Issuesinsights v08n17

Young Leaders in Tokyo

PACIFIC FORUM CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS

Issues & Insights
Vol. 8 - No. 17

Tokyo, Japan
October 2008

Pacific Forum CSIS
Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS (www.pacforum.org)
operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum’s programs
encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business,
and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with
the region’s leaders in the academic, government, and corporate arenas.
Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research
institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives
and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion
leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

The Young Leaders Program

The Young Leaders Program invites young professionals and graduate
students to join Pacific Forum policy dialogues and conferences. The
program fosters education in the practical aspects of policy-making,
generates an exchange of views between young and seasoned
professionals, promotes interaction among younger professionals, and
enriches dialogues with generational perspectives for all attendees.
Fellows must have a strong background in the area covered by the
conference they are attending and an endorsement from respected experts
in their field. Supplemental programs in conference host cities and
mentoring sessions with senior officials and specialists add to the Young
Leader experience. The Young Leaders Program is currently supported by
Chevron, the Freeman Foundation, the Luce Foundation, and the
Yuchengco Group, with a growing number of universities, institutes, and
organizations also helping to sponsor individual participants. For more
details, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website, www.pacforum.org, or
contact Brad Glosserman, director of the Young Leaders Program, at
bradgpf@hawaii.rr.com.

Table of Contents
Page

Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………. vi

Foreword ………………………………………………………………………. vii

The 12th Japan-U.S.-China Conference
on Trilateral Security Cooperation

Young Leaders in Tokyo …………………………………………………... 1
By Shanshan Wang

10 Suggestions on How to Enhance Economic Security
as Well as Overall Japan-China-U.S. Relations…………………………. 5
by Joni Caminos, Daisuke Hayashi, Fan Li, Wakana Mukai, and Tony Wan

Young Leaders Assessment of and Suggestions
for the Trilateral Relationship …………………………………………….. 9
By Madoka Futamura, David Janes, Tetsuo Kotani, Liu Lin, Jiyon Shin, and Tina Zhang

U.S.-Japan-China Relations:
Prospects for Deepening the Trilateral Partnership ……………………… 15
By Leif-Eric Easley, Chin-Hao Huang, Sachi Nagaoka, Greer Pritchett, and Ryo Sahashi

Japan-U.S.-China Trilateral Cooperation:
Back to Basics and Moving Beyond ……………………………………… 23
By Raymund Jose G. Quilop, Aki Mori, and Dewardric McNeal

The Significance of the U.S.-Japan-China Trilateral Relations
and Suggestions for the Future Young Leaders Program ………………… 25
By Shanshan Wang

Strategic Goals in Japan, U.S., and China Relations …………………… 29
By Brian Cathcart

China’s Move to MultilateralismTrilateral Mechanisms
Now Vital for Regional Security ………………………………………… 31
By Leif-Eric Easley

iii

Page
The 12th Japan-U.S.-China Conference on
Trilateral Security Cooperation …………………………………………… 35
By Madoka Futamura

The U.S.-China-Japan Trilateral Relationship:
A Traditional Balance of Power or
Exploring a New Cooperative Framework? ……………………………… 37
By Daisuke Hayashi

China-Japan Relations ……………………………………………………. 43
By David P. Janes

Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management
in Northeast Asia …………………………………………………………. 47
By Liu Lin

Beyond the Outdated Mindset that Conflict is Inevitable ……………. 51
By Aki Mori

The Northeast Asia Geometry Lesson ………………………………….. 55
By A. Greer Pritchett

Searching for the Nexus Between
National Security and Human Security …………………………………. 59
By Raymund Jose G. Quilop

U.S.-China-Japan Relations and the ROK ……………………………… 65
By Jiyon Shin

China’s Perspective on the U.S.-Japan Alliance ………………………… 69
By Wan Ruyi Tony

U.S.-Japan Alliance and Trilateral Relations:
A Chinese Perspective ……………………………………………………. 73
By Shanshan Wang

The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the U.S.-Japan-China Triangle …………. 75
By Weiwei Zhang

iv

Page
Chinese Internal Affairs:
What Matters or Will Be the Matters!! ………………………………… 79
by Masahiro (Hiro) Yumino

Pacific Forum Young Leaders Forum
How Human Security Complements State Security

Program Report ……………………………………………………………. 83
By Joni Caminos

Summary of Presentation for
Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Conference ………………………… 89
By Brian Cathcart

Key Issues of State Security for the U.S., Japan, and China:
How Can We Solve These Problems? …………………………………… 91
By Wakana Mukai

How Human Security Complements State Security …………………… 93
By Stephan Pierre Sakalian

Presentation at the CSIS Young Leaders Forum ………………………... 95
By Tomoko Suzuki

Human Security and Global Health ……………………………………… 99
By Tomoko Suzuki

Social Entrepreneurs – the Change Makers ……………………………… 101
By Fan Li

Appendices
Appendix A: Japan-U.S.-China Conference Agenda ……………………………. A-1
Appendix B: Young Leaders Forum Agenda ……………………………………… B-1
Appendix C: Young Leaders Biographies ………………………………………….. C-1

v

Acknowledgements

The Pacific Forum CSIS would like to thank the United States-Japan
Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation, and Christophe Bosquillon of Dai
Nippon Kali Kaisha, Limited for their support of the Young Leaders
program. A big mahalo goes out to The Research Institute for Peace and
Security (RIIPS) for welcoming the Young Leaders Participation in the
12th Japan-U.S.-China Conference on Trilateral Security Cooperation
and co-hosting the Young Leaders Forum. We would also like to thank
the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) for assisting in hosting
the Young Leaders Forum. This program would not have been possible
without the hard work of Ana Villavicencio and the Pacific Forum staff,
and especially Tetsuo Kotani, our Japanese Young Leader.

The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections
of the Young Leaders program participants; they do not necessarily
represent the views of their governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent
organizations and institutes.

vi

Foreword

If the U.S.-Japan-China relationship is one of the most important relationships in
the world – and we believe that it is – then there is a special burden on the next
generation in the three countries to understand each other and be prepared to work
together to solve shared problems and tackle common concerns. The Pacific Forum CSIS
has promoted a trilateral dialogue among the three countries for over a decade. For the
last four years, we have brought Young Leaders to those meetings as well, so that they
can begin to know each other, to better understand the issues, and (hopefully) to
commence applying themselves to problem solving.

At the 12th trilateral meeting, over two dozen Young Leaders from the three
countries as well as the ROK, the Philippines, and Thailand engaged in spirited
discussions about the future of the trilateral relationship and its impact on Asia and the
world. Being a diverse group, they brought a wide range of perspectives to our meeting –
from those of the Chinese military to NGO leaders. At the conclusion of the conference,
Young Leaders were divided into groups and asked to provide specific recommendations
on ways that they could contribute to trilateral problem-solving. In other words, they
were trying to figure out what we could do to help them build better trilateral relations.
Some of the suggestions are quite interesting. In addition to those group projects, this
volume includes papers that individual Young Leaders wrote in preparation for the
conference.

Since we started this program, we have hoped to convene a Young Leaders-only
conference that would allow program participants and others to discuss key issues in a
more extended, in-depth fashion and bring new voices into the dialogue. This year, we
held the first Young Leaders conference. Some 40 people joined the 27 Young Leaders
from the trilateral conference for a day of discussions that aimed to extend our thinking
about security beyond the state-oriented perspective that dominates senior-level track two
meetings to one that puts more weight on human security. This offered us the chance to
bring entirely new constituencies into the room. It was an intriguing and sometimes
frustrating process. While all the participants were enthusiastic about the project and its
goals, they had very different perspectives, used very different vocabularies, and most
significantly, were not used to thinking about many of these issues as problems to be
solved. The papers from that day of meetings provide insight into the various approaches
of the participants.

Indeed, the most important lesson from this exercise is that we need more of
them. Not only to enrich the discussions and force participants to consider new
approaches to these issues, but to inculcate a problem-solving mentality in the next
generation. We need to encourage Young Leaders in all fields to take ownership of issues
and think creatively about how to deal with them. Sadly, this particular skill set does not
seem to be much encouraged these days. Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders are
encouraged – “forced” is probably more accurate – to engage these problems and to think
about ways to solve them. It is a task for which they are well suited – and unfortunately,
there is ample material to keep them busy for years to come.
vii

THE 12TH JAPAN-U.S.-CHINA CONFERENCE ON
TRILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION

Organized by
Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS),
Pacific Forum CSIS, and
China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS)

Tokyo, Japan
April 1-2, 2008

Young Leaders in Tokyo
Project Report
By Shanshan Wang

Young Leaders from all over the world – China, Japan, Ecuador, the Philippines,
South Korea, and the United States – with diverse backgrounds (from media, academia,
government, and nonprofit organization, participated in a three-day Young Leaders
program hosted by the Pacific Forum CSIS as part of the 12th Japan-U.S.-China
Conference on Trilateral Security Cooperation organized by the Research Institute for
Peace and Security (RIPS), Pacific Forum CSIS, and China Foundation for International
and Strategic Studies (CFISS). Young Leaders (YLs) not only audited but also
participated in the trilateral conference. Before and after the senior level conference, YLs
held their own discussions to summarize the meetings and briefings. YLs had two
assignments: one pre-conference assignment that required an essay on their view of the
“other” bilateral relationship. For instance, a Chinese Young Leader was asked to write
on U.S.-Japan relations while a Japanese Young Leader had to contribute thoughts on
China-U.S. relations. A post-conference group assignment was designed to have Young
Leaders work together to assess the importance of U.S.-China-Japan track-two trilateral
meetings and give concrete and creative suggestions on how to improve trilateral
relations.

The program began with an opening dinner. Masashi Nishihara, President of
RIPS, gave welcoming remark. Young leaders took this opportunity to get to know each
other and mingle with senior scholars at the trilateral conference.

On April 1, the trilateral conference began. YLs were not just there as observers,
but they also were encouraged to contribute the next generation’s perspective to the
discussions. The first topic was China – Japan cooperation. A Japanese YL urged China
to act actively and positively toward the U.S.-Japan alliance. He noted China’s role as a
“responsible stakeholder” and suggested Japan rid itself of a deep-rooted “hedging”
mentality when it views trilateral relations. His view was echoed by a Chinese YL who
argued that China and Japan should overcome “old thinking” and seek more creative
cooperation on nontraditional security etc. A U.S. YL urged China and Japan to embrace
a “win-win” mentality in their bilateral relations. China and Japan should cooperate in
Africa to achieve a “win-win-win” model of development that helps Africans, too.

The second focus of discussion was the two “flashpoints” – the Korean Peninsula
and Taiwan – that will have profound influence on future trilateral relations. YLs held
heated discussions with senior presenters. Many YLs emphasized China’s positive role
in the Six-Party Talks while some YLs demonstrated concern about China taking
advantage of the multilateral mechanism for its own benefit instead of working for the
institutionalization of the mechanism in the long run.

YL discussions of Taiwan focused on the Taiwan presidential election, President-
elect Ma Ying-jeou’s (Kuomintang, KMT) future cross-Strait policy, and its implications

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for China-U.S.-Taiwan relations. U.S. YLs and participants agreed the U.S. wants
Taiwan and China to come together and build prosperous cross-Strait relations,
economically and politically demonstrating goodwill on both sides. One Chinese YL
supported Taiwanese efforts toward building democracy and is achievements so far. She
urged the mainland to learn to respect Taiwan, and to seek “win-win-win” cross-Strait
relations among China, U.S. and Taiwan. A Chinese YL pointed out that the dangers of
conflicts in this region were decreasing, yet U.S. arms sales to Taiwan still bother China.
She further recommended that the three parties seek more creative thinking to solve
current problems. Another Chinese YL emphasized that when dealing with Taiwan,
China should not only focus on “crisis management” but “opportunity management.”

On April 2, discussion focused on environmental security. All the Young Leaders
agreed that environmental degradation is a new and critical security issue. A Chinese YL
highlighted the role of civil society in helping the government to tackle environmental
problems, while bemoaning the difficulties and underdevelopment of China’s NGOs due
to the lack of government support.

In the discussion of the future strategic environment faced by the three countries,
a U.S. YL suggested that Young Leaders should go beyond a “paradigm shift” mentality
and learn to “forgive and forget” so that generational change can play a more positive
role in strengthening trilateral relations. A Chinese YL suggested that young leaders
should focus more on nontraditional issues and emphasize more culture exchange and
communications.

During the Young Leader wrap-up session after the conference on April 2,
discussion and debate were not limited to the topics of the senior level conference, but
expanded to include topics of concern for the younger generation, including China’s
media censorship, cooperation to build online knowledge, Japanese national identity,
U.S. national interest and future role in Asia, etc. Here are some key issues of concern
that were discussed in this session.

First, perceptions of China’s younger generation of Japan, the U.S. and the world.
A Chinese YL explained that media censorship has kept younger Chinese from acquiring
information and contributed to their misunderstanding of the outside world. The
ideology-laden “patriotism campaign” of the 1990s also contributed to a nationalist
“lens” through which Chinese young people perceive the world. A Japanese YL urged
younger Chinese and Japanese to increase exchanges and mutual understanding through
“common knowledge buildup” via the internet to bridge the asymmetrical information
flow.

A second issue was Japanese and Chinese perceptions of the U.S. role in East
Asia and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Some Japanese YLs expressed support for an active
U.S. role in Asia and they are also positive about rejuvenating the U.S.-Japan alliance.
They explained to Chinese YLs Japan’s goodwill when some Chinese YLs voiced
China’s deep-rooted concern and suspicion about whether this alliance is targeting China.
Chinese YLs also stressed that China welcomes the U.S. contribution to stability of the

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region. Most U.S. YLs emphasized the importance of positive and cooperative China-
Japan relations, which is also a U.S. interest. There was a consensus among all YLs on
the need to get over the old type of thinking. A U.S. YL applauded the Young Leaders
Program as a creative and effective measure to build confidence among the younger
generation in the region, which cultivates more moderate perspectives toward each other
among future leaders of this region.

3

10 Suggestions on How to Enhance Economic Security
and Japan-China-U.S. Relations
by Joni Caminos, Daisuke Hayashi, Fan Li,
Wakana Mukai, and Tony Wan

China, the U.S., and Japan should work together to enlarge their common interest.
There’s a lot the three countries can do on nontraditional security issues, while the efforts on
traditional security frequently halt under domestic and global pressure. We identified
opportunities for trilateral cooperation to improve economic security. All of these proposals
permit China, the U.S., and Japan to improve cooperation, at the government and civil level.

1. Society Solution: Social Entrepreneurs are doers, equipped with ideas and a long-term
vision as well as market finance, skills, and techniques. Social entrepreneurship is a process,
a new thing that changes people’s minds. The online community can easily connect cross
boarders. What’s more, state action like ODA tends to lack of stability as régimes change and
state interests are guided. However, social entrepreneurship is self-independent, thus
sustainable.

Social entrepreneurship is still a new concept for Japan and China; in the U.S., the concept is
well accepted among creative thinkers such as Bill Clinton and Bill Gates. People-to-people
links and exchange on this topic can be extremely useful for better understanding and
collaboration among the three countries.

The cost for a three-year project for 100 people: $500,000

2. Corporate Solution: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept whereby
organizations consider the interests of society by taking responsibility for the impact of their
activities on customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, communities, and the
environment in all aspects of their operations. This obligation extends beyond the statutory
obligation to comply with legislation and sees organizations voluntarily taking further steps
to improve the quality of life for employees and their families as well as for the local
community and society at large. 1

A good reference is the AIESEC model. The world’s biggest student organization, the main
program of AIESEC in Asia is the Ilternational Traineeship Exchange Program (ITEP).
AIESEC adopted the CSR concept in ITEP; trainees enrolled by AIESEC and companies
globally will have opportunities to promote CSR cooperation in a ‘foreign environment.’ For
example, AIESEC Shanghai has a lot of cooperation with AIESEC Tokyo since many

1
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corporate_social_responsibility
2
For example, Sato from Tokyo University applied for a traineeship at Sumitomo Company Shanghai, and passed
interviews by Sumitomo Company and AIESEC Tokyo. During the traineeship, culture exchange is another
important task for Sato. He should organize/attend the culture understanding seminar (CUS) held by AIESEC
Shanghai. See http://www.aiesec.org/AI

5

Japanese corporations have branches in Shanghai. AIESEC Shanghai charges 500 RMB from
each applicant and 1500 RMB from each corporation for each trainee accepted.

3. Government Solution A: Efforts to secure access to education and healthcare are the
foundation of sustainable development. Education also allows people the opportunity to
strive for economic satisfaction, while healthcare rids people of fears of expense of
treatment. A comparative study among China, Japan and, the U.S. can help put together
suggestions for future collaboration.

Several solutions can be proposed. First, at the primary education level, we should
encourage grass-roots exchange programs. Each school (if possible, supported by the board
of education) in each country dispatches or exchanges a delegate of teachers and students to a
partner school in the other countries. Teachers can be dispatched not only as an exchange but
also for training for an academic semester/year range. The host school can hold discussions
among the delegate and their own teachers/students in classrooms as well as in a public
forum. They can develop mutual understanding in education.

At the university level, we should make a more flexible exchange program such as the Asia-
Pacific Erasmus Program. Erasmus is a European education program in which university
students of EU member states can study and get credits in universities in other countries
within the EU. It can be also practical because the U.S. has traditionally encouraged foreign
students to study in the U.S. through the Fulbright and other programs. The Japanese
government is also trying to accept and increase the number of foreign students from China
and Asia. They are already trying to develop such exchanges to higher and more flexible
levels.

Third, healthcare and human security issues can also contribute to mutual understanding,
such as assistance in a disaster. One example of this is the Japanese offer of emergency aid
to the Sichuan Earthquake in China. Japan has a lot of experience with large earthquakes and
has the capacity to respond to such emergencies. It is reported that the Japanese dispatch of
rescue workers is changing anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese toward a more
amicable perception. The U.S. has also know-how to deal with wildfires. In this sense, those
three powers should have a joint training program on emergency aid.

4. Global Solution A: International tax system. This is a second redistribution among states.
The tax should be stored and managed in an international organization that is agreed by
every state party member.

5. Global Solution B: Regional bodies like ASEAN should build a cross-state economic
security mechanism as well as independent financial aid foundation to serve the people in
the region.

6. Global Solution C: People tend to unite when they confront devastating disasters, like
tsunamis, earthquakes, epidemic diseases, etc. International organizations, states, and social
groups put efforts together at that time. Disasters are an opportunity to form and implement
a fund raising commission, which should be advocated by former high officials and

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celebrities. This commission’s fund can be used to offer aid to the casualties as well as
infrastructure when needed.

7. Global Solution D: Regarding traditional security issues, the U.S., China, and Japan can
improve counter-terrorism cooperation, especially that aiming at nonstate actors. They
should establish a regular forum for information sharing on this issue. Moreover, although
there already exist important governmental initiatives such as the Asian Senior-level Talks on
Non-Proliferation (ASTOP) and seminars initiated by the Japanese government on export
controls (Asian Export Control Seminar), the U.S., China, and Japan can establish another
initiative aiming specifically at the issue of arms proliferation (both weapons of mass
destruction and conventional weapons) regarding the DPRK. This is an international concern,
yet starting from a small regional initiative would be effective, since the transport of weapons
can be stopped locally, especially where China and Japan exercise sovereign rights. Then,
they should expand such cooperation initiatives to more sensitive areas such as fighting
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, maritime cooperation, air and space security
cooperation, etc.

8. Sustainable Development Solution: In an era of rising global energy prices, Japan has set
the benchmark in energy efficiency. The U.S., Japan, and China should recognize the value
of trilateral dialogue on sustainable development and its impact on energy security, climate
change, and pollution-related health problems. Reducing energy consumption not only
protects the environment, but the economy as well. Through an exchange program, Japan
should work constructively with the U.S. and China to advance clean energy technologies.
Some of Japan’s innovative technologies include energy-efficient home appliances such as
low-energy televisions, refrigerators that buzz if the door is left open too long, machines that
convert hydrogen into electricity in order to heat water among others.

9. Solution related to recent events in China-Japan-US relations: The Tibet issue and
media coverage showed the mass media’s different standpoints in different countries. The
information receivers, especially the young people, can hardly discern the truth inside their
borders. How can governments enlarge the common interest, when citizens strongly
disagree with others? Can Chinese make friends with Japanese, American and the rest of the
international community even when we disagree with each other?

The YL program is a good testing ground; are we only making friends with people who
agree with us? If so, how do we learn to disagree without being disagreeable?

Suggestion 1: Workshop or simulation on better communication and conscience-building
among Young Leaders. Invite professional coach/coordinator to facilitate the workshop.
Cost: This is a very cost effective exercise that YL program organizers can run alongside the
regular program.

Suggestion 2: Independent ‘news station’ in three languages. (Chinese, Japanese, English)
The user can choose his/her own language to report on what he/she sees in the country they
live.

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Cost: This is also cost effective if we use the existing technology platform such as wiki and
if Young Leaders contribute on a volunteer basis.

10. YL program Solution in general: If the Pacific Forum YL program aim to promote
practical and innovative initiatives, the GIFT YL program (YLP) organized by the Global
Institute for Tomorrow is a good reference. 2 This program aims to challenge prevailing
perceptions, to expose participants to diverse cultures and different ways of thinking –
outside the classroom; beyond the boardroom; in those parts of the world that have been to
them just concepts of “elsewhere.” This is accomplished through a life-changing
experiential learning process where participants are immersed in community projects
carefully chosen for their strong links with globalization.

The YLP turns skilled minds to pressing globalization-related issues facing Asia. By
exposing participants to real issues, the program aims to encourage socially conscious,
globally minded decision-making. Each YLP works towards an outcome – a “business plan”
that lets the community take control of its future. In this way, leadership training is
combined with positive outcomes for individual communities.

The GIFT program is focusing on “making changes.” However, this might not fit with PF
YL program’s character or capacity. Pacific Forum needs to reconfirm the goal of YL
program: is it for ‘thinkers’ or ‘doers’?

If the PF YL program is focusing on supporting ‘thinkers,’ the St. Gallen Symposium (ISC) 3
might be a good model and good example for the YL program. The organizing method of
ISC serves better to encourage and gather new thinking from YLs. It holds one conference
annually on a certain topic, which is very general. Young people from all over the globe
write an essay on this topic and apply for the YL program. The symposium organizes a jury,
to select the 200 participants from all applicants and to announce an award to some
excellent contributions. The contribution by the YL is given recognition and discussion.

2
http://www.globalinstitutefortomorrow.org/global_young_leaders_programme
3
http://www.stgallen-symposium.org/

8

Young Leaders Assessment of and Suggestions
for the Trilateral Relationship
By Madoka Futamura, David Janes, Tetsuo Kotani,
Liu Lin, Jiyon Shin, and Tina Zhang

Significance of the trilateral relationship

There are major questions concerning the trilateral relationship. How will two close allies
with the “same” set of systems and values accommodate a bulky neighbor s destined to be
different? How will the biggest communist party-led country continue with reform and opening-
up in midst of serious misunderstanding and suspicion? How will an economic power seeking
bigger political and military rights balance its interests and mentality between an overbearing
ally and a once poor and weak neighbor that is fast developing and releasing its goodwill? How
will a superpower accept and manage a changing global geopolitical map in face of the many
new challenges both at home and abroad?

The answers to these questions will also affect attitudes of and relations among other
states. They are tremendous and fundamental questions to which the answers can establish
models for other relations and on which hinges the fundamental outlook of the future Asia-
Pacific region. The significance of trilateral relations is obvious: they shape the basic structure of
international relations in East Asia. So the “quality” of trilateral relations is extremely significant
for international relations in the region.

Characteristics of the Trilateral Relationship

Two main factors that shape international relations in Asia are the extent of U.S.
engagement with the region and the external behavior of China. Japan also plays an important
role by accepting the U.S. presence and through its economic power. Especially after the Cold
War, the relationship between China, Japan, and the United States has undergone profound
changes. The forces driving these changes are complex, and consist of geopolitical, economic,
security and nationalist components. The early 21st century has been and will continue to be an
era of dynamic changes for China and Japan, as well as for the rest of Asia. The changes provide
opportunities for all countries in the region, but at the same time they create friction in the status
quo that deserves scrutiny.

U.S.-Japan

The United States and Japan, because of domestic political transformations, changes in
the international security environment, and the rise of China, have been strengthening and
readjusting their alliance. It can be said that the alliance evolved to adapt to the new security

9

atmosphere, and to manage security threats both in the region and around the world. In the
foreseeable future, the U.S.-Japan alliance will continue to be strengthened due to the fact that
the U.S. is relying on the alliance to fight the war on terrorism and maintain its interests in East
Asia. As a result, the U.S. will pay more attention to the role of Japan. In the same line, Japan
also will continue utilizing the alliance to achieve its objective of being a “normal” country.
However, in the long run, Japan’s ambition may contradict one of the objectives of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, that is, to have Japan as a ‘manageable’ partner. This suggests that there is
potential that the future evolution of the alliance will not be smooth. Given the general mistrust
in Northeast Asia, Japan’s security policy development and possible change of its constitution
may alarm neighboring countries trigger an arms race.

