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19. Chapter VIII.
A DEMOCRATIC WORLD.[44]
“We believe in association—which is but the reduction to action of our faith
in one sole God, and one sole law, and one sole aim—as the only means we
possess of realising the truth; as the method of progress; the path leading
towards perfection. The highest possible degree of human progress will
correspond to the discovery and application of the vastest formula of
association.
We believe, therefore, in the Holy Alliance of the Peoples as the vastest
formula of association possible in our epoch;—in the liberty and equality of
the peoples without which no true association can exist; in nationality, which
is the conscience of the peoples, and which, by assigning to them their part in
the work of association, their function in humanity, constitutes their mission
upon earth, that is to say, their individuality, without which neither liberty nor
equality is possible; in the sacred Fatherland, cradle of nationality, altar and
worship of the individuals of which each people is composed.
And, as we believe in humanity as the sole interpreter of the law of God, so
do we believe in the people of every state as the sole master, sole sovereign,
and sole interpreter of the law of humanity, which governs every national
mission. We believe in the people, one and indivisible, recognising neither
castes nor privileges, neither proletariat nor aristocracy, whether landed or
financial; but simply an aggregate of faculties and forces consecrated to the
well-being of all, to the administration of the common substance and
possession, the terrestrial globe.”—
Mazzini.
44. This chapter was written some time before the League of Nations plan
adopted at the Peace Conference was issued. It is, in spite of a few points
which might require modification, allowed to stand as it was written, since
the general course of the argument still appears to be sound, especially as it
20. D
raises points in relation to which the official scheme will most certainly
require great changes.
“Come, read the meaning of the deep!
The use of winds and waters learn!
’Tis not to make the mother weep
For sons that never will return.
’Tis not to make the nations show
Contempt for all whom seas divide;
’Tis not to pamper war and woe
Nor feed traditionary pride;
It is to knit with loving life
The interests of land to land,
To join in far-seen fellowship
The tropic and the polar strand.
And more, for Knowledge crowns the gain
Of intercourse with other souls,
And wisdom travels not in vain
The plunging spaces of the poles.
O may our voice have power to say
How soon the wrecking discords cease,
When every wandering wave is gay
With golden argosies of peace.”
—George Meredith.
EMOCRACY can only thrive in a democratic setting; and while any
powerful remnants of the dynastic tradition survive in the world,
it is unlikely that democracy will be able to reach the full term of its
own development. For the dynastic tradition is from the nature of
the case of an incurably predatory character; and democracy will be
arrested in its self-realisation by so much of the dynastic habit of
21. thought and way of life as it may be necessary to retain in order to
gain immunity from attack. It has been one of the commonplaces of
the Great War that the democratic countries have been compelled to
defend themselves against Prussianism by adopting the familiar
Prussian methods of repression and regimentation. And what the
war has actually provoked is always potentially present. So long as
there are dynastic nations with highly centralised and
omnicompetent authority and consequently in a more or less
advanced state of preparation for military enterprise, it is not to be
expected that their democratic neighbours will leave themselves at
their mercy; and the common democratic rights of freedom—
whether of the person or of thought—have to be so far permanently
subject to curtailment and even entire suspension in the event of
war. It is easy to say that once the danger is past, the former
liberties will be automatically restored; but it does not so work out in
actual fact. For authority is ever loth to relinquish any advantage it
has gained; and there are always parties in every community who
either on selfish or academic grounds are favourable to the
curtailment of democratic rights. The restoration of these rights has
commonly to be effected against the opposition of parties interested
in their curtailment. It is a matter of common knowledge that
powerful interests are already at work, for instance, to secure that
the hard-won privileges of the Trade Unions shall not be restored to
them; and we may expect to find very considerable and dangerous
opposition to the re-establishment of those civil liberties which were
suspended “for the duration of the war.” It is not likely, however, that
this opposition can be long maintained. But it is certain that it will be
some time after the close of the war before the domestic liberties of
the democratic countries will be restored to the point which they had
reached at the beginning of the war; and by so much democratic
advance will have been retarded.
22. I
So that the development of the democratic principle requires the
cessation of war and of preparedness for war. And this to begin with
requires the disappearance of the dynastic tradition. But will the
disappearance of the dynastic tradition necessarily carry with it the
abolition of that preoccupation with national “prestige” and the like
out of which it has always drawn its strength? The dynasty may
vanish; but nationalism may remain; and the catchwords of national
prestige and national honour may conceivably become a menace to
peace and therefore to freedom as real as the dynastic tradition.
And at the present time there is, as has been previously shown, a
very real possibility that the disappearance of the dynastic tradition
may leave the door open to another type of predatory nationalism
no less injurious to the cause of democracy. This is that “commercial
imperialism” to which reference has already been made. The
impression has been deeply made upon this generation that the
accumulation of wealth constitutes the primary business of the
community. It should aim to become the richest, wealthiest nation.
It is not generally perceived that the distribution of this wealth is of
a character which robs it of any right to be regarded as a “national”
interest. It is the interest only of a comparatively small class within
the nation. Yet so sedulously has this illusion of national prosperity
been cultivated, and so feeble is the faculty of discrimination in the
multitude, that it will yet be possible for commercial adventurers to
invoke and receive national endorsement of their projects even to
the extent of a guarantee of military support in case of need. The
surplus capital of a nation will seek avenues of activity beyond its
frontiers and it will move heaven and earth to secure that the nation
shall be committed to the business of protecting it when it goes
abroad. And it will do this by fostering the illusion that in some
mysterious way its profitable foreign excursions bring prosperity to
23. the home community. A moment’s reflection should be sufficient to
show that operations of this kind will bring to no nation any
compensation that is even remotely commensurate with the cost of
guaranteeing them.
