Methods of PolicyCommunicationPA R TIIIPolicy .docx

Methods of Policy
Communication
PA R T
III
Policy
Analysis
Materials
Development
Knowledge
Utilization
Interactive
Communication
KNOWLEDGE
PRESENTATIONS
DOCUMENTSSTAKEHOLDERS
POLICY
ANALYST
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Public Policy Analysis, Fifth Edition, by William N. Dunn.
Published by Pearson. Copyright © 2012 by Pearson Education,
Inc.
338
8
CHAPTER
By studying this chapter, you should be able to
Developing Policy
Arguments
� Describe the structure of a policy
argument.
� Compare and contrast four types of

policy claims.
� Describe relations among different
elements of an argument.
� Explain how objections and
rebuttals affect the strength of an
argument.
� Demonstrate how qualifiers change
in response to objections and
rebuttals.
� Distinguish and illustrate different
modes of policy argumentation.
� Explain why formal and informal
fallacies diminish the strength of
claims.
� Use argument mapping techniques
to represent cases of foreign policy
argumentation.
W
hat policy makers understand and analysts often forget is that
policy
argumentation is central to policy making.1 Policy arguments
are among
the major vehicles for communicating policy-relevant
information and an
important source of knowledge about the ways policies are
made and put into effect.
Because policy arguments are carriers of policy-relevant
information, they are also

important for understanding the use and misuse of policy
analysis by policy makers.
1One of the landmark books on policy argumentation was
Giandomenico Majone, Evidence,
Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
O B J E C T I V E S
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The Structure of Policy Arguments 339
The ability to organize, structure, and evaluate a policy
argument is central to
critical analytical thinking. In contexts of practice,
argumentation is not limited to
the kinds of reasoning employed in formal logic or in the social
sciences, for
example, reasoning based on quantitative models designed to
explain political
behavior or on formal mathematical models of rational choice
used in economics.
Many other modes of argumentation—from ethical and political
reasoning to
reasoning by analogy and metaphor—coexist and compete for
the attention of
policy makers. Competent analysts should be able to compare
and contrast different
modes of reasoning and express technical arguments in a
language that is
comprehensible to policy makers.
THE STRUCTURE OF POLICY ARGUMENTS
A policy argument is the product of argumentation, which is the
process.
In real-life policy settings, arguments are complex and prone to
misunderstanding.
For this reason, conceptual models or maps are useful in
identifying and relating
the elements of policy arguments. One such model is the
structural model of
argument originated by the English-born philosopher Stephen
Toulmin and
extended by others.2 Another structural model of argument
called Rationale,
developed by Tim van Gelder and associates, is what we use

here to map policy
arguments (see Figure 8.1).3
Structural models are designed to investigate the organization
of practical
reasoning. Arguments based on practical reasoning, as
distinguished from those
based on the formal reasoning of mathematics and deductive
logic, lack the
certainty of formally valid logical arguments, for example, if A
is preferred to
B, and B is preferred to C, then A is preferred to C. Practical
arguments are always
uncertain, as are the reasons and evidence employed to justify
conclusions.
Reasons are not always stated explicitly, and in some cases they
are not stated at
all. Even when they are stated, they are seldom complete or
conclusive.
In Toulmin’s words, practical reasoning yields conclusions
“about which we are
not entirely confident by relating them back to other
information about which we
have greater assurance.”4 Policy arguments rarely if ever have
the certainty of
deductive logic.
2Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1958); and
Toulmin, Robert Rieke, and Alan Janik, An Introduction to
Reasoning, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan,
1984). Other models of reasoning and argument are Hayward
Alker Jr., “The Dialectical Logic of
Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue,” American Political Science
Review 82, no. 3 (1988): 805–20; Michael
Scriven, Reasoning (New York: McGraw Hill, 1977); D. R. Des

Gasper, “Structures and Meanings:
A Way to Introduce Argumentation Analysis in Policy Studies
Education,” Africanus (University of
South Africa) 30, no. 1 (2000): 49–72; and D. R. Des Gasper,
“Analyzing Policy Arguments,” European
Journal of Development Research 8, no. 1 (1996): 36–62.
3See Tim van Gelder, “The Rationale for Rationale.” Law,
Probability, and Risk 6 (2007): 23-42.
The computer application called Rationale is available at
www.austhink.com.
4Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 127.
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A policy claim is the conclusion of a
policy argument. There are four types
of claims: definitional, designative,
evaluative, and advocative. Arguments
may include subordinate claims and
arguments.
CLAIM
Policy-relevant information
provides the grounds for
supporting a policy claim.
Policy-relevant information
may be statistical data,
experimental findings, expert
testimony, common sense,
or political judgments. The
information begins with the
words “Given that ...”
INFORMATION
A qualifier expresses the
degree of confidence in a
claim. Qualifiers may be
stated statistically
(p = 0.01) or in everyday
language (“probably” or
“not at all”). Qualifiers
answer the question “Is
the claim approximately
true?”
QUALIFIER
A warrant is a reason to

support a claim. Warrants
may be economic theories,
ethical principles, political
ideas, religious authority,
and so forth. Warrants
begin with the word
“Because...”
WARRANT
A rebuttal is an objection to an objection.
Rebuttals challenge objections by
identifying special conditions or
exceptions that reduce confidence in
the objection. Rebuttals begin with the
word “However...”
REBUTTAL
A backing is a reason
to support the warrant.
Backings begin with the
word “Since...”
An objection challenges
information by identifying
special conditions or
exceptions that reduce
confidence in the
information. Objections
begin with the word
“But...”
BACKINGOBJECTION
An objection challenges

