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McAfee Confidential
Kernel Debugging Demystify
Thomas ROCCIA | InfoSec Researcher
thomas.roccia@intel.com
.
McAfee Confidential
2
Overview
Summary
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
.
McAfee Confidential
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0000 – $whoami
• Thomas ROCCIA | @r1tch1e_
• InfoSec Researcher at Foundstone Intel Security
(McAfee)
• Forensic / Incident Response
• Malware Analysis
• Penetration Testing
.
McAfee Confidential
4
Overview
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
.
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0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
• To better understand how works my system
• To better understand what’s happened when I got this…
• To analysis how works a driver
• To analysis a Rootkit
• Or just for play with the kernel…
.
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Overview
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
kerneland Userland
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Userland
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
• Userland is the place where every user application running
• Userland usually refers to the various programs and libraries that the
operating system uses to interact with the kernel
• A memory space is assigned to Userland application
• Each user space process normally runs in its own virtual memory
space
• The processus in Userland can normaly not accessed to kerneland
.
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Kerneland
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
• kerneland is a place of Operating System where Input/Output
requests from Software are managed
• The Kernel is a specific software use for transmit data to processor
• The code is usually loaded into a protected area of memory, for avoid
overwritten by other programs
• The kernel have full access to:
– CPU
– Memory
– Devices
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McAfee Confidential
• Operating System uses a
protection ring
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Protection ring
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
• A kernel connect the
application software to the
hardware
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McAfee Confidential
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Windows Architecture
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
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Memory distribution
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
• Userland memory space from
0x0000 0000 to 0x7FFF FFFF
• Applications process
• DLL
• Variables
• …
• kerneland memory space from
0x8000 0000 to 0xFFFF FFFF
• Boot Drivers
• Kernel
• HAL
• …
Userland
kerneland
.
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Who wins?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
• As we saw, kerneland has some protection to avoid access from
Userland
• But, what’s happen if user process attempt to access to kerneland?
• Normaly a crash!
• But sometimes a malicious code can gain full access to your system
across vulnerabilities or with a malicious DLL…
.
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Who wins?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
• And now the attacker is like GOD in your system
.
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Who wins?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
• If we try to access to the kerneland from userland with a simply piece
of code:
.
McAfee Confidential
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Who wins?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
• We get an error of access violation:
.
McAfee Confidential
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Overview
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
.
McAfee Confidential
17
Presentation
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• The Windows Kernel is the composant that allow secure access from
Windows task to Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL)
• Kernel32.dll, ntdll.dll and other dll are loaded in user-mode but this is
a gateway for access to kernel
• On 32bit architecture the name of the kernel is NTOSKRNL.EXE
• The kernel is the only component to have access to the HAL:
– DMA (memory)
– Bus mapping
– Horloge and timer
– Interrupt
– Privileged architecture
.
McAfee Confidential
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Architecture Kernel
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• Windows Executive : Services de base du système d’exploitation,
gestion mémoire, gestion des processus et des threads, securité, E/S,
réseaux, IPC, etc.
• Kernel Windows : Fonctions bas niveau du système : gestion des
exceptions et des interruptions, scheduling de threads et processus,
synchronisation, etc.
• Device Driver : comprend les pilotes matèriels mais aussi les pilotes
de devices virtuels (système de fichier, réseaux).
.
McAfee Confidential
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Processor initialisation
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• When a kernel boot up, it performs basic initialization for each
processor.
• The PCR (Process Control Region) is a structure (one by processor)
that stores critical CPU information and state
• Inside the PCR there is another data structure called PRCB (Process
Region Control Block. This structure contains information about
processors (CPU type, model, speed…)
– Kd> dt nt!_KPCR / !pcr
– Kd> dt nt!_KPRCB / !prcb
.
McAfee Confidential
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System Calls
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• The System Calls is used for interact with the hardware
• A system call is typically a function in the kernel that users request for
services I/O
• It’s implemented in the kernel because only high-privilege code can
manage such resources
• System calls uses a service dispatcher for access to the kernel
function
• In x86 for call the service dispatcher we use the SYSENTER
instruction for access to the kernel mode and SYSEXIT for return to
the user mode
.
McAfee Confidential
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System Calls – Service Dispatcher – SSDT
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
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System Calls – Service Dispatcher
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• Windows stores the System Call into
two data structure
• KeServiceDescriptorTable: contains
native syscall table.
