Motor Accident Claim Petitions - MACP - Reference Manual updated upto April, 2015.

1 MACP Reference Manual
MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIM
PETITION REFERENCE
MANUAL
Updated upto April, 2015.
Prepared by Hanif. S. Mulia.

CONTENTS
Sr.
No.
Particulars Page
No.
1 Re Requirement for the police to forward to the Claims Tribunal
“Accident Information Report” (AIR) which the Tribunal has to treat
as an application for compensation.
6
2 How to decide a claim petition wherein Fatal Injuries were sustained
by the deceased
12
3 How to decide a claim petition wherein claimant has sustained
Injuries
21
4 How to determine monthly income of the deceased or injured when
no document in support thereof is produced
44
5 How to determine income of the deceased or injured claimant when
there is documentary evidence on record to show that the deceased
or injured claimant was earning in foreign currency and not in
Indian Rupee
45
6 How to decide a claim petition where defence of Invalid, Learners
Licence & Fake Driving Licence and Defense of Qualification/Badge
is taken
48
7 In which circumstances Insurer is liable to pay compensation when
injured claimant or deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle
57
8 Liability of insurer to compensation in the cases where injured
claimant or deceased was travelling in the private car as occupants
or travelling on two wheeler as pillion rider
61
9 How to decide a claim petition preferred under section 163A of the
Act
62

10 What if the cheque given for payment of premium of insurance
policy is dishonoured
67
11 What is the meaning of “Arising out of use of Motor Vehicle” 68
12 Whether Finance Company, which has advanced loan for the
purpose of purchase of vehicle under the 'Hire Purchase Agreement'
can be said to be the owner of the Vehicle
70
13 When driver of the unknown vehicle sped away after the accident,
whether in such situation claim petition is maintainable in view of
the provisions contained under Sections 161 & 163 of the Act
71
14 Whether all the joint tortfeasors are required to be joined as party
opponents in the claim petition
73
15 Whether the point of negligence and liability of insurer, decided by
the coordinate Tribunal is binding on the other coordinate
Tribunal, if the claim petition has arisen from the same accident
76
16W Whether a claim petition preferred by the a claimant (also the owner
of the offending vehicle, without involving another vehicle) alleging
therein that accident occurred because of the rash and negligent
driving of the vehicle owned by him, is maintainable
77
17 What is the meaning of “Public Place”, as defined u/s 2(34) of the
Act
79
18 What if, the vehicle which met with an accident is sold of by its
owner before the date of accident and name of the transferee owner
(purchaser) is not entered into the R.C. Book
83
19 Whether a claim petition can be dismissed for want of prosecution or
nonappearance of the claimant and/or his Advocate
87
20 Whether a claim petition can be dismissed for non production of
documents mentioned under Rule 211 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles
88

Rules,1988
21 How to decide a claim petition, where insurer has taken a defence of
violation of 'Permit'
89
22W Whether an award passed by the Tribunal can be reviewed 96
23 Details of Proposal Forms for Private Cars/Motorised Two Wheelers
Package Policy and Liability Only/ Act Policy
98
24 Standard wordings in respect of the Policy including Premium
computation table, certificate of Insurance and Cover Note
98
25Ce Requisition of Vehicle by the Government/Authority 99
26 Liability of Insurance Company in the case wherein the vehicle
involved in the accident was stolen.
102
27 Whether executing court can pass an order of attachment of
Residential premises/home?
103
28 When possession of vehicle is taken over by the transferee along
with certificate of insurance, Insurance company is liable to pay
amount of compensation.
104
29 Commencement of Policy and Breach of Policy 105
30 Which kind of licence required for LMVLGVHGVHTVMGV 108
31 Registration of Vehicle/Number Plate 113
32 Under Section 140 of M.V. Act. 114

1. While deciding a claim petition, preferred under the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act'), more often then not, Ld. Judges of
the Tribunals are vexed with such questions that it becomes difficult for
them to come to a certain conclusion, main reasons for such vexation are:
a)Non availability of judgments on certain points,
b)If judgments are available on some points, they run in
different directions,
c)Lack of reference book to decide, as to whether the
insurance policy is 'Act Policy' (Statutory Policy) or
'Comprehensive Policy' (Package Policy).
2. By way of this Manual, an attempt is made to help Judicial Officers to
decide claim petitions easily, and more particularly, in accordance with the
law. Hon'ble Apex Court and Hon'ble High Courts have laid down
principles/guidelines to decide claim petitions, which will be discussed
hereinbelow.

3. Requirement for the police to forward to the Claims Tribunal “Accident
Information Report” (AIR) which the Tribunal has to treat as an application
for compensation:
3.1 The Bench comprising of Three Hon'ble Lordships of Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Jai Prakash v/s National Insurance Com. Ltd,
reported in 2010 (2) GLR 1787 (SC) has given following directions to
Police and Tribunals.
A) Directions to the Police Authorities :
 The Director General of Police of each State is directed to instruct
all police stations in his State to comply with the provisions of Sec.
158(6) of the Act. For this purpose, the following steps will have
to be taken by the Station House Officers of the jurisdictional
police stations :
(i) Accident Information Report ('AIR', for short) in Form No.
54 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 shall be
submitted by the police (Station House Officer) to the
jurisdictional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, within 30 days
of the registration of the F.I.R. In addition to the particulars
required to be furnished in Form No.54, the police should also
collect and furnish the following additional particulars in the
AIR to the Tribunal :
(i) The age of the victims at the time of accident;
(ii) The income of the victim;
(iii) The names and ages of the dependent family members.
(ii) The AIR shall be accompanied by the attested copies of the

F.I.R., site sketch/mahazar/photographs of the place of
occurrence, driving licence of the driver, insurance policy (and
if necessary, fitness certificate) of the vehicle and post mortem
report (in case of death) or the injured or dependent family
members of the deceased should also be furnished to the
Tribunal.
(iii) Simultaneously, a copy of the AIR with annexures thereto
shall be furnished to the Insurance Company concerned to
enable the insurer to process the claim.
(iv) The police shall notify the first date of hearing fixed by
the Tribunal to the victim (injured) or the family of the victim
(in case of death) and the driver, owner and insurer. If so
directed by the Tribunal, the police may secure their presence
on the first date of hearing.
B) Directions to the Claims Tribunals :
The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to
instruct all Claims Tribunals in his State to register the reports
of accidents received under Sec. 158(6) of the Act as
applications for compensation under Sec. 166(4) of the Act
and deal with them without waiting for the filing of claim
applications by the injured or by the family of the deceased.
The Registrar General shall ensure that necessary registers,
forms and other support is extended to the Tribunal to give
effect to Sec. 166(4) of the Act.

 For complying with Sec. 166(4) of the Act, the jurisdictional
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals shall initiate the following
steps :
(a) The Tribunal shall maintain an institution register for
recording the AIRs. which are received from the Station House
Officers of the police stations and register them as miscellaneous
petitions. If any private claim petitions are directly filed with
reference to an AIR, they should also be recorded in the register.
(b) The Tribunal shall list the AIRs. as miscellaneous petitions. It
shall fix a date for preliminary hearing so as to enable the police
to notify such date to the victim (family of the victim in the event
of death) and the owner, driver and insurer of the vehicle
involved in the accident. Once, the claimant(s) appear, the
miscellaneous application shall be converted to claim petition.
Where a claimant(s) file the claim petition even before the receipt
of the AIR by the Tribunal, the AIR may be tagged to the claim
petition.
(c) The Tribunal shall enquire and satisfy itself that the AIR
relates to a real accident and is not the result of any collusion and
fabrication of an accident (by any "police officerAdvocatedoctor"
nexus, which has come to light in several cases).
(d) The Tribunal shall by a summary enquiry ascertain the
dependent family members/legal heirs. The jurisdictional police
shall also enquire and submit the names of the dependent legal
heirs.
(e) The Tribunal shall categorise the claim cases registered, into

those where the insurer disputes liability and those where the
insurer does not dispute the liability.
(f) Wherever the insurer does not dispute the liability under the
policy, the Tribunal shall make an endeavour to determine the
compensation amount by a summary enquiry or refer the matter
to the Lok Adalat for settlement, so as to dispose of the claim
petition itself, within a timeframe not exceeding six months from
the date of registration of the claim petition.
(g) The Insurance Companies shall be directed to deposit the
admitted amount or the amount determined, with the Claims
Tribunals within 30 days of determination. The Tribunals should
ensure that the compensation amount is kept in a fixed deposit
and disbursed as per the directions contained in Kerala S.R.T.C. v.
Susamma Thomas, 1994 (2) SCC 176.
(h) As the proceeding initiated in pursuance of Secs. 158(6) and
166(4) of the Act are different in nature from an application by
the victims(s) under Sec. 166(1) of the Act, Sec. 170 will not
apply. The insurers will therefore be entitled to assist the Tribunal
(either independently or with the owners of the vehicles) to verify
the correctness in regard to the accident, injuries, age, income and
dependants of the deceased victim and in determining the
quantum of compensation.
C) Direction with respect to investment:
In para No. 28 & 29 of Jai Prakash's case (supra) it has been held as
under:

“28. To protect and preserve the compensation amount awarded to
the families of the deceased victim special schemes may be
considered by the Insurance Companies in consultation with Life
Insurance Corporation of India, State Bank of India or any other
Nationalised Banks. One proposal is for formulation of a scheme in
consultation with the Nationalised Banks under which the
compensation is kept in a fixed deposit for an appropriate period
and interest is paid by the Bank monthly to the claimants without
any need for the claimants having to approach either the Court or
their Counsel or the Bank for that purpose. The scheme should
ensure that the amount of compensation is utilised only for the
benefit of the injured claimants or in case of death, for the benefit of
the dependent family”.
29. We extract below the particulars of a special scheme offered by a
Nationalised Bank at the instance of the Delhi High Court :
(i) The fixed deposit shall be automatically renewed till the period
prescribed by the Court.
(ii) The interest on the fixed deposit shall be paid monthly.
(iii) The monthly interest shall be credited automatically in the savings
account of the claimant.
(iv) Original fixed deposit receipt shall be retained by the Bank in safe
custody. However, the original passbook shall be given to the
claimant along with the photocopy of the F.D.R.
(v) The original fixed deposit receipt shall be handed over to the
claimant at the end of the fixed deposit period.

(vi) Photo identity card shall be issued to the claimant and the
withdrawal shall be permitted only after due verification by the
Bank of the identity card of the claimant.
(vii) No cheque book shall be issued to the claimant without the
permission of the Court.
(viii) No loan, advance or withdrawal shall be allowed on the fixed
deposit without the permission of the Court.
(ix) The claimant can operate the Savings Bank account from the
nearest branch of U.CO. Bank and on the request of the claimant,
the Bank shall provide the said facility”.

4. How to decide a claim petition wherein Fatal Injuries were sustained by
the deceased:
4.1 In Sarla Verma v/s Delhi Transport Corporation, reported in 2009
ACJ 1298 (SC) = AIR 2009 SC 3104 guidelines for determination of
multiplier, future prospects of the deceased, deduction towards personal
and living expenditures are issued. The ratio laid down in the case of
Sarla Verma (supra) was considered by the Three Hon'ble Judges of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Reshma Kumari v/s Madan Mohan,
reported in 2013 ACJ 1253 (SC) and it is held that ratio laid down in the
case of Saral Verma (supra) should be followed by the all the Tribunals.
The principles laid down in the case of Srala Veram and Reshma Kumari
(supra) qua determination of multiplier, future prospects of the
deceased, deduction towards personal and living expenditures are as
under:
a) Choice of Multiplier:
Age of the Deceased Multiplier
Upto 15 years 15
15 to 20 years 18
21 to 25 years 18
26 to 30 years 17
31 to 35 years 16
36 to 40 years 15
41 to 45 years 14
46 to 50 years 13
51 to 55 years 11
56 to 60 years 9
61 to 65 years 7
Above 65 years 5

b) What should be the multiplier in the case of Fatal injury case,
where deceased was unmarried son/daughter:
There are difference of opinion as to what should be the multiplier in
the case of fatal injury case, where deceased was unmarried
son/daughter. In Shyam Singh, reported in 2011 (7) SCC 65  = 2011
ACJ 1990 (SC), it has been held that  Multiplier in the case of death of
unmarried son/daughter, proper multiplier should be arrived at by
assessing average age of parents of the deceased. But different views
are taken by Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of P. S. Somnathan v/s
Dist. Insurance Officer, reported in 2011 ACJ 737 (SC),  Amrit Bhanu
Shali v/s NI  Com., reported in 2012 ACJ 2002 (SC), Saktidevi v/s  NI
Com, reported in 2010 (14) SCC 575 and Reshma Kumari v/s Madan
Mohan, reported in 2013 ACJ 1253 (SC). In the above referred cases it
has been held that in the case of death of unmarried son/daughter,
multiplier should be a applied on the basis of age of the deceased and
not on the basis of average age of the parents of the deceased.
c)  Future Prospect of Deceased:
In para No.11 of the Srala Verama's (supra) judgment it is held as
under:
“In view of imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of
adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to
the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects.
where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years.
[Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words 'actual
salary' should be read as 'actual salary less tax']. The addition

should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years.
There should be no addition, where the age of deceased is more than
50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of
increase, it is necessary to standardize the addition to avoid different
yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculations being
adopted. Where the deceased was selfemployed or was on a fixed
salary (without provision for annual increments etc.), the courts will
usually take only the actual income at the time of death. A departure
therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases
involving special circumstances”.
4.2 In the case of Sanjay Verma v/s Haryana Roadways, reported in
2014 (3) SCC 210, a threejudges Bench of Hon'ble Apex court, after
considering the ratio laid down in the case of Reshma Kumari(supra)
has held in para No.15 as under:
15: Answering the above reference a three Judge Bench of this Court
in Reshma Kumari v/s Madan Mohan (2013) 9 SCC 65 (para 36)
reiterated the view taken in Sarla Verma (supra) to the effect that in
respect of a person who was on a fixed salary without provision for
annual increments or who was selfemployed the actual income at
the time of death should be taken into account for determining the
loss of income unless there are extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances. Though the expression “exceptional and
extraordinary circumstances” is not capable of any precise definition,
in Shakti Devi v/s New India Insurance Company Limited (2010) 14
SCC 575 there is a practical application of the aforesaid principle.