a warrant or backing
by identifying special
conditions or exceptions
that reduce confidence
in the warrant or backing.
Objections begin with
“But...”
OBJECTION
The qualifier may
change as a result
of objections
and rebuttals. A
second qualifier
may replace
the first.
Five types of policy-
relevant information
are created and
transformed by
employing policy-
analytic methods
(Fig 1.1).
340 C H A P T E R 8 Developing Policy Arguments
FIGURE 8.1
Structure of a policy argument
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Types of Knowledge Claims
A knowledge claim or contention is the conclusion of an
argument. There are four
types of knowledge claims: definitive, designative, evaluative,
and advocative.
� Definitive. If a claim asserts that a policy has a particular
definition, then the
claim is definitive. Look for words such as is, is not, constituted
by, represented
by, similar to, and different from. A definitive claim states what
something
is or is not, what it is like or not like, or whether it belongs in
one class or
category rather than another. One type of definitive claim with

particular
relevance to policy is the metaphor. Policies have been defined
metaphorically
in terms of “war,” “contagion,” “epidemic,” and “quarantine.”
� Designative. If a claim asserts that some aspect of a policy
has been or can
be observed, or if observations are used to infer causes, then the
claim is designa-
tive. Look for words that describe observed or observable
characteristics: became,
originated, linked, caused, effected, consequence, prediction.
Some terms that
seem to be designative are really evaluative, for example, “He
is a good liberal”
or “The evil empire (or axis of evil) is the problem.” Claims
using these and other
“appraising” descriptions are not questions of fact; they are
evaluative. At the
same time, it is also possible to study values empirically by
making observations
relevant to appraising descriptions. Good examples are
measures of democracy,
ethical behavior, conservatism, and liberalism included in
questionnaires and
interview schedules.5
� Evaluative. If a claim asserts that some aspect of a policy has
or does not
have value or worth, it is evaluative. Look for words such as
good, bad, right,
wrong, beneficial, costly, efficient, responsive, equitable, just,
fair, and secure.
Examples: “The policy will bring about a living wage, thus
moving society
toward equity and responsiveness.” “The program is less

efficient than
expected.” “The policy will build a healthy economy.” Some
evaluative claims
refer to states or conditions (e.g., a just society) and some to
procedural
processes (e.g., a fair trial). Evaluative claims rest on warrants
that involve
values, ethics, and meta-ethics.
� Advocative. If a claim asserts that a government or division
within it should
take action, the claim is advocative. Look for words such as
should, needs to,
and must. Examples: “The World Bank should terminate its
structural
adjustment program.” “Congress should pass the Equal Rights
Amendment.”
“The United States should sign the Kyoto Treaty.” “Auto
manufacturers
should produce more fuel efficient vehicles.” Advocative claims
rest on
warrants that simultaneously involve facts and values.
Policy Maps
Policy maps are useful in representing complex arguments.
Arguments have seven
elements: claim, information, warrant, backing, objection,
rebuttal, and qualifier,
5See Delbert C. Miller and Neil J. Salkind, Handbook of
Research Design and Social Measurement,
6th ed. (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 2002).
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(see Figure 8.1). The claim is the conclusion or contention of an
argument. It is
supported by policy-relevant information, which is usually the
starting point of an
argument. The warrant is a reason for making the claim on the
basis of the informa-
tion supplied. The qualifier expresses the approximate truth,
plausibility, or confi-
dence in the claim. Consider the following example:

The senator supports the privatization of the federal highway
system, which will
bring gains in efficiency and reduced taxes. Considering that
the privatization of
public services has been successful in other areas, this is
definitely a “no brainer.”
This same conclusion was reached by a panel of experts on
privatization.
The senator’s argument may be broken down into its basic
elements (Figure 8.2):
“The senator supports the privatization of the federal highway
system (INFORMA-
TION), which will bring significant gains in efficiency and a
reduction in taxes
(CLAIM). Considering the WARRANT that the privatization of
public services has
Privatization will bring
significant gains in efficiency
and a reduction in taxes.
CLAIM
The Senator supports
the privatization of the
federal highway system.
INFORMATION
This is definitely a
“no brainer.”
QUALIFIER I
The Senator believes that the
privatization of public services has

been successful in other areas.
WARRANT
The Senator’s beliefs about
privatization are based on the
conclusions of an expert panel.
But these areas involved
mass rapid transit, which
is different from the
federal highway system.
BACKING OBJECTION
Considering
the objections,
the claim seems
doubtful.
QUALIFIER II
But the experts are consultants to
the Senator’s political party. The
conclusions are biased, or at least
have the appearance of being so.
OBJECTION
However, the experts are
distinguished economists.
REBUTTAL
FIGURE 8.2
Argument map—privatizing transportation

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been successful in other areas, QUALIFIER 1 states that “this is
definitely a ‘no
brainer.’” Additional elements are then introduced to strengthen
the argument. For
instance, a BACKING has been added (“This is the conclusion
of an expert panel on
privatization.”). Finally, an OBJECTION to the backing states
that the experts are

consultants to the senator’s party. A weak REBUTTAL then
states that the experts
are distinguished economists. The rebuttal is weak because it is
not a plausible chal-
lenge to the objection, which is about political bias and not
academic standing. A
second OBJECTION states that the management of urban mass
transit is different
from managing the federal highway system. This appears to be a
plausible challenge.
Finally, QUALIFIER 1 was that the claim is a “no brainer.” In
QUALIFIER 2, this
is reduced to “perhaps,” considering the strength of the
objections and rebuttal. This
considerably weakens the CLAIM that “Privatization will bring
significant gains in
efficiency and a reduction in taxes.”
BOX 8.1
Mapping a Policy Argument
6. Repeat the same procedure with the backing.
If there is a question whether a statement is
a backing or a warrant, look for the one that
is more general. This is the backing.
7. Remember that a warrant or backing may be
implicit and unstated—do not expect
arguments to be entirely transparent.
8. Look to the arguments of other stakeholders
to find objections and rebuttals. If possible,
obtain objections and rebuttals from
someone who actually believes them.

