iOS application (in)security

iOS Application (In)Security
OWASP: Google Ireland
March 2012

Introduction
Company and Speaker Overview

1999
• I’m a co-founder & director of MDSec
• Apple fanboy? 2004
- CVE-2011-0204: Apple ImageIO TIFF Heap Overflow
CVE-2011-0194: Apple ImageIO TIFF Image Integer Overflow
CVE-2010-1845: Apple ImageIO PSD Memory Corruption
• Perspective is that of a Pen tester, not a developer 2007

• MDSec:
- Web App Hacker’s Handbook 1st & 2nd Edition
- Worldwide training
- Online training 2011
- Burp Suite
2013

© 2011 MDSec Consulting Ltd. All rights reserved.

iOS Applications (In)Security
Overview

• Introduction
• Overview of iOS & Apps
• Blackbox Assessment
• Transport Security
• Data Storage
• Keychain
• Protocol Handlers
• UIWebViews
• Injection Attacks
• Filesystem Interaction
• Geolocation
• Logging
• Memory Corruption

Overview
Why Mobile Security?

Mobile Security
- In focus over last few years
- Steady increase in requests for mobile app assessments
- Public app problems:
- Citigroup data storage
- Skype XSS & Protocol Handler vulnerabilities
- Often hold personal data
- Online banking, social networking etc…

Why iOS Apps?
- Apple have a 52% market share [1]
- Over half a million apps in App Store
http://www.netmarketshare.com/operating-system-market-share.aspx?qprid=9&qpcustomb=1


Overview
Why Mobile Security?

“In a letter, the US banking giant said
the Citi Mobile app saved user
information in a hidden file that
could be used by attackers to gain
unauthorized access to online
accounts. Personal information
stored in the file could include
account numbers, bill payments and
security access codes…”.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/07/27/citi_iphone_app_weakness/


Overview
Platform Security Features

• Code Signing
- Prevents unauthorised apps running
- Validates app signatures at runtime
• Sandboxing
- Apps run in a self-contained environment
- Third party apps assigned “container” seatbelt profile
- Allows some access to address book, media & outbound network
• ASLR
- Randomises where data & code is mapped in an address space
- Apps can have partial or full ASLR (compiled with PIE)
• Encryption
- Hardware based encryption; “data is encrypted at rest”
- Provides Data Protection API for protecting individual items


Overview
iOS Apps

• Developed in Objective C
– Superset of C
• Xcode for development
– I can haz Apple?

NSAutoreleasePool *pool = [[NSAutoreleasePool alloc] init];
NSLog (@"Hello, World!");
[pool drain];


Overview
iOS Apps

• Previous work:

– “Auditing iPhone and iPad Applications” by Ilja van Sprundel

– “Secure Development on iOS” by David Thiel

– “Apple iOS 4 Security Evaluation” by Dino Dai Zovi


Blackbox Assessment
Intercepting Communications

• Configure the device for a proxy
• Install a self-signed certificate on the device to capture HTTPS

http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2010/11/iphone-burp.html


Blackbox Assessment
Reverse Engineering

• Apps are stored as an IPA in iTunes Library
– IPA is just ZIP

• App Store binaries are encrypted
– Manual decryption
• Use debugger, breakpoint EP, let loader decrypt, dump decrypted image
• http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/blog/2009/03/06/reverse-engineering-iphone-appstore-
binaries
– Automated
• Crackulous & AppCrack


Blackbox Assessment
Reverse Engineering

• LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO:


Blackbox Assessment
Reverse Engineering

– Manual decryption of an AppStore Binary:
• Take cryptsize from LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO
• Breakpoint doModInitFunctions
• Dump memory from start address to start address + cryptsize
# gdb --quiet -e ./99Bottles
Reading symbols for shared libraries . done
(gdb) set sharedlibrary load-rules ".*" ".*" none
(gdb) set inferior-auto-start-dyld off
(gdb) set sharedlibrary preload-libraries off
(gdb) rb doModInitFunctions
Breakpoint 1 at 0x2fe0ce36
<function, no debug info>
__dyld__ZN16ImageLoaderMachO18doModInitFunctionsERKN11ImageLoader11LinkContextE;
(gdb) r
Starting program: /private/var/mobile/Applications/E938B6D0-9ADE-4CD6-83B8-
712D0549426D/99Bottles.app/99Bottles

Breakpoint 1, 0x2fe0ce36 in
__dyld__ZN16ImageLoaderMachO18doModInitFunctionsERKN11ImageLoader11LinkContextE ()
(gdb) dump memory 99bottles.dec 0x2000 (0x2000 + 0x3000)

