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ii
© Copyright 2022, Cloud Security Alliance. All rights reserved.
The official location for the Zero Trust Working Group is
https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/working-groups/zero-trust/
Disclaimer
Cloud Security Alliance designed and created this Zero Trust Training course study guide (the “Work”)
primarily as an educational resource for security and governance professionals. Cloud Security
Alliance makes no claim that use of any of the Work will assure a successful outcome. The Work
should not be considered inclusive of all proper information, procedures and tests or exclusive of
other information, procedures and tests that are reasonably directed to obtaining the same results.
In determining the propriety of any specific information, procedure or test, professionals should
apply their own professional judgment to the specific circumstances presented by the particular
systems or information technology environment.
© 2022 Cloud Security Alliance – All Rights Reserved. You may download, store, display on your
computer, view, print, and link to the Cloud Security Alliance at https://cloudsecurityalliance.org
subject to the following: (a) the draft may be used solely for your personal, informational, non-
commercial use; (b) the draft may not be modified or altered in any way; (c) the draft may not be
redistributed; and (d) the trademark, copyright or other notices may not be removed. You may quote
portions of the draft as permitted by the Fair Use provisions of the United States Copyright Act,
provided that you attribute the portions to the Cloud Security Alliance.

iii
About Cloud Security Alliance
The Cloud Security AllianceSM
(CSA) (www.cloudsecurityalliance.org) is the world’s leading
organization dedicated to defining and raising awareness of best practices to help ensure a secure
cloud computing environment. Cloud Security Alliance harnesses the subject matter expertise of
industry practitioners, associations, governments, and its corporate and individual members to
offer cloud security-specific research, education, certification, events and products. Cloud Security
Alliance activities, knowledge and extensive network benefit the entire community impacted by
cloud—from providers and customers, to governments, entrepreneurs and the assurance industry—
and provide a forum through which diverse parties can work together to create and maintain a
trusted cloud ecosystem.
CSA Address
709 Dupont St.
Bellingham, WA 98225, USA
Phone: +1.360.746.2689
Fax: +1.206.832.3513
Contact us: support@cloudsecurityalliance.org
Website: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/
Zero Trust Training Page: https://knowledge.cloudsecurityalliance.org/page/zero-trust-training
Zero Trust Advancement Center: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/zt/
Provide Feedback: support@cloudsecurityalliance.org
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CSA Youtube Channel: https://csaurl.org/youtube
CSA Blog: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/blog/

iv
Acknowledgments
Dedicated to Juanita Koilpillai, a pioneer in software-defined perimeters whose contributions to the
Zero Trust Architecture Training and CSA are immeasurable.
The Zero Trust Training was developed with the support of the Cloud Security Alliance Zero Trust
Training (ZTT) Expert Group, whose members include volunteers from a wide variety of industries
across the globe. Made up of subject matter experts with hands-on experience planning and
implementing ZTT, both as cloud service consumers and providers, the ZTT Expert Group includes
board members, the technical C-suite, as well as privacy, legal, internal audit, procurement, IT,
security and development teams. From cumulative stakeholder input, the ZTT Expert Group
established the value proposition, scope, learning objectives, and curriculum of the Zero Trust
Training.
To learn more about the Zero Trust Training and ways to get involved please visit: https://
cloudsecurityalliance.org/zt/
We would also like to thank our beta testers, who provided valuable feedback on the Zero Trust
Training.
Lead Developers:
Abhishek R. Singh, Araali Networks, USA
Agnidipta Sarkar, Group CISO, Biocon, India
Daniele Catteddu, CTO, CISM, Cloud Security Alliance, Italy
Heinrich Smit, CISSP, CISA, CRISC, Semperis, USA
Juanita Koilpilla, CEO, Waverly Labs, USA
Michael Roza, CPA, CISA, CIA, MBA, Exec MBA, CSA Research Fellow, Exec MBA, Belgium
Michael J. Herndon, CCSP, CISSP, CRISC, CGEIT, CIPP/US, CIPT, AWS Certified Solution Architect,
Bayer A.G., USA
Michael Shurman, Ravtech, Israel, Inactive member
Prasad T, OSCP, Senior Security Architect, Verse Innovation, India
Richard Lee, CISSP, CCSP, WCP, Citizens Financial Group, USA
Sam Aiello, CISSP CISA CCSK MSc MBA, Verizon Business, USA
Vani Murthy, CISSP, CDPSE, CCSK, CRISC, PMP, ITIL, MBA, MS, Sr. Information Security Compliance
advisor at Akamai Technologies, Cambridge, USA

v
Contributing Editors:
Abbas Kudrati, C|CISO, Forrester ZTX Strategist, CISA, CISM, CSXP, CGEIT, Microsoft, Australia,
Adil Abdelgawad, Security+, 3M, USA
Anna Schorr, Training Program Manager, MBA, CCSK, Cloud Security Alliance, USA
Anusha Vaidyanathan, USA
Hannah Rock, Content Development Manager, Cloud Security Alliance, USA
Jacob Kline, CISSP, The MITRE Corporation, USA
James Lam, CISA, CISM, CRISC, CDPSE, TOGAF, M.S., Accenture Strategy & Consulting, USA
Jenna Morrison, CCSK, USA
Junaid Islam, USA
Lauren Fishburn, USA
Leon Yen, Technical Writer, Cloud Security Alliance, USA
Naresh Kurada, P.Eng, MBA, CISSP, Deloitte, Canada
Remo Hardeman, Security Architect, Cybersecurity Advisor, Omerta Information Security, Petro SA,
Vrije University of Amsterdam VU, Netherlands
Shruti Kulkarni, CISA, CRISC, CISSP, CCSK, ITIL v3 Expert, ISO27001 LA, 6point6, United Kingdom
Stephen Smith, Graphic Designer, Cloud Security Alliance, USA
Expert Reviewer:
Alex Sharpe, CRISC, CDPSE, CMMC RP, Sharpe42, USA
Asad Ali, Thales, USA
Matthew Meersman, PhD, CISM, CISSP, CCSP, CDPSE, PMP, MITRE Corporation, USA
Michael J. Herndon, CCSP, CISSP, CRISC, CGEIT, CIPP/US, CIPT, AWS Certified Solution Architect,
Bayer A.G., USA
Nishanth Singarapu, CISM, CCSK, ZCEA, Neustar, USA
Rajesh Ingle, PhD, International Institute of Information Technology, Naya Raipur, India
Ravi Adapa, India
Robert D. Morris, CISSP, GDSA, GCIH, MITRE Corporation, USA
Ron Martin, PhD, CPP, Capitol Technology University, USA
Ryan Bergsma, CCSK, Cloud Security Alliance, USA
Shamun Mahmud, Cloud Security Alliance, USA
Shinesa Cambric, CISSP, CISA, CCSP, CISM, Microsoft, USA
Srinivas Tatipamula, C-CISO, CISSP, CISA, AWS CSS/CSA, CDPSE, CISM, CGEIT, CRISC, ISO 27000LA,
CCSK, ITIL-F, PMP, Fairfax, USA

