. In October
1992, two containers of radioactive material were discovered by the police in
Frankfurt containing amounts of cesium and strontium misappropriated from
scientific or medical establishments in the former Soviet Union. Meanwhile,
nuclear scientists in the former Soviet republics (who currently earn an aver-
age monthly salary of $30 in defunct research facilities) are being lured to
less developed states like Iran to work in budding nuclear research programs
by the promise of high wages and social status. All these factors suggest that
the threat of nuclear terrorism has indeed increased in the post-Cold War era
(Forsberg, Driscoll, Webb, and Dean 1995).

• GLOBAL SOLUTIONS:
NONPROLIFERATION INITIATIVES
Proliferation is a very complex and multilayered challenge to international
security. Many world leaders and experts have recognized this threat and
have begun to address the proliferation challenge through a series of re-
gional and global nonproliferation initiatives. The scope, number, and mo-
mentum of these initiatives have steadily increased over the past few
decades.
• Global Responses—the Nonproliferation Regime
In some ways, the global nuclear nonproliferation movement began even
before the first use of atomic weapons in 1945. Politicians, military lead-
ers, and scientists involved in the Manhattan Project recognized from the
outset that such weapons were somehow special and more dangerous than
other systems. President Truman, who had ordered the use of atomic
bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, authorized his ambassador to the
United Nations, Bernard Baruch, to deliver a proposal to the organization
calling for all nuclear materials and technology to be placed under UN
oversight. While the plan did not receive widespread support, it demon-
strated a first step toward global consideration of proliferation problems
and set the stage for later progress on the issue.
Ten years later, in 1956, member states of the UN agreed to create the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA's primary mission
was to serve as a watchdog and inspection organization to promote the
peaceful uses of nuclear technology and stop adaptation for military uses.
This agency soon became an integral part of the global nuclear nonprolif-
eration regime.
In the 1960s, world leaders agreed to new initiatives, including the
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. This agreement banned nuclear tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, and it was originally signed
by leaders from the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. In
1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
created the first large nuclear-free zone. Signatories to this treaty pledged
to use nuclear facilities only for peaceful purposes. Most important, the
treaty outlawed the testing or acquisition of nuclear weapons in the region
and even precluded third parties from bringing weapons to the region
(Davis 1991).
• The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The NPT represented one of the most significant advances in the develop-
ment of the global nonproliferation regime. The NPT was an agreement to

Weapons Proliferation 2 3
halt the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five declared nuclear pow-
ers. Specifically, the treaty had ambitious goals for both vertical and hori-
zontal proliferation. Article I of the treaty dictated that no nuclear weapons
state (defined by the treaty as a state that detonated a nuclear explosive
prior to 1967) would transfer "directly or indirectly" nuclear weapons, ex-
plosive devices, or control over these weapons to another party. Article II
stipulated that no nonnuclear weapons state could receive, manufacture,
obtain assistance for manufacturing, or otherwise try to acquire nuclear
weaponry. Article VI obligated all nuclear states to pursue disarmament,
and other sections of the treaty required all nonnuclear weapons states to
accept full-scope nuclear safeguards established and monitored by the
IAEA (Roberts 1995).
The NPT represented the crowning achievement of global nonprolif-
eration efforts during the Cold War. After careful and extensive negotia-
tions, the treaty was signed by all the acknowledged nuclear states and 168
others. The NPT went into effect in 1970. In 1995, world leaders gathered
at a special Review and Extension Conference to reconsider and evaluate
the effectiveness of the treaty. After some debate, they declared that the
treaty would "continue in force indefinitely" as a guarantor of interna-
tional peace and security. Signatories also agreed to continue to pursue the
ultimate goals of eliminating nuclear weapons and completing a treaty on
general disarmament under strict and effective international control.
£ Related Nonproliferation Initiatives
Several other significant agreements have followed in the spirit of the
NPT. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1972 was the first
formal effort to gain some control over the world's deadly biological ar-
senal. More than 100 signatories agreed to ban "the development, produc-
tion and stockpiling of microbial or other biological agents." The conven-
tion, however, did not sanction nonsignatories and did not preclude
research on biological weapons (Davis 1991).
In the same spirit, world leaders drafted a Chemical Weapons Con-
vention (CWC) that was opened for signature in January 1993, after years
of intensive negotiations. In many ways the framework of the CWC was
similar to the structure of the NPT and the BWC. It committed all signa-
tories to eliminate their stockpiles of chemical weaponry and to halt all de-
velopment efforts. In addition, it included a set of verification procedures
somewhat more stringent than those under the NPT. These procedures sup-
ported the rights of a new CWC Inspectorate to conduct rigorous investi-
gations and surprise "challenge inspections" of suspected chemical
weapons programs in signatory states. Ratification by the legislatures of
sixty-five countries in the system was required for the CWC to come into
force. After a great deal of debate about the implications of the treaty for

U.S. national security and sovereignty, the U.S. Congress finally ratified
the agreement in April 1997.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), another non-
proliferation initiative, was opened for signature in 1996. A large majority
of UN member states voted to support the CTBT (a treaty that would elim-
inate all actual nuclear testing), and world leaders began to sign the treaty
in the fall of 1996. To become international law, the treaty requires the sig-
nature of all forty-four countries known to possess nuclear reactors. By
early 1998, representatives of the five declared nuclear powers had all
signed the CTBT, but both India and Pakistan refused to do so. India has
claimed that it wants the CTBT to be stronger in order to force nuclear
states' compliance with Article VI of the NPT. Meanwhile, the Pakistani
government has stated that it would not sign the CTBT without Indian co-
operation. Both countries' nuclear tests of May 1998 underscored their re-
sistance to this latest initiative of the nonproliferation regime. Several
other states also remain reluctant to sign the treaty, including Libya, Cuba,
and Syria (Crossette 1996a).
0 Controlling Weapons at the Point of Supply
There are also important concerns about the implications of the spread of
WMD technology around the world. The NPT, for example, did not pre-
vent states from exporting other types of materials that could potentially
be adapted for use in the development of WMD programs. World leaders
have tried to address the problem of weapons technology transfers for sev-
eral decades. In 1976, major supplier states—including the Soviet Union,
Japan, France, the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and
Canada—agreed to establish a "trigger list" of items that could be sold to
other countries only under IAEA safeguards. Representatives of these
states met in London, and this "London Club" established and coordinated
a supply control group. In the 1980s, supplier states established the ballis-
tic Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which prohibited the
transfer of essential technology for this aspect of weapons programs.
Like the NPT, however, supply control efforts have had only a mixed
rate of success. They helped limit missile development projects under way
in South America and the Middle East but allowed some twenty countries
to join the ballistic missile club. These supply controls did not prevent Iraq
from making significant progress toward the development of nuclear
weapons through the modification of civilian scientific technology that was
adapted for military use. And they did not prevent Iraq from manufactur-
ing and modifying the Scud-B missiles, which were used against Israel and
Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War—and which were capable of carrying
chemical warheads. Meanwhile, Pakistan developed its own ballistic mis-
sile, the Hatf, and acquired about thirty nuclear-capable medium-range