Nor is it for their foreign adventures alone that these particular
interests will work up national pride and prejudice. They look upon
the home market with the same avid eye as the foreign; and it is an
affair of common knowledge that they have not hesitated to inflame
national feeling in order to secure invidious protective tariffs against
other nations. “Keep out the foreigner” is always an effective
battlecry; it bears a certain immediate and obvious plausibility to the
untutored and uncritical mind. The argument for free trade labours
under the disadvantage of not possessing this kind of effective
simplicity. Except in cases where free trade has been tried and is
supported by experience, the argument for it has to lean upon
postulates which are not so easily demonstrable to the crowd and
which do not lend themselves to glib catchwords such as the
protectionists delight in. It is easy for instance, to show that the
prosperity of a particular industry depends upon its security against
a foreign competition which apparently starts with the superior
advantage of cheap labour; and a case may be fairly made for the
protection of a young and struggling industry from unequal
competition. The protectionist, however, extends his argument to
cover all industry; his concern is not for the growth of a struggling
industry but for a monopoly of the home markets—what time he is
also actively invading foreign markets. The free trader has in reply to
show that a protective tariff is a stranglehold upon all industry.
Because, for instance, it renders the capitalist producer immune
from foreign competition, it reduces the necessity on his part to
improve methods of production; and in so much as his care is for his
profits rather than the real development of industry for the good of
the social whole, he will tend to remain content with obsolete and
antiquated methods of production so long as improvement is not
essential to the maintenance of profits. Moreover, it works in the
direction of compelling the industries of the nation to utilise the raw
24. materials available within its own borders even though these be
inferior in quality to those obtainable elsewhere, with the result that
the national industries are seriously handicapped in competition in
foreign markets, even in some cases in the home markets. The
problem of clothing oneself in the United States of America is a
sufficient illustration of the fantastic illusion that a protective tariff
makes for the common good. The tariff on woollen goods may be
useful to the owners of the woollen industries in America; but the
advantage is gained at the expense of the whole people, including
the very operatives in woollen mills.
This is, however, not the place to state the whole case as between
protection and free trade. Chiefly it is to our point here to emphasise
the fact that the advocates of a protective tariff belong mainly to the
capitalist class; and that they will plead for a protective tariff on the
ground of national prosperity, and that national pride and prejudice
will be invoked in support of the argument. They will be careful to
abstain from calling undue attention to the point that a protective
tariff will discriminate in favour of the classes that are already
sufficiently prosperous, and their popular argument will have much
to say about the high wages of the worker. “Make the foreigner pay”
was the battlecry of the Chamberlainite fiscal reformer in England;
and what the foreigner pays we all enjoy together. It sounds fair
enough; until it is seen that by no chance whatsoever does the
foreigner pay anything. He may lose something in the diminution of
his trade; but he pays nothing. The payment is made by the
domestic consumer in the higher prices which immediately prevail in
respect of “protected” commodities; and this higher price brings an
advantage to whom? To the worker? Not at all, if the capitalist can
help it. Will the worker get higher wages? Only if he is strong
enough to demand it. The empty hypocrisy of this talk about
national prosperity should be evident from the fact that the very
people who are interested in high prices are those who are equally
interested in lowering wages. The increase of the wage rate during
the war has not automatically or proportionately followed the rise in
prices; it has always to be wrested by main force from those whose
25. interest lies in keeping prices high and wages low. Under a
protectionist régime, wages are rarely high enough to compensate
for the higher cost of living, and the more dependent a country is
upon importation from abroad, the truer is this statement. It is only
in countries like the United States of America where the natural
resources are large and more or less easily available that protection
can effect any substantial appearance of social prosperity, and even
in these cases it is scarcely doubtful that the general prosperity
would be greatly increased by the removal of a protective tariff. The
dividends upon invested capital would no doubt be lower; but the
general level of material well-being would be appreciably raised.
Democracy must make up its mind upon this point. It must turn a
cold and critical eye upon all plausible talk about national prosperity
and ask whether this prosperity is in fact the thing it professes to be.
National wealth is so inequitably distributed that the production of
wealth as a national concern is a polity pour rire. Protection and
commercial imperialism are devices which work in the interests of
the already prosperous classes, a very small minority of the
community. This is not to say that there are not advocates of
protective tariffs who sincerely believe all they say so fluently about
“national” prosperity; of these good people it is not the
disinterestedness that is to be called into question but the
intelligence. But it as sure as anything can very well be that if a
statutory limit were set upon profits, incomes and fortunes, we
should hear very little about protective tariffs and the need of
protecting commercial interests “in partibus infidelibus.” To say that
this would immediately crush the incentive to the commercial and
industrial enterprise of the nation would be an unworthy reflection
upon the patriotism of those who are at present directing the
enterprise. In any case the point which is coming up for the decision
of democratic communities is whether they are going to identify
themselves with, and commit themselves to, the support of
enterprises which primarily serve the interests of a class already well
enough provided for and which can bring no advantage to the
people at large commensurate with the risk involved in endorsing
26. them. With the crumbling of the dynastic tradition, the one
substantial cause still outstanding of international misunderstanding
is commercial rivalry; but this commercial rivalry is in no sense a
rivalry between peoples; it is purely a rivalry between the capitalist
interests in the different countries. Are the democracies still
prepared to suffer arrest of their own development by retaining a
sort of potential war-footing in the interests of what are after all
mainly class-adventures?[45]
45. The proposal to establish an International Labour Standard will, of course,
do something to rob the protectionist argument of the force it borrows from
playing up the “dumping” of goods produced by underpaid foreign labour.