China-Japan

China-Japan relations have been troublesome for most of the past decade. The two
countries have an impressive economic relationship; China’s trade with Japan in 2007 surpassed
U.S. trade with Japan for the first time since World War II. Nevertheless, due to the shifting
balance of power in East Asia, the relationship between China and Japan keeps deteriorating.
The history problem, the competition for East China Sea’s oil and gas resources, China’s rapid
military equipments modernization, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute and the Taiwan issue
thwarts progress in the Sino-Japan relationship. Former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi’s repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine damaged the already troubled relationship to the
freezing point.

After twists and turns, the exchanges of high-level visits since Shinzo Abe came to
power have helped “melt the ice” in the Sino-Japan relationship. The two countries plan to
establish a “strategic partnership of mutual benefit,” and enhance exchanges and cooperation in
various fields. Some signs of change were also present in May 2008, when Chinese President Hu
Jintao made a “warm spring trip” to Japan, the first visit to Japan of a Chinese president for 10
years. Yet, as long as China and Japan fail to solve the structural problems in their relationship,
they will continue to face deep-rooted challenges regardless of their willingness to create a more
stable relationship.

U.S.-China

Compared with U.S.-Japan and China-Japan relations, the Sino-U.S. relationship is much
more complicated. On the one hand, with the rise of China becoming an undeniable reality, the
U.S., trapped in the war on terrorism, needs China’s assistance and cooperation in solving
regional and global problems, such as countering terrorism, preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, etc. Also, the two
countries are becoming more interdependent in economics and trade. On the other hand, as the

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only superpower, the most important U.S. security objective in East Asia is keeping its influence.
So the U.S. views China’s rise as a great concern. The conflicting views on ideology, human
rights, and democratic values add more suspicions to U.S.-China relations. Based on these facts,
the U.S. has adopted a hedging policy toward China: that is, to encourage China to become a
“responsible stakeholder,” while simultaneously taking concrete military, economic, and political
measures to limit China’s influence in the region and preventing China from challenging U.S.
influence.

Key obstacles

1. Colliding interests in military, economy, environment, and energy-related fields.

Naturally, countries have their own national interests, and with the changing security
order in Northeast Asia, countries are concerned about China’s rise as it undermines the status
quo, whether it be in the economic, military, or energy fields, or in preserving the environment.
The fear of the unknown (how China will act in the future: benevolent power vs. selfish power)
inserts tension in the trilateral relationship and the region.

2. Different values, misunderstanding, intolerance, and the media

The fact that the U.S. and Japan share values regarding democratic governance and
capitalism, and the fact that China is governed by an elite communist party builds
misunderstanding into these relationships. Not knowing the counterpart’s system creates
suspicions, mistrust, and at times illogical dislike of the other. There is not enough willingness to
tolerate differences, but a simple eagerness to make the other more similar to themselves, or a
knee-jerk rejection of others’ points of views. Often biased media coverage of each country’s
policies, people, or topic gives a lasting and unfair impression of the other, resulting in more
misperceptions and nationalistic reactions.

3. Failure to resolve history issues, overall distrust

The history of the Cold War and colonialism lingers in Northeast Asia. The Japanese
government, emperor, prime ministers have repeatedly apologized but not to their neighbors’
satisfaction. Japan asks: How much is enough? The problem is that any military, trade, political,
resource or island related-disputes with Japan falls back on the apology issue and triggers
nationalistic sentiment, stalling progress in the relationship.

11

4. China’s inability to improve its global image

China also has capability to promote a positive image, and is unable to respond to biased
criticism effectively. This could be a product of the weak structure of China’s civil society that
could enhance China’s image, and help other countries better understand China.

Suggestions for Young Leaders’ Forum

Pacific Forum’s Young Leaders’ Program provides a platform for enhancing mutual
understanding and cooperation between promising professionals of the young generation of the
United States, China, Japan, and others around the world. It is in a meaningful and important
effort to overcome obstacles in the trilateral relationship. To make the program more effective,
we suggest:

(1) KNOWLEDGE SHARING

Participants of the YL Forum can circulate thought-provoking articles and books
concerning the U.S.-China-Japan relationship, or international relations in general, among
ourselves to share knowledge and initiate discussions. YL participants can also send their own
papers to each other to get constructive input.

(2) YLs ACADEMIC EXCHANGES

YLs can invite each other to conferences, seminars or workshops held by their own
institutions. YLs and Pacific Forum can invite local YLs to visit their institution and hold
discussions or practice field research with the staff there. This will be an economical way to
establish a foundation for friendship among different country members.

(3) ENHANCE SUPPORT FOR CHINESE CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGO DEVELOPMENT

YLs can write proposals to their organizations, publish essays to argue for more support
for civil society and NGO development in China. The content should focus on urging institutes
to devote more attention to joint programs, especially for young people in China, the U.S., and
Japan. These programs need to have a specific aim to narrow cultural differences among the
three countries, and should be realistic in conducting its projects.

(4) YL ALUMNI SYSTEM

Pacific Forum can establish an YL Alumni mechanism and organize a get-together every
four or five years to continue relations. Having a regular meeting for YLs is extremely important

12

to consolidate friendship, and ensure that the YL program has influence over time. To do this, a
reliable database to follow up on the whereabouts of YLs will be necessary, and to make an
assessment of the results of the YL program.

(5) CREATE A PROGRAM TO DEAL WITH HISTORY ISSUES

Any interested organization affiliated with YL activities can create a joint Center for the
Study of Historical Relations between Chin and Japan. The objective is not to simply analyze
history, but to study the cultural connections between China and Japan, such as during the Heian
period. The center could have a facility in China and Japan and scholars from both countries
could be at both locations. Joint publications would be encouraged which would form individual
friendships, but would remind a larger audience in both countries of the deep historical ties that
bind China and Japan. Another alternative could be finding an organization that has such a
program and establish ties with it and invite its staff as YLs.

(6) TOPICS OF SPECIFIC & SIGNIFICANT INTEREST

YLs can focus on ‘humanity,’ a universal subject that brings about understanding from
diverse fields of interests. Other contested issues can also be discussed, such as the role of
religion in modern society, energy security, environmental problems, the Taiwan issue, etc. For
the YL Forum, setting more concrete and specific topics for discussions, such as “is there a clash
of civilizations in contemporary world,” “how should the U.S. approach China on Tibet…”
would help. Brainstorming on broad issues like human security is necessary but giving YLs
more specific discussion topics in advance will help the program’s outcome.

(7) MORE READING LISTS PRIOR TO CONFERENCES

A more detailed reading and discussion list relevant to the conference will better prepare
YLs.

(8) A JOINT LIBRARY

Establish a joint library, an electric one if more convenient, to collect basic materials and
diverse perspectives on political, military, and economic issues in trilateral relations. The library
should have a clear focus. It can also organize lectures and seminars on specific issues.
Compiling all the reading lists for each YL conference and putting them online would be helpful.

13

(9) READ the ‘OPENING THE FUTURE–HISTORY TEXT BOOK’ JOINTLY PUBLISHED
IN JAPAN, KOREA, and CHINA.

Having the YLs read the joint-project history text book among the three countries in their
own language will help highlight how much progress has been made in terms of history. This
will highlight the importance of education in understanding history and contemporary times. YLs
can have a co-authored project to organize and express their thoughts on history issues.

(10) YLs OBLIGATION TO BRING MORE YL CANDIDATES

Making it an obligation for YLs to bring others who can contribute to the YL program is
crucial to keep the program going.

14

U.S.-Japan-China Relations:
Prospects for Deepening the Trilateral Partnership
By Leif-Eric Easley, Chin-Hao Huang,
Sachi Nagaoka, Greer Pritchett, and Ryo Sahashi

The United States, China, and Japan share an overarching desire: to maintain peace and
stability in East Asia. Though this end-goal may be the same, the modus operandi used to
achieve it can be quite different depending on the particular player. Nevertheless, one thing
seems certain; the fate of the region will rely largely on how well these three countries manage
their relationship. Therefore, creating the proper formula whereby the sometimes-contentious
power relations within Northeast Asia could be assuaged is of paramount importance.
Developing concrete solutions, as opposed to simply identifying problems, is the way to foster
and deepen trilateralism. Existing reports have put forward Track-I proposals for a Trilateral
Security Dialogue. The authors of this report endorse that idea and welcome progress on the
Track-I agenda. This report looks to contribute at the Track-II and III levels with cost-effective
recommendations that will especially affect the next generation of leadership in China, Japan and
the United States.

Significance of Trilateral Relations 1

Relations between China, Japan, and the United States have seen steady progress, with all
three sets of bilateral relationships becoming more amicable. Today, the trilateral partnership is
one of the most important factors for peace and stability in East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific
region. More specifically, the significance of China-Japan-U.S. relations draws its strength from
three key factors.

First, Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington’s hard economic interests and priorities take
precedence and bind them increasingly closer to one another. The statistics are familiar to most
observers following the trade and economic relationship between these three interdependent
economies. From 1993 to 2003, for example, two-way trade between China and Japan grew over
250 percent. To date, over 30,000 Japanese enterprises and joint ventures have been set up in
China, with an accumulated investment of nearly $60 billion. For Japan, the United States is
now its second largest trading partner, and Japan’s foreign direct investment in the U.S. totaled
$211 billion in 2005. On the U.S.-China front, economic relations (and the political debates that
follow) have intensified. To cite a few examples: China is one of the fastest growing export
markets for the United States, up over 300 percent in 10 years. China has also purchased over
$200 billion in Treasury instruments, which has helped keep interest U.S. rates low.

Combined, the three countries today share more than two-fifths of the world’s gross
domestic product (GDP) and are pivotal forces in driving global economic growth. At the same,
trade tensions have surfaced within all three sets of bilateral relationships. Recognizing that such
1
Economic data cited in this section available at: http://www.chinabalancesheet.org/;
http://www.ustr.gov/World_Regions/North_Asia/China/Section_Index.html and
http://www.ustreas.gov/initiatives/us-china/

15

disputes can be more effectively managed through dialogue and cooperation, each side has
stepped up the level of engagement in senior-level bilateral dialogues as well as on the
multilateral forum (such as the World Trade Organization dispute mechanism) to air differences,
and more importantly focus on constructive policy options to help move the debate forward.

Second, policymakers have come to realize that the trilateral partnership can be applied to
more effectively address regional security challenges. By and large, it is in the interest of
Beijing, Tokyo, and Washington to seek closer coordination to resolve regional conflicts as well
as to prevent hot spots from escalating. Rather than driving a wedge in the partnership, the latest
security situation in North Korea, for example, has drawn all three sides (within and outside the
six-party framework) to work together assiduously. Ongoing trilateral dialogue continues to
focus on denuclearization and preserving stability in the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, the
dialogue has also expanded on the sidelines to include such related issues as global
nonproliferation and disarmament as well as military transparency.

Maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait has also become an important source of
dialogue for all three sides. Owing to political sensitivities in all three capitals on the Taiwan
question, coordinated policy measures will be limited. As such, improvements in cross-Strait
relations will most likely result from strong political will and a resumption of constructive
dialogue between Beijing and Taipei. It will be important, however, for the other two key
stakeholders in the region to discourage Beijing and Taipei from taking unilateral steps that
could upset the status quo and to resolve the situation on peaceful terms.

Third, the significance of trilateral relations is also reflected in the three sides’ ability to
reach greater common ground in defining and tackling such transnational challenges as climate
change, disaster control, pursuing energy security, cross-border crime, the spread of new,
infectious diseases, and maritime security. Recent years have seen policymakers in Beijing,
Tokyo, and Washington increasingly working together under bilateral, trilateral, and
multilaterals framework within the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Obstacles in Trilateral Relations

Though the relationship between the three countries has been strengthened in recent
years, there remain stumbling blocks for solid trilateral cooperation among China, Japan, and the
United States. Inherent differences in political and economic development, cultural and
ideological values, and at times, divergent national interests, pose challenges. Sometimes,
campaigns arise in the U.S. and Japan from human rights camps and consumer groups on topics
such as food security, which target Chinese practices and fan Chinese feelings of victimization
and resentment. On the other hand, some Chinese diplomacy and development practices,
particularly in Africa, have irritated U.S. politicians and planners, who urge China to become a
responsible stakeholder on the world stage. Further, as China’s economy continues to rise and its
military expenditures increase, the Washington and Tokyo defense communities remain
concerned by Beijing’s apparent lack of transparency.

As stated above, differences in national interests, or at the very least, different priority
hierarchies, might also hinder trilateral cooperation. In matters relating to global governance

16

affairs, such as climate change, China still wants to behave as a member (and a leader) of
developing nations (or economies in transition), which can place it at odds with certain G8
initiatives. Moreover, as the three capitals work to carve out spheres of influence in the region
and over the global agenda, gaps in perceptions rooted in different interests become more
apparent. For example, Washington and Tokyo have not yet coordinated an approach to
ASEAN-based regionalism, such as the East Asia Summit and future community building, with
Beijing.

The lack of experience of each government to foster a trilateral approach to problem-
solving and opportunity maximization could prevent bureaucrats from developing a trilateral
framework that might ameliorate existing obstacles. While the number of trilateral Track II
conferences has been increasing since the 1990s, the three capitals have failed to create any
official Track I framework. Therefore, current and future policy specialists at the working level
have not learned to approach policy problems using the trilateral lens. So, as their predecessors
did, they tend to approach issues through a framework of bilateral arrangements and multilateral
institutions. The U.S. and Japan have a formal alliance, while both Sino-American and Sino-
Japanese relations have their own strong historical contexts; this might bias professionals and
politicians from recognizing the efficiency of trilateral approaches.

On the cross-Strait issue, the U.S., China, and Japan approach Taiwan from very different
historical standpoints making it exceedingly difficult for the three governments to set the same
ultimate goal for the island. It is true that all key players want to maintain the status quo along
the Strait (if only temporarily for some), and ideally would like to avoid getting involved in a
military solution to solve this situation. Additionally, common motivations and interests to “keep
the peace” have pushed Washington and Tokyo to use leverage on Taiwan to not stray too close
to any perceived redlines, but it would cause political backlash in both capitals to commit
themselves beyond their communiqués in the 1970s.

Recommendations

Since this region is ripe with both opportunities and obstacles, the following
recommendations can allay some underlying mistrust between these three countries and develop
habits of maximizing shared interests.

1. Pacific Forum Young Leaders one-day seminar with Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies (APCSS) fellows on regional confidence building measures and transnational
cooperative networks.

The APCSS offers an “Advanced Security Cooperation Course.”2 The course brings
together “mid-level leaders from 30 countries” to develop cooperative networks and policy
solutions to address “terrorism, ethnic conflict, poor governance, widening socioeconomic gaps,
and natural disasters...longstanding acrimony between some regional neighbors and ever-
increasing competition for energy sources.” 3

2
http://www.apcss.org.
3
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49469.

17

Pacific Forum YLs could meet with APCSS fellows to discuss what they learned from
the Advanced Security Cooperation Course and how they plan to apply it. This could help YLs
understand what regional militaries are focusing on and challenges they face in implementation.
YLs would also see U.S. PACOM’s CBMs in action.

The meeting could serve as a pre-conference day for YLs, scheduled prior to a Pacific
Forum conference in Hawaii. This would mitigate the cost associated with the endeavor since
the YLs would already be in town. Therefore the only additional costs for running this seminar
would be one-day of meals and one extra hotel night, approximately $3,000 in total.

2. Language training scholarship for translation of key policy articles.

Future policy makers and analysts in the U.S. and Asia are in need of enhanced language
skills to close gaps in communication, perception, and understanding, increase the quality of
exchanges, and better focus dialogue on workable policy solutions.

A scholarship program could be established to supplement the funding of students of
foreign policy and international relations. The scholarships would provide translation workshops
for students who are developing language skills and offer them mini-grants for translating key
policy articles from English into Chinese, Japanese or Korean and from Asian languages to
English (for articles not already covered by Open Source Center services). 4 The program would
provide a valuable public good to the broader academic and policy communities and would build
the language ability and policy knowledge of the next generation of experts.

The scholarship program could be administered as a supplement to the Foreign Language
and Area Studies (FLAS) Program 5 or the Fulbright Program 6 to minimize administrative costs.
A pilot year of the program could begin with 40 students who would receive workshop training
(10 in Washington, 10 in Tokyo, 10 in Beijing, 10 in Seoul) and $2,000 each for translating two
policy articles (one to and another from native language). Estimated cost for the pilot year is
$250,000.

3. U.S.-Japan-China-India conference in Delhi on “rising powers, building trust.”

Senior participants and YLs from China, Japan, and the U.S. often talk about the
importance of their country’s relations with India and the need for trilateral coordination beyond
Northeast Asia. A conference held in India could greatly advance these interests and provide
new comparative perspectives on addressing suspicions and uncertainties related to the
emergence of great powers.

Pacific Forum (with RIPS and CFISS) could organize a conference in India on
“comparing issues for rising powers” focused on challenges for building trust. Possible
institutions to collaborate with in India include the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

4
http://www.opensource.gov.
5
http://www.ed.gov/programs/iegpsflasf.
6
http://www.iie.org/Template.cfm?section=Fulbright1.

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(IDSA) and the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi. 7 The conference would be the first to
bring a full delegation of Young Leaders from India together with YLs from China, Japan, and
the U.S. – an excellent opportunity for networking and to add a new dimension to innovative
policy approaches.

The cost for organizing the conference would depend on the size of delegations and the
ability of the host institution to hold down local costs, but a tentative estimate is $150,000.

4. U.S.-Japan-ROK-China Young Leaders conference in Okinawa to produce a book on ‘next
generation views’ of alliance transformation and the role of U.S. bases in Asia.

There is a lack of understanding among next generation security specialists about the role
U.S. bases play in regional security. The structure of the U.S. force presence in the region is in
flux so Chinese experts have questions about the future posture of USFJ and USFK. Japanese
and Korean experts have important comparative views on strategic flexibility, host nation
support, base-society relations, and alliance management.

A Young Leaders conference on Okinawa would be an excellent opportunity to address
these issues. YLs would visit U.S. facilities on the island as well as important memorials and
civic offices. The YL group would likely be small (perhaps 12 participants) and would be
divided into pairs to outline a chapter-length paper on one of six topics such as 1) Security
contributions of ally-supported bases in East Asia; 2) Historical and sovereignty issues
concerning U.S. bases in Japan and Korea; 3) “Not in my backyard” (NIMBY) politics and base
realignment; 4) Chinese perspectives on alliance and force transformation; 5) Lessons-learned
from differences in U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliance management; 6) Prospects for mil-mil
exchange and operational cooperation between the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and China.

After the conference, the chapters would be completed for an edited volume overseen by
an expert such as Dr. Shelia Smith (who would write a brief introduction and conclusion) and
published as a CSIS book. Estimated cost for the Okinawa trip: $50,000.

5. A Young Leaders report on China, Japan and U.S. ODA policies toward Africa.

There is little coordination among China, Japan, and the U.S. in aid policies toward
Africa. Not only do these national programs lack coordination, there is also a lack of
information as to where efforts to support development, human security and good governance
overlap.

For the next Pacific Forum trilateral meeting, several Young Leaders (two from the U.S.,
two from Japan, two from China) could write a combined/comparative report on their countries’
ODA policies toward African nations, with the aim of identifying synergies not yet pursued.

The report can provide concrete suggestions concerning future cooperation among efforts
by the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the Forum on China-

7
http://www.idsa.in; http://www.cprindia.org.

19

Africa Cooperation, and USAID. 8 The report could be published as a volume of Issues and
Insights and would not involve any significant extra costs beyond what is already budgeted for a
U.S.-Japan-China trilateral security conference.

6. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) would augment their bilateral cooperation programs
that address transnational problems such as environmental issues and infectious diseases
by inviting a team of Chinese Official Development Assistance (ODA) experts to
participate.

After Prime Minister Miyazawa and President Clinton declared “the Common Agenda
for Cooperation in Global Perspective” in July 1993, JICA and USAID started a joint ODA
program to tackle infectious diseases and environmental issues in developing countries such as
the Philippines, Bangladesh, Zambia, Tanzania, and Mexico. This bilateral partnership could be
developed into a trilateral cooperation mechanism to tackle transnational problems in developing
countries. As JICA and USAID have developed this official exchange program in 1994, adding
Chinese ODA experts, at least for the short-term, could be a good starting point to develop norms
of behavior and cooperation that could deepen this trilateral relationship between these three
countries.

This recommendation wouldn’t require significant funding. Rather, the U.S., Japan, and
China would work out a cost-sharing arrangement by which the Chinese ODA experts would
participate in the project. Costs would include travel, food, and lodging; these expenditures
should be fairly minimal and not cost prohibitive.

7. An internet course on U.S.-Japan-China trilateral relations among universities in the three
countries.

There is a lack of awareness about the importance and potential of trilateral cooperation
among university students in Japan, China, and the U.S. Three universities could be given grants
to offer a joint course on trilateral relations. The three classes would interact via
teleconferencing and be given the same assignments.

Veterans of the Pacific Forum YL program could help facilitate the courses. Students
would collaborate over a common website and produce a public (online) product illuminating
differences in how students of the three countries learn about and envision the future of trilateral
relations. Professor Ken Jimbo (a YL alumnus from the CSCAP process) is already coordinating
a U.S.-Japan-Korea distance-learning course 9 and could be asked to lead this trilateral effort.

Universities have most of the equipment needed, so funding would only be necessary to
cover logistical issues, a common website platform and provide some financial incentive for
universities to include the program in their curriculum. Start-up costs are thus estimated at
$50,000.

8
http://www.ticad.net; http://english.focacsummit.org; http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/
9
http://dislecture.nuts-choco.com/en_index.html.

20

8. Instructors from three universities in Japan, China, and the U.S. could build a trilateral
network to jointly prepare for a course on trilateral relations.

This would provide an invaluable opportunity for instructors to collaborate on teaching
methodologies, syllabus design, reading selections, etc. By bringing the instructors together, it
might help ensure that each of the country’s perspectives is given a voice within the course. This
initiative would help to develop best practices to train students to be trilateral specialists.

Capacity-building amongst the course’s instructors is essential for the program’s success.
Sometimes, new courses dealing with broader regions and topics rely on regional specialists
who, in actuality, focus on a single country. This can lead to lack of coordination and
shortchange the course’s aim: taking a comprehensive look at each country in the triangle.
Instructors in Japan, China, and the U.S. should be funded to collaborate on effective methods to
make students understand the significance of the trilateral approach.

This collaboration would not only deepen trilateral networks between instructors in
today’s generation, but would motivate future generations to be trilateral specialists.

Capacity-building among the course instructors would require at least a three-year
funding cycle for them to develop good teaching methodologies. In addition to the start-up costs
we suggest in recommendation six, we should also incentivize instructors to participate in this
project by offering short- to mid-term (three months or more) research opportunities in other
countries so that they may expand their regional expertise. Therefore, first-year costs would be
approximately $30,000, ($10,000 per three months for three instructors from each university).

9. Japan should collaborate with the U.S. and China to implement a training program for
peacebuilding operations in Asia.

The current half-year program allows Asian trainees to work together to learn
peacebuilding methods both at academic institutions, and in the field. Having all three countries
participating jointly would contribute to confidence building in the region.

The existing program is called the “Terakoya” pilot program, which the Japanese
government started last September. 10 In this program, Asian trainees are required to complete
course work at the Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center followed by on-the-job training at field
offices of international organizations and NGOs in war-torn countries such as East Timor and Sri
Lanka. Trilateral partnership for implementing this program could be expanded to address post-
conflict transnational issues such as refugee repatriation and tribal reconciliation.

Expanding upon the existing program would not require considerable additional funds.
The main expenditures for the U.S. and China would be providing the resources to help their
respective training institutions receive trainees of the program.

10
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/symposium0803-s.html

21

10. Pacific Forum Young Leaders could help connect civilian disaster relief agencies and
organizations between the three countries.

The need to enhance trilateral partnership for nontraditional security threats has been
witnessed on many occasions. Disaster relief and the accompanying humanitarian aid have often
been specifically highlighted as a “safe place” to start this type of cooperation. However, there
has been a lack of follow through to provide a concrete list of specific institutions. The work of
PF Young Leaders could help fill this void. Young Leaders would research the backgrounds and
activities of civilian disaster relief agencies and organizations to assess their financial resources,
scope of assistance, political influences, perceived efficacy, etc. Research conducted by Young
Leaders can be used to identify which organizations in Japan, the U.S., and China could
coordinate efforts. This report could be published on-line, thus reducing publishing costs. The
report would be made accessible to users upon registration, but there would be no subscription
fee. By requiring users to register, Pacific Forum could create a database of interested parties.