M - l l missiles from China (McNaugher 1990). Today the North Korean
government is developing a long-range Taepo Dong missile that may
someday have the potential to reach the United States.
IS The U.S. Response: Counterproliferation Strategies
In the post-Cold War era, President Clinton identified proliferation as a
key threat to U.S. national security and argued that the government needed
a coherent policy to deal with new states that acquired nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons. Given the dangers of proliferation and new deter-
rent dynamics, President Clinton authorized a comprehensive Nuclear Pos-
ture Review in October 1993 to define and adapt nuclear weapons to the
changing international security environment. Even before the completion
of the review, the administration had already begun "vigorous counterpro-
liferation and threat-reduction efforts" including (1) an improvement of in-
telligence monitoring of proliferation; (2) an enhancement of the United
States' ability to destroy, seize, and disable nuclear, chemical, or biologi-
cal systems; (3) the development of ballistic and cruise missile defense;
and (4) better cooperation with friendly governments to improve export
control measures.
In November 1994, President Clinton took counterproliferation efforts
a step further by issuing Executive Order No. 12938, which declared pro-
liferation a "national emergency." In the face of such an emergency, the
administration pushed for the implementation of arms reduction agree-
ments like the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II, which called for a re-
duction of Russian and U.S. nuclear warheads to a level of 3,500, and the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which would reduce military hard-
ware levels across Europe. The Clinton administration also supported a bi-
partisan Senate initiative known as the Nunn-Lugar Plan to promote and
oversee weapons dismantling programs, demilitarization, and defense di-
versification. Each of these programs has contributed to a new U.S. secu-
rity policy posture that recognizes the contemporary challenge of prolifer-
ation (Rathjens 1995).
• CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR T H E FUTURE?
The proliferation of weapons is truly a major challenge to global security,
but there are also reasons for optimism about the prospects for solutions.
One of the most important catalysts of global proliferation was the
Cold War arms race between the superpowers. Today, many scholars and
politicians are taking a new look at incentives for proliferation in the post-
Cold War era, and some say that we may be headed toward a nuclear-free
twenty-first century. Optimists argue that a global build-down in tensions—

a reverse proliferation—has occurred with the end of Cold War tensions.
They cite the completion of START I in January 1991, by which the two
superpowers pledged to reduce their arsenals to between 8,000 and 9,000
weapons, as evidence of this trend toward reverse proliferation. Further
momentum was gained two years later when the United States and Russia
agreed to sign START II, reducing nuclear arsenals to no more than 3,500
warheads each. And the Clinton administration has now begun preliminary
negotiations with Russia on a START III accord that would lead to further,
dramatic reductions in pursuit of a "minimum nuclear deterrent" relation-
ship (Bundy, Crowe, and Drell 1993).
Meanwhile, the indefinite extension of the NPT and the establishment
of the CTBT both suggest an emerging global consensus to stop nuclear
proliferation. On the conventional weapons front, there is growing recog-
nition that conventional arms transfers—even small arms—also represent
a threat to international security. UN experts and government leaders have
been discussing ways to increase the transparency of the conventional
arms trade by making more information available on arms transfer policies
and data. Efforts are under way for both general classes of weapons trans-
fers to enforce trade regulations and closely monitor weapons transactions
(Karp 1994).
Solutions to the proliferation challenge must go even deeper, however.
As we look toward the twenty-first century, citizens of the world must
agree to build on the momentum of recent progress by making moral and
principled stands against proliferation. For instance, Oscar Arias, the 1987
Nobel Peace Prize winner, has recently called for a global agreement to
stop arms sales to countries that have violated human rights. This certainly
would be an important step in a global effort to address ethical and moral
concerns about the development of certain classes of weapons such as
landmines and chemical and biological weapons. A moral stand against
proliferation in favor of economic development, health care, and education
may pave the way toward real peace and justice in the twenty-first century.
• QUESTIONS
1. In your opinion, which of the four types of proliferation represents the
most serious threat to international security?
2. Is the proliferation of conventional weapons a challenge that can ever
fully be met by the global community? Why or why not?
3. Is it possible that weapons proliferation could actually make the in-
ternational system more stable in the twenty-first century? How might
this occur?

4. What are some of the efforts that individual countries and interna-
tional organizations have made to respond to the proliferation chal-
lenge? Which are most effective, and why?
5. What are some of the implications of the trade-off between expendi-
tures on defense and social welfare programs?
6. Can countries afford to enjoy a "peace dividend" in the post-Cold War
era by diverting large sums from defense expenditures to other needs?
Can they afford not to?
7. In your opinion, should government leaders offer to pursue complete
W M D disarmament? Why or why not?
• SUGGESTED READINGS
Bailey, Kathleen C. (1993) Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Karp, Aaron (1994) "The Arms Trade Revolution: The Major Impact of Small
Arms," Washington Quarterly 17 (Autumn).
Krause, Keith (1992) Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and
Trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moodie, Michael (1995) "Beyond Proliferation: The Challenge of Technology Dif-
fusion," Washington Quarterly 18 (Spring).
Quester, George H., and Victor A. Utgoff (1994) "Toward an International Nuclear
Security Policy," Washington Quarterly 17 (Winter).
Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz (1995) The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A
Debate. New York: W.W. Norton.