But it may be urged that even in the event of the elimination of
this type of commercial rivalry, the national feeling would still remain
—intrinsically and without the adventitious aid of dynastic or
commercial interests—a permanent ground of separation and
possible dissension between peoples, even democratic peoples. We
are told that there is such a thing as national “honour” which is a
sacred trust and which the nation must be prepared to defend
against all comers. It may be seriously questioned whether this
conception of national “honour” is not an archaism which has lapped
over from the age when men still talked of gambling debts as “debts
of honour” and gentlemen adjusted their differences by means of
“affairs of honour.” It should be evident that no nation has any kind
of honour which is subject to real offence save at its own hands, or
which can be forfeited save by its own act; and a nation in anything
like a mature stage of ethical development should be (in a
memorable phrase) “too proud to fight” merely because its amour
propre had been pricked by some ill-behaved urchin among the
nations. No self-respecting citizen resorts to fisticuffs in order to
avenge an insult; and the more self-respecting he is the more
effectual is the interior constraint which forbids him to act in that
way. And it is equally inconceivable that a self-respecting nation
should think it worth while to assert itself in a retaliatory way against
what after all can amount to no more than rudeness or
impertinence. It is true that there is a good deal of residual
27. superstition in this particular region which is apt to magnify out of all
proportion the significance of such improprieties as disrespect to the
flag; but a little good humoured realism is all the antidote that is
required. Such things as these have no real meaning except where
symbolic and formal punctilio still takes precedence over the
actualities of life. For the rest, the only possible sources of offence to
national honour lies in the region where national honour travels
abroad in the persons of official and unofficial individuals of that
nation. But at this time of day, it is inconceivable that any issues
should arise in this region which are not capable of easy and friendly
adjustment. In point of fact, that is what usually happens. Apologies
are made; a formula is adopted; and the affair blows over. It will
occur to the cynical that in recent times the point of honour has
been chiefly insisted upon on such occasions as the pursuit seemed
likely to eventuate in some material advantage; in any case the point
of honour survives only as an affair of statesmen and diplomats and
provokes no more than a languid interest in the remainder of the
nation, which has more pressing concerns on hand. National
“honour” seems on the whole to be but a frill left over from the day
in which the divine right of kings was still a live dogma.
In the fact of nationality itself there is nothing which necessarily
tends to a breach of the peace. We know that it represents no fact
of organic inheritance which is bound to perpetuate divisions of an
unfriendly or unneighbourly kind between peoples. There is no
modern “nation” which can claim homogeneity of racial origin, of
language, of religion. It describes a political unity within which a
people by the simple process of living together has developed and is
continuing to develop a particular way of life and quality of culture.
The peculiar colour of national life is due of course to some extent to
its geographical location, to the circumstances of its history, and to
its natural resources, but national unity is achieved in the evolution
of a common tradition and a common culture. Nor is it possible to fix
any real bounds to the growth of a nation. It is a historical
commonplace how the small primitive groupings of man have
steadily grown in extent until we have reached the stage of vast
28. aggregations of polyglot peoples comprehended under a single
national name—like the British Empire and the United States. The
“nation” possesses no fixity, and national feeling undergoes continual
change and modification as the result of changing circumstances.
There are many like the present writer whose early schooling left
them with the impression that there was a necessary and permanent
antagonism of interest between the British and French; but since
then the Entente Cordiale and other momentous happenings have
completely banished that hoary tradition from the British mind. It is,
moreover, not open to question that the increase and improvement
of means of communication have done much to dispel the ignorance
from which national prejudice and international suspicion drew their
strength. The biological judgment upon nationality is pertinent to
this point: “All the most important agencies producing the divergent
modification of the nations are human products and can be
altered.”[46]
These agencies are presumably the factors which
constitute what Mr. Benjamin Kidd called social heredity; and he has
shown with great force how possible it is to “impose the elements of
a new social heredity” on a whole people and to change its character
accordingly.[47]
The sum of the matter is that nationality is a fluid and
changing entity; and its intrinsic nature and its history appear to
point to the conclusion that it is a necessary stage in the evolution of
human society, by which the caveman is to become at last a citizen
of the world. There is nothing to justify the expectation that present
national characters and national frontiers will remain as permanent
factors in the life of the world.
46. Chalmers Mitchell, Evolution and the War, p. 90.
47. Benjamin Kidd, The Science of Power, p. 305.
This does not mean that the world will not continue to be
organised on the basis of nationality; it means only that the present
national divisions are not permanent. The law of natural variation
will operate in producing diversity in the complexion and culture of
communities; and the race will contain to the end an infinite variety
of social types. Indeed as the dynastic imperial tradition decays, the
29. tendency to induce uniformity among the peoples brought under a
common rule will disappear; and the free play of variation will
probably be more evident in the future than it has been, at least in
the near past. The emphasis upon the rights of small nations and
the disruption of Russia and of the Dual Monarchy into their
constituent nations both alike indicate that we shall have a
considerable accentuation of distinctive national types in the years
ahead of us. But this is not in any sense a matter for misgiving; for
the larger the variety of typical national cultures, the more varied
and rich will the life of the race become. As Lord Bryce said in the
early days of the war, the world was already too uniform and was
becoming more uniform every day; and a reaction from uniformity is
a sign of renewed life.
At the same time it must not be forgotten that without some
balancing principle there are dangers inherent in nationality. It has
been justly observed that nationality is an admirable thing when it is
being struggled for, but that once achieved it is apt to become a
peril. The passion for nationality may overshoot its mark. National
self-consciousness may breed national self-conceit; and out of this
temper especially under the conditions of modern commerce may
grow the spirit of aggression. It is useless to hide this fact from
ourselves; the recent history of Italy gives ample demonstration of
it. The Italy of Garibaldi was hardly recognisable in the Italy of the
Tripoli adventure. It is therefore necessary that the nations that have
come to new birth in the world-travail of these last five years, should
be preserved from the danger of becoming aggressive at the
expense of their neighbours, and in this necessity is contained in
little the entire problem of international integration which is likely to
occupy the minds of statesmen and political thinkers in the coming
century. At the same time the ultimate security of the peace which is
necessary to the progress of the democratic principle must lie not in
external safeguards and checks but in the increasing democratisation
of national life. The elimination of those residual predatory interests
which still dog the steps of democracy and are still able to pervert it
to their own ends may be helped by the creation of international
30. machinery which will limit the area of their opportunities; but it
depends most of all upon the progressive disappearance of class and
sectional privileges within the nations. For privilege is always
predatory; and so long as there still remain privileged classes within
the nations no international machinery of adjustment and restraint
can do more than preserve a highly precarious equilibrium between
conflicting interests.