11. Trilateral Track II dialogues examining defense white papers.

Discussing defense white papers in a Track II setting would allow government officials,
academics, policy makers, and experts to discuss this important issue free from official
constraints. They could engage in frank discussions, build trust and mutual confidence, and help
promote enhanced transparency with regard to military expenditures and defense postures.

These dialogues could be held as soon as a new White Paper is published, and the
location could rotate between the three countries. These Track II dialogues could produce a
jointly authored report that would incorporate the unique perspectives of all three countries.

The cost of these meetings would depend on the size of delegations and host institution’s
ability to hold down costs, but a tentative estimate is $40,000 per meeting.

Conclusion

How can the relationship between the U.S., China, and Japan be bolstered to ensure
regional peace and security and diminish mistrust and the danger of miscalculation? The
recommendations offered here offer new options for linking future policy-makers, academics,
practitioners, and government officials who manage relations in Northeast Asia. Our
recommendations are cost effective and implementable, and could make significant inroads in
forging a trilateral partnership. Instead of relegating this paper to the ever-growing pile of reports
with “good ideas,” relevant actors in all areas of trilateral relations can work to turn these ideas
into reality.

22

Japan-U.S.-China Trilateral Cooperation:
Back to Basics and Moving Beyond
By Raymund Jose G. Quilop,
Aki Mori, and Dewardric McNeal

Relations among the U.S., Japan, and China remain the cornerstone of the East Asian
security environment. The kind of relationship each of these three states maintains with each
other determines to a great extent the stability or instability of East Asia as well as the Asia-
Pacific. A cooperative trilateral relationship is desired and essential.

Several key considerations make this problematic. First, each actor is in transition. The
U.S. remains the only superpower, although, it may feel that it is on a decline. Japan has been
seeking for a broader role in the global arena, but domestic opinion toward the kind of power
Japan should be remains divided. China’s economic, political, and military influence has been
expanding but its future trajectory remains uncertain.

Second, bilateral relations between two of the three states are also in transition, which
affects their trilateral relationship. For example, the U.S. does not want to see a deterioration of
the Sino-Japanese bilateral relationship, as this could spark nationalist feelings in the citizens of
both states. Yet, the U.S. does not also want to see too close a tie between Japan and China,
which could result in the U.S. being excluded from the equation.

Back to Basics

Observers usually point to building mutual trust and confidence among the three players
as the first key step in a stable trilateral relationship among the three. Building trust and
confidence is not the solution to all challenges that the three face in their trilateral relationship.

Furthermore, considering that each of the three players is in transition and could be
described as in search of an appropriate role in the region, it is more basic that each needs to
come to grips with their individual roles and capacities. Only by having a clear grasp of each
place in East Asian security can a meaningful partnership among them could emerge.

As noted, no state seeks a deterioration in the bilateral relationship in which it is not
included. Ironically however, there are also worries about relations becoming too intimate, as
there are fears of exclusions.

This is something the third state has to resolve by itself. Being comfortable with the
cooperation between the other two players is a matter of national choice for the third party in the
trilateral relationship. Of course, the two other states need to assure the third state and allow it to
develop a sense of comfort and confidence. It is in this context that building trust and confidence
plays an important role, particularly because these seem to be lacking specifically in regard to
defense and military-related issues.

23

Moving Beyond

There is also the need to move the trilateral relationship to a higher level. The first step
would be to have regular high-level strategic dialogue among political and administrative leaders
of the three states. The current track-two trilateral dialogue involving nongovernmental
institutions should be complemented with a track-one (official) dialogue.

The development of official dialogue mechanisms could be facilitated by the
participation of government officials from each of the three states in the current track-two.
Participation of these officials could lead to the recognition of the need and utility of a similar
dialogue at the official level. Their exposure to and involvement in a track-two undertaking
would make them more receptive to the idea of a track-one mechanism.

These dialogue channels could become a venue for high- and official-level consultations
in the field of politics, security and economics. A meaningful dialogue exchange particularly in
regard to the sensitive issues of military capability and defense spending could also take place.

Finally, these dialogue mechanisms would identify common interests and thrust among
the three states, specifically in improving economic relations and enhancing their security
partnership.

Proposals that look improving the relationship through nontraditional areas should also
pursued. One nontraditional security issue that each country shares an interest and concern is
clean energy technology. This has profound implications for the climate change agenda and can
benefit the entire global community. Or, the three countries could help China develop a domestic
framework for civil society. This could prove useful to Beijing and would help the U.S. and
Japan to become closer to the Chinese public.

Elevating trilateral cooperation to a higher level would mean having the three states work
closely together in ensuring East Asian security, peace, and stability. Beyond playing the largest
roles in a secure, peaceful and stable East Asia, they also benefit most from such a strategic
environment.

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The Significance of U.S.-Japan-China Trilateral Relations
and Suggestions for the Young Leaders Program
By Shanshan Wang

U.S.-China-Japan trilateral relations are one of the most trilateral relationships in the
world. The three countries are the world’s biggest economies, the biggest consumers of energy,
and possessors of the largest and most advanced militaries in the world. The U.S. and China are
nuclear powers and holders of permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council; Japan
and the U.S. are two of the world’s most technologically advanced economies and two of the
world’s largest providers of development assistance. The U.S. and China are directly involved in
the two of the world’s most tense flashpoints – the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula:
Japan, by virtue of geography and its alliance commitments to the U.S., is indirectly involved in
both as well. Individually, each of the three countries has an extraordinary impact on regional
and global developments; if they work together that influence is greatly magnified. More
significantly, a refusal or an inability to cooperate will have equally powerful consequences.

Nevertheless, deep embedded mistrust, unwillingness, and inability to cooperate hamper
the process of building effective trilateral relations despite the call for strengthened “trilogue” by
pundits from the three countries. Therefore, in the first part of this paper, I identify the problems
and challenges for trilateral relations, followed by suggestions from a younger generation
perspective. In the second part, I focus on how to strengthen the Young Leaders Program.

Problems in U.S.-China-Japan Trilateral Relations and Solutions

Given the significance of the three countries and their trilateral relations, their relations
will shape the future of the Asia-Pacific region and the world. However, general mistrust exists
among the three countries. This composes the first and foremost problem in trilateral
cooperation.

China’s booming economy combined with a unique political system has posed structural
contradictions toward the other two countries. Suspicion of China’s intentions is easily in under
this context. The irrational nationalism demonstrated by overseas Chinese during the Olympic
torch relay has exacerbated this sentiment and damaged China’s image abroad. However, a
gradual warming of Sino-Japanese relations is gaining momentum with a Japanese rescue team
offering help with the deadly Sichuan earthquake and military exchanges between the two
countries. With the KMT leader Ma Ying-jeou taking office in Taiwan and direct charter flights
becoming a reality, the risk of cross-Strait violent conflicts has been decreased, which also
benefits Sino-U.S. relations.

That said, suggestions for solving this problem include:

• Increase military-to-military exchanges among the three countries. For example,
invite junior representatives from the Chinese military to observe U.S.-Japan joint
military exercises;

25

• Taking the opportunity provided by the Sichuan earthquake and the open attitude of
China’s government toward foreign aid and media, propose a joint disaster relief and
management exercise among the three countries at a venue in China;

• The Chinese government should devote more energy to its overseas image building
and create an unbiased media environment domestically to help the Chinese people to
construct an objective mentality about the international image of China;

• The rise of China and the expanding space a rising China seeks in the international
system requires fundamental attitude changes in the U.S. and Japan. Both the U.S.
and Japan should be aware of the high potential for misunderstanding and devote
more energy to public diplomacy in China. The U.S. embassy in Beijing should
expand its education function and join hands with the Japanese embassy to hold more
cultural events to increase Chinese people’s understanding of the significance of the
U.S.-China-Japan trilateral relations;

Second, all three countries have national sensitivities. A better understanding of this will
help improve trilateral relations. More cooperation can be achieved with an objective
understanding of national perspectives. Efforts should be made on all sides to try walking in the
others’ shoes.

As for the U.S., the priority of the new government will be ending the war in Iraq,
fighting terrorism, and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The damage
done by the Bush administration’s unilateralism must be fixed. Domestically, dealing with
climate change, rejuvenating the sagging economy, and stabilizing soaring oil prices have put
great pressure for the government. In Japan, aging is posing great challenges. In the regional
arena, a nuclear North Korea and a rising China contribute to feelings of insecurity of Japan.
Finally, as for China, domestic problems such as rampant corruption, widening gap between the
rich and poor, an underdeveloped social security system, high-level energy consumption and
environmental pollution may pose greater challenges than external pressure.

Based on this rough analysis of the three countries’ fragility, my suggestions for
improving the trilateral relations include:

• The U.S. should encourage and help cultivate Sino-Japanese cooperation in Asia to
share the burden of maintaining regional stability. The U.S. should serve as a broker
for the two to improve mutual trust by holding bilateral/trilateral dialogue or
increasing financial support for academic exchange programs in the U.S.;

• Energy efficiency is another field for cooperation. The three countries could establish
joint laboratories to develop new energy sources. Japan should share advanced
technology of environmental protection with both China and the U.S. to deal with the
common threat of environment deterioration; a focus on the issues (i.e., climate
change) instead of the actors themselves may help further progress. In other words,
focus on what is right and not who is right.

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• Horizontal cooperation among domestic agencies based on function should be
strengthened. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice could establish
operational initiatives with its Chinese and Japanese counterparts. Horizontal
cooperation will help build capacity for good governance in China and can serve as a
driving force for China’s domestic reform.

Suggestions for Future Young Leaders Program (China-U.S.-Japan)

• Use social networking websites such as Facebook/MySpace/YouTube to establish
trilateral YL-only forum to increase interaction among young people from the three
countries;

• Hold annual conference of trilateral Young Leaders in Beijing/Shanghai,
Tokyo/Osaka or Washington DC/Honolulu in cooperation with local media to
increase awareness of the next generation’s perspectives on trilateral cooperation;

• Establish a Trilateral YL Fellowship for applicants from China, the U.S., and Japan;
qualified candidates should be young people (newly college graduate or junior
professionals) that have never traveled to either of the other two countries.

For example, a qualified Chinese applicant would have just graduated from a Chinese
accredited institution or college and have never traveled to U.S. or Japan. This could
be a one-year-long fellowship combined with residence at Pacific Forum (3 months)
and field study in the other countries’ (China’s remote rural areas or Japanese
southern islands included) The Fellowship could be co-funded by the three countries
educational ministries;

• Build up Trilateral Young Leaders Initiative along with each conference-based
Young Leaders Program and include a chapter of Trilateral Next Generation
Perspectives in each conference’s executive summary;

• Invite more Chinese NGO people to get involved in the Young Leaders program;
they don’t have to be present at each conference, but there should be effort to get
more NGOs posted on YL events and getting more Chinese NGO people on the
mailing list.

Suggestions for Future Young Leaders Program
(YL Program in General)

• Establish a Facebook/Gmail/YouTube Young Leaders Group and appoint an
administrative officer to manage the online Young Leaders database; This
administrative officer can shift among the Young Leaders;

• Register an Idealist.org account and put ads for the Young Leaders Program there to
have more publicity for Young Leaders activities;

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• Strengthen the leadership role of U.S. Young Leaders (given their language ability)
and further institutionalize the program;

• Set YL project awards for each group assignment to elevate the team work spirit of
teams;

• Organize more on-site/in-depth field study of the conference host country; For
example, use host YLs to introduce the YL group to the local academic community.
For instance, bring the whole YL group to a local university’s classroom and have
candid exchange of views with peers.

• Regarding the conference-based Young Leaders program, invite a volunteer senior
leader to be the mentor/advisor of the Young Leaders only project (There has been
passionate YL “huggers” among the old folks…)

• Strengthen connections and information sharing with relevant well-established
similar Young Leaders program, such as the Asia Pacific Leadership Program, the
Global Youth Forum, etc.

• Improve the quality of the Young Leaders Newsletter and invite Young Leaders to
contribute with some moderate reward;

• Better explain the purpose of each program and examples of expected results
(“deliverables”). What type of solutions, parameters, etc should participants come up
with?

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Strategic Goals in Japan, U.S., and China Relations
By Brian Cathcart

How do you see the relationship between China and Japan?

The Sino-Japanese relationship is fraught with contradictions. Japan preaches a
nonnuclear, peace policy but is protected by the world’s only superpower. China claims to be a
developing country but has the world’s third largest economy, with nuclear weapons and a
rapidly increasing defense budget. Its lack of transparency leads many to wonder about its
political future, contributing to distrust between it and Japan and the West.

Japan and China’s relationship goes back thousands of years, suggesting a familiarity
they lack when compared with either country’s relations with the United States. This century will
be the first where both countries are powers, providing an opportunity for cooperation.

They could be both said to be more allies (in different forms) with the U.S. than each
other. It is hard to imagine a China-Japan alliance trying to stop U.S. action. More likely, the
U.S. can manipulate its relationships with both and therefore with each other. Plainly Sino-
Japanese relations are not an obstacle to the realization of U.S. national interests.

Japan and China are each other’s trading partners. Despite this, politically relations have
been cold. Relations have warmed up, and there is much potential for cooperation on
nontraditional security issues such as global warming, health, and terrorism.

But historical issues between the two countries could flare up, enhance nationalism in
China (perhaps anti-American or anti-Japanese sentiment) and disrupt the supply of goods to the
U.S. The U.S. wants to maintain stability in order for goods to be delivered to the U.S. and
export markets to remain open. Terrorist threats and “rogue states” also need to be engaged or
contained to prevent attack or something less than that.

At the moment, Sino-Japanese relations do not harm the environment, but better relations
could increase trade, economic interdependence, and better chances for social justice and other
forms of human security. As Japanese and Chinese strive to be leaders, they will continue to
collide in East Asia.

What should be done to strengthen relations between the three?

Increased communication, strategically planned, is one option. Explanations of distrust,
more transparency, and less arrogance would ease relations. Practical confidence-building
measures at the middle and high levels could help reduce tensions as well. Identification of
common goals and practical steps for success could enhance real partnerships. A medium for
solving issues would go a long way in preventing a crisis. Resolving issues with the DPRK and
Taiwan would also create a foundation for a true alliance.

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China’s Move to Multilateralism
Trilateral Mechanisms Now Vital for Regional Security
By Leif-Eric Easley

For those with an ear for East Asian security, recent years involved North Korean alarm
bells and an occasional whistle over Taiwan. The discernable hissing in the background was the
sound of regional heavyweights China and Japan blowing off steam. Chinese historical
resentments concerning Japan and Japanese fears of a rising China simmered over with the
combined heat of Japan’s moves on history (including Yasukuni Shrine visits, patriotic
education) and Chinese military provocations (including submarines in Japanese waters, anti-
satellite test). Japan pursued a more assertive values-based diplomacy disliked by Beijing, and
China continued a massive military modernization program disconcerting to Tokyo. Anti-
Japanese protests covered Chinese cyberspace and sometimes city streets, while suspicions of
China filled Japanese airwaves and bookshelves. Beijing boycotted high-level contacts with
Tokyo and multilateral efforts for East Asian security were seriously constrained.

Over the past months, Japan-China relations have pulled back from the brink. High-level
meetings have resumed, the demonization of the other in domestic politics has toned down, and
prospects for multilateral cooperation are brighter. Seeing Japan-China relations improve from
the depths of 2006 is a positive development for the region and for the United States. The U.S.
has strong interests in stability and avoiding a Japan-China rivalry that would get in the way of
Washington’s productive relations with both Tokyo and Beijing. 1 But China-Japan relations are
far from being in the clear.

For the first time in modern history, both China and Japan are strong and influential
countries. The Japan-China relationship is complex, involving deep economic interdependence,
security dilemma dynamics, and nationalist frictions. The mutual trust necessary to prevent the
relationship from spiraling out of control does not yet exist. Current calls for cooperation in both
Tokyo and Beijing are genuine and constructive, but the causes of recent tensions rest just below
the surface.

The reason most often cited for the rebound in Japan-China relations is the change of
leadership in Japan. With his nationalist credentials, Shinzo Abe could avoid visiting Yasukuni
Shrine (along the lines of the old adage “only Nixon could go to China”) and the current prime
minister, Yasuo Fukuda, is much more conciliatory toward China than Abe or Junichiro
Koizumi. But the change in Japanese diplomacy is more a change in style than in substance.
Japan’s concerns about China have not changed, nor have its plans for dealing with those
concerns via regional engagement, a more robust and assertive foreign and security policy, and a
reinforced alliance with the United States.

The more dynamic national actor is China. China is not only economically rising,
upgrading its military apace, and facing significant social changes that will demand uncertain
political adjustments. Beijing is also reworking the concepts on which it bases its foreign policy.
1
Leif-Eric Easley, “United States SAVI Interests in East Asia: Stability, Access, Values, Influence, and Averting Sino-Japanese
Rivalry,” Issues and Insights, Vol. 6, No. 19 (December 2006), pp. 17-21.

31

What is often missing from discussions about the future of Japan-China relations is just how
significantly China’s foreign policy is changing.

This paper observes and examines why China’s foreign policy discourse is moving from
its traditional advocacy of multipolarity and paying greater attention to multilateralism.
Recognizing current opportunities but also enduring limits to overlapping national interests, the
paper suggests that multilateral security cooperation in East Asia could be best pursued via
trilateral cooperation.

First, it helps to be clear about the difference between multipolarity and multilateralism.
Multipolarity describes a global distribution of power where major countries share roughly equal
influence. Multilateralism is a means for addressing global problems based on the cooperation
of multiple countries. One does not necessarily indicate or cause the other, but the relative
emphasis of these concepts tells much about China’s changing approach to international affairs.

The Chinese foreign policy discourse about multipolarity goes back to Mao Zedong’s call
for developing countries to rise up against capitalist nations. During the Cold War, multipolarity
provided a competing vision to the power politics of the Soviet Union and United States. As the
Cold War ended, arguments about multipolarity were aimed against the lone superpower’s post-
Tiananmen efforts to “contain” China.

Even after relations between China and the United States improved, multipolarity
remained an important concept for advocating the “democratization of international relations”
(国际惯系民主化 guojiguanxi minzhuhua). China’s would-be democratic international order
places legitimacy with the United Nations, where China wields great influence. China’s Foreign
Ministry website explains the theory that “multipolarization on the whole helps weaken and curb
hegemonism and power politics, serves to bring about a just and equitable new international
political and economic order and contributes to world peace and development.” 2

Polarity has been an obsession of realist studies of international relations for decades, and
there is still no consensus on what global configuration of power is most stable. Factors other
than polarity – such as international institutional constraints and who wields power for what –
matter a great deal. But much history and many scholars suggest that all else being equal, a
multipolar world verges on war as major countries compete for advantage.

Multilateralism appears a safer bet for curbing power politics and contributing to peace
and development. The relative power concerns of multipolarity imply zero-sum competition,
whereas multilateralism recognizes the challenges and opportunities of global interdependence.
When countries act upon shared interests and put aside differences to address transnational
issues, better policy outcomes are possible. Of course, multilateral talk is easier than multilateral
results. Nonetheless, a significant change is underway in China’s foreign policy as the discourse
of multilateralism overtakes that of multipolarity.

2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s View on the Development of Multi-
polarity,” Nov. 15, 2000; http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjwt/gjzzyhy/2594/2595/t15139.htm.

32

A search in Chinese reveals that “multipolarity” (多极化 duojihua) is still featured on the
Chinese Foreign Ministry website, but references to “multilateralism” (多边主义 duobian zhuyi)
are increasing in official papers and speeches. Meanwhile, a full text search of Chinese
academic and policy journals from 2000 to 2007 shows a gradual decline in discussion of
multipolarity and a dramatic increase for multilateralism.

There are at least six notable reasons why multipolarity appears of waning importance in
the Chinese foreign policy discourse.

First, global empirical trends defy old debates about polarity. The continued strength of
the United States does not fit traditional concepts of multipolarity. At the same time, the world
is too interdependent and other powers too influential to label the international system as
unipolar.

Second, China is benefiting greatly from the stable international environment defined
largely by the United States as the sole superpower. Chinese scholars point out that globalization
under “one superpower and several great powers” (一超多强 yichao duoqiang) is allowing China
to focus on economic development and domestic reforms.

Third, China’s weight in international affairs has dramatically increased and Beijing is
about to host the summer Olympics. A discourse on multipolarization is no longer needed for
national pride as China overcomes its historical victimization.

Fourth, now that China has reclaimed its great power status, Beijing is not much
interested in multipolarization if it means the rise of its rivals. China has reservations about the
growing power of India and increasing assertiveness of Japan, and the desires of both countries
to join the UN Security Council. China has also been careful to avoid a Russian resurgence in
Central Asia and a unified ASEAN that excludes China.

Fifth, Beijing has found that talk of multilateralism makes for better public relations than
calls for multipolarity. Multipolarity carries anti-U.S. undertones and raises concerns among
other states that a rising China may have revisionist intentions. Beijing has also witnessed there
can be push back when a government that does not yet practice democracy at home calls for a
more democratic order abroad.

Finally, focusing on multilateralism rather than multipolarity allows greater ideological
coherence for China’s foreign policy. Multipolarity, anti-hegemonism, and non-interference are
the old concepts of a relatively weak and isolated China. The new concepts of a strong and
globally engaged China – peaceful rise (和平崛起 heping jueqi), win-win diplomacy (双赢外交
shuangying waijiao), and harmonious world (和谐世界 hexie shijie) – are more consistent with
multilateralism, not multipolarity.

China should be credited for its “new security concept” (新安全觀 xin anquan guan)
involving increased participation in international institutions, as this demonstrates China is
embracing multilateralism in positive ways. Yet, just as other countries can do more to address

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charges of unilateralism and Cold War oriented alliances, China can better pursue “responsible
stakeholder” foreign policies that support multilateralism.

A clear impediment to multilateralism in Northeast Asia is the lack of regional security
mechanisms. Experts have recently laid out rationales for a U.S.-Japan-China Strategic
Dialogue 3 and a U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Security Committee. 4 The problem is that
the former would raise concerns in Seoul about being “passed” and the latter would raise
concerns in Beijing about being “contained.” A new forum including all four countries would
add little value to the existing Six-Party Talks and ASEAN dialogues because disagreement
about the role of alliances and maintaining relations with Taiwan would inhibit substantive
progress.

The next U.S. president would thus be well advised to launch parallel U.S.-Japan-China
and U.S.-Japan-South Korea strategic dialogues, where senior officials would coordinate security
policies. The two trilateral mechanisms would be separate meetings with different agendas, but
would be clearly linked in carrying the region toward an increasingly stable security architecture.

3
Brad Glosserman and Bonnie Glaser, “And now to Trilateralism,” PacNet #24, May 1, 2007;
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0724.pdf.
4
Michael Auslin and Christopher Griffin, “Time for Trilateralism?” AEI Asian Outlook #2, March 6, 2008;
http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27611/pub_detail.asp.

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The 12th Japan-U.S.-China Conference
on Trilateral Security Cooperation
By Madoka Futamura

The relationship between the U.S. and China seems to get stronger: the two countries
increasingly recognize that they have common interests both regionally and internationally and
that a positive relationship would serve their national interests. However, the more they
recognize the strategic importance of a good relations and move toward that aim, the more they
face conflicts in interests. Such conflicts can be attributed to differences in politics and
economics, as well as values and cultural backgrounds, such as political systems and human
rights. Unlike tensions in strategic thinking, these differences easily exacerbate mistrust and
misunderstanding between the two countries, which makes it possible for small issues to lead to
a serious confrontation. For the relationship to truly develop, it is necessary to build mutual
confidence and mechanisms to make their actions and intentions more transparent.

A strong and positive relationship between the United States and China serves Japan’s
national interests. This is because such a relationship is indispensable for regional stability and
prosperity. We now face various nontraditional security issues, such as terrorism, proliferation of
WMD, climate change and so on. Being of regional and global concern, each country has to
collaborate with other countries to deal with them. China and the United States are especially
important for tackling these problems both by promoting solutions and preventing problems from
getting worse. As for traditional security concerns, issues surrounding North Korea and Taiwan
are especially important for Japan, and dealing with them depends on the relationship between
the U.S. and China. In order to contain North Korea and pressure it to stick to international
norms, regional powers need to be monolithic in their approach to Pyongyang. As for Taiwan,
the United States and China need to build a good communication mechanism to make their
intentions as clear and transparent as possible. Taiwan is one of the most likely problems that
may lead to direct confrontation between the two countries, even on the military level. Because
of the Japan-U.S. alliance, Japan will be involved in such a situation. A positive and close
relationship between the U.S. and China without any prospect of future conflict is indispensable
not only for Japan’s national interests but also for peace and prosperity of the region.

