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Table of contents
introduction
Mental spaces and discourse analysis 1
Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley
chapter 1
Connecting the dots: Mental spaces and metaphoric language in discourse 27
Todd Oakley and Seana Coulson
chapter 2
The text and the story: Levels of blending in fictional narratives 51
Barbara Dancygier
chapter 3
Fictive interaction blends in everyday life and courtroom settings 79
Esther Pascual
chapter 4
A semiotic approach to fictive interaction as a representational strategy
in communicative meaning construction 109
Line Brandt
chapter 5
Designing clinical experiences with words: Three layers of analysis
in clinical case studies 149
Todd Oakley and David Kaufer
chapter 6
Compression in interaction 179
Anders Hougaard
chapter 7
Guided conceptualization: Mental spaces in instructional discourse 209
Robert F. Williams](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-11-320.jpg)
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Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction
chapter 8
Looking at analyses of mental spaces and blending /
Looking at and experiencing discourse in interaction 235
Alan Cienki
chapter 9
“Mental spaces” and “blending” in discourse and interaction:
A response 247
Gitte R. Hougaard
chapter 10
Reflections on blends and discourse 251
Paul Chilton
Author index 257
Subject index 259](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-12-320.jpg)
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Mental spaces and discourse analysis
Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley
Since their inceptions, mental spaces theory (Fauconnier 1994, 1997) and concep-
tual integration theory, better known as blending theory (Fauconnier Turner
1994, 1998, 2002), have developed rapidly from being semantic theories of (mainly
textual) discourse meaning to general cognitive1
theories of human sense making
across diverse domains of human activity. These activities range from text and
discourse comprehension to the construction of meaning in religious rituals and
meaning in music. This developmenthas been endorsed by the elaboration of Fau-
connier’s (1994 [1985]) early work on mental spaces in discourse into a larger
theoretical machinery which has the general cognitive capacity of blending (and
accompanying processes) as its central object of inquiry. Despite this expansive
development, however, discourse, in its many variants (from poetry to face-to-
face interaction), remains a vibrant area of research within the mental spaces and
conceptual integration framework (hereafter MSCI).
Two major developments can be observed in the discursive application, elabo-
ration and rethinking of MSCI. One is that increasingly more attention is being
paid to the way contextual or situational factors determine mental spaces and
blending operations, under which or in accordance with which discourse par-
ticipants construct meaning. And here we use both terms – “context” and “sit-
uation” – in the broadest conceivable fashion as any micro, mezzo or macro,
textual or non-textual set of circumstances. The other major development, already
indicated in the latter, is an increasing multiplicity of particular theoretic and em-
pirical notions on which researchers study discourse. A great number of major
approaches to discourse from the fields of pragmatics, text linguistics, discourse
studies and interactional studies are represented in discursive MSCI research. This
diversity of approaches presents the joint cognitive enterprise with a great chal-
lenge: either 1) to attempt to reconcile these diverse theoretic and empirical bases
into a joint enterprise that produces comparable results without violating the the-
. For a discussion of mental space as a cognitive theory, see below.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-13-320.jpg)
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Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley
oretic and methodological bases of these results or 2) to consider an appropriate
division of labor between them, which involves considering which theories and
methods do what best and what results are incompatible with which theories
and methods.
It was in the interest of the two challenges that Hougaard and Oakley or-
ganized a panel session at the International Pragmatics Organization’s biannual
conference at Riva del Garda, Italy, in 2005. The present volume presents both
written and extended versions of papers given on that occasion and additional in-
vited papers by other researchers within the “branch” of discursive MSCI. The
volume has two major purposes: One is to stimulate discussions within MSCI
as well as cognitive linguistics in general of a joint discursive enterprise or of
complementary discursive enterprises, including a thorough exchange of philo-
sophical, theoretical and methodological viewpoints. The other is to provide other
researchers who work with discourse and/or interaction and who take an interest
in cognitive issues with a palette of different ways in which blending theorists have
made discourse and interaction an object of inquiry. Additionally, to initiate the
discussion of a general discursive and interactional MSCI enterprise – including
both its prospects and problems – we have invited three relevantexperts to respond
to the contributions made in the present volume: discourse analyst Paul Chilton,
cognitive linguist Alan Cienki, and conversation analyst Gitte R. Hougaard. Below
we will give a short overview of the contributions to this volume. But first, for
readers who are not familiar with MSCI, we offer a short introduction to MSCI
and discourse, and then we discuss MSCI in relation to traditions of discourse
analysis, with particular focus on some seemingly antithetical major “schools”:
Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis and Discursive Psychology.
We have chosen to focus on these because they are dealt with explicitly in sev-
eral contributors and because they present novel and very different perspectives
from those commonly found in cognitive linguistics. MSCI is commonly accepted
as a tool for analysis of individuals’ interpretations of sequences of spoken and
written language. Such studies have been a part of the cognitive linguistics en-
deavor at least since the first version of Fauconnier’s Mental Spaces (1985). Yet,
the sociological methods employed by these schools introduce a new concern:
meaning construction as a shared or public phenomenon.Many cognitive linguists
would perhaps consider this issue as being beyond the concerns of cognitive lin-
guistics proper, as being a sociological not a cognitive or linguistics concern. But in
truth cognitive linguistics in general and MSCI in particular are starting to address
explicitly the issue of socially shared and constructed meaning. For instance, Croft
(to appear) argues explicitly for a “social” extension of cognitive linguistics, and in
their 2002 book Fauconnier and Turner provide blending analyses of phenomena
that are distinctly social and can only be achieved in and through social processes.
These include the concept of ‘money’, Japanese image clubs (where sexual fantasies](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-14-320.jpg)
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Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis
are enacted collaboratively by prostitutes and customers) and religious rituals.
Furthermore, Turner (2001) dedicates a whole book to arguing for a fusion be-
tween cognitive science and social science using blending theory as a platform for
bringing the two together. If MSCI makes social aspects of meaning construction
a principal concern, then a sociological viewpoint may as a consequence change
some of the theoretical premises. As several of this volume’s contributors and com-
mentators make clear, these sociological viewpoints need to be incorporated in
future iterations of MSCI theory.
Introducing mental spaces and blending: Achilles sees a tortoise
In this section we discuss the technical application of mental spaces and in the
following section we address some definitional issues with respect to the status of
mental spaces. Consider then first the following piece of text, originally analyzed
in Fauconnier (1997:44):
Achilles sees a tortoise. He chases it. He thinks that the tortoise is slow and that he
will catch it. But it is fast. If the tortoise had been slow, Achilles would have caught
it. Maybe the tortoise is really a hare.
This little slice of discourse consisting mostly of simple sentences requires of its
reader an almost acrobatic mastering of information chunks which emerge and
get connected in all sorts of ways during the very brief time span it takes to read
and understand the text. Fauconnier analyses the reader’s cognitive take on the
unfolding text in terms of a proliferating network of interconnected mental spaces.
Let us follow Fauconnier’s analysis step-by-step.
Base space
According to Fauconnier, all discourse networks of mental spaces grow from a
so-called Base space which represents the discourse starting point of a meaning
construction. It is important to notice that this space need not be true or real or
actual in any way outside the cognizer’s (or cognizers’) understanding. Only as
an interpreter’s understanding of something is it claimed to be very real. It thus
simply marks the point from which the meaning construction extends. Truth is
not an issue – people’s understanding is. People understand the sentence Achilles
sees a tortoise whether or not Achilles is real, has been real, could be real or only
exists in imagination. MSCI seeks to model how people keep track of currents of
information and make sense of them however bizarre, fantastic, imaginary, fictive
or real they may be. The Base space is thus a here-and-now space with respect to
the unfolding discourse, not with respect to any real or possible world situation.
This is also a major reason why mental spaces are cognitive. We need judgement](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-15-320.jpg)
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Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley
a
b
a name Achilles
b tortoise
SEE a b
Figure 1.
to distinguish between truths, falsities, fictions, imaginations, etc.; but technical
cognitive principles of meaning assembly do not make that distinction. Hence one
might argue that MSCI follows a trend already set by speech act theory (Austin
1962) in relocating the issue of meaning from being an issue of truth or falsity to
being an issue of understanding.
Mental spaces analysis
The first sentence in the discourse is then,
(1) Achilles sees a tortoise.
In mental space terms, the name Achilles is linked to an element, a, already in-
troduced into the Base space prior to the present excerpt (this must be so due to
the definite reference). The element b(tortoise), which is set up by the indefinite
noun phrase a tortoise, gets introduced as a new element in the Base space; and
finally sees evokes a SEEING frame (a structured domain of knowledge pertaining
to seeing, Fillmore 1982, 1985) which takes a and b in the roles of seer and seen
respectively (figure 1).