The near certainty of the regular employment of the deceased in a
government department following the retirement of his father was
held to be a valid ground to compute the loss of income by taking
into account the possible future earnings. The said loss of income,
accordingly, was quantified at double the amount that the deceased
was earning at the time of his death.
4.3 Even in para No.13 of the above referred judgment is observed
as under:
“13. The view taken in Santosh Devi (supra) has been reiterated by
a Bench of three Judges in Rajesh and Others vs. Rajbir Singh and
Others[(2013) 9 SCC 54] by holding as follows :
“8. Since, the Court in Santosh Devi case actually intended to follow
the principle in the case of salaried persons as laid down in Sarla
Verma case and to make it applicable also to the selfemployed and
persons on fixed wages, it is clarified that the increase in the case of
those groups is not 30% always; it will also have a reference to the
age. In other words, in the case of selfemployed or persons with
fixed wages, in case, the deceased victim was below 40 years, there
must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased
while computing future prospects. Needless to say that the actual
income should be income after paying the tax, if any. Addition
should be 30% in case the deceased was in the age group of 40 to 50
years.
9. In Sarla Verma case, it has been stated that in the case of those
above 50 years, there shall be no addition. Having regard to the fact
that in the case of those selfemployed or on fixed wages, where there

is normally no age of superannuation, we are of the view that it will
only be just and equitable to provide an addition of 15% in the case
where the victim is between the age group of 50 to 60 years so as to
make the compensation just, equitable, fair and reasonable. There
shall normally be no addition thereafter.”
4.4 From the above referred observations, it becomes clear that
where the deceased had a permanent job and in other cases, where it is
proved that there was scope for the increase in the income of the
deceased, addition, varying from 50% to 15% may be made, depending
on the age of the deceased. Addition should be 50% and if the age of
the deceased was between 40 to 50 years, addition should be only 30%
and an addition of 15% in the case where the deceased was between
the age group of 50 to 60 years.
4.5 It is also required to be born in mind that House Rent
Allowance, Medical Allowance, Dearness Allowance, Dearness Pay,
Employees Provident Fund, Government Insurance Scheme, General
Provident Fund, C.C.A. etc should be treated as part and parcel of the
income of the deceased, while calculating income of the deceased for
the purpose of computing compensation. Reference may be made to
ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sunil Sharma v/s
Bachitar Singh, reported in 2011 ACJ 1441 (SC) also see Vimal Kanwar
v/s Kishore Dan, reported in 2013 ACJ 1441.
4.4 Now, the question is, when a departure from the above referred
guideline should be made? In this regards, reference is required to be

made to the ratio laid down in the case of K. R. Madhusudhan v/s
Administrative Officer, reported in AIR 2011 SC 979. In the said case
deceased was aged 53 years and was working as Senior Assistant in
Karnataka Electricity Board. As per Board Agreement, after completion
of five years, pay revision was compulsory and evidence was produced
by the claimants showing that if deceased would have been alive he
would have reached gross salary of Rs. 20,000/ p.m. Hence, even
though deceased was above 50 years of age, it is held that claimants
are entitled to compensation calculated on the basis of such increased
income.
d)  Deduction towards Personal and Living Expenditures:
4.5  In Para No.14 of Sarla Veram's case (supra) it is held as under:
“Having considered several subsequent decisions of this court, we are
of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction
towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one
third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to
3, onefourth (1/4th) where the number of dependant family members
is 4 to 6, and onefifth (1/5th) where the number of dependant family
members exceed six”.
     4.6   In Para No.14 of Sarla Veram's case (supra) it is held as under:
“Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents,
the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors,
normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it
is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even

otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short
time, in which event the contribution to the parents and siblings is
likely to be cut drastically”.
4.7 Meaning thereby, the deduction towards personal and living expenses
of the deceased, should be onethird (1/3rd
) where the number of
dependant family members is less than 3, onefourth (1/4th
) where the
number of dependant family members is 4 to 6, and onefifth (1/5th
)
where the number of dependant family members exceed six. And in the
cases where deceased was unmarried son/daughter, the deduction
towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be onehalf.

4.7.1. It has been further held in Para No.15 of Sarla Verma's case (supra)
that:
“Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to
have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and
the mother alone will be considered as a dependent. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as
dependents, because they will either be independent and earning, or
married, or be dependant on the father. Thus even if the deceased is
survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered
to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and
living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the
family. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependant
on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed
mother and large number of younger nonearning sisters or brothers,

his personal and living expenses may be restricted to onethird and
contribution to the family will be taken as twothird”.
4.8 Plain reading of above referred observations, makes it clear that,
unless, it is proved that father of the deceased was not having
independent income, father of the deceased cannot be treated as
dependant. Same analogy applies in the cases of where claim petition is
preferred by the sibling/s of deceased who was/were unmarried
brother/sister of such deceased. But if, it is proved that father of the
deceased was not having independent income, father of the deceased can
be treated as dependant. In the cases where claim petition is preferred by
the mother, sibling/s who were solely dependant on the income of the of
deceased, in such cases, onethird (1/3rd
) may be deducted towards
personal and living expenses of deceased.
4.9 In Srala Veram (supra) it has been held in par 26 that:
“In addition, the claimants will be entitled to a sum of Rs. 5,000/
under the head of 'loss of estate' and Rs. 5,000/ towards funeral
expenses. The widow will be entitled to Rs. 10,000/ as loss of
consortium'.
4.10 But a bench of Three Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Rajesh v/s Rajbir Singh , reported in 2013 ACJ 1403 has held that
claimants will be entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/ under the head of loss
of care and guidance for minor children, Rs. 25,000/ towards funeral
expenses and the widow will be entitled to Rs. 1,00,000/ as loss of
consortium.

4.11 Ratio laid down in the case of Rajesh (supra) qua consortium, funeral
expenditure etc is followed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Savita
v/s Bindar Singh, reported in 2014 ACJ 1261 (SC) and Anjani Singh v/s
Salauddin, reported in 2014 ACJ 1565 (SC).
4.12 In the case of Jiju Kuruwila v/s Kunjujamma Mohan, 2013 ACJ 2141
(SC), it is held that each child of the deceased is entitled for for
Rs.1,00,000/ under the head of loss of love and affection. Same is
followed in 2015 ACJ 598 (SC) – Neeta v/s Divisional Manager.
4.13 In 2015 STPL(Web) 204 SC (SC)(DB) Shashikala v/s
Gangalakshmamma, a reference to larger Bench is made since the bench
disagreed only insofar as the addition towards the future prospects in
case of selfemployed or fixed wages to be added to the compensation
towards the dependency, the matter directed to be placed before the
Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders towards the
constitution of a suitable larger Bench to decide the said issue.

5.  How to decide a claim petition wherein claimant has sustained Injuries:
5.1 If the claim petition is preferred u/s 166 of the Act, in injury cases,
choice of multiplier remains the same, as in the case of fatal injuries
cases. Deductions towards personal and living expenditures are not
made in injuries case. To determine the future loss of income, ratio laid
down in the case of Raj Kumar v/s Ajay Kumar, reported in  2012 ACJ 1
=  2011 (1) SCC 343 is required to be followed. In paragraph 6 of the
said decision, the various elements of compensation are enumerated as
under:
"Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines,
transportation, nourishing food and miscellaneous expenditure.
(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would
have made had he not been injured, comprising:
(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.
(iii) Future medical expenses.
Nonpecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of
the injuries.
(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal
longevity)".

5.2 Compensation in the case, where an injured victim is Government
Servant/Salaried person, whose salary has increased after the accident and
has not sustained any financial loss:
5.2.1 The concept of awarding compensation is : that no amount of
compensation can restore the physical frame of the appellant. That is
why it has been said by courts that whenever any amount is determined
as the compensation payable for any injury suffered during an accident,
the object is to compensate such injury" so far as money can
compensate" because it is impossible to equate the money with the
human sufferings or personal deprivations. Money cannot renew a
broken and shattered physical frame.
5.2.2 Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Raj Kumar v/s Ajay Kumar,
reported in 2011 ACJ 1 = 2011 (1) SCC 343, has held in para No.10 as
under:
“… On the other hand, if the claimant was a clerk in government
service, the loss of his left hand may not result in loss of
employment and he may still be continued as a clerk as he could
perform his clerical functions; and in that event the loss of earning
capacity will not be 100% as in the case of a driver or carpenter,
nor 60% which is the actual physical disability, but far less. In fact,
there may not be any need to award any compensation under the
head of `loss of future earnings', if the claimant continues in
government service, though he may be awarded compensation
under the head of loss of amenities as a consequence of losing his
hand...”

5.2.3 Reference is also required to be made to ratio laid down by
Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Gurdipsinh s/o Bisensingh
Sadhu vs. Chauhan Bhupendrakumar Udesing, reported in 1980 GLR
221. In the said judgment, it is held that the Court can make rough
estimate about loss of earning capacity in the light of the facts and
circumstances and the available data of medical evidence on record. In
the said case, Hon'ble High Court had estimated the loss of earning
capacity at 25% of actual income and claimant was awarded Rs.45,000,
though there was no immediate reduction in his salary as a Technical
Assistant in O.N.G.C. Relying upon the said decision, Hon'ble Division
bench of Gujarat High Court has held in the case of Mohanbhai
Gemabhai vs. Balubhai Savjibhai, reported in 1993(1) GLR 249 (para
20) that:
“No doubt, it is imperative for the Tribunal to consider the facts
and circumstances, and the medical evidence, showing the extent of
physical impairment. If no precise and direct evidence showing the
percentage or extent of the disablement is spelt out, the Tribunal
can make rough and reasonable estimate of loss of earning capacity
so as to determine the just amount of compensation under the head
of 'prospective economic loss'.”
5.2.4 Even the observations of House of Lords, reported in 1912 AC
496 are very relevant and same can be taken into consideration.
Reference required to be made to the ratio laid down in 2013 ACJ 79 –
para 20.

5.2.5 From the above referred ratios of Hon'ble Apex Court and
Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, it becomes clear that Tribunal can grant
compensation to those injured persons who have not suffered any
financial loss or whose salary income have actually increased after the
date of accident and such compensation should not be under the head
of 'loss of Future Earnings' but under the head of 'Loss off Amenities'
Such claimants are entitled for such amount of compensation,
calculated on the basis of 1/4th
of the net salary income, which they
were getting at the time of accident.
5.3A What should be reasonable amount of compensation in the cases
where minor has sustained serious injuries in vehicular accident:
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mallikarjun v/s Divisional Manager,
reported in 2013 ACJ 2445. Wherein in para No.12 it is held has under:-
“12. Though it is difficult to have an accurate assessment of the
compensation in the case of children suffering disability on account
of a motor vehicle accident, having regard to the relevant factors,
precedents and the approach of various High Courts, we are of the
view that the appropriate compensation on all other heads in
addition to the actual expenditure for treatment, attendant, etc.,
should be, if the disability is above 10% and upto 30% to the whole
body, Rs.3 lakhs; upto 60%, Rs.4 lakhs; upto 90%, Rs.5 lakhs and
above 90%, it should be Rs.6 lakhs. For permanent disability upto
10%, it should be Re.1 lakh, unless there are exceptional
circumstances to take different yardstick. In the instant case, the

disability is to the tune of 18%. Appellant had a longer period of
hospitalization for about two months causing also inconvenience and
loss of earning to the parents.”
5.3 Determination of permanent Partial Disablement of the claimant:
5.3.1. In the cases where injured had sustained more that one fracture
injuries, it may appear to Tribunal that disability certificate issued by
the Doctor depicts the higher value of disability than the injured
claimant has actually sustained. In such situation, Ld. Judge of the
Tribunal finds it difficult to arrive at the exact amount of disability
sustained by the injured claimant. Normally, Doctors issue disability
certificate on the basis of formula invented by Dr. Henry H. Kessler in
his book titled as 'Disability – Determination & Evaluation'. For
determination of disability in such cases, Doctors apply formula evolved
by Dr. Henry H. Kessler. Said Formula reads as under:
A+{ [B (100A)] / 100}
5.3.2. In the said formula, 'A' stands for higher value of partial
disablement, whereas 'B' stands for lower value of partial disablement.
Doctors normally, take disadvantage of the comments given on page
No.49 of the above referred book. Careful reading of the said
comments, leads to the conclusion that when injured victim/claimant
has sustained injuries, which resulted into two or more fractures on two
different limbs of the body, then in such situation disablement in
relation to whole body may be assessed as per the above referred

formula. But above referred formula does not apply in the cases where
claimant has sustained two or more fractures on the same limb i.e one
fracture on right hand and second on left hand or one fracture on right
lag and second on the left leg. It is also mentioned in the said book that
lower part of the body i.e. legs or upper part of body i.e. two hands are
considered as one limb of the body (lower limb or upper limb) and
when victim/claimant has sustained fractures on the one particular
limb then in such case, disablement in relation to whole may be
assessed as one half of the permanent partial disablement assessed by
the doctor. Say for an example, claimant has sustained one fracture
injury on right leg and doctor has assessed disability in relation to right
lower limb as 27% and second fracture injury on left leg and doctor has
assessed disability in relation to left lower limb as 7% and if, we apply
simple principle in the facts of the above referred example, the
disablement in relation to whole body, comes to 17%. (27% in relation
to right lower limb plus permanent partial impairment of 7% in relation
to left lower limb, divided by two [27% + 7% ] / 2 ). But, if we apply
the above referred formula, disablement in relation to whole body
comes to 32.11%. { 27 + [7 (100 – 27) / 100] }. From the above
referred discussion, it becomes clear that when victim/claimant has
sustained more than one fractures on one limb and when
victim/claimant has sustained more than one fractures on two limbs,
assessment of disablement in relation to whole body is required to be
assessed by applying different formulas. Book written by Dr. Henry H.
Kessler, namely, 'Disability – Determination & Evaluation' is considered
to be the authority as far as calculation of permanent partial

disablement is concerned. However, it is to be noted that Dr. Henry H.
Kessler has also mentioned in his book that there is always variation of
plus/minus 5%, in the permanent partial disablement assessed by the
doctor. Therefore, while deciding permanent partial impairment of the
injured claimant, above referred facts are required to be remembered.
5.3.3 Reference may also be made to 'Manual For Doctors To
Evaluate Permanent Physical Impairment', which is based on expert
group meeting on disability evaluation and national seminar on
disability evaluation and dissemination, G.G.H.S. W.H.O. A.I.I.M.S.,
New Delhi 1981. Reference may also be made to 'Disability
Guidelines issued by Office of Chief Commissioner for Persons with
Disabilities, dated 1 st
June 2001. Guidelines issued in the above
referred reports are as under:
5.3.3.1. Guidelines for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment in
Upper Limbs:
1. The estimation of permanent impairment depends upon the
measurement of functional impairment, and is not expression of a
personal opinion.
2. The estimation and measurement must be made when the clinical
condition is fixed and unchangeable.
3. The upper extremity is divided into two component parts the arm
component and the hand component.
4. Measurement of the loss of function of arm component consists in
measuring the loss of motion, muscle strength an coordinated

activities.
5. Measurement of the loss of function of hand component consists in
determining the Prehension, Sensation & Strength. For estimation of
Prehension : Opposition, lateral pinch, Cylindrical grasp, spherical
grasp and hook grasp have to be assessed as shown in the column of
“prehension” component in the proforma.
6. The impairment of the entire extremity depends on the combination
of the functional impairment of both components.
ARM COMPONENT:
Total value of arm component is 90%.
Principles of Evaluation of range of motion of joints
1. The value for maximum R.O.M. in the arm component is 90%.
2. Each of the three joints of the arm is weighted equally (30%).
Example
A. fracture of the right shoulder joint may affect range of motion so that
active adduction is 90degree. The left shoulder exhibits a range of
active abduction of 180degree. Hence there is loss of 50% of abduction
movement of the right shoulder. The percentage loss of arm component
in the shoulder is 50 x 0.03 or 15% loss of motion for the arm
component.
If more than one joint is involved, same method is applied, and the
losses in each of the affected joints are added.
Say for example:
Loss of abduction of the shoulder = 60%
Loss of extension of the wrist = 40%