• KeServiceDescriptorTableShadow:
contains same data in addition to the
syscall table for GUI threads.
– dps nt!KeServiceDescriptorTable
– dps nt!KiServiceTable
.
McAfee Confidential
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Faults, Traps and Interrupts
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• When a device requires the processor’s attention, it causes an
interrupt that forces the processor to pause what it is doing and
handle the device request.
• There is an Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) wich store each
information on the interrupt handler.
– Kd> dt nt!_KIDTENTRY
– Kd> !idt
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McAfee Confidential
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Faults, Traps and Interrupts
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
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McAfee Confidential
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Interrupt Request Level
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• The Windows Kernel uses an abstract concept called Interrupt
Request Level (IRQL).
• Kd> !irql
• Interrupt can be devided into two general categories:
• Software: They are triggered by conditions in the running code
• Hardware: They are triggered by devices connected to CPU
• There is different level of priorities:
• PASSIVE LEVEL (0): This is the lowest IRQL in the system. All the user-
mode code and most kernel code executes at this IRQL
• APC LEVEL (1): This is the IRQL at which APC (Asynchronous Procedure
Calls)
• DISPATCH LEVEL (2): This is the highest IRQL. Thread dispatcher and
DPC (Deferred Procedure Calls)
.
McAfee Confidential
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Interrupt Request Level
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
.
McAfee Confidential
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Processes and Threads
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• A thread is defined by two kernel data structures:
• ETHREAD: Structure contains information about thread
⎻ Kd> dt nt!_ETHREAD
• KTHREAD: Structure contains scheduling information for the thread dispatcher
⎻ Kd> dt nt!_KTHREAD
• An ETHREAD contains a KTHREAD
• A process contains at least one thread and is defined by two kernel data:
• EPROCESS: Stores basic information about process (PID, list of threads, security
token…)
– Kd> dt nt!_EPROCESS
• KPROCESS: Stores scheduling information about the process
– Kd> dt nt!_KPROCESS
• An EPROCESS contains a KPROCESS
.
McAfee Confidential
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Execution Context
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
• Every running thread has an execution context
• An execution context contains the adresse space, security tokens and
other properties of the running thread.
• In the kernel three execution context can be defined:
– Thread context: context of specific thread
– System context: Context of thread executing in the system process
– Arbitrary context: Context of whatever thread was running before the scheduler
took over
.
McAfee Confidential
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Overview
0100 – Drivers
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
.
McAfee Confidential
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What is a driver?
0100 – Drivers
• A driver is a software running in kernel-mode (sometimes in user-
mode), use for communicate with hardware or devices.
• There are many different type of driver in kernel-mode the following
are the most interesting:
– Legacy software driver: Software that runs in ring0 and interacts with the kernel
through interfaces.
– Legacy filter driver: Driver that attach to an existing driver and modify its input.
– File system minifilter driver: Drivers that interact with the file system to intercept
file I/O requests
.
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Driver Entry Points
0100 – Drivers
• The DriverEntry() function is the first call in a driver load:
• This function load the structure DRIVER_OBJECT in a kernel memory
space where the driver is a loaded
• To get information about a driver:
– Kd> !drvobj <NameOfDriver>
• Windows communicates with drivers by sending IRP (Input Request
Packet
NTSTATUS DriverEntry (
PDRIVER_OBJECT pDriverObject,
PUNICODE_STRING pRegistryPath
);
.
McAfee Confidential
32
Overview
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
.
McAfee Confidential
33
Environment
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
• This lab is setting up on Mac OS Host with Vmware Fusion
• You need to have 2 virtual machines with Windows:
1. Target (Kernel Debugging): Windows XP SP3
2. Debugger: Windows 7 with Windbg installed
.
McAfee Confidential
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Target Windows XP
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
• For activate the Kernel debugging mode we need to modify the
Boot.ini file.
• Thi file is used for load the system in a specific mode or not
• C:boot.ini
• Add the following line:
.
McAfee Confidential
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Target Windows XP
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
• In a terminal go to the VM file and edit the VMX file
• Scroll to the end of the file and add the following lines:
serial0.present = "TRUE"
serial0.pipe.endPoint = ”server”
serial0.fileType = "pipe"
serial0.yieldOnMsrRead = "TRUE"
serial0.startConnected = "TRUE"
serial0.fileName = "/Users/tomroc/serial0"
.