Notice here that, mental spaces are only partial conceptual structures. They do
not contain entire domains of knowledge, concepts or categories. They “recruit”
exactly what is required by the discourse. Hence not all knowledge that is related
to seeing is brought to bear on Achilles and the tortoise, only that Achilles is a seer
who has caught sight of the tortoise which is a visible object. Yet, frames are con-
sidered to be activated and hence available in the background for further mental
space construction.
Background information telling us that Achilles is a man and that the tortoise
is an animal makes it possible in the next sentence,
(2) He chases it,
to reference them anaphorically. Otherwise the next elements only add the addi-
tional relation CHASE through the verb chases. A frame for chasing is activated
and Achilles is cast in the role as chaser and the tortoise in the role as chased
(figure 2).](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-16-320.jpg)
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Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis
a
b
a name Achilles
b tortoise
SEE a b
CHASE a b
Figure 2.
Notice thus how one space comes to contain a short narrative and thus a tem-
poral and dynamic dimension: Achilles sees a tortoise and then he chases it. Mental
spaces are not just frozen images, states or relations; they can have extension in
time and change over time.
The third sentence,
(3) He thinks it is slow and that he will catch it,
sets up new spaces with new structure (figure 3).
He thinks is called a ‘space builder’ because it marks a new (or “discontinu-
ous”) chunk, or seam, of information with respect to the previous seams. We are
no longer talking about what Achilles and the tortoise do in their shared world
but about what Achilles thinks about that shared world and this is not the same –
hence the partitioning into new spaces.2
Thus in the diagramming, Fauconnier
represents Achilles’ thinking as two new spaces. The first part of sentence (3) sets
up a belief space, M, with an internal structure where the tortoise, b’, is slow. No-
tice that a’, Achilles, appears in this space too even though this element has not
been explicitly referred to. This is one way in which mental space theory is differ-
ent form formal semantics. Language implies more than it explicitly states. It is
claimed to be understood that Achilles himself is of course a part of that scenario
in which the tortoise is slow since it must be slow for him in his belief. The second
. The issue of when a new mental space is needed is a contested issue. Harder (2003), proposes
that a new space is needed when chunks of information contrast. However, consider an example
like: The sun is shining and that is actually how Achilles sees it too. Here there is a full match
between what is the state of affairs in the world and what Achilles thinks is the state of affairs
in the world. But we must of course acknowledge the distinction that is made between what
is reported to be the objective state of affairs in the world and what is reported to be Achilles’
subjective impression of the world. Hence instead of having “contrast” as a criterion for mental
space assignment, one might argue that “discontinuity” is a better candidate. Hence partitioned
chunks of information may indeed be compatible although they are discontinues in time, space,
ontology, modality, etc. and thus should be treated as separate chunks.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-17-320.jpg)
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Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley
Future
space
Belief
space M
Base
space B
.a
.b
a name Achilles
b tortoise
SEE a b
CHASE a b
.a’
.b’
.a’’
.b’’
SLOW b’
CATCH a’’ b’’
Figure 3.
part of sentence (3) sets up a space which is in the future of space B and M. In that
space, Achilles, a”, catches the tortoise, b”.
One might perhaps argue that what Achilles thinks should rightfully be placed
with Achilles in the space already set up (the Base space), because just as Achilles
SEES and CHASES, he THINKS in that space. Yet, this would risk confusions and
make the modelling unnecessarily complicated. The hierarchical relationship be-
tween the spaces is captured in the progression of the network from the Base space
and downwards. And placing spaces within spaces might risk confusing a repre-
sentation of the situation as it is presented with a progressive representation of
the chunks of information as they appear, the latter and not the former being the
object of Fauconnier’s mental space theory.
The fourth sentence,
(4) But it is fast,
takes us back to the Base space and sets up the attribute FAST for b, the tortoise.
Notice how the word But explicitly marks a contrast between FAST in space B and
SLOW in space M. We are now manipulating – simultaneously – incompatible
scenarios where the same tortoise is respectively FAST and SLOW (figure 4).
The fifth sentence
(5) If the tortoise had been slow, Achilles would have caught it,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-18-320.jpg)
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Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis
Future
space
Belief
space M
Base
space B
.a
.b
a name Achilles
b tortoise
SEE a b
CHASE a b
FAST b
.a’
.b’
.a’’
.b’’
SLOW b’
CATCH a’ b’
Figure 4.
sets up an interesting structure which must clearly belong in a space that is differ-
ent from the Base space (figure 5). The conjunction If sets up a mental space H
with hypothetical content (that is, it has a hypothetical relation to the bases space).
And as Fauconnier (Ibid.:46) observes, the distal past perfect form indicates that
the space is counterfactually related to the discourse’s factual state of affairs in
space B. In this hypothetical space the novel structures SLOWb1 and CATCHa1b1
appear. For the sake of simplicity and brevity, we skip the more elaborate discus-
sion and detailed analysis of conditionals and matching conditions and instead
direct the reader to Chapters 4 and 5 of Fauconnier’s Mappings in Thought and
Language (1997). For now we simply observe that the mood of the discourse has
now shifted from indicative to conditional. However, below we will elaborate the
analysis of sentence 5 in another way, demonstrating how it can be conceived of as
a conceptual blend.
The last sentence,
(6) Maybe the tortoise is really a hare,
sets up an epistemic situation in which the tortoise is a hare (figure 6). The result-
ing configuration between spaces B and P allows the so-called Access Principle to
work: through the naming of an element in one space one may get access to that
element’s counterpart in another space. So when talking about the tortoise in this
latter case, we are not talking about the Base space tortoise; rather we use the name](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-19-320.jpg)
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Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley
Base
space B
Future
space
Belief
space M
.a
.b
a name Achilles
b tortoise
SEE a b
CHASE a b
FAST b
.a’
.b’
.a’’
.b’’
SLOW b’
CATCH a’ b’
.b1
.a1
SLOW b1
CATCH a1 b1
Figure 5.
given in the Base space to gain mental access to the new entity, of which we now
predicate that it is a hare.
Discourse management: Base, viewpoint, and focus
The latter point about mental access shows us that grammar does not just indicate
the introduction of new mental spaces and their content; it also guides a variety
of other mental tasks in the treatment of the incoming information such as the
management of viewpoint, focus and base structure in the constructed network.
We have already seen how phrases like He thinks, If and Maybe can partition in-
formation away from the Base space, that is the state of affairs in the space that the
discourse departs from. Consider now the notion of viewpoint. “At any point in the
construction [of mental spaces],” Fauconnier (1997:49) writes, “one space is dis-
tinguished as Viewpoint, the space from which others are accessed and structured
or set up.” Consider again sentence (5):
(5) If the tortoise had been slow, Achilles would have caught it.
In the Base space the tortoise is fast, but from the point of view of that space
we look to a hypothetical space in which the tortoise is slow. Consider next the
notion of Focus. As we saw, sentence (5) prompts a hypothetical mental space](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-20-320.jpg)
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Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis
Possibility space P
Base
space B
Future
space
Belief
space M
.a
.b
a name Achilles
b tortoise
SEE a b
CHASE a b
FAST b
.a’
.b’
.a’’
.b’’
SLOW b’
CATCH a’ b’
.b1
.a1
SLOW b1
CATCH a1 b1
.b2
Counterfactual
space H
Figure 6.
which is counterfactually related to the Base space. However, attention is on the
hypothetical space, not the Base space.
Though catching the discursive development of meaning management, the
five-space network depicted above is far from the whole story of what is required
of the interpreter of sentence (1) through (6). For instance, sentence (5) – If the
tortoise had been slow, Achilles would have caught it– not only requires the par-
titioning of mental space structure to a counterfactual space, it also requires the
integration of incompatible mental spaces in order to create a mental space of
the counterfactual situation. Even though, the discourse base tortoise is not slow,
we can still imagine it being slow, and we can further think of the consequences
of it being – contrary to discourse facts – slow. Such discoveries led Fauconnier
and Turner to propose the theory of conceptual blending. Above, sentence (5) was
analysed in terms of two mental spaces. For the sake of simplicity, we will here
treat the counterfactual situation as one blended space. In one input space – which
would be the Base space from above, we have the fast tortoise and Achilles. In
this space, Achilles cannot catch the tortoise. Yet, under normal circumstance we
might expect a tortoise to be slow, so slow at least that a human can easily catch](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-21-320.jpg)
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Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley
Generic space
Input space 1
Blended space
Input space 2
Achilles a
Tortoise b
FAST b
a’ Achilles
b’ Tortoise
b’ SL OW
a’b’ CA TC H
Human
Tortoise
h Human
t Tortoise
t SLOW
h t CA TC H
Figure 7.
it.3
We have knowledge of such situations which can be used to imagine a situation
in which this particular tortoise is slow – though it is not – and consequently that
Achilles can catch it – though he cannot. The knowledge we have of normal tor-
toises constitutes another input space. And the imagined situation in which this
particular tortoise is slow and gets caught is technically described as the blended
space. Finally, the mapping of the two incompatible inputs gives rise to a generic
structure supporting the entire blending work (figure 7).
