IoT_Security and impelementation in school
- 1. European Union Agency for Network and Information Security Introduction to IoT security Christina Skouloudi, Apostolos Malatras | ENISA IoT Security team ENISA-FORTH NIS Summer School| 26.09.2018
- 2. Structure of Day 1
- 3. 3 • Round table • Intro & ENISA’s efforts on IoT • IoT 101 • Intro and definition • Ecosystem (including assets and components) • IoT platforms • IoT protocols • IoT Security • Challenges • Threats • Attack scenarios • Case-study: BLE Security • LAB Day 1
- 4. 4 Positioning ENISA activities POLICY Support MS & COM in Policy implementation Harmonisation across EU CAPACITY Hands on activities EXPERTISE Recommendations Independent Advice
- 5. 5 Horizontal and vertical Studies Expert Groups Validation Workshops Conferences Summer School ENISA’s efforts on IoT Security
- 6. 6 ENISA’s efforts on IoT Security Industry 4.0 Baseline IoT Security
- 7. 7 IoT security in sectors • Understand threats & assets • Consider context of use • Highlight security good practices in specific sectors • Provide recommendations to enhance cyber security • Expert groups
- 8. 8 • Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT • Map existing IoT security initiatives • Address the problem holistically engaging with wider community • Utilize sectorial knowhow • Provide horizontal cybersecurity recommendations and security measures • One stop shop for IoT cybersecurity in Europe ENISA and IoT cybersecurity https://enisa.europa.eu/iot
- 9. IoT 101
- 10. 10 10 What is IoT to you?
- 11. 11 “ ”11 IoT ENISA defines IoT as a cyber-physical ecosystem of interconnected sensors and actuators which enable intelligent decision making.
- 12. 12 Sensor
- 13. 13 Sensor element that allows to monitor the environment and the context on which IoT systems operate • accelerometers • temperature sensors • pressure sensors • light sensors • acoustic sensors sensors can measure defined physical, chemical or biological indicators, and on the digital level, they collect information about the network and applications
- 14. 14 Actuator
- 15. 15 Actuator the entity responsible for moving or controlling a system or mechanism. an actuator operates in the reverse direction of a sensor; it takes an electrical input and turns it into physical action.
- 16. 16 Sensor + Actuator + .. Structure of an IoT embedded system • medical implants • wearables (smart watches) • connected lights • smart thermostats
- 18. 18 Everything becomes connected Business side • “Everything connected” hype - Competitors do IoT, hence we must do IoT - Competitors don’t do IoT, let’s be the first one! • Financial gains • New business models and opportunities • Advanced data collection and processing
- 19. 19
- 21. 21 IoT Ecosystem GATEWAYS ENDPOINT DEVICES (SENSORS, ACTUATORS, EMBEDDED DEVICES etc.) CLOUD PLATFORM, BACKEND AND SERVICES
- 22. 22 • Smart appliances • Smartphones • Smart ‘things’ IoT Components – Endpoint Devices
- 23. 23 • WiFi • Zigbee • Z-Wave • NFC • RFID • BLE • LoRAWAN • MQTT/SIP/CoAP IoT Components - Communications SESSION AMQP, CoAP, DDS, MQTT, XMPP NETWORK ENCAPSULATION 6LowPAN, Thread ROUTING CARP, RPL DATALINK Bluetooth / BLE, Wi-Fi / Wi-Fi HaLow, LoRaWAN, Neul, SigFox, Z-Wave, ZigBee, USB
- 24. 24
- 25. 25
- 26. 26 • Data and storage • Web-based services • Device management (config, etc) IoT Components - Cloud
- 28. 28 • Consumer Electronics • Automotive • Healthcare • Industrial IoT • Wearables • Logistics • Sport & Fitness IoT Components - Use case / context
- 29. 29 29 What are the assets of IoT? Group of 4 – 5’
- 30. 30 IoT Assets
- 32. 32 • ThingBox • Node-RED • M2MLabs Mainspring • Kinoma • Eclipse IoT Project • Arduino IoT development platforms
- 33. 33 • Apio • Arduino Nano • Arduino Pro Mini • Arduino Uno • Arduino Yún • Arietta G25 • BeagleBoard • Flutter • Flutter • IMUduino BTLE • Intel Edison • Intel Galileo • Libelium Waspmote • LightBlue Bean • Local Motors Connected Car • Microduino • Nanode • OpenKontrol Gateway • OpenPicus • panStamps • PicAxe • Pinoccio • Raspberry Pi 2 • RasWIK • SAM R21 Xplained Pro • SmartEverything • SODAQ • SparkFun RedBoard • Tessel • Tessel 2 • The AirBoard • The Rascal • TinyDuino • UDOO • WIOT • XinoRF IoT hardware platforms
- 34. 34 Home Automation • Eclipse SmartHome • Home Gateway Initiative (HGI) • Ninja Blocks • openHAB • PrivateEyePi • RaZberry • The Thing System Middleware • IoTSyS • Kaa • OpenIoT • OpenRemote Operating Systems • AllJoyn • Contiki • Raspbian • RIOT • Spark IoT software platforms
- 35. 35 • Canopy • Chimera IoT • DeviceHive(IoT Integration Tools and Horizontal Platforms ) • net • Distributed Services Architecture (DSA) • IoT Toolkit • M2MLabs Mainspring • Mango • Nimbits • Open Source Internet of Things (OSIOT) • OpenRemote • Pico Labs (Kynetx open source assigned to Pico Labs) • prpl Foundation • RabbitMQ • SiteWhere • ThingSpeak • webinos • Yaler IoT Iintegration platforms
- 36. 36 https://nodered.org/ Presentation Title | Speaker Name ( To edit click Insert/ Header & footer) Node-Red
- 37. IoT Security
- 38. 38 38 What could possibly go wrong?