31. III
Upon this whole subject there is little to be said which is not
already perfectly clear to those who have given it any serious
thought. Two courses are open, and only two, to modern
democracies. They may choose to retain the traditional dogmas of
national sovereignty and “honour,” and the current acceptances of
the business system, or they may resolve upon a break with the
past. The consequences of the first choice are perfectly evident from
the state into which the world has been brought by its operation in
the near past. It implies the retention of a privileged class with
interests to be defended at home and abroad; it will work out in
competitive commerce and as a natural corollary in competitive
armaments. And competitive armaments soon or late mean war. It
has already been pointed out how the doctrine of military
“preparedness” must inevitably retard and arrest the realisation of
democratic liberty within the nation, but it must farther be
recognised that any general retention of military establishments,
under the conditions of modern industry, must eventuate in the total
destruction of democracy and civilisation. The other choice means a
deliberate and progressive attempt to organise the intercourse of
nations upon a basis of reciprocity and co-operation. Even though
the consequences of such an attempt may be at present uncertain
and problematical, it may at least be asserted that they cannot be
worse than those which have so tragically ensued from the former
tradition.
Indeed, we have already come to a state of the world in which the
former tradition has long ceased to correspond to actuality. So long
as the means of communication remained elementary and slow, it
was possible for nations to live more or less independent lives and it
was in their interest to become self-sufficing and self-contained.
They were sufficiently far from one another to meet only in the
32. event of border brawls or of predatory excursions on a large scale on
the part of a strong neighbour against a weaker. But with the
modern development of the means of communication a policy of
isolation has become utterly impossible. The world has become a
neighbourhood; and national interests are inextricably intertwined.
When President Wilson said in 1916 that the European War was the
last great war out of participation in which it would be possible for
the United States to remain, he was speaking with this particular
circumstance in mind; and not even his foresight was sufficient at
that time to see that the day of isolation was already over. In six
months, the United States was engulfed in the bloody maelstrom.
The policy of national isolation is obsolete; and the persons who
advocate military preparedness and protective tariffs are “back
numbers.” These atavistic policies are no longer possible except at
the cost of the incalculable impoverishment of the nation which
adopts them. The nation that shuts others out also shuts itself in
and will slowly perish from an inbreeding mind and an ingrowing
energy. For the barrier against mutual confidence and goodwill which
is military preparedness, and the barrier against reciprocal trade,
which is a protective tariff, hinder much more than the exchanges of
friendship and trade. They hinder that exchange of spiritual,
intellectual and cultural goods which are on any radical analysis
more essential to a people’s growth and wealth than its trade.
Even as things are, those barriers are not sufficient to prevent a
certain mutuality in trade and in culture. Neither the German tariff
could keep Sheffield steel out of Germany, nor does the United
States tariff keep Bradford cloth out of America, and in the region of
intellectual and cultural interests the commerce has attained in
recent times a considerable briskness. But in the present state of the
world, why should a nation still cling to the illusion that it is a source
of strength to be self-contained? It is simply silly to continue to live
on homemade goods and homemade ideas when one’s neighbours
are ready to supply those which they are in a position to produce
better than ourselves, and to supply them freely on a basis of fair
exchange; and it is no compensation for the consumption of second-
33. rate goods that it helps to increase the bank balance of a few of
one’s countrymen, especially when these few countrymen who are
thus profited can out of their profits procure the superior foreign
article which they put out of the reach of the rest.
The organisation of the world upon a basis of international
reciprocity becomes a necessity by reason of the proximity into
which modern means of communication have thrown the peoples.
The process is indeed already afoot and in spite of hindrances will
inevitably grow in power and range; and we are only anticipating
events when we set out to organise the nations on a foundation of
mutuality. The process is, however, not without its difficulties; and
the conditions which are necessary in order to create a league of
nations bound together by a principle of reciprocity may be passed
in brief review.
34. IV
First of all it is necessary that the last vestige of imperial dominion
should disappear. A nation which is held unwillingly within a
particular political unity should be emancipated and be set up in
independence. Real reciprocity is only possible on a foundation of
common freedom, and it is a pre-requisite of any scheme of world
federation that any so-called “subject” nation which puts in a claim
to independence should have its claim conceded at sight. The whole
conception of reciprocity is denied when a nation is dragged into the
scheme at the tail of another. At the same time it should be made
clear that an independence thus recognised does not carry with it
the prerogative of a sovereignty of the traditional kind.
Independence is to mean autonomy in domestic affairs but not
independent action in external affairs. Reciprocity implies joint action
in matters of international interest; and in so much as the working of
a reciprocal scheme implies the power of authoritative action by
some superior joint council, it is clear that there must be a cession of
such portion of national sovereignty as is implied in the joint
transaction of international affairs. Nor is this to be a rule merely for
the lesser or the newly emancipated nations. Clearly it must be a
rule for all nations great or small which enter into the arrangement.
It is supposed that the nations will be found unready to make this
surrender; in which case it is in no need of demonstration that a
League of Nations is impossible save only for the purely negative
business of adjusting difficulties and settling disputes. That indeed
were a great gain, even though from the nature of the case it would
in all probability be only temporary. Nations still boasting sovereignty
would soon or late be tempted to take matters into their own hands
in the event of adjustments and settlements which proved
unsatisfactory. But in point of fact there is no difficulty at all about
this cession of sovereignty except in the minds of incurable jingoes
35. or legal doctrinaires. The thing has been done and is in practice on a
large scale already. That vast unity called the United States of
America became and remains possible only because independent
states have voluntarily ceded certain elements of their sovereignty to
a federal authority; and there is no objection other than that of
chauvinistic prejudice or of academic theory which could effectually
prevent the creation of a United States of Europe on the same basis
and a greatly extended United States of America as well.
But it requires to be emphasised at this point that we need less a
league of nations than a league of peoples; and if it be alleged that
this is a distinction which implies no real difference, the answer must
be made that the difference is indeed deep and vital. Sir
Rabindranath Tagore has lately criticised the idea of the nation on
the ground that it is the organisation of a people in the interests of
its material welfare and power;[48]
and insomuch as the nation finds
its focus in the sovereign state, its effect is separative and divisive. A
league of nations in the Western World would tend to be a league of
states, of governments; and the psychological inheritance of such a
league would tend to an undue preoccupation with schemes and
policies rather than the broader matters of human intercourse. It is
inconceivable that a league of nations will be able to divest itself
from the characteristic stock-in-trade of the specialist in “foreign
affairs,” since it would naturally be engineered by statesmen
schooled in the traditional order. No league has any chance of
permanence which does not break wholly with the current
conventions of international business; and the only hope of such a
break lies in the direct selection by the people of the various
countries of their own representatives on the council of the league.