There are mappings between all the spaces in the blending space network. The
mappings between the inputs are called vital relations (historically the notion of
connectors from mental space theory prior to blending). Achilles and the tortoise
in input 1 are connected to the human and the tortoise in input 2 by ROLE rela-
tions. There is also DISANALOGY between FAST in input 1 and SLOW in input
2. DISANALOGY is a central relation in the construction of counterfactual spaces.
Achilles a and tortoise b map onto Achilles a’ and tortoise b’ in the blended space.
This mapping has been established by the projection of Achilles (a’) and tortoise
(b’) from input 1. The relations SLOW and CATCH have been projected from in-
put 2 which establishes mappings between these relations in the input and the
blend. Finally, Fauconnier and Turner posit a generic space that projects common
structure to the other spaces in the network.
. Whether Achilles is really human or not is of course debatable if seen from the point of
view of mythology (given that only his heels could be wounded), but we abstain from such
considerations here and instead observe that whether human or not, one would expect Achilles
to be able to catch a tortoise!](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-22-320.jpg)
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Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis
The basic elements of a technical description of blending are thus a minimum
of four spaces (two inputs, generic space and blended space), mappings and se-
lective projections (only selected parts of the inputs get projected). (Further basic
elements are discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2002)). As a key aspect of the
blending, the blended space has emergent structure: The tortoise which is really fast
is slow and Achilles who cannot catch the tortoise can now catch it. All blends have
emergent structure, not only counterfactuals but also metaphors (He had smoke
coming out of his ears), X is the Y of Z constructions (John is the President of the
Company), certain caused motion constructions (They clapped the band back on
stage), fictive motion (This highway goes to Copenhagen), NN compositions (money
problems), AN compositions (false alarm) and many others.
Another key component of blending is “compression.” This component may
better be understood in the following example
(7) At this World Cup, Ronaldo is fighting against his own former performances.
One understanding of this complex utterance has Ronaldo fighting a personi-
fication of his earlier performances. Yet, Ronaldo at the present World Cup is
separated in time from his earlier performances. But the blending allows the in-
terpreter to put present-day Ronaldo directly – at the same point in time and at
the same place – up against his earlier performances. This blend then involves the
compression of time that separates Ronaldo today from his earlier performances.
This makes blending a phenomenal cognitive tool for bringing together in thought
what cannot be brought together in the real world. Fauconnier and Turner (2002)
emphasize the great importance and omnipresence of this capacity throughout
human activities.
Blending, though, has developed into much more than a theory of seman-
tics and pragmatics. Fauconnier (1997) introduces blending as an elaboration
of mental spaces theory in connection to discourse and sentence semantics. In
Turner (1996), however, blending is further elaborated into a more general theory
of imagination. And in Fauconnier and Turner (2002), which sums up nearly a
decade of explosively spreading and growing blending research around the globe,
blending has become a general theory of the singular nature of human thinking.
Such domains as religion, semiotics, art, music, social science, politics, rhetoric,
interaction, mathematics, anthropology and much more have been included in
applications and elaborations of blending theory. For an overview of work done in
blending and mental space theory we direct the reader to Mark Turner’s blending
website:http://www.markturner.org/blending.html. Besides containing references
and links to papers and events the webpage also links up to further reference sites.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-23-320.jpg)
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Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley
What is a mental space?
Above we have discussed technical aspects of the application of mental spaces, in-
cluding when a new space is needed (at least theoretically speaking). However,
thus far we can hardly postulate that we have much more than a useful model. The
claim by Fauconnier and Turner that mental spaces are human cognition at work
still fails to be supported by definitions and empirical investigations which concern
themselves with what mental spaces really are (that is, what they are meant to rep-
resent), what their statuses really are. This issue has left the field completely open.
Most MSCI researchers do not address the issue explicitly in their work, while oth-
ers have turned it into a central question (for instance Brandt 2005 and Hougaard
2004). We will not attempt to provide a solution to this issue for a very important
reason: the answer to the question of what mental spaces really are seems to go
hand-in-hand with the directions that current research, including the papers in
the present volume, takes. Often, mental spaces seem to be applied as a sort of “in-
ner” representations of or ideas about the world or possible or imaginary worlds.
In such works, mental spaces are not a far cry from earlier representationalism and
the disembodied, dualist thinking (Cf. Descartes and Spinoza) that characterises
much of cognitive science. However, none of the contributions to the present
volume explicitly take on a representationalist view. MSCI’s representationalist rel-
atives, when applied in this vein, include such theories as Johnson Laird’s (1983)
Mental Models, which also focus on the way that representationsof the world form
a basis for reasoning and expectations and Situation Semantics (Barwise Perry
1981), which also emphasizes the partial nature of represented situations. Others
emphasize the embodied nature of the knowledge on which mental space building
relies and thus distance themselves from representationalism. But too rarely do
MSCI researchers explicitly address the issues of the relation of mental spaces to
other cognitive representation theories, asking themselves, in what sense they are
cognitive and what are the possible limitations for their application? This volume
addresses such questions in connection to discourse.
Mental spaces and discourse studies
The role cognition and cognitive science can or should play in discourse stud-
ies and vice versa is hotly contested, and one’s stand on the issue depends almost
entirely on how one conceives of cognition and discourse in the first place. Is cog-
nition something that resides entirely inside individual persons? Is it synonymous
with knowledge or epistemic states, and is it antonymous with social action and
emotional or passionate states? And if so, are these epistemic states manifestations
of innate dispositions of which social action is merely an epiphenomenon? Alter-](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-24-320.jpg)
![TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.13 (13)
Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis
natively, is cognition distributed between or emergent among co-participants? Is
cognition so dependent on embodied, social, and emotional experience that the
very ideas of knowledge, reasoning, understanding, remembering and experienc-
ing have to be understood in terms of how they arise in and from richly perceptual,
affective, motor and interpersonal situations?
Researchers in MSCI are far more likely to deny the first set of questions and
affirm the second, thereby in principle aligning themselves with some of the tenets
of major contemporary perspectives in discourse studies. However, MSCI is not
itself a theory of discourse; rather, it is a theory of human cognition and con-
ceptualization that is supposed to suggest ways to theorize about and model the
“mental work” of discourse in its broadest sense.
As pointed out in the commentary by Gitte R. Hougaard, the volume presents
two major aims. The first aim is to show how discourse functions as a vehicle of
particular cognitive processes of conceptual integration. The second complemen-
tary aim is to show how particular cognitive processes of conceptual integration
arise from interaction between interlocutors in discourse. Thinking about dis-
course in terms of cognition is the primary focus of the contributions by Todd
Oakley and Seana Coulson, Barbara Dancygier, Todd Oakley and David Kaufer,
Line Brandt, and Ester Pascual. Thinking about cognition in terms of interac-
tion is the primary focus of the contributions by Anders Hougaard and Robert
Williams in their attempts to reveal what MSCI researchers can learn from micro-
analytic studies of interaction. Given the “chicken-and-egg” nature of these two
aims, it is instructive to take stock of some common divergences and conver-
gences with mainstream discourse studies and see what prospects they leave us
with. We will focus in particular on ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and
their daughter discipline discursive psychology.
Discourse analysis often emphasizes the social and contextual aspects of lan-
guage use as well as the need to look at actual, naturally occurring language use.