vi
Table of Contents
List of Figures�� ix
Course Intro��1
Course Structure��1
Course Learning Objectives��1
1 Context of ZTA��2
1.1 History of ZT ��2
2 Definitions, Concepts, Components of ZT ��4
2.1 Definition of the ZT Concept ��4
2.2 Tenets��5
2.3 Design Principles��5
2.4 Pillars ��6
2.5 Components Elements��7
3 Objectives of ZT��10
3.1 Technical Objectives�� 11
3.1.1 Establishing a Protective Framework�� 11
3.1.2 Reduce Management Overhead�� 11
3.1.3 Reduce Attack Surface�� 12
3.1.4 Reduce Complexity�� 12
3.1.5 Enforces the Principle of Least Privilege �� 13
3.1.6 Improved Security Posture Resilience�� 13
3.1.7 Improved Incident Containment Management�� 13
3.2 Business Objectives��14
3.2.1 Risk Reduction��14
3.2.2 Compliance Management�� 15
3.2.3 Organizational Improvements��16
4 Benefits of ZT ��16
4.1 Reduced Risk of Compromise ��16
4.1.1 Reduced Attack Surface Impact Radius�� 17
4.1.2 Reduced Ability to Move Laterally�� 17
4.1.3 Reduced Time to Detect Contain Breaches�� 17
4.2 Increased Trustworthiness of Access ��18
4.3 Increased Visibility Analytics��19
4.4 Improved Compliance��20
4.5 Additional Benefits�� 21

vii
5 Planning Considerations for ZTA �� 21
5.1 Organizational Technical Planning��23
5.1.1 Understand Your Needs��23
5.1.2 Identify Key Stakeholders��23
5.1.3 Assemble a Team��24
5.1.4 Define Current State��24
5.1.5 Set Goals ��25
5.1.6 Define the Use Cases��25
5.1.7 Develop Collaboration Plan ��25
5.2 Risks of Project Implementation ��26
6 Implementation Options of ZTA��29
6.1 NIST Approach to ZT��29
6.2 Software-Defined Perimeter ��29
6.2.1 Description��30
6.2.2 Compliance with ZT Principles�� 31
6.2.3 Implementation Options��32
6.2.3.1 Service Initiated (Cloud-to-Cloud)��32
6.2.3.2 Collaboration Across Boundaries��33
6.2.4 Characteristics��33
6.3 Zero Trust Network Access��34
6.3.2 Compliance with ZT Principles��35
6.3.4 Advantages��35
6.3.5 Disadvantages��36
6.4 Google BeyondCorp��36
6.4.2 Compliance with ZT Principles��37
6.4.3.1 Service Initiated (Remote Application Access)��37
6.4.4 Advantages��37
6.4.5 Disadvantages��37
7 ZT Use Cases ��38
7.1 Remote Access VPN Replacement ��38
7.1.1 Use Case Description��38
7.1.2 Security Risks��38

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Faith and the Sciences.
In the last half of the seventeenth century and the first half of the
eighteenth, the so-called free-thinkers defended their rejection of
the Christian mysteries on the alleged ground that the
mathematicians had exploded them. Thus Dr. Garth, in his last
illness, resisted the efforts of Addison to persuade him to die as a
Christian, by saying, Surely, Mr. Addison, I have good reason not
to believe those trifles, since my friend, Dr. Halley, who has dealt
much in demonstration, has assured me that the doctrines of
Christianity are incomprehensible, and the religion itself an
imposture.
In this assurance of Dr. Halley, we see a trace of Cartesianism
which places certainty in clearness of ideas, and assumes that what
is incomprehensible, or what cannot be clearly apprehended by the
mind, is false; as if the human mind were the measure of the true,
and as if there were not truths too large for it to comprehend! But
since Berkeley, the Protestant Bishop of Cloyne, exposed in his
Analyst, and Letters in its defence, the confused and false
reasoning of mathematicians, especially in fluxions or the
differential calculus, in which, though their conclusions are true,
they are not obtained from their premises, the free-thinkers have
abandoned the authority of mathematicians, and now seek to
justify their infidelity by that of the so-called physicists. They appeal
now to the natural sciences, chiefly to geology, zoology, and
philology, and tell us that the progress made in these sciences has
destroyed the authority of the Holy Scriptures and exploded the
Christian dogmas. Geology, we are told, has disproved the
chronology of the Bible, zoology has disproved the dogma of
creation, and ethnology and philology have disproved the unity of
the species; consequently the dogma of original sin, and all the
dogmas that presuppose it. Hence our scientific chiefs, whom the
age delights to honor, look down on us, poor, benighted Christian

believers, with deep pity or supreme contempt, and despatch our
faith by pronouncing the word credulity or superstition with an
air that anticipates or admits no contradiction. It is true, here and
there a man, not without scientific distinction, utters a feeble
protest, and timidly attempts to show that there is no discrepancy
between the Christian faith and the facts really discovered and
classified by the sciences; but there is no denying that the
predominant tendency of the modern scientific world is decidedly
unchristian, even when not decidedly anti-christian.
The most learned men and profoundest thinkers of our age, as of
every age, are, no doubt, believers, sincere and earnest Christians;
but they are not the men who represent the age, and give tone to
its literature and science. They are not the popular men of their
times, and their voice is drowned in the din of the multitude. There
is nothing novel or sensational in what they have to tell us, and
there is no evidence of originality or independence of thought or
character in following them. In following them we have no
opportunity of separating ourselves from the past, breaking with
tradition, and boldly defying both heaven and earth. There is no
chance for war against authority, of creating a revolution, or
enjoying the excitement of a battle; so the multitude of little men
go not with them. And they who would deem it gross intellectual
weakness to rely on the authority of St. Paul, or even of our Lord
himself, have followed blindly and with full confidence an Agassiz, a
Huxley, a Lyell, or any other second or third-rate physicist, who is
understood to defend theories that undermine the authority of the
church and the Bible.
We are not, we frankly confess, learned in the sciences. They have
changed so rapidly and so essentially since our younger days, when
we did take some pains to master them, that we do not know what
they are to-day any more than we do what they will be to-morrow.
We have not, in our slowness, been able to keep pace with them,
and we only know enough of them now to know that they are
continually changing under the very eye of the spectator. But, if we

do not know all the achievements of the sciences, we claim to
know something of the science of sciences, the science which gives
the law to them, and to which they must conform or cease to
pretend to have any scientific character. If we know not what they
have done, we know something which they have not done.
We said, in our article on the Cartesian Doubt, that the ideal
formula does not give us the sciences; but we add now, what it did
not comport with our purpose to add then, that, though it does not
give them, it gives them their law and controls them. We do not
deduce our physics from our metaphysics; but our metaphysics or
philosophy gives the law to the inductive or empirical sciences, and
prescribes the bounds beyond which they cannot pass without
ceasing to be sciences. Knowing the ideal formula, we do not know
all the sciences, but we do know what is not and cannot be
science.
The ideal formula, being creates existences, which is only the first
article of the creed, is indisputable, certain, and the principle alike
of all the real and all the knowable, of all existence and of all
science. This formula expresses the primitive intuition, and it is
given us by God himself in creating us intelligent creatures,
because without it our minds cannot exist, and, if it had not been
given us in the very constitution of the mind, we never could have
obtained it. It is the essential basis of the mind, the necessary
condition of all thought, and we cannot even in thought deny it, or
think at all without affirming it This we have heretofore amply
shown; and we may add here that no one ever thinks without
thinking something the contrary of which cannot be thought, as St.
Anselm asserts.
As Berkeley says to the mathematicians, Logic is logic, and the
same to whatever subject it is applied. When, therefore, the
cultivators of the inductive sciences allege a theory or hypothesis
which contradicts in any respect the ideal formula, however firmly
persuaded they may be that it is warranted by the facts observed