The league must be democratically controlled; and that with as
much direct democratic power as such expedients as proportional
representation and recall can secure. The foreign offices of Europe
are so incurably steeped in an evil tradition that the less they have
to do with any future league the better. The secrecy, the intrigue,
the diplomatic finesse in which they have been expert are
incongruous with the democratic principle; and it is necessary in the
36. interest of international understanding that they should be put out of
commission with all decent haste. The kind of domestic organisation
for foreign business which a league of nations requires differs toto
coelo from the existing institution; and it will have to be built from
the bottom up.
48. See Atlantic Monthly, March, 1917, p. 291.
A league of peoples requires plain dealing in the open; but there is
nothing gained even then if there be no public apprehension of the
nature of the business in hand. Hitherto, the common man has
displayed but a flickering interest in the external affairs of his
country; and this vast and important region has been left the
monopoly of a comparatively small coterie of people who have made
the shunning of publicity a fine art. This circumstance is bound up
with the fact that speaking generally these persons have consistently
belonged to the prosperous classes; and the conventions of the
diplomatic tradition have made it a preserve of people possessing
considerable independent incomes. It is needless to observe how
inevitably the whole service must be vitiated by this anti-democratic
discrimination. The established system is secured by employing in it
only those whose upbringing and education have instilled into them
the spirit of class superiority and ascendency. The Foreign Offices of
Europe have from the nature of the case been the breeding ground
of jingoism and chauvinism. The principle of democratic control in
foreign affairs, both by the public discussion of international business
and by the thorough democratisation of Foreign Offices is a sine qua
non not alone of democracy at home but of any such league of
peoples as may be established.
It follows as a corollary that there should be a systematic
education of the people in foreign affairs. Popular ignorance would
nullify any advantage which accrued from the democratisation of the
control and the conduct of international business. For the control
and conduct would under such conditions pass back into the hands
of specialists and experts and interested parties. This popular
education does not fail to be considered in detail at this point. But it
37. may be questioned whether it can be effectively sustained unless in
some form or another foreign relations can be made a permanent
issue of domestic politics. Perhaps we may come to the point of
instituting the popular election of the persons in whom the
responsibility of foreign business shall be vested. At the present time
it is only rarely, and then but in a subordinate way, that questions of
foreign policy enter into the issues of an election; and until some
means is devised of educating the public mind in the subject-matter
of foreign relations, this condition will continue.
38. V
It is, however, likely that the force of circumstances may expedite
this process of education. The articles of the coming peace are
guaranteed to contain a provision for general disarmament; and so
far as Europe is concerned, this will be a work of necessity and not
of supererogation. Professor Delbrück, for instance, has come to
acknowledge that the “derided notions” of disarmament, hitherto
“entertained only by persons of no account,” are likely to be raised
to “the position of the ruling principle of our time.”[49]
His conversion
is due to the fact that the war will leave the belligerents of Europe in
a financial position which will not only make the increase of
armaments impossible, but will require the very drastic reduction of
their military establishments. The only danger to the process of
disarmament lies in the circumstance that two of the belligerent
powers, the United States and Japan, have been so little crippled by
the war that they are in a position and may get into the mood to
maintain large armaments. It is useless to obscure from ourselves
the further circumstance that these two powers that are in a position
to afford large military establishments look upon one another with a
considerable measure of suspicion despite their recent association
upon the same side in the war, and the formal professions of mutual
good-will that have latterly been made. It must be borne in mind
that Japan is still mainly dynastic in government and consequently
imperialistic in spirit, that its economic development seems to
require an expansion of marketing opportunities, and that its over-
population will stimulate emigration. In these matters there is plenty
of inflammable stuff; and we should be guilty of not facing the facts
of the case, did we not perceive that by reason of the attraction
which Western America has for the Japanese emigrant, and of the
peculiar interest which America has taken in the welfare of China,
situations of very great peril may arise between Japan and the
39. United States. It is upon such a state of the case that the argument
for universal military service in America will be based; and indeed
must be based; as it is inconceivable that any American in his senses
should apprehend any danger from the other side of the Atlantic.
The certain democratisation of Europe and the virtual certainty of
the impossibility on financial grounds of any considerable war-like
enterprise on the part of the European nations make the
contingency of a Transatlantic war unthinkable at the present time,
or indeed at any future time. This, of course, pre-supposes that the
causes of friction likely to arise from the national underwriting of
private foreign investments will be removed by a common
understanding that the private ventures of capital abroad are made
at its own risk.
49. Prüssische Jahrbucher (November, 1917).
The possible strain of the situation between the United States and
Japan is, however, already alleviated to some extent by the prospect
of a democratic movement in the latter country. Japan can in any
case hardly expect to keep its institutions intact if it enters into
reciprocal relations with democratic communities. Now, for the first
time, a commoner is premier of Japan; and the widespread social
discontent is likely to stimulate the tendency to popularise the
machinery of government. It is probably too much to expect in the
present state of Japanese education, that the veneration in which
the dynasty is held will speedily disappear. Yet after the swift and
dramatic disappearance of “divine rights” in Germany, it is not wise
to assume that historical processes of this type are necessarily slow.