As will be addressed in greater detail shortly, arguments about the status of evi-
dence strike a chord among recent researchers in cognitive linguistics, especially
those who defend a “usage based approach” to language structure and acquisi-
tion (Langacker 1988; Fauconnier 1999; Tomasello 2000). Such approaches take
as their starting point descriptions of real situations of language use as and thus
avoid isolating “language” as rules for generating sentences. In principle, the areas
of cognitive linguistics which go beyond the boundaries of the sentence can be seen
as inherently carrying a discourse analysis agenda. Yet, despite this general accord,
significant differences and major challenges appear when trying to integrate cog-
nitive linguistics with these other frameworks. The alternative frameworks allow
for the complementary mode of investigation in which cognitive processes are to
be understood from a social science perspective.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/21067-250727181248-f29b07a9/85/Mental-Spaces-in-Discourse-and-Interaction-Todd-Oakley-25-320.jpg)
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Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction Todd Oakley
- 1. Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction Todd Oakley - PDF Download (2025) https://ebookultra.com/download/mental-spaces-in-discourse-and- interaction-todd-oakley/ Visit ebookultra.com today to download the complete set of ebooks or textbooks
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- 3. ADOLESCENCE PLACES AND SPACES Places Spaces Pediatrics Child and Adolescent Health Taylor M https://ebookultra.com/download/adolescence-places-and-spaces-places- spaces-pediatrics-child-and-adolescent-health-taylor-m/ Cognitive Development Routledge Modular Psychology 1st Edition Lisa Oakley https://ebookultra.com/download/cognitive-development-routledge- modular-psychology-1st-edition-lisa-oakley/ Academic and Professional Discourse Genres in Spanish Giovanni Parodi https://ebookultra.com/download/academic-and-professional-discourse- genres-in-spanish-giovanni-parodi/ Spaces in Translation Japanese Gardens and the West Christian Tagsold https://ebookultra.com/download/spaces-in-translation-japanese- gardens-and-the-west-christian-tagsold/ Organisation Interaction and Practice Nick Llewellyn https://ebookultra.com/download/organisation-interaction-and-practice- nick-llewellyn/
- 5. Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction Todd Oakley Digital Instant Download Author(s): Todd Oakley, Anders Hougaard ISBN(s): 9789027254146, 9027254141 Edition: Kindle File Details: PDF, 2.47 MB Year: 2008 Language: english
- 7. Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction
- 8. Volume 170 Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction Edited by Todd Oakley and Anders Hougaard Editor Andreas H. Jucker University of Zurich, English Department Plattenstrasse 47, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland e-mail: ahjucker@es.uzh.ch Editorial Board Shoshana Blum-Kulka Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jean Caron Université de Poitiers Robyn Carston University College London Bruce Fraser Boston University Thorstein Fretheim University of Trondheim John C. Heritage University of California at Los Angeles Susan C. Herring Indiana University Masako K. Hiraga St.Paul’s (Rikkyo) University David Holdcroft University of Leeds Sachiko Ide Japan Women’s University Catherine Kerbrat- Orecchioni University of Lyon 2 Claudia de Lemos University of Campinas, Brazil Marina Sbisà University of Trieste Associate Editors Jacob L. Mey University of Southern Denmark Herman Parret Belgian National Science Foundation, Universities of Louvain and Antwerp Jef Verschueren Belgian National Science Foundation, University of Antwerp Emanuel A. Schegloff University of California at Los Angeles Deborah Schiffrin Georgetown University Paul Osamu Takahara Kobe City University of Foreign Studies Sandra A. Thompson University of California at Santa Barbara Teun A. van Dijk Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona Richard J.Watts University of Berne Pragmatics & Beyond New Series is a continuation of Pragmatics & Beyond and its Companion Series. The New Series offers a selection of high quality work covering the full richness of Pragmatics as an interdisciplinary field, within language sciences. Pragmatics & Beyond New Series (P&BNS)
- 9. Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction Edited by Todd Oakley Case Western Reserve University Anders Hougaard University of Southern Denmark John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia
- 10. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mental spaces in discourse and interaction / edited by Todd Oakley and Anders Hougaard. p. cm. (Pragmatics & Beyond New Series, issn 0922-842X ; v. 170) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Discourse analysis--Psychological aspects. 2. Social interaction. I. Oakley, Todd. II. Hougaard,Anders. P302.8.M47 2008 401'.41--dc22 2007041026 isbn 978 90 272 5414 6 (Hb; alk. paper) © 2008 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984. 8 TM
- 11. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:30/01/2008; 12:12 F: PB170CO.tex / p.1 (v) Table of contents introduction Mental spaces and discourse analysis 1 Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley chapter 1 Connecting the dots: Mental spaces and metaphoric language in discourse 27 Todd Oakley and Seana Coulson chapter 2 The text and the story: Levels of blending in fictional narratives 51 Barbara Dancygier chapter 3 Fictive interaction blends in everyday life and courtroom settings 79 Esther Pascual chapter 4 A semiotic approach to fictive interaction as a representational strategy in communicative meaning construction 109 Line Brandt chapter 5 Designing clinical experiences with words: Three layers of analysis in clinical case studies 149 Todd Oakley and David Kaufer chapter 6 Compression in interaction 179 Anders Hougaard chapter 7 Guided conceptualization: Mental spaces in instructional discourse 209 Robert F. Williams
- 12. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:30/01/2008; 12:12 F: PB170CO.tex / p.2 (vi) Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction chapter 8 Looking at analyses of mental spaces and blending / Looking at and experiencing discourse in interaction 235 Alan Cienki chapter 9 “Mental spaces” and “blending” in discourse and interaction: A response 247 Gitte R. Hougaard chapter 10 Reflections on blends and discourse 251 Paul Chilton Author index 257 Subject index 259
- 13. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.1 (1) Mental spaces and discourse analysis Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley Since their inceptions, mental spaces theory (Fauconnier 1994, 1997) and concep- tual integration theory, better known as blending theory (Fauconnier Turner 1994, 1998, 2002), have developed rapidly from being semantic theories of (mainly textual) discourse meaning to general cognitive1 theories of human sense making across diverse domains of human activity. These activities range from text and discourse comprehension to the construction of meaning in religious rituals and meaning in music. This developmenthas been endorsed by the elaboration of Fau- connier’s (1994 [1985]) early work on mental spaces in discourse into a larger theoretical machinery which has the general cognitive capacity of blending (and accompanying processes) as its central object of inquiry. Despite this expansive development, however, discourse, in its many variants (from poetry to face-to- face interaction), remains a vibrant area of research within the mental spaces and conceptual integration framework (hereafter MSCI). Two major developments can be observed in the discursive application, elabo- ration and rethinking of MSCI. One is that increasingly more attention is being paid to the way contextual or situational factors determine mental spaces and blending operations, under which or in accordance with which discourse par- ticipants construct meaning. And here we use both terms – “context” and “sit- uation” – in the broadest conceivable fashion as any micro, mezzo or macro, textual or non-textual set of circumstances. The other major development, already indicated in the latter, is an increasing multiplicity of particular theoretic and em- pirical notions on which researchers study discourse. A great number of major approaches to discourse from the fields of pragmatics, text linguistics, discourse studies and interactional studies are represented in discursive MSCI research. This diversity of approaches presents the joint cognitive enterprise with a great chal- lenge: either 1) to attempt to reconcile these diverse theoretic and empirical bases into a joint enterprise that produces comparable results without violating the the- . For a discussion of mental space as a cognitive theory, see below.