Despite the positive impact of a strong relationship between the U.S. and China, Japan is
ambivalent about the two countries getting close because of the fear of being neglected by
Washington. Traditionally, when Washington has a close relationship with Japan, it has a rather
cold relationship with China, and vice versa. From outside, it seems that the U.S. is pursing its
interests in the region by exploiting the rivalry between Japan and China. Even if this is not the
case, such a record makes Japan cautious about close relations between China and the U.S.
While there has been a talk about “Japan passing,” the close relationship between the U.S. and
China has been highlighted. The fact that the U.S. is interested in China and eager to develop
relations with Beijing illustrates the fragile relationship between the two, and because the
relationship between Japan and the U.S. is stable and mature, the latter is more relaxed than the
former. However, this is not necessarily clear to Tokyo, and thus it is also not clear how Japan
would observe and react to U.S.-China relationship.

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The difficulty in strengthening the relationship between the three countries is strongly
related to the strength and weakness of the existing relationships among them. One obvious
example is Japan-U.S. alliance: it has been growing stronger and thus raised tension between
them and China, making the latter suspicious about the real intention of the former. Japan and
the U.S. need to make extra effort to explain their intentions. For its part China has to make
effort to increase the level of transparency in what it is doing and what it is thinking to decrease
suspicions held by Japan and the United States.

In general, each three bilateral relationship (Japan-U.S., U.S.-China, Japan-China) more
or less suffers from the lack of solid foundation of mutual trust and understanding. The fact that
history issues and issues related to culture and value are often raised in each relationship or
referred to whenever there are tensions in economic or political relations, shows that further
effort needs to be made to enhance understanding of the other countries, including others’
experiences in the Asia-Pacific War. This effort needs to be made especially at the public level
considering the fact that people in each country seem to be ‘inward looking’ in relation to global
politics and there is excessive nationalism in some segments of society.

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The U.S.-China-Japan Trilateral Relationship:
A Traditional Balance of Power or
Exploring a New Cooperative Framework?
By Daisuke Hayashi

In a broad historical perspective, the trilateral relationship among the U.S., China, and
Japan has repeated a cycle of the traditional balance of power. First, China sought to establish
the multipolar international system against the U.S.-led unipolar world order. To that end, China
has been expanding its political and economic ties with Asian countries and excluded U.S.
influence, where it sometimes cooperates with the U.S. to deter the rise of Japanese military
capabilities. Second, the U.S. has been struggling with power politics during the Cold War and
the post Cold-War period to keep its position as a superpower. Therefore, while it has been
trying to secure and expand its influence in Asia based on the alliance with Japan, the U.S. has
also tried to approach and make a deal with China from a viewpoint of geopolitical or security
strategies. Third, Japan has sought to expand its diplomatic autonomy while it enjoys political
and military support from the U.S. In this sense, Japan traditionally makes U.S.-Japan relations
its top priority, but, it has been also trying to independently develop historical ties with China on
trade and regional policies.

How will this trilateral relationship evolve? Will it remain a balance-of-power system or
will it be transformed and develop into a new kind of partnership or marriage? This paper tries
to explore the possibilities and argues these three powers will be able to establish a more
advanced cooperative framework in two dimensions: from the bottom to the top level, and from
technical and economic issues to political and security issues.

U.S.-China Relations and Japan

First, how is the relationship between the U.S. and China seen from a Japanese point of
view? Basically, those two great powers are in “strategic partnership” though their positions are
incompatible on quite a few issues. For example, the U.S. is urging China to become and act as
a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. More specifically, on economic issues,
the U.S. encourages China to appreciate the Chinese yuan, make its economy more open to the
world, and enhance environmental protection along with large-scale economic development. On
political agendas, the U.S. expects China to establish a more democratic political system with
freedom of the press, enhance its legal infrastructure, regulate piracy to protect intellectual
property rights, enhance transparency in its military spending and seek a peaceful settlement in
the Taiwan Strait and Tibet. Meanwhile, China tries to defend its political and economic
approaches, and challenges U.S. “interventionism” toward Chinese “domestic problems” such
Taiwan, Tibet, or Communist rule. China has also opposed vital U.S. security engagements such
as the air bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO in 1999 or the Iraq war in 2003.

However, while they repeat a pattern of confrontation and cooperation, both the U.S. and
China have been trying to avoid conflict. Hiyoruki Akita, former correspondent in Beijing and
Washington, D.C. of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, explains a general pattern of U.S. policies
toward China: the U.S. government at first tries to take a hard line in the first two years after its
37

inauguration, but then gradually shifts to a soft line and seeks cooperation with China. As
former Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro pointed out, both the U.S. and China keep
important channels of dialogue open on conflicting topics, try to find common ground, and
finally reach a compromise. In this sense, each can no longer ignore the other in world politics
because both the cost of conflict and the degree of interdependence between them are too big.
They recognize each other as an important partner on political, economic, trade, strategic, and
security issues on the regional and the global levels. Some analysts expect that this will become
“the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” especially if the Democrats return to
power in the next presidential election. In the long run, it might be natural that their relations
equal Anglo-American or U.S.-Japan relations.

Is the relationship between the U.S. and China strong or weak? How does it affect Japan,
and does Japan have an impact on that relationship? Clearly, the answer is yes – the trilateral
relationship among the U.S., China, and Japan has great influence on each other, no matter how
good or bad their relations are, given the conventional balance of power. The relationship
between the U.S. and China is one of the most important elements defining the international
environment for Japan, especially for political and military issues that Japan does not control (at
least not compared with those two great powers). The U.S.-China rapprochement in 1971, for
example, gave a tremendous shock to the Japanese government, but Japan successfully
established diplomatic relations with China in the following year, resisting pressure from Henry
Kissinger. Japan also concluded the Peace and Amity Treaty with the PRC in 1978, earlier than
the U.S. normalized diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1979. Japan had to take care of both the
U.S. and China after the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989. When Sino-U.S. relations were
harmed by the U.S. economic sanctions against China, Japan had to follow the U.S. policy.
However, Japan also sought to lift sanctions and restart economic assistance to China as soon as
possible in order to avoid driving China into international isolation.

Japan also has an impact on U.S.-China relations because Japan is in a unique position
between those two great powers. First, Japan shares common values with the U.S. such as
democracy, freedom, human rights, and the market economy. China does not. Japan also has
culture, religion, ethnicity, and traditions like those in China. Second, Japan is included both in
Asia and the Western world: that is not true for U.S. or China. In this sense, Japan can take
unique approaches to influence both the U.S. and China. For example, Japan influences both the
U.S. and China through its diplomatic strategy of “the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.” While it
does not directly target China but covers a more extensive region, this diplomatic principle
compensates for the U.S. strategic view of “the Arc of Instability” and contributes to
democratizing and enhancing the political and economic order of China. Japan also provides the
U.S. with geopolitical bases for extending U.S. commitments in China and the Asian region,
especially on political and security issues. As W. David Straub, former director of the Office of
Japanese Affairs in the U.S. Department of State, says, all or most of the purpose of the recent
realignments of U.S. forces in Japan is part of the U.S. strategy to deal with the rise of Chinese
military capabilities.

However, it should be also noted that in the trilateral balance of power, Japanese
influences are relatively limited compared with U.S. or Chinese diplomatic capabilities. That is
because Japan possesses no nuclear weapon, has constitutional restrictions in security

38

engagement, and focuses most of its political resources on economic development. Professor
Yoshihide Soeya of Keio University calls Japan a “middle power,” not a great power like the
U.S. and China. He advocates that Japan keep a certain distance from genuine power games
between those two powers, and should expand and exercise its own influence on commercial and
cultural exchanges with those powers.

Consequently, in the trilateral balance of power among the U.S., China, and Japan, every
dyad has been developing relations and influencing the other player through confrontation and
cooperation. Both the U.S. and China have been seeking a strategic partnership while quite a few
issues remain unsolved. The powerful relationship between the U.S. and China, either in a
positive or negative sense, is one of the most important factors defining diplomatic conditions
within which Japan operates. And, Japan also has an impact on Sino-U.S. relations because of
its unique position between those two powers’ values, when considering culture, geopolitics and
security.

The Future of the Regional Framework and Trilateral Relations

So: is the U.S.-China relationship an obstacle to the realization of Japan’s national
interests? Does it make the regional environment better or worse? The answer to these
questions depends on their relationship.

As Akita explains in the chart below, the U.S.-China relationship influences Japan and
the Asian region in four ways. Pattern A suggests the most stable situation for the U.S., China,
Japan, and all Asia; the other patterns include a certain risk. In Pattern B, Japan may lose
diplomatic freedom since it has to face serious tensions with China and shift to cooperating with
the U.S. to solve the conflicts. Pattern C presents the Japanese with a dilemma: Japan may
expand its capabilities to mediate between the U.S. and China, but Japan may also be torn
between those two great powers. Pattern D shows the worst scenario, as Professor John J.
Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago also expects, in which both the U.S. and China
drastically aggravate conflicts, and the U.S. and Japan may strengthen cooperation against China.

39

The Influence the U.S.-China Relationship has on Japan and Asia
C Cooperation Japan-China relations A

- Tensions will be raised in Asia. - Asia will keep stable.
- It will raise the risk that Japan is torn between - It will raise the possibilities of multilateral
the U.S. and China. (The Japanese efforts to Asian security cooperation
mediate the U.S. and China are limited.)

U.S.-China relations

Confrontation Cooperation

- Tensions will be drastically raised in Asia. - It will raise the risk that the U.S. and China
- The U.S. and Japan will strengthen cooperation take initiatives in establishing an Asian order
and China will confront them. but Japan is marginalized
- Japan’s free hand on diplomacy will decline.

D Confrontation B

*This chart assumes that the U.S. and Japan keep the alliance and stable relations. [Source]: Hiroyuki
Akita, Anryu (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbun Press, 2008) p. 224.

Among those influences, what meets the national interest of Japan? The Japanese
government defines its national interest in the Diplomatic Bluebook as follows: to develop the
alliance with the U.S. as the linchpin of peace and stability in Japan and the Asia-Pacific region;
to devote itself to multilateral cooperation through international organizations such as the UN; to
foster relations with neighboring states like China and Korea; and to engage in international
cooperation on regional stability and international security such as international terrorism,
poverty and development, humanitarian crises, and violations of human rights.

In this sense, Japan can find its national interest in any pattern. Pattern A is the most
desirable case for Japan to maximize its national interest such as keeping the Asian order,
exploring the multilateral security framework, and developing both the U.S.-Japan and China-
Japan bilateral partnership. In Pattern B, good U.S.-China relations can contribute to
establishing the regional order in Asia, which is part of the Japanese national interest. However,
it may also harm its national interest as Japan may be disengaged and marginalized from the
regional framework dominated by the U.S. and China. Pattern C encourages Japan to develop its
own national interest to improve the “mutually beneficial relationship based on common
strategic interests” with China as well as the traditional alliance with the U.S. in the bilateral
level. However, on the multilateral level, Pattern C is not clear whether Japan can expand its
influence toward the U.S. and China or may be caught between them. And, even in the worst
situation such as Pattern D, Japan can seek its national interest to maintain and develop the
alliance with the U.S. against China though those three powers create unstable regional
environment in Asia. Consequently, while it may harm the Japanese interest, the U.S.-China
relationship always gives Japan opportunities to expand its own national interest.

40

On those analyses of the status quo and the future of the trilateral relations, what should
be done to strengthen relations between the three? First, those three powers should establish a
regional framework through bottom-up approaches to the top governmental and official levels.
As Fan Li, executive director of Global Links Initiative, and Qinghong Wang of the University
of Hawaii propose, it is essential not only to depend on governmental initiatives but also to
leverage civil societies among those powers in order to establish a “Creative Partnership.” Li
and Wang point out that Japan, China, and the U.S., have abundant NGO/NPOs to work on the
international level. They advocate that civil societies can spread ideas further and faster than
governments, and build a solid foundation of mutual understanding and trust. Those civil
societies can be relatively independent of the official intergovernmental relationship in the
balance of power, and create more advanced frameworks for multilateral cooperation. On the
other hand, the top-down approach driven by governmental initiatives is subject to political
situations and likely to fail. On this point, as I explain, Japan (to be more accurate, Japanese
civil societies) can be the key player to extend such cultural and economic networks and develop
those civil connections to the official level. One of the solutions is Track II and Track III
dialogues among those powers. As Professor Reinhard Drifte of the University of New Castle
points out, those three powers and other Asian states have been successfully expanding dialogues
through various channels, including the trilateral security conference hosted by the Pacific
Forum CSIS and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, or the Global Thinknet promoted
by the Japan Center for International Exchange and other leading think tanks in the U.S. and
China. By sharing those opportunities, the U.S., China, and Japan can extend the epistemic
community to encourage governments to promote official dialogues and to establish a new
political framework.

Second, those three powers should start cooperation on technical and economic matters
and gradually seek a framework for political and security issues. Most of the conflicts among
them come from the hard-power level in which they are likely to have clashes of interest.
Compared with political and military issues, the three powers can find common ground on
technical or economic issues and seek multilateral cooperation more easily because those matters
are essentially less competitive and more cooperative. The three powers have already started to
develop multilateral cooperation in the area of environment or culture. One example is the
Japanese technical support to China for environmental protection or the cultural exchange
between Japan and China. As Li and Wang also acknowledge, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda’s
announcement of the academic and cultural exchange program in his recent visit to China at the
end of 2007 is an important step. Europe offers other important examples. They have been
integrating mainly in economic and trade areas such as the single European market, and then
expanding to political cooperation such as the framework of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) or the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Such a process can help
the U.S., China, and Japan free themselves from the traditional balance of power and extend the
trilateral relationship a multilateral framework.

The U.S., China, and Japan have a lot of potential to develop the trilateral relationship. It
is, not clear how much they can expand it. The powerful U.S.-China relationship has a powerful
impact on Japan. And, Japan can enhance its national interest no matter how their relationship
influences Japan. Whether it remains the balance-of-power system or is transformed and

41

developed to a new kind of partnership depends on how much the governments and people
appreciate cooperation and expand their relationship.

42

China-Japan Relations
By David P. Janes

In its prime, Chang-an (present day Xian) was one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the
world and a key nexus along the Silk Road. The city drew people from as far away as Central
Asia and present day Eastern Europe as well as from Japan, many of whom saw Chang-an as a
great center of learning, especially learning about religion. Taoists, Buddhists, Nestorian
Christians, and those from other faiths could be found there. Japanese Buddhist monks, hoping
to learn new knowledge and increase their prestige back home embarked on difficult journeys to
Chang-an in the 8th and 9th century, and while there, mastered various forms of Buddhism that
were hitherto unknown in Japan.

Among the most famous monks making their way to Chang-an were Kukai (Kobo
Daishi), the founder of Shingon Buddhism, and Saicho (Dengo Daishi), the founder of Tendai
Buddhism. Representative of the many Buddhist leaders and scholars who saw China as the
location of sacred knowledge and new technologies, these monks were illustrative of the deep
interest in China that existed in Japan at the time.

Architecturally, Chang-an was also important to Japan since Kyoto, which remained the
capital of Japan for roughly 1,000 years, was based on Chang-an’s layout. From the geomancy
to the city walls, Kyoto borrowed much from Chang-an’s design. All of this alludes to a time
when deep intellectual exchange between China and Japan was rich. But today, over 1,000 years
later, the relationship between China and Japan is quite different.

In my first trip to China in 2002 with a group of New York City high school teachers, I
was stunned when student after student in China told me how they hated the Japanese and
thought the Japanese hated them. When the Chinese leader of our trip learned that I worked on
U.S.-Japan relations, she sat me down and inquired why on earth I would be so enamored by
Japanese culture and hoped that somehow this interest in Japan would come to an end. During
my last visit to China in 2005, as the sole American in a delegation of Japanese teachers visiting
China, I was again amazed at visceral frustration Chinese teachers had with their perception that
Japan had not apologized for the Nanjing Massacre, among other things. Just prior to my arrival,
thousands of Chinese people had been in the streets in anti-Japanese protests throwing rocks at
the Japanese Embassy and at Japanese businesses.

It seems to me, therefore, that the heyday of deep intellectual ties between China and
Japan, when relations were deeper and cultural connections were fostered, are far gone.
Economic interaction is important, but it is not clear that this will lead to better understanding
between the two countries. If the people of China continue to harbor frustrations toward Japan
and the Japanese populace does little to address the issue, then anger could explode.

The relationship between China and Japan, whether positive economic interaction or
negative visceral frustration on the public and, depending on the day, political level, affects the
United States in myriad ways. First and foremost, the U.S. has a deep relationship with both
China and Japan that must be managed and tension between the two complicates America’s

43

relationship with both. Second, the United States is treaty bound to protect Japan should it be
attacked. With China viewed as a potential threat to Japan, the U.S. military is poised to defend
Japan against an attack. Increased tensions between China and Japan increase the necessity of
U.S. military forces in the region. Third, deeper economic and trade integration between China
and Japan could lead to a regional trading bloc that inhibits the work of the World Trade
Organization and this could have a negative impact on the United States. The U.S. must ensure
that this interaction results in positive outcomes for all.

The U.S. therefore has high stakes in the relationship between China and Japan and has a
role to play, both at the governmental level, and at the civil society level. At the governmental
level, the United States needs to ensure that it has deep ties and solid diplomatic representation in
both countries to ensure that its bilateral alliances with each remain firm. Furthermore, it has an
obligation to not worsen the relationship between China and Japan by maintaining a degree of
transparency about the U.S.-Japan alliance and by illustrating that it is an alliance that need not
be perceived as attempting to weaken China. Simultaneously, the U.S. government is challenged
to ensure Japan that the U.S.-China relationship is not more important than the alliance between
the U.S. and Japan. At the nongovernmental level, universities and think tanks in the United
States can play a critical role in engaging scholars and others in China and Japan in efforts to
reconcile historical differences as well as to explore innovative ways to deal with other tensions
that arise between these countries, such as the development of multilateral structures for security
in the region.

Developing a more cooperative relationship between China and Japan, and one in which
tensions between the people of both countries are eased, would be of immense benefit to the
region. While China and Japan have governments with entirely different values that inevitably
lead to some degree of tension, it is possible for both countries to establish a better working
relationship on issues of mutual concern. Whether climate change, energy, disease, or threats
faced from countries like North Korea, cooperation between China and Japan, and the United
States, can be of immense benefit to the region and to the world.

Aside from the tension that exists at the popular level in both countries, (especially the
frustration on the Chinese side), another area of tension that both Japan and the U.S. share in
regard to China is China’s human rights violations both internally, in places like Tibet, for
instance, as well as in places such as Sri Lanka and in countries in Africa. China’s investments,
which come with a policy of “noninterference”, are anything but. Investment is interference with
another country and choosing to ignore the affects of that investment is not “noninterference.”
Tensions between Japan and China (and the United States) may very well reach their peak, and
perhaps their breaking point, in places such as Africa. Addressing this issue is one key to
mitigating tensions between and among these countries.

Additionally, it is important to not lose sight of the impact that people-to-people
exchange programs between China and Japan can have to improve relations. While the differing
historical narratives that exist in Japan and China are difficult to discuss, connecting individuals
from both societies and engaging them in enriching programs that help them realize their
common humanity has potential to develop the room necessary for cooperation on larger issues,
such as those mentioned above. One important example of such an exchange program has been

44

taking place over the last year between college students at Nanjing University and International
Christian University in Tokyo. Students from both schools have co-authored a play that
discusses historical issues including the Nanjing Massacre; these students have developed deep
bonds that overshadow the difficult memories of the past.

Relations between China and Japan are not destined to be negative. Painful memories
from the 20th century need not lead toward an inability to remember the past, such as during the
Heian period discussed at the outset of this paper when interaction was deep and relations were
better. Nor need these more recent memories blind individuals in both countries to their common
humanity and to the benefits that positive interaction on issues of mutual concern could bring.
But neither is the relationship between China and Japan destined to be good; without proactive
engagement by leaders in the U.S., Japan, and China to mitigate negative forces in all three
countries, problems could mount and the common challenges that confront us all could take back
seat to military buildup.

45

Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management
in Northeast Asia
By Liu Lin

1. The Concept of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management

Research on conflict prevention and conflict management has proliferated in the 1990s.
This is both due to the end of the Cold War and the move from a bipolar order to a multipolar
one, as well as to a greater sensitivity to devastating conflicts and the humanitarian suffering and
economic ruin they create.

Up to now, there is no agreed definition of conflict prevention and conflict management
in practice and research. However, it is generally accepted that conflict prevention is a set of
instruments used to prevent disputes from forming, or preventing them from developing into
active conflict. In other words, conflict prevention is applied before the conflict has become open
and violent. Thus, conflict prevention is, in fact, not about preventing a conflict, but about
managing, change and channeling conflicts into peaceful procedures. It has more to do with
preventing the outbreak of violence. Conflict management involves tactics that are enforced
when violent conflict is deemed likely, but before it escalates into open war. Prevention takes
place at early stages of the conflict cycle and it is more cost-efficient than actions taken later. It
is generally agreed that conflict prevention is more important than conflict management.

Conflict prevention has two important aspects. First is prediction of conflicts, which is
mainly based on information gathering and early warning. The second is international
intervention. But intervention by any third party should be agreed by both sides of the conflict,
and should abide by the principles of neutrality and noninterference. The purpose is to use
peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, engagement to restore or establish
security mechanisms and preventing the escalation of conflicts. The specific forms of conflict
prevention measures include: confidence-building, fact-finding missions, early warning
networks, preventive deployment, and demilitarized zones.

2. Necessity of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia

Northeast Asia is one of the regions most urgently in need of the development and
implementation of conflict prevention and conflict management mechanisms. Northeast Asia is
the most militarized region in the world. This the consequence of an arms race between states
due to, among other things, a lack of trust due to historical hostility, fear of regional dominance,
and the close proximity to conflicts with a real potential for escalation.

In addition to, and in parts a reason for, the arms race, the region hosts two almost 60-
year long conflicts – on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. There will be
catastrophic consequences if violence breaks out on the Korean Peninsula or across the Taiwan
Strait. On the Korean Peninsula, such a scenario could lead to regional nuclear proliferation, as
well as regional chaos. In the Taiwan Strait, outbreak of violence would undermine the economic
development not only on the mainland and in Taiwan, but in the region as a whole and possibly

47

even beyond. It could also trigger a conflict between China and the U.S., which would be
devastating to all states in the region. Consequently, conflict prevention is, at least in theory, the
rational strategic choice and preventive diplomacy has an important and effective role to play.

3. Practices of Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia

In Northeast Asia, conflict prevention and conflict management has been practiced,
which has had positive influence on the final resolution of potential conflicts in this region.

The Korean Peninsula

The Korean Peninsula is the place where war or crisis is most likely to erupt in Northeast
Asia. The Korean Peninsula problem is a legacy of the Cold War and is influenced by great
strategic changes in this region after the Cold War. Because of the low level of mutual trust
between the major players on the Korean Peninsula, especially the historical political tensions
and military confrontation between North and South Korea and the hostile U.S. position against
North Korea, some direct prevention measures, such as military confidence-building, including
hot lines and mutual notification of military exercises, do not exist on the Korean Peninsula.

However, the two Koreas and external major players have taken direct and structural
prevention measures to reduce the possibility of the breakout of conflict on the Korean
Peninsula. These measures include: 1) the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and
Exchange/Cooperation signed by the two Koreas in 1991; 2) the 1992 Joint Declaration of
Denuclearization in Korea; 3) the South Korea’s Sunshine Policy toward North Korea since the
Kim Dae-jung’s government (marked by two North-South summits, increased tourist exchange
and trade, etc.); 4) the 1994 Agreed Framework between North Korea and the U.S. in the first
North Korean nuclear crisis (although finally failed); 5) the Six-Party Talks initiated in wake of
the second North Korean nuclear crisis.

The Six-Party Talks is a good example of preventive diplomacy, characterized by
interaction among the involved parties, with the purpose of preventing the crisis from escalating
into war. At present, the Six-Party Talks is perceived to be the most effective means to solve the
North Korean nuclear problem, although this process is filled with many ups and downs caused
by various factors, such as the U.S. financial sanctions on North Korea, North Korea’s nuclear
test on October 2006, North Korea’s refusal to submit the list of its nuclear program by the end
of 2007, etc. If the Six-Party Talks could be extended to address issues other than the nuclear
crisis, such as finding a solution to the underlying problem of the Korean Peninsula, it could
develop into a more permanent regional conflict resolution mechanism. In other words, the
significance of the Six-Party Talks to conflict prevention strategy is its potential to become a
regional security mechanism.