9. Remember that elements may contain rules,
principles, or entire arguments.
10. An uncontested argument is static;
argumentation, which involves at least
two parties, is dynamic and usually
contested.
11. The initial qualifier usually changes when
objections and rebuttals are advanced to
challenge the claim.
12. Most qualifiers become weaker, although
some stay the same. Some can grow stronger
(a fortiori) by withstanding challenges.
13. Argumentation produces “trees” and
“chains” involving dynamic processes
of argumentation that change over time.
Policy arguments have seven elements: information,
claim, qualifier, warrant, backing, objection, and
rebuttal. The following guidelines are useful in
identifying and arranging these elements:
1. If possible, identify arguments by performing
a stakeholder analysis (see Chapter 3).
Stakeholders are the main source of policy
arguments.
2. Start by locating the claim, which is the
endpoint or output of the argument. A claim
is always more general than the information
on which it is based. Claims involve an
“inferential leap” beyond information.

3. Look for language that indicates the degree
of credibility the arguer attaches to the
claim—this is the qualifier.
4. Look for the information that supports the
claim. The information answers two
questions: What does the arguer have to go
on? Is it relevant to the case at hand?
5. Look for the warrant, which in conjunction
with the information supports the claim.
The warrant answers the question: Why is the
arguer justified in making the claim on the
basis of the information?
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MODES OF POLICY ARGUMENTATION
Distinct modes of argumentation are used to justify policy
claims. Modes of argumen-
tation, which are specific patterns of reasoning include
reasoning from authority,
method, generalization, classification, cause, sign, motivation,
intuition, analogy,
parallel case, and ethics.6 Each of these modes of
argumentation and its characteristic
reasoning pattern is described in Table 8.1. Note that more than
one mode may be
used in a policy argument.
6Some of the modes presented here draw from Wayne
Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, “Toulmin or
Argument: An Interpretation and Application,” Quarterly
Journal of Speech 1006 (1960): 45–53; and
Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning, pp.
213–37. I have added several additional modes.
TABLE 8.1
Modes of Policy Argumentation with Reasoning Patterns
Mode Reasoning Pattern
Authority Reasoning from authority is based on warrants having
to do with the achieved or
ascribed statuses of producers of policy-relevant information,

for example, experts,
insiders, scientists, specialists, gurus, power brokers. Footnotes
and references are
disguised authoritative arguments.
Method Reasoning from method is based on warrants about the
approved status of methods
or techniques used to produce information. The focus is on the
achieved or ascribed
status or “power” of procedures. Examples include approved
statistical,
econometric, qualitative, ethnographic, and hermeneutic
methods.
Generalization Reasoning from generalization is based on
similarities between samples and
populations from which samples are selected. Although samples
can be random,
generalizations can also be based on qualitative comparisons. In
either case,
the assumption is that what is true of members of a sample is
also true
of members of the population not included in the sample. For
example, random
samples of n � 30 are taken to be representative of the
(unobserved and often
unobservable) population of elements from which the sample is
drawn.
Classification Reasoning from classification has to do with
membership in a defined class.
The reasoning is that what is true of the class of persons or
events described
in the warrant is also true of individuals or groups described in
the information.
An example is the untenable ideological argument that because

a country has
a socialist economy it must be undemocratic, because all
socialist systems are
undemocratic.
Cause Reasoning from cause is about generative powers
(“causes”) and their
consequences (“effects”). A claim may be made based on
general propositions,
or laws, that state invariant relations between cause and effect
for example, the
law of diminishing utility of money. Other kinds of causal
claims are based on
observing the effects of some policy intervention on one or
more policy outcomes.
Almost all argumentation in the social and natural sciences is
based on reasoning
from cause.
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Modes of Policy Argumentation 345
Mode Reasoning Pattern
Sign Reasoning from sign is based on signs, or indicators, and
their referents.
The presence of a sign or indicator is believed to justify the
expectation that some
other sign or indicator will occur as well. Examples are
indicators of institutional
performance such as “organizational report cards” and
“benchmarks” or
indicators of economic performance such as “leading economic
indicators.” Signs
are not causes, because causality must satisfy temporal
precedence and other
requirements not expected of signs.
Motivation Reasoning from motivation is based on the
motivating power of goals, values, and
intentions in shaping individual and collective behavior. For
example, a claim that
citizens will support the strict enforcement of pollution
standards might be based on
reasoning that since citizens are motivated by the desire to
achieve the goal of clean
air and water, they will support strict enforcement.