- 14. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.2 (2) Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley oretic and methodological bases of these results or 2) to consider an appropriate division of labor between them, which involves considering which theories and methods do what best and what results are incompatible with which theories and methods. It was in the interest of the two challenges that Hougaard and Oakley or- ganized a panel session at the International Pragmatics Organization’s biannual conference at Riva del Garda, Italy, in 2005. The present volume presents both written and extended versions of papers given on that occasion and additional in- vited papers by other researchers within the “branch” of discursive MSCI. The volume has two major purposes: One is to stimulate discussions within MSCI as well as cognitive linguistics in general of a joint discursive enterprise or of complementary discursive enterprises, including a thorough exchange of philo- sophical, theoretical and methodological viewpoints. The other is to provide other researchers who work with discourse and/or interaction and who take an interest in cognitive issues with a palette of different ways in which blending theorists have made discourse and interaction an object of inquiry. Additionally, to initiate the discussion of a general discursive and interactional MSCI enterprise – including both its prospects and problems – we have invited three relevantexperts to respond to the contributions made in the present volume: discourse analyst Paul Chilton, cognitive linguist Alan Cienki, and conversation analyst Gitte R. Hougaard. Below we will give a short overview of the contributions to this volume. But first, for readers who are not familiar with MSCI, we offer a short introduction to MSCI and discourse, and then we discuss MSCI in relation to traditions of discourse analysis, with particular focus on some seemingly antithetical major “schools”: Ethnomethodology, Conversation Analysis and Discursive Psychology. We have chosen to focus on these because they are dealt with explicitly in sev- eral contributors and because they present novel and very different perspectives from those commonly found in cognitive linguistics. MSCI is commonly accepted as a tool for analysis of individuals’ interpretations of sequences of spoken and written language. Such studies have been a part of the cognitive linguistics en- deavor at least since the first version of Fauconnier’s Mental Spaces (1985). Yet, the sociological methods employed by these schools introduce a new concern: meaning construction as a shared or public phenomenon.Many cognitive linguists would perhaps consider this issue as being beyond the concerns of cognitive lin- guistics proper, as being a sociological not a cognitive or linguistics concern. But in truth cognitive linguistics in general and MSCI in particular are starting to address explicitly the issue of socially shared and constructed meaning. For instance, Croft (to appear) argues explicitly for a “social” extension of cognitive linguistics, and in their 2002 book Fauconnier and Turner provide blending analyses of phenomena that are distinctly social and can only be achieved in and through social processes. These include the concept of ‘money’, Japanese image clubs (where sexual fantasies
- 15. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.3 (3) Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis are enacted collaboratively by prostitutes and customers) and religious rituals. Furthermore, Turner (2001) dedicates a whole book to arguing for a fusion be- tween cognitive science and social science using blending theory as a platform for bringing the two together. If MSCI makes social aspects of meaning construction a principal concern, then a sociological viewpoint may as a consequence change some of the theoretical premises. As several of this volume’s contributors and com- mentators make clear, these sociological viewpoints need to be incorporated in future iterations of MSCI theory. Introducing mental spaces and blending: Achilles sees a tortoise In this section we discuss the technical application of mental spaces and in the following section we address some definitional issues with respect to the status of mental spaces. Consider then first the following piece of text, originally analyzed in Fauconnier (1997:44): Achilles sees a tortoise. He chases it. He thinks that the tortoise is slow and that he will catch it. But it is fast. If the tortoise had been slow, Achilles would have caught it. Maybe the tortoise is really a hare. This little slice of discourse consisting mostly of simple sentences requires of its reader an almost acrobatic mastering of information chunks which emerge and get connected in all sorts of ways during the very brief time span it takes to read and understand the text. Fauconnier analyses the reader’s cognitive take on the unfolding text in terms of a proliferating network of interconnected mental spaces. Let us follow Fauconnier’s analysis step-by-step. Base space According to Fauconnier, all discourse networks of mental spaces grow from a so-called Base space which represents the discourse starting point of a meaning construction. It is important to notice that this space need not be true or real or actual in any way outside the cognizer’s (or cognizers’) understanding. Only as an interpreter’s understanding of something is it claimed to be very real. It thus simply marks the point from which the meaning construction extends. Truth is not an issue – people’s understanding is. People understand the sentence Achilles sees a tortoise whether or not Achilles is real, has been real, could be real or only exists in imagination. MSCI seeks to model how people keep track of currents of information and make sense of them however bizarre, fantastic, imaginary, fictive or real they may be. The Base space is thus a here-and-now space with respect to the unfolding discourse, not with respect to any real or possible world situation. This is also a major reason why mental spaces are cognitive. We need judgement
- 16. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.4 (4) Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley a b a name Achilles b tortoise SEE a b Figure 1. to distinguish between truths, falsities, fictions, imaginations, etc.; but technical cognitive principles of meaning assembly do not make that distinction. Hence one might argue that MSCI follows a trend already set by speech act theory (Austin 1962) in relocating the issue of meaning from being an issue of truth or falsity to being an issue of understanding. Mental spaces analysis The first sentence in the discourse is then, (1) Achilles sees a tortoise. In mental space terms, the name Achilles is linked to an element, a, already in- troduced into the Base space prior to the present excerpt (this must be so due to the definite reference). The element b(tortoise), which is set up by the indefinite noun phrase a tortoise, gets introduced as a new element in the Base space; and finally sees evokes a SEEING frame (a structured domain of knowledge pertaining to seeing, Fillmore 1982, 1985) which takes a and b in the roles of seer and seen respectively (figure 1). Notice here that, mental spaces are only partial conceptual structures. They do not contain entire domains of knowledge, concepts or categories. They “recruit” exactly what is required by the discourse. Hence not all knowledge that is related to seeing is brought to bear on Achilles and the tortoise, only that Achilles is a seer who has caught sight of the tortoise which is a visible object. Yet, frames are con- sidered to be activated and hence available in the background for further mental space construction. Background information telling us that Achilles is a man and that the tortoise is an animal makes it possible in the next sentence, (2) He chases it, to reference them anaphorically. Otherwise the next elements only add the addi- tional relation CHASE through the verb chases. A frame for chasing is activated and Achilles is cast in the role as chaser and the tortoise in the role as chased (figure 2).
- 17. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.5 (5) Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis a b a name Achilles b tortoise SEE a b CHASE a b Figure 2. Notice thus how one space comes to contain a short narrative and thus a tem- poral and dynamic dimension: Achilles sees a tortoise and then he chases it. Mental spaces are not just frozen images, states or relations; they can have extension in time and change over time. The third sentence, (3) He thinks it is slow and that he will catch it, sets up new spaces with new structure (figure 3). He thinks is called a ‘space builder’ because it marks a new (or “discontinu- ous”) chunk, or seam, of information with respect to the previous seams. We are no longer talking about what Achilles and the tortoise do in their shared world but about what Achilles thinks about that shared world and this is not the same – hence the partitioning into new spaces.2 Thus in the diagramming, Fauconnier represents Achilles’ thinking as two new spaces. The first part of sentence (3) sets up a belief space, M, with an internal structure where the tortoise, b’, is slow. No- tice that a’, Achilles, appears in this space too even though this element has not been explicitly referred to. This is one way in which mental space theory is differ- ent form formal semantics. Language implies more than it explicitly states. It is claimed to be understood that Achilles himself is of course a part of that scenario in which the tortoise is slow since it must be slow for him in his belief. The second . The issue of when a new mental space is needed is a contested issue. Harder (2003), proposes that a new space is needed when chunks of information contrast. However, consider an example like: The sun is shining and that is actually how Achilles sees it too. Here there is a full match between what is the state of affairs in the world and what Achilles thinks is the state of affairs in the world. But we must of course acknowledge the distinction that is made between what is reported to be the objective state of affairs in the world and what is reported to be Achilles’ subjective impression of the world. Hence instead of having “contrast” as a criterion for mental space assignment, one might argue that “discontinuity” is a better candidate. Hence partitioned chunks of information may indeed be compatible although they are discontinues in time, space, ontology, modality, etc. and thus should be treated as separate chunks.
- 18. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.6 (6) Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley Future space Belief space M Base space B .a .b a name Achilles b tortoise SEE a b CHASE a b .a’ .b’ .a’’ .b’’ SLOW b’ CATCH a’’ b’’ Figure 3. part of sentence (3) sets up a space which is in the future of space B and M. In that space, Achilles, a”, catches the tortoise, b”. One might perhaps argue that what Achilles thinks should rightfully be placed with Achilles in the space already set up (the Base space), because just as Achilles SEES and CHASES, he THINKS in that space. Yet, this would risk confusions and make the modelling unnecessarily complicated. The hierarchical relationship be- tween the spaces is captured in the progression of the network from the Base space and downwards. And placing spaces within spaces might risk confusing a repre- sentation of the situation as it is presented with a progressive representation of the chunks of information as they appear, the latter and not the former being the object of Fauconnier’s mental space theory. The fourth sentence, (4) But it is fast, takes us back to the Base space and sets up the attribute FAST for b, the tortoise. Notice how the word But explicitly marks a contrast between FAST in space B and SLOW in space M. We are now manipulating – simultaneously – incompatible scenarios where the same tortoise is respectively FAST and SLOW (figure 4). The fifth sentence (5) If the tortoise had been slow, Achilles would have caught it,
- 19. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.7 (7) Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis Future space Belief space M Base space B .a .b a name Achilles b tortoise SEE a b CHASE a b FAST b .a’ .b’ .a’’ .b’’ SLOW b’ CATCH a’ b’ Figure 4. sets up an interesting structure which must clearly belong in a space that is differ- ent from the Base space (figure 5). The conjunction If sets up a mental space H with hypothetical content (that is, it has a hypothetical relation to the bases space). And as Fauconnier (Ibid.:46) observes, the distal past perfect form indicates that the space is counterfactually related to the discourse’s factual state of affairs in space B. In this hypothetical space the novel structures SLOWb1 and CATCHa1b1 appear. For the sake of simplicity and brevity, we skip the more elaborate discus- sion and detailed analysis of conditionals and matching conditions and instead direct the reader to Chapters 4 and 5 of Fauconnier’s Mappings in Thought and Language (1997). For now we simply observe that the mood of the discourse has now shifted from indicative to conditional. However, below we will elaborate the analysis of sentence 5 in another way, demonstrating how it can be conceived of as a conceptual blend. The last sentence, (6) Maybe the tortoise is really a hare, sets up an epistemic situation in which the tortoise is a hare (figure 6). The result- ing configuration between spaces B and P allows the so-called Access Principle to work: through the naming of an element in one space one may get access to that element’s counterpart in another space. So when talking about the tortoise in this latter case, we are not talking about the Base space tortoise; rather we use the name