Then, loss of range of motion for the
arm = (60 x 0.30) + (40 x 0.30) = 30%
Principles of Evaluation of strength of muscles:
1. Strength of muscles can be tested by manual testing like 05 grading.
2. Manual muscle gradings can be given percentages like
3. – 100%
4. – 80%
5. – 60%
6. – 40%
7. – 20%
8. – 0%
9. The mean percentage of muscle strength loss is multiplied by 0.30.
If there has been a loss of muscle strength of more than one joint, the
values are added as has been described for loss of range of motion.
Principles of Evaluation of coordinated activities:
1. The total value for coordinated activities is 90%.
2. Ten different coordinated activities are to be tested as given in the
Proforma.
3. Each activity has a value of 9%.
Combining values for the Arm Component:
1. The value of loss of function of arm component is obtained by
combining the values of range of movement, muscle strength & co
ordinated activities, using the combining formula

A+ b(90a)/90
Where 'A' = higher value & 'B' = lower value
Example
Let us assume that an individual with a fracture of the right shoulder
joint has in addition to 16.5% loss of motion of his arm, 8.3% loss of
strength of muscles, and 5% loss of coordination. We combine these
values as :
Range of motion : 16.5% 16.5 +8.3(9016.5)/90 =23.3 %
Strength of Muscles : 8.3%
Coordination : 5% 23.3 + 5(9023.3)/90 =27.0%
So total value of arm component = 27.0%
HAND COMPONENT:
Total value of hand component is 90%.
The functional impairment of hand is expressed as loss of prehension,
loss of sensation, loss of strength.
Principles of Evaluation of Prehension :
Total value of Prehension is 30%. It includes :
(A) Opposition (8%). Tested against
Index finger (2%). Middle finger (2%)
Ring finger (2%) & Little finger (2%)
(B) Lateral Pinch (5%). Tested by asking the patient to hold a key.
(C) Cylindrical Grasp (6%). Tested for
(D) Large object of 4 inch size (3%)
(E) Small object of 1 inch size (3%)
(F) Spherical Grasp (6%). Tested for

(G) Large object 4 inch size (3%)
(H) Small object 1 inch size (3%)
(I) Hook Grasp (5%). Tested by asking the patient to lift a bag.
Principles of Evaluation of Sensations:
Total value of sensation is 30%. It includes :
1. Grip Strength (20%)
2. Pinch Strength (10%)
3. Strength will be tested with hand dynamometer or by clinical
method (Grip Method).
10% additional weightage to be given to the following factors :
1. Infection
2. Deformity
3. Malaignment
4. Contractures
5. Cosmetic appearance
6. Abnormal Mobility
7. Dominant Extremity (4%)
Combining values of the hand component:
The final value of loss of function of hand component is obtained by
summing up values of loss of prehension, sensation and strength.
Combining Values for the Extremity:
Values of impairment of arm component and impairment of hand
component are combined by using the combining formula.

Example
Impairment of the arm = 27% 64 +27(9064)/90=71.8%
Impairment of the hand = 64%
Lower Limbs:
The lower extremity is divided into two components: Mobility
component and Stability component.
MOBILITY COMPONENT:
Total value of mobility component is 90%. It includes range of
movement and muscle strength.
Principles of Evaluation of Range of Movement:
1. The value of maximum range of movement in the mobility
component is 90%.
2.Each of the three joints i.e. hip, knee, footankle component, is
weighted equally – 0.30.
Example
A Fracture of the right hip joint may affect range of motion so that
active abduction is 27degree. The lift hip exhibits a range of active
abduction of 54degree. Hence, there is loss of 50% of abduction
movement of the right hip. The percentage loss of mobility component
in the hip is 50, 0.30 or 15% loss of motion for the mobility component.
If more than one joint is involved, same method is applied and the

losses in each of the affected joints are added.
Example
Loss of abduction of the hip = 60%
Loss of extension of the knee = 40%
Loss of range of motion for the mobility component
= (60 x 0.30) + (40 x 0.30) = 30%.
Principles of Evaluation of Muscle Strength:
1. The value for maximum muscle strength in the leg is 90%.
2. Strength of muscles can be tested by manual testing like 05 grading.
3. Manual muscle gradings can be given percentages like
Grade 0 = 100%
Grade 1= 80%
Grade 2= 60%
Grade 3= 40%
Grade 4= 20%
Grade 5= 0%
4. Mean percentage of muscle strength loss is multiplied by 0.30.
5. If there has been a loss of muscle strength of more than one joint, the
values are added as has been described for loss of range of motion.
Combining Values for the Mobility Component:
Let us assume that the individual with a fracture of the right hip joint
has in addition to 16% loss of motion 8% loss of strength of muscles.
Combing Values:
Motion 16%, Strength 8%

= 16 +8(9016)/90 =22.6%
Where 'a' = higher value, 'b' = lower value.
STABILITY COMPONENT:
1. Total value of stability component is 90%
2. It is tested by 2 methods
3. Based on scale method.
4. Based on clinical method
Three different readings (in kilograms) are taken measuring the total
body weight (W), scale ‘A’ reading and scale ‘B’ reading. The final value
is obtained by the formula :
Difference in body weight divided by Total body weight, multiplied by
90.
In the clinical method of evaluation nine different activities are to be
tested as given in the proforma. Each activity has a value of ten percent
(10%).
5.3.3.4. Guidelines for Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment of
Trunk (Spine):
The local effects of lesions of spine can be divided into traumatic and
nontraumatic lesions.
TRAUMATIC LESIONS
Cervical Spine Fracture
Percent Whole body Permanent Physical Impairment and Loss of
Physical Function to Whole Body.

A. Vertebral compression 25%, one or two vertebral adjacent bodies, no
fragmentation, no involvement of posterior elements, no nerve root
involvement, moderate neck rigidity and persistent soreness.
B. Posterior elements with Xray evidence of moderate partial
dislocation.
(a) No nerve root involvement, healed 15
(b) With persistent pain, with mild motor and sensory Manifestations
25
(c) With fusion, healed no permanent motor or sensory changes 25
C. Severe dislocation, fair to good reduction with surgical fusion
(a) No residual motor or sensory changes 25
(b) Poor reduction with fusion, persistent radicular pain, motor
involvement, only slight weakness and numbness 35
(c) Same as (b) with partial paralysis, determine additional rating for
loss of use of extremities and sphincters.
Cervical Intervertebral Disc:
1. Operative, successful removal of disc, with relief of acute pain, no
fusion, no neurological residual 10
2. Same as (1) with neurological manifestations, persistent pain,
numbness, weakness in fingers 20
Thoracic and Dorsolumbar Spine Fracture:
Percent Whole body Permanent Physical Impairment and Loss of
Physical Function to Whole Body
A. Compression 25%, involving one or two vertebral bodies, mild, no

fragmentation, healed no neurological manifestations.10
B. Compression 50%, with involvement posterior elements, healed, no
neurological manifestations, persistent pain, fusion indicated. 20
C. Same as (B) with fusion, pain only on heavy use of back. 20
D. Total paraplegia. 100
E. Posterior elements, partial paralysis with or without fusion, should
be rated for loss of use of extremities and sphincters.
Low Lumbar:
1. Fracture
2. Vertebral compression 25%, one or two adjacent vertebral bodies,
little or fragmentation, no definite pattern or neurological changes.15
3. Compression with fragmentation posterior elements, persistent pain,
weakness and stiffness, healed, no fusion, no lifting over 25 pounds
40
4. Same as (B), healed with fusion, mild pain 20
5. Same as (B), nerve root involvement to lower extermities, determine
additional rating for loss of industrial function to extremities
6. Same as (c), with fragmentation of posterior elements, with
persistent pain after fusion, no neurologic findings 30
7. Same as (c), with nerve root involvement to lower extremities, rate
with functional loss to extremities
8. Total paraplegia 100
9. Posterior elements, partial paralysis with or without fusion, should
be rated for loss of use of extremities and sphincters.
@. Neurogenic Low Back Pain – Disc Injury

A. Periodic acute episodes with acute pain and persistent body list, tests
for sciatic pain positive, temporary recovery 5 to 8 weeks 50
B. Surgical excision of disc, no fusion, good results, no persistent sciatic
pain 10
C. Surgical excision of disc, no fusion, moderate persistent pain and stiffness
aggravated by heavy lifting with necessary modification of activities 20
D. Surgical excision of disc with fusion, activities of lifting moderately
modified 15
E. Surgical excision of disc with fusion, persistent pain and stiffness
aggravated by heavy lifting, necessitating modification of all activities
requiring heavy lifting – 25
NONTRAUMATIC LESIONS:
Scoliosis
The whole Spine has been given rating of 100% and region wise the
following percentages are given:
Dorsal Spine 50%
Lumbar Spine – 30%
Cervical Spine – 20%
Kobb’s method for measurement of angle of curve in standing position
is to be used. The curves have been divided into three sub groups :
Particulars Cervical
Spine
Thoracic spine Lumber Spine
30degree
(Mild)
2.00% 5.00% 6.00%
30-60degree 3.00% 15.00% 12.00%

(Moderate)
Above
60degree
(Severe)
5.00% 25.00% 33.00%
In the curves ranging above 60 0, cardiopulmonary complications are
to be graded separately. The junctional curves are to be given that
rating depending upon level of apex of curve. For example, if apex of
dorsolumbar curve falls in the dorsal spine the curve can be taken as a
dorsal curve. When the scoliosis is adequately compensated, 5%
reduction is to be given from final rating (for all assessment primary
curves are considered for rating).
Kyphosis
The same total rating (100%) as that suggested for scoliosis is to be
given for kyphosis. Regionwise percentages of physical impairment
are:
Dorsal Spine – 50%
Cervical Spine – 30%
Lumbar Spine – 20%
For dorsal spine the following further gradings are :
Less than 20degree – 10%
21degree – 40degree – 15%
41degree – 60degree – 20%
Above 60degree – 25%

For kyphosis of lumbar and cervical spine 5% and 7% respectively have
been allocated.
Paralysis of Flexors & Extensors of Dorsal and Lumbar Spine:
The motor power of these muscles to be grouped as follows :
Normal
Weak 5%
Paralysed 10%
Paralysis of Muscles of Cervical Spine:
Particulars Normal Weak Paralysed
Flexors 0 5.00% 10.00%
Extensors 0 5.00% 10.00%
Rotation 0 5.00% 10.00%
Side Bending 0 5.00% 10.00%
Miscellaneous:
Those conditions of the spine which cause stiffness and part etc., are
rated as follows :
A. Subjective symptoms of pain, No involuntary muscle spasm, Not
substantiated by demonstrable structural pathology. 0
B. Pain, Persistent muscle spasm and stiffness of spine, substantiated by
demonstrable and radiological changes. 10%
C. Same as B, with moderate radiological changes. 15%
D. Same as B, with severe radiological changes involving any one of the
region of spine (cervical, dorsal or lumbar) 20%
E. Same as D, involving whole spine 30%
In Kyphoscoliosis, both curves to be assessed separately and then

percentage of disability to be summed.
Amputees:
Basic Guidelines:
1. In case of multiple amputees, if the total sum of percentage
permanent physical impairment is above 100%, it should be taken as
100%.
2. Amputation at any level with uncorrectable inability to wear and use
prosthesis, should be given 100% permanent physical impairment.
3. In case of amputation in more than one limb percentage of each limb
is counted and another 10% will be added, but when only toes or
fingers are involved only another 5% will be added.
4. Any complication in form of stiffness, neuroma, infection etc. has to
be given a total of 10% additional weightage.
5. Dominant upper limb has been given 4% extra percentage.
Upper Limb Amputation:
Sr. No Particulars of Amputation Permanent Partial
Impairment, in %
1 Fore-quarter 100
2 Shoulder Disarticulation 90
3 Above Elbow upto upper 1/3 of
arm
85
4 Above Elbow upto lower 1/3 of
arm
80
5 Elbow Disarticulation 75
6 Below Elbow upto upper 1/3 of
forearm
70

7 Below Elbow upto lower 1/3 of
forearm
65
8 Wrist Disarticulation 60
9 Hand through carpal bones 55
10 Thumb through C.M. or through
1st
M.C. Joint
30
11 Thumb Disarticulation through
metacarpophalangeal joint or
through proximal phalanx
25
12 Thumb Disarticulation through
inter phalangeal joint or through
distal phalanx
15
Amputation of Finger:
Particulars IIndex
Finger
Middle
Finger
Ring
Finger
Little
Finger
Amputation through
proximal phalanx or
disarticulation through MP
joint
115.00% 5.00% 3.00% 2.00%
Amputation through
middle phalanx or
disarticulation through PIP
joint
110.00% 4.00% 2.00% 1.00%
Amputation through distal
phalanx or disarticulation
through DIP joint
55.00% 2.00% 1.00% 1.00%
Lower Limb Amputations:
1. Hind quarter 100%
2. Hip disarticulation 90%
3. Above knee upto upper 1/3 of thigh 85%
4. Above knee upto lower 1/3 of thigh 80%
5. Through keen 75%
6. B.K. upto 8 cm 70%
7. B.K. upto lower 1/3 of leg 60%

8. Through ankle 55%
9. Syme's 50%
10. Upto midfoot 40%
11. Upto forefoot 30%
12. All toes 20%
13. Loss of first toe 10%
14. Loss of second toe 5%
15. Loss of third toe 4%
16. Loss of fourth toe 3%
17. Loss of fifth toe 2%
5.4 What should be the amount of compassion in the cases where injured
lost one of the limbs (amputation):
5.4.1. Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Govind Yadav v/s National
Insurance Com. Ltd., reported in 2012 (1) TAC 1 (SC) = 2012 ACJ 28
(SC), M.D. Jacob v/s United India Insurance Com. Ltd. 2014 ACJ 648
(SC) (FB) and Sanjay Kumar v/s Ashok Kumar 2014 ACJ 653 (SC) has
held that as the cost of living and cost of artificial limb (prosthetic) has
substantially increased and, therefore, Rs.2,00,000/ to be awarded
under the said head. Rs.1,50,000/each to be awarded under the heads
of pain, shock & sufferings and special diet, attendance &
transportation and loss of amenities and enjoyment of life, respectively.
And if injured is unmarried and his/her prospects for marriage have
considerably reduced, Rs.1,00,000/ may be awarded.
5.5 Whether Dependants of the injured claimant who died his natural death
during the pendency of the claim petition are entitled to get any amount of
compensation:

5.5.1. Maxim “Actio Personalis MoriturcumPersona” is applicable in
such cases. Even provisions of Section 306 (along with Illustrations) of
Indian Succession Act, 1925 would apply. In the cases of Pravabati
Ghosh & Anr. Vs. Gautam Das & Ors., reported in 2006 (Suppl) 1 GLT
15, relying on the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Melepurath Sankunni Ezuthassan v/s Thekittil Geopalankutty Nair,
reported in 1986 (1) SCC 118, and the case of M. Veerappa v/s Evelyn
Sequeria & Ors., reported in 1988 (1) SCC 556, has held in paragraph 8
of the judgment thus:
“the right to sue will not survive in favour of his representatives,
for, in such an appeal, what the legal representatives of such a
claimant would be doing is to ask for compensation and the right to
ask for compensation to be awarded does not survive if the claimant
dies before the claim for compensation is awarded or decreed in his
favour, the cause of death not being the injuries sustained by the
deceased claimant”.
5.5.2. From the above referred ratio it becomes clear that if the
claimant dies before the claim for compensation is awarded or decreed
in his favour is passed, claim petition at the behest of the legal
representative of the such injured claimant is not maintainable.
5.5.3. However, Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Jenabai
wd/o Abdulkarim Musa v/s GSRTC, reported in 1991 GLR 352 and in
the case of Surpalsing Gohil, reported in 2009(2) GLH 217 has taken a
different view and has held that Section 306 of Indian Succession Act,
1925 and maxim Actio personalis moritur cum persona is not applicable
in its widest sense in an accident causing injuries to a victim.