3
Nationalism
John K. Cox
Nationalism is a complicated and widespread phenomenon in modern life.
At its most basic level, nationalism is something felt by an individual. It is
a sense of belonging. This belonging links the individual to a group of
people on the basis of certain shared characteristics. Most important
among these are a common language, a common history, and common cus-
toms or cultural traditions (sometimes including religion). When this indi-
vidual national feeling develops into group national identity, nationalism
becomes political. The term self-determination is used to describe the per-
ceived right of every nation, or people, to rule itself. Ideally, this means
that the various countries, or states, of the world would become "nation-
states" (independent countries composed of members of a single national
group) if their populations have nationalist feelings. This is a very com-
plicated procedure, however, since many great empires and countries of
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were, and still are, decidedly multi-
ethnic or multinational. Thus, only a small fraction of today's countries are
true nation-states.
• THE HISTORY OF NATIONALISM
Napoleon Bonaparte, who ruled France from 1799 to 1815, is usually cred-
ited with introducing the modern concept of nationalism. It spread
throughout Europe as a result of the Napoleonic Wars. This new national
feeling went far beyond simple patriotism, which is the love of one's
homeland. Patriotism has been a part of human behavior since the begin-
ning of history. Usually considered noble, it most often found expression
29

in military terms. But it was a rather narrow idea compared to today's na-
tionalism, since it was limited to the religious duty to "die a good death,"
was bound up with feudal localism, or was restricted to one stratum of so-
ciety, usually an upper class (Teich and Porter 1993: xviii).
Nationalism as we know it was a product of the French Revolution.
In 1789, France was seized by massive protests and revolts, while many of
its intellectuals were under the influence of the Enlightenment. The ancien
régime (old government and social system) of France had run the country
deep into debt. Important economic and demographic shifts had taken
place with the growth of cities and industries and commerce. The classes
that participated in such activities, such as skilled and unskilled workers,
and merchants, were clamoring for more political power. But the system
was still controlled by the Bourbon family, France's absolutist kings who
claimed rule by divine right. The disturbances in France eventually
brought about a democratic government. French nationalism was thus born
in people's minds when their government truly became theirs for the first
time. People, formerly known as subjects, became citizens in the new
French democracy.
Most scholars who deal with nationalism—historians, political scien-
tists, and sociologists—believe that the growth of nationalism is a funda-
mental aspect of modernization. Of course modernization involves more
than self-determination; generally it involves industrialization, urbaniza-
tion, increased literacy, and secularization. This was as true of European
history in the nineteenth century as it is of the history of the decolonizing
world—mostly Africa and Asia—in the twentieth. Therefore, the growth of
nationalism involves two processes: its appearance in people's minds as a
sense of loyalty and belonging; and its appearance as a political force,
which ultimately works to create nation-states.
The transition to an industrial society often predisposes people to be-
come more nationalistic, since the breakdown of traditional village and
family structures leaves emotional and moral gaps in individual lives.
Also, the centralization of government, which originated in the Middle
Ages in the struggle of kings against recalcitrant nobles, was to tap into
nationalism as a way to mobilize the population. Napoleon was the first
to make use of this great power of the people by appealing to them with
the symbolism and emotions of national unity and a national mission.
In the nineteenth century, people began to accept nationalism only
gradually. Europe continued to be the main place where nationalism grew.
In the many small states that made up the German cultural realm, for in-
stance, nationalists and advocates of greater democracy joined forces.
They were at once attracted to the power of nationalism and disturbed by
France's use of it against them. Philosophers, publicists, and revolutionaries
portrayed drives for national unity and independence in the best possible

Nationalism 31
light; they said, in essence, that the diversity among nations was a blessing
from God. Separating people into nations was thought to be a duty that
would result in the maximum use of individuals' talents in the overall ser-
vice of humanity. One of the leading idealistic nationalists was French his-
torian Ernest Renan, who claimed that a nation was not built on ethnic or
religious criteria, but on a "rich legacy of memories" and a "common will
in the present"; in short, Renan said that a nation was a "spiritual princi-
ple" (Renan 1996: 52).
Skeptics and detractors of the movement, however, had very strong ar-
guments against it. Leaders of Europe's many multinational states (Great
Britain, Russia, and the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires), the nobility,
many officials of the Catholic church, and Marxists, all for different rea-
sons, opposed nationalism.
Despite this diverse and often intense opposition, the twentieth cen-
tury began with what most people regard as the triumph—or running
amok—of the national idea. The great powers of Europe, such as Ger-
many, France, and Russia, became imperialistic and sought to expand their
power at their neighbors' expense. They were filled with national pride,
became aggressive, and organized themselves into massive alliance sys-
tems. A result was World War I, in which large numbers of troops com-
bined with the propaganda of national glory and the vilification of the
enemy to create a new level of battlefield fury and destructiveness. The
Great War, as it is sometimes called, was the first total war involving
weapons and tactics of mass destruction such as poison gas, tank assaults,
and the bombardment of civilian population centers.
There is another important connection between World War I and na-
tionalism: the realm of nation-states in Europe was greatly expanded as a
result of the fighting. The old multinational empires of Europe collapsed.
In their place arose a set of what diplomats endorsed at the time as nation-
states, from Finland in the north to Turkey in the south. These included
Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Austria, as well as two
small, multiethnic confederations of mostly related peoples—Czechoslo-
vakia and Yugoslavia.
• TYPES OF NATIONALISM
One way to categorize types of nationalism is by their organizing con-
cepts. What is a "nation"? Who belongs to it? And who is an outsider? In
general, we may say that nationalism is broken down into two types. The
first, and oldest, was initially associated with Western European or North
American politics and with countries elsewhere that followed them. It is
usually called "civic" or political nationalism and it is seen above all as a