- 20. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.8 (8) Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley Base space B Future space Belief space M .a .b a name Achilles b tortoise SEE a b CHASE a b FAST b .a’ .b’ .a’’ .b’’ SLOW b’ CATCH a’ b’ .b1 .a1 SLOW b1 CATCH a1 b1 Figure 5. given in the Base space to gain mental access to the new entity, of which we now predicate that it is a hare. Discourse management: Base, viewpoint, and focus The latter point about mental access shows us that grammar does not just indicate the introduction of new mental spaces and their content; it also guides a variety of other mental tasks in the treatment of the incoming information such as the management of viewpoint, focus and base structure in the constructed network. We have already seen how phrases like He thinks, If and Maybe can partition in- formation away from the Base space, that is the state of affairs in the space that the discourse departs from. Consider now the notion of viewpoint. “At any point in the construction [of mental spaces],” Fauconnier (1997:49) writes, “one space is dis- tinguished as Viewpoint, the space from which others are accessed and structured or set up.” Consider again sentence (5): (5) If the tortoise had been slow, Achilles would have caught it. In the Base space the tortoise is fast, but from the point of view of that space we look to a hypothetical space in which the tortoise is slow. Consider next the notion of Focus. As we saw, sentence (5) prompts a hypothetical mental space
- 21. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.9 (9) Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis Possibility space P Base space B Future space Belief space M .a .b a name Achilles b tortoise SEE a b CHASE a b FAST b .a’ .b’ .a’’ .b’’ SLOW b’ CATCH a’ b’ .b1 .a1 SLOW b1 CATCH a1 b1 .b2 Counterfactual space H Figure 6. which is counterfactually related to the Base space. However, attention is on the hypothetical space, not the Base space. Though catching the discursive development of meaning management, the five-space network depicted above is far from the whole story of what is required of the interpreter of sentence (1) through (6). For instance, sentence (5) – If the tortoise had been slow, Achilles would have caught it– not only requires the par- titioning of mental space structure to a counterfactual space, it also requires the integration of incompatible mental spaces in order to create a mental space of the counterfactual situation. Even though, the discourse base tortoise is not slow, we can still imagine it being slow, and we can further think of the consequences of it being – contrary to discourse facts – slow. Such discoveries led Fauconnier and Turner to propose the theory of conceptual blending. Above, sentence (5) was analysed in terms of two mental spaces. For the sake of simplicity, we will here treat the counterfactual situation as one blended space. In one input space – which would be the Base space from above, we have the fast tortoise and Achilles. In this space, Achilles cannot catch the tortoise. Yet, under normal circumstance we might expect a tortoise to be slow, so slow at least that a human can easily catch
- 22. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.10 (10) Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley Generic space Input space 1 Blended space Input space 2 Achilles a Tortoise b FAST b a’ Achilles b’ Tortoise b’ SL OW a’b’ CA TC H Human Tortoise h Human t Tortoise t SLOW h t CA TC H Figure 7. it.3 We have knowledge of such situations which can be used to imagine a situation in which this particular tortoise is slow – though it is not – and consequently that Achilles can catch it – though he cannot. The knowledge we have of normal tor- toises constitutes another input space. And the imagined situation in which this particular tortoise is slow and gets caught is technically described as the blended space. Finally, the mapping of the two incompatible inputs gives rise to a generic structure supporting the entire blending work (figure 7). There are mappings between all the spaces in the blending space network. The mappings between the inputs are called vital relations (historically the notion of connectors from mental space theory prior to blending). Achilles and the tortoise in input 1 are connected to the human and the tortoise in input 2 by ROLE rela- tions. There is also DISANALOGY between FAST in input 1 and SLOW in input 2. DISANALOGY is a central relation in the construction of counterfactual spaces. Achilles a and tortoise b map onto Achilles a’ and tortoise b’ in the blended space. This mapping has been established by the projection of Achilles (a’) and tortoise (b’) from input 1. The relations SLOW and CATCH have been projected from in- put 2 which establishes mappings between these relations in the input and the blend. Finally, Fauconnier and Turner posit a generic space that projects common structure to the other spaces in the network. . Whether Achilles is really human or not is of course debatable if seen from the point of view of mythology (given that only his heels could be wounded), but we abstain from such considerations here and instead observe that whether human or not, one would expect Achilles to be able to catch a tortoise!
- 23. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.11 (11) Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis The basic elements of a technical description of blending are thus a minimum of four spaces (two inputs, generic space and blended space), mappings and se- lective projections (only selected parts of the inputs get projected). (Further basic elements are discussed in Fauconnier and Turner (2002)). As a key aspect of the blending, the blended space has emergent structure: The tortoise which is really fast is slow and Achilles who cannot catch the tortoise can now catch it. All blends have emergent structure, not only counterfactuals but also metaphors (He had smoke coming out of his ears), X is the Y of Z constructions (John is the President of the Company), certain caused motion constructions (They clapped the band back on stage), fictive motion (This highway goes to Copenhagen), NN compositions (money problems), AN compositions (false alarm) and many others. Another key component of blending is “compression.” This component may better be understood in the following example (7) At this World Cup, Ronaldo is fighting against his own former performances. One understanding of this complex utterance has Ronaldo fighting a personi- fication of his earlier performances. Yet, Ronaldo at the present World Cup is separated in time from his earlier performances. But the blending allows the in- terpreter to put present-day Ronaldo directly – at the same point in time and at the same place – up against his earlier performances. This blend then involves the compression of time that separates Ronaldo today from his earlier performances. This makes blending a phenomenal cognitive tool for bringing together in thought what cannot be brought together in the real world. Fauconnier and Turner (2002) emphasize the great importance and omnipresence of this capacity throughout human activities. Blending, though, has developed into much more than a theory of seman- tics and pragmatics. Fauconnier (1997) introduces blending as an elaboration of mental spaces theory in connection to discourse and sentence semantics. In Turner (1996), however, blending is further elaborated into a more general theory of imagination. And in Fauconnier and Turner (2002), which sums up nearly a decade of explosively spreading and growing blending research around the globe, blending has become a general theory of the singular nature of human thinking. Such domains as religion, semiotics, art, music, social science, politics, rhetoric, interaction, mathematics, anthropology and much more have been included in applications and elaborations of blending theory. For an overview of work done in blending and mental space theory we direct the reader to Mark Turner’s blending website:http://www.markturner.org/blending.html. Besides containing references and links to papers and events the webpage also links up to further reference sites.
- 24. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.12 (12) Anders Hougaard and Todd Oakley What is a mental space? Above we have discussed technical aspects of the application of mental spaces, in- cluding when a new space is needed (at least theoretically speaking). However, thus far we can hardly postulate that we have much more than a useful model. The claim by Fauconnier and Turner that mental spaces are human cognition at work still fails to be supported by definitions and empirical investigations which concern themselves with what mental spaces really are (that is, what they are meant to rep- resent), what their statuses really are. This issue has left the field completely open. Most MSCI researchers do not address the issue explicitly in their work, while oth- ers have turned it into a central question (for instance Brandt 2005 and Hougaard 2004). We will not attempt to provide a solution to this issue for a very important reason: the answer to the question of what mental spaces really are seems to go hand-in-hand with the directions that current research, including the papers in the present volume, takes. Often, mental spaces seem to be applied as a sort of “in- ner” representations of or ideas about the world or possible or imaginary worlds. In such works, mental spaces are not a far cry from earlier representationalism and the disembodied, dualist thinking (Cf. Descartes and Spinoza) that characterises much of cognitive science. However, none of the contributions to the present volume explicitly take on a representationalist view. MSCI’s representationalist rel- atives, when applied in this vein, include such theories as Johnson Laird’s (1983) Mental Models, which also focus on the way that representationsof the world form a basis for reasoning and expectations and Situation Semantics (Barwise Perry 1981), which also emphasizes the partial nature of represented situations. Others emphasize the embodied nature of the knowledge on which mental space building relies and thus distance themselves from representationalism. But too rarely do MSCI researchers explicitly address the issues of the relation of mental spaces to other cognitive representation theories, asking themselves, in what sense they are cognitive and what are the possible limitations for their application? This volume addresses such questions in connection to discourse. Mental spaces and discourse studies The role cognition and cognitive science can or should play in discourse stud- ies and vice versa is hotly contested, and one’s stand on the issue depends almost entirely on how one conceives of cognition and discourse in the first place. Is cog- nition something that resides entirely inside individual persons? Is it synonymous with knowledge or epistemic states, and is it antonymous with social action and emotional or passionate states? And if so, are these epistemic states manifestations of innate dispositions of which social action is merely an epiphenomenon? Alter-
- 25. TSL[v.20020404] Prn:25/01/2008; 8:03 F: PB170IN.tex / p.13 (13) Introduction: Mental spaces and discourse analysis natively, is cognition distributed between or emergent among co-participants? Is cognition so dependent on embodied, social, and emotional experience that the very ideas of knowledge, reasoning, understanding, remembering and experienc- ing have to be understood in terms of how they arise in and from richly perceptual, affective, motor and interpersonal situations? Researchers in MSCI are far more likely to deny the first set of questions and affirm the second, thereby in principle aligning themselves with some of the tenets of major contemporary perspectives in discourse studies. However, MSCI is not itself a theory of discourse; rather, it is a theory of human cognition and con- ceptualization that is supposed to suggest ways to theorize about and model the “mental work” of discourse in its broadest sense. As pointed out in the commentary by Gitte R. Hougaard, the volume presents two major aims. The first aim is to show how discourse functions as a vehicle of particular cognitive processes of conceptual integration. The second complemen- tary aim is to show how particular cognitive processes of conceptual integration arise from interaction between interlocutors in discourse. Thinking about dis- course in terms of cognition is the primary focus of the contributions by Todd Oakley and Seana Coulson, Barbara Dancygier, Todd Oakley and David Kaufer, Line Brandt, and Ester Pascual. Thinking about cognition in terms of interac- tion is the primary focus of the contributions by Anders Hougaard and Robert Williams in their attempts to reveal what MSCI researchers can learn from micro- analytic studies of interaction. Given the “chicken-and-egg” nature of these two aims, it is instructive to take stock of some common divergences and conver- gences with mainstream discourse studies and see what prospects they leave us with. We will focus in particular on ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and their daughter discipline discursive psychology. Discourse analysis often emphasizes the social and contextual aspects of lan- guage use as well as the need to look at actual, naturally occurring language use. As will be addressed in greater detail shortly, arguments about the status of evi- dence strike a chord among recent researchers in cognitive linguistics, especially those who defend a “usage based approach” to language structure and acquisi- tion (Langacker 1988; Fauconnier 1999; Tomasello 2000). Such approaches take as their starting point descriptions of real situations of language use as and thus avoid isolating “language” as rules for generating sentences. In principle, the areas of cognitive linguistics which go beyond the boundaries of the sentence can be seen as inherently carrying a discourse analysis agenda. Yet, despite this general accord, significant differences and major challenges appear when trying to integrate cog- nitive linguistics with these other frameworks. The alternative frameworks allow for the complementary mode of investigation in which cognitive processes are to be understood from a social science perspective.