6.How to determine monthly income of the deceased or injured when no
document in support thereof is not produced:
6.1 In the case of Govind Yadav (supra), in para No.17 it has been held
that when there is no proof of income, income of the deceased or
injured claimant shall be decided by taking into consideration
prevalence minimum wages.
6.2 Several State Government have issued notifications of the relating to
Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred as '1948 Act'). Details
of rates of minimum wages applicable in the state of Gujarat form april
1992 to September, 2014 can be availed from
www.slideshare.net/mobile/hanifmulia/minimumwagesact
ratesapprovedbygovernmentgovernmentofgujaratwefapril1992to
september2014.

7. How to determine income of the deceased or injured claimant when
there is documentary evidence on record to show that the deceased or
injured claimant was earning in foreign currency and not in Indian Rupee:
7.1 Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd v/s
S.Malarvizhi, decided on 6 June, 2013 has held that when the deceased
or injured claimant was getting salary in foreign currency, then in such
situation such foreign salary/income should be converted into Indian
Rupee, at the rates applicable at the time of accident and deduction of
higher percentage of 60% of the income and low multiplier should be
applied.
7.2 Reference may also be made to ratio laid down in the case of In the
case of United India Insurance Com. Ltd. v/s Patricia Jean Mahajan,
reported in 2002 (6) SCC 281 = 2002 ACJ 1481= 2002 (4) Supreme
518. Said case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court arose out of a claim
made on behalf of the Doctor of Indian origin who became the American
citizen and was killed in a road accident when he visited India. The
claim for compensation was based upon the income in the foreign
country and while considering the said case, among other things, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the total amount of compensation
would work out to Rs.16.12 crores with interest and looking to the
Indian Economy, fiscal and financial situation, the amount is certainly a
fabulous amount though in the background of American conditions it
may not be so. It was further held that when there is so much disparity
in the economic conditions and affluence of two places viz. place to

which the victim belong and the place at which the compensation is to
be paid, a golden balance must be struck somewhere, to arrive at a
reasonable and fair compensation. Looking by the Indian standards they
may not be much too overcompensated and similarly not very much
under compensated as well, in the background of the country where
most of the dependent beneficiaries reside.
7.3 In the recent ratio, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chanderi devi
v/s Jaspal Singh, reported in 2015 STPL(Web) 273 (SC) has held that:
Deceased aged 32 years Employed as an Indian Cook in Moghul
Tandoor Restaurant in Germany – He was drawing wages of 1145 Euro
per month Taking the income of the deceased at the time of his death
at Rs.8,333/ per month by High Court held to be on the lower side –
Plausibly estimating as to how much a cook of similar nature as the
deceased would have earned in India in the year 2006, it would be just
and reasonable to ascertain the income of the deceased at the time of
his death at Rs.15,000/ per month – By adding 50% of the actual salary
as provision for future prospects, the income of the deceased to be
considered for calculation of loss of dependency is Rs.22,500/ per
month i.e. Rs.2,70,000/ per annum – Deducting 10% towards income
tax the net income comes to Rs.2,43,000/ per annum – Further,
deducting 1/3rd towards personal expenses and applying the correct
multiplier the loss of dependency would come to Rs.25,92,000/
[(Rs.2,43,000/ () 1/3rd of Rs.2,43,000/) x 16] – Rs.1,00,000/
awarded towards loss of estate to the appellant wife, Rs.25,000/
towards funeral expenses and Rs.1,00,000/ towards loss of consortium
to the appellantwife – An amount of Rs.1,00,000/ is awarded to the

appellantminor towards loss of love and affection of her
father(deceased) – Compensation enhance from Rs.17,10,000/ to Rs.
29,17,000/ with interest @9% p.a. from the date of filing of the
application till the date of payment.

8. How to decide a claim petition where defence of Invalid, Learners
Licence & Fake Driving Licence and Defense of Qualification/Badge is
taken:
8.1 Reference is required to be made to ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of National Insurance Com. Ltd. V/s Swaran Singh,
reported in AIR 2004 SC 1531, in Para No.105 it has been held as
under:
105: The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in
these petitions are as follows :
(i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory
insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare
legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents
caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory
insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and
the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
said object.
(ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under
Section 163A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inter
alia in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act.
(iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of driver or
invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in subsection (2)(a)
(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the
insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or
invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at
the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the
insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its

liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured
was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the
matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles
by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the
relevant time.
(iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their
liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the
said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the
owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be on them.
(v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden
would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case.
(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the
insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid
licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant
period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards
insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving
licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the
cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy
conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of
"fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insured under
Section 149(2) of the Act.
(vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care
to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver, (a
fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not

will have to be determined in each case.
(viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person
having a learner's licence, the insurance companies would be liable to
satisfy the decree.
(ix) The claims tribunal constituted under Section 165 read with
Section 168 is empowered to adjudicate all claims in respect of the
accidents involving death or of bodily injury or damage to property of
third party arising in use of motor vehicle. The said power of the
tribunal is not restricted to decide the claims inter se between
claimant or claimants on one side and insured, insurer and driver on
the other. In the course of adjudicating the claim for compensation
and to decide the availability of defence or defences to the insurer, the
Tribunal has necessarily the power and jurisdiction to decide disputes
inter se between insurer and the insured. The decision rendered on the
claims and disputes inter se between the insurer and insured in the
course of adjudication of claim for compensation by the claimants
and the award made thereon is enforceable and executable in the
same manner as provided in Section 174 of the Act for enforcement
and execution of the award in favour of the claimants.
(x) Where on adjudication of the claim under the Act the tribunal
arrives at a conclusion that the insurer has satisfactorily proved its
defence in accordance with the provisions of Sections 149(2) read
with subsection (7), as interpreted by this Court above, the Tribunal
can direct that the insurer is liable to be reimbursed by the insured for
the compensation and other amounts which it has been compelled to

pay to the third party under the award of the tribunal. Such
determination of claim by the Tribunal will be enforceable and the
money found due to the insurer from the insured will be recoverable
on a certificate issued by the tribunal to the Collector in the same
manner under Section 174 of the Act as arrears as land revenue. The
certificate will be issued for the recovery as arrears of land revenue
only if, as required by subsection (3) of Section 168 of the Act the
insured fails to deposit the amount awarded in favour of the insurer
within thirty days from the date of announcement of the award by
the tribunal.
(xi) The provisions contained in subsection (4) with proviso
thereunder and subsection (5) which are intended to cover specified
contingencies mentioned therein to enable the insurer to recover
amount paid under the contract of insurance on behalf of the insured
can be taken recourse of by the Tribunal and be extended to claims
and defences of insurer against insured by relegating them to the
remedy before regular court in cases where on given facts and
circumstances adjudication of their claims inter se might delay the
adjudication of the claims of the victims”.
8.2 Bare reading of above referred observations makes it clear
that mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification
of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves
defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the
third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has
to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to

exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of
the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one
who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. The
insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their
liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in
the said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of
the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefore would be
on them. Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part
of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of
a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the
relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its
liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the
condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to
have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in
interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main
purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow
defences available to the insured under Section 149(2) of the Act.
If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by a person having a
learner's licence, the insurance companies would be liable to satisfy
the decree.
8.3 It is also held in Para 105 (ix) and (x) that Tribunal is
empowered to pass and order to “Pay and Recover” against the
insurer.
8.4 As far as, defence of insurer qua the qualification/badge of the
licence is concern, same can be decided by relying upon para
Nos.42, 43 & 84 of the Swaran Singh's case. Paras 42, 43 & 84

reads as under:
“42. If a person has been given a licence for a particular type of
vehicle as specified therein, he cannot be said to have no licence for
driving another type of vehicle which is of the same category but of
different type. As for example when a person is granted a licence
for driving a light motor vehicle he can drive either a car or a jeep
and it is not necessary that he must have driving licence both for
car and jeep separately.
43. Furthermore, the insurance company with a view to avoid its
liabilities is not only required to show that the conditions laid
down under Section 149(2)(a) or (b) are satisfied but is further
required to establish that there has been a breach on the part of
the insured. By reason of the provisions contained in the 1988 Act,
a more extensive remedy has been conferred upon those who have
obtained judgment against the user of a vehicle and after a
certificate of insurance is delivered in terms of Section 147(3) a
third party has obtained a judgment against any person insured by
the policy in respect of a liability required to be covered by Section
145, the same must be satisfied by the insurer, notwithstanding
that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or to cancel the policy or
may in fact have done so. The same obligation applies in respect of
a judgment against a person not insured by the policy in respect of
such a liability, but who would have been covered if the policy had
covered the liability of all persons, except that in respect of liability
for death or bodily injury.

84. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold
an effective driving licence for the type of vehicle which he intends
to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables Central Government to
prescribe forms of driving licences for various categories of vehicles
mentioned in subsection (2) of said section. The various types of
vehicles described for which a driver may obtain a licence for one
or more of them are: (a) Motorcycle without gear, (b) motorcycle
with gear, (c) invalid carriage, (d) light motor vehicle, (e)
transport vehicle, (f) road roller, and (g) motor vehicle of other
specified description. The definition clause in Section 2 of the Act
defines various categories of vehicles which are covered in broad
types mentioned in subsection (2) of Section 10. They are 'goods
carriage', 'heavygoods vehicle', 'heavy passenger motorvehicle',
'invalid carriage', 'light motorvehicle', 'maxicab', 'medium goods
vehicle', 'medium passenger motorvehicle', 'motorcab',
'motorcycle', 'omnibus', 'private service vehicle', 'semitrailer',
'tourist vehicle', 'tractor', 'trailer', and 'transport vehicle'. In claims
for compensation for accidents, various kinds of breaches with
regard to the conditions of driving licences arise for consideration
before the Tribunal. A person possessing a driving licence for
'motorcycle without gear', for which he has no licence. Cases may
also arise where a holder of driving licence for 'light motor vehicle'
is found to be driving a 'maxicab', 'motorcab' or 'omnibus' for
which he has no licence.In each case on evidence led before the
Tribunal, a decision has to be taken whether the fact of the driver

possessing licence for one type of vehicle but found driving another
type of vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident. If
on facts, it is found that accident was caused solely because of some
other unforeseen or intervening causes like mechanical failures and
similar other causes having no nexus with driver not possessing
requisite type of licence, the insurer will not be allowed to avoid its
liability merely for technical breach of conditions concerning
driving licence”.
8.4 Meaning thereby, even if driver of offending vehicle was not
qualified to ply the offending vehicle or was not having the required
badge to ply such vehicle then also insurer is liable to pay amount of
compensation. Before passing any order, Tribunal has to decide whether
the fact of the driver possessing licence for one type of vehicle but found
driving another type of vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of
accident. If on facts, it is found that accident was caused solely because
of some other unforeseen or intervening causes like mechanical failures
and similar other causes having no nexus with driver not possessing
requisite type of licence, the insurer will not be allowed to avoid its
liability merely for technical breach of conditions concerning driving
licence.
8.5 Reference is also required to be made to the recent decision of
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S. Iyyapan v/s United India Insurance
Com. Ltd., dated 01.07.2013. Wherein, after referring several ratios of
Hon'ble Apex Court, it has been held in Para No.19 that:

“In the instant case, admittedly the driver was holding
a valid driving licence to drive light motor vehicle. There is no
dispute that the motor vehicle in question, by which accident took
place, was Mahindra Maxi Cab. Merely because the driver did not get
any endorsement in the driving licence to drive Mahindra Maxi Cab,
which is a light motor vehicle, the High Court has committed grave
error of law in holding that the insurer is not liable to pay
compensation because the driver was not holding the licence to drive
the commercial vehicle. The impugned judgment is, therefore, liable
to be set aside”.
8.6 Even in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Roshanben
Rahemansha Fakir, reported in AIR 2008 SC 2266, it has been held that
when driver of offending vehicle was holder of licence of three wheeler
i.e. auto rickshaw delivery van and his licence was not meant for driving
'transport vehicle' but for goods carrying public carrier, in such case
Insurer is not liable but directed the insurer to first pay entire amount of
compensation with a further direction to recover the same from the
insured (these directions were issued under Article 142 of Constitution
of India).

9. In which circumstances, Insurer is liable to pay compensation when
injured claimant or deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle:
9.1 It is the duty of the insurer to prove that injured claimant or
deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle and, therefore, it is not
liable to pay amount of compensation, unless, same has been prove,
insurer is liable to pay amount of compensation.
9.2 To decide whether, injured claimant or deceased was travelling in
the goods vehicle or not, Panchnama of scene of accident plays very
vital role. If, after reading Panchnama, it appears that there were goods
loaded in the vehicle or were found lying at the sight of accident then it
can be presumed that vehicle was used for carrying goods. However,
there are some points, which are required to be considered before
fastening liability on insurer, which are:
9.2.1 Whether injured claimant or deceased was travelling in the
cabin of the goods vehicle or not. If, injured claimant or deceased
was travelling in the cabin of the goods, insurer is liable otherwise
not. Reference be made to ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v/s Cholleti Bharatamma,
reported in AIR 2008 SC 484.

9.2.2 Whether the insurer is liable in a case where the injured claimant or
deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle as the labourer of the owner or
the hirer:
9.2.2.1. If it is proved that injured claimant or deceased was
travelling in the goods vehicle as the labourer of the owner of the
goods then insurer is liable to pay amount of compensation,
provided additional premium of labourer/collie is paid by the
owner but insurer is not liable in the such cases where injured
claimant or deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle as the
labourer of the hirer. Reference be made to the ratio laid down in
the case of Sanjeev Kumar Samrat v/s National Insurance Co. Ltd,
reported in AIR 2013 SCW 301, wherein it is held that:
“the Act policy does not cover all kinds of employees. Thus, on a
contextual reading of the provision, schematic analysis of the Act
and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 it is quite limpid that
the statutory policy only covers the employees of the insured, either
employed or engaged by him in a goods carriage. It does not cover
any other kind of employee and therefore, someone who travels not
being an authorized agent in place of the owner of goods, and claims
to be an employee of the owner of goods, cannot be covered by the
statutory policy”.
9.3 Whether insurer is liable in the case where injured claimant or
deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle as the owner or representative
of the goods:

9.3.1. If it is proved that the injured claimant or deceased was
travelling in the goods vehicle as the owner or representative of the
goods, insurer is liable to pay amount of compensation otherwise not.
Reference be made to ratio laid own in the case of New India Insurance
Company v/s Darshana Devi, reported in AIR 2008 (Supp) SC 1639.
9.4 Whether injured claimant or deceased was travelling in Tractor/trolley
is entitled to get amount of compensation:
9.4.1 Normally, Tractortrailer/trolley is used for agricultural purpose
and if it found that same was used for agricultural purpose and same is
covered by the 'Farmer Comprehensive Policy' or the 'Farmer
Package Policy', in such situation, insurer is liable to pay compensation.
If the above referred two conditions are not fulfilled, insurer can not be
held responsible to pay amount of compensation.
9.4.2 It is also to be noted that in the Annexure of Indian Motor
Tariff, list of Miscellaneous and Special types of vehicles is given. As per
the said list tractors can be used for Agricultural and if Trolley is
attached to such Tractor, same may be used for carrying goods. As per
the said list there is one another kind of Tractor, which is 'Traction
Engine Tractor'. If is found that tractor is not used for the purpose of
agricultural work and if it used for carrying goods, such tractortrolley
must be insured for such purpose and if is not insured as such, insurer is
not liable to pay any amount of compensation.