Intuition Reasoning from intuition is based on the conscious or
preconscious cognitive,
emotional, or spiritual states of producers of policy-relevant
information. For
example, the belief that an advisor has some special insight,
feeling, or “tacit
knowledge” may serve as a reason to accept his or her
judgment.
Analogy Reasoning from analogies is based on similarities
between relations found in a given
case and relations characteristic of a metaphor or analogy. For
example, the claim
that government should “quarantine” a country by interdicting
illegal drugs—with
the illegal drugs seen as an “infectious disease”—is based on
reasoning that since
quarantine has been effective in cases of infectious diseases,
interdiction will be
effective in the case of illegal drugs.
Parallel Case Reasoning from parallel case is based on
similarities among two or more cases
of policy making. For example, the claim that a local
government will be successful
in enforcing pollution standards is based on information that a
parallel policy was
successfully implemented in a similar local government
elsewhere.
Ethics Reasoning from ethics is based on judgments about the
rightness or wrongness,
goodness or badness, of policies or their consequences. For
example, policy claims
are frequently based on moral principles stating the conditions

of a “just” or
“good” society, or on ethical norms prohibiting lying in public
life. Moral principles
and ethical norms go beyond the values and norms of particular
individuals or
groups. In public policy, many arguments about economic
benefits and costs involve
unstated or implicit moral and ethical reasoning.
Argumentation from Authority
Here claims are based on authority. Whereas information
consists of factual reports
or expressions of opinion, the warrant affirms the reliability or
trustworthiness
of the source of the information. Depending on the social
context, authorities may
be kings, magicians, or religious leaders, or they may be
scientists, professors, or
news reporters.
In an authoritative argument, the claim reiterates the policy-
relevant infor-
mation that has been provided by the authority, whose
reliability, status, or
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sagacity has been underwritten by the warrant. To illustrate
(Figure 8.3), let
us imagine that a policy analyst advising the National Security
Council at the
height of the 1999 U.S.-NATO attack on Yugoslavia made the
designative claim,
Though Western officials continue to deny it, there
can be little doubt that the bombing campaign has
provided both motive and opportunity for a wider
and more savage Serbian operation than what
was first envisioned.
CLAIM
Carnes Lord, a professor at the
Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy and former Bush
Administration national security

advisor, states that “Though
Western officials continue to
deny it, there can be little doubt
that the bombing campaign has
provided both motive and
opportunity for a wider and more
savage Serbian operation than
what was first envisioned.”
INFORMATION
The claim is
almost certainly
true.
QUALIFIER
Mr. Lord has had a distinguished
career in government and
academia and wide practical
experience. He is considered by
many to be an honest, reliable,
and perceptive analyst,
WARRANT
Lord’s judgment is consistent with that
of US-NATO Commander Wesley Clark,
who stated that the outcome of the
bombing was “entirely predictable.”
BACKING
Another reliable source, State Department spokesman
James Rubin, evades the question by stating that “the
United States is extremely alarmed by reports of an
escalating pattern of Serbian attacks on Kosovar
Albanian citizens.”

OBJECTION
Rubin’s alarm merely reflects the Clinton
Administration’s effort to deny responsibility
for the consequences of the US-led bombing
campaign.
REBUTTAL
FIGURE 8.3
Argumentation from authority—unintended consequences of the
U.S.-NATO attack
on Yugoslavia
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C: “Though Western leaders continue to deny it, there can be
little doubt that the
bombing campaign has provided both motive and opportunity
for a wider and
more savage Serbian operation than what was first
envisioned.”7 The informa-
tion, I, is from a statement by Carnes Lord, a professor at the
Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy and former Bush administration national
security advisor.
The warrant, W, affirms Lord’s reliability and is backed, B, by
an additional
authoritative argument intended to add to the persuasiveness of
the argument.
The objection, O, challenges the initial warrant, but without
weakening the
claim’s credibility, which is stated in the qualifier, Q. The
rebuttal, R, has
virtually no effect on Q, which does not change in response to
the challenge by a
rival authority, State Department spokesman James Rubin.
Method
Argumentation from method is based on warrants about the
approved status of
methods used to produce information. Policy-relevant
information may consist of
factual statements or reports. The role of the warrant is to
provide a reason for
accepting the claim by associating the information with the use
of an approved

method, rule, or principle. Usually, the claim is that the
condition described in the
information should be regarded as valuable (or worthless),
because of the method
used to produce it. Consider the following public investment
problem: An analyst
has information I, that the production of energy per dollar is
greater in nuclear
power plants than in hydroelectric plants, which in turn produce
more energy then
solar plants. The claim, C, is that
The government should invest in nuclear energy. The warrant,
W, associates the
information, I, with claim, C, by invoking the transitivity rule
of mathematical
economics.8 The warrant is backed, B, by the presumption that
transitivity is a
“universal selection rule” that guarantees the rationality of
choice.
The rebuttal, R, challenges the presumption about the universal
validity of
transitivity by pointing to the presence of cyclical preferences.
The original qualifier
Q1 is reduced from “very likely” to the new qualifier Q2, which
is now stated as
“quite uncertain” (Figure 8.4).
In argumentation from method, claims are assessed in terms of
the achieved or
ascribed status of methods or the rules guiding their use. Those
who accept the
authority of analytic methods such as econometrics, benefit-cost
analysis, a or
decision analysis falsely believe that the use of such methods

actually “sets the
policy agenda and its directions, that useful analysis will be
used analysis.”9
The authority of methods need not be derived from rules of
formal logic or
mathematics, as the history of qualitative methods shows. Many
qualitative methods
originate in the hermeneutic tradition, which evolved from the
interpretation of
7Boston Globe, April 4, 1999. Quoted in Noam Chomsky,
Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World
Affairs (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000), p. 35.
8On rules expressing transitive and cyclical preferences, see,
for example, Norman Frohlich and Joe A.
Oppenheimer, Modern Political Economy (Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall, 1978), pp. 6–13.
9Allen Schick, “Beyond Analysis,” Public Administration
Review 37, no. 3 (1977): 259.
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biblical texts. The authority of qualitative methods, like any
other, stems from the
professional and scientific communities that create definitions
of the purpose, scope,
and proper application of approved methods.10 These
communities are extra-scien-
tific sources of authority.
The transitivity rule and other axioms of mathematics have also
arisen from
extra-scientific sources:
Consider the axiom which asserts the transitivity of preference:
if A is
preferred to B, and B to C, then A is (or rationally must be)
preferred to C.
The intuitive appeal of this assertion is so great that few if any
economists
feel the urge to build formal economic systems in which the
axiom fails.
Geometry . . . is the classic example; the intuitive strength of