Apart, however, from the possible causes of friction between the
United States and Japan, there seems to be little insuperable
difficulty in reaching an international understanding concerning
disarmament.[50]
Upon such an understanding, the whole future of
the projected League of Nations hangs. The League will be no more
than an empty shell if the constituent nations still continue to go
about with loaded fire-arms. Yet even if the League itself were not to
come into existence immediately the economic necessity of
40. disarmament would of itself suffice to change international
relationships very profoundly. Reduction in armaments will involve a
revolution in foreign policy. For the two things go together. A
particular kind of foreign policy requires a corresponding scale of
armaments; and the state of a nation’s armaments very materially
affects the objects and the tone of its foreign policy. In a word the
reduction of armaments would compel the nations in some sort to
moralise their mutual relations. The old basis of ambition-cum-fear
backed by force will have to be displaced by a practice of plain
dealing and mutual understanding. Since the nations cannot afford
to fight one another for some time to come, there is nothing for it
but that they learn to behave themselves properly toward each
other. After a while it is permissible to hope that they would not
want to fight each other.
50. This statement does not seem quite so true now as when it was written, in
view of the provisions of the Peace Treaty.
41. VI
But if disarmament is likely to compel a new type of international
dealing, it is plain that there must be some kind of international
clearing house. We have gone past the stage at which one nation
can transact a bargain with another which will not affect the
interests of a third party. The shrinkage of the world has thrown the
nations too closely together for any of them to suppose that they
can determine their policies in isolation and carry them through
piece-meal with this one and that, without reference to the rest.
Preferential trade agreements, for instance, are not merely an affair
of the contrasting parties; they affect all the nations. And it is
impossible any longer—in the absence of force majeure—to establish
relations of that kind without the consent of the rest of the world.
The case for an international clearing house is indeed at this time of
day irresistible.
Moreover, the immediate stress of the food-situation throughout
the world is certain to require some such organ for the co-ordination
and the distribution of the available food-supply. It seems likely that
the supply of food for the world will be for some years inadequate to
the need without careful distribution; and it will require the most
careful organisation and rationing of what food there is if the people
of some parts of the world are to escape very great and protracted
hardship. For this, a clearing house is necessary. Fortunately we
have the foundations of this organisation already laid—on the one
hand in the machinery of international distribution created by Mr.
Hoover, and on the other in Mr. David Lubin’s far-seeing institution of
an international bureau for the survey of the world’s grain resources.
From a central organisation of this kind the world will need to
receive its food for some time to come.
Nor is the problem of food the only urgent matter of this kind.
There will be presently a very great demand for the raw material of
42. industrial production. In the past, raw material has been provided by
means of private ventures of all kinds on a competitive basis. Any
reversion to such a chaotic and uncoordinated method of providing
raw material would be attended by consequences of a most
disastrous kind. There would be no guarantee of equitable
distribution among the nations; with the result that those
unfavourably placed in the matter of capital or credit, would be put
in a position of permanent and increasing economic dependence and
disability. If the nations now released from ancient tyrannies are to
be set upon their feet, it is plain that they must receive supplies of
raw material as nearly adequate for their need as possible.
Otherwise we may create a number of pauper nations. In addition to
this fact, there is also the danger that the private exploitation of the
sources of raw material would tend to the subjugation of backward
peoples whose lands chanced to be rich in such material. It is an old
and a shameful story how the need of civilisation for raw material
has led to the laceration and impoverishment of the native
population of (say) Africa; and it is necessary that the conscience of
the world should refuse to tolerate the system of concessions and
the like which made this criminality possible. On both grounds—the
need of industrial production among the civilised people, and the
rights of the undeveloped peoples—a system of the joint
international quest and distribution of raw material is requisite.
This international rationing of raw material may seem a drastic
and impracticable proposal; but any consideration of its alternatives
must drive us to the conclusion that we cannot escape some
experiment however inadequate in this direction. In the present
state of the world, the balance is so overwhelmingly in favour of the
strong nations that any perpetuation of the private and competitive
quest of raw materials will simply lead to a struggle of great
commercial imperialisms in which the victims will be the weak
nations. Just as the unprivileged classes within the nation have been
the victims of the great industrial powers, the weaker nations which
start with a handicap in the struggle will be disabled in perpetuity
and will be squeezed between their stronger neighbours. It is
43. difficult to see that the economic dependence and subjection of one
nation to another differs appreciably in its consequences to the
people at large from that political dependence and subjection to
destroy which the European war was undertaken and fought at so
terrific a cost.
44. VII
The necessity and the logic of the case leads us therefore, to
expect the creation of an international organisation which shall have
certain positive functions in addition to the negative task of
mitigating the causes of international friction and the adjustment of
differences. The hope of the permanence of the League lies in its
positive activities rather than in its purely negative offices. Moreover,
the just rationing of food and raw material would of itself so
considerably diminish the possibility of international
misunderstanding, that we may look to the extension of the positive
and integrative functions of the League while the need of purely
mediatorial activity would naturally decrease. Nor have we
exhausted the matters in which the need of the nations requires
action and organisation of a constructive and positive kind. At the
present time it is plain that some of the peoples newly liberated are
not in a position to conduct their affairs without outside assistance.
Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, for instance, must be guided and
protected for some time to come; and while the peoples of these
countries might choose to be placed under the wing of one or other
of the existing “great” powers, it is not open to argument that such
a connection should be under an arrangement which secured the
accountability of the protecting power to an international body. If
Great Britain becomes foster-mother to Palestine, or France to Syria,
the agreement should be so formulated that this relationship is
always subject to revision at the hands of the League of Peoples.
The case with the native populations in the former German colonies
is still more clear. Africa, in especial, has suffered unspeakable things
from the imperialistic rivalries of the European nations; and its whole
future development is bound up with a guarantee that its territory
and its peoples shall be immune from invasion and exploitation at
the hands of nations with selfish purposes. This again points to the
45. institution of a system of international tutelage and supervision. It
goes without saying, of course, that any such international action
should consist not only of protection and tutelage, but of education
into self-government. The question as to the mode in which this
international supervision should be exercised is secondary. The
proposal that it should be made effective by means of international
commissions is met with the objection that international
commissions have proved to be a failure in practice. In some cases
this is doubtless true; but it is not the whole truth. The Danube
Commission and the Postal Union furnish examples of successful
management by international commission. But there is no need to
mix up the question of international supervision with the method of
rendering it effective. There appears to be no inconsistency in
maintaining that the method of international commission would be
most fruitful in some instances, while the method of devolving the
work upon a single nation suitably placed for doing it would be more
advantageous in other cases. In those instances, where a weak or
backward people is capable of appreciating the alternatives, there is
no reason why the choice should not be left to the people
themselves.