9.5 It to be noted that when insurance policy contains 'Avoidance
Clause', then in such situation, insurer is liable to pay compensation
under the principle of 'Pay and Recover'. Reference may be made to the
ratio laid down in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vimal,
Devi, reported in 2010 ACJ 2878 and ratio laid down by the Hon'ble
Full Bench of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Shantaben
Vankar v/s Yakubbhai Patel, reported in 2012 ACJ 2715.
9.6. However, it is to be noted that the issue with respect to passing an
order of 'Pay and Recover' is pending for consideration before the Full
Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court. Reference be made to judgment
delivered in the case of National Insurance com. Ltd. v/s Parvathneni,
reprted in 2009 (3) GLH 377 (SC).

10. Liability of insurer to pay compensation in the cases where injured
claimant or deceased was travelling in the private car as occupants or
travelling on two wheeler as pillion rider:
10.1. In the recent decision, Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National
Insurance Company Ltd. v. Balakrishnan, reported in AIR 2013 SC 473
has held in para No.21 that:
“comprehensive/package policy" would cover the liability of the
insurer for payment of compensation for the occupant in a car. There
is no cavil that an "Act Policy" stands on a different footing from a
"Comprehensive/Package Policy". As the circulars have made the
position very clear and the IRDA, which is presently the statutory
authority, has commanded the insurance companies stating that a
"Comprehensive/Package Policy" covers the liability, there cannot be
any dispute in that regard. We may hasten to clarify that the earlier
pronouncements were rendered in respect of the "Act Policy" which
admittedly cannot cover a third party risk of an occupant in a car.
But, if the policy is a "Comprehensive/Package Policy", the liability
would be covered”.
10.1.1. In view of the observations made by Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Balakrishnan (supra), occupant of private car or the
pillion rider of two wheeler is entitled to recover amount of
compensation from insurer, provided the offending vehicle is covered
with the 'Comprehensive/ Package Policy'. Reference may also be
made to ratio laid down in the case of Oriental Insurance Company
Ltd. v. Surendra Nath Loomba, reported in AIR 2013 SC 483.

11. How to decide a claim petition preferred under section 163A of the
Act:
11.1. As per the ratio laid down in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and
Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda (2004) 5 SCC 385 =
AIR 2004 SC 2107, Hon'ble Full Bench of Apex Court has held that
claim petition preferred u/s 163A is under 'No Fault Liability'.
Whereas, in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sinitha,
reported in AIR 2012 SC 797, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
claim petition preferred u/s 163A is under 'Fault Liability'.
11.2. It does not become clear from the facts of the of Deepal Girishbhai
Soni's (supra) case as to whether, more than one vehicles were involved
in the said accident or not but from the reading of the Sinitha's (supra)
case, it becomes clear that there was only one vehicle involved and
question which was required to be decided by Hon'ble Apex Court as to
whether, insurer has succeeded in proving that claimant himself was
negligent in causing the accident or not.

11.3. From the reading of both the above referred ratios, it appears that
there are conflicting views and, therefore, each claim petition may be
decided on the basis of it's facts. That is to say, if only one vehicle is
involved, point of negligence must be decided.
11.4. The ratio laid down in the case of Sinitha (supra) is referred to the
Full Bench for consideration. Please refer to United India Insurance
Com. Ltd. v/s Sunil Kumar, reported in 2013 ACJ 2856 (SC).

11.4. It is to be noted that in a claim petition, preferred u/s 163A of the
Act, income of the injured claimant or the deceased should not be more
that Rs.40,000/ per annum. If, the income of the injured claimant or
the deceased is more that Rs.40,000/ per annum, in such cases,
claimant/s may be given an option to convert the same under Section
166 of the Act. If claim petition is not converted, even after the
order/direction, same be dismissed. In this regards reference many be
made to ratio laid down in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra).
11.5. It also required to be noted that in the Fatal injury cases, multiplier
cannot be applied as same is applied only in the cases where claim
petition is preferred by the injured. Reference be made to ratio laid
down in the case of National Company Ltd. Versus Gurumallamma,
reported in AIR 2009 SCW 7434, para No.8. Similar kind of
observations are made by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sarla Verma
(supra), at Para No.17 (page No.3112 in AIR), which reads under:
“... Therefore, where the application is under section 163A of the Act,
it is possible to calculate the compensation on the structured
formula basis, even where compensation is not specified with
reference to the annual income of the deceased, or is more than Rs.
40,000/ by applying the formula : (2/3 x A1 x M), that is two
thirds of the annual income multiplied by the multiplier applicable
to the age of the deceased would be the compensation”.

11.6. From the above referred ratios, laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, it

becomes amply clear that Tribunal is not required to make calculation of
compensation on the basis of application of multiplier. But Tribunal is
only required to grant compensation as per ScheduleII of the Motor
Vehicle Act, taking into considering the age and income of the deceased
and figure shown against the age and income of the deceased. For an
example, if, monthly income of the deceased who was aged about 48
years at the time of accident, is assessed as Rs.2,500/ per month
(Rs.30,000/ per annum), how the compensation should be calculated.
Since Rs.30,000/ per annum is not shown anywhere in column of
“ANNUAL INCOME” of the Second Schedule of the Act, now, the
question, is how the amount of compensation to be calculated. In such
cases, average of figures in the income group of Rs.24,000/ per annum
and Rs.36,000/ per annum i.e Rs.2,86,000/ and Rs.4,32,000,
respectively are required to be taken into consideration. Average of
Rs.2,86,000/ and Rs.4,32,000, comes to Rs.3,59,000. Out of the said
amount of 3,59,000, 1/3 is required to be deducted in consideration of
expenses incurred by deceased towards maintaining himself and,
therefore, net amount of future income loss comes to approximately
Rs.2,40,000/. [Reference: National Insurance Com. Ltd. v/s P.C.
Chacko, reported in 2012 ACJ 1065 (Devision Bench of Hon'ble Kerala
High Court, Ernakulan Bench)]
11.7. It is to be remembered that in every claim petition preferred u/s 163
A of the Act, whether the deceased is married or not, unlike as claim
petition preferred u/s 166 of the Act, onethird (1/3rd
) amount from the
actual income of the deceased should be deducted towards personal and

living expenditures of the deceased.
11.8. Over and above the future income loss, claimant/s is/are entitled to
such amount, specified under the Second Schedule of the Act. However,
in the case of Sapan v/s United India Insurance Com. Ltd., reported in
AIR 2008 SC 2281, held that when claim petition preferred u/s 163A
and claimant would remain crippled throughout life and would have no
enjoyment for life, Tribunal can award further sum of Rs. 75,000/ for
future medical treatment.
11.9. In the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v/s Rajni Devi,
(2008) 5 SCC 736, wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held
that in a case where third party is involved, the liability of the insurance
company would be unlimited. It was also held in the said decision that
where, however, compensation is claimed for the death of the owner or
another passenger of the vehicle, the contract of insurance being
governed by the contract qua contract, the claim of the claimant against
the insurance company would depend upon the terms thereof. It was
held in the said decision that Section 163A of the MVA cannot be said
to have any application in respect of an accident wherein the owner of
the motor vehicle himself is involved. The decision further held that the
question is no longer res integra. The liability under Section 163A of the
MVA is on the owner of the vehicle. So a person cannot be both, a
claimant as also a recipient, with respect to claim. Therefore, the heirs
of the deceased could not have maintained a claim in terms of Section
163A of the MVA. Above referred ratio is applicable in the case where
the deceased/injured not being the owner of the vehicle and if he
borrows the such vehicle from its real owner, in such case the deceased

cannot be held to be employee of the owner of the vehicle although he
is authorised to drive the said vehicle by its owner, and therefore, under
such circumstances, he steps into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle.
Similar views are taken in by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sadanand Mukhi (2009) 2 SCC 417 and
Ningamma v/s United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 2009 SC
3056.

12. What if the cheque given for payment of premium of insurance policy is
dishonoured:
12.1. Reference may be made to the ratios laid down in the cases of
Deddappa v/s National Insurance Com. Ltd., reported in (2008) 2 SCC
595 = AIR 2008 SC 767 = 2007 AIR SCW 7948 and United India
Insurance Com. Ltd v/s Laxmamma, reported in 2012 ACJ 1307 (SC). In
both these judgments, it has been held that when cheque given for
payment of premium of policy, is dishonoured and on that count
Insurance Company cancels the policy by intimating the insured of such
dishonour of cheque before the date of accident, then in such situation
Insurance Company cannot be held liable to pay amount of
compensation but if insurer fails to intimate the insured about such
dishonour and cancellation of policy before the date of accident, then in
such situation insurer is held liable to pay amount of compensation and
Insurance Company may prosecute its remedy to recover the amount
paid to the claimants from the insurer.

13. What is the meaning of “Arising out of use of Motor Vehicle”:
13.1. Legislature has advisedly used the expression 'arising out of the use
of motor vehicle' and not 'connected with the use of motor vehicle'
under Sections 140, 163A and 166 of the Act and, therefore, there must
be more direct and pronounced linkage or nexus between the use of
motor vehicle and the accident which has resulted. A mere casual
connection is not sufficient.
13.2. To decide the such issue one may advantageously refer to the
judgment delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court, reported as Shivaji Dayanu
Patil and Anr. v. Vatschala Uttam More, (1991) 3 SCC 530 = AIR 1991
Sc 1769. In the said case, Hon'ble Apex Court considered at length, the
questions whether the fire and explosion of the petrol tanker in which
deceased lost his life could be said to have resulted from an accident
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, namely the petrol tanker. The
court answered the question in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour
of the claimant and against the insurance company.
13.3. It is true that the case Shivaji Dayanu Patil (supra) arose from the
claim for nofault compensation under section 92A of the 1939 Act (u/s
163A of the New Act). All the material facts were considered at length
by Hon'ble Apex Court in above referred case and, therefore, said
principle is also applicable in the claim petition preferred u/s 166 of the
Act.

13.4. Ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shivaji Dayanu
Patil (supra) is also relied upon by Hon'ble Apex Court in several
decisions, namely, Samir Chanda, v/s Managing Director, Assam State
Transport Corporation, reported in AIR 1999 SC 136 and Smt. Rita Devi
v/s New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 2000 SC 1930 and
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Yadu Sambhaji More, reported in AIR
2011 SC 666.

14. Whether Finance Company, which has advanced loan for the purpose of
purchase of vehicle under the 'Hire Purchase Agreement' can be said to be
the owner of the Vehicle:
14.1. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Godavari Finance v/s Degala
Satyanarayananamma, reported in 2008 ACJ 1612 has held in para 13
as under:
“13. In case of a motor vehicle which is subjected to a HirePurchase
Agreement, the financier cannot ordinarily be treated to be the owner.
The person who is in possession of the vehicle, and not the financier
being the owner would be liable to pay damages for the motor
accident”.
14.2. Reference may also be made ratio laid down in the case of Anup
Sarmah v/s Bhola Nath Sharma, reported in IV (2012) CPJ 3 (SC), para
No.8 & 9.
14.3. Reference may also be made ratio laid down in the case of HDFC
Bank v/s Resham (FB) 2015 ACJ 1 (SC).

15. When an accident, involving two vehicles and driver of one of the
unknown vehicle sped away after the accident, whether in such situation,
claim petition is maintainable against the other tortfeasor, in view of the
provisions contained under Sections 161 & 163 of the Act:
15.1. Hon'ble Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in First Appeal
No.3354 of 2000 with Civil Application No.746 of 2005 dated 13.7.2005
has held in such situation claim petition is not maintainable. But Hon'ble
Gujarat High Court in the case of Bhanuben P. Joshi V/s. Kantilal B.
Parmar, reported in 1994 ACJ 714 (DB) has held otherwise. Facts of the
Bhanuben P. Joshi (supra) as under:
15.1.1. In the said case accident occurred because one unknown truck
dashed the motor cycle from behind and after the accident, truck
driver sped away with the truck and remained unidentified and
pillion rider sustained fatal injuries. Claimants of the said claim
petition averred that motor cycle was being driven by its rider at
excessive speed and in rash and negligent manner. Tribunal
dismissed the claim petition by holding that there was no rashness on
the part of the motor cyclist. After noting the said facts Hon'ble
Gujarat High Court has observed that motor cycle was being driven
in rash and negligent manner and in flagrant violation of traffic rules
and regulations and finally reversed the finding of Tribunal.

15.1.2. It is also held in para No.9 of the above referred ratio, namely
Bhanuben P. Joshi (supra) that victims of road accident are entitled

to claim compensation from all or any of the joint tortfeasors, it
would not be necessary to apportion the extent of contribution of
each driver of happening of unfortunate accident.

15.2. From the above referred ratios it becomes clear that even if driver
and owner of the unknown vehicle is not joined as parties opponents,
claim petition is maintainable against any one of the tortfeasors.
15.3. The other issue is whether in a Hit and Run case, claimant can claim
fixed compensation of Rs.25,000/ u/s 140 the M.V. Act when claimant
has not filed an application under the scheme framed u/s 161 of the
M.V. Act. In A. Prakash v/s General Manager, reported in 2015 ACJ 203
(AP), it is held that claimant is entitled to get Rs.25,000/ u/s 140 of the
M.V. Act.

16. Whether all the joint tortfeasors are required to be joined as party
opponents in the claim petition:
16.1. Hon'ble Gujarat Court in the case of O.I.Com.Ltd. v/s Zubedaben
Pathan, in F.A. No.651 of 2012 and judgment dated 18.02.2010,
delivered by Hon'ble Kerala Court in the case of U.I.Com.Ltd. v/s
Mariamma George, in M.A.C.A. No.744 of 2005 have held that the
claimant/s is/are not entitled to recover amount of compensation,
jointly and severally from the insurance company/companies, if all the
tortfeasors are not joined.
16.2. But Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Amarsing Jugabhai v/s
Vijyaben Dhuliya, reported in 1996(3) GLR 493 has held in para No.23
that:
“Where a person is injured in a motor accident which occurs not on
account of his negligence, but because the drivers of collided vehicles
were negligent, the claimants are entitled to damage jointly and
severally from the negligent respondents. Every wrongdoer is liable
for the whole damage and it does not matter whether they acted
between themselves as equals. A decree passed against two or more
tortfeasors can be executed against any one of the defendants and
such defendant can be compelled to pay the entire amount of damages
decreed. It is further clear that the defendant who is compelled to pay
the entire amount of damages decreed has a right to contribution
from the other wrongdoer. The liability in the case of composite
negligence, unless must normally should not be apportioned because
the claimant is able to recover the whole amount of compensation

from owner or driver of either vehicles. In case of composite
negligence, liability for compensation in normal circumstances, should
not be apportioned, as both wrongdoers are jointly and severally
liable for the whole loss. Rule of apportionment of liability applies in
a case of contributory negligence, i.e., where the injured himself is
also guilty of negligence.”
16.3. Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Kusumben Vipinchandra
Shah v. Arvindbhai Narmadashankar Raval, reported in AIR 2007 Guj.
121. Wherein it is held that:
“As held in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Gurunath
Shahu (supra), the finding given by the Tribunal in such a case
regarding apportionment of liability would be tentative for the
purpose of subsequent proceeding which might be filed by the
defendant tortfeasor against the other joint tortfeasor who was not a
party to the first proceeding. But such tentativeness for the purpose of
contribution between two joint tortfeasors did not at all affect the
right of the plaintiffclaimant to recover full damages from the
defendant tortfeasor against whom the first proceeding was filed”.
16.4. In the recent decisions, in the cases of Oriental Insurance v/s Meena
Variyal, reported in 2007 ACJ 1284 (SC), Pawan Kumar v/s Harkishan
Dass Mohan, reported in 2014 ACJ 704 (SC) (FB), Hon'ble Apex Court
has taken the view that where a person is injured/expired in a motor
accident which occurs not on account of his negligence, but because the

drivers of collided vehicles were negligent, the claimants are entitled to
damage jointly and severally from the negligent respondents and such
claimants are not required to join all tortfeasors as party. From the
above referred ratios it becomes clear that claimant/s is/are not
required to join all the tortfeasors as party opponent/s.