"legal-political concept," or as a "political configuration" (Bojtar 1988:
254). This type of nationalism is heir to the legacy of the French and
American revolutions. In these revolutions, the growing middle class, or
bourgeoisie, was carving out space in the political structure for itself.
These revolutions are thus important milestones on the path to democracy,
since they resulted in breaking the stranglehold on political power of the
kings and aristocrats. Still, these middle classes were not interested in giv-
ing the vote immediately to the lower classes or to women. In theory,
though, civic nationalism presupposes that citizenship and nationality are
identical (Liebich, Warner, and Dragovic 1995: 186). The nation is a po-
litical population, united in its ideas and habits.
The other type of nationalism, "ethnic" nationalism, was originally as-
sociated with countries in Eastern and Central Europe. This nationalism is
based on "ancestral association" (Bojtar 1988: 254) as compared to civic
nationalism, which can embrace diverse people who live within shared
borders. Ethnic nationalism requires a common culture, way of life, and
above all a perceived sense of genetic links (as in a greatly extended fam-
ily) to the members of the ethnic community. The word ethnic comes from
the Greek word ethnos meaning a group of people united by their common
birth or descent. It should be noted that all types of nationalism are in
some way exclusionary. If nothing else, this is true because of the presence
of borders and frontiers. But ethnic nationalism, due to its emphasis on the
"blood line" or racial connections between citizens, is far more exclusion-
ary than civic nationalism and pays less attention to political boundaries.
The historical differences between these types of nationalism are great
and remain relevant to this day. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina can be
better understood by remembering that many Serbs and Croats adhere to
the kind of exclusive nationalism of the second category (see Case Study
One: Yugoslavia, p. 38). Why? Because the more inclusive civic national-
ism of Western Europe was developing in the spirit of certain key turning
points in European civilization, such as the Enlightenment and the growth
of middle-class democracy. Western European nationalism arose in soci-
eties that were already modernizing, while the peoples of Eastern Europe
were neither independent nor economically modern. In short, Eastern Eu-
rope became nationally conscious before it had experienced economic de-
velopment, representative government, and political unity (or in many
cases even independence from foreign rule). The result was a desire to
alter the political boundaries to coincide with the national or cultural
boundaries (Sugar and Lederer 1994: 10; Kohn 1965: 29-30).
The much-heralded civic nationalism can also be exclusive. For in-
stance, the U.S. Constitution was designed in the 1780s to deny women and
slaves the right to vote. It was only after the Civil War that African Ameri-
can men were officially given the right to vote (the Fifteeth Amendment),

Nationalism 33
and in many states this right was not protected by meaningful enforcement
of laws until the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s, almost 100 years later.
Women were denied the right to vote almost everywhere until the twenti-
eth century; in the United States, this right was provided by the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920.
• FUNCTIONS OF NATIONALISM
Nationalism functions in five ways. First, there is the matter of identifi-
cation, whereby individuals consider themselves, especially since the ad-
vent of industrialization and its processes of urbanization and seculariza-
tion, to be part of a nontraditional mass group, the "nation." Second,
governments since the time of Napoleon have used nationalism as a
means to mobilize military and economic power and to further their own
legitimacy. Third, nationalism can function as a centrifugal force when it
breaks up bigger countries (or empires) into smaller ones. This occurred
in many European countries after World War I. It also took place in a
massive way in the British Empire after World War II when India, Pak-
istan, Ghana, Nigeria, and other former colonies became independent.
Then in the 1990s, it occurred again in the breakups of Czechoslovakia
(into the separate Czech and Slovak republics) and Yugoslavia (into
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Serbia-Montenegro). Canada
and Spain are two countries experiencing the centrifugal effects of sepa-
ratist nationalism today: the French-speaking Quebecois in Canada and
the Catalonians and Basques in Spain. The recent civil war in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) is another important example
of different national groups competing for power and gradually crippling
the power of the central government.
Nationalism can also work in a fourth way, as a centripetal force,
when it unites various people into new nation-states, such as occurred in
the long and bloody unification struggles of the Germans and Italians in
the nineteenth century, or in the Vietnam War of this century.
Fifth, nationalism can serve as a form of resistance, especially to colo-
nial intruders. In Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, this has often been a
kind of state-run, top-down nationalism that aims at organizing more
meaningful resistance to actual or potential invaders. Sometimes this top-
down nationalism is called "reform nationalism" (Breuilly 1993:9). In
Turkey after World War I, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk launched a highly suc-
cessful plan of economic and political modernization based on this kind of
government-led reform nationalism. Cuba under Fidel Castro fits this def-
inition as well. Another kind of resistance to colonialism takes the form
of wars of independence (sometimes called national liberation struggles).

Important examples of this kind of national struggle include the Vietnam
War and the Algerian war of independence (1954-1962).
• NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF NATIONALISM
We have seen that nationalism can be an individual's sense of identity, a
political allegiance, and a force for military and political change. Arising
from these different levels of meaning are various negative effects of na-
tionalism. Many of the conflicts in the world today originate in national
disputes. A quick glance over the headlines shows warfare, ethnic con-
flicts, or genocide in Bosnia, Chechnya, Rwanda, Indonesia, Canada,
South Africa, Macedonia, Cyprus, and Ireland. We can discuss these neg-
ative, conflict-producing effects of nationalism in terms of the following
categories: imperialism, the glorification of the state, the creation of ene-
mies, the overlap with religion, discrimination against minorities, and
competing rights.
N Imperialism
Self-confidence and group assertiveness, integral aspects of nationalism,
can lead to arrogance or aggressiveness. Imperialism, which is the projec-
tion of a country's power beyond its borders to achieve the subjugation or
exploitation of another country, is as old as history itself. But it takes on
greater intensity when it meets with a sense of national unity and purpose.
The "scramble for Africa" of the late nineteenth century, when many Eu-
ropean states collaborated in literally carving up and occupying almost the
whole continent, is a breathtaking example of arrogant imperialism im-
bued with a purported "civilizing mission" or "white man's burden,"
which justified the exploitation of other races. Carried to a much greater
extreme, nationalism can end in genocide, as it did in the wildly homicidal
policies of Adolf Hitler in the Third Reich, who sought to rid the world of
Jews in order to make it "safe" for Germans.
®l Glorification of the State
Although many early nationalists, especially in the nineteenth century, be-
lieved that the nation-state was a vehicle of progress and liberty for all
human beings, not all nationalist thought is connected with individual free-
dom. Indeed, nationalism often encourages antidemocratic practices. When
a "people" or nation feels threatened by neighbors, or when it has a history
of underdevelopment or division, political leaders can make the case for an