One of the further consequences of the contraction of the world is
that health has become an international question. The days when a
plague could be confined to a city are over.[51]
The recent spread of
the so-called “Spanish” influenza is an instance which proves how
indissolubly bound together the world has come to be. And the
system of national quarantines has to be superseded by an
international organ for the localisation and the extirpation of
diseases which like the bubonic and the pneumonic plagues are
capable of easy and destructive diffusion; and for the removal of
those conditions of filth and insanitation in any part of the world to
which these scourges owe their origin. It is likely, moreover, that the
great increase in pulmonary and venereal diseases as by-products of
the war require international handling if their worst consequences
are to be averted.
46. 51. If, indeed, there ever were any such days. In 1665, the Great Plague was
brought from London to Eyam, a little Derbyshire town, in a parcel of cloth
consigned to the local tailor!
It will also belong to the proposed international body to oversee
and improve the facilities for travel and transport. Obviously this is
largely a question of keeping the seas an open highway for traffic.
The phrase “the freedom of the seas” has a special connotation in
current discussions which is apt to obscure the real point at issue.
The claim made by the German Government for the establishment of
the “freedom of the seas” seemed and was intended to imply that
British naval supremacy had constituted a hindrance to sea-borne
trade in normal times. No one with any historical knowledge would
be able to consent to that judgment. British naval supremacy has
been in no sense a limitation upon the “freedom of the seas” in
times of peace. The seas have always been free in modern times;
and so far from its having been restricted by British naval
supremacy, a good case may be made out for the contrary view. The
safety of the high seas is possibly more connected with the
efficiency of the British navy than a superficial judgment might
allow. The freedom of the seas only comes in question in war time;
and if we are minded to eliminate war from the world the whole
problem loses its relevancy anyhow, except in so far that some
measure of police surveillance may continue to be necessary. In the
meantime it should be remembered that the insular position of Great
Britain has created the necessity in past times for a strong navy in
order to secure the freedom of the seas for its own commerce; but it
is not to be maintained for a moment that it has in recent times
used its supremacy to limit the freedom of other commerce. Even if
the policing of the high seas should be placed by the international
authority in the hands of Great Britain, its past record shows that it
may be trusted; and in any case its own interest in the free and
unimpeded passage of commerce upon the seas is a guarantee that
it would discharge its office effectually.
Still, it is probably not desirable that the control of the seas should
be devolved upon a single power. The universal interests of the
47. nations in the franchise of the ocean highways make it necessary
that their protection be an international obligation. This part of the
problem should, however, present no insuperable difficulty. In
practice the high seas are to all intents and purposes already
neutralised. Our difficulties arise when we come to the question of
narrow inter-ocean waterways. The most conspicuous, though
perhaps not the most important, case of this type, is the water
connecting the Black and the Ægean Seas; and the obvious solution
lies in the permanent neutralisation of the Bosphorus, the Sea of
Marmora and the Dardanelles. There is no difficulty involved in the
institution of an international commission to carry this project into
effect. This particular outlet affects so many nations that it is
intolerable that it should remain the particular property of a single
nation; and the only possible alternative is this of neutralisation
under international commission. The straits of Gibraltar present a
different though a no more difficult problem. With the development
of modern ordnance, the military and political importance of the
Rock of Gibraltar has virtually disappeared; and its value is chiefly
that of a naval base and coaling station. It is difficult to see what
purpose under modern conditions the retention of a kind of British
sovereignty in the Straits serves. In the days when the route to India
had to be protected, it was of course another story; and there is
really no reason why the Straits of Gibraltar—as well as all other
narrow waterways—should not be neutralised in perpetuity under
international guarantee. The experience of the present war in the
matter of submarine attacks on merchant ships in the Mediterranean
showed how ineffectual any guardianship of the Straits is likely to be
in the future; and the same thing is true of all waterways which are
not sufficiently narrow to be swiftly barred against entrance by
submarine craft.
The most thorny part of this problem lies in the question of the
two great inter-ocean canals, Suez and Panama. These two
passages are now held by single powers though they are governed
in such a way as to give virtual equality of use to the seacraft of all
nations. Apart from the profits which accrue to the possessing
48. nations from the charges upon traffic, it is difficult to see what
advantage the arrangement possesses. It is in the interest of the
possessing nations to encourage the general use of the canals, so
much so, indeed, that it has been found expedient by the United
States to renounce the idea of preferential treatment to its own
shipping in the Panama Canal. Probably not much would be
immediately gained by the neutralisation of these canals, though it is
likely that the pressure of circumstances may lead to such an event
at a later time. Nevertheless, any international authority would find it
necessary to secure that craft of all nations should have free and
equal access to the canals at all times.
But the facilitation of international traffic is not an affair of the
water only. It is no less essential that the great trunk railroads
should be effectually co-ordinated. The British project of an “all-red
route” round the world is an instance of the kind of co-ordination
that is required. The Interstate Railroad Commission of the United
States supplies the idea at another angle. The convenient
international transport of persons and commodities, the regulation of
time-schedules, of fares and freights, is surely part of the subject
matter of a League of Nations. It has long been seen that the roads
of a nation are its arteries and veins; and the provision of cheap and
easy transit for persons and things may well become one of the
most potent factors in the cohesive energy of a League of Nations.
Enough has already been said upon the conditions of international
trade which are requisite to the project of a League of Peoples.
Invidious protective tariffs, “favoured nation” clauses, preferential
arrangements of any kind must work injuriously to the process of
integration. That these devices are also injurious to the nations
which utilise them is of less moment to us at this point than their
effect in creating rivalry and antagonism. To secure a genuine and
universal reciprocity in trade should be one of the aims of the
league, as it will also be one of the primary conditions of its
consolidation and growth.