17. Whether the point of negligence and liability of insurer, decided by the
coordinate Tribunal is binding on the other coordinate Tribunal, if the
claim petition has arisen from the same accident:
17.1. Hon'ble the Privy Council in its decision rendered in the case of Syed
Mohamamd Saadat Ali Khan v. Mirza Wiquar Ali Beg, reported in AIR
(30) 1943 PC 115 has observed as under :
"In order that a decision should operate as res judicata between co
defendants, three conditions must exist : (1) There must be a conflict of
interest between those codefendants, (2) it must be necessary to decide
the conflict in order to give the plaintiff the relief he claims, and (3) the
question between the codefendants must have been finally decided."
17.2. Thus, the Privy Council has laid down that if the aforesaid three
conditions stand satisfied, res judicata can operate between the co
defendants also. Said principle is also followed by Hon'ble Gujarat High
Court in the case of United India Insurance Com. ltd. v/s. Laljibhai
Hamirbhai, reported in 2007 (1) GLR 633.

18. Whether a claim petition preferred by the a claimant   (also the owner of
the offending vehicle, without involving another vehicle) alleging therein
that accident occurred because of the rash and negligent driving of the
driver of the vehicle owned by him, is maintainable:
18.1. Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Dhanraj v/s N.I.A.Com. Ltd.,
reported in 2005 ACJ No.1, Oriental Insurance Com. Ltd. v/s Jhuma
Saha, reported in 2007 ACJ 818 and N.I.A. Com. Ltd. v/s Meera Bai,
reported in 2007 ACJ 821 has interpreted Section 147 and it has been
held that Section 147 does not require an Insurance Company to assume
risk for death or bodily injury to the owner of the vehicle.
18.2. To decide such point, fact of each case is required to be taken into
consideration. Facts of Dhanraj (supra) are: Appellant (owner of jeep)
along with certain other persons were travelling in his own Jeep and
said Jeep met with an accident. In the accident, the Appellant as well as
other passengers received injuries. In the claims petitions,  Tribunal held
the Driver of the Jeep responsible for the accident. In all the Claim
Petitions filed by the other passengers, Tribunal directed that the
Appellant (as the owner) as well as the Driver and Insurance Company
were liable to pay compensation. In the Claim Petition filed by the
appellantowner of the jeep, the Tribunal directed the Driver and the
Insurance Company to pay compensation to the appellant. Insurance
Company filed an Appeal before the Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High
Court. That Appeal was  allowed and held that as the appellant was the
owner of the jeep and, therefore, the Insurance Company is not liable to

pay him any compensation. Against the said order of Hon'ble Madhya
Pradesh High Court, appeal was preferred by appellantowner. In the
said appeal, after incorporating Section 147 of the Act, Hon'ble Apex
Court has held that comprehensive policy covers the liability incurred
by the insured in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person
(including an owner of the goods or his authorized representative)
carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused
by or arising out of the use of the vehicle. Section 147 does not require
an Insurance Company to assume risk for death or bodily injury to the
owner of the vehicle.
18.3. Relying upon Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunita Rathi and Ors.
1998 ACJ 121, it is further held in para No.9 that the liability of an
Insurance Company is only for the purpose of indemnifying the insured
against liabilities incurred towards third person or in respect of damages
to property.
18.4. Thus, where the insured i.e. an owner of the vehicle has no liability to
a third party the Insurance Company has no liability also.
18.5. From the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Dhanraj (supra), it becomes amply clear that comprehensive policy
covers the liability incurred by the insured in respect of death of or
bodily injury to any person (including an owner of the goods or his
authorized representative) carried in the vehicle or damage to any
property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the
vehicle. Section 147 does not require an Insurance Company to assume
risk for death or bodily injury to the owner of the vehicle.

19. What is the meaning of “Public Place”, as defined u/s 2(34) of the Act:
19.1. Definition of 'Public Place', reads as under:
"2(34) "Public place" means, a road, street, way or other
place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public
have a right of access, and includes any place or stand at
which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage
carriage."
19.2. The definition of 'public place' under the M. V. Act is, therefore, wide
enough to include any place which members of public use and to which
they have a right of access. The right of access may be permissive,
limited, restricted or regulated by oral or written permission, by tickets,
passes or badges or on payment of fee. The use may be restricted
generally or to particular purpose or purposes. What is necessary is that
the place must be accessible to the members of public and be available
for their use, enjoyment, avocation or other purpose.
19.3. Vary question came up for consideration before the Full Bench of
Bombay High Court in Pandurang Chimaji Agale and another v. New
India Life Insurance Co. Ltd., Pune and others, AIR 1988 Bom 248,
wherein the Hon'ble Court after taking note of the divergent views of
different High Courts with regard to the meaning and import of the
term 'public place', as defined under Section 2(24) of the 1939 Act
(corresponding to Section 2(34) of the M. V. Act), proceeded to hold
that for the purpose of Chapter VIII of the said Act, the expression
'public place' will cover all places including those of private ownership

where members of the public have an access whether free or controlled
in any manner whatsoever.
19.4. Relying on the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court (cited
supra), a Full Bench of Madras High Court in the case of United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Parvathi Devi and others, 1999 ACJ 1520 (Madras)
has held as follows:
"16. The definition of 'public place' is very wide. A perusal of the same
reveals that the public at large has a right to access though that right
is regulated or restricted. It is also seen that this Act is beneficial
legislation, so also the law of interpretation has to be construed in the
benefit of public. In the overall legal position and the fact that if the
language is simple and unambiguous, it has to be construed in the
benefit of the public, we are of the view that the word 'public place'
wherever used as a right or controlled in any manner whatsoever,
would attract section 2(24) of the Act. In view of this, as stated, the
private place used with permission or without permission would
amount to be a 'public place'”.
19.5. Division Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Rajan
v. John, 2009 (2) TAC 260 (Ker) : (AIR 2009 Ker 136), the Hon'ble
Court while considering the definition of 'public place' for the purpose of
Section 2(34) of the Act, proceeded to hold that the term 'public place'
cannot be given a restricted meaning in as much as, it is not to be taken
as a place where public have uncontrolled access at all times. 'Public
place' for the purpose of the Act has to be understood with reference to
the places to which a vehicle has access. Accordingly, the Hon'ble Court

proceeded to hold that the private premises of a house where goods
vehicle is allowed entry, is a 'public place' for the purpose of Section
2(34) of the Act and therefore the insurer is liable to pay the
compensatioon.
19.6. From the above referred ratios, it becomes clear that in any private
premises, where goods vehicle is allowed entry, is a 'public place' for the
purpose of Section 2(34) of the Act.

20. What if, the vehicle which met with an accident was sold of by its
registered owner before the date of accident and name of the transferee
owner (purchaser) is not entered into the R.C. Book:
20.1. Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court and Hon'ble Kerala High Court,
in the cases reported in 2011 ACJ 577 & 1997 ACJ 260, respectively, it
has been held that when registered owner denies his liability to pay
amount of compensation on the ground that he had sold the vehicle in
question and received the consideration thereof and handed over the
possession of the vehicle along with R.C. Book and relevant transfer
Forms for getting the vehicle transferred in the name of transferee much
prior to the accident, then in that circumstances transferee owner
cannot be allowed to evade his liability to pay amount of compensation
on the ground that he is not registered owner.
20.2. But Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pushpa alias Leela v/s.
Shakuntala, reported in 2011 ACJ 705(SC) = AIR 2011 SC 682 in the
above referred judgment Hon'bel Apex Court, in paragraphs Nos.12 to
16 has held as under:
“12. The question of the liability of the recorded owner of a vehicle
after its sale to another person was considered by this Court in Dr.
T.V. Jose v. Chacko P.M., (2001) 8 SCC 748 : (AIR 2001 SC 3939).
In paragraphs 9 and 10 of the decision, the Court observed and held
as follows:
"9. Mr. Iyer appearing for the Appellant submitted that the High Court
was wrong in ignoring the oral evidence on record. He submitted that
the oral evidence clearly showed that the Appellant was not the owner

of the car on the date of the accident. Mr. Iyer submitted that merely
because the name had not been changed in the records of R.T.O. did
not mean that the ownership of the vehicle had not been transferred.
Mr. Iyer submitted that the real owner of the car was Mr. Roy
Thomas. Mr. Iyer submitted that Mr. Roy Thomas had been made
partyRespondent No.9 to these Appeals. He pointed out that an
Advocate had filed appearance on behalf of Mr. Roy Thomas but had
then applied for and was permitted to withdraw the appearance. He
pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had been duly served and a public
notice had also been issued. He pointed out that Mr. Roy Thomas had
chosen not to appear in these Appeals. He submitted that the liability,
if any, was of Mr. Roy Thomas.
10. We agree with Mr. Iyer that the High Court was not right in
holding that the Appellant continued to be the owner as the name had
not been changed in the records of R.T.O. There can be transfer of title
by payment of consideration and delivery of the car. The evidence on
record shows that ownership of the car had been transferred. However
the Appellant still continued to remain liable to third parties as his
name continued in the records of R.T.O. as. the owner. The Appellant
could not escape that liability by merely joining Mr. Roy Thomas in
these Appeals. Mr. Roy Thomas was not a party either before MACT or
the High Court. In these Appeals we cannot and will not go into the
question of inter se liability between the Appellant and Mr. Roy
Thomas. It will be for the Appellant to adopt appropriate proceedings
against Mr. Roy Thomas if, in law, he is entitled to do so."

(Emphasis added)
13. Again, in P.P. Mohammed v. K. Rajappan and Ors., (2008) 17
SCC 624, this Court examined the same issue under somewhat similar
set of facts as in the present case. In paragraph 4 of the decision, this
Court observed and held as follows:
"4. These appeals are filed by the appellants. The Insurance Company
has chosen not to file any appeal. The question before this Court is
whether by reason of the fact that the vehicle has been transferred to
Respondent 4 and thereafter to Respondent 5, the appellant got
absolved from liability to the third person who was injured. This
question has been answered by this Court in T.V. Jose (Dr.) v. Chacko
P.M. (reported in 2001 (8) SCC 748) wherein it is held that even
though in law there would be a transfer of ownership of the vehicle,
that, by itself, would not absolve the party, in whose name the vehicle
stands in RTO records, from liability to a third person. We are in
agreement with the view expressed therein. Merely because the vehicle
was transferred does not mean that the appellant stands absolved of
his liability to a third person. So long as his name continues in RTO
records, he remains liable to a third person."
(Emphasis added)
14. The decision in Dr. T.V. Jose was rendered under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939. But having regard to the provisions of section
2(30) and section 50 of the Act, as noted above, the ratio of the
decision shall apply with equal force to the facts of the case arising
under the 1988 Act.On the basis of these decisions, the inescapable

conclusion is that Jitender Gupta, whose name continued in the
records of the registering authority as the owner of the truck was
equally liable for payment of the compensation amount. Further, since
an insurance policy in respect of the truck was taken out in his name
he was indemnified and the claim will be shifted to the insurer,
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.
15. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that even
though the registered owner of the vehicle was Jitender Gupta, after
the sale of the truck he had no control over it and the possession and
control of the truck were in the hands of the transferee, Salig Ram. No
liability can, therefore, be fastened on Jitender Gupta, the transferor
of the truck. In support of this submission he relied upon a decision of
this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Deepa Devi and
Ors., (2008) 1 SCC 414 : (AIR 2008 SC 735). The facts of the case in
Deepa Devi are entirely different. In that case the vehicle was
requisitioned by the District Magistrate in exercise of the powers
conferred upon him under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
In that circumstance, this Court observed that the owner of the vehicle
cannot refuse to abide by the order of requisition of the vehicle by the
Deputy Commissioner. While the vehicle remained under requisition,
the owner did not exercise any control over it: the driver might still be
the employee of the owner of the vehicle but he had to drive the vehicle
according to the direction of the officer of the State, in whose charge
the vehicle was given. Save and except the legal ownership, the
registered owner of the vehicle had lost all control over the vehicle. The

decision in Deepa Devi was rendered on the special facts of that case
and it has no application to the facts of the case in hand.
16. In light of the discussion made above it is held that the
compensation amount is equally realisable from respondent No. 3,
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and it is directed to make full
payment of the compensation amount as determined by the Claims
Tribunal to the appellants within two months from the date of this
judgment”.
20.3. From the above referred ratio of Hon'ble Apex Court, it can be held
that, as on the date of accident, transferor owner was the registered
owner of offending vehicle, he must be deemed to continue as owner of
the offending vehicle for the purpose of the Motor Vehicles Act, even
though under the Civil Law, he ceased to be its owner after its sale and
Transferor Owner and Transferee Owner (both) are equally liable to pay
the amount of compensation in favour of the claimant.

21.  Whether a claim petition can be dismissed for want of prosecution or
nonappearance of the claimant and/or his Advocate:
21.1. Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Bharatbhai Narsingbhai
Chaudhry v/s Malek Rafik Malek Himantbhai Malek, reported in 2012
ACJ 1262 = AIR 2011 Gujarat 150 has held in Para No.5.14 and 6.1
that Claims Tribunals are not empowered to dismiss claim application
for default of claimant after framing of issues. It is further held that
Tribunals are required to decide claim petitions on merits with a view to
provide substantial justice to the victim of accident, keeping in mind the
object of benevolent legislation, instead of entering into niceties and
technicalities.
21.2. However, Full Benches of Hon'ble Kerala High Court in the case of
Jacob Thomas v. C. Pandian, reported in AIR 2006 Kerala 77 and
Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of  Mohammad Yousuf Wani
v/s Abdul Rehman Gujri, reported in AIR 1982 Kerala 146 have taken a
view that when O. 9 of CPC is specifically made applicable to
proceedings before claims Tribunal, it cannot be said that Tribunal has
no power to dismiss application for default when the case is posted for
hearing if claimant is absent and respondents are present. But, S. 168
did not insist that in all cases award should be passed but only directed
that Tribunal "may make an award", once it makes a judgement or
award, mandates of Rules framed under the Act has to be complied
with.