and analyzed, we tell them at once, without any examination of
their proofs or reasonings, that their hypothesis is unfounded, and
their theory false, because it contradicts the first principle alike of
the real and the knowable, and therefore cannot possibly be true.
We deny no facts well ascertained to be facts, but no induction
from any facts can be of as high authority as the ideal formula, for
without it no induction is possible. Hence we have no need to
examine details any more than we have to enter into proofs of the
innocence or guilt of a man who confesses that he has openly,
knowingly, and intentionally violated the law. The case is one in
which judgment à priori may be safely pronounced. No induction
that denies all science and the conditions of science can be
scientific.
The ideal formula does not put any one in possession of the
sciences, but it enables us to control them. We can entertain no
doctrine, even for examination, that denies any one of the three
terms of the formula. If existences are denied, there are no facts or
materials of science; if the creative act is denied, there are no facts
or existences; and finally, if God is denied, the creative act itself is
denied. God and creature are all that is or exists, and creatures can
exist only by the creative act of God. Do you come and tell me that
you are no creature? What are you, then? Between God and
creature there is no middle term. If, then, you are not creature, you
must be God or nothing. Well, are you God? God, if God at all, is
independent, necessary, self-existent, immutable, and eternal being.
Are you that, you who depend on other than yourself for every
breath you draw, for every motion you make, for every morsel of
food you eat, whom the cold chills, the fire burns, the water
drenches? No? do you say you are not God? What are you, then, I
ask once more? If you are neither God nor creature, then you are
nothing. But nothing you are not, for you live, think, speak, and
act, and even reason, though not always wisely or well. If
something and not God, then you are creature, and are a living
assertion of the ideal formula. Do you deny it, and say there is no
God? Then still again, what are you who make the denial? If there

is no God, there is no real, necessary, and eternal being—no being
at all; if no being, then no existence, for all existence is from being,
and if no existence, then what are you who deny God? Nothing?
Then your denial is nothing, and worth nothing.
It is impossible to deny any one of the three terms of the formula,
for every man, though he may believe himself an atheist or a
pantheist, is a living assertion of each one of them, and in its real
relation to the other two. We have the right, then, to assert the
formula as the first principle in science, and oppose it as conclusive
against any and every theory that denies creation, and asserts
either atheism or pantheism. Do not think to divert attention from
the intrinsic fallacy of such a theory by babbling about natural laws.
Nature, no doubt, has her laws, according to which, or, if you
please, by virtue of which, all natural phenomena or natural effects
are produced, and it is the knowledge of these laws that constitutes
natural science or the sciences. But these laws, whence come they?
Are they superior to nature, or inferior? If inferior, how can they
govern her operations? If superior, then they must have their origin
in the supernatural, and a reality above nature must be admitted.
Nature, then, is not the highest, is not ultimate, is not herself
being, or has not her being in herself; is, therefore, contingent
existence, and consequently creature, existing only by virtue of the
creative act of real and necessary being, which brings us directly
back to the ideal formula. God denied, nature and the laws of
nature are denied.
The present tendency among naturalists is to deny creation and to
assert development—to say with Topsy, in Uncle Tom's Cabin,
only generalizing her doctrine, Things didn't come; they growed.
Things are not created; they are developed by virtue of natural
laws. Developed from what? From nothing? Ex nihilo nihil fit.
From nothing nothing can be developed. A universe self-developed
from nothing is somewhat more difficult to comprehend than the
creation of the universe from nothing through the word of his
power by One able to create and sustain it. You can develop a

germ, but you cannot develop where there is nothing to be
developed. Then the universe is not developed from nothing: then
from something. What is that something? Whatever you assume it
to be, it cannot be something created, for you deny all creation.
Then it is eternal, self-existent being, being in itself, therefore being
in its plenitude, independent, immutable, complete, perfect in itself,
and therefore incapable of development. Development is possible
only in that which is imperfect, incomplete, for it is simply the
reduction of what in the thing developed is potential to act.
There is great lack of sound philosophy with our modern theorists.
They seem not to be aware that the real must precede the
possible, and that the possible is only the ability of the real. They
assume the contrary, and place possible being before real being.
Even Leibnitz says that St. Anselm's argument to prove the
existence of God, drawn from the idea of the most perfect being,
the contrary of which cannot be thought, is conclusive only on
condition that most perfect being is first proved to be possible.
Hegel makes the starting-point of all reality and all science to be
naked being in the sense in which it and not-being are identical;
that is, not real, but possible being, the abyssus of the Gnostics,
and the void of the Buddhists, which Pierre Leroux labors hard, in
his L'Humanité and in the article Le Ciel in his Encyclopédie
Nouvelle, to prove is not nothing, though conceding it to be not
something, as if there could be any medium between something
and nothing. In itself, or as abstracted from the real, the possible is
sheer nullity; nothing at all. The possibility of the universe is the
ability of God to create it. If God were not himself real, no universe
would be possible. The possibility of a creature may be understood
either in relation to its creability on the part of God, or in relation
to its own perfectibility. In relation to God every creature is
complete the moment the Divine Mind has decreed its creation,
and, therefore, incapable of development; but, in relation to itself,
it has unrealized possibilities which can be only progressively
fulfilled. Creatures, in this latter sense, can be developed because
there are in them unrealized possibilities or capacities for becoming,

by aid of the real, more than they actually are, that is, because
they are created, in relation to themselves, not perfect, but
perfectible. Hence, creatures, not the Creator, are progressive, or
capable, each after its kind, of being progressively developed and
completed according to the original design of the Creator.
Aristotle, whom it is the fashion just now to sneer at, avoided the
error of our modern sophists; he did not place the possible before
the real, for he knew that without the real there is no possible. The
principium, or beginning, must be real being, and, therefore, he
asserted God, not as possible, but real, most real, and called him
actus purissimus, most pure act, which excludes all unactualized
potentialities or unrealized possibilities, and implies that he is most
pure, that is, most perfect being, being in its plenitude. God being
eternally being in himself, being in its plenitude, as he must be if
self-existent, and self-existent he must be if not created, he is
incapable of development, because in him there are no possibilities
not reduced to act. The developmentists must, then, either admit
the fact of creation, or deny the development they assert and
attempt to maintain; for, if there is no creation, nothing
distinguishable from the uncreated, nothing exists to be developed,
and the uncreated, being either nothing, and therefore incapable of
development, or self-existent, eternal, and immutable being, being
in its plenitude, and therefore from the very fulness and perfection
of its being also incapable of development. If the developmentists
had a little philosophy or a little logic, they would see that, so far
from being able to substitute development for creation, they must
assert creation in order to be able to assert even the possibility of
development. Is it on the authority of such sciolists, sophists, and
sad blunderers as these developmentists that we are expected to
reject the Holy Scriptures, and to abandon our faith in Christianity?
We have a profound reverence for the sciences, and for all really
scientific men; but really it is too much to expect us to listen, with
the slightest respect, to such absurdities as most of our savans are
in the habit of venting, when they leave their own proper sphere
and attempt to enter the domain of philosophy or theology. In the