49. VIII
But may not this concentration of authority in the hands of an
international body create a kind of super-state? In any case this
danger is very remote at the present time; but it is no less necessary
that at its inception conditions should be agreed upon which will
safeguard it from such a tendency. This might be done in one of two
ways. It might, for instance, be ordained that the machinery of the
League should not be unitary, but that the commissions requisite for
various purposes should be independently appointed by the
contracting nations and derive their mandate directly from them;
and in the event of overlapping, the commissions concerned might
adjust the matter by joint session. The other alternative is that there
should be a supreme international authority, but that it should be
subject to a “Barrier Act.”[52]
This would provide that the power and
the enactments of the authority should be perpetually subject to the
revision of the contracting parties; and it would be impossible for the
international body to take any material step outside the limits of its
mandate and consequently to extend its sphere of authority without
the general consent of the nations concerned. Perhaps both these
conditions are necessary—the direct appointment of commissions
and the Barrier Act; and in any case a general agreement should be
reached beforehand as to the limits and nature of the functions to
be vested in the international body. It is plain, of course, that in any
event the League must stand upon consent. It will be a voluntary
association of free peoples; and its maintenance will depend upon
the impossibility of its ever accruing any authority sufficient to
prevent the withdrawal of any nation which might be so minded. It is
questionable whether once the League had come into operation, any
nation could afford to withdraw; but no power should be veiled in it
to coerce a nation to remain in the League against its will. The basis
50. of free and voluntary association is the only guarantee of genuine
and fruitful solidarity.
52. The Barrier Act was a Presbyterian device against hasty innovation. “Every
proposal which contemplates a material change in the constitution of the
Church or in its laws respecting doctrine, discipline, government, or worship,
after being considered and accepted by the Synod, must be sent down to
Presbyteries for their approval or disapproval, before it can become the law
of the Church.” (The Book of Order of the Presbyterian Church of England, p.
50.) Just so, the Federal Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
relative to prohibition had to be referred to the several states for
endorsement before final ratification.
This, however, raises the question of whether the League should
be armed with powers to enforce its decisions. That it should be
endowed with a definite judicial authority goes without saying; but is
it to be supported by a police organisation? In the present state of
opinion it appears likely that some kind of international police force
will be attached to the League; but there are some reasons for
doubting whether such a provision is necessary or likely to be useful.
In this connection the interesting point has been raised that the
Constitution of the United States established a court to adjudicate
upon disputes between the States, with no provision of force to
compel a State to accept the Court’s decision, but depending upon
public opinion alone to validate the judgment. Had there been any
attempt on the part of those who framed the Constitution to invest
the federal authority with power to coerce a recalcitrant state, it is
likely that the Union would never have come into existence; but the
Union was founded and survived despite the absence of coercive
sanctions, and the venture of faith has been vindicated by the
growth and unity of the American people.[53]
There is a real danger
lest the institution of a police force at the disposal of the League
might prove a disruptive factor; and the question should be carefully
canvassed before a decision is reached. In any case it is safe to say
that it should be the business of the League to work towards the
ultimate elimination of coercive sanctions.
53. Technically, in the Civil War, force was used to prevent the secession of the
South; but what the North really fought for was the abolition of slavery.
51. But meantime is there any method by which the League could
effectually deal with recalcitrant nations other than direct physical
compulsion? A good deal has been said about the use of economic
boycott; but it requires some casuistry to distinguish successfully
between military coercion and economic boycott. Certainly in
intention both devices come within the same category, and in result
they may work out in curiously identical fashion. Constraint by
starvation bears in effect a strong family resemblance to constraint
by destructive force majeure. At the same time it is evident that a
nation which chooses to put itself “in contumaciam” must in some
way or another pay the penalty of its offence. The Bank Clearing
House deals with an offending and impenitent member by the simple
process of exclusion. In the League of Nations, a nation in the same
position should be dealt with in the same fashion; it should
understand that its persistency in the offending attitude carries with
it exclusion from the comity of nations. It should, that is, be
compelled to accept the responsibility of imposing the punishment
upon itself. It has put itself outside the pale; and no injustice is
involved in accepting its deed at its obvious face value and letting it
remain where it has chosen to place itself until such time as it elects
to think better of its action. It is doubtful whether any constituent
nation would think it worth while to indulge in a contumacy which
automatically led to excommunication.
It would take us too far afield from our purpose to discuss the
details of the organisation required by a League of Nations.
Questions of constitution and representation, the problems involved
in the adhesion to the League of vast composite aggregates like the
British Empire, and of the place of some of the minute independent
states that still remain in the world,—these and many more matters
will have to be faced in the institution of the League. Here, however,
it has been our business merely to point out that some such device
as a League of Peoples is entirely necessary to the further
development of the democratic principle, and to pass in brief review
certain of the conditions which the League must satisfy, and certain
of the functions it must assume, if it is to be consistent with and
52. helpful to the realisation of the ideal of democracy. A League to
enforce peace may be no more than the Holy Alliance redivivus, an
unholy alliance in defence of the status quo.[54]
What is needed is a
League to guarantee freedom and to promote fellowship, and given
such a League peace will largely look after itself. It is not sufficiently
recognised that to make peace an object in itself is to condemn the
world to virtual stagnation. The only peace, like the only happiness
which is permanent, is that which is a bye-product. Permanent
peace will come from a voluntary association of peoples co-operating
on a basis of reciprocity; and such a consummation is not so far off
as it would at fist sight appear. The reciprocity which has been
established between the Allied peoples in the war will have to be
continued long after the war. Their needs are so vast that they will
only escape death and want by close co-operation. Moreover, the
agreement of the Allies reported in the press as these pages are
written to send food to their late enemies, is an asset of the utmost
importance to the creation of the League. And once the League is
properly afoot, we may live in the hope of the day which William
Blake foretold:
“In my exchanges, every land shall walk,
And mine in every land;
Mutual shall build Jerusalem,
Both heart in heart, and hand in hand.”
54. It is hardly possible to resist the remark at this point that the League as
fashioned in Paris bears a strong family likeness to the Holy Alliance, and so
far behaves uncommonly like it,—e.g., towards Russia and Hungary.