22. Whether a claim petition can be dismissed for non production of
documents mentioned under Rule 211 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles
Rules,1989:
22.1. There is no judgment on this point but Rule 211, subrule 5 provides
that: with all claim petition, preferred u/s 166 of the Act, FIR, Injury
Certificate or Postmortem Report and details of owner and insurance
policy of offending vehicle, supplied either by police or regional
transport authority should be furnished.
22.1.1. Above referred provisions are mandatory provision and
deviation therefrom, would lead to dismissal of the claim petition.
However, it is to be noted that along with claim petition, original
documents are not required to be furnished and only photo copy of
such documents will do. Original documents may be produced when
the stage of evidence comes.

23.    How to decide a claim petition, where insurer has taken a defence of
violation of  'Permit':
23.1. In some claim petitions, insurer takes defence of violation and/or
breach of 'Permit'. To understand legal position, some examples with the
case law are required to be taken into consideration. Some examples
and findings of the Hon'ble High Courts are as under:
1. Insurer seeks to avoid its liability on the ground that offending
vehicle was being plied without valid permit. It has come on record
that insurer had insured the said vehicle without there being valid
permit. Therefore, it is held that it is the duty of Insurer to verify the
fact that permit of vehicle was valid or not at the time of insuring the
vehicle and, as insurer having insured the vehicle without valid
permit, it cannot seek exemption from liability. This has been held by
Hon'ble Uttarakhand High Court in the case of U.I.I.Com. v/s
Prakashi Devi, reported in 2011 ACJ 1683.
2. Insurer seeks to avoid its liability on the ground that owner of ‘Taxi’,
which hit the pedestrians had violated terms of policy, as ‘Taxi’ could
not have been used in a public place after expiry of permit. It has
come on record that policy was valid. Even it was not  the case of
Insurer that passengers were being carried for hire and reward and
policy did not cover the case of Third Party. It was therefore, held
that victim did not suffer injuries while travelling in the ‘Taxi’ for hire
or reward and mere expiry of permit would not absolve Insurer to
pay compensation, as no provision of the Act is shown by Insurer to

point out that owner of ‘Taxi’ was under legal obligation, not to ply
‘Taxi’ after the expiry of permit. This has been held by Hon'ble Kerala
High Court in the case of Sethunath v/s John Varghese, reported in
2011 ACJ 2242.
3. Truck was loaded with coal and carrying 12 passengers, capsized.
Truck was insured covering driver, cleaner and 6 coolies. Insurer
contended that truck was over loaded as it was carrying more that 8
persons and further contended that there is breach of policy. It is
held that Insurer has failed to show that carrying more number of
coolies would be treated as breach of policy and, it has been further
held that if at all there is any breach of policy, it is not so
fundamental as to put end to the contract totally. Finally Insurer was
directed to satisfy the highest six awards of coolies. This has been
held by Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Sanjay v/s
Sukhiyabai, reported in 2012 ACJ 287.
4. Truck hit a person standing on roadside and he sustained grievous
injuries. Tribunal found that Truck was being plied without valid
permit and owner of the Truck has committed breach of the terms
and condition of policy. After holding this, Tribunal directed insurer
to pay compensation and then recover from the owner. This award of
Tribunal was challenged before the Hon'ble High Court. Hon'ble High
Court, after relying upon the several Judgments of Hon'ble Apex
Court, has held that award of Tribunal is just and proper and
directions of Tribunal against insurer to 'pay and recover' is just and

proper. This has been held by Hon'ble Allahabad High Court (DB) in
the case of N.I. Com. v/s Radhey Shyam, reported in 2013 ACJ 788.
5. Mini bus being plied on the route for which it had no permit. It is
also found that in the said bus 13 passengers travelling against the
permit of 12 passengers. Held that there is violation of insurance
policy and Insurer held not responsible but order of 'pay and recover'
is passed. This has been held by Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh High
Court in the case of N.I. Com. v/s Balbir Singh, reported in 2013 ACJ
1008.
23.2 The interpretation of contravention of condition of permit envisaged
under Section 66 of the M.V. Act and the contravention of condition/s of
permit came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in State
of Maharastra v/s Nanden parrebhani, reported in (2000) 2 SCC 69,
albeit in a different context. In the said case, the police had seized
certain vehicles for carrying passengers in excess of the numbers
permitted by the condition of permit issued by the Transport Authority.
The action was challenged by the Association of Transporters by virtue
of a writ petition before the Hon'ble Aurangabad Bench of Hon'ble
Bombay High Court. The Hon'ble High Court analyzed the different
provisions of the M. V. Act, and the Rules framed thereunder and on
consideration of the same came to the conclusion that it is not each and
every violation of the condition of the permit which would authorize the
seizure and detention of the vehicle under Section 207 (1) of the M.V.
Act. It was held that it was only when the condition of permit relating to

the route on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the
vehicle was used, is violated, the vehicle could be seized by the
Authorities. The Appeal filed by the State of Maharastra was dismissed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The contention raised on behalf of the
State of Maharastra that carrying passengers more than prescribed by
the permit could be construed to be violation, was rejected. The
Supreme Court relied upon the report in Kanailal Sur v/s Paramnidhi
Sadhu Khan, reported in (1958) 1 SCR 360 and held as under:
"If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not
be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on
the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged
object and policy of the Act. The intention of the legislature is required
to be gathered from the language used and, therefore, a construction,
which requires for its support with additional substitution of words or
which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided.
Bearing in mind, the aforesaid principles of construction of statute and
on examining the provisions of Section 207 of the M.V. Act, which has
been quoted earlier, we have no doubt in our mind that the police
officer would be authorised to detain a vehicle, if he has reason to
believe that the vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of
Section 3 or Section 4 or Section 39 or without the permit required
under Subsection (1) of Section 66 or in contravention of any
condition of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in
which or the purpose for which the vehicle may be used. In the case in
hand, we are not concerned with the contravention of Section 3 or
Section 4 or Section 39 or Subsection (1) of Section 66 and we are

only concerned with the question of contravention of the condition of
permit. Reading the provisions as it is, the conclusion is irresistible that
the condition of permit relating to the route on which or the area in
which or the purpose for which the vehicle could be used if contravened,
would only authorise the police officer to detain the vehicle and not
each and every condition of permit on being violated or contravened,
the police officer would be entitled to detain the vehicle. According to
the learned Counsel, appearing for the State of Maharashtra, the
expression "purpose for which the vehicle may be used" could be
construed to mean that when the vehicle is found to be carrying
passengers more than the number prescribed in the permit, the purpose
of user is otherwise. We are unable to accede to this contention as in
our opinion, the purpose would only refer to a contingency when a
vehicle having a permit of stage carriage is used as a contract carriage
or vice versa or where a vehicle having a permit for stage carriage or
contract carriage is used as a goods vehicle and vice versa. But carrying
passengers more than the number specified in the permit will not be a
violation of the purpose for which the permit is granted. If the
legislature really wanted to confer power of detention on the police
officer for violation of any condition of the permit, then there would not
have been the necessity of adding the expression "relating to the route
on which or the area in which or the purpose for which the vehicle may
be used". The user of the aforesaid expression cannot be ignored nor can
it be said to be a tautology. We have also seen the Form of permit
(From P.Co. T.), meant in respect of a tourist vehicle, which is issued

under Rule 72(1)(ix) and Rule 74(6) of the Maharashtra Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989. On seeing the different columns, we are unable to
accede to the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the State
of Maharashtra, that carrying passengers beyond the number
mentioned in Column 5, indicating the seating capacity, would be a
violation of the conditions of permit relating to either the route or the
area or the purpose for which the permit is granted. In this view of the
matter, we see no infirmity with the conclusion arrived at by the
Hon'ble High Court in the impugned judgment and the detention of the
vehicles has rightly been held to be unauthorised and consequently, the
compensation awarded cannot be said to be without jurisdiction........."
23.2.1. Although, the interpretation of Section 207 of M.V. Act was done by
Hon'ble Apex Court in a different context, but same would apply to Clause
(c) to Section 149 (2) (a) (i) of the Act.
23.3 Thus, if a vehicle has been or is being used in contravention of
Section 3 or Section 4 or Section 39 or without the permit required
under Subsection (1) of Section 66 or in contravention of any condition
of such permit relating to the route on which or the area in which or the
purpose for which the vehicle may be used, if contravened, would
amount to violation of permit and not every contravention or violation
of condition of permit issued by the Transport Authority would amount
to violation of permit.
23.4 From the above referred ratios, it becomes clear that it is for the
insurer to verify before insuring the vehicle, as to whether vehicle is
having valid permit or not and, if insurer having insured the vehicle

without valid permit, it cannot seek exemption from liability afterwards.

23.3 If it is found that owner has violated terms of the policy, Tribunal can
pass an order exonerating insurer but may also pass and order of 'pay
and recover'.

24.Whether an award passed by the Tribunal can be reviewed:
24.1 Many time claimant or opponent/s including insurer prefer/s an
application for review of award passed by the Tribunal on the ground
that the award on a question on which the judgment of the Tribunal is
based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of
Superior Court. To deal with such kind of application, reference may be
made to Explanation of Order XLVII (47) Rule – 1 of C.P.C., 1908,
which reads as under:
Explanation of Order XLVII (47) Rule – 1 of C.P.C.:
“The fact that the decision on a question of law on which
the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or
modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in
any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of
such judgment”.
24.1.1. From the above referred provision, it becomes clear that when
an application for review of award, passed by the Tribunal is moved
on the ground that the award on a question on which the judgment
of the Tribunal is based has been reversed or modified by the
subsequent decision of Superior Court, such application can not be
entertained.
24.2 Various High Courts have taken a view that Tribunal does not have
powers to modify, alter, recall and revers it's earlier award. And if such an
order is passed in review petition/application, it is nullity, non est and void.
Relying upon the several decisions, Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in the

case of N.I.Com. v.s Rajbir Sing, reported in 2012 AAC 3007 that tribunal
does not have powers to review.
24.3 Reference may also be made to the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of CTO v/s Makkad Plastic Agencies, reported in AIR
2011 SCW 2154, wherein it is observed in para No.17 as under:
“… It is also now an established proposition of law that review is a
creature of the statute and such an order of review could be passed
only when an express power of review is provided in the statute. In
the absence of any statutory provision for review, exercise of power of
review under the garb of clarification/modification/correction is not
permissible...”.
24.4 Bare reading of above referred observations of Hon'ble Apex Court
reveals the fact that review is a creature of the statute and such an order
of review could be passed only when an express power of review is
provided in the statute. As, there is no provision for review in the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, award of the tribunal is not reviewable.
24.5 On the above referred issue, reference may also be made to ratios laid
down by Hon'ble Clacutta High Court in the case reported in 2008 ACJ
1248 (DB) and N.I.Com. v/s Chhabirani, reported in 2013 ACJ 1130
and ratio laid down by Hon'ble Gauhati High Court in the case reported
in 2008 ACJ 1248 (DB) and N.I.Com. v/s Nani Gopal Debnath, reported
in 2012 ACJ 2720.

25. Details of Proposal Forms for Private Cars/Motorised Two Wheelers
Package Policy and Liability Only/ Act Policy:
25.1 Details above may be gathered from the India Motor Tariff. Pleased See
Section 5, PROPOSAL FORMS at page No.88 to 101.
26. Standard wordings in respect of the Policy including Premium
computation Table, Certificate of Insurance and Cover Note:
26.1. Details above may be gathered from the India Motor Tariff. Pleased See
Section 6, at page No.102 to 176.
26.1.1.Details can also be downloaded from IDRA web site by
tying/searching 'India Motor Tariff'.

27.Liability of registered owner, in case where Vehicle in question is
requisitioned by Government/Authority/Divisional Magistrate:
1. The car in question was requisitioned during the Assembly Elections in
the year 1993 by the SubDivisional Magistrate Rampur through the
Deputy Commissioner, Shimla. The said vehicle was in possession as
also under the control of the said officer. On or about 17.11.1993 while
the SubDivisional Magistrate Rampur was travelling in the said vehicle,
an accident occurred as a result whereof a boy named Satish Kumar
sustained injuries. He later on expired. Under these circumstances, who
would be responsible to pay amount of compensation? State
Government or the Ownerdriver and Insurance company of the said
Car?
2. After considering several judgments, Hon'ble Apex court has held that
when a vehicle is requisitioned, the owner of the vehicle has no other
alternative but to handover the possession to statutory
authority/Government and once possession is handed over and the
accident resulted due to the negligent driving of the driver of the
Government, in such situation it cannot be said that the owner has any
control over said vehicle and, therefore, under such situation, Owner
and insurer are not liable to pay amount of compensation but State
Government.
3. This ratio is laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi, reported in AIR 2008 SC 735.
4. In another case before the Hon'ble Apex Court a Minibus was hired by
the Corporation and said minibus was being driven by the driver
provided by the registered owner and accident occurred. Driver was

supposed to drive as per the instructions of the employee of the
Corporation (Conductor), whether in such circumstances, insurance
company can be held liable?
1. Hon'ble Apex in the case reported in 2011 ACJ 2145, has held that
under such situation, insurer is liable to pay amount of
compensation.
5. In a case before Hon'ble Gujarat High Court the vehicle in question
which belonged to the State of Gujarat was entrusted to the
Municipality for distribution of water to the citizens. It was implicit in
allowing the vehicle being used for such purpose that the State of
Gujarat which owned the vehicle also caused or allowed any driver of
the Municipality who was engaged in the work of distribution of water
to the citizens, to use motor vehicle for the purpose and when the
vehicle was driven by the driver of the Municipality the accident
occurred because of the negligence of driver of Municipality. The issue
before Hon'ble Court was as to whether the insurer of the vehicle is
liable to pay the compensation under the provisions of the Act or not?
1. It is held that the State, as the owner of the vehicle and the
respondent Insurance Company as its insurer were also liable to
pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. This ratio is laid
down by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Chief Officer,
Bhavnagar Municipality v/s Bachubhai Arjanbhai, reported in AIR
1996 Gujarat 51.
2. In a case before Hon'ble Apex Court the facts of the case was:
U.P. State Raod Transport Corporation took Minibus on hire from
its owner for plying on the route alloted to Corporation by RTO.

Said Minibua rammed into a shop resulting in death of five
persons. According to agreement between the Corporation and
owner of the Minibus, said bus was given on hire by owner of the
bus along with insurance policy and driver would be provided by
the owner and said driver was supposed to ply bus under the
instructions of conductor appointed by the Corporation and as
such Corporation was having overall and effective control on the
Minibus and its driver. In a claim petition, insurer admits that
premium for insurance of the Minibus was same if it is plied by the
owner himself or attached with Corporation. It was not not even a
case of the insurer that prior permission of the insurer was
required before attaching Minibus with Corporation.
1. It is held that since Corporation has over all control of the
Minibus, it became the owner of the vehicle for specified period
and, therefore, insurer is liable to indemnify the owner i.e.
Corporation. Please refer to ratio laid down by Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of U.P. State Raod Transport Corporation v/s
Kulsum, reported in 2011 ACJ 2145.