McAfee Confidential
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WinDBG Windows 7
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
• In a terminal go to the VM file and edit the VMX file
• Scroll to the end of the file and add the following lines:
serial0.present = "TRUE"
serial0.pipe.endPoint = ”client”
serial0.fileType = "pipe"
serial0.yieldOnMsrRead = "TRUE"
serial0.startConnected = "TRUE"
serial0.fileName = "/Users/tomroc/serial0"
.
McAfee Confidential
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WinDBG configuration
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
• Before start your WinDBG machine you need to boot your Target
Machine (WinXP), for create the serial0 server
• Then boot on your WinDBG machine
• Download the symbols for XP from Microsoft website
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/hardware/gg463028.aspx
• Download WindDBG from Microsoft website
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/windows/desktop/bg162891
• Install it!
.
McAfee Confidential
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WinDBG Symbol configuration
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
• Run WinDBG as Administrator
• In WinDBG click File >> Symbols File Path and enter:
srv*c:symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
.
McAfee Confidential
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Starting Kernel Debugging
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
• In Windbg click File >> Kernel Debug
• Click in the “COM” tab and verify the information (com1 for us)
.
McAfee Confidential
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Starting Kernel Debugging
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
• Restarting your target Windows XP
• Choose Debugger enabled
.
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Overview
0110 – Rootkit analysis
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
.
McAfee Confidential
42
What is a Rootkit?
0110 – Rootkit analysis
• Rootkit is a malware that modify internal functionalities of the OS to
hide their existence.
• These modification can hide files, processes or other resources from
running program.
• There is many way for attackers to create a rootkit (Driver rootkit,
Hooking rootkit, DKOM rootkit…)
• The most used is the SSDT hooking
.
McAfee Confidential
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SSDT hooking
0110 – Rootkit analysis
• As we saw the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) is a table of
pointers for various Nt functions, that are callable from user-mode
• A malicious application can replace pointers in the SSDT with pointers
to its own code
• All pointers in the SSDT should point to code within ntoskrnl, if any
pointer is pointing outside of ntoskrnl it is likely hooked
.
McAfee Confidential
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SSDT hooking
0110 – Rootkit analysis
SYSENTER
User-mode
Kernel-mode
KiSystemService()
SSDT ntoskrnl.exe
ServiceTable
Native SSDT
CounterTable
ServiceLimit
ArgumentsTable
WinFunction()
Native functions table
WinFunction()
RootkitFunction()
WinFunction()
User-mode Program
.
McAfee Confidential
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Practical Case
0110 – Rootkit analysis
1. Short analysis of IAT and code in IDA
2. Use malware analysis tools
3. Run the sample and monitor
4. Find the driver
5. Check the SSDT
6. Identify the hooked function
7. Analyze the hooked function
.
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Overview
0111 – Conclusion
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
.
McAfee Confidential
47
What I learned here?
0111 – Conclusion
• Difference between Userland and Kerneland
• Basic concept of Kernel Windows
• Basic concept of Driver Windows
• How to use Windbg
• How to setup kernel debugging with Fusion
• How works a Rootkit (SSDT hooking style) and how to analyse
.
McAfee Confidential
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Overview
1000 – Reference
0000 – $whoami
0001 – Why debugging Kernel?
0010 – Kerneland VS Userland
0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
0100 – Drivers
0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM
0110 – Rootkit Analysis
0111 – Conclusion
1000 – References
.
McAfee Confidential
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1000 – Reference
• https://msdn.microsoft.com
• http://undocumented.ntinternals.net
• https://technet.microsoft.com/fr-fr/sysinternals/bb545021.aspx
• Practical Reverse Engineering: x86, x64, ARM, Windows Kernel, Reversing Tools, and
Obfuscation
• Windows Internals, Part 1 & 2
• Practical Malware Analysis
• https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff551063(v=vs.85).aspx
• https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff558823(v=vs.85).aspx
• Hacking Exposed: Malware & Rootkits Secrets & Solutions
.
McAfee Confidential
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Thomas.roccia@intel.com
Thank you!
.