Nationalism 35
authoritarian (antidemocratic) government. Sometimes, in the case of
fascist governments, which are extremely authoritarian and stress anti-
individualism, racial or national homogeneity, scapegoating, and mili-
tarism, the state or its leader comes to be regarded as the ultimate expres-
sion of the people's character and ambitions (Payne 1995; Weber 1964).
Loyalty to governments like these is extremely dangerous because of their
aggressive and intolerant policies.
Creation of Enemies
Another negative effect of nationalism can take place at the most basic level
of self-identification. When people identify with one group, they often de-
velop mistrustful or hostile feelings about people outside that group. Even
neighboring states with a great deal in common can come to mistrust each
other, as in the case of the recent fishing controversies between the United
States and Canada. Similarly, countries with common political interests and
similar economic systems—such as the United States and Japan—can de-
velop deep misunderstandings based largely on national feeling.
ss Overlap with Religion
In some conflicts, such as those in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and
Bosnia, nationalism and religion cross paths in a very destructive way. In
the current three-way struggle in Bosnia, between mostly Orthodox Chris-
tian Serbs, Roman Catholic Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, religion is a
factor. Adding a religious dimension to nationalism can intensify divisive
feelings; for instance, it can sanction killing—or dying—for a cause. Thus,
it can make nationalists more fanatical and conflicts bloodier (Landres
1996).
a Discrimination Against Minorities
Other difficulties arise when states or countries are actually constructed on
national principles. Such principles hold that only members of a given na-
tional or ethnic group have the right to live in the new national state. Often
a related principle tends to hold a lot of weight also: for example, only
members of a particular ethnic group should enjoy the full benefits of cit-
izenship. This creates a problem for minority groups, which are quite nu-
merous in today's world. Major examples include the Hungarians in Ro-
mania and Slovakia, the Russians in the former Soviet republics (now
independent states) of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and, until the cre-
ation of the Irish Republic, the Irish in the United Kingdom.

• Competing Rights
Another negative aspect of nationalism lies in the competing rights and
claims states m a k e against one another. Three kinds are derived from or
have a major impact on ethnic and minority questions. The first involves
historic rights. These include claims by one national group to a certain
piece of territory based on historical precedent. In other words, who was
there first? This issue is hotly debated in Transylvania, a large portion of
western Romania that has a substantial Hungarian population. In Bosnia,
the competing parties of Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, and Croats have each
tried to prove that they contributed more to the region's cultural heritage
and, having set the tone for the region's culture, deserve to mold the re-
gion's political future now.
Next are ethnic rights, which address the question of who is currently
in the majority in a given region. The contemporary setting—determined
by population counts, polls, and votes of self-determination (such as in the
Austrian province of Carinthia and in the Polish-German region of Silesia
just after World War I)—is the decisive factor, not the complicated histor-
ical record of settlements, assimilation, immigration, and emigration.
The final claim can be referred to as strategic rights. Sometimes a
state will claim a piece of territory simply because it needs that territory in
order to be viable. This usually means the land is necessary for the coun-
try's defense or basic economic well-being. For example, after World War
I, the new state of Czechoslovakia was given the Sudetenland region, even
though it was heavily populated with Germans. This was done to provide
the fledgling republic with a more mountainous, defensible border. Unfor-
tunately, the Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler would later attack Czechoslovakia
both diplomatically and militarily to "liberate" the Germans of that region,
who he claimed were being denied their right to self-determination.
• CHALLENGES TO NATIONALISM
We have seen that historically nationalism has been opposed by many
forces. In addition to the conservative opposition in Europe, European im-
perialist powers in Africa—especially Great Britain, France, Belgium, and
Portugal—resisted the growth of nationalism in their colonies. They did
this despite being more or less nation-states themselves. This is because
nationalism among colonized peoples presented a direct challenge to Eu-
ropean domination and exploitation.
We now examine the four main challenges to the nation-state. One of
these challenges is inherent in the ideal of nationalism itself. This is the
problem of carrying the principle of self-determination through to its

Nationalism 37
logical conclusions; if one national group deserves its own country and in-
dependence, then do not all groups deserve these things too? But countries
are destabilized when every ethnic group within them agitates for its in-
dependence. And sometimes so-called microstates are created that are too
small to be economically viable and that swell the membership of the
United Nations and affect voting patterns there. For instance, the Pacific
island country of Kiribati has about one-eighth as many people as the
Canadian city of Toronto; likewise, the combined populations of thirty-
eight microstates total only about a third of that of California (Rourke
1995: 201-202).
A related issue is devolution, or the decentralization of power in eth-
nically mixed countries. This usually does not result in the breakup of the
country. The United Kingdom continues to experiment with this principle
by giving more and more autonomy to its Welsh and Scottish regions. Bel-
gium has also achieved a balance, based on this principle, between its
Flemish and Walloon populations. Russia is faced with this issue today in
many autonomous regions and districts.
Second is the issue of supranational groupings of various kinds. At the
height of the era of decolonization, some Arab and African countries tried
to establish political leagues that cooperated on a wide variety of issues.
Today there are regional political and economic groupings on every conti-
nent. But in Europe, the blossoming of the European Union seems to her-
ald an age of ever greater integration of nations. The United Nations, of
course, while generally respecting the sovereignty of all countries, is the
best example of a global grouping above the national level. Other contem-
porary examples include the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the Mercado Commun de Sud-America (Mercosur); both are
regional free trade groups in the Western Hemisphere.
Third, modern economic developments are also undermining the
nation-state. The influence of multinational corporations, the obsession
with free trade, and the appearance of a global, computer-driven, mass
market economy are breaking down barriers between populations and
eroding the sovereignty of smaller, less developed nations. This trend is
analyzed in detail in Benjamin Barber's (1996) Jihad vi. McWorld, where
a grim picture is painted of an increasingly standardized, shallow world
culture dominated by a few, nearly all-powerful, marketing agents and pro-
ducers of consumer goods.
Today the concept of national identity, and even to some degree the
concept of nation-states, is in flux. The prevalence of computer-driven
communication on the Internet and the World Wide Web affects society in
many ways. From shopping to political discussions to dating networks, ge-
ography and distance are suddenly rendered virtually inconsequential by
computers. The much-heralded "global village" of travel and communication