investigation of the laws of nature and the observation and
accumulation of facts they are respectable, and often render
valuable service to mankind; but, when they undertake to
determine by their inductions from facts of a secondary order what
is true or false in philosophy or theology, they mistake their
vocation and their aptitudes, and, if they do not render themselves
ridiculous, it is because their speculations are too gravely injurious
to permit us to feel toward them anything but grief or indignation.
None of the sciences are apodictic; they are all as special sciences
empirical, and are simply formed by inductions from facts observed
and classified. To their absolute certainty two things are necessary:
First, that the observation of the facts of the natural world should
be complete, leaving no class or order of facts unobserved and
unanalyzed; and, second, that the inductions from them should be
infallible, excluding all error, and all possibility of error. But we say
only what every one knows, when we say that neither of these
conditions is possible to any mortal man. Even Newton, it is said,
compared himself to a child picking up shells on the beach; and
after all the explorations that have been made it is but a small part
of nature that is known. The inductive method, ignorantly supposed
to be an invention of my Lord Bacon, but which is as old as the
human mind itself, and was always adopted by philosophers in their
investigations of nature, is the proper method in the sciences, and
all we need to advance them is to follow it honestly and strictly.
But, every day, facts not before analyzed or observed come under
the observation of the investigator, and force new inductions, which
necessarily modify more or less those previously made. Hence it is
that the natural sciences are continually undergoing more or less
important changes. Certain principles, indeed, remain the same; but
set aside, if we must set aside, mathematics and mechanics, there
is not a single one of the sciences that is now what it was in the
youth of men not yet old. Some of them are almost the creations
of yesterday. Take chemistry, electricity, magnetism, geology,
zoology, biology, physiology, philology, ethnology, to mention no

more; they are no longer what they were in our own youth, and
the treatises in which we studied them are now obsolete.
It is not likely that these sciences have even as yet reached
perfection, that no new facts will be discovered, and no further
changes and modifications be called for. We by no means complain
of this, and are far from asking that investigation in any field
should be arrested, and these sciences remain unchanged, as they
now are. No: let the investigations go on, let all be discovered that
is discoverable, and the sciences be rendered as complete as
possible. But, then, is it not a little presumptuous, illogical even, to
set up any one of these incomplete, inchoate sciences against the
primitive intuitions of reason or the profound mysteries of the
Christian faith? Your inductions to-day militate against the ideal
formula and the Christian creed; but how know you that your
inductions of to-morrow will not be essentially modified by a fuller
or closer observation of facts? Your conclusions must be certain
before we can on their authority reject any received dogma of faith
or any alleged dictamen of reason.
We know á priori that investigation can disclose no fact or facts
that can be incompatible with the ideal formula. No possible
induction can overthrow any one of its three terms. It is madness
to pretend that from the study of nature one can disprove the
reality of necessary and eternal being, the fact of creation, or of
contingent existences. The most that any one, not mad, does or
can pretend is, that they cannot be proved by way of deduction or
induction from facts of the natural world. The atheist Lalande went
no further than to say, I have never seen God at the end of my
telescope. Be it so, what then? Because you have never seen God
at the end of your telescope, can you logically conclude that there
is no God? For ourselves, we do not pretend that God is, or can be
asserted by way of deduction or induction from the facts of nature,
though we hold that what he is, even his eternal power and
divinity, may be clearly seen from them; but the fact that God
cannot be proved in one way to be does not warrant the conclusion

that he cannot in some other way be proved, far less that there is
no God.
We do not deduce the dogmas of faith from the ideal formula, for
that is in the domain of science; but they all accord with it, and
presuppose it as the necessary preamble to faith. We have not the
same kind of certainty for faith that we have for the scientific
formula; but we have a certainty equally high and equally infallible.
Consequently, the inductions or theories of naturalists are as
impotent against it as against the formula itself. The authority of
faith is superior, we say not to science, but to any logical inductions
drawn from the facts of the natural world, or theories framed by
natural philosophers, and those then, however plausible, can never
override it. No doubt the evidences of our faith are drawn in part
from history, and therefore from inductive science; but even as to
that part the certainty is of the same kind with that of any of the
sciences, rests on the analysis of facts and induction from them,
and is at the very lowest equal to theirs at the highest.
But let us descend to matters of fact. We will take geology, which
seems just now to be regarded as the most formidable weapon
against the Christian religion. Well, what has geology done? It has
by its researches proved an antiquity of the earth and of man on
the earth which is far greater than is admissible by the chronology
of the Holy Scriptures. It has thus disproved the chronology of the
Bible; therefore it has disproved the divine inspiration of the Bible,
and therefore, again, the truth of the Christian dogmas, which have
no other authority than that inspiration. But have you, geologists,
really proved what you pretend? You have discovered certain facts,
fossils, etc., which, if some half a dozen possible suppositions are
true, not one of which you have proved or in the nature of the case
can prove, render it highly probable that the earth is somewhat
more than six thousand years old, and that it is more than five
thousand eight hundred and sixty-seven years since the creation of
man. As to the antiquity of man, at least, you have not proved
what you pretend. Your proofs, to be worth anything, must destroy

all possible suppositions except the one you adopt, which they do
not do, for we can suppose many other explanations of the
undisputed facts besides the one you insist on our accepting.
Moreover, the facts on which you rely, if fairly given by Sir Charles
Lyell in his Antiquity of Man, by no means warrant his inductions.
Suppose there is no mistake as to facts, which is more than we are
willing to concede, especially as to the stone axes and knives,
which, according to the drawings given of them, are exactly similar
to hundreds which we have seen when a boy strewing the surface
of the ground, the logic, by which the conclusion is obtained is
puerile, and discreditable to any man who has had the slightest
intellectual training.
But suppose you have proved the antiquity of the earth and of man
on it to be as you pretend, what then? In the first place, you have
not proved that the earth and man on it were not created, that
God did not in the beginning create the heavens and the earth, and
all things therein. You leave, then, intact both the formula and the
dogma which presupposes and reasserts it as a truth of revelation
as well as of science. But we have disproved the chronology of the
Bible. Is it the chronology of the Bible or chronology as arranged by
learned men that you have disproved? Say the chronology as it
actually is in the Bible, though all learned men know that that
chronology is exceedingly difficult if not impossible to make out,
and we for ourselves have never been able to settle it at all to our
entire satisfaction, is it certain that the Scriptures themselves even
pretend that the date assigned to the creation of the world is given
by divine revelation and is to be received as an article of faith?
There is an important difference between the chronology given in
the Hebrew Bible and that given in the Septuagint used by the
apostles and Greek fathers, and still used by the united as well as
by the non-united Greeks, and we are not aware that there has
ever been an authoritative decision as to which or either of the two
chronologies must be followed. The commonly received chronology
certainly ought not to be departed from without strong and urgent
reasons; but, if such reasons are adduced, we do not understand

that it cannot be departed from without impairing the authority of
either the Scriptures or the church. We know no Christian doctrine
or dogma that could be affected by carrying the date of the
creation of the world a few or even many centuries further back, if
we recognize the fact of creation itself. Our faith does not depend
on a question of arithmetic, as seems to have been assumed by the
Anglican Bishop Colenso. Numbers are easily changed in
transcription, and no commentator has yet been able to reconcile
all the numbers as we now have them in our Hebrew Bibles, or
even in the Greek translation of the Seventy.
Supposing, then, that geologists and historians of civilization have
found facts, not to be denied, which seem to require for the
existence of the globe, and man on its face, a longer period than is
allowed by the commonly received chronology, we do not see that
this warrants any induction against any point of Christian faith or
doctrine. We could, we confess, more easily explain some of the
facts which we meet in the study of history, the political and social
changes which have evidently taken place, if more time were
allowed us between Noah and Moses than is admitted by Usher's
chronology; it would enable us to account for many things which
now embarrass our historical science; yet whether we are allowed
more time or not, or whether we can account for the historical
facts or not, our faith remains the same; for we have long since
learned that, in the subjects with which science proposes to deal,
as well as in revelation itself, there are many things which will be
inexplicable even to the greatest, wisest, and holiest of men, and
that the greatest folly which any man can entertain is that of
expecting to explain everything, unless concluding a thing must
needs be false because we know not its explanation is a still
greater folly. True science as well as true virtue is modest, humble
indeed, and always more depressed by what it sees that it cannot
do than elated by what it may have done.
Science, it is further said, has exploded the Christian doctrine of the
unity and the Adamic origin of the species, and therefore the