McAfee Confidential

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Windows Kernel Debugging

  • 1. . McAfee Confidential Kernel Debugging Demystify Thomas ROCCIA | InfoSec Researcher thomas.roccia@intel.com
  • 2. . McAfee Confidential 2 Overview Summary 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References
  • 3. . McAfee Confidential 3 0000 – $whoami • Thomas ROCCIA | @r1tch1e_ • InfoSec Researcher at Foundstone Intel Security (McAfee) • Forensic / Incident Response • Malware Analysis • Penetration Testing
  • 4. . McAfee Confidential 4 Overview 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References
  • 5. . McAfee Confidential 5 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? • To better understand how works my system • To better understand what’s happened when I got this… • To analysis how works a driver • To analysis a Rootkit • Or just for play with the kernel…
  • 6. . McAfee Confidential 6 Overview 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References kerneland Userland
  • 7. . McAfee Confidential 7 Userland 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland • Userland is the place where every user application running • Userland usually refers to the various programs and libraries that the operating system uses to interact with the kernel • A memory space is assigned to Userland application • Each user space process normally runs in its own virtual memory space • The processus in Userland can normaly not accessed to kerneland
  • 8. . McAfee Confidential 8 Kerneland 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland • kerneland is a place of Operating System where Input/Output requests from Software are managed • The Kernel is a specific software use for transmit data to processor • The code is usually loaded into a protected area of memory, for avoid overwritten by other programs • The kernel have full access to: – CPU – Memory – Devices
  • 9. . McAfee Confidential • Operating System uses a protection ring 9 Protection ring 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland • A kernel connect the application software to the hardware
  • 11. . McAfee Confidential 11 Memory distribution 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland • Userland memory space from 0x0000 0000 to 0x7FFF FFFF • Applications process • DLL • Variables • … • kerneland memory space from 0x8000 0000 to 0xFFFF FFFF • Boot Drivers • Kernel • HAL • … Userland kerneland
  • 12. . McAfee Confidential 12 Who wins? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland • As we saw, kerneland has some protection to avoid access from Userland • But, what’s happen if user process attempt to access to kerneland? • Normaly a crash! • But sometimes a malicious code can gain full access to your system across vulnerabilities or with a malicious DLL…
  • 13. . McAfee Confidential 13 Who wins? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland • And now the attacker is like GOD in your system
  • 14. . McAfee Confidential 14 Who wins? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland • If we try to access to the kerneland from userland with a simply piece of code:
  • 15. . McAfee Confidential 15 Who wins? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland • We get an error of access violation:
  • 16. . McAfee Confidential 16 Overview 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References
  • 17. . McAfee Confidential 17 Presentation 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • The Windows Kernel is the composant that allow secure access from Windows task to Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) • Kernel32.dll, ntdll.dll and other dll are loaded in user-mode but this is a gateway for access to kernel • On 32bit architecture the name of the kernel is NTOSKRNL.EXE • The kernel is the only component to have access to the HAL: – DMA (memory) – Bus mapping – Horloge and timer – Interrupt – Privileged architecture
  • 18. . McAfee Confidential 18 Architecture Kernel 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • Windows Executive : Services de base du système d’exploitation, gestion mémoire, gestion des processus et des threads, securité, E/S, réseaux, IPC, etc. • Kernel Windows : Fonctions bas niveau du système : gestion des exceptions et des interruptions, scheduling de threads et processus, synchronisation, etc. • Device Driver : comprend les pilotes matèriels mais aussi les pilotes de devices virtuels (système de fichier, réseaux).