Blackbox Assessment
Position Independent Executable

• Use a jailbroken phone to SSH to the device and extract the app
• Otool is your friend
– With PIE:

– Without PIE:


Blackbox Assessment
Inspecting the binary

• Wealth of information in the __OBJC segment
– Internal classes, methods and variables

• Parse using class-dump-z
– Snippet from CommBank Kaching App:

@interface RootViewController :
/private/tmp/KIA_IPHONE_SOURCE/ <UIWebViewDelegate,
DILDisplayView, UIAlertViewDelegate>
{
<snip>
- (BOOL)isJailbrokenDevice;


Blackbox Assessment
Hooking the runtime

• The runtime can be hooked using MobileSubstrate
– Hook Objective-C, C or C++
– CaptainHook provides API for MobileSubstrate

• Allows access to internals of app

CHOptimizedMethod(0, self, BOOL, RootViewController, isJailbrokenDevice)
{
NSLog(@"####### isJailbrokenDevice hooked");
return false;
}


Blackbox Assessment
Hooking the runtime

DEMO


Transport Security
Introduction

• Mobile devices may often use untrusted networks
– Imperative that data is sent securely

• Apple provides a couple of ways to do HTTPS
– NSURLConnection
– CFNetwork

• Developers sometimes pass on to third party code
– CyaSSL
– Matrix SSL
– OpenSSL


Transport Security
SSL Ciphers

• Different TLS handshake depending on SDK

• Version 4.3 of SDK uses TLS 1.0 with 29 suites, some weak:
– TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
– TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_MD5
– TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA
– TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA
– TLS_DHE_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_DES40_CBC_SHA

• Version 5.0 uses TLS 1.2 with 37 suites, none weak

• API provides no way to configure cipher suites AFAIK


Transport Security
NSURLConnection

• Developers often allow self-signed certs

• NSURLRequest:
– Default behaviour is to reject cert and throw NSURLErrorDomain
– Developers override with allowsAnyHTTPSCertificateForHost
• Private delegate method

• NSURLConnection:
– Alternate approach using didReceiveAuthenticationChallenge delegate
• Ignore cert using continueWithoutCredentialForAuthenticationChallenge selector


Transport Security
CFNetwork

• Alternate API implementation
– More granular than NSURLConnection

• Developers have more control over certs
– Allow expired certs:
• kCFStreamSSLAllowsExpiredCertificates
– Allow expired roots:
• kCFStreamSSLAllowsExpiredRoots
– Allow any root:
• kCFStreamSSLAllowsAnyRoot
– No validation at all????
• : kCFStreamSSLValidatesCertificateChain


Data Storage
Introduction

• Mobile apps can often hold sensitive data
– High risk of device being lost or stolen
– Imperative data is protected in these scenarios

• Client-side data takes a number of forms
– Custom created documents
– Logs
– Cookie stores
– Plists
– Data caches
– Databases

• Stored in /var/mobile/Applications/<GUID>


Data Storage
Data Protection API

• Apple API for using the hardware crypto
• Encrypted using a key derived from passcode
• Developers must “mark” files to protect

• 4 levels of protection
– No protection:
• NSDataWritingFileProtectionNone / NSFileProtectionNone
– Complete protection:
• NSDataWritingFileProtectionComplete / NSFileProtectionComplete
– Complete unless open:
• NSDataWritingFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen /
NSFileProtectionCompleteUnlessOpen
– Complete until first authentication:
• NSDataWritingFileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication /
NSFileProtectionCompleteUntilFirstUserAuthentication

Data Storage
Real World Example

• Kik Messenger
– Send IM through data
– Over 1 million users
– Users sign up for a Kik account

– http://kik.com/


Data Storage
Kik Messenger

• Library/Preferences/com.kik.chat.plist:
– Username
– Password
– Email


Data Storage
Kik Messenger

• Documents/kik.sqlite:
– Chat history


Data Storage
Kik Messenger

• Documents/fileAttachments:

mbp:Documents $ file fileAttachments/057a8fc9-0daf-4750-b356-5b28755f4ec4
fileAttachments/057a8fc9-0daf-4750-b356-5b28755f4ec4: JPEG image data, JFIF
standard 1.01 mbp:Documents $


Keychain
Overview

• Encrypted container for storing sensitive information
• Apps can only access their keychain items unless part of a keychain access
group:
– Set by entitlements from provisioning profile
– Jailbroken – apps to dump keychain

• 6 levels of protection with Data Protection API:
– kSecAttrAccessibleAlways
– kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked
– kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock
– kSecAttrAccessibleAlwaysThisDeviceOnly
– kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly
– kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly


Protocol Handlers
Overview

• No real Inter-Process Communication

• Apps prohibited from sharing because of sandbox

• Apps sometimes need to share data

• Apps can register a custom protocol handler


Protocol Handlers
Implementation

• Two methods for implementing protocol handlers

• handleOpenURL
– Now deprecated

• openURL
– Provides bundle identifier
– Allows developer to validate source app

• Example found during an app assessment
– app://setConfiguration?landingpage= - Set the landing page for an app


Protocol Handlers
Skype Vulnerability

• Skype registers the “skype://” protocol handler

• Malicious web site could make calls

• Skype app did not prompt or validate before call

<iframe src=”skype://123456789?call"></iframe>

https://media.blackhat.com/bh-eu-11/Nitesh_Dhanjani/BlackHat_EU_2011_Dhanjani_Attacks_Against_Apples_iOS-WP.pdf


UIWebViews
Overview

• iOS rendering engine for displaying text, supports a number of formats:
– HTML
– PDF
– RTF
– Office Documents (XLS, PPT, DOC)
– iWork Documents (Pages, Numbers, Keynote)

• Built upon WebKit and uses the same core frameworks as Safari

• Supports java-script, cannot be disabled
– Unescaped input leads to Cross-Site Scripting


UIWebView
Cross-Site Scripting

• Similar attacks to standard XSS
– Session theft etc

• Can occur whenever user controlled Objective C variables populated in to
WebView
– stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString

NSString *javascript = [[NSString alloc] initWithFormat:@"var myvar="%@";",
username];

[mywebView stringByEvaluatingJavaScriptFromString:javascript];


UIWebView

• No native JS to Objective C bridge
– Developers will often implement one
– Examples:
• Using camera from JS
• Sending e-mails from JS
• Sending SMS from JS

• Bridge implemented using WebView specific URL handler:
– shouldStartLoadWithRequest

• Bridge can often expose Objective C methods
– Serialize/Unserialize methods & parameters
– performSelector:NSSelectorFromString(method)


UIWebView

• Real world example:
– Skype (AGAIN!)
– Displays “full name” from incoming call in a WebView
– Used a local HTML template so loaded in local context
– XSS in full name lead to addressbook theft

https://superevr.com/blog/2011/xss-in-skype-for-ios/


XML Processing
Overview

• Widely used in mobile apps

• iOS offers 2 options for parsing XML with the SDK:
– NSXMLParser
– libXML2

• Lots of other third party implementations exist


XML Processing
NSXMLParser

• Not vulnerable to “billion laughs” attack by default
– Parser raises a NSXMLParserEntityRefLoopError exception

• Not vulnerable to eXternal Xml Entity injection by default

• Developer must enable the setShouldResolveExternalEntities option
– Not unthinkable, seen in practice on several occasions

NSXMLParser *addressParser = [[NSXMLParser alloc] initWithData:xmlData];
[addressParser setShouldResolveExternalEntities:YES];


XML Processing
libXML2

• Not vulnerable to “billion laughs” attack by default
– Parser throws error: “Detected an entity reference loop”

• Vulnerable to eXternal XML Entity injection by default!

-(BOOL) parser:(NSString *)xml {

xmlDocPtr doc = xmlParseMemory([xml UTF8String], [xml
lengthOfBytesUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding]);

xmlNodePtr root = xmlDocGetRootElement(doc);
}


SQL
Overview

• Apps may need to store data client-side
– API supports SQLite

• Unsanitised user input in dynamic queries leads to SQL injection

NSString *sql = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"SELECT name FROM products
WHERE id = '%@'", id];
const char *query = [sql UTF8String];

• Used parameterised queries!

const char *sql = "SELECT name FROM products WHERE id = ?";
sqlite3_prepare_v2(database, sql, -1, &sql_statement, NULL);
sqlite3_bind_text(&sql_statement, 1, id, -1, SQLITE_TRANSIENT);


SQL
Demo

NSString *sql = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"INSERT INTO tweets VALUES('1',
'%@','%@','%@')", tweet, user, displayname];
const char *insert_stmt = [sql UTF8String];
sqlite3_prepare_v2(database, insert_stmt, -1, &statement, NULL);
if (sqlite3_step(statement) == SQLITE_DONE)

DEMO


Filesystem Interaction
Overview

• Objective C provides NSFileManager class for filesystem access:
– Check if file exists
– Compare file contents
– Check file permissions
– Move/Copy files
– Read & write from/to files

• Can be affected by traditional file IO issues


Directory Traversal

• Vulnerable to vanilla traversals:
– ../../../../../../../

NSString *fname = @"../Documents/secret.txt";
NSString *sourcePath = [[NSString alloc] initWithFormat:@"%@/%@", [[NSBundle
mainBundle] resourcePath], fname];
NSString *contents = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:[fm readContents:sourcePath]
encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];