doctrines of Original Sin, the Incarnation, the Redemption, indeed
the whole of Christianity so far as it is a supernatural system, and
not a system of bald and meagre rationalism. Some people perhaps
believe it. But science is knowledge, either intuitive or discursive;
and who dares say that he knows the dogma of the unity of the
human species is false, or that all the kindreds and nations of men
have not sprung from one and the same original pair? The most
that can be said is that the sciences have not as yet proved it, and
it must be taken, if at all, from, revelation.
Take the unity of the species. The naturalists have undoubtedly
proved the existence of races or varieties of men, like the
Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Malayan, the American, and the
African, more or less distinctly marked, and separated from one
another by greater or less distances; but have they proved that
these several races or varieties are distinct species, or that they
could not all have sprung from the same original pair?
Physiologists, we are told, detect some structural differences
between the negro and the white man. The black differs from the
white in the greater length of the spine, in the shape of the head,
leg, and foot and heel, in the facial angles, the size and
convolutions of the brain. Be it so; but do these differences prove
diversity of species, or, at most, only a distinct variety in the same
species? May they not all be owing to accidental causes? The type
of the physical structure of the African is undeniably the same with
that of the Caucasian, and all that can be said is, that in the negro
it is less perfectly realized, constituting a difference in degree,
indeed, but not in kind.
But before settling the question whether the several races of men
belong to one and the same species or not, and have or have not
had the same origin, it is necessary to determine the characteristic
or differentia of man. Naturalists treat man as simply an animal
standing at the head of the class or order mammalia, and are
therefore obliged to seek his differentia or characteristic in his
physical structure; but if it be true, as some naturalists tell us, that

the same type runs through the physical structure of all animals,
unless insects, reptiles, and crustacea form an exception, it is
difficult to find in man's physical structure his differentia. The
schoolmen generally define man, a rational animal, animal
rationale, and make the genus animal, and the differentia
reason. The characteristic of the species, that which constitutes it,
is reason or the rational mind, and certainly science can prove
nothing to the contrary. Some animals may have a degree of
intelligence, but none of them have reason, free will, moral
perceptions, or are capable of acting from considerations of right
and wrong. We assume, then, that the differentia of the species
homo, or man, is reason, or the rational soul. If our naturalists
had understood this, they might have spared the pains they have
taken to assimilate man to the brute, and to prove that he is a
monkey developed.
This point settled, the question of unity of the species is settled.
There may be differences among individuals and races as to the
degree of reason, but all have reason in some degree. Reason may
be weaker in the African than in the European, whether owing to
the lack of cultivation or to other accidental causes, but it is
essentially the same in the one as in the other, and there is no
difference except in degree; and even as to degree, it is not rare to
find negroes that are, in point of reason, far superior to many
white men. Negroes, supposed to stand lowest in the scale, have
the same moral perception and the same capacity of distinguishing
between right and wrong and of acting from free will, that white
men have; and if there is any difference, it is simply a difference of
degree, not a difference of kind or species.
But conceding the unity of the species, science has, at least,
proved that the several races or varieties in the same species could
not have all sprung from one and the same original pair. Where has
science done this? It can do it only by way of induction from facts
scientifically observed and analyzed. What facts has it observed and
analyzed that warrant this conclusion against the Adamic origin of

all men? There are, as we have just said, no anatomical,
physiological, intellectual, or moral facts that warrant such
conclusion, and no other facts are possible. Wherever men are
found, they all have the essential characteristic of men as
distinguished from the mere animal; they all have substantially the
same physical structure; all have thought, speech, and reason, and,
though some may be inferior to others, nothing proves that all may
not have sprung from the same Adam and Eve. Do you say
ethnology cannot trace all the kindreds and nations of men back to
a common origin? That is nothing to the purpose; can it say they
cannot have had a common origin? But men are found everywhere,
and could they have reached from the plains of Shinar continents
separated from Asia by a wide expanse of water, and been
distributed over America, New Holland, and the remotest islands of
the ocean, when they had no ships or were ignorant of navigation?
Do you know that they had, in what are to us antehistorical times,
no ships and no knowledge of navigation, as we know they have
had them both ever since the first dawn of history? No? Then you
allege not your science against the Christian dogma, but your
ignorance, which we submit is not sufficient to override faith. You
must prove that men could not have been distributed from a
common centre as we now find them before you can assert that
they could not have had a common origin. Besides, are you able to
say what changes of land and water have taken place since men
first appeared on the face of the earth? Many changes, geologists
assure us, have taken place, and more than they know may have
occurred, and have left men where they are now found, and where
they may have gone without crossing large bodies of water. So long
as any other hypothesis is possible, you cannot assert your own as
certain.
But the difference of complexion, language, and usage which we
note between the several races of men proves that they could not
have sprung from one and the same pair. Do you know they could
not? Know it? No; not absolutely, perhaps; but how can you prove
they could and have? That is not the question. Christianity is in

possession, and must be held to be rightfully in possession till real
science shows the contrary. I may not be able to explain the origin
of the differences noted in accordance with the assertion of the
common origin of all men in a single primitive pair; but my
ignorance can avail you no more than your own. My nescience is
not your science. Your business is by science to disprove faith; if
your science does not do that, it does nothing, and you are
silenced. We do not pretend to be able to account for the
differences of the several races, any more than we pretend to be
able to account for the well-known fact that children born of the
same parents have different facial angles, different sized brains,
different shaped mouths and noses, different temperaments,
different intellectual powers, and different moral tendencies. We
may have conjectures on the subject, but conjectures are not
science. If necessary to the argument, we might, perhaps, suggest
a not improbable hypothesis for explaining the difference of
complexion between the white and the colored races. The colored
races, the yellow, the olive, the red, the copper-colored, and the
black, are inferior to the Caucasian, have departed farther from the
norma of the species, and approached nearer to the animal, and
therefore, like animals, have become more or less subject to the
action of the elements. External nature, acting for ages on a race,
enfeebled by over-civilization and refinement, and therefore having
in a great measure lost the moral and intellectual power of resisting
the elemental action of nature, may, perhaps, sufficiently explain
the differences we note in the complexion of the several races. If
the Europeans and their American descendants were to lose all
tradition of the Christian religion, as they are rapidly doing, and to
take up with spiritism or some other degrading superstition, as they
seem disposed to do, and to devote themselves solely to the
luxuries and refinements of the material civilization of which they
are now so proud, and boast so much, it is by no means
improbable that in time they would become as dark, as deformed,
as imbecile as the despised African or the native New Hollander. We
might give very plausible reasons for regarding the negro as the
degraded remnant of a once over-civilized and corrupted race; and