  • 19. . McAfee Confidential 19 Processor initialisation 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • When a kernel boot up, it performs basic initialization for each processor. • The PCR (Process Control Region) is a structure (one by processor) that stores critical CPU information and state • Inside the PCR there is another data structure called PRCB (Process Region Control Block. This structure contains information about processors (CPU type, model, speed…) – Kd> dt nt!_KPCR / !pcr – Kd> dt nt!_KPRCB / !prcb
  • 20. . McAfee Confidential 20 System Calls 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • The System Calls is used for interact with the hardware • A system call is typically a function in the kernel that users request for services I/O • It’s implemented in the kernel because only high-privilege code can manage such resources • System calls uses a service dispatcher for access to the kernel function • In x86 for call the service dispatcher we use the SYSENTER instruction for access to the kernel mode and SYSEXIT for return to the user mode
  • 21. . McAfee Confidential 21 System Calls – Service Dispatcher – SSDT 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
  • 22. . McAfee Confidential 22 System Calls – Service Dispatcher 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • Windows stores the System Call into two data structure • KeServiceDescriptorTable: contains native syscall table. • KeServiceDescriptorTableShadow: contains same data in addition to the syscall table for GUI threads. – dps nt!KeServiceDescriptorTable – dps nt!KiServiceTable
  • 23. . McAfee Confidential 23 Faults, Traps and Interrupts 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • When a device requires the processor’s attention, it causes an interrupt that forces the processor to pause what it is doing and handle the device request. • There is an Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) wich store each information on the interrupt handler. – Kd> dt nt!_KIDTENTRY – Kd> !idt
  • 24. . McAfee Confidential 24 Faults, Traps and Interrupts 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
  • 25. . McAfee Confidential 25 Interrupt Request Level 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • The Windows Kernel uses an abstract concept called Interrupt Request Level (IRQL). • Kd> !irql • Interrupt can be devided into two general categories: • Software: They are triggered by conditions in the running code • Hardware: They are triggered by devices connected to CPU • There is different level of priorities: • PASSIVE LEVEL (0): This is the lowest IRQL in the system. All the user- mode code and most kernel code executes at this IRQL • APC LEVEL (1): This is the IRQL at which APC (Asynchronous Procedure Calls) • DISPATCH LEVEL (2): This is the highest IRQL. Thread dispatcher and DPC (Deferred Procedure Calls)
  • 26. . McAfee Confidential 26 Interrupt Request Level 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure
  • 27. . McAfee Confidential 27 Processes and Threads 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • A thread is defined by two kernel data structures: • ETHREAD: Structure contains information about thread ⎻ Kd> dt nt!_ETHREAD • KTHREAD: Structure contains scheduling information for the thread dispatcher ⎻ Kd> dt nt!_KTHREAD • An ETHREAD contains a KTHREAD • A process contains at least one thread and is defined by two kernel data: • EPROCESS: Stores basic information about process (PID, list of threads, security token…) – Kd> dt nt!_EPROCESS • KPROCESS: Stores scheduling information about the process – Kd> dt nt!_KPROCESS • An EPROCESS contains a KPROCESS
  • 28. . McAfee Confidential 28 Execution Context 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure • Every running thread has an execution context • An execution context contains the adresse space, security tokens and other properties of the running thread. • In the kernel three execution context can be defined: – Thread context: context of specific thread – System context: Context of thread executing in the system process – Arbitrary context: Context of whatever thread was running before the scheduler took over
  • 29. . McAfee Confidential 29 Overview 0100 – Drivers 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References
  • 30. . McAfee Confidential 30 What is a driver? 0100 – Drivers • A driver is a software running in kernel-mode (sometimes in user- mode), use for communicate with hardware or devices. • There are many different type of driver in kernel-mode the following are the most interesting: – Legacy software driver: Software that runs in ring0 and interacts with the kernel through interfaces. – Legacy filter driver: Driver that attach to an existing driver and modify its input. – File system minifilter driver: Drivers that interact with the file system to intercept file I/O requests
  • 31. . McAfee Confidential 31 Driver Entry Points 0100 – Drivers • The DriverEntry() function is the first call in a driver load: • This function load the structure DRIVER_OBJECT in a kernel memory space where the driver is a loaded • To get information about a driver: – Kd> !drvobj <NameOfDriver> • Windows communicates with drivers by sending IRP (Input Request Packet NTSTATUS DriverEntry ( PDRIVER_OBJECT pDriverObject, PUNICODE_STRING pRegistryPath );
  • 32. . McAfee Confidential 32 Overview 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References
  • 33. . McAfee Confidential 33 Environment 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM • This lab is setting up on Mac OS Host with Vmware Fusion • You need to have 2 virtual machines with Windows: 1. Target (Kernel Debugging): Windows XP SP3 2. Debugger: Windows 7 with Windbg installed
  • 34. . McAfee Confidential 34 Target Windows XP 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM • For activate the Kernel debugging mode we need to modify the Boot.ini file. • Thi file is used for load the system in a specific mode or not • C:boot.ini • Add the following line:
  • 35. . McAfee Confidential 35 Target Windows XP 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM • In a terminal go to the VM file and edit the VMX file • Scroll to the end of the file and add the following lines: serial0.present = "TRUE" serial0.pipe.endPoint = ”server” serial0.fileType = "pipe" serial0.yieldOnMsrRead = "TRUE" serial0.startConnected = "TRUE" serial0.fileName = "/Users/tomroc/serial0"
  • 36. . McAfee Confidential 36 WinDBG Windows 7 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM • In a terminal go to the VM file and edit the VMX file • Scroll to the end of the file and add the following lines: serial0.present = "TRUE" serial0.pipe.endPoint = ”client” serial0.fileType = "pipe" serial0.yieldOnMsrRead = "TRUE" serial0.startConnected = "TRUE" serial0.fileName = "/Users/tomroc/serial0"
  • 37. . McAfee Confidential 37 WinDBG configuration 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM • Before start your WinDBG machine you need to boot your Target Machine (WinXP), for create the serial0 server • Then boot on your WinDBG machine • Download the symbols for XP from Microsoft website https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/hardware/gg463028.aspx • Download WindDBG from Microsoft website http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-US/windows/desktop/bg162891 • Install it!