The Taiwan Strait

The military and political tension across the Taiwan Strait has long been a major concern
to countries in East Asia because if war breaks out in the Strait, the U.S. will almost certainly be
involved and the whole region’s security will be jeopardized. In recent years, because the Taiwan

48

authority aggressively pushed the “Taiwan Independence” movement, mutual trust between
mainland China and Taiwan is low and few direct confidence-building measures have been
taken, especially in the political and military fields. The only exception may be the 1992 meeting
between the China-based Association of Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and the
Taiwan-based Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF), during which the mainland and Taiwan
reached a mutual understanding of the “one China” principle, although with a different
interpretation. However, since Chen Shui-bian came to power, the Taiwan authority has refused
to recognize the 1992 consensus and political dialogue between the mainland and Taiwan was
suspended.

On March 22, 2008, Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou won the Taiwan presidential
election. This provides a good opportunity for the two sides across the Taiwan Strait to develop a
new relationship and open a new situation of peaceful development in the Strait. Just prior to the
election, on March 4, Chinese President Hu Jintao made a very important speech on relations
across the Taiwan Strait during the annual NPC/CPPCC session. He called for united efforts to
develop new scenarios to cross-Strait relations, and realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese
nation. He said China is looking forward to the formal end of the state of hostility across the
Strait through joint efforts by both sides and consultations based on the one-China principle. Hu
Jintao said he hopes to reach a peace agreement and build a framework for the peaceful
development of cross-Strait relations. After being elected, Ma Ying-jeou also reiterated his
pledge to start working with China on allowing direct flights between their cities, signing a
comprehensive bilateral trade deal with Beijing, allowing regular visits by mainland Chinese
tourist groups to boost the domestic economy and lifting restrictions preventing Taiwanese banks
from investing directly in China. With the increased political will on both sides to improve cross-
Strait relations and take confidence building measures, we can expect the often stormy cross-
Strait relations will enter into a new era of relative calm.

4. Prospects for Conflict Prevention and Conflict Management in Northeast Asia

Although some conflict prevention and conflict management measures have been taken
to address potential conflicts in Northeast Asia, research and practice in this field is still rather
limited. This is because in Northeast Asia, the dynamics of conflict involve regional powers and
geopolitical struggle, political and sovereign issues dominate the agenda of conflict management,
and the political will to adopt conflict prevention strategies is limited. Therefore, a security
mechanism cannot be institutionalized overnight. Instead of rushing into establishing a regional
institution for crisis management, it is better to stress conflict prevention as a process and a
strategy. Through interaction and engagement, political adversaries, the third party, neighboring
states, and other stakeholders, should recalculate their interests of preventing armed conflicts and
utilize this interest in the establishment of a regional framework for conflict prevention.

49

Beyond the Out-dated Mindset that Conflict is Inevitable
By Aki Mori

Japan stands between the United States and China in East Asia. As China rises in the
region and the world, it is clear that the development of the Sino-U.S. relationship is decisive for
Japan’s future. The cooperation of the United States and China at the Six-Party Talks has some
observers in Japan worried the United States is tilting to China on some security issues, i.e., the
abduction issue posed by North Korea. It is said that the George W. Bush administration has
come to rely on the support of China on regional issues; moreover, some say the U.S. doesn’t
want to create hostilities with China because the United States already has difficulties in the
Middle East. However, as China is recognized as a major power by the United States, and as
China has come back to the traditional position which enables it to play a proactive role in East
Asia, Japan is facing the reality that cooperation between the United States and China could
come at the expense of Japan’s national interest to some extent. The realistic consideration of
national interest and priorities is needed for Japan.

However, too close U.S-China cooperation that ignores Japanese fears of being bypassed
could increase Japanese insecurity. This could undermine the regional security environment.
Japan is clearly involved in the development of the relationship between the United States and
China on security issues in the region, and this framework will shape Japan’s future. A
nightmare for Japan is being forced to choose between the United States and China. Of course
Japan is an ally of the United States, so in case of conflict Japan will stand with the United
States, but Japan doesn’t want to be an enemy of China. However, China is a major power
located close to Japan and Japan and China are interdependent in economics. Japan doesn’t want
to be in a hostile relationship with China as a result of the withdrawal of the United States from
East Asia as well.

Kissinger’s legacy and the logic of “a cap in the bottle”

The convergence of U.S. and Chinese concerns toward Japan is easily seen among
scholars and strategists in the two countries. Some observers in China repeat criticism that
Japan’s expanding military role in the U.S.-Japan alliance may harm regional stability. Some
realist scholars in the United States predict that Japan will build nuclear weapons when and if the
country feels its survival is threatened by a foreign military power. 1 These arguments
demonstrate that the United States and China share a common concern of the “Japan problem” to
some extent.

Henry Kissinger’s logic at the negotiation of the U.S.-China rapprochement in 1970s –
that the United States is “a cap in the bottle” to prevent Japan’s remilitarization – helps clarify
these discourses. China expects the United States to prevent Japan from breaking away by
integrating Japan into its military operation and strategy in the alliance. 2 U.S. Secretary of State

1
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, International Security, 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993).
2
Xia Liping, “Zhong Mei Ri Zhuanlüe Guanxi: Zhengqu Gongyin he Bimian Anquan Kunjing (China-U.S-Japan
Strategic Relations: Striving for Win-Win and Avoiding Security Dilemmas)”, Shijie Jingzhi yu Zhengzhi, vol. 9,
2007, pp. 31-38, p. 34.

51

Condoleezza Rice stated after the North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, “that the United
States has the will and the capability to meet the full range – and I underscore the full range – of
its deterrent and security commitments to Japan.” From Kissinger’s point of view, the United
States assured China that the U.S. remains “a cap in the bottle” to control Japan within the
alliance.

Kissinger’s legacy may have new implications for trilateral relations in a fluid strategic
environment. Japan’s security role, in particular in the military in the region and the world, poses
a new issue for the United States and China. China’s expectation that the United States will be “a
cap in the bottle” seems to be enforced even as Japan is pushed to play a more proactive role in
the military field by the United States. On the other hand, the United States feels much
uncertainty about China’s future, in particular in the area of its expanding military power and
how that power might be used. 3 In order to respond to regional contingencies, the United States
expects Japan to possess strengthened military capabilities. Some observers in the United States
expect Japan to be “a cap in the bottle” against a rising China. Others in the United States don’t
believe that the United States should use the “Japan card” to restrict China’s rapid military
modernization. Given U.S. primacy in security in East Asia, the United States remains “a cap in
the bottle” for Japan as well as an “administrator” of the power balance in Japan-China relations.

Debates regarding Japan’s expanding military role in the alliance are ongoing. Some
observers in China and the United States describe a “normal” Japan as assertive and nuclear.
However, it should be noted that some Japanese politicians and public are hesitant about the
Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) playing a military-centric role within the alliance. The
national debate over Japan’s role in the region and the world politics has not concluded; a
“normal” Japan need not be nuclearized. Japan understands that the only reliable security vehicle
is the alliance with the United States. The shift of Japan’s security role in the region and the
world proceeds within the alliance with the United States.

China’s attempt to undermine United States engagement of East Asia

Japan’s expanding military role within the U.S.-Japan alliance gives China an incentive
to undermine the legitimacy of Japanese security policy and its role in the U.S-Japan alliance.
Some Chinese strategists attempt to make the United States nervous about the future course of
Japan: this is because China sees the United States facilitating Japan’s attempts to become a
political power with a strengthened military capability. China is alarmed also by U.S. attempts to
use “the Japan card” to deter the rising China. Chu Shulong argues that attempts by the United
States to create “intense and overt Sino-Japanese competition would severely limit the U.S.
ability to maneuver in the region.” 4 This suggests that China’s intimidation of Japan and the
United States seems to mainly target the United States.

China doesn’t forget to directly intimidate the United States through Iraqi either. Chu
Shulong criticizes United States policy in Iraq; “a unilateral approach is no longer sufficient to

3
Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress; Military Power of the People’s Republic of China
2008.”
4
Chu Shulong, “A Mechanism to Stabilize U.S.-China-Japan Trilateral Relations in Asia,” January 2008, The
Brookings Institution.

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make or mainstream peace and stability, as the case of Iraq clearly demonstrates.” China doesn’t
intend to assist the United States in normalizing Iraq’s situation.

In sum, some strategists seem to consider the intimidation of Japan and the United States
could help undermine the mechanism of U.S. engagement in East Asia. China targets Japan and
the U.S.-Japan alliance since Japan is the closest ally of the United States in East Asia and the
U.S.-Japan alliance is the core of the U.S. commitment to the region.

China wants “soft” measures along with the Western role within the existing security
order in the region. Some observers in China recommend that multilateral cooperation through
dialogues and consultations is the best way to achieve long-term regional peace and stability.
They note, the institutionalization of security dialogues among three countries is needed to build
mutual trust. However, a critical question remains; will China still prefer dialogue after China
possesses confidence in the field of the military and the economy?

Direct dialogues are needed for China’s constructive participation in international
society, but it is not enough. China must cease “criticism” that intends to reduce the influence of
Japan and the U.S.-Japan alliance, since this keeps Japan and the U.S. from believing China will
be peaceful in the future. Rather, it could intensify suspicions of the United States and Japan
toward China, and it provides a reason for the two countries to practice hedging strategies. China
should understand that building mutual trust supported by a solid foundation is critical for
China’s sustainable development and maintenance of long-term stability in East Asia.

Preventing the vicious circle

To build a solid foundation of mutual trust among the three countries, building the habit
of working together is key. The U.S., China, and Japan’s should be able to work together on
nontraditional security issues. There is a long list for trilateral cooperation in mutually beneficial
areas like resources, environment issues, piracy, counter-terrorism, disaster management etc.
Japan’s political resources and the range of its maneuverability is the most limited among the
three countries, but Japan can push for strong cooperation on the environmental issue. Working
together for the realization of the “comprehensively well-off society,” (Quanmian Jianshe
Xiaokang Shehui) China is keen for the three countries to have a sustainable healthy relationship.

The most important thing is to move beyond out-dated thinking that conflict is inevitable,
whereas “Asia will have two almost equally powerful giants.” 5 The United States and Japan can
help China decrease social unrest and instability at the regional and the global level.

5
Ibid.

53

The Northeast Asia Geometry Lesson
By A. Greer Pritchett

The United States, China, and Japan all share an overarching desire: to maintain peace
and stability in East Asia. Though this end goal may be the same, the modus operandi used to
achieve it can be quite different depending on the player. Nevertheless, one thing seems certain;
the fate of the region will rely largely on how well these three countries manage their
relationship. Therefore, creating the proper formula whereby sometimes contentious power
relations within Northeast Asia can be assuaged is of paramount importance. Perhaps the best
way to achieve this goal is by enhancing consultation and collaboration between the region’s
great powers to solidify trilateral cooperation.

The United States, China, and Japan are so intricately entwined, especially from an
economic perspective, which it might seem to obviate the need to discuss why relationships
between these countries necessitate stability, trust, and friendship. The figures speak for
themselves. The U.S. is China’s top trade partner with an estimated trade volume of $302.1
billion in 2007, a 15 percent change over the previous year, and Japan is in the number two
position with an estimated trade volume of $236 billion, a 13.9 percent increase over 2006.
Furthermore, the U.S. and Japan rank number one and number three, respectively, in terms of
China’s top export destinations. Japan topped China’s list as the leading import supplier in 2007
with the U.S. coming in fourth (behind South Korea and Taiwan). 1 In 2007, China finally
overtook the United States to become Japan’s largest trading partner. China accounted for 17.7
percent of Japan’s total trade last year, and the United States came in second place, with 16.1
percent. 2

These economic linkages do not reconcile the complexities that taint the “harmonious”
relationship they endeavor to pursue. Historical legacies, differences in political systems and
values, strategic interests that sometimes are at odds with one another, lack of transparency of
military modernization and capabilities, and perceived power plays aimed at “containing” or
“diminishing” a specific country’s regional footprint are hindering one of the world’s most
significant regional relationships.

Often described as a three-sided association, the weakest leg in this geometric puzzle may
be the one between China and Japan. The tensions or conflicts that might arise from an unstable
relationship have serious spillover effects for the region and could damage the United States’
national interests. The reasons for the sometimes tenuous relationship between these two
regional giants are numerous and complex. Some are born in history while others are the
consequence of conflicting interests; this has created an atmosphere of wariness and
apprehension. For example, as China continues its rapid military modernization and expansion,
due to its general opaqueness and lack of transparency, Japan (and many other countries the U.S.
included) grows increasingly worried. Couple this trend with continuing territorial disputes,
issues over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), and the unresolved question of East China Sea

1
These figures came from The US – China Business Council, http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html.
2
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/28/business/AS-FIN-ECO-Japan-China-Trade.php.

55

resources, and one can see how incident escalation could occur. 3 On the other side of the coin,
Japan’s passing of the “Three Emergency Laws,” its upgrading of the defense agency to a
ministry and its increasing flexing of muscles in international peacekeeping operations and its
assistance to the United States in the war on terror, have led many in China (and in the region) to
wonder whether Japan is renouncing its pacifist values and could revise Article IX of its
constitution. 4

If the relationship between China and Japan should cool significantly, or worse yet,
deteriorate radically, this would cause major problems for the United States. The U.S.-Japan
alliance is one of the most vital and important bilateral relationships the United States has, and is
the bedrock of its Asia-Pacific security policy. It is a multi-pronged alliance built on a foundation
of shared economic, security, and values-based interests. Therefore, a Sino-Japanese rift could
precipitate the United States’ involvement in the dilemma. And like other countries in the Asia
Pacific region that fear a scenario where they would have to choose sides between China and
Japan, so does the United States. Additionally, because of the economic interdependence
between the three countries, a downturn in relations between China and Japan would herald
ramifications not just for the two countries involved, but for the United States and the rest of the
world. Finally, as John Dunne wrote, “No man is an island, entire of itself…” This concept can
be transferred to international relations. Security threats, both traditional and non-traditional, are
often no longer contained within a country’s borders; therefore, to secure a country’s national
interests, it is increasingly important to strengthen bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relations.
What affects one country creates ripple effects for others; if China and Japan are at odds with
one another it becomes increasingly difficult for the U.S. to navigate.

The question remains: how can the relationship between the three countries be bolstered to
ensure regional peace and security and diminish the mistrust that can lead to miscalculations and
serious missteps? The burden for improving this relationship is on the shoulders of all three
countries; and though it is complex, it is one geometry problem that must be solved. The
following are recommendations.

• Ongoing and sustained dialogue between Tokyo and Beijing is essential. Though the
relationship between these two countries has improved over recent years under former Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe and most recently under Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, there are still
significant tensions. To build on the concept of a “mutually beneficial relationship based on
common strategic interests,” elucidated during then Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Beijing in
October 2006, and further refined during Chinese Prime Minister Wen’s subsequent visit to
Japan, a more robust set of common interests should be identified. 5 Though there are
divergent strategic interests that will not be likely reconciled in the near future, like Taiwan,
there are enough areas where the two countries’ interests overlap to warrant consultation and
cooperation. These include a host of transnational security concerns such as environmental

3
These issues are elaborated in Chu Shulong’s paper entitled “A Mechanism to Stabilize US – China – Japan
Trilateral Relations in Asia.”
4
Constitutional revision seemed to be a real possibility under Prime Minister Abe.
5
This idea was discussed in Seiichiro Takagi’s, “Japan-China Relations: How to build a Strategic Relationship of
Mutual Benefit?”

56

protection, preventing the proliferation of WMD, maritime security, terrorism, energy
security, etc.

• Fortify the relationship between the three countries against the vagaries of domestic
politics. Security and strategic dialogues ought to continue no matter what the domestic
political climate in each country. In 2008, there will be presidential elections in the United
States, a possible House of Representatives dissolution and general election in Japan, and
China will be closely watching elections in Taiwan and gearing up for the Olympics, two
events that can affect its own internal politics. All these events could (and most probably
will) have serious repercussions for each country’s internal dynamics. These events should
try to be compartmentalized so that consultation and coordination between the three players
are not cut off. It is imperative that this constant communication include mil-mil ties. If the
militaries do not trust each other’s motives, ambitions, and capabilities, “worst case scenario”
assumptions will be cultivated.

• The United States needs to develop a strategy to deal with the rise of both China and
Japan. We are entering unchartered waters. Throughout history there have been instances of
a strong China and a weak Japan, or vice versa. Today both countries are rising and gaining
strength regionally and globally, and as they do so, are trying to carve out their own place in
the sun. Managing this “double rise” will take a nuanced and sophisticated approach. Though
the United States will continue to support Japan and has been encouraging it to take a more
proactive approach in its security dealings, it needs to recognize that having Japan become a
more “normal power,” while China continues its rapid development, may cause fear and
uncertainty in the region. The United States will also need to manage Japanese fears about
marginalization. As the United States and China pursue strategic cooperation, it is crucial to
reassure Japan that this relationship will not come at the expense of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
This issue is particularly salient as Japan has taken to talking about the “three betrayals” in
conjunction with what they see is the current U.S. trend in the Six-Party Talks. 6

• Trilateralism should be fostered. China has often felt threatened by the bilateral alliance
between the U.S. and Japan. Often construed as a means of “containing” China’s rise, Beijing
needs to be included in discussions concerning areas of mutual interest to diminish distrust
and minimize misunderstandings. The three countries have been working together, in
conjunction with Russia and South Korea, under the auspices of the Six-Party Talks, which
have proven an effective tool dealing with the region’s greatest security threat, a nuclear
Korean Peninsula. Though this sort of ad hoc regional multilateralism can be effective, it is
not sufficient and does not preclude the need for a concrete trilateral regional architecture. In
the same vein, trilateralism is not meant to supersede any existing bilateral alliances; rather it
is a means of strengthening the ties that bind this region and will help ensure peace and
stability.

6
The “three betrayals” were discussed in the March 3, 2008 and March 7, 2008 Nelson Reports.

57

Searching for the Nexus Between
National Security and Human Security1
By Raymund Jose G. Quilop

The concept of security is an interesting area of study. Security is considered as a
primordial concern of states. In fact, in an international setting where each state remains
sovereign and independent, security is something which states are preoccupied with, for security
is often equated with their existence.

Leszek Buszynski in his “ASEAN National Security in the Post-Cold War Era” states
that security means “the absence of threat to a state’s territorial integrity, its political system and
values, and entails the maintenance of a harmonious relationship with the external
environment.” 2 In a similar fashion, Barry Buzan in “New Patterns of Global Security in the
21st Century” notes that security is about “the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of
states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integration against
forces of change which they see as hostile.” 3 Likewise, Water Lippman points out that “a nation
is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes
to avoid war, and is able, if challenged to maintain them by victory in such a war.” 4

Previous ways of conceptualizing security indicate that security and threat are two
concepts that are linked with each other with the absence of threat being equated to a sense of
security – threats that conventionally meant military threats emanating either from within or
outside a state’s territorial limits. If threats were primarily seen as military in nature, then, it
follows that the primary means of addressing such threats was the military force at the disposal
of states.

Estrella Solidum provides a definition of security which moves away from merely
emphasizing “threats.” She focuses on the idea of “satisfaction of values” as something that
underpins security. Values of a state therefore relate to a state’s sense of being secure in the same
manner that values of an individual impact on his sense of security. In Solidum’s view, security
“consists of the feeling that accompanies actual, perceived, or sustained satisfaction of values
and/or reasonable and stable expectation of their realization.” This implies that security is a
“psychological condition, a feeling.” 5

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent end of the Cold War
seemed to have validated the perspective that security could not simply be centered on military
1
This essay is based on a paper presented at the International Development Studies Conference
entitled “Mainstreaming Human Security: The Asian Contribution” held at the Chulalongkorn University in
Bangkok, Thailand Oct. 3-5, 2007.
2
Leszek Buszynski, “ASEAN National Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” in Michael D. Bellows (ed.), Asia in the
21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), p. 91.
3
Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the 21st Century,” in William Clinton Olson with James R. Lee
(eds.), The Theory and Practice of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994), p.
207.
4
Watter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, (Boston: Little Brown, 1943), p. 51.
5
Estrella D. Solidum, The Small State: Security and World Peace, (Manila: Kalikasan Press, 1991), p. 26.

59

considerations and is more appropriately seen as being holistic. Thus, the concept of
comprehensive security came to the fore.

The concept of comprehensive security meant that security is multi-dimensional and
includes economic, political, and even environmental dimensions. It also means that it is multi-
level, i.e. security is something not only national but also regional and global. More importantly,
it meant that these various dimensions and levels are all inter-linked. 6

Meanwhile, the concept of human security has started to catch the attention not only of
academics and civil society where it originated but also that of states. This idea of human
security was acknowledged in the UN Human Development Report of 1994 in its advocacy for a
“transition from nuclear security to human security” and through its laying out of the seven
concerns within the rubric of human security, namely “economic, environmental, personal,
community, health, political and food.” 7

The concept of human security appears to be similar to that of comprehensive security
considering that human security focuses on dimensions of security such as economic well-being,
environment-related issues, social stability; dimensions which are under the rubric of
comprehensive security. Yet, proponents of “human security” point out that the difference
between these two notions of security lies on the focus of human security which is the individual
itself. Thus, while comprehensive security may acknowledge the multidimensionality of security,
it does so more or less from the perspective of the society or the state.

Human security, on the other hand, emphasizes the individual and highlights that security
should be viewed from the perspective of the individual.

In this regard, it may be worthwhile to examine the nexus between national security and
human security, particularly in the Philippine setting, where national security is defined by the
government as comprehensive. This is partly brought about by the fact that in the Philippines,
insurgency remains to be the foremost security challenge. As is widely acknowledged,
insurgency is a multi-dimensional problem, and thus it can not be managed, addressed, or solved
exclusively with military force.

What is equally necessary is addressing what is now commonly known as the “root
cause” of insurgency, with poverty usually identified as such. Poverty apparently induces people
to become insurgents even while other people use it as an issue to undermine government
authority. Insurgents often exploit social problems, specifically poverty, to recruit members.

Whether poverty is the root cause of insurgency, there appears to be a consensus that
insurgency could best be addressed if the government “wins the hearts and minds” of the people,
something that could only be done if their well-being is taken care of. As acknowledged by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, an insurgent’s “will to fight … cannot be diminished simply by

6
See Carolina G. Hernandez, “Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Challenges: The Asia-Pacific Region in the
Late 20th Century” (Lecture prepared for the Joint-Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and delivered at the
General Headquarters of the AFP on September 1999).
7
Herman Joseph Kraft, “11 September 2001 and Human Security”, OSS Digest, 1st and 2nd Quarter 2006, p. 13.

60

attrition but by tangible improvements regarding his well being.” 8 People’s well-being
incidentally lies at the very core of human security.

National Security in the Philippines

The status of the Philippines as a developing economy and a democratizing polity
probably helps explain why the government has defined national security as the creation of
physical and policy environment where the national vision of having a Philippines where
“freedom, dignity and prosperity” is attained and the “nation’s core values, way of life and
institutions; capacity to create and share wealth; living standards; sovereignty/territorial integrity;
and strategic relationships” are protected and enhanced. 9

The government has identified several strategic objectives that need to be met if the
Philippines is to be secure. These are: (1) moral consensus,(2) cultural cohesiveness, (3)
ecological balance, (4) economic strength, (5) socio-political stability, (6) territorial integrity, (7)
international harmony, (8) global competitiveness, (9) people empowerment, and (10) solid
infrastructure. 10

Going back to the seven concerns within the rubric of human security spelled out by the
United Nations – economic, environmental, personal, community, health, political and food –
five of these concerns are part of the strategic objectives considered to be dimensions of national
security for the Philippines. These are economic, environmental, people, community, and
political. And as previously mentioned, challenges to the Philippines’ national security emanate
mainly from internal sources, with insurgency being the foremost security challenge. Insurgency
in the Philippines comes in the form of communist insurgency, Muslim secessionism, and
terrorism.

It is in this context that the Philippines’ National Internal Security Plan (NISP) was
adopted. Formalized through Executive Order No. 21 which was issued by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo in 2001, the plan recognizes that “insurgency … pose[s] a serious threat to
national security. [Thus,] government response … requires a holistic approach consisting of
political, socio-economic/psychological, security and information components to address the root
causes and armed threats of insurgency”. 11

More recently, the government has come up with a so-called “enhanced” version of the
NISP. This enhanced version calls for not only a holistic approach but a “whole of government”
approach to address insurgency. Such an approach involves five key offensives namely political,
legal, information, economic and military offensives as well as three programs: Amnesty;
Human Rights; and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.

8
Rey C. Ardo, “The Military Dimension of National Security” (Lecture delivered at the 10th Executive Course on
National Security held at the National Defense College of the Philippines, September 26, 2007).
9
A. Francisco J. Mier, “National Security Concept” (Presentation delivered at the National Defense and Security
Review held at the National Defense College of the Philippines, September 3, 2007), p. 3.
10
Ibid.
11
See the National Internal Security Plan.