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- 30. The Project Gutenberg eBook of The French and British at Three Rivers
- 31. This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook. Title: The French and British at Three Rivers Creator: Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County Release date: March 15, 2021 [eBook #64828] Most recently updated: October 18, 2024 Language: English Credits: Stephen Hutcheson and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net *** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE FRENCH AND BRITISH AT THREE RIVERS ***
- 32. The French and British at Three Rivers Prepared by the staff of the Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County 1953 One of a historical series, this pamphlet is published under the direction of the governing Boards of the Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SCHOOL CITY OF FORT WAYNE B. F. Geyer, President Joseph E. Kramer, Secretary William C. Gerding, Treasurer Willard Shambaugh Mrs. Sadie Fulk Roehrs PUBLIC LIBRARY BOARD FOR ALLEN COUNTY The members of this Board include the members of the Board of Trustees of the School City of Fort Wayne (with the same officers), together with the following citizens chosen from Allen County outside the corporate city of Fort Wayne. James E. Graham Arthur Niemeier Mrs. Glenn Henderson
- 33. 1 2 Mrs. Charles Reynolds After the discovery of America, four European states, England, France, Holland, and Spain, laid claim to various portions of the North American continent. The French claims were largely based upon the discovery of the St. Lawrence by Cartier in 1521, and subsequent exploration of the interior of the Continent by Champlain, La Salle, and other Frenchmen. Ultimately, the territory which the French pre-empted included the St. Lawrence Valley, the Great Lakes region, the territory extending southward to the Ohio River, the territory immediately west of the Mississippi River, and that part of the coastline of the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the mouth of the Mississippi River. The French exploited the fur-trading and fur- producing possibilities of this vast empire; French priests sought the conversion of the Indian inhabitants to the Catholic faith; French military forces established a chain of forts or posts extending along the Great Lakes, down the Wabash River, and along the Mississippi River to the Gulf. Numerous Frenchmen came to this interior region, but few Frenchwomen accompanied them; consequently, French settlements were relatively few and weak. Many Frenchmen formed temporary or permanent unions with Indian women, and in the next generation a considerable number of half-breeds were born of these unions. Important French posts in the area were Presque Isle, Mackinac, Detroit, Post Miami, Vincennes, New Orleans, Kaskaskia, and St. Louis. The environs of the Indian village of Kekionga, located in the present Lakeside section of Fort Wayne, were selected by the French for the location of Post Miami, because of combined strategic, economic, and geographic significance. The village was located at the confluence of the St. Joseph and St. Mary’s Rivers. It was, therefore, on water highways connecting with Lake Erie and tapping the interior of Michigan and Ohio. Kekionga was only a few miles from the Wabash River with the St. Lawrence-Mississippi
- 34. 3 watershed lying between the two. A shallow lake, since drained out of existence, extended southwest from Kekionga to present-day Waynedale, and was navigable by canoe during part of the year. These factors inevitably made the confluence of the rivers a portage for east and west traffic between the Great Lakes and the Mississippi. Pelts and trade goods, passing back and forth from the East to the Southwest, and in reverse, could travel by canoe all the way between Lake Erie and New Orleans with the exception of a few miles at Kekionga. This short break in navigation made the portage necessary; the geography of the rivers made it possible. Here men were forced to carry canoe and cargo from the navigable waters at the confluence of the rivers to the headwaters of the Wabash River. The portage at Kekionga brought relative prosperity to the Indian rulers of this region, because a tribute for portage was levied upon every canoeload of pelts and trade goods. Possession of this valuable location afforded the Miami Indians at Kekionga political importance, too, because economic advantage always makes for political interest. The political power controlling the portage, therefore, dominated the commercial intercourse of the area. The French immediately sensed the importance of Kekionga and located their post nearby at a very early date. The date of the coming of the first white man to this area is unknown; some believe that Champlain saw Three Rivers as early as 1614 or 1615. The earliest extant map, dated 1632, indicates that the Maumee River was then known to French cartographers. Other maps drawn in 1654, 1656 and 1674 chart the rather thorough exploration of the territory by the French. There is a possibility that La Salle was on these rivers during the period between 1679 and 1681, for he seemed to have known about the Wabash-Maumee Portage. The Frenchman came on a peaceful mission. He sought trade with the Indians and brought valuable commercial articles, which were strange, new and desirable to the red man. The Frenchman was usually willing to live with the Indian on terms of equality, and to
- 35. 4 take an Indian woman in marriage. He wanted no occupation of the land; he did not seek to dispossess the Indian; his missionaries sought no material advantage. At first, these practices won the friendship and confidence of the simple child of the forest, and the relations between Frenchman and Indian were usually amicable. French influence, then, in the interior of America and in the region known today as the great Middle West, was paramount in the beginning because of primacy of arrival. Meanwhile, the land-hungry English on the Atlantic Coast rapidly expanded over the entire seaboard driving out the Indians. The Appalachian Mountains long proved a barrier to English expansion westward. Not until the English could acquire a suitable beast of burden for conveying freight and merchandise across the mountains would French influence in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys be jeopardized. The date of establishment of the first French Post at the confluence of the Rivers is veiled in the mists of the past. We only know, as these mists lifted, that the French were located here in a small fort, block house, or trading post which was named Post Miami. Probably of greater commercial and religious, rather than political importance, it was situated on the St. Mary’s River near the present crossing of the Nickel Plate Railroad. The French Officer Bissot may have been stationed here as commandant in charge of French interests as early as 1697. Cadillac passed through the portage on his way southward from Detroit in 1707; already English influence was beginning to be felt in the area. The Miami Indian population in and about the village approximated 400 persons. They subsisted from their plantings along the Maumee River, from forest products and hunting, and from their trade with the French. Francois Margane succeeded Sieur Bissot as commandant at Post Miami. He extended French influence and power by establishing, first, Post Ouiatenon at the present location of Wabash, Indiana, and later, Post Vincennes on the present site of the city of Vincennes. During the first quarter of the eighteenth century the English began
- 36. 5 6 seriously to undermine French influence with the Indians. This rivalry became more bitter and culminated in an Indian uprising against the French who were not destined to dominate the portage much longer. Soon they learned that the English had erected a stronghold on Laramie Creek, a few miles from the present site of Sidney, Ohio. Chief Sanosket, known also as Chief Nicolas of the Hurons, fell under British control; he made war against the French, and attacked a number of French posts on the frontier. In alliance with the Miamis, the Ottawas attacked Post Miami and partially burned the buildings. Ensign Douville, the commandant, was absent in Detroit. The eight men forming the garrison were captured, although two of them later escaped to Detroit. To a certain extent, the French and Miamis soon adjusted their relations because of mutual need for trade. However, the relationship thereafter was never sincerely friendly. The ruined fort was partially restored but gave much evidence of neglect. Father Jean de Bonnecamps recorded his observations of the fort made in 1749. Griswold’s Pictorial History of Fort Wayne, vol. 1, p. 46 quotes the priest as follows: “The fort of the Miamis was in a very bad condition when we reached it. Most of the palisades were decayed and fallen into ruin. There were eight houses, or, to speak more correctly, eight miserable huts which only the desire of making money could make endurable. The French there number twenty-two; all of them including the commandant, had the fever. Monsieur Raimond did not approve the situation of the fort and maintained that it should be placed on the bank of the St. Joseph a scant league from the present site. He wished to show me the spot, but the hindrances of our departure prevented me from going hither. All I could do for him was to trace the plan for his new fort. The latitude of the old one is 41 degrees and 29 minutes.” Captain Raimond lost little time in relocating his fort. The site he chose is the high ground near the present intersection of St. Joe