perhaps, if recovered, Christianized, civilized, and restored to
communication with the great central current of human life, he may
in time lose his negro hue and features, and become once more a
white man, a Caucasian. But be this as it may, we rest, as is our
right, on the fact that the unity of the human species and its
Adamic origin are in possession, and it is for those who deny either
point to make good their denial.
But the Scriptures say mankind were originally of one speech, and
we find that every species of animals has its peculiar song or cry,
which is the same in every individual of the same species; yet this
is not the case with the different kindred and nations of men; they
speak different tongues, which the philologist is utterly unable to
refer to a common original. Therefore there cannot be in men unity
of species, and the assertion of the Scriptures of all being of one
speech is untrue. If the song of the same species of birds or the
cry of the same species of animals is the same in all the individuals
of that species, it still requires no very nice ear to distinguish the
song or the cry of one individual from that of another; and
therefore the analogy relied on, even if admissible, which it is not,
would not sustain the conclusion. Conceding, if you insist on it, that
unity of species demands unity of speech, the facts adduced
warrant no conclusion against the Scriptural assertion; for the
language of all men is even now one and the same, and all really
have one and the same speech. Take the elements of language as
the sensible sign by which men communicate with one another, and
there is even now, at least as far as known or conceivable, only
one language. The essential elements of all dialects are the same.
You have in all the subject, the predicate, and the copula, or the
noun, adjective, and verb, to which all the other parts of speech
are reducible. Hence the philologist speaks of universal grammar,
and constructs a grammar applicable alike to all dialects. Some
philologists also contend that the signs adopted by all dialects are
radically the same, and that the differences encountered are only
accidental. This has been actually proved in the case of what are
called the Aryan or Indo-European dialects. That the Sanskrit, the

Pehlvi or old Persic, the Keltic, the Teutonic, the Slavonic, the
Greek, and the Latin, from which are derived the modern dialects
of Europe, as Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, English, Dutch,
German, Scanian, Turk, Polish, Russian, Welsh, Gaelic, and Irish, all
except the Basque and Lettish or Finnish, have had a common
origin, no philologist doubts. That the group of dialects called
Semitic, including the Hebrew, Chaldaic, Syriac, Coptic, and
Ethiopic, have had an origin identical with that of the Aryan group
is, we believe, now hardly denied. All that can be said is, that
philologists have not proved it, nor the same fact with regard to the
so-called Turanian group, as the Chinese, the Turkish, the Basque,
the Lettish or Finnish, the Tataric or Mongolian, etc., the dialects of
the aboriginal tribes or nations of America and of Africa. But what
conclusion is to be drawn from the fact that philology, a science
confessedly in its infancy, and hardly a science at all, has not as yet
established an identity of origin with these for the most part
barbarous dialects? From the fact that philology has not ascertained
it, we cannot conclude that the identity does not exist, or even that
philology may not one day discover and establish it.
Philology may have also proceeded on false assumptions, which
have retarded its progress and led it to false conclusions. It has
proceeded on the assumption that the savage is the primitive man,
and that his agglutinated dialect represents a primitive state of
language instead of a degenerate state. A broader view of history
and a juster induction from its facts would, perhaps, upset this
assumption. The savage is the degenerate, not the primeval man;
man in his second childhood, not in his first; and hence the reason
why he has no growth, no inherent progressive power, and why, as
Niebuhr asserts, there is no instance on record of a savage people
having by its own indigenous efforts passed from the savage to the
civilized state. The thing is as impossible as for the old man,
decrepit by age, to renew the vigor and elasticity of his youth or
early manhood. Instead of studying the dialects of savage tribes to
obtain specimens of the primitive forms of speech, philologists
should study them only to obtain specimens of worn-out or used up

forms, or of language in its dotage. In all the savage dialects that
we have any knowledge of, we detect or seem to detect traces of a
culture, a civilization, of which they who now speak them have lost
all memory and are no longer capable. This seems to us to bear
witness to a fall, a loss. Perhaps, when the American and African
dialects are better known, and are studied with reference to this
view of the savage state, and we have better ascertained the
influence of climate and habits of life on the organs of speech and
therefore on pronunciation, especially of the consonants, we shall
be able to discover indications of an identity of origin where now
we can detect only traces of diversity. As long as philology has only
partially explored the field of observation, it is idle to pretend that
science has established anything against the scriptural doctrine of
the unity of speech. The fact that philologists have not traced all
the various dialects now spoken or extinct to a common original
amounts to nothing against faith, unless it can be proved that no
such original ever existed. It may have been lost and only the
distinctions retained.
Naturalists point to the various species of plants and animals
distributed over the whole surface of the globe, and ask us if we
mean to say that each of these has also sprung from one original
pair, or male and female, and if we maintain that the primogenitors
of each species of animal were in the garden of Eden with Adam
and Eve, or in the Ark with Noah. If so, how have they become
distributed over the several continents of the earth and the islands
of the ocean? Argumentum a specie ad speciem, non valet, as
say the books on logic. And even if it were proved that in case of
plants and animals God duplicates, triplicates, or quadriplicates the
parents by direct creation, or that he creates anew the pair in each
remote locality where the same species is found, as prominent
naturalists maintain or are inclined to maintain, it would prove
nothing in the case of man. For we cannot reason from animals to
man, or from flora to fauna. Nearly all the arguments adduced from
so-called science against the faith are drawn from supposed
analogies of men and animals, and rest for their validity on the

assumption that man is not only generically, but specifically, an
animal, which is simply a begging the question.
Species again, it is said, may be developed by way of selection, as
the florist proves in regard to flowers, and the shepherd or
herdsman in regard to sheep and cattle. That new varieties in the
lower orders of creation may be attained by some sort of
development is not denied, but as yet it is not proved that any new
species is ever so obtained. Moreover, facts would seem to
establish that, at least in the case of domestic animals, horses,
cattle, and sheep, the new varieties do not become species and are
not self-perpetuating. Experiments in what is called crossing the
breed have proved that, unless the crossing is frequently renewed,
the variety in a very few generations runs out. There is a perpetual
tendency of each original type to gain the ascendency, and of the
stronger to eliminate the others. Cattle-breeders now do not rely on
crossing, but seek to improve their stock by selecting the best
breed they know, and improving it by improved care and
nourishment. The different varieties of men may be, perhaps,
improved in their physique by selection, as was attempted in the
institutions of Lycurgus; but, as the moral and intellectual nature
predominates in man and is his characteristic, all conclusions as to
him drawn from the lower orders of creation, even in his physical
constitution, are suspicious and always to be accepted with extreme
caution. The church has defined what no physiologist has
disproved, that anima est forma corporis. The soul is the
informing or vital principle of the body, which modifies all its
actions, and enables it to resist, at least to some extent, the
chemical and other natural laws which act on animals, plants, and
unorganized matter. The physiological and medical theories based
on chemistry, which were for a time in vogue and are not yet
wholly abandoned, contain at best only a modicum of truth, and
can never be safely followed, for in the life of man there is at work
a subtiler power than a chemical or any other physical agent. We
do not deny that man is through his body related to the material
world, or that many of the laws of that world, mineral, vegetable,

and animal, are in some degree applicable to him; but, as far as
science has yet proceeded, they are so only with many limitations
and modifications which the physician—we use the word in its
etymological as well as in its conventional sense—can seldom
determine. The morale every physician knows has an immense
power over the physique. The higher the morale, the greater the
power of the physical system to resist physical laws, to endure
fatigue, to bear up against and even to throw off disease. Physical
disease is often generated by moral depression, and not seldom
thrown off by moral exhilaration. What is called strength of will at
times seems not only to subject disease to its control, but to hold
death itself at bay. In armies the officer, with more care, more
labor, more hardship, and less food and sleep, will survive the
common soldier, vastly his superior as to his mere physical
constitution. These facts and innumerable others like them justify a
strong protest against the too common practice of applying to man
without any reservation the laws which we observe in the lower
orders of creation, and arguing from what is true of them what
must be true of him. Tear off the claw of a lobster, and a new one
will be pushed out; cut the polypus in pieces, and each piece
becomes a perfect polypus, at least so we are told, for we have not
ourselves made or seen the experiment. But nothing of the sort is
true of man, nor even of the higher classes of animals in which
organic life is more complex. We place little confidence in
conclusions drawn from the assumed analogies between man and
animals, and even the development of species in them by selection
or otherwise, if proved, would not prove to us the possibility of a
like development in him. We must see a monkey by development
grow into a man before we can believe it.
But why, even in the case of animals that can be propagated only
by the union of male and female, we should suppose the necessity
of duplicating the parents of the species is more than we are able
to understand. The individuals of the species could go where man
could go. Suppose we find a species of fish in a North American
lake, and the same species in a European or Asiatic lake which has