61

Incidentally, the president in early September issued Proclamation No. 1377, which
grants amnesty to members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s
Army/National Democratic Front as well as other communist insurgent groups in the Philippines.
In this proclamation, the president noted that “accepting rebels back into the folds of the law
through amnesty, and eventually providing them access to the government’s existing socio-
economic services, are essential to attaining peace and reconciliation” in the Philippines. 12

This national plan is implemented in four phases: the clear, hold, consolidation and
develop phases. The clear phase involves the “neutralization” of the insurgent’s armed
combatants in a certain locality. The hold phase involves preventing the return of insurgents to a
certain area, primarily by organizing local communities. The consolidation phase refers to
sustaining the gains of the government in these areas through the initiation of development
projects that assist local communities in their march toward progress.

In the context of the holistic approach and whole of government approach mentioned
previously, the Philippine military takes charge of the clear and hold phases while civilian
agencies of the national government as well as local government units and executives take care
of the consolidate and develop phases, with the Armed Forces apparently performing a support
role in such efforts.

National security for the Philippines is closely linked with national development. The
National Security Council notes that development involves the “creation of value and wealth and
its distribution in a manner that motivates all to create more value and wealth on a sustained
basis”. Consequently, national security pertains to the creation of the physical and policy
environment that allows the creation and distribution of value and wealth. Wealth simply cannot
be created where insecurity among the people persists or fear for one’s life dominates.

Beyond conducting purely military operations against insurgents, the Philippine military
has been implementing a so-called Kalayaan Barangays program, which aims to “transform
communities previously affected by internal conflict into development areas.” 13 The program
aims to “expedite the delivery of basic services in areas affected by [insurgency].” 14 The idea
behind this program is that funds from civilian agencies of the national government such as the
Department of Education and the Department of Public Works and Highways are pooled with the
Philippine military, with its military engineers being in charge of implementing various “high-
impact, short-gestation” projects. These include electrification of barangays as well as
construction of school buildings, medical facilities and access roads. 15 Cooperatives for rebel
returnees are also expected to be established. 16 These projects are believed to have positive
effects on local communities.

12
See “PGMA Issues Proclamation Granting Amnesty to CPP-NPA-NDF Members, Other Communist Rebels
found at http://www.gov.ph/news/?i=18770.
13
See “Philippines to use engineer corps to establish 500 ‘freedom villages’”, Janes Defense Weekly, found at
http://www8.janes.com/ janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2006/jdw30585.htm.
14
Hermongenes C. Esperon, “Progress in Counter-Terrorism: The Philippine Experience” (Paper delivered at the
6th Shangri-la Dialogue organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies held in Singapore on June 2-
4, 2007), p. 10.
15
Ardo, p. 4.
16
See “Philippines to use engineer corps to establish 500 ‘freedom villages.’”

62

In September 2007, the Armed Forces of the Philippines activated its National
Development Support Command (NDSC) in a move to enhance its capacity to undertake
development-related projects such as infrastructure and livelihood projects in far-flung
communities. The AFP notes that the creation of this command is in line with the national
government’s thrust to ensure the development of communities. The national government and
the Philippine military acknowledge that development is a requisite to end insurgency by 2010, a
deadline that the president has set.

Accordingly, the newly created command will be closely working with civilian agencies
of government as well as nongovernment organizations in identifying priority projects,
implementing them, and as monitoring their progress. It would also be in charge of informing the
public in far-flung communities of development programs being implemented in those areas. It
will have operational control over AFP units involved in engineering, public, and civic affairs.

Mainstreaming Human Security in the Philippines

The essence of human security appears to have permeated the Philippines’ notion of
national security. In fact, even the Human Security Act, more popularly known as the Anti-
Terrorism Law enacted in 2007, recognizes the value of protecting the people’s well being.

While it is understandable that some sectors are apprehensive that this law could pave the
way for the government to disregard the basic rights of private citizens, a closer look reveals that
there are 22 provisions that protect the rights and welfare of people while only four provisions
are actually directed against what the government considers terrorists.

Thus, the idea of human security need not be presented as an alternative to national
security, but rather a complement to it. As one observer notes, “notwithstanding their [national
security and human security] differences, [the two] are not really diametrically opposed to each
other to the extent that they can not be reconciled.” 17 The same observer goes on to argue that
“… just as human security refers to the protection and safety of the individual, so is national
security focused on the protection of the state which, [incidentally] is a community of persons.” 18

The complementariness of national security and human security needs to be
communicated to the government if human security is to become part of the mainstream security
discourse in the Philippines and elsewhere. While some argue that the idea of national security is
already passé, this may not be the case, particularly in societies, such as the Philippines, where
national security has evolved from its “traditional” sense of being military-centric to something
more encompassing.

In societies where the government has acknowledged human security through policy
pronouncements, social forces outside the state should capitalize on them rather than present
human security as an alternative to national security or demand that the state give up national
security and simply adopt human security. Doing so would be more counter-productive as a

17
Cesar P. Pobre, “Towards a Broadened and Integrated Concept of Security”, OSS Digest, 1st and 2nd Quarter
2006, p. 10.
18
Ibid.

63

government may acknowledge the essence of human security, but it will remain focused on
national security.

64

U.S.-China-Japan Relations and the ROK
By Jiyon Shin

U.S.-China-Japan relations: Constructive Competition or Cut-throat Rivalry?

Military

The United States and Japan for half a century have been allies, and at the turn of 21st
century have strengthened their alliance by burden sharing in military expenses, military
modernization, expanding the use of Japan’s Self-Defense Force, proclaiming their common goal
to tackle global terrorism, and cooperating on a ballistic missile defense program formulated by
the United States. Their alliance is close enough to be conceived as a powerfully coordinated
voice for Northeast Asian security. This intimate tie troubles security analysts in neighbouring
countries, including China and South Korea (and North Korea).

Meanwhile, China has been modernizing its military by increasing military spending,
upgrading conventional and nuclear weapons, which adds to the lingering Cold War tension in
Northeast Asia. Thus, the security dilemma surfaces as countries intensify military build-ups and
upgrade military alliances. Mistrust is in the air as Northeast Asia lacks a sense of community, a
legacy of the long shadows of colonialism and Cold War.

Energy

A newly rising China has been blamed for ‘swallowing’ global resources with
nationalistic policies that deplete natural resources, and environmental degradation caused by its
development. The United States has been the number one consumer of oil, and has been
perceived as an ‘oil addicted nation’ for decades as it became entangled in wars. The United
States is also scrutinizing China’s global resource consumption. Japan (like Korea) is 100
percent reliant on imported oil to sustain its economy, so it too feels jittery about China’s
‘ravenous’ thirst for oil and natural resources.

Economy

The United States and Japan are the world’s largest market economies, yet both may be
overtaken by China. Capitalist China is quickly catching up, and is estimated to surpass Japan in
a decade, provided current trends continue. ‘Trade wars,’ or commercial disputes leading to
mercantilism and harsh feelings, whether related to retaliatory trade regulations, anti-dumping, or
dumplings, are unavoidable.

The ROK’s Diplomatic Dilemma

Although a middle power, the Republic of Korea is surrounded by great military and
economic powers (United States, Russia, China, and Japan), and nuclear powers including
Russia, China, the United States, and its hostile other half North Korea. Consequently, ROK
defense has relied on the ROK-U.S. alliance for the last half century. ROK renounced its nuclear

65

agenda in exchange for an alliance that provided a nuclear umbrella and a sturdy military
presence. This allowed the ROK to focus on rapid economic development which was a great
success.

As time passed and a younger generation that did not experience the Korean War
emerged in Korea, views of the ROK-U.S. alliance evolved. Korean nationalism and pride
demanded respect and fairer treatment as an ally of the U.S., shaking the foundations of the
alliance. Although the significance of the alliance is emphasized through governmental channels,
scholars predict nationalism may continue, changing the nature of the bilateral relationship.

Moreover, the history of colonialism and the Cold War makes it hard for the ROK to
approach Japan or China. Attempts by Japan to become a ‘normal’ power, such as changing rules
governing the use of the SDF or changing the constitution, or disputes over territory, and
labelling waters nearby (such as the East Sea or Sea of Japan) creates a commotion among the
Korean public. The government is then compelled to reflect negative domestic sentiment to its
foreign policies, often exacerbating relations with Japan. On the other hand, speculation during
rocky times with the United States — that China could be a substitute for the U.S. alliance –
vanished as suspicions mounted about China’s intentions, reflected in the Northeast Asia
project, 1 massive investment in North Korea surpassing that of South Korea, trade-related
conflicts, and differences in values.

ROK in the Middle of “The” Great Powers

The ROK, as a middle power among great powers, has to overcome those issues. When
hostility in Northeast Asia is created by the U.S.-Japan and China rivalry, South Korea is
affected by triangular relations of the great powers, and must deal with it to deter the ROK’s
biggest fear: lagging in the midst of rivalry, competition, and alliance-making in Northeast Asia.

The ROK’s alliance challenge in Northeast Asia is to continue building on the alliance
with the U.S. in a more comprehensive way while turning the alliance into a fairer deal;
positively competing with Japan for more attention from the U.S., yet simultaneously
collaborating with Japan and the U.S. as it did during the Cold War. In the course of forming a
triangular alliance, the ROK challenge is to prevent a situation in which China feels contained.
China is increasingly significant in South Korea’s economy, and South Korea wishes to maintain
friendly relations with China, as much as it desires the same with the U.S., and Japan.

Going beyond mere friendly relations with Japan and China, the ROK’s ambition is to
create a stable channel between Japan and China so it will not be left out of the region’s
dynamics. Therefore the ROK has initiated high-level meetings to show goodwill and to remind
both countries of its importance. Public opinion and the governmental sector have expressed
anxiety when Sino-Japanese relations seemed to visibly warm such as Hu’s visit to Japan and his
‘skipping’ South Korea.

Finally, the ROK challenge is to raise its national capacity by reaching out to other
regions through FTAs, economic partnerships, securing energy policies, being a responsible
1
See Bruce Klingner, China Shock for South Korea, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FI11Dg03.html

66

member of the United Nations, picking up larger bills regarding the ROK-U.S. alliance, and
tailoring itself into a refined developed nation (‘Sunjinhwa,’ or becoming a developed nation, is
the term frequently used in South Korea’s policy outlines).

ROK’s interests are to have a region of co-prosperity and peace in the midst of great
powers, to be more influential with its North Korean policy, and to be an active member of
Northeast Asia, and the world. Northeast Asian arms race, rivalry, and conflicts, and a nuclear or
unstable North Korea are threats to the ROK and to Northeast Asia.

Regional Cooperation: Key to Peace in Northeast Asia, and the World

Focusing on commonalities, such as mutual economic development by institutionalizing
an economic channel, a political channel may lead to a loose Northeast Asian community which
will lay groundwork for further collaboration.

Increasing multilateral efforts among China, the U.S., Japan, and ROK to tackle
traditional security problems, such as solving the North Korea nuclear threat and countering
terrorism activities will enhance trust.

Creating institutes to cooperate on nontraditional security issues such as the environment,
human rights, energy, and global diseases may contribute to regional peace.

Lastly, deepening cultural exchanges through creative policies, in addition to visa waiver
policies, creating a favorable environment for tourism, and making efforts to resolve historical
issues are recommended.

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China’s Perspective on the U.S.-Japan Alliance
By Wan Ruyi Tony

With rapid economic growth, East Asia claims a more strategic role for great powers.
China and Japan are the two major powers in this region. Historically, only one of the countries
has dominated this region. This is the first time in history that both claim regional leadership.
East Asia’s future order will be decided by this bilateral relationship. Meanwhile, after the Cold
War, the DPRK has become a regional strategic concern not a global one. However, the U.S.-
Japan alliance was not weakened as tension eased. Instead, the alliance was strengthened.
Furthermore, the Sino-U.S. relationship is even more important regionally and globally. The
basic Chinese perspective on the U.S.-Japan alliance is evident in the chart that follows.

The main function of the U.S.-Japan alliance is security. After the Cold War, both
countries found their interests overlapped, like containing China, securing leadership in East
Asia, etc. Japan’s aggressive efforts at militarization were tolerated by the U.S. within the
alliance framework to contain a rising China. Military cooperation also legalized U.S. troops’
garrison in the Far East. With the support of NATO, U.S. has successfully contained Russia both
at the Pacific and the Atlantic. At the same time, under rapid economic growth, the regional
order of East Asia is being restructured. After the domestic crisis in Indonesia and the economic
crisis in Thailand, the region is becoming an economic engine. So, no matter what happens in the
Middle East, more of U.S. efforts should be put here. The U.S.-Japan alliance uses NATO as an
example. Meanwhile, the alliance shelters a pacifist constitutional Japan, from traditional
security to sea-line protection, at least before normalization.

With the alliance strengthened, Japan began to boldly advocate Western values, which
have been adopted since the Meiji Era. After wealth, welfare, and the middle class solidified,
people claimed more democratic rights and government was restrained. Social change was
spread through civil communication and other social activity in Tokyo, to developing country
like BRICs. Sometimes, the democratic notion rose to the ideological level, thus legalizing
efforts to rebuild others’ regimes.

But the allies have differences on economic issues. After the Plaza accord, Stock Index
exploded. Foreign capital was pumped out. Japan and U.S. suffered from trade tensions for a
long time. The strong reliance on the U.S. could not help Japan out of its recession, nor has Japan
helped the U.S. after the sub-prime debt crisis. As a result, Japanese youth started to raise an
identity that Japan is firstly Asian, then a member of the G8. They realized the importance of
economic ties with neighbors, especially when the neighbors are fast growing.

So, Japan and the U.S. share common interests in security, but disagree on the economy,
which leaves quite an important role for China.

China agrees little with the U.S.-Japan alliance, and is sometimes angered by it. The
alliance focuses on security, allowing Japan to be more aggressive (and the U.S. too). China is
challenged on the PLA’s development and there is reference to the China threat, while China is
needed on other issues, like the DPRK crisis, Darfur, etc. It should be noticed that both allies

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have maintained strategic discussions with China since the 1970s. China can make use of
bilateral mechanisms to influence the alliance’s policy toward China. However, it is too negative.
Still, China cherishes domestic and regional stability. As an important part of the UNSC, NPT,
ARF, ASEAN+1(3), China will push regional integration and multipolarization to secure
regional and domestic stability. It is obvious that China is enlarging its influence in this direction
through expanding mutual benefits in trade and other forms of economic cooperation. It can be
expected that strengthened regional mechanisms can contain the aggressive efforts of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, to guard against direct confrontation.

The left side of the following chart illustrates China’s response to the alliance’s
aggressive efforts on security. It is protective and negative. The right side illustrates the
economic field. China turns out to be much more confident and positive. With comprehensive
cooperation with neighboring countries and other notable achievements, China’s influencing
ability, or soft power, is increased. However, the U.S. still claims dominance of military power,
which comes at the cost of soft power. As Brzezinski mentioned, many countries in the Middle
East and East Asia now doubt the Bush administration’s ability to assure security. So, Japan will
be getting close with China on economy in Asia, while keeping close to the U.S. in the security
alliance. This is also true for China. Only by strengthening the two bilateral relationships will the
trilateral relationship be strengthened.

China’s response to the U.S.-Japan alliance, positive or negative, is compatible with
regional interests because aggressive efforts by the alliance will kindle an arm race and create
great uncertainty in the restructuring period. As shown in the chart, China can and will push
regional integration and multipolarization, which is compatible with the interests of neighboring
counties.

As a conclusion, it is noticeable that the three countries have their own characteristics and
needs. Japan will try to enlarge economic cooperation with China, while facing the dilemma
between security and economy. China will comprehensively strengthen the bilateral relationship
with the U.S. and Japan, while enlarging its regional influence through expanding mutual
benefits in trade and other economic channels. Finally, the U.S. will balance both sides according
to prompt changes, until the regional order is clear.

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Strengthen Sino-US CHN’s choice Strengthen Sino-JPN
MILITARY SOFT POWER
Close to US JPN’s status Close to CHN
Security Society Economic
[DIVERGENCE] US-leading
APEC’s influence down;
[STRENGTHENING] [SIMILAR] western democratic Economic recession; JPN-US
US-JPN Authority -> Cooperation -> Partner value recognition & spreading; trade contest upgraded;
relation 2+2 Meeting; Taiwan Issue Interference; DPRK Issue; Iraq War; NGO; technology dominance; JPN’s Asian identity
Keep up with western powers;
baffle the current world order; More cooperative/alternative in
Interest dilute neighbors’ historic Asia than US; secure leadership
Contain CHN (since SU collapse); legalize militarization; secure
of JPN sea-lifeline; hostility; in Asia via economic status;

Interest Contain CHN (since SU collapse); strengthen the influence during Spread American value; isolate Penetrate reliance;
East Asia restructuring; expand the ally’s influence (Asian socialism value; legalize its
of US efforts to build US-close regime; share/transfer risk;
“NATO”); emphasis transferred to AP; NPT compliance in EA;
IPR/antidumping; CNY
Constrain PLA’s development; enkindle the distrust to US/JPN; policy pressed; economic risk
Influence disturb Sino-JPN/Sino-US relation; constrain CHN’s efforts on Influence CHN domestic value; transfer; instability caused by
to CHN Taiwan issue; fillip nationalism; Brain drain; fillip nationalism; floating foreign capital;
Cultural influence at the region; Market; leading role in
(Permanent member of UNSC; NWS of the NPT framework; Comprehensive accessibility to ASEAN+3/1; role in APEC;
important role in 6-party talk; role in ARF) the world; close relationship cooperation in FTA & EPA; big
Influence Promote regional mechanism to dilute alliance influence; with the third world; engine of multilateral method;
of CHN influence JPN-US relation via Sino-US & Sino-JPN mechanism; nationalism plenty of foreign exchange;
Push multipolarization via
Territory integrity; security in neighboring sea area (including Sovereignty independence; regional integration; expand
Interest energy supply); protect the glacis with JPN-US; push the Domestic/regional influence via common
of CHN multipolarization in SEA integration; enlarge regional influence; stability; economic interest;
Promote regional integration; enkindle the distrust towards US- Promote regional Promote regional integration;
Regional JPN; disturb Sino-US relation, thus disturb the present order of integration; Enlarge regional cooperation;
effect US-EA; fail to constrain arm contest due to JPN militarization; Secure regional stability; reduce economic risk;
Strengthen Strengthen and stabilize Sino-US & Sino-JPN relationship; push forward the regional integration, stability, multipolarization, cooperation
trilateral at security, energy, trade and economy in East Asia; stick to JPN’s pacificist constitution ; deepen the exchange at civil level.
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U.S.-Japan Alliance and Trilateral Relations:
A Chinese Perspective
By Shanshan Wang

Both China-U.S and China-Japan relations are key considerations in Beijing’s foreign
policy calculus and to a large extent, play a significant role in China’s grand strategy. Thus, the
U.S.-Japan alliance should not be overlooked by China. China is concerned that a strong U.S.-
Japan alliance would (or at least aims to) hinder China’s rise and China’s “glorious cause of
unification” of Taiwan. Although more pundits in China call for the buildup of a win-win
mentality in China’s management of the U.S.-Japan alliance, there are still worries when China
views this alliance.

China and Japan are burdened with historical and territorial disputes and bilateral
relations have undergone ups and downs, in spite of goodwill among both peoples. Some argue
that given that China and Japan have always been vying for leadership in East Asia and future
conflicts between the two – a rising China and a rejuvenating Japan – are ordained in the 21st
century. The U.S. pressure in East Asia has been regarded as a security umbrella for a militarily
weak Japan (vis-à-vis China) with the alliance serving as the core. However, China is also aware
of the uncertainties of the U.S.-Japan alliance, such as Japan’s growing nationalism and Japan
leading the U.S. by the nose in the Sino-U.S.-Japanese relationship.

Bearing in mind the profound transformation of the security structure of East Asia and
the world, it is time for China to bring in more sober realism and take its perception of the U.S.-
Japan alliance beyond zero-sum calculations. The U.S.-Japan alliance should not be regarded as
an obstacle to the realization of China’s national interest.

First, China’s utmost interest is maintaining peace and stability, not only internationally
but also domestically. This is vital to the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leadership. China needs a stable and peaceful international environment to trade and maintain
economic development; the CCP has bet on economic development and globalization to maintain
its domestic authority.

In spite of contrasting values and political systems, China and the U.S. share common
interests, such as a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and stable and peaceful China-Japan
relations. The U.S. presence in Asia does not necessarily contradict China’s interests or should
be regarded as part of a U.S. “plot to contain China.” The U.S.-Japan alliance does not serve that
purpose either. The U.S. can serve as a moderator and balancer in this porous and unstable
relationship to maintain regional stability.

Second, national unification is another Chinese concern, but here too, there exists a close
linkage between this basic national interest and the CCP’s concern for domestic legitimacy. Is
the U.S.-Japan alliance in the way of China’s realization of its “glorious cause” of “liberating”
Taiwan? Not necessarily. With KMT President-elect Ma Ying-jeou taking office in Taiwan in
May, cross-Strait relations will warm and economic links will be strengthened, although disputes
and uncertainties persist. The U.S., burdened by the war on terror, and a Japan worried about the

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security dilemma will not want to see the Taiwan Strait become a flashpoint. Thus stable and
prosperous cross-Strait relations are also in the U.S. and Japan’s interest.

It is commonly believed that the three countries desire positive, constructive and stable
relations among themselves. How can we achieve this goal?

First, a most important action that can strengthen this trilateral relationship is mutual trust
and confidence among these three countries. Taiwan and the ROK can also be included in this
confidence-building mechanism.

Second, a trilateral cooperative mechanism based on bilateral mechanisms involving
China and the U.S., China, and Japan, and the Japan-U.S. alliance should be developed and
institutionalized. It can start from trilateral coordination on nontraditional affairs.

Third, cooperation on “soft power” should be addressed to strengthen mutual
understanding and pave the way for “high politics” cooperation.

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The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the U.S.-Japan-China Triangle
By Weiwei Zhang

I. The Shortest Side of the Triangle

As there are both strong inertia and wide convergence of national interests in the U.S.-
Japan relationship, the U.S.-Japan side is and will remain the shortest one in the triangle that the
U.S., Japan, and China are forming.

Being allies for decades, the U.S. and Japan have developed psychological dependence
on each other and a set of communication and cooperation mechanisms to strengthen their
partnership. Keeping the alliance with Japan has never been a question in U.S. politics. Though
Japan’s Asian policy has swayed from time to time, every prime minister acknowledges the
utmost importance of relationship with the U.S. Nowadays, there is a strong basis for the two
allies: deep economic ties, similar security concerns, and most importantly, a vibrantly changing
Asia-Pacific posing challenges to both of their traditional regional and global roles.

The alliance is readjusting. Washington wants Tokyo to play a bigger role in regional
affairs to impose its own presence. However, it is not sincerely supporting Tokyo’s cry for
“normal power” status. Risking a decline of influence, Washington has to keep an eye on
Tokyo’s political and military projections. Though Tokyo’s strategic capabilities have not yet
aroused Washington’s concern, there is a distant prospect of a clash of interests within the
alliance.

But, old friends are more reliable than new ones, especially in times of great change
when the “loyalty” of new friends is not clear. Clinging to the alliance is an established and
rational choice for both Washington and Tokyo.

II. China, the Third Point

China is in the best position in the trilateral relationship in is history. The great success of
economic reform has woven the Chinese economy into the world. Its political influence is
playing constructive roles in Asia and beyond. By entering the WTO, appreciating the RMB, and
cooperating on Darfur, China demonstrates a good will and cooperative spirit to blend peacefully
into the international system. All these have won China unprecedented attention and positive
expectations from both the U.S. and Japan.

For decades, the Sino-American relationship has been on good terms apart for
interruptions like the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the EP-3
incident. Although disputes on economic affairs and human rights surface every now and then
and the two militaries are preparing for potential conflicts across the Taiwan Strait, both
governments have leaned to steer the relationship in a constructive direction and remain
restrained in time of crisis.

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The Sino-Japanese relationship has been more volatile. At the beginning of this century,
despite sound economic exchanges, the political relationship went from worse to worse by strong
national sentiments in both countries. Fortunately, things are changing for the better since Shinzo
Abe took office in Sept. 2006. Though disputes still persist on East China Sea resources, the
Diaoyu Islands, and the contaminated dumplings, they are handled with political amity.
However, fluctuations on the political relationship can not be ruled out as Japan’s China policy
may still be heavily influenced by domestic politics.

Against this background, both the U.S. and Japan began to be concerned that the other’s
good relations with China may harm its own interests in the region. Both began to use the China
relationship as a lever in relations with each other. The U.S.-Japan alliance has also moved from
direct hostility toward China to a more engaging stance.