Euclid’s
The government should
invest in nuclear energy.
CLAIM
The production of energy per dollar
is greater in nuclear (N) power plants
than hydroelectric (H) plants, which
in turn produce more energy than
solar (S) plants.
INFORMATION
Absolutely. This
is a universal
selection rule.
QUALIFIER I
The transitivity rule states that
if N is preferred to H, and
H is preferred to S, then N is
preferred to S.
WARRANT
But the dangers of
nuclear power outweigh
the monetary benefits.
OBJECTION BACKING
But universality cannot be guaranteed.
When groups make choices, preferences
are cyclical, so that S is actually
preferred to N.

OBJECTION
However, the dangers of
nuclear power are minimal
in new plants as
compared with old ones.
REBUTTAL
Transitivity is a universal
selection rule necessary for
making rational choices. The
rule is supported by rational
choice theorists.
Probably not,
considering the
strength of the
objections.
QUALIFIER II
FIGURE 8.4
Argumentation from method—intransitivity of preferences for
nuclear power
10Approved methods are part of Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix.
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1971), p. 103.
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“postulates” was so great that for two thousand years geometers
played their
games strictly within the domain . . . which Euclid had laid
down. Even when
non-Euclidean geometries were discovered in the early
nineteenth century,
most mathematicians never thought of them as valid.11
Adherence to approved methods is wrongly believed to make
policy decisions
more “rational.” A rational choice is thought to be possible if
the analyst can
order all consequences associated with action, if the ordering of
consequences
is transitive, and if the analyst can consistently and in a

transitive fashion choose
the alternative that will bring the greatest benefit in relation to
cost.12 Challenges
to this argument may be made on empirical, authoritative,
intuitive, and ethical
grounds.13 New schools of analysis may serve as a source of
approved methods,
new axioms providing for nontransitive preferences may come
to be accepted
on intuitive grounds, and rules that run counter to moral
principles and ethical
norms may be replaced with new ones.14 Challenges may also
be made on prag-
matic grounds, for example, by arguing that the transitivity rule
does not actually
promote better decisions in policy settings characterized by
incomplete
information, value conflicts, multiple competing objectives,
partisan mutual
adjustment, and “organized anarchy.”15 In the last analysis, a
successful argument
from method is a pragmatic matter. An argument from method
must demonstrate
only that the results of using particular rules are superior to
those that occur
without them and that the observed improvement is a
consequence of using the
rule or procedure.16
Generalization
Arguments from generalization involve samples. Policy-relevant
information
consists of sampled elements—events, persons, groups,
organizations, countries—
that are taken to be representative of a larger population of the
same elements. The

function of the warrant is to affirm that what is true of the
sampled elements is also
true of the unobserved (and often unobservable) elements in the
population. The
policy claim rests on the argument that the sample is a
satisfactory representation of
the population.
11C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic
Concepts of Systems and Organization
(New York: Basic Books, 1971), p. 25.
12Joseph L. Bower, “Descriptive Decision Theory from the
‘Administrative’ Viewpoint,” in The Study
of Policy Formation, ed. Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J.
Gergen (New York: Free Press, 1968),
pp. 104–6.
13Good examples of these challenges may be found in Jeffrey
Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice
Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996).
14See the discussion of the evolution of welfare economics in
public policy analysis by Duncan MacRae
Jr., The Social Function of Social Science (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 107–57.
15See Chapter 2.
16Bower, “Descriptive Decision Theory from the
‘Administrative’ Viewpoint,” p. 106. See Nicholas
Rescher’s essays on methodological pragmatism, for example,
Induction (Pittsburgh, PA: University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1980).
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To illustrate, consider the director of a community food bank
who wants
to know whether persons receiving food are getting an adequate
daily allowance
of calcium, one of the most important minerals in the body
(Figure 8.5). The
director, who is attentive to reasons that might justify additional
funding for
the food bank, makes the claim, C, that it is “pretty likely” that
food bank clients
are receiving sufficient calcium—specifically, given that the

sampled amount
of 755 milligrams (mg) of calcium could have occurred by
chance 9 times
out of 100, it is not reliably different from the recommended
daily allowance
(RDA) of 800 mg, an amount prescribed by the Food and
Nutrition Board of the
National Academy of Sciences.
In this case, the information, I, describes the average daily
intake of calcium
(755 mg) measured in a random sample (sometimes
inappropriately called a
“scientific sample” in policy circles) of fifty clients. The
information, I, indicates
that the difference between 755 mg and 800 mg could occur by
chance 9 times
out of 100, a conclusion reached on the basis of a statistical test
(a “two-sample
test”). The probability value (p � 0.09) is included in the
qualifier, Q, with the
ordinary words “probably true.” The warrant, W, which
provides the reason for
moving from I to C, has two parts: The rule that a random
sample of at least 30 is
adequate in such cases to generalize to the population from
which the sample
is selected; and the practice of accepting a level of statistical
significance of
p � 0.05 (5 times out of 100) as an “acceptable” level of risk.
When pressed for
additional justification, the director checks her statistics text to
find the
appropriate theoretical backing, B, for the rule n � 30. The B is
the Central Limit
Theorem of probability theory.