28. Liability of Insurance Company in the case wherein the vehicle involved
in the accident was stolen.
28.1 The case before Hon'ble Delhi High Court was that stolen car hit
pedestrian resulting in his death. Said vehicle was stolen much before the
accident and Insurance company paid compensation to the real owner and
vehicle was already transferred under subrogation right in favour of the
insurance company. In the said facts of the case it is held that owner of the
vehicle is insurance company and original owner cannot be held liable to
pay amount of compassion. United India Insurance Com. Ltd. v/s
Amaratta, reported in 2014 ACJ 1706 (Delhi).
28.2 In another case, accident was caused by unknown driver by stolen
vehicle which stolen prior to the date of accident. After the accident, said
vehicle was returned to original owner by Police. Owner was not aware as
to who was driving the said stolen vehicle and was possessing valid licence
or not. Insurance company disputed its liability on the count that the driver
of the stolen vehicle was not possessing valid and effective licence.
Whether such stand of insurer is sustainable? Held The person who
committed theft and accident could not be traced by police and, therefore,
original owner cannot be held liable for the act done by unknown person
and defence of Insurer that driver of the offending vehicle was not
possessing valid and effective licence cannot be accepted. National
Insurance Company v/s Golana, reported in 2014 ACJ 1165 (Allahabad).

29. Whether executing court can pass an order of attachment of Residential
premises/home?
29.1 In the case of Prem Chand v/s Akashdeep, reported in 2014 ACJ
1467 (P&H), it is held that Executing court was justified in proceeding
against residential property of judgmentdebtor and further held that
special privileges given u/s 60 (ccc) of CPC for enforcement of decree
cannot be applied in the cases of enforcement of an award.

30. When possession of vehicle is taken over by the transferee along with
certificate of insurance, Insurance company is liable to pay amount of
compensation.
30.1 In the case before Hon'ble Apex Court a Tractortrailer loaded
with sand overturned and its driver sustained fatal injuries. Said vehicle
was transferred by its original owner to the transferee and deceased was
an employee of the transferee but insurance policy subsisted on the date
of accident in the name of original owner. Whether in the said facts
and circumstance of the cases, insurance company can be held liable to
pay compensation? It is held by Hon'ble Apex Court that since on the
date of accident, ownership of the vehicle stood transferred from its
original owner to transferee and premium for legal liability to person
employed in connection with operation and/or loading unloading of
vehicle had been paid and, therefore, insurance company is held liable
to pay amount of compensation. Mallamma v/s National Insurance
Company, reported in 2014 ACJ 1266 (SC).

31.  Co mmencement of Policy and Breach of Policy:
31.1 Policy – commencement of premium accepted on 3.5.97 but
cover note specified the effective date of commencement as 5.5.97, as
3.5.97 was holiday IC contended that at the date of accident i.e.4.5.97,
there was not effective policy in existence whether IC is liable held
yes contract of insurance comes in to effect from the date of acceptance
of premium more particularly when IC had received the premium prior
to the date of accident
2011 ACJ 1728 (BOM)
31.2  Accident occurred on 20.5.85 at 7.45 pm IP valid from 20.5.85 to
19.5.86 IP does not speak about the time of commencement of policy
when policy is silent about the time of its commencement, starting time
has to be taken as from the midnight of 20.5.85 and its ends at 2400 hrs
on 19.5.86 Ic held liable
2011 ACJ 2394 (DEL)
31.3   An insurance policy, in law, could be issued from a future date. A
policy, however, which is issued from a future date must be with the
consent of the holder of the policy. The insurance company cannot issue
a policy unilaterally from a future date without the consent of the
holder of a policy – 2009 (13) SCC370 –Blabir Kaur v/s N.I.A.Com
31.4 U/s 147 (1) Insurance Act u/s 64VB IC tried to avoid its
liability on the ground that police has not come into existence as
verification of vehicle was not done whether sustainable Held No
once premium is paid, IC cannot avoid its liability 2012 ACJ 1322
31.5 Commencement of policy starts when? It starts when entire

amount of premium is paid/made and it does not make any difference
when policy is made effective. 2013 ACJ 2493 (Mad) O. I. Com. v/s
Venkataraman, dated 18.07.2012.
31.6   Section 64VB – commencement of policy – whether IC can defer
assumption of risk to a later point of time other than from the date and
time of receipt of the premium? Held No. Insurance Policy (IP) under
the MV Act stand on differnet footing than the other IP
2014 ACJ 2847 (Chh) – SC judgments followed.
31.7   One of the grounds which is available to the Insurance Company
for denying its statutory liability is that the policy is void having been
obtained by reason of nondisclosure of a material fact or by a
representation of fact which was false in some material particular once
a valid contract is entered into, only because of a mistake, the name of
original owner not been mentioned in the certificates of registration, it
cannot be said that the contract itself is void unless it was shown that
in obtaining the said contract, a fraud has been practiced no
particulars of fraud pleaded IC held liable
2009 (1) SCC 58.
31.8   Private vehicle breach of policy in FIR it is stated that vehicle
was hired IC disputed its liability relying on the word ‘hired’ in FIR eye
witnesses deposed that vehicle was ‘borrowed’ from the friend and
denied that it was ‘hired’ whether IC is liable held yes as IC has
neither confronted the witnesses with the statement made by them in
FIR nor examined the IO or RTO officer
2011 ACJ 1482 (SIK)
31.9   Liability of IC in tariff, under 'Limits of Liability' it is mentioned

'As required by Law' and not 'Act Policy' – words explained. In such
situation, IC is liable to pay awarded by the Tribunal.
2012 AAC 3136.
31.10 Farmer's Package Policy Tractortrolley purpose – use of
guideline for assessment of liability of IC.
2014 ACJ 1691 (Mad).

32. Which kind of licence required for LMVLGVHGVHTVMGV:
32.1  Driver was holding licence to ply ‘light motor vehicle’ drove ‘pick
up jeep’ which is transport vehicle whether IC is liable held no w.e.f
29.03.2001, no person can said to hold an effective driving licence to
drive transport vehicle if he only holds a licence entitling him to drive
‘light motor vehicle’ when there is no endorsement on driving licence to
drive transport vehicle, IC is not liable
2008 ACJ 721 (SC), 2011 ACJ 2115 (HP), 2014 ACJ 1128. But see
2014 ACJ 1117 Tractor whether Non transport vehicle or not – which
kind of licence is required.
32.2 Driving licence liability of IC ‘light motor vehicle’ driver had
licence to ply auto rickshaw and was driving auto rickshaw delivery van,
which caused accidentTribunal held that driver was not holding valid
licence whether sustainable held no further held that use of vehicle
for carriage of goods does not take the auto rickshaw outside the scope
and definition of ‘light motor vehicle’, which includes a transport vehicle
whose gross vehicle weight does not exceed permissible limit of
7500kgs lastly held that driver was holding valid licence to drive and IC
is liable
2011 ACJ 1592 (ORI),  2014 ACJ 1037, 2014 ACJ 2148, 2014 ACJ 2259
(All), 2014 ACJ 2471 (Guj), 2014 ACJ 2703 (P&H)
32.3  Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 u/s. 149, 163A, 166 and 170 Vehicle
was used as a commercial vehicle Driver was holder of licence to drive
LMV Driver not holding licence to drive commercial vehicle Breach of
contractual condition of insurance Owner of vehicle cannot contend

that he has no liability to verify as to whether driver possessed a valid
licence Extent of third party liability of insurer Death of a 12year girl
in accident Claimants are from poor background After having
suffered mental agony, not proper to send them for another round of
litigation Insurer directed to pay to claimants and then recover from
the owner in view of Nanjappan's case [2005 SCC (Cri.) 148].
32.4 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 S. 10(2) motor accident claim
liability of insurer appellant insurance company cannot be held liable
to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants for the cause of
death in road accident which had occurred due to rash and negligent
driving of scooterist who admittedly had no valid and effective licence
to drive the vehicle on the day of accident scooterist was possessing
driving licence of driving HMV and he was driving totally different class
of vehicle which act of his is in violation of S. 10(2) of the Act
2008(12) SCC 385 – Zahirunisha
32.5 Death of workman who was sitting on the mudguard IC sought
to avoid its liability on the ground that driver was holding License to
drive heavy transport vehicle but he was driving tractor which did not
conform to the particular category License for higher category of
vehicle will not amount to valid and effective DL to drive a vehicle of
another category IC is held not liable
2012 ACJ 179
32.6 licence endorsement on licence Specific endorsement to ply a
transport vehicle is necessary.
2013 ACJ 487 & 668 – IMP Relied on 2006 ACJ 1336 Kusum Rai, 2008
ACJ 627 N.I. A.Co. v/s Prabhulal , 2008 ACJ 721, N.I.Com. v/s Annappa

Irappa Nesaria (wherein it is held that endorsement is required from
28.03.2001), 2009 ACJ 1141, O.I.Com. v/s Angad Kol (wherein it is
held that for non passenger/ non transport vehicles, licences are issued
for 20 years whereas for passengers vehicles they are issued for 3 years
only).
32.7 LMV whether tractor is light motor vehicle? Held yes, as
defined u/s 2(21) of the Act.
2013 ACJ 1160, 2014 ACJ – Sudha v/s Dalip Singh (P&H), 2014 ACJ
2817 (Chh)
255
32.8   Tractor is LMV and Car /Jeep are also LMV and, therefore, driver
who was holding DL to drive LMV (Car/Jeep) can also drive Tractor.
2013 ACJ 2679 Ghansham v/s O.I.Com.
30.9 Tractor – DL LMV & HTV Tractor is defined u/s 2(44)
Whether for driving Tractor, separate licence is required? Held Yes.
2014 ACJ 854 (P&H).
32.10  Badge Vehicle of same category
2014 ACJ 1180
LMV can be equated with LGV for the purpose of Driving Licence (DL)?
Held – yes. Same cannot be termed as breach of IP.
2014 ACJ 2873 (SC)   Kulwant Singh v/s OI Com.   S. Iyyappa v/s UII
Com, 2013 ACJ 1944 followed
32.11   DL LMV – LGV – Accident occurred prior to the amendment
which came into effect from of 21.03.2001 Driver was holding DL to
drive LMV but was driving LGV – Whether IC can be held liable? Held
Yes. 2008 ACJ 721(SC) Annappa Irappa Nesaria.

2014 ACJ 1828 (Raj)
32.12 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 u/s. 149, 163A, 166 and 170
Vehicle was used as a commercial vehicle Driver was holder of licence
to drive LMV Driver not holding licence to drive commercial vehicle
Breach of contractual condition of insurance Owner of vehicle cannot
contend that he has no liability to verify as to whether driver possessed
a valid licence Extent of third party liability of insurer Death of a 12
year girl in accident Claimants are from poor background After
having suffered mental agony, not proper to send them for another
round of litigation Insurer directed to pay to claimants and then
recover from the owner in view of Nanjappan's case [2005 SCC (Cri.)
148].
2006(2) GLH 15 (SC) – N.I.A Com v/s Kusum Rai.
Following Kusum Rai judgment, Delhi High Court in the case of O I
Com. v/s Shahnawaz, reorted in 2014 ACJ 2124 has held that driver of
offending vehicle was possessinng lincence to ply LMV (Nontransport)
but was plying Tata Sumo registered as Tourist Taxi and, therefore, IC is
not liable to pay compensation.
32.12 Liability of IC to avoid liability, IC had to prove that owner of
the vehicle knew that driver was not having valid driving licence Driver
was having licence to ply LMV, MGV and HGV IC did not led any
evidence to prove that owner knew about driver being incompetent to
ply passenger vehicle.
2012 AAC 3302 (J & K) N.I. Com. v/s Mst. Bakhta., 2014 ACJ 1037
32.13 Central M.V. Rules Rule 16 Tractor Driving licence Rule 16
provides that every licence issued or renewed shall be in Form VI which

provides for grant of licence in respect of LMV or Transport Vehicle
amongst other categories but there is no specific entry for issuance of
licence for driving a Tractor. As per Section 2(44), by definition Tractor
is LMV and, therefore, when driver has licence to ply LMV, he can also
ply Tractor.
2014 ACJ (P&H)
32.14 DL – Valid DL – IC disputed its liability on the ground that driver
of offending vehicle was holding DL for driving LMV but actually at the
time time accident, he was driving LMV (commercial) – liability to prove
that driver of offending vehicle had no valid DL at the time accident, is
on the shoulder of IC.
2015 ACJ 340 (Del) but also see 2015 ACJ 576 (AP).

33.     Registration of Vehicle/Number Plate:
33.1  Registration number of offending vehicle not disclosed at the time
of filling of FIR driver of offending vehicle, convicted by criminal court
vehicle number, disclosed afterwards does not lead to the conclusion
that there is collusion between claimant and driver of offending vehicle.
2012 ACJ 2176 (Del)
33.2 Use of vehicle without the registration certificate temporary
registration expired on the date of accident owner is not entitled to get
anything under the Own Damage Claim.
2014 ACJ 2421 (SC).
33.3  Registration Certificate Expiry of liability of IC non renewal if
RC on the date of accident – same is not illegality but irregularity and
same will not absolve IC from its liability.
2014 ACJ 2399 (Kant) But contrary view is taken in 2014 ACJ 2665
(MP)
33.4 U/s 39 – Registration of vehicle – temporary registration –
expired before the date of accident – under this circumstances, IC has to
prove breach of terms of Policy as envisaged in Section 149(2) of the
MV Act if IC fails to prove this, it liable to pay compensation first and
then recover from Driver/owner.
2015 ACJ 236 (Kar).

34.    Important Judgments on Section 140 of the M.V. Act.
34.1   U/S 140 – No fault liability – claimant need not to plea and
establish negligence he is required to prove that injuries sustained due to
vehicular accident.
2011 ACJ 1603 (Bombay)
But P& H High Court has held ( 2011 ACJ 2128) in that case claimant
pleaded that he was earning Rs 7000 p/m. – in deposition, he deposed
that he was earning Rs 3000 p/m.whether oral evidence which is
contrary to the pleadings could be accepted in absence of any other
documentary evidence held –no.
34.2 NFL application not filled along with main petition Tribunal
rejected the application filed later on HC confirmed the said order
whether valid held no claimant can file NFL u/s 140 at any time
during pendency of main claim petition.
2010 (8) SCC 620.
34.3   No order of investment can be passed in the order passed u/s
140 of the M. V. Act.
First Appeal 1749 of 2012 (Coram Jst. Harsha  Devani)
34.4   Constructive res judicata Whether order passed u/s 140 of the
Act, qua negligence of the driver is binding to the tribunal as
constructive res judicata, while deciding the claim petition u/s 166 of
the Act? Held Yes.
F.A. No. 264 of 2005 dated 15/02/2013, Minor Siddharth Makranbhai.
2012 (2) GLH 465 Siddik U. Solanki.
Judgment delivered in the case of 2012 (2) GLH 465 Siddik U.

Solanki is modified First Appeal No.2103 of 2005 and allied matters
(Coram Jst. Akil Kuresi and Jst.Vipul Pancholi)
34.5 U/s 140 Whether amount paid u/s 140 of the can be recovered
in case if the main claim petition is dismissed Held No.
2014 ACJ 708 (Raj) – SC judgment in the case of O I Com. v/s Angad
Kol, reported in 2009 ACJ 1411, para Nos. 4 to 8 relied upon
34.6 An application u/s 140 has to be decided as expeditiously as
possible – an order of hear the same along with the main claim petition
is bad.
2013 ACJ 1371 (Bom).

Motor Accident Claim Petitions - MACP - Reference Manual updated upto April, 2015.

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Motor Accident Claim Petitions - MACP - Reference Manual updated upto April, 2015.