- 39. 39 What could possibly go wrong?
- 40. 40 • IoT botnet • IoT devices used for DDoS attacks Based on a real life example
- 41. 41 No device is fully secured • Reliance on third-party components, hardware and software • Dependency on networks and external services • Design of IoT/connected devices • Vulnerabilities in protocols • Security by design NOT the norm. IoT security is currently limited • Investments on security are limited • Functionalities before security • Real physical threats with risks on health and safety • No legal framework for liabilities Why IoT security matters? Cyber System Physical System
- 42. 42 • Very large attack surface and widespread deployment • Limited device resources • Lack of standards and regulations • Safety and security process integration • Security by design not a top priority • Lack of expertise • Applying security updates • Insecure development • Unclear liabilities IoT Security – Main challenges
- 43. 43
- 44. 44 44 What are the threats to IoT? Group of 4 – 5’
- 46. 46 46 Which way would you attack IoT? Attack scenarios
- 47. 47 • Attacks over the entire IoT ecosystem • Sensors/actuators - E.g. draining the battery of pacemakers • Communications - E.g. intercepting Bluetooth LE communication • Decision making (data integrity, etc.) - E.g. modification of messages to modify smart car behavior • Information privacy - E.g. smart toys exploited to eavesdrop on children Many ways to attack IoT
- 48. 48 IoT Attack Scenarios IoT administration system compromised
- 49. 49 IoT Attack Scenarios Botnet / Commands injection
- 51. 51
- 53. 53 • What we are exposing on the internet • Online scanners • The use of shodan, and the many grey areas. • Who is a potential target of these kind of scanners? • Are shodan results an indicator of potential attacks and more sophisticated version of current attacks? (eg. Mirai evolved to target specific ports – why?) What to understand
- 54. 54 IP Angry
- 55. 55 Study Mirai code on github: https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code Code of a Botnet
- 56. 56 • AIOTI High Level Architecture functional model • FP7-ICT – IoT-A Architectural reference model • NIST Network of Things (NoT) • ITU-T IoT reference model39 • ISO/IEC CD 30141 Internet of Things Reference Architecture • ISACA Conceptual IoT Architecture • oneM2M Architecture Model • IEEE P2413 - Standard for an Architectural Framework IoT Security Architectures
- 57. 57 High-level IoT reference model
- 58. Case-study Demo on Smart Health Security
- 59. 59 Sensor Sensor (RGB sensor) High Med Low 1 = red 0 = green -1 = blue 1 0 -1 Display?/LED
- 60. 60 Interconnectivity Sensor (RGB sensor) 1 = red 0 = green -1 = blue reading
- 61. 61 Decision Making If(red) add blue If(green) do nothing If(blue) add red High Med Low 1 0 -1 Based on reading, we want to increase or decrease value to get optimal state
- 63. 63 Scenario 1: Sensor tampering modifying the values read by sensors or their threshold values and settings
- 64. 64 Real life practice – Electronic thermometer
- 65. 65 Scenario 2: Man-In-the-Middle modifying the values intercepted from the man in the middle
- 66. 66 Real life practice – Pacemaker
- 67. 67 Scenario 3: Unauthorised access modifying or sabotaging normal settings of the device
- 68. 68 Real life practice – Unauthorised syringe injections
- 69. 69 • IoT 101 • IoT Security • Challenges • Threats • Attack scenarios • Case-study Summary
- 70. 70 70 What follows.. Lab exercises on BLE attacks Time to set up the VMachines!
- 71. 1 Vasilissis Sofias Str, Maroussi 151 24, Attiki, Greece Tel: +30 28 14 40 9711 info@enisa.europa.eu www.enisa.europa.eu Thank you