has to some extent arrived, although its effects will likely never be as gra-
ciously positive and progressive as the gurus of technology predicted a
few decades ago. Computer culture has developed rapidly along with the
general economic shift in the world's most developed countries (such as
Germany, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, and Japan) into a ser-
vice-based economy (in contrast to economies based on the production of
industrial goods). Many important changes in thought and attitudes go
along with these technological and economic shifts. Service economies are
oriented toward individual consumption, and the Internet means that indi-
viduals can have a maximum of "self-fulfillment" with a minimum of real
contact with other citizens. This can reduce the sense of group loyalty so
important in nationalism.
Finally, the world today is also witnessing a revival of conservative
religious activity. This is most prominent in the Muslim world, but it is
also present to some extent among other religions. Politically speaking, it
is the new Islamism (sometimes called "Muslim fundamentalism") that
most affects international politics, because it rejects capitalism and the
decadence of Western culture as manifestations of a new imperialism.
Since much, although by no means all, of the Muslim world consists of
states that are ethnically and linguistically Arab, there is added potential
for cooperation that transcends political boundaries.
The following two case studies illustrate national conflicts in various
parts of the world today. They give us an idea of how national issues mix
with other kinds of problems to create major crises.
• CASE STUDY ONE: YUGOSLAVIA
The region of southeastern Europe known as the Balkans provides numer-
ous intriguing case studies of nationalism at work. One of the characteris-
tics of the region is the prevalence of ethnic or cultural nationalism rather
than civic (or political) nationalism. Another is the highly diversified na-
ture of its population. In many areas, numerous ethnic or national groups
live close together; groups often intermingle and sometimes occupy the
ancestral homelands of their neighbors. Two of the most mixed of these
areas are Bosnia and Macedonia, both of which were part of the former
Yugoslavia.
A third major characteristic of Balkan societies is a long history of
foreign rule. Various empires, from the Ottoman and Hapsburg to the
Russian and Soviet, have dominated the region, preventing the self-deter-
mination of its peoples. The two main peoples within the multinational
state of Yugoslavia were the Serbs and Croats. It was their conflicting

Nationalism 39
national aspirations—strengthened and made poisonous, many would say,
by their current leaders—that provided the impetus for the breakup of the
country in 1991-1992.
The term Yugoslavia means simply "land of the South Slavs." The
country was created in 1918 as a kind of catch-all state for a number of
small nationalities, including several that had been part of empires that
collapsed in World War I. Thus, the term Yugoslav did not correspond to
any genuine national or ethnic group; it was a matter of citizenship only,
except for a small number of idealists or people who were part of mixed
families created by marriages between members of different national
groups.
During its existence, the country—first under the authoritarian rule of
the Serbian royal family and then under the firm hand of the Communist
military leader Josip Broz (known as Tito)—was divided into provinces or
"republics" that reflected its chief national groups: Serbs, Croats, Bosnian
Muslims, Slovenes, etc. There were also large and important minority
groups, especially Albanians.
Rivalries among the various South Slavic national groups have been
common, as they are among almost all neighboring peoples. But the fre-
quently used journalistic phrases "ancient ethnic hatreds" and "long-smol-
dering ethnic feuds" are not accurate. While the Muslim-Christian rivalry in
the Balkans had been a problem since the Middle Ages in Bosnia, the dif-
ficulties between Serbs and Croats became acute only during World War II.
After the Nazis and their allies carved up Yugoslavia in 1941, puppet
states in both Croatia and Serbia emerged (see Figure 3.1). Both countries,
but especially Croatia, sought to expand their territory and to homogenize
their population at the expense of their neighbors and minorities. Further
complicating the situation was the nature of Yugoslav resistance to the
Nazis, which was led by the Communists under Tito but which included
other rival political groups.
The post-World War II government sought to stabilize the country's
national groups by one-party rule and by a decentralized administration.
The three wars of succession that accompanied the breakup of the country
after 1991—in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—show that
Tito's policies failed. There is also continued unrest among Albanians in
Macedonia and in the Kosovo region of Serbia. In some ways, Tito may
have made the national situation worse. Still, it is impossible to attribute
the breakup of the country to any one cause. Nationalism played a part, as
did economic problems, the ambitions of current leaders, and the failure of
the Communists to allow or promote a pluralistic civil society that could
have taught deeper loyalties to the central government and the Yugoslav
ideal.

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V
Durante el almuerzo, Meg se mantuvo en silencio, melancólica y
como fatigada. Sus ojos, verde-remanso, yacían misteriosamente en
la sombra violácea de las ojeras, y miraban, sin parpadear, con larga
caricia á Alberto, el cual, aun cuando estaba muy determinado en
hacerse el indiferente y muy seguro de sí propio, concluyó por
entregarse á la fascinación de las acuosas pupilas, respondiendo á la
asiduidad de sus miradas con otras, de su parte, no menos
amorosas, y un sí es no es acarneradas. Entre tanto se decía:
«¿acaso los pensamientos de esta mañana no eran sino sofismas
sentimentales, provocados por la certidumbre de que Meg amaba á
Ettore? ¿Es posible que no fueran sino ridículos y engañosos lenitivos
que á mí mismo me aplicaba?» Bajo el hechizo de los ojos verdes
Alberto no sabía qué pensar, pero estaba resuelto á romper con
Meg, en la primera conversación que tuvieran.
Después de almorzar, así que Bob se adormeció en su
acostumbrado butacón, Alberto descendió al bosquecillo de
araucarias. Meg, tendida en la hamaca, leía. Alberto se adelantó con
pie lento; su espíritu temblaba en un filo de enorme incertidumbre,
como si la balanza de su porvenir estuviera en el fiel y en inminencia
de doblarse para siempre: en un platillo, la liberación; en el otro, el
amor delirante, fatídico, eterno por aquella mujer. De ella —un
gesto, un ademán, una sonrisa, una palabra— quizá dependiese
todo. Aquellos instantes ligeros, volando entre la penumbra
perfumada del bosque, eran la conjunción suprema del pasado y el
futuro.