- (NSData*) readContents:(NSString*)location {
NSFileManager *filemgr;
NSData *buffer;
filemgr = [NSFileManager defaultManager];
buffer = [filemgr contentsAtPath:location];
return buffer;
}

Poison Null Byte Attacks

• NSString does not use null bytes to terminate strings
– Creates problems if used with C file operations
– May allow early termination for bypasses

NSString *fname = @"../Documents/secret.txt0";
NSString *sourcePath = [[NSString alloc] initWithFormat:@"%@/%@.jpg", [[NSBundle
mainBundle] resourcePath], fname];
char line[1024];
FILE *fp = fopen([sourcePath UTF8String], "r");


Logging
Overview

• API provides the NSLog() method
– Will print to console log
– Visible in Xcode Organiser
– Logs cached until reboot
– Can be read by any iOS app using Apple System Log (ASL) lib

• Some jailbreaks redirect console > syslog

• Some apps will use their own wrapper and log to app folder

• Don’t store sensitive information there!
– If used, ensure removed in release builds – use a pre-processor macro
NSLog(@"Account Number: %@, Sort code: %@", account, sortcode);

Geolocation
Overview

• Provided by the Core Location framework

• Avoid being “too accurate”

• Don’t log location information on either client or server
– If you MUST – make anonymous!


Geolocation
Accuracy

• Can be set by one of the following constants:
– kCLLocationAccuracyBestForNavigation;
kCLLocationAccuracyBest;
kCLLocationAccuracyNearestTenMeters;
kCLLocationAccuracyHundredMeters;
kCLLocationAccuracyKilometer;
kCLLocationAccuracyThreeKilometers;

self.locationManager.desiredAccuracy = kCLLocationAccuracyBest;


State Transitions
Backgrounding

• Application might change state, enter background if:
– Incoming call
– User hits home button

• To streamline the transition, iOS takes a snapshot of current view
– Used to give the impression of “instant” loading
– Stored on the file system in clear text
– May contain sensitive data

- (void)applicationDidEnterBackground:(UIApplication *)application {
viewController.creditcardNumber.hidden = YES;
}


Memory Corruption
Overview

• As previously mentioned – superset of C
– Developers often using straight C
– Compiled to native code

– Gives rise to the traditional issues
• Overflows
• Integer wraps

• Shouldn’t need to allocate memory unless specific performance overhead
– Stick to objective C allocators


Memory Corruption
Format Strings

• A number of API methods support format specifiers

• If used incorrectly, leads to classic format string bugs

• Vulnerable methods include:
– NSLog()
– [NSString stringWithFormat]
– [NSString stringByAppendingFormat]
– [NSString initWithFormat]
– [NSMutableString appendFormat]
– [NSAlert alertWithMessageText]
– [NSException]


Memory Corruption
Format Strings - Exploitation

• Traditionally use %n to write to an arbitrary address
– Not available on iOS

• Apple provide %@ specifier for objects
– Call an arbitrary function pointer!
– Unfortunately rare to find data stored on stack 


Memory Corruption

• Example:
NSString *myURL=@"http://localhost/test";
NSURLRequest *theRequest = [NSURLRequest requestWithURL:[NSURL
URLWithString:myURL]];
NSURLResponse *resp = nil;
NSError *err = nil;
NSData *response = [NSURLConnection sendSynchronousRequest: theRequest
returningResponse: &resp error: &err];
NSString * theString = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:response
encoding:NSASCIIStringEncoding];
NSLog(theString);


Memory Corruption

• Example:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 29

AAAA%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.

• Output:

2012-01-31 17:46:41.780 fmtstr[2476:1207]
AAAA93f9ea22.0030fc90.00000001.bffffbf8.00000000.

• Dumps stack memory


Memory Corruption
Object Use after Free

• Same concept as use-after-free bugs

• References to an object still exist after it has been freed

• Exploitable but unlikely in practice

• Some protection offered by Automatic Reference Counting (ARC)

MDSec *mdsec = [[MDSec alloc] init];
[mdsec release];
[mdsec echo: @"MDSec!"];


Conclusions

• Transport security & data storage are probably two of the biggest issues for iOS
apps

• Apps can be vulnerable to lots of API specific attacks

• Platform provides additional security features to mitigate against some attacks


Q&A
That’s all folks!

QUESTIONS?

• Online:
– http://www.mdsec.co.uk
– http://blog.mdsec.co.uk
• E-Mail:
– dominic [at] mdsec [dot] co [dot] uk
• Twitter:
– @deadbeefuk
– @MDSecLabs


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