A member of the director’s staff believes that clients served by
the food bank
may have a calcium deficiency. He therefore challenges the
claim with several
rebuttals: the data on calcium intake are unreliable because of
the way they were
collected; and the sample is biased because it is not a random
sample. The rebuttals
are plausible, and the director’s qualifier, Q1, changed from
“probably true” to Q2
“not likely” that clients are receiving their minimum RDA of
calcium. The director’s
original claim—that calcium intake is probably adequate—is
diminished by the
objections of the well-meaning and critical staff member.
Arguments from generalization are not always statistical, in the
specific sense
that statistics are estimates of population values (called
parameters). Nonrandom
samples—for example, purposive samples, theoretical samples,
and sociometric
(snowball) samples—do not permit statistical estimation. They
are nevertheless
useful in making claims about populations.17 Even case studies
(where n � 1) may
be used to generalize to wider populations by means of various
pattern-matching
methods.18
17Generalizability (external validity) in experimental research
is essentially nonstatistical. Among other
reasons this is why Campbell called it “proximal similarity.”
See William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook,
and Donald T. Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental

Designs for Generalized Causal
Inference (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2002).
18See William N. Dunn, “Pattern Matching: Methodology,”
International Encyclopedia of the Social
and Behavioral Sciences (New York: Elsevier, 2002).
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Food Bank clients are receiving sufficient calcium in
their diet. There is no statistically significant difference

between their daily intake of 800 mg of calcium and
the recommended daily allowance (RDA) of 755 mg
approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
CLAIM
The average daily intake
of calcium in a sample
of 50 Food Bank clients
is 755 mg. The
recommended daily
allowance (RDA) is
800 mg.
INFORMATION
The claim is
probably true.
QUALIFIER I
No, it is probably
untrue
QUALIFIER II
A random sample of 30 or more persons is
usually acceptable as a basis for generalizing
from the sample to the population. Given a
sample of 30, a test was performed to
determine the statistical significance of a
difference in calcium intake of 45 mg
(800–755). The test indicates that
the difference is not statistically significant
at the p = 0.05 level.
WARRANT

The Central Limit Theorem
justifies a sample size of 30
and a statistical test based
on the normal distribution,
also known as the bell-
shaped curve.
BACKING
The sample was not drawn randomly, but was based
on clients who visited the Food Bank on the week-
ends, when dieticians seemed to be available to
interview clients. Tests of significance are not
valid without a random sample.
OBJECTION
An evaluation of records showing
the intake of calcium indicated
that some clients were asked to
estimate their calcium intake,
while other were required to
provide evidence of what foods
they ate. Data on calcium intake
are unreliable and should not
be used for statistical tests.
OBJECTION
However, the weekend visitors were selected randomly by
means of an interval sample of every 5th client who entered the
Food Bank.
REBUTTAL

FIGURE 8.5
Argumentation from generalization—statistical inference as a
basis for success in
community nutrition
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Classification
Argumentation from classification focuses on membership in a
defined class. The

reasoning is that what is true of the class of persons or events
described in
the warrant is also true of individuals or events that are
members of the class, as they
are described in the information. To illustrate, consider the
following argument
about the relationship between regime type and the control of
terrorism (Figure 8.6).
The information, I, is that Iran, Iraq, and the Palestinian
Authority are authoritarian
dictatorships. The claim, C, is that Middle Eastern states can
control terrorism
within their borders. The warrant, W, is that authoritarian
dictatorships exercise firm
control of terrorists and other armed groups within their
territories. The backing, B,
has two parts. The first is that firm control exercised by
authoritarian dictatorships
is possible because such regimes do not permit the private use
of weapons without
the express approval of the government. The objections, O, are
that one or more
of the Middle Eastern regimes lack such control because they
permit the private
use of weapons; and that the definition of “authoritarian
regime” may be inappro-
priate. The original qualifier Q1 (“virtually certain”) is reduced
to Q2 (“not . . .
certain at all”).
Middle Eastern states
are authoritarian
dictatorship.
INFORMATION
This is virtually

certain.
QUALIFIER I
A key characteristic of authoritarian dictator-
ships is that they exercise firm control over
armed groups within their borders.
WARRANT
Firm control is possible because
the private use of weapons is
prohibited without the express
approval of state authorities.
BACKING
Considering the
objections, the
claim does not
seem certain
at all.
QUALIFIER II
Unless the definition
of authoritarian
dictatorship, which was
developed to
characterize communist
regimes, is not useful
as a way to understand
Middle Eastern states.
OBJECTION
But some states lack such control because
they do not prohibit the private use of

weapons. This is not be an important
characteristic of authoritarian dictatorships
after all.
OBJECTION
Middle Eastern states can control
terrorist activities within their borders
if they wish to do so.
CLAIM
FIGURE 8.6
Argumentation from classification—challenging claims about
authoritarian rule and
terrorism
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The plausibility of classification arguments depends on the
completeness and
internal consistency of the definition of the class. Various
classes of political
regimes—authoritarian dictatorships, totalitarian democracies,
socialist democra-
cies, capitalist democracies—are less homogeneous and
internally consistent than
popular classifications suggest. The same is true for classes of
policies (e.g.,
“privatization”), organizations (e.g., “bureaucracy”), political
doctrines (e.g.,
“liberal” and “conservative”), and groups (e.g., “lower class,”
“middle class,”
“upper class”). Many apparently simple classifications may turn
out to be ideologies
in disguise.
Cause
Argumentation from cause focuses on the causes and effects of
policies.19 In causal
arguments, information consists of one or more evidently
factual statements or
reports about a policy. The warrant transforms these statements
or reports by relat-
ing them to generative powers (causes) and their results
(effects). The claim relates