- 37. 7 Boulevard and Delaware Avenue. The old buildings of the original French fort served as a nucleus for a settlement and were now occupied by the few Miami Indians who still remained on friendly terms with the French. The little village came to be known as Coldfoot’s village, in honor of Miami Chief Coldfoot. In the face of waning prestige, the French made one spirited attempt to check the English. Under the leadership of Charles Langlade, a few Frenchmen and two hundred Chippewas and Ottawas moved down from Detroit to attack Fort Pickawillany. Assembling their forces at the portage near Kekionga, they turned into the St. Mary’s River, and thence marched overland unheralded toward Pickawillany. After a surprise attack the fort was reduced. In celebration of the victory, and in vengeance for his friendship with the British, the Indians enjoyed a cannibal feast on the body of La Demoiselle, chief of the Piankeshaws. This victory temporarily restored the prestige of France with the Miamis at the portage. The defeat of Braddock in 1755 still further diminished the influence of the English among the Indians. Thus, the battle of propaganda and bribery for the favor of the Indian tribes seesawed back and forth. The pendulum, however, was swinging in favor of the British. During the next few years British political emissaries and traders made ever-increasing trouble for the French; these machinations foreshadowed the destruction of French power in the Ohio Valley. The small French garrison, and French half-breed families living in the present Spy Run Avenue neighborhood, led a precarious existence. The local Indians, aided and abetted by the English, and well-fortified with whiskey (hitherto denied them by the French) now liberally dispensed by the British, increasingly harassed their former French allies. In 1756, the Seven Years’ War, known in American history as the French and Indian War, broke out between France and England. One of the prizes at stake in the contest was the domination of the North American continent. After the fall of Quebec, concomitant with the
- 38. 8 defeat of General Montcalm by General Wolfe on the Plains of Abraham, French authority in North America passed to the English. Shortly thereafter, the garrison at Detroit surrendered to the English. In December, 1760, Lieutenant Butler, commanding a detachment of twenty English soldiers, received the surrender of Fort Miami. Thereafter, the Union Jack flew over the Maumee portage. During the period beginning in 1760 and ending with the termination of the Revolutionary War, British policy seems to have emphasized commerce and conciliation with the local Indians. British military forces were never strong in the area, and now that the French were vanquished, the stockade no longer possessed military value. Fort Miami fell into decay. A brief era of good feeling between the Indians and the British followed. Soon, however, there were stirrings among the red men. The great Pontiac, chief of the Ottawas, a man of superior intelligence and great skill in statecraft, began inciting the Indians to expel the British from the entire western country. For a long time the conspiracy and war preparations continued in secret; not until 1763 were they revealed. Soon the Indians attacked and laid siege to all the British forts on the entire frontier; they captured Forts Sandusky, St. Joseph, Michilmackinac, Ouiatanon and Miami. At least one romantic but tragic incident occurred in connection with the attack on Post Miami. Ensign Holmes, English Commandant at the isolated British fort on the St. Joseph River, was a young and very lonely man. Rumor has it that he shared few common interests with the men of his garrison. He sought feminine companionship and found favor in the eyes of an Indian maiden who reciprocated his affections. Let Parkman tell the story: “On the 27th day of May, a young Indian girl, who lived with the commandant, came to tell him that a squaw lay dangerously ill in a
- 39. 9 wigwam near the fort, and urged him to come to her relief. Having confidence in the girl, Holmes forgot his caution and followed her out of the fort. Pitched on the edge of a meadow (in present-day Lakeside), hidden from view by an intervening spur of woodland, stood a great number of Indian wigwams. When Holmes came in sight of them his treacherous conductress pointed out that in which the sick woman lay. He walked on without suspicion, but, as he drew near, two guns flashed from behind the hut and stretched him lifeless on the grass. The shots were heard at the fort and the sergeant rashly went out to learn the cause. He was immediately taken prisoner, amid exulting yells and whoopings. The soldiers in the fort climbed upon the palisades to look out, when Godefroy, a Canadian, and two other white men, made their appearance and summoned them to surrender, promising that if they did so their lives would be spared.”
- 40. BURNING OF THE FRENCH POST MIAMI (SITE OF FORT WAYNE) 1747. During the period of the Chief Nicolas conspiracy, in 1747, while the commandant, Ensign Douville, was absent at Detroit, the savages attacked the post situated on the St. Mary’s river in the present city of Fort Wayne and partially destroyed it with fire. The post was rebuilt, and later, in 1750 a new
- 41. 10 11 fort was established on the left bank of the St. Joseph river. The drawing is after an old woodcut. From Griswold’s Pictorial History of Fort Wayne, Indiana Ultimately Pontiac’s Conspiracy was quelled and uneasy peace was restored on the frontier. At the beginning of the American Revolution the British were confronted with the problem of retaining the Indians as allies against the Americans. The savages realized the need of British subsidies and soon became genuinely attached to the redcoats. In October, 1778, Governor Hamilton’s army, advancing from Detroit against the forces of George Rogers Clark in southern Indiana, passed over the portage. The only military action, however, which occurred here during the Revolutionary War is known as La Balme’s Massacre. Augustus La Balme, one of the volunteer French officers who had accompanied the Marquis de LaFayette to America, was commissioned a colonel in General Washington’s army. In October he appeared at Kaskaskia, then under American domination since its capture by George Rogers Clark. He gathered a considerable force of Frenchmen and Indians and advanced northward, his objective being the expulsion of the British from Detroit. Arriving at the Indian settlement at Three Rivers, La Balme and his men plundered the village and destroyed a great deal of property. At close of day he retired with his 103 men and camped on the Aboite River. In the dead of night an Indian force under the leadership of Little Turtle attacked the invader, destroyed nearly a half of the little force and compelled the remainder to flee. The incident has little significance except as the initial engagement in a series of bloody victories won by Little Turtle and the Miami Indians against the Americans.
- 42. 12 The Treaty of Paris in 1783 made the United States nominally paramount in the Ohio Valley. However, the British, on the pretext of bad faith on the part of the American Government, continued to occupy forts in the area which they had contracted to evacuate under terms of the treaty. Among the forts they still held illegally were Presque Isle, Mackinac, Detroit, and Fort Miami near Toledo. From the vantage point of these forts, British military officers and diplomatic representatives continued friendly relations with the local Indians. By moral suasion the Indian was influenced to believe that his friends were British rather than American. Through gifts of food, equipment and arms, the Indian was relieved of problems of logistics which might place him at a disadvantage with any American military force. The Indians massacred hundreds of American settlers on the western frontier, and burned and pillaged their homes. Under the leadership of Little Turtle and others in 1790 and 1791, Indian warriors inflicted overwhelming defeats upon the armies of American Generals Harmar and St. Clair.
- 44. 13 Chief Little Turtle (Me-she-kin-no-quah) The above likeness was made from a cut out of a very old book which had been reproduced from a painting made for him while in Philadelphia. This painting was destroyed when the Capitol building at Washington was burned by the British in the war of 1812. Head dress on the forehead, contains three rattles from at least three rattlesnakes; has always been considered a splendid likeness of the famous Chief. American influence and prestige were at a low ebb, indeed, and it appeared that the Ohio Valley with the portage at Three Rivers might fall by default to the British after all. In order to prevent this calamity, General Wayne undertook his campaign westward into the Indian country from Pittsburgh. He soundly defeated the Indians at Fallen Timbers in 1794. Wayne’s expedition culminated in the building of the fort which bears his name and in the formal occupation under the American flag in September and October, 1794.
- 45. Transcriber’s Notes Silently corrected a few typos. Retained publication information from the printed edition: this eBook is public-domain in the country of publication. In the text versions only, text in italics is delimited by _underscores_.
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