no water communication with it, can you say the two lakes have
never been in communication, you who claim that the earth has
existed for millions of ages? Much of what is now land was once
covered with water, and much now covered with water it is
probable was once land inhabited by plants, animals, and men.
Facts even indicate that the part of the earth now under the Arctic
and Antarctic circles once lay nearer to the Equator, if not under it,
and that what are now mountains were once islands dotting the
surface of the ocean. No inductions which exclude these
probabilities or indications are scientific, or can be accepted as
conclusive.
Take, then, all the facts on which the naturalists support their
hypotheses, they establish nothing against faith. The facts really
established either favor faith or are perfectly compatible with it;
and if any are alleged that seem to militate against it, they are
either not proved to be facts, or their true character is not fully
ascertained, and no conclusion from them can be taken as really
scientific. We do not pretend that the natural sciences, as such,
tend to establish the truth of revelation, and we think some over-
zealous apologists of the faith go further in this respect than they
should. The sciences deal with facts and causes of the secondary
order; and it is very certain that one may determine the quality of
an acorn as food for swine without considering the first cause of
the oak that bore it. A man may ascertain the properties of steam
and apply it to impel various kinds of machinery, without giving any
direct argument in favor of the unity and Adamic origin of the race.
The atheist may be a good geometrician; but, if there were no
God, there could be neither geometry nor an atheist to study it. All
we contend is, that the facts with which science deals are none of
them shown to contradict faith or to warrant any conclusions
incompatible with it.
Hence it may be assumed that, while the sciences remain in their
own order of facts, they neither aid faith nor impugn it, for faith
deals with a higher order of facts, and moves in a superior plane.

The order of facts with which the sciences deal no doubt depends
on the order revealed by faith; and no doubt the particular sciences
should be connected with science or the explanation and
application of the ideal formula or first principles, what we call
philosophy, as this formula in turn is connected with the faith; but
it does not lie within the province of the particular sciences as such
to show this dependence or this connection, and our savans
invariably blunder whenever they attempt to do it, or to rise from
the special to the general, the particular to the universal, or from
the sciences to faith. Here is where they err. What they allege that
transcends the particular order of facts with which the sciences deal
is only theory, hypothesis, conjecture, imagination, or fancy, and
has not the slightest scientific value, and can warrant no
conclusions either for or against faith. There is no logical ascent
from the particular to the universal, unless there has been first a
descent from the universal to the particular. Jacob saw, on the
ladder reaching from heaven to earth, the angels of God
descending and ascending, not ascending and descending. There
must be a descent from the highest to the lowest before there can
be an ascent from the lowest to the highest. God becomes man
that man may become God. The sciences all deal with particulars
and cannot of themselves rise above particulars, and from them
universal science is not obtainable.
He who starts from revelation, which includes the principles of
universal science, can, no doubt, find all nature harmonizing with
faith, and all the sciences bearing witness to its truth, for he has
the key to their real and higher sense; but he who starts with the
particular only can never rise above the particular, and hence he
finds in the particulars, or the nature to which he is restricted, no
immaterial and immortal soul, and no God, creator, and upholder of
the universe. His generalizations are only classifications of facts,
with no intuition of their relation to an order above themselves; his
universal is the particular, and he sees in the plane of his vision no
steps by which to ascend to science, far less to faith. Saint-Simon
and Auguste Comte both understood well the necessity of

subordinating all the sciences to a general principle or law, and of
integrating them in a universal science; but starting with the special
sciences themselves, they could never attain to a universal science,
or a science that accepted, generalized, and explained them all,
and hence each ended in atheism, or, what is the same thing, the
divinization of humanity. The positivists really recognize only
particulars, and only particulars in the material order, the only order
the sciences, distinguished from philosophy and revelation, do or
can deal with. Alexander von Humboldt had, probably, no superior
in the sciences, and he has given their résumé in his Cosmos;
but, if we recollect aright, the word God does not once appear in
that work, and yet, except when he ventures to theorize beyond
the order of facts on which the sciences immediately rest, there is
little in that work that an orthodox Christian need deny. Herbert
Spencer, really a man of ability, who disclaims being a follower of
Auguste Comte or a positivist, excludes from the knowable,
principles and causes, all except sensible phenomena; and although
wrong in view of a higher philosophy than can be obtained by
induction from the sensible or particular facts, yet he is not wrong
in contending that the sciences cannot of themselves rise above the
particular and the phenomenal.
Hence we do not agree with those Christian apologists who tell us
that the tendency of the sciences is to corroborate the doctrines of
revelation. They no more tend of themselves to corroborate
revelation than they do to impair it. They who press them into the
cause of infidelity, and hence conclude that science explodes faith,
mistake their reach, for we can no more conclude from them
against faith than we can in favor of faith. The fact is, the sciences
are not science, and lie quite below the sphere of both science and
faith. When arrayed against either, their authority is null. Hence we
conclude, á priori, against them when they presume to impugn the
principles of science as expressed in the ideal formula, or against
faith which is, considered in itself objectively, no less certain than
the formula itself; and we have shown, à posteriori, by
descending to the particulars, that the sciences present no facts

that impugn revelation or contradict the teachings of faith. The
conclusions of the savans against the Christian dogmas are no
logical deductions or inductions from any facts or particulars in their
possession, and therefore, however they may carry away sciolists,
or the half-learned, or little minds, greedy of novelties, they are
really of no scientific account.
All that faith demands of the sciences as such is their silence. She
does not demand their support, she only demands that they keep
in their own order, that the cobbler should stick to his last, ne
sutor ultra crepidam. Faith herself is in the supernatural order,
and proceeds from the same source as nature herself; it
presupposes science indeed, and elevates and confirms it, but no
more depends upon it than the creator depends on the creature.
The highest science needs faith to complete it, and in all probability
never could have been attained to without revelation; but neither
science nor the sciences, however they may need revelation, could
ever, without revelation, have risen to the conception of a divine
and supernatural revelation. It is idle, then, to suppose that without
revelation we could find by the sciences the demonstration or
evidence of revelation. Lalande was right when he said he had
never seen God at the end of his telescope, and his assertion
should weigh with all natural theologians, so-called, who attempt to
prove the existence of God by way of induction from the facts
which naturalists observe and analyze; but he was wrong and
grossly illogical when he concluded from that fact, with the fool of
the Bible, there is no God, as wrong as those chemists are who
conclude against the real presence in holy eucharist, because by
their profane analysis of the consecrated host they find in it the
properties of bread. The most searching chemical analysis cannot
go beyond the visible or sensible properties of the subject analyzed,
and the sensible properties of the bread and wine nobody pretends
are changed in transubstantiation. None of the revealed dogmas
are either provable or disprovable by any empirical science, for they
all lie in the supernatural order, above the reach of natural science,