these causes and effects back to the information supplied.
The role of causal arguments in transforming policy-relevant
information
into policy claims may be illustrated by Allison’s well-known
causal explana-
tions of foreign policy behavior during the Cuban missile crisis
in October
1962.20 Showing how different models yield alternative
explanations of foreign
policy, Allison argues that (1) government policy analysts think
about problems
of foreign policy in terms of implicit conceptual models that
shape their thought;
(2) most analysts explain the behavior of governments in terms
of one basic
model, one that assumes the rationality of political choices
(rational policy
model); and (3) alternative models, including those that
emphasize organiza-
tional processes (organizational process model) and
bureaucratic politics
(bureaucratic politics model), provide bases for improved
explanations of
foreign policy behavior.
19Causal argumentation dominates efforts of political scientists
to explain policy making. Recent
examples include contributors to Sabatier, Theories of the
Policy Process, 2nd ed.(Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2007). Other examples are James E. Anderson,
Public Policy-Making (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1975); Thomas R. Dye, Understanding
Public Policy, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1978); Robert Eyestone, The Threads of Public
Policy: A Study in Policy Leadership

(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Jerald Hage and J.
Rogers Hollingsworth, “The First Steps
toward the Integration of Social Theory and Public Policy,”
Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 434 (1977): 1–23; Richard I.
Hofferbert, The Study of Public Policy
(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974); Charles O. Jones, An
Introduction to the Study of Public
Policy, 2d ed. (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1977);
Robert L. Lineberry, American Public
Policy: What Government Does and What Difference It Makes
(New York: Harper & Row, 1977);
Austin Ranney, ed., Political Science and Public Policy
(Chicago: Markham, 1968); Richard Rose, ed.,
The Dynamics of Public Policy: A Comparative Analysis
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1976);
Ira Sharkansky, ed., Policy Analysis in Political Science
(Cambridge, MA: Markham, 1970); and Peter
Woll, Public Policy (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers,
1974).
20Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban
Missile Crisis,” American Political Science
Review 3002, no. 3 (1969): 689–718.
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In contrasting alternative models, Allison examines explanatory
arguments
derived from the three conceptual models. In 1962, the policy
alternatives
open to the United States ranged from no action and diplomatic
pressures to
secret negotiations, invasion, surgical air strike, and blockade.
The alternatives
are assessed in terms of rival explanations of foreign policy
behavior. The expla-
nations conform to a type of causal explanation that
philosophers call deductive-
nomological (D-N), which holds that valid explanations are
possible only when
general theoretical propositions or laws link prior circumstances
with subsequent
events.21
Among the several advocative claims made at the time of the
Cuban missile crisis,

let us consider the policy recommendation actually adopted by
the United States:
“The United States should blockade Cuba.” In this case, the
policy-relevant informa-
tion, I, is “The Soviet Union is placing offensive missiles in
Cuba.” The warrant, W, is
since “the blockade will force the withdrawal of missiles by
showing the Russians that
the United States is determined to use force.” In providing
additional reasons to accept
the claim, the backing, B, states because “[a]n increase in the
cost of an alternative
reduces the likelihood of that alternative being chosen.”22 B
represents a general theo-
retical proposition, or law, within the rational policy model
(Figure 8.7). In this case,
Q1 (probably) changes to Q2 (probably not) after the objection,
O, has successfully
challenged the backing B.
The purpose of Allison’s account is not to demonstrate the
inherent superiority
of one or another of the three explanatory models. It is rather to
show that the use
of multiple competing models can result in improved
explanations of foreign policy
behavior. The use of multiple models moves analysis from a
self-contained and static
single argument about the relation between information and
claim to a new stage of
dynamic debate. In this context, the organizational, process
model provides an
objection, O, with its own backing, B, in the form of a
competing causal argument.
The objection, O, states that Soviet leaders may be unable to
force their own orga-

nizational units to depart from assigned tasks and routines. This
can be expected
to occur because “[m]ajor lines of organizational behavior are
straight, that is,
behavior at one time is marginally different from that same
behavior at t � 1.”23
The backing, B, for the objection, O, is again a general
proposition or law within
the organizational process model.
The case of the Cuban missile crisis illustrates some of the
limitations of
causal argumentation based on D-N explanation. First, several
competing causal
arguments are equally compatible as general propositions or
laws. These argu-
ments, each backed by social science theories, cannot be
confirmed or refuted
solely on the basis of this or any other information or data.24
Second, a given
causal argument, however persuasive, cannot directly lead to an
advocative claim
21See Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New
York: Free Press, 1965).
22Allison, “Conceptual Models,” p. 694.
23Ibid. p. 702.
24Georg H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca,
NY: Comell University Press, 1970),
p. 145; and Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
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or recommendation, because traditional causal explanations do
not themselves
contain value premises.25 Indeed, there is a suppressed value
premise, which is
that U.S. leaders are motivated by the value of security from the
Soviet military
presence in the Western Hemisphere. If some other value had
motivated policy
makers, either of the two competing causal explanations would
have supported
altogether different claims, for example, that the United States
should invade and