Nevertheless, China’s strategic intention is in question. Will it be a challenger to the
established order? After all, China maintains a distinct political system that runs counter to what
the Western world relentlessly advocates; China builds its military to prevent the independence
of Taiwan; and China is not adapting to international economic rules fast and smooth enough.

As this fundamental suspicion is hard to dispel, the U.S.-Japan alliance is used as a
hedging tool toward China’s development. On the other side, given the outward nature of any
alliance and the centrality of the Taiwan issue in this alliance, China cannot help feeling
offended.

As a Chinese, I see two issues on top of China’s agenda: peaceful development and
national unity equally important. Peaceful development means nation building in a peaceful way,
including economic growth, institution building, and international profile building. So far
breathtaking economic growth has caused many internal problems such as development
disparities, and institution building lags far behind. In this sense, an open and cooperative
relationship with both the U.S. and Japan will help ease their suspicions, and the good economic
environment they have established is generally healthy and helpful for China’s development.

Neither the U.S. nor Japan favors a clear-cut attitude toward the status of Taiwan.
Ambiguity complicates the regional situation and the alliance is used as a de facto check on
China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. However, instead of seeing the U.S.-Japan alliance as an
obstacle to China’s national interests, I would rather call their individual intentions “stumbling
blocks.”

III. Work toward a Triangle on a Harmonious Circle

The U.S.-Japan alliance has preserved decades of regional peace. Yet as the environment
changes, the alliance needs to adapt to more regional individuality and closer interdependence.
The U.S.-Japan-China triangle is in formation. While the relative positions of the three may
change constantly, all parties want relations to be productive rather than conflicting. Therefore
the triangle is better to see as a circle that assures major interaction ultimately returns to the right
track.

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To achieve this ideal, three things are essential-----vision, courage and skills.

“Vision” involves the identification of each party’s core interests and the
acknowledgement of their positions. Judging from the table below, the three core interests do not
necessarily conflict.

STATE CORE INTERESTS
China Peaceful development and national unity
The U.S. Prevailing global and regional influence
Japan Being a normal power

“Courage” means the bravery to make compromises for one’s core interests. Courage
requires the traditional wisdom of “live and let live” as well as “give and take.”

“Skills” are needed to understand the different domestic environments and political
cultures, to show respect, and to handle disputes and national sentiments properly.

While the above three are fundamental, there are more concrete measures that can be
taken.

• Strengthen and broaden current high-level dialogues and exchanges in the political,
economic, and military fields.
• Intensify civil society communications to build a basis at the grassroots level.
• Advocate freedom of speech and an open environment to enhance transparency and
public monitoring.
• Work out a bounding mechanism for cooperation so any party that turns away will face
great losses.

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Chinese Internal Affairs:
What Matters or Will Be the Matters!!
by Masahiro (Hiro) Yumino

Chinese development today is obvious and looks stable on the surface. But many
problems are getting more serious. It is impossible to keep this high speed development. Yet
once it slows down many problems will emerge. That makes things unstable in the East Asian
security environment. In the next couple of years, a sustainable, peaceful, developed China will
be critical for China, but for the U.S. and Japan as well. So cooperation between these three
countries in these fields (helping China to develop and persuading China to allocate resources to
resolve internal problems not just military modernization) is critical to Asia’s security
environment. These are not just domestic issues for China!

U.S.-China-Japanese trilateral relations don’t look as bad as they seem. Sino-Japanese
relations have been getting better after Prime Minister Fukuda’s visit to China and Primer Wen
Jiabao’s visit to Japan, even though some gyoza (dumpling) problems exist. Meanwhile, the U.S.
is busy dealing with Iraq and does not have time to think deeply about Asia. So, Sino-U.S.
relations don’t look bad. U.S.-Japan relations also look ok. Is this accurate? Might there be
conflict (or tension) between these countries in the near future?

The situation is not simple and conflicts can still accidentally happen as has occurred in
recent years:

“Crises” related to China that caused international (bilateral) tension include:
• 1999 NATO air-strike against the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and student protests
• 2001 EP-3 accident
• 2002 N. Korean refugee incident
• 2003 SARS problems, Anti-Japanese protest caused by Japanese students’ obscene play
• 2005 “Anti-Japanese” protests
• 2007 dumpling problems, Tibet protests, Olympics→？？

These issues made the Chinese government recognize the importance of “crisis”
management not only internationally but also domestically. Domestically, the Chinese
government calls this “public crisis management” (公共危机管理). Now the government is
building a new crisis management bureau, the Civil Security Bureau (民防局).

To maintain stable development, “crisis management” is important not only
internationally but also domestically. Negative aspects of development are getting more obvious;
to ensure “harmonious development,” the government must decrease gaps in Chinese society,
especially after the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo. That’s why the Chinese
government insists on building the “Harmonious society (和谐社会)”.

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What creates disharmony?

Big gaps in society hinder the creation of a “harmonious society” and stable development. Those
gaps are between:
• the poor and the rich
• east and west (in China)
• city and countryside
• citizen and farmer
• coastal and inland
• Entrepreneur and labor-workers
• Party members and non-members
• Political leaders (people who can access power) and ordinary citizens (people who can’t)
• People who are educated and people who aren’t

These gaps make it difficult to pursue stable development and complicate foreign
relations. Those kinds of situation are not favorable for Japan or the U.S.

These gaps can cause serious friction, and the Chinese government might face big
challenges.

Some of these problems are evident. Such as:
• Demonstrations against the government are increasing (80,000/year)
• Many people seek spiritual solutions such as through Falungong（法轮功）.

These problems can raise suspicions about the CPC’s governability.

What can Japan and the U.S. do about this situation? How can the three countries
cooperate?

Japan and the U.S. can:
• Persuade China to allocate resources not to military expenditures, but to reduce poverty
and on environment issues.
• Coordinate ODA schemes to reduce gaps in the field that China can accept, especially in
the countryside. Examples include education, infrastructure, etc.

With China:
• Increase interdependence of mutual interests, such as human exchanges for government
bureaus and school. By creating common interests, we can hope to decrease conflict.

• Increase information and human exchange in the fields of crisis management, such as
earthquake, fire, flood (natural disaster factor), drugs, crime, disease, AIDS, bird flu, etc.

A stable, peaceful, developed (but not aggressive, hard-power oriented) China is
welcome in Japan. A power-oriented foreign policy is not favorable for Japan.

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Pacific Forum CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS
PACIFIC FORUM YOUNG LEADERS FORUM
HOW HUMAN SECURITY COMPLEMENTS STATE SECURITY

Co-hosted by the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) with
assistance by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF)

Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Kaiyo Sempaku Building Conference Hall (10th Floor)
Tokyo April 3, 2008

Program Report
By Joni Caminos

On April 3, 2008, the Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the Research Institute for Peace
and Security (RIPS), held the first Young Leaders Conference. Over 50 young scholars and
professionals, representing more than eight countries, participated in an intense day of
discussions to strengthen understanding and cooperation on human security issues. In addition,
this conference aimed to give young professionals from around the world a chance to meet each
other, network, and develop enduring personal and professional relationships.

Session I: Review of the April 1-2, 2008 U.S.-Japan-China conference

During the first session we examined several key issues of state security for the U.S.,
Japan, and China. Young Leaders from each participating country presented an analysis.

Japanese participant Ms. Wakana Mukai, a Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of
International Affairs, made three points. First, she was shocked that the three countries seemed
extremely satisfied with relation. Second, Japan seems to be seeking a more concrete position
within the trilateral Taiwan issue. Third, she was troubled by some lack of familiarizing with
non-traditional security issues such as environmental degradation. In Japan, environmental
sustainability is a very significant issue. Furthermore, she added that beyond the issue of
democracy, stability is critical to Asia’s future.

Ms. Shanshan Wang, Pacific Forum CSIS Vasey Fellow from China, observed three
views among Chinese participants. The moderate view is vigilant of the U.S.-Japan alliance and
doesn’t want to see it directed at China; however, China is positive about the China-U.S.
confidence building process and China is willing to move forward to build a trilateral dialogue
model to improve relations. China is willing to take advantage of various measures, not only
bilateral but also multilateral, to strengthen its diplomatic muscle. The conservative view is that
China should hold fast to its hard line and never make any compromise on the “One China”
principle. Taiwan is a Chinese domestic affair. And China does not want to see an expanded
U.S.-Japan alliance. The liberal believes China should take more efficient measures to speed up
its democratization process so as to broaden its common values with Taiwan; China should
understand Japan’s “insecurity” and the existence of U.S.-Japan alliance and manage its
nationalism at home in a “smarter” way so as to push trilateral relations for its own benefits.

American participant Mr. Brian Cathcart, a Research Associate at the Japan Center for
International Exchange, noted that the relationships between the three countries seemed to be on
a positive footing for the first time in a long time. He observed that many in the group supported
a trilateral track 1 dialogue. Despite productive conversations about nation-states and security
issues between the U.S., Japan, and China, he believes there should be more discussions about
non-state actors. Nontraditional security analyses may offer new perspectives on how to address
certain challenges. For instance, a non-state centric approach would analyze which actors
(companies, militaries, contractors, governments, and individuals) benefit from the arms sales to
Taiwan, and which actors perceive it to be a threat.

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Overall, we were challenged to put ourselves into the other’s shoes. One Young Leader
commented that each country needs to respect each others’ core interests. However, we must ask
if we agree upon these core interests? We came back to the roles Japan, China, and the U.S. play
in the region. Nonetheless, there was a general agreement among the participants that the world
faces increasing nontraditional security challenges and they have great importance for the
development of confidence among Asian countries.

Session II: Human Security Overview by Carl Baker, Director of Programs, Pacific Forum
CSIS

Carl Baker, co-editor of Comparative Connections at Pacific Forum CSIS and former
faculty member at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, gave a conceptual framework on
human security.

He began by asking what we think of when we refer to security and what it means to
move away from state security. Traditionally, sovereign states with clearly defined borders that
raise militaries to protect its citizens from other states equals national defense.
However, in the era of globalization, we are defending national security beyond the borders. We
have citizens living in other countries, thousands of people traveling through international
airports, and people working for NGOs overseas dealing with human security.

States have broadened their definition of security beyond military defense. Japan
developed the concept of comprehensive security, which focuses on economic and political
considerations. ASEAN developed cooperative security to address shared security concerns such
as transnational crime.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Commission on Human Security
Report (2003) asserts that human security complements state security by addressing insecurities
that have not been considered as state security threats. Human security includes specific elements
such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political securities.

Baker challenged participants to look at how nongovernment organizations and
multinational corporations are working to raise awareness of security issues that tend to be
overlooked by the state.

Keynote Speaker: Ambassador Yukio Satoh, President, Japan Institute of International
Affairs

Ambassador Yukio Satoh is President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs in
Tokyo, and his long distinguished diplomatic career included parting as Permanent
Representative of Japan to the United Nations Ambassador of Japan to the Netherlands, and to
Australia.

Ambassador Satoh began his presentation on Japan’s public relations failure with their
international humanitarian efforts. He spoke about how the Japanese government has been
spending billions to combat diseases such as HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis: Currently, Japan

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has pledged to spend another $5 billion to promote health in developing countries. When
mentioning this to his American friends, most were not aware, stating that this is a huge foreign
policy failure on behalf of the Japanese government. It is only recently that the Japanese
government has worked to make its efforts known.

Another example of public relations failure is Japan’s Tokyo International Conference on
African Development (TICAD). Established in 1993, TICAD has become a major global
framework for Asia and Africa to collaborate in promoting Africa’s development. Ambassador
Satoh emphasized that TICAD is not a Japan-Africa conference, rather it also includes Southeast
Asian nations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). He noted Japan has
promoted and established funds with the UN to create a Commission on Human Security. This
commission has helped to bring attention to the concept of human security into the mainstream
international debate, particularly international development assistance.

Ambassador Satoh emphasized that we should use human security as a broad term: many
people have different ideas about the definition of human security. Challenges in reducing the
impact of pandemic diseases, poverty, desertification, and the rise in sea levels, are all part of
human security. Internal conflict and ethnic conflict should also be regarded as a threat to human
security. The shift of focus from the state to people is critical, and the enhancement of human
security should be looked at with the involvement of local communities.

Ambassador Satoh closed by reiterating the fact that we need to look at human security in
a much broader sense. It is important to care about human security and give it priority in policy
making.

During the third session, Young Leader participants were divided into three groups,
Economic Security, Health and Environment, and Conflict Management. Each group was asked
to examine its topic and come up with solutions to deal with longstanding concerns and
problems.

Session III A: Economic Security in the region/globally

Those who examined economic security agreed that it is essential to human security.

All the group members agreed that the region is economically in secure. Some pointed
that the governments are to blame but trying to change the government is not realistic. Therefore,
they focused on solutions that could supplement the state’s function.

One solution is the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility whereby organizations
consider the interests of society by taking responsibility for the impact of their activities on
customers, suppliers, employees, shareholders, communities and the environment in all aspects
of their operations. This obligation is seen to extend beyond the statutory obligation to comply
with legislation and sees organizations voluntarily taking steps to improve the quality of life for
employees and their families as well as for the community in which they do business.

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Members of this group came up with several other solutions for economic sustainability
such as social entrepreneurship, securing education and health care, and an international tax
system, where the tax would be stored and managed in an international organization which is
agreed by every state party member. Another solution would be to use natural disasters as an
opportunity to unite international organizations to form and practice a Fundraising Commission.
This commission would be advocated by former high officials and celebrities where the funds
raised are used to offer aid.

Session III B: Health and Environment in the region/globally

Participants from this group focused on the shift from traditional security to non-
traditional security. They emphasize the link between health and environmental interdependence,
and how human security needs concerted effort from multisector commitments: the government,
private sector, civil society, and NGOs.

Members of this group agreed that health and environmental security is a vast topic. They
noted several threats include global disease and pandemics, bio-chemical threats, human and
drug trafficking, environmental refugees, aggrandized human population, water scarcity and
pollution, food security, air pollution, deforestation, soil erosion, desertification, and rising sea
levels.

Education was a big part of the solution devised by participants they suggested raising
consciousness in primary schools by distributing handbooks, or textbooks it a require
environmental education for students. In addition, focusing on knowledge transfer requires
educating specialists who will go back to the local community to practice skills, and provide
general infrastructure at home.

Other solutions include conferences and community meetings to adopt sustainable
practices, such as using less disposables, using energy-saving light bulbs, bringing one’s own
chopsticks and water bottles, as a way to reduce negative effects on the environment. In addition,
another solution is to support and recognize organizations by giving awards such as the
McArthur Genius Award for best government, best town, or best student for contributing to the
environment, such as curbing CO2 emissions.

Session III C: Conflict management in the region/globally

Young Leaders in this group addressed dimensions of conflict management such as
territorial conflicts, the fight for access and control over key natural resources, weapons
proliferation, and mass migration.

Participants identified several solutions to improve conflict management such as utilizing
existing institutions like ASEAN to getting local communities involved through cultural
exchanges. Dialogue with the full range of stakeholders in conflict zones is another vital
mechanism.

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In summary, Young Leaders encountered an extremely complicated and multi-faceted
subject. Human security is a very broad issue that involves numerous actors. We were challenged
to look at different aspects of human security and come up with creative solutions to
nontraditional security threats. We were encouraged to think out of the box and into someone
else’s perspective. Can human security bring trust and confidence building to another level?

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Summary of Presentation for
Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Conference
By Brian Cathcart

This is present an American perspective on the traditional security subjects presented at
the U.S.-Japan-China Trilateral Conference. Before I begin I would like express one caveat. I am
not a security studies expert but rather trained as a humanitarian. This does not mean I am an
expert on human security per se but I have studied how international organizations such as the
International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs provide assistance to civilians in
the midst of conflict. Also, I work for an organization that promotes civil society activities.

The conference opened with panelists describing the relationship of the two other
participants in the triangle, the “opposite leg.” Bad Sino-Japanese relations, which can harm U.S.
influence in the region economically and otherwise, are not in U.S. interests. Similarly, on
history issues, America’s most productive position is to let Japan and China solve the issues
themselves. One speaker noted that whereas the U.S.-Japan alliance was once characterized as
“America keeping Japan in a box that it wanted to stay in,” it is now more accurate to say
“America is helping Japan out of a box that Japan wants to get out of.” Overall, the relationships
between all three countries seemed to be on positive footing for the first time in a long time.
Many in the group supported a trilateral track 1 dialogue.

Despite the productive conversation about security issues between these three countries, I
found the discussions rather limited. The nation-state was the focal point, if not the only actor, of
interactions between these peoples. Discussions focused on potential threats, although talk
shifted from “targets” of alliances to “opportunities” of alliances. Discussions aimed at avoiding
misunderstandings and potential for state-level cooperation. Tactics seemed to play Japan and
China off one another through hedging and balancing, as it seemed to take a lot of effort to get
away from talk of zero-sum relations and the security dilemma.

The next session dealt with the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Discussions focused on
the potential alliances and 3- and 4-country groupings within the Six-Party Talks, both during
and potentially after the resolution of the situation regarding North Korea. The Six-Party Talks
could be a useful conflict management mechanism, if there were sufficient political will for
participants to come to the table on issues other than those regarding North Korea. While I
viewed this issue as perhaps the most fit for a traditional security analysis, nontraditional security
analyses may offer new perspectives on how to solve the problem. The recent trip by the New
York Philharmonic to North Korea might affect the resolution of the crisis. More limiting is how
bilateral relations within the frameworks of the six-party talks treat each state as monolithic
entities, severely limiting potential frameworks for solutions and potential actors in those
solutions.

A session on Taiwan followed, albeit with no Taiwanese present. The U.S. stressed to
China that the election of Ma Ying-jeou is a tremendous, time-sensitive opportunity to make
progress on relations with Taiwan. An American presented concrete steps China, the U.S., and
Japan can take to improve relations with Taiwan and improve the situation overall. It was

89

important to note the different perceived “starting points” for each country. However,
discussions about military buildup created a zero-sum and a tense atmosphere not without
misunderstandings and accusations. A nonstate centric approach would analyze exactly which
actors (companies, militaries, contractors, governments, and individuals) benefit from the arms
sales to Taiwan, and which actors perceive it to be a threat.

The next session focused on the nontraditional topic of environmental security. Although
the presentations were fascinating, the vast topic and lack of expertise among the participants
meant there was little progress on how to cooperate on these issues. When considering
nontraditional security topics, conference organizers should analyze the purpose and desired
outcomes (trust-building, policy memos, or concrete action plans) and who is best able to deliver
on those outcomes. If people who have been trained in traditional security do not have the
expertise to express substantive comments on particular nontraditional security topics, the
presentations become little more than informational seminars. Perhaps states are not the best
actors to handle some “security” issues. Rather the question may be whether states can mobilize
other actors involved in the issue.

The last session dealt with future prospects of security between the three nations. What is
different now than in the past is that as all three countries are powers, they are able to determine
their own relations; they are not as determined as much by external factors as in the past. Future
issues relevant to the three actors include activities with Africa (although I warned that
empowering African institutions is necessary to avoid “neo-neocolonialism”), crisis
management, governance (I suggest international relations at all levels: local, national, and
regional), and security around food, finance, maritime activities, and energy. States are not the
only actors equipped to solve these problems.

I encourage Japan to play an active role as a “middle power norm creator,” developing,
for example, a Prize for the Environment akin to the Nobel Prize. Japanese businesses could
cooperate with the EU to push for higher global environmental standards. Japan, and North
Korea, for that matter, could be the “Norway of East Asia.” Then, after experience being a
middle power, could Japan assume a spot on the UN Security Council and become a “normal”
country. However, debates would have to occur openly within Japan and with Asia as to its role,
and information would have to flow freely.

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Key Issues of State Security
for the U.S., Japan and China:
How can we solve these problems?
By Wakana Mukai

1. As an arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation expert, I was very much
surprised that all three countries seem comfortable with each other. In the security
arena, this never happens: Japan is always cautious about China’s policy, while China
seems to be quite uncomfortable with the U.S.-Japan security alliance and how that
might influence the power balance in Northeast Asia. To see the three countries not
talking about how worried they are about each other was rather astonishing.

2. Regarding the Six-Party Talks, Japan seems quite worried about the fact that it might
be left out. This is because Japan attaches the abduction issue to the Six Party Talks,
which, from my perspective, is stalling the talks. I would say that nuclear issues
would be the top priority at the talks when we take a Northeast Asian point of view:
bilateral issues between Japan and the DPRK should be dealt with in a different
arena.

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How Human Security Complements State Security
By Stephan Pierre Sakalian

1. Developments in (post-Cold War) conflict trends and environments: Global and
Regional

• Changing patterns of warfare: Territorial and ideological conflicts vs. fight for access
and control over key natural resources or state failure to guarantee security and public
service;

• Complicating factors: Weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, scarcity of
land and water, mass migration (new forms of urban violence), blurring line between
political and criminal violence;

• Global dynamics and emergence of new actors: Interplay of local, regional and global
dynamics, multiplication of non-international conflicts with a variety of state and non-
state actors (sometimes fragmented, unstable, and clandestine).

• Length and intensity of conflicts: Long-term and/or chronic nature of often low
intensity conflicts with widespread and indirect impact on the civilian population.

• ICRC’s emergency appeal 2008: “According to the ICRC’s analysis, there is a
trend whereby civilians are being specifically targeted and the number of indirect
victims is growing”.

• “ Threats to civilians’ security often arise from a lack of respect by the warring
parties for the relevant norms and rules of international law, notably International
Humanitarian Law (IHL)”

• However, because these conflicts are of low intensity, they are often under the
threshold of IHL (Infra-IHL situations): therefore, less protection for the
population and relevance of IHRL and national legislation.

• Whole range of human security problems, such as:

personal insecurity (armed violence, criminality)
economic disruption (basic needs, economic activities)
lack of social services (health and education)
human dignity

These trends and changes explain the relevance of adapting the former approach centered on
State Security to a more comprehensive approach centred on Human Security.

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2. ICRC’s answer to the challenge of Human Security in post-conflict situation/situations
of transition.

Definition: A transition period is understood to mean a period of indeterminate duration,
which constitutes the prolongation of an armed conflict or internal strife, where opened armed
confrontation has ended or at least has died down, generally following a ceasefire or “peace
agreement”. It is a period in which violence can always resume. (Aceh, Mindanao, Timor Leste,
Nepal, etc.)

• Have a comprehensive approach to the variety of needs of the victims (“needs-based
approach”). Some typical needs in relation with hostilities but also new types of needs.

• Longer-term commitment in chronic crisis, in the early stages of transition to peace or in
situations of armed violence which attract little international attention and to spot new
forms of armed confrontation. (Bridge the gap before the arrival of development agencies)

• Awareness of people’s concern and individual dignity and sensitivity in addressing their
needs (“proximity with the victims”). Encourage participatory approach (including in the
phase of need assessment), develop local capacities for the future (“empowerment”), limit
substitution (which is often not sustainable on longer term).

• Seek dialogue with the full range of stakeholders in conflict zone (importance of
impartiality and neutrality).

• Remind all stakeholders of their obligation to respect applicable law, depending on the
situation.

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Presentation at the CSIS Young Leaders Forum
By Tomoko Suzuki

I would like to share with you my experiences at the Japan Center for International
Exchange (JCIE) related to human security and global health. First, please note that I am not an
expert on health.

Some of you may have already listened to my colleague’s presentation on JCIE’s
activities, but I would like to brief you about JCIE.

JCIE is non-profit, nongovernmental and nonpartisan organization, founded in 1970 by an
individual, Mr. Tadashi Yamamoto. He is still managing this organization as president. JCIE has
three clusters of activities: one is political exchange program, another is the Civilnet program,
and the other is Global Thinknet program. Civilnet and Global Thinknet programs are network-
oriented programs, which aim to strengthen capacity of civil society and track two or three
diplomacy through encouraging dialogues and cooperation among NGOs, thinktanks, academic
institutes, media, corporate leaders, and policy makers around the world. Our geographical focus
is the Asia Pacific, Europe, and recently Africa, but in the context of regional cooperation with
Asia.

JCIE’s first encounter with human security dated back to 1998. These are JCIE’s human
security-related activities.

In 1998, Mr. Keizo Obuchi suggested to create a dialogue among Asian intellectuals in
response to the Asian Financial Crisis, especially focusing on human security of the vulnerable
population who were most affected by the crisis. JCIE was asked to serve as the secretariat. Mr.
Yamamoto was very close to Mr. Obuchi and served as one of his “private brains.” Mr. Obuchi
was one of the participants of JCIE’s political exchange program.

JCIE implemented five phases of the intellectual dialogue project. At first, the discussions
were focused on conceptual exploration, then went on how to bring the concept to actions. In the
process of implementing this project, JCIE also collaborated with the Commission on Human
Security, which was co-chaired by Madam Sadako Ogata and Prof. Amartya Sen.