and while they control all the empirical sciences they can be
controlled by none.
But when we have revelation and with it, consciously or
unconsciously, the ideal formula, which gives us the principles of all
science and of all things, and descend from the higher to the lower,
the case is essentially different. We then find all the sciences so far
as based on facts, and all the observable facts or phenomena of
nature, moral, intellectual, or physical, both illustrating and
confirming the truths of revelation and the mysteries of faith. We
then approach nature from the point of view of the Creator, read
nature by the divine light of revelation, and study it from above,
not from below; we then follow the real order of things, proceed
from principles to facts, from the cause to the effect, from the
universal to the particular, and are, after having thus descended
from heaven to earth, able to reascend from earth to heaven. In
this way we can see all nature joining in one to show forth the
being and glory of God, and to hymn his praise. This method of
studying nature from high to low by the light of first principles and
of divine revelation enables us to press all the sciences into the
service of faith, to unite them in a common principle, and do what
the Saint-Simonians and positivists cannot do, integrate them in a
general or universal science, bring the whole intellectual life of
man, as we showed in our article on Rome or Reason, into unison
with faith and the real life and order of things, leaving to rend our
bosoms only that moral struggle symbolized by Rome and the
World, of which we have heretofore treated at length.
But this can never be done by induction from the facts observed
and analyzed by the several empirical or inductive sciences. We
think we have shown that the pretension, that these sciences have
set aside any of the doctrines of Christianity, or impaired the faith,
except in feeble and uninstructed minds, is unfounded; we think we
have also shown that they not only have not, but cannot do it,
because they lie in a region too low to establish anything against
revelation. Yet as the sciences are insufficient, while restricted to

their proper sphere, to satisfy the demand of reason for apodictic
principles, for unity and universality, there is a perpetual tendency
in the men devoted exclusively to their culture to draw from them
conclusions which are unwarranted, illogical, and antagonistic both
to philosophy and to faith. Against this tendency, perhaps never
more strongly manifested than at this moment, there is in natural
science alone no sufficient safeguard, and consequently we need
the supernatural light of revelation to protect both faith and science
itself. With the loss of the light of revelation we lose, in fact, the
ideal formula, or the light of philosophy; and with the light of
philosophy, we lose both science and the sciences, and retain only
dry facts which signify nothing, or baseless theories and wild
conjectures, which, when substituted for real science, are far worse
than nothing.

My Meadowbrook Adventure.
No, no, Tom; that is out of the question. I can't afford to go away
just now. I am getting into a fine practice; the courts open in ten
days; and besides, I am in the midst of an essay on the Law of
Contracts which I promised for the next number of a certain law
magazine. Your prescription is a very pleasant one; but really I
can't take it. You must give me a good dose of medicine instead.
I tell you what it is, Franklin, I don't let my patients dictate to me
in that style. You have been fool enough to throw yourself into a
nervous fever by working in this nasty den all summer, instead of
taking a vacation-run to the country as you ought to have done;
and now, if you don't follow my directions, I swear I won't cure
you! Go off to some quiet farm-house for a week or two, and, if
your essay on contracts weighs upon your mind, take the stupid
stuff with you. I'll risk your working much at it after you get within
scent of the fields.
I could not stand out very long against the bluff orders of my
friend and physician Tom Bowlder. I knew, too, that he was right. I
had overtasked myself. I had been dangerously ill; and, eager as I
was to get on with my work, I could not help feeling that rest and
change were absolutely necessary for me. So I packed my
portmanteau, not forgetting my precious essay and a liberal supply
of writing-paper, and the next morning saw me on the way to
Meadowbrook.
It was a quiet, sleepy little village, nestling at the foot of a
beautifully wooded ridge, and looking out from its shelter, across a
slope of green fields, to a little stream which ran purling over the
stones a quarter of a mile distant. Majestic old elm-trees shaded
the grassy roads and swung their branches over the roofs of the
trim little cottages. There was only one house in the place which

pretended to be anything better than a cottage, and that was a
rather stately villa, a good hundred years old at least, which stood
a little way out of the village, surrounded with trees, and shut in
from the public gaze by an enormous hawthorn hedge which ran
around the extensive grounds. Meadowbrook House, or the
house, as it was generally called by the villagers, was the property
of an old maiden lady named Forsythe, the daughter of a retired
merchant who long years ago had chosen this quiet spot as a
retreat for his old age. Mr. Forsythe was a Catholic, and one of his
first actions after removing to Meadowbrook was to build the pretty
stone church in the main street of the village, and to pledge a
certain sum annually from his ample income for the support of the
priest. When, after a long life of usefulness, he died and was
buried by the side of his wife, leaving all his property to his
daughter, who had already long passed the period of youth, the
generosity of Miss Forsythe continued to supply what the poor little
Catholic congregation was unable to give, and the excellent spinster
was still the mainstay of the church. Poor Father James, an old
man now of nearly seventy, would have fared ill but for her
assistance.
So much I learned in an after-supper chat with my landlady on the
night of my arrival. I cannot say that I was much engrossed at the
time by the good woman's garrulous narrative, but after-events
were to give me a deep interest in Meadowbrook House and in
everything connected with it. I had taken lodgings in the village
inn, a neat, quiet, respectable establishment, where there were few
guests except the villagers who used to drop in of an evening to
enjoy a little gossip and a pipe, and with whom, after a days'
ramble, I used often to sit and smoke my cigar. I led an idle but
most delicious life during my ten day's holiday. I ranged through
the woods, with my gun on my shoulder, bringing home now and
then a bird or so, but caring in reality more for the walk than the
shooting. I whipped the brook for trout. I searched the fields for
botanical specimens. I wandered about with a volume of Tennyson
or Buchanan in my pocket, stopping at times to lie down and read

under the trees. I did almost everything, in fact, except work at my
essay, which remained in the portfolio where I had originally
packed it.
One sunny afternoon I was dozing on my back in the shade of an
apple orchard, when a strain of music was borne to my ears,
beginning like the distant hum of bees, and gradually swelling on
the air with slow and majestic cadences. I had never heard such
music in Meadowbrook before. Curious to know whence it came, I
followed the sound, and was not long in discovering that some
practised hand was touching the wheezy little organ in the village
church. Not the same hand which was accustomed painfully to
struggle with the keys there on Sunday, and wring from them
broken and doleful sounds to the distress of all nervous listeners.
The person who was playing now had the touch of a master; and
as the plaintive phrases of the Agnus Dei from Mozart's First Mass
broke upon the solitude of the church, the rickety organ seemed
infused with a new spirit. I could not have believed that so much
pathos and such exquisite delicacy of tone could be drawn from the
wretched instrument whose laborious whistling and puffing had set
my teeth on edge the previous Sunday. I sat down in a pew under
the gallery, and listened. It was not until twilight approached that
the playing ceased. I heard the organ closed; the player was silent
for a few moments; He is saying a prayer, thought I; and then a
soft step began to descend the stairs. Thinking it possible the
performer might feel annoyed at perceiving a stranger in the
church, I sat quietly in my place, confident that the growing
darkness and the shelter of one of the pillars would screen me
from observation. I could see very well, however, though I could
not be seen, and my surprise was great when a slender female
figure issued from the gallery staircase, and came within the light
of the open street door. She was young—not more than eighteen, I
should think—with a face of rare beauty, a pretty form, a light and
graceful carriage, and the unmistakable air of a gentlewoman.
Small, regular features, light brown eyes, cheeks like a peach,
blooming with health, a profusion of dark hair, and an expression of

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