—¿Por qué no te acercas á besarme? —preguntó Meg, con voz
lenta y suplicante.
—Porque no he venido á besarte, sino á hablar contigo de
asuntos serios —respondió Alberto severamente. Meg compuso una
muequecita tan desolada, tan zalamera, tan inocente, que Alberto
perdió la serenidad. Adelantóse un paso, y mordiendo las palabras,
murmuró—: ¡No tienes vergüenza!
Meg no respondió; pero sus ojos se iluminaron de sutil alegría;
por dominar la sonrisa, sus mejillas temblaban. Alberto, que lo
advertía claramente, repitió:
—¡No tienes vergüenza! ¿Lo has oído?
Meg inclinó la cabeza en señal de asentimiento. Una lengüecilla
de oro bajó desde la frente á besarle, trémula, los ojos. Con la mano
blanquísima, que azuleaba en la penumbra, redujo el rizo á su lugar
correspondiente, y como éste se obstinara en insubordinarse, Meg
hizo un gesto de contrariedad como si el tocado fuera lo único que le
preocupase en tales circunstancias. Domeñado el díscolo mechón,
Meg se puso á mirar á Alberto con infantil insolencia. El hombre,
cada vez con mayor desvarío, continuó:
—Pero ¿tú creías que á mí se me engañaba como á un pipi?
Meg sacó lindamente el hociquito, como diciendo: ¡Jesús, qué
palabra!
Alberto, exasperándose progresivamente, no apartaba los ojos del
rostro de la niña, descifrando su lenguaje mímico. Pero la respiración
de Meg, rápida y anhelante, y el agitado movimiento del frágil torso
eran cosas que no existían para él. El gesto de reprobación irónica
con que Meg recibió la palabra pipi, aprendida por Alberto en las
noches orgiásticas de la vida libertina madrileña, y pronunciada
ahora involuntariamente, le enfureció más aún en su interior. Sin
freno ya, refirió descaradamente su espionaje y el hallazgo de las

cartas. En este punto de su discurso, hubiera sido un gran alivio para
él, y así lo deseaba con toda vehemencia, que Meg replicara
ofendida, echándole en cara la bajeza de su conducta. Pero Meg no
desplegó los labios; sus ojos seguían bañados de alegría misteriosa y
la piel de los pómulos estremecida. Entonces Alberto la oprimió un
brazo, con bárbara violencia, á tiempo que, acuñando las sílabas,
pronunciaba una palabra soez. Retrocedió, espantado de sí mismo,
llevándose las manos al rostro. Meg rompió á llorar. Y lloraba de
alegría. Entre las lágrimas suspiraba:
—¡Cómo me quieres! ¡Cómo te quiero!
—¿Eh? —interrogó Alberto, atónito, dejando caer las manos á los
lados del cuerpo.
—¡Cómo me quieres! ¡Cómo te quiero!
Arrebatadamente, Alberto fué sobre Meg, la tomó por las sienes y
aproximándose hasta casi unir las frentes, buceó en los ojos
verdiclaros hasta desentrañar los últimos limbos de aquella profunda
alma femenina.
—¿Te quiero? —preguntó Meg con desmayado soplo.
—Sí.
Oyóse la voz de Nancy:
—Meg; ven un momento.
Alberto quedó á solas. Su sér, convulso y descompuesto poco
antes, había sufrido nueva trasmutación. Disipáronse, como por arte
de encantamiento, la lumbrarada y humareda que le habían
abrasado y desvanecido los últimos días. La balanza se había
rendido del lado de la liberación. Había llegado prematuramente á
una convicción, cuando su ímpetu sensual y su desconcierto
espiritual no habían cuajado aún en sentimiento de raíces duraderas.
Muerta la incertidumbre, muerta la zozobra, muerta la ansiedad,
muerta la esperanza, muertas todas las potencias misteriosas que

presiden al nacimiento del genuino amor. Ahora, sólo sentía por Meg
un á manera de interés ético ó afecto maternal. La alegría de
sentirse otra vez en imperio de sí propio, se acibaraba con la
compasión que le inspiraba Meg. Accidentalmente, tomó el libro que
la niña había dejado sobre la hamaca y lo hojeó al azar. Era una
antología de poetas norteamericanos. Sus ojos fueron á posarse en
un poema de J. G. Whittier[2]; Telling the Bees.
Here is the place; right over the hill
Runs the path I took;
You can see the gap in the old wall still,
And the stepping-stones in the shallow brook.
There is the house, with the gate red-barred,
And the poplars tall;
And the barn’s brown length, and the cattle-yard,
And the white horns tossing above the wall.
There are the beehives ranged in the sun;
And down by the brink
Of the brook are her poor flowers, weed —o’errun—,
Pansy and daffodil, rose and pink.
¿No era la casa de Fina en Villaclara? En aquellos mismos
instantes ¿no estaría Fina esperándole, cantando, por alimentar la
confianza, á la vera de la ringla de colmenas? ¿No era Fina el escudo
contra el peligro de toda loca pasión futura, y corona de rosas para
una frente serena? ¿No le unía aún á Fina un amor hecho amistad
estrecha, incorruptible como un diamante?
Formulaba Alberto en su pensamiento estas que no eran
preguntas sino en la forma retórica, que en sustancia eran
afirmaciones, cuando retornó Meg. Se agazapó al flanco de Alberto,
como buscando protección para su alma quebradiza y caprichosa.
Era en aquel punto una criatura toda humildad, solicitud y
renunciamiento. Dijo:

—Lo que tú sabes mejor que yo, no tengo para qué contártelo. Yo
me hubiera alegrado de que nunca lo hubieras sabido, pero me doy
por satisfecha al ver que de un mal puede venir un bien tan grande
como el que ahora siento. Es verdad que fuí una loca, que fuí muy
mala, muy mala. Yo quiero ser siempre buena, pero no sé cómo, á
veces hay una fuerza extraña que no sé de dónde viene, y me obliga
á hacer maldades. ¡Si supieras cuánto he llorado, desesperada de no
ser nunca dueña de mí misma! Llegué á atribuirlo á la influencia de
mi casa, á esa desesperación sorda y continua que hay siempre en
mi casa; á esa tristeza que no es una tristeza tranquila como otras
tristezas, sino una tristeza agria que le envenena á una. Y entonces,
fuera como fuera, aun cometiendo una falta para toda la vida, decidí
escaparme de casa, y estaba segura de que en huyendo iba á llegar
á ser buena. Yo no sé si me explico, ó si tú me entiendes. Te juro
que digo la verdad. Lo de Ettore... ¡Yo qué sé! Quiero llorar... ¿Ves?
Una de tantas cosas como hago sin saber cómo, arrastrada,
sufriendo. Pero ahora me parece que comienza una nueva vida.
Nunca me he sentido tan buena como hoy, ni tan segura, y es que
me parece que me apoyo en tu corazón. (Una pausa.) Ahora te digo;
puedes pedir mi mano á papá.
—Meg, niñita mía, ¿eres realmente buena?
Meg levantó sus ojos con dulce desolación infantil, como
preguntando: ¿es posible que lo dudes?
—Vamos á probarlo ahora. Si estás segura de ti misma como
dices, y sientes que comienza una nueva vida, prepárate á oirme con
entereza. No puedo pedir tu mano á tu padre, porque sería una
locura. Olvida todo lo pasado. Yo no puedo ser tu novio, menos aún
tu marido. Te quiero, sí, como un hermano mayor, quizá como un
padre.