After concluding the five phases, JCIE undertook a research project on the UN Trust Fund
for Human Security. In this project, we tried to find out how the concept of human security has
been understood by the implementers and how it looks on the ground.

Since 2004, JCIE has been focusing on global health issues. I cannot tell you why JCIE
picked up global health among various human security issues. We had no intention at that time.
We just responded to expectations from the outside.

In 2004, upon a request from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
JCIE launched a private supporting group for the Global Fund, (we call it Friends of the Global
Fund, Japan (FGFJ)) and JCIE has been serving as the secretariat. Since then, JCIE has
increasingly focused on global health issues, especially major communicable diseases. The most
95

important mission of the FGFJ is to raise awareness of the importance of the fight against
communicable diseases and creating an enabling environment for Japan, especially getting
Japanese government to support the Global Fund and these fights. It is a kind of advocacy work
for bringing the issue of communicable diseases for the political agenda and mobilizing
continuous support against them.

Last year, JCIE launched a research and dialogue project on “Challenges in Global Health
and Japan’s Contribution.” This project has been directed by Mr. Keizo Takemi, former senior
vice minister of health, labor and welfare and a strong advocate of human security. He also
served as parliamentary secretary for foreign affairs under Foreign Minister Obuchi.

We organized a working group that consists of representatives of various sectors, such as
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Health, Labor and Welfare, medical associations,
academia, private foundations, and NGOs. The group is trying to bring the global health issues to
the agenda at the Toyako G8 Summit. At the same time, it is exploring how the international
community can contribute to human security on the ground – in other words, encouraging
protection and empowerment of individuals and communities in developing countries so that they
are resilient to the threats.

Through these experiences, I learned that human security requires two levels of actions.
One is the macro level and the other is the micro level, though the principle is the same on both:
aiming at realizing freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live with dignity of all
the people around the world.

At the macro level, we need advocacy, mobilizing various sectors to bring the human
security issue to the political agenda either within a country or the international community. At
the micro level or on the ground, we need bottom-up and top-down approaches that promote the
empowerment and protection of the individuals and communities.

In order to promote human security at the macro and micro levels, the role of facilitators,
who can engage various key actors and coordinate their activities and interests, is critical.

Though the first involvement of JCIE in health issues was neither intentional nor
strategic, health can be an entry point to promote human security. First, countries are generally
more willing to accept help from outside for health-related challenges because it is a less
controversial and threatening field relative to other human security challenges. Second, disease
and severe malnutrition are easy challenges for people to understand at an emotional level,
making it easier to rally people to support health initiatives for their fellow human beings. Third,
the interconnections between health and many other human security challenges are relatively
clear, and there is already growing evidence of the impact that improved health conditions has on
other factors of livelihood and quality of life. This encourages comprehensive approaches.

Finally, as we learned from our experiences with the SARS outbreak of 2003, avian
influenza, and other examples of emerging infectious diseases, diseases do not stop at national
borders. People are increasingly aware that good health in one country depends on good health in
other countries.

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As Mr. Obuchi mentioned in a speech in Hanoi in December 1998, the major tool for
Japan to promote human security is ODA. JCIE regards Japan’s major role as a global civilian
power. In this sense, promoting global health and human security is a perfect fit for Japan’s
future direction.

Thank you very much.

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Human Security and Global Health
By Tomoko Suzuki

What is JCIE?

• Non-profit, non-governmental, and non-partisan organization
• Founded in 1970 by an individual, Mr. Tadashi Yamamoto
• 3 clusters of activities: Political Exchange Program, CivilNet Program, and Global
ThinkNet Program

Human Security related activities

• Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow
• Research projects on UN Trust Fund for Human Security
• Secretariat for the Friends of the Global Fund, Japan (FGFJ)
• Secretariat for a research & dialogue project: “Challenges in Global Health and Japan’s
Contribution”

Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow

• At the urging of Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi, it was launched in 1998.

1. Asian Crisis and Human Security (1998)
2. Sustainable Development and Human Security (1999)
3. Cross-Sectoral Partnerships in Enhancing Human Security (2000)
4. Health and Human Security: Moving from Concept to Action (2002)
5. Implementing the Human Security Concept: Exploring Approaches to Evaluating Human
Security Projects (2003)

Research projects on UN Trust Fund for Human Security

• Purpose: look into how the concept of HS has been understood by the people involved in
its implementation and how it looks like on the ground
• First phase: 5 projects in Asia (2003)
• Second phase: 2 projects in Thailand and 3 projects in Africa focusing on HIV/AIDS
(2005~2006)

Secretariat for the Friends of the Global Fund, Japan (FGFJ)

• Private supporting organization of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria,
Launched in 2004
• Advisory board consists of representatives of various sectors, chaired by former PM
Yoshiro Mori.
• Mission: raise awareness of the importance of the fight against communicable diseases
and create enabling environment for continuing support for them

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Research & dialogue project “Challenges in Global Health and Japan’s Contribution”

• Launched in September 2007
• Mission: bring the global health issue to the agenda of the G8 Toyako Summit and
propose an action plan reflecting by human security concerns
• Working Group consists of ministries, medical association, academia, private foundations
and NGOs

How to bring the concept to actions

• At the macro level: advocacy for bringing the human security issue to the political agenda
• At the micro level: promote bottom-up and top-down approaches as well as
comprehensive approaches
• Key actor: facilitators

Health as an entry point to promote human security

1. Countries are generally more willing to accept help from outside for health-related
challenges.
2. Health is easy to understand at the emotional level and rally people to support global
initiatives.
3. The interconnections between health and other human security challenges are relatively
clear.
4. Diseases do not stop at national borders.

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Social Entrepreneurs – the Change Makers
By Fan Li

About Global Links Initiative
• Established in 2003
• UK registered Charity
• Promoting social entrepreneurship through face-to-face exchange and online network
(www.glinet.org)
• Focusing on China-UK-Japan
• 6 staff members and 40 volunteers

GLI Networkers

People with energy, compassion and creativity can change the world. GLI invites people
with these talents to be Global ‘Networkers’ and share their visions, stories, and interests with
others around the world through our website. We now have more than 900 networkers from 60
countries and regions including China, Japan, UK, India, Canada and South Africa.

Social Entrepreneurs: Who are they?

• Business skills/financial skills/PR skills/negotiation skills
• Knowing the market/Team player/Well connected/Consensus building/Hard worker
• Advocacy/Idealism/Motivator/Dreamer

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Case 1: 1kg More

• 1 kilogram more in your travel pack of books and stationeries for kids in need while
you’re traveling.
•

• Pass - Prepare 1kg of books or stationeries for underprivileged children you may meet on
your journey;
• Communicate - Talk to and play with kids and get to know them;
• Share - Share your experience through 1kg.com

Case 2: Zhao Yi’s Story

Courage + Persistence = Success!

• Being a student at China Agriculture University, Zhao organized students to edit a series
of practical books for rural people and migrant workers.
• Letter to the Premier--book series published with a circulation of 60,000.
• New approach--broadcast on the train
• Elected as one of the ‘world 100 social entrepreneurs’ by Newsweek Japan.

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Case 3: TRACK 2000

• In 2006, 75 percent of Track’s trainees who came under the categories of special
needs/socially excluded/long term unemployed achieved full-time employment.
• Over 5,000 tons of waste were diverted from landfill sites or illegal dumping and was
processed into reused or recycled resources.
• 85,000+ individuals, families, voluntary/community groups received resources.
• Over 450 items of IT/ICT computer equipment were redistributed to a diverse range of
low-income individuals, and families

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APPENDIX A

The 12th Japan-U.S.-China Conference on
Trilateral Security Cooperation

Organized by
Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS),
Pacific Forum CSIS, and
China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS)

Venue: Nippon Foundation Bldg, 2F
Dates: April 1 and 2, 2008

Program

Monday, March 31

Participants arrive in Tokyo

18:00 Welcome Dinner hosted by RIPS [Wolfgang Puck Cafe]
Greetings by Masashi Nishihara, President, RIPS

Tuesday, April 1

9:30 Registration [Nippon Foundation Bldg., 2F]

10:00 Opening Remarks:
Seiichiro Takagi, Professor, School of International Politics, Economics, and
Business, Aoyama Gakuin University

Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS

Zhang Tuosheng, Director, Academic Assessment Committee and Center for
Foreign Policy Studies, CFISS

10:10-12:30 Session I: The Third Party’s Views on Bilateral Relations
Moderator: U.S.

10:10-10:45 Chinese Views on U.S.-Japan Relations
Presenter: Yang Mingjie, Assistant President, China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations

10:45-11:00 Coffee Break

11:45-12:30 Japanese Views on China-U.S. Relations
Presenter: Seiichiro Takagi
A-1

11:00-11:45 U.S. Views on Japan-China Relations
Presenter: Robert Dujarric, Director, Institute of Contemporary
Japanese Studies, Temple University, Tokyo

12:30-13:30 “Bento” Lunch [Nippon Foundation Bldg., 2F]

13:30-15:15 Session II: The Changing Situation in the Korean Peninsula
Moderator: (China)
Presenters: Yasuyo Sakata, Professor, Kanda University of International
Studies

Scott Snyder, Senior Associate, Pacific Forum

Zhu Feng, Professor, School of International Studies and Deputy
Director, Center for International & Strategic Studies, Peking
University


15:15-17:15 Session III: The Taiwan Question
Moderator: (Japan)
Presenters: Bonnie Glaser, Senior Associate, CSIS

Zhang Tuosheng

Yasuhiro Matsuda, Professor, National Institute for Defense
Studies

18:00 Evening free

Wednesday, April 2

9:30-11:00 Session IV: Cooperation for Environmental Security
Moderator: (Japan)
Presenters: Ouyang Wei, Professor and Deputy Director of Research, Center
for Crisis Management, National Defense University

Hiroshi Ota, Professor, School of International Liberal Studies,
Waseda University

Miranda Schreurs, Director, Environmental Policy Research
Centre, Freie Universität Berlin


A-2

11:15-12:45 Session V: Assessing Global Strategic Environment
Moderator: (U.S.)
Presenters: Akio Watanabe, Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo and
Aoyama Gakuin University

David Brown, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International
Studies

Lu Dehong, Deputy Director, Research Department, CFISS

12:45-13:30 “Bento” Lunch [Nippon Foundation Bldg., 2F]

13:30-14:15 Wrap Up
Moderator: Seiichiro Takagi

14:15-14:30 Closing Remarks
Zhang Tuosheng
Ralph Cossa
Masashi Nishihara

16:00-1800 Public Seminar [Nippon Foundation Bldg., 2F]
(Please confer separate program)

19:00 Farewell Dinner – Restaurant “Aux Bacchanales Akasaka”
Hosted by Pacific Forum

Thursday, April 3

Senior participants depart

Young Leaders Forum starts (Please confer separate program)

Friday, April 4

Junior participants depart

A-3

APPENDIX B

Pacific Forum CSIS
YOUNG LEADERS
PACIFIC FORUM YOUNG LEADERS FORUM
HOW HUMAN SECURITY COMPLEMENTS STATE SECURITY

Co-hosted by the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) with
assistance by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF)

Ocean Policy Research Foundation, Kaiyo Sempaku Building Conference Hall (10th Floor)
Tokyo April 3, 2008

9:30 AM Welcome, Brad Glosserman, Executive Director, Pacific Forum CSIS

9:45AM Session I: Review of the U.S.-Japan-China conference
What are key issues of state security for the US, Japan and
China? How can we sole these problems?
Japan’s view (10min): Wakana Mukai, Research Fellow,
Japan nstitute of International Affairs
China’s view (10min): Shanshan Wang, Vasey Fellow, Pacific
Forum CSIS
U.S. view (10min): Brian Cathcart, Research Associate,
Japan Center for International Exchange
Discussion (30min)

11:00AM Session II Human security: Overview
Presenter: Carl Baker, Director of Programs, Pacific Forum
CSIS

12:00AM Lunch

12:30PM Welcome Remarks
Keynote speaker: Ambassador Yukio Satoh, President, Japan
Institute of International Affair

B-1

13:30PM Breakout into 3 separate sessions.

Session III A: Economic security in the region/globally
Overview (20min): Guillermo Lechuga, Economics Student,
Temple University.
Case study (10min): Fan Li, Executive Director, Global Links
Initiative
Q&A and draft suggestions

Session III B: Health and environment in the region/globally
Overview (20min): Greer Pritchett, Visiting Lecturer, China
Foreign Affairs University
Case Study (10min): Tomoko Suzuki, Japan Center for
International Exchange

Session III C: Conflict management in the region/globally
Overview (20min): Raymund Quilop, Assistant Professor, Dept.
of Political Science, University of the Philippines
Case Study (10min): Stephan Pierre Sakalian, ICRC

3: 30PM Break

3:45PM Session IV Group presentations and discussion
How does human security complement state/region security? What
needs to be done? How can government, business and civil society
work together? What can we do?

5:15PM Concluding remarks

6:00PM Dinner (optional) TENGU – Toranomon

B-2

APPENDIX C

Young Leaders Biographies

Ms. Joni CAMINOS is a Development Assistant at Pacific Forum CSIS. She received
her B.S. in Cultural Anthropology and Minor in Geography from Southern Oregon
University. She participated in projects for the Center for Sustainable Development in
Atenas, Costa Rica.

Mr. Brian CATHCART is a Research Associate at the Japan Center for International
Exchange in Tokyo. He completed his Master’s Degree from the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy focusing on the role of psychosocial services in humanitarian action. As a
Slawson Fellow with the Asia Foundation in Sri Lanka, he monitored psychosocial
services for tsunami survivors, worked on torture prevention, and documented human
rights abuses. At Buduburam Refugee Settlement in Ghana, he worked with a local NGO
that provides counseling and support services to women and children survivors of
violence. His five years in Japan include studying “war memory” at the University of
Tokyo as a Japanese Education Ministry Research Scholar; researching post–World War
II reconciliation as a Fulbright Scholar at Kyushu University; Japanese Language Studies
at the Inter-University Center in Yokohama; and studying Japanese culture for the Kyoto
University International Exchange Program. He holds a BA in Asian Studies from Tufts
University.

Mr. Leif-Eric EASLEY is a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University’s Department of
Government and a Visiting Scholar at the UCLA Department of Political Science. His
dissertation examines national identity, bilateral trust and security cooperation among
Japan, South Korea, China, and the United States. Leif has served as a teaching fellow
for Asian International Relations and American Foreign Policy at Harvard. He led the
security workshop of the Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations and was
an editor for the Harvard Asia Quarterly. Leif has published journal articles and book
chapters on the U.S.-Japan alliance, U.S.-South Korea alliance, and Chinese foreign
policy. He also writes a monthly column on East Asian security politics for newspapers
in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

Dr. Madoka FUTAMURA is a Research Fellow, Peace and Governance Program at the
United Nations University.

Mr. Daisuke HAYASHI is a Ph.D. candidate at Keio University, researching the Anglo-
American foreign policy toward Asia, particularly Japan and China. Mr. Hayashi was a
program officer at the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) from 2006 to
2007. He received BA from Nanzan University in 1998, he researched the US-Japan
diplomatic history in Doshisha University and the University of California, Irvine, and
received MA from Doshisha University in 2002.

C-1

Mr. Chin-Hao HUANG is a Research Associate (Office of the Director) with the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stockholm, Sweden.
Previously, he was a research assistant with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., U.S.A. Mr.
Huang led the CSIS China-Africa project, a multi-year initiative examining Chinese
intentions, policies, and practices in Africa and implications for U.S. strategic interests,
and co-authored several reports, monographs, and book chapters on China-Africa-U.S.
relations. Mr. Huang has also presented conference papers and published other works on
Chinese foreign and security policy. Prior to CSIS, he served as executive-director for
the Georgetown International Relations Association, a non-profit organization based in
Washington, D.C.

Mr. David JÄNES is Program Officer and Assistant to the President at the United
States-Japan Foundation, where he directs the Education, Policy, and Communications
grant portfolios. During his tenure, Mr. Jänes created, and currently directs, the Elgin
Heinz Outstanding Teacher Awards, a national award for precollegiate educators who
have demonstrated exemplary and innovative teaching on Japan, and is also the founder
of the Reischauer Scholars Program, an Internet-mediated Japan studies program for
America’s top high school students currently directed by Stanford University. Mr. Jänes
has served as Director of College and University Relations for the International
Partnership for Service-Learning, and has assisted in the formation of workshops on the
subject of service-learning in the Philippines and Ecuador. He received the BA degree
from Mary Washington College and the MA degree in Asian Religions from the
University of Hawaii. He studied in the Department of Theology at Doshisha University
in Kyoto as a Rotary Ambassadorial Scholar, and holds a Certificate in Japanese Studies
from the Japan Center for Michigan Universities in Hikone, Japan. He recently
completed the MA in International Affairs at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
In addition to maintaining his position with the US-Japan Foundation next year, he will
also be a Ph.D. student in Sociology at The New School for Social Research in New York
City, where he will be focusing on issues of historical memory in China and Japan.

Mr. KOTANI Tetsuo is a PhD candidate at Doshisha University and is currently a
research fellow at Ocean Policy Research Foundation. His dissertation focus is on the
strategic implication of homeporting U.S. carriers at Yokosuka. His other research
interests include U.S.-Japan relations and international relations and maritime security in
the Asia-Pacific region. His English publications include “Reaffirming the Taiwan
Clause: Japan’s National Interest in the Taiwan Strait and the US-Japan Alliance” (co-
authored with Dr. Jim Auer) (NBR Analysis Vol. 16 No. 1, 2005) and “Presence and
Credibility: Homeporting USS Midway at Yokosuka” in the Journal of America-East
Asian Relations (forthcoming). He was a visiting fellow at the US-Japan Center at
Vanderbilt University. He received the 2003 Defense Minister Prize for his essay.

Ms. LI Fan is Executive Director of Global Links Initiative, a nonprofit organization on
social inclusion and citizen empowerment themes beginning from a Japan-China-U.K.
dimension. Ms. Li was an intern at Japan NPO Center, a national infrastructure nonprofit
organization based in Tokyo and later joined the organization as program associate and

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was responsible for international programs on capacity building of NPOs and
collaboration with governments and corporate entities. She was also the coordinator of
the Nonprofit Organizations National Network on Law and Tax System Reform. Prior to
Japan NPO Center, Fan worked for Shimizu Corporation Shanghai Branch from 1994 to
1999. Fan holds an MA in international relations from Waseda University (Japan). She
studied Public Administration in Leiden University (the Netherlands) and received the
BA from Suzhou University with a major in Japanese literature.

Maj. LIU Lin is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Department of World Military
Studies at the PLA Academy of Military Science.

Mr. Dewardric L. McNEAL is Assistant Director for International Programs at the
Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center. He joined Brookings in July
2005 to help launch the China Initiative, which was elevated to a full policy Center in
October 2006. He also serves as the China Center’s primary contact and project manager
for all international programs and conferences, which currently include projects and
annual conferences in Beijing, Chongqing, and Shanghai. In 2006, under the direction of
Ambassador Jeffrey Bader and Chinese legal advisors, Mr. McNeal led the process to
establish the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy. Before joining Brookings in
2005, Mr. McNeal was Special Assistant to the Director of Information at the Taipei
Economic and Cultural Office in Los Angeles and served as an Analyst in Foreign
Affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) during the second session of the
106th United States Congress. Mr. McNeal also worked as an advisor in the Foreign
Affairs Office at Yangzhou University in China. He received a BA in international
studies from Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia. He has also studied Chinese
politics, culture, and language at the University of London’s School of Oriental and
African Studies (SOAS) and at Nanjing University in China.

Ms. Aki MORI is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Doshisha
University in Kyoto, Japan. Her research fields are; China’s security perception and its
policy in the open and reform era, China’s military modernization, and U.S-China-Japan
trilateral relations. She is currently studying at the School of International Studies in
Renmin University of China. She received the MA degree from the Graduate School in
Law at Doshisha University and the BA degree from Waseda University.

Ms. Wakana MUKAI is a Ph.D. candidate in International Politics at the University of
Tokyo in Japan and is also a research fellow at the Center for the Promotion of
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Japan Institute of International Affairs. She
specializes in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues as well as South Asian
issues, especially views from Pakistan. She received her B.A. in Language and Area
Studies from Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and her M.P.P. from the School of
Public Policy at the University of Tokyo.

Dr. Sachi NAGAOKA is a Visiting Fellow at the Department of Government at Harvard
University.

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Ms. A. Greer PRITCHETT is currently a Visiting Lecturer at the China Foreign Affairs
University in Beijing for the 2007-2008 academic year as a recipient of a “Princeton in
Asia” fellowship. Previously, she served as the Assistant Project Director of the
Northeast Asia Project at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP)
in New York. In that capacity, she managed projects on multilateral cooperation for a
denuclearized Korean Peninsula; the possible creation of a Northeast Asian Security
Forum; China-Taiwan relations; and the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea.
Greer has also worked for the International Crisis Group and the International Peace
Academy. She received her B.A. with Honors and graduated summa cum laude from
Hunter College, City University of New York, majoring in Political Science and Classical
and Oriental Studies.

Prof. Raymund Jose QUILOP is assistant professor of Political Science at the
University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City. He is also a senior
researcher/analyst of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies (OSS), Armed Forces of
the Philippines and a fellow of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies. He
was the 2006 Pacific Forum Yuchengco Fellow. He serves as the editorial associate of
the Philippine Political Science Journal, and as the editor-in-chief of OSS official
publication, the OSS Digest. He is currently the secretary of the board of the International
Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi’s Philippine Chapter. Mr. Quilop holds a M.A. degree in
Political Science from the University of the Philippines where he also obtained the B.A.
degree in Political Science in 1995 (Summa Cum Laude).

Mr. Ryo SAHASHI is an Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy
(GraSPP), the University of Tokyo. He also serves as a Research Fellow, Japan Center
for International Exchange. Previously, Mr. Sahashi served as a Research Associate/
Program Officer for Policy Studies, Japan Center for International Exchange, as a
Research Fellow of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, as a Research Assistant,
Social Science Research Institute, International Christian University, and as a Research
Assistant, Bureau of Trade Policy, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. Mr.
Sahashi received his LL.M from the University of Tokyo and his Bachelor of Arts in
Liberal Arts from the International Christian University after studying at University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is currently completing his dissertation on American
foreign policy towards China and Taiwan during the Cold War. Also, he is a recipient
both of Minister of Foreign Affairs Award and of Japan Association of Taiwan Studies
Distinguished Paper Award, a frequent invitee for Young Leaders Program of CSIS
Pacific Forum, Honolulu, and currently registered as a non-residence fellow for security
studies at Research Institute of Peace and Security (RIPS), Tokyo.

Ms. Jiyon SHIN is Pacific Forum CSIS 2007-2008 Vasey Fellow. Currently an
undergraduate at Ewha Women’s University, she specializes in International Studies,
minors in Korean studies, while focusing on diplomacy and security in Northeast Asia,
and spent a year as an exchange student at University of Hawaii 2005-2006. She has
worked extensively with the Korean University Students’ Politics & Diplomacy Research
Association on issues pertaining to the ROK-U.S. alliance, and anti-American sentiment
among ROK’s young generation. Ms. Shin was a member of the North Korea Security

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Research Group in Ewha Women’s University, and assisted several international
conferences related to North Korean refugees, and the UN ministerial conference on
sustainable environment at the Environment and Sustainable Development Division
office of UNESCAP. Most recently she attended Shanghai’s Fudan University for a
summer Chinese language program.

Mr. Ruyi WAN is from Shanghai, China. He received his B.A. in Electrical Power
Engineering from Shanghai Jiao Tong University and is now pursuing his Juris Master in
Tsinghua University. He has been working as secretary of Communist Party Student
Branch in both universities and was twice awarded the People’s Scholarship. He also
worked as VP in AIESEC local committee in Jiao Tong University. Mr. Wan has interned
in Shanghai Municipal Electrical Power Company and McKinsey & Company. He
founded Gananan Forum Shanghai, an international bi-weekly open forum in 2005, and
will support its foundation in Hong Kong and Beijing.

Ms. Shanshan WANG is a Pacific Forum CSIS 2008 Vasey Fellow. She has also been
working actively as a Pacific Forum “Young Leader” since 2006. She received both her
BA in diplomacy and MA in international relations from China Foreign Affairs
University. She was a student fellow in the Asia Pacific Leadership Program at East-West
Center in Hawaii from 2006-2007. She worked as liason officer at Boao Forum for Asia,
interned with People’s Bank of China and Boston Consulting Group and also traveled
extensively in the Asia Pacific region. Shanshan is also a freelance translator and
interpreter and has published four translation works in China. Most recently she has been
involved in China’s carbon emission trading market and conducted research on China’s
climate change policy. Her research interest lies in China’s foreign policy, China’s
domestic politics and East Asian security.

Ms. ZHANG Weiwei is a Research Assistant at the China Institute of International
Studies.

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