  • 38. . McAfee Confidential 38 WinDBG Symbol configuration 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM • Run WinDBG as Administrator • In WinDBG click File >> Symbols File Path and enter: srv*c:symbols*http://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols
  • 39. . McAfee Confidential 39 Starting Kernel Debugging 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM • In Windbg click File >> Kernel Debug • Click in the “COM” tab and verify the information (com1 for us)
  • 40. . McAfee Confidential 40 Starting Kernel Debugging 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM • Restarting your target Windows XP • Choose Debugger enabled
  • 41. . McAfee Confidential 41 Overview 0110 – Rootkit analysis 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References
  • 42. . McAfee Confidential 42 What is a Rootkit? 0110 – Rootkit analysis • Rootkit is a malware that modify internal functionalities of the OS to hide their existence. • These modification can hide files, processes or other resources from running program. • There is many way for attackers to create a rootkit (Driver rootkit, Hooking rootkit, DKOM rootkit…) • The most used is the SSDT hooking
  • 43. . McAfee Confidential 43 SSDT hooking 0110 – Rootkit analysis • As we saw the System Service Dispatch Table (SSDT) is a table of pointers for various Nt functions, that are callable from user-mode • A malicious application can replace pointers in the SSDT with pointers to its own code • All pointers in the SSDT should point to code within ntoskrnl, if any pointer is pointing outside of ntoskrnl it is likely hooked
  • 44. . McAfee Confidential 44 SSDT hooking 0110 – Rootkit analysis SYSENTER User-mode Kernel-mode KiSystemService() SSDT ntoskrnl.exe ServiceTable Native SSDT CounterTable ServiceLimit ArgumentsTable WinFunction() Native functions table WinFunction() RootkitFunction() WinFunction() User-mode Program
  • 45. . McAfee Confidential 45 Practical Case 0110 – Rootkit analysis 1. Short analysis of IAT and code in IDA 2. Use malware analysis tools 3. Run the sample and monitor 4. Find the driver 5. Check the SSDT 6. Identify the hooked function 7. Analyze the hooked function
  • 46. . McAfee Confidential 46 Overview 0111 – Conclusion 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References
  • 47. . McAfee Confidential 47 What I learned here? 0111 – Conclusion • Difference between Userland and Kerneland • Basic concept of Kernel Windows • Basic concept of Driver Windows • How to use Windbg • How to setup kernel debugging with Fusion • How works a Rootkit (SSDT hooking style) and how to analyse
  • 48. . McAfee Confidential 48 Overview 1000 – Reference 0000 – $whoami 0001 – Why debugging Kernel? 0010 – Kerneland VS Userland 0011 – Windows Kernel Structure 0100 – Drivers 0101 – Setup a Lab with 2 VM 0110 – Rootkit Analysis 0111 – Conclusion 1000 – References
  • 49. . McAfee Confidential 49 1000 – Reference • https://msdn.microsoft.com • http://undocumented.ntinternals.net • https://technet.microsoft.com/fr-fr/sysinternals/bb545021.aspx • Practical Reverse Engineering: x86, x64, ARM, Windows Kernel, Reversing Tools, and Obfuscation • Windows Internals, Part 1 & 2 • Practical Malware Analysis • https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff551063(v=vs.85).aspx • https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff558823(v=vs.85).aspx • Hacking Exposed: Malware & Rootkits Secrets & Solutions