Meg atribuyó estas frases á un deseo de chancear, pero al ver el
rostro de Alberto y su severidad noble, comprendió que todo se
había perdido para ella.
—¿Por qué me has engañado?
—No te he engañado, Meg. Yo era el engañado, no porque tú me
engañases, que yo á mí mismo me engañaba.
—Sí, sí, lo comprendo. He llegado á quererte demasiado, y
demasiado pronto. Lo comprendo.
—Quizá sí.
—¿Y qué piensas hacer?
—Marcharme mañana mismo en el vapor de las siete.
—¿Y sabes que tu marcha puede ser la muerte de papá... y la
mía?
—La muerte, para tu padre, será una solución. ¿La tuya? ¿No me
acabas de asegurar que te consideras fuerte y tranquila?
—Creo que te he escuchado y respondido con perfecta
tranquilidad.
—Pues yo te digo que la vida es buena, siempre que sepamos
nosotros conducirla bien. Y yo te digo, además, que debes ser feliz y
que serás feliz.
—¡Feliz...! No sé cómo.
—Meg, niñita mía —la besó en la frente—; espera y confía.
—¿Qué vas á decir á papá?
—Nada. Marcharé sin que él lo sospeche.
—¿Quieres que baje á despedirte al jardín, mañana?
—Lo quisiera, pero creo que es mejor que no bajes. Adiós.
—¿No me das otro beso?
Alberto quiso besarla en la frente, pero Meg echó la cabeza hacia
atrás y recibió el beso en la boca.

—Adiós, Alberto, y mira si soy fuerte que no lloro —pero cada
palabra se desprendía de sus labios temblando como una lágrima.

VI
Aún hay sol en las bardas.
Don Quijote.
He aquí la casa, y el sendero que desciende de la colina, y la
pasadera de piedras sobre el arroyo, y los altos álamos emboscando
la vivienda, y el portón de rojos barrotes, y el muro, bajo y viejo.
Alberto, en tres días de viaje había olvidado tres años de vida y
soldado el instante presente con aquel otro de la despedida de la
estación de Pilares, cuando su ideal era la casita modesta, entre el
bosque y el mar. Camino de Villaclara se decía: aún hay sol en las
bardas.
Apoyándose sobre la tapia y con el pulso agitado, tendió una
ojeada sobre el jardín. El arroyo lo atravesaba, y siguiendo el
compás danzarín del agua, margaritas y narcisos, rosas y claveles,
corrían á lo largo de las márgenes. Allí estaban las colmenas de Fina,
y yaciendo en lo verde una masa negra que se enderezó de pronto.
Un rostro consumido, atormentado é iracundo, como el de una sibila
decrépita, se encaró con Alberto, y unas manos, de dedos
epilépticos y luengas uñas, comenzaron á conjurar maleficios sobre
él. De la lóbrega y desdentada boca volaron roncas palabras.
—¡Que el mexo del sapo te emponzoñe la lengua; esa lengua de
falsedad. Que las anxiguas fediondas te coman la cara; esa cara
traidora en el afalagar. Que las llocas aviésporas te saquen los ojos;
esos ojos de criminal. Que en el cucho de tu corazón maldito haga

su nido el alacrán. Que en por los siglos de los siglos te queme el
alma Satanás![3].
Era tita Anastasia. Alberto apenas tuvo fuerzas para interrogar:
—¿Fina?
—Pregúntaslo y tú la mataste. ¡Arreniego!
Florencia-Noviembre-1911.

ADVERTENCIA
Los antecedentes de algunos personajes de esta novela han sido
narrados en dos novelas anteriores, Tinieblas en las cumbres y A. M.
D. G.
La Pata de la Raposa está estrechamente ligada, y de ellas
recibirá luz en ciertos puntos oscuros, con otras dos novelas, Las
Mellizas y Troteras y Danzaderas, que aparecerán muy pronto.

ÍNDICE
Páginas.
Parte primera.—La noche. 7
Parte segunda. 201
Parte tercera.—La tarde. 321

NOTAS
[1] ¿Qué es el hombre? ¿De dónde viene? ¿Adónde va?
[2] Lo que dicen las abejas.
Aquí es. Colina arriba, va el sendero que yo tomé. Aún está aquí el trozo
derrumbado de la vieja tapia, y la pasadera de piedra en el agua.
He allí la casa, con el portón de barrotes rojos, y los altos álamos, y la
caperuza parda del henil, y el establo. Y los blancos cuernos que
balanceándose asoman por el muro.
He allí las colmenas, alineadas al sol. Y en las márgenes del arroyo, las
flores humildes, pródigas de simiente, margaritas y narcisos, rosas y
claveles.
[3] Mexo = orina. Anxiguas = viruelas. Fediondas = hediondas. Afalagar
= halagar. Aviésporas = avispas. Cucho = estiércol.

Nota de transcripción
Los errores de imprenta han sido corregidos sin avisar. Para detectarlos se ha
consultado una edición posterior de esta obra.
La ortografía del original ha sido normalizada a la grafía de mayor frecuencia.
De un modo global, se ha substituido «por que» por «porque», cuando es
conjunción causal, y «con que» por «conque», cuando es conjunción ilativa.
Se ha corregido la ortografía de nombres propios, citas y expresiones en lenguas
distintas del castellano.
Se han añadido tildes a las mayúsculas que las necesitan y se han espaciado las
rayas —o guiones largos—.
Las páginas en blanco han sido eliminadas.
Las notas a pie de página se han renumerado y colocado al final del libro.

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