occupy Cuba.
The United States should force
the Soviet Union to withdraw the
missiles by blockading Cuba.
CLAIM
Reliable intelligence
reports confirm that the
Soviet Union is placing
offensive missiles in Cuba.
INFORMATION
A blockade will show Soviet leaders
that the United States means business
because it is prepared to use force.
WARRANT
Probably
QUALIFIER I
An increase in the cost of
an action reduces the
likelihood that it will be
taken.
BACKING
But Soviet leaders may not convince their naval units to
depart from standard operating procedures which permit
only marginal changes in behavior.
OBJECTION
Research on organizations shows that major lines of

behavior are straight: Behavior at time t+1 is almost always
marginally different from behavior at time t.
WARRANT
Considering
the objections,
probably not.
QUALIFIER II
FIGURE 8.7
Argumentation from theoretical cause—competing deductive-
nomological
explanations of the cuban missile crisis
25This is not to say that they do not imply values, because
empirical theories in the social and natural
sciences rest on unstated value premises. See, for example, M.
Gunther and K. Reshaur, “Science and
Values in Political ‘Science,’ ” Philosophy of Social Sciences 1
(1971): 113–21; J. W. Sutherland,
“Axiological Predicates in Scientific Enterprise,” General
Systems 19 (1974): 3–14; and Ian I. Mitroff,
The Subjective Side of Science: A Philosophical Inquiry into
the Psychology of the Apollo Moon
Scientists (New York: American Elsevier Publishing, 1974).
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Causal argumentation based on the D-N model of scientific
explanation
attempts to develop and test general propositions about causes
and effects.26 Carl
Hempel has elaborated D-N explanation as follows:
We divide explanation into two major constituents, the
explanandum and
the explanans. By the explanandum, we understand the sentence
describing
the phenomenon to be explained (not that phenomenon itself);
by the
explanans the class of those sentences which are adduced to
account for the
phenomenon. . . . [Scientific explanation] answers the question,
“Why did

the explanandum-phenomenon occur?” by showing that the
phenomenon
resulted from particular circumstances, specified in C1, C2, . . .
, Ck, in
accordance with laws L1, L2, . . . , Lr. By pointing this out, the
argument
shows that, given the particular circumstances and the laws in
question, the
occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in
this sense that
the explanation enables us to understand why the phenomenon
occurred.27
A simple example illustrates traditional causal (D-N)
explanation.28 If I leave my
car outside overnight and the temperature drops below freezing,
my full radiator
(without antifreeze) will burst. Why will this happen? “My
radiator burst”
(explanandum). “My radiator was full of water, the cap was
tightly fastened, and the
temperature outside dropped below freezing” (circumstances, or
Ck, in the
explanans). And, “the volume of water expands when it freezes”
(general proposition
or law, Lr, in the explanans).
29 In this example, knowledge of prior circumstances and
the appropriate law permits a prediction of the resultant event.
Questions have been raised about the suitability of D-N
explanation in history and
the social sciences.30 These questions arise, among other
reasons, because policy analysis
and other social sciences are partly evaluative and advocative
(normative) in character.

Every advocative claim contains both factual and value
premises, whereas in traditional
causal explanations, we evidently find only factual premises.
Traditional causal explana-
tions also require that the explanans precede (or accompany) the
explanandum. Yet
many advocative claims reverse this sequence, insofar as
circumstances that explain
action are situated in the future. Future circumstances,
including intentions, goals, and
desires, explain present actions to the extent that actions cannot
occur without the
motivation provided by such intentions, goals, and desires.31
Finally, any correspon-
dence between the results of acting on an advocative claim and
the conclusions of a
causal argument may be purely coincidental. In policy making,
predictions based on
D-N explanations will fail if policy actors employ intelligent
reflection to change their
behavior or if unpredictable factors deriving from creative
thought intervene.32
26Allison, “Conceptual Models,” p. 690 (note 4) tells us that
Hempel’s D-N (deductive-nomological)
explanation is the basis (backing) for his three models.
27Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 247–58.
28See von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, p. 12.
29Ibid., p. 12.
30Ibid., p. 11.
31Ibid., pp. 74–124; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (London:
Basil Blackwell, 1957); and W. H. Dray,
Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University
Press, 1957).
32Alasdair Maclntyre, “Ideology, Social Science, and
Revolution,” Comparative Politics 5, no. 3 (1973): 334.

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D-N explanation is not the sole legitimate form of causal
argumentation in public
policy. Another form is hypothetico-deductive (H-D)
explanation, which involves the
deduction of hypotheses from theories that do not involve
propositions about invariant
causal relations or laws. Often the hypotheses of interest are

those dealing with policy
or program actions designed to achieve some practical
outcome.33 The relation
between action and outcome, however, is not certain. If it were,
it would conform to
the following requirements, usually called the “essentialist”
view of causation:
� The policy, x, must precede the outcome, y, in time.
� The occurrence of the policy, x, must be necessary for the
occurrence of y, the
outcome, which must not occur in the absence of the policy, x.
� The occurrence of the policy, x, must be sufficient for the
occurrence of y, the
outcome, which must occur when the policy, x, is present.
If these requirements were met, the relation between a policy
action and an outcome
would be certain. These requirements are virtually never
satisfied in real-life policy
settings. Instead, what occurs is that other conditions—
uncontrolled contingencies
that lie beyond the control of policy makers—make it
impossible to know definitely
whether a policy is necessary or sufficient for the occurrence of
an outcome. The
uncontrolled contingencies are plausible rival hypotheses that
must be taken into
account and, when possible, eliminated as competing
explanations of a policy
outcome. Here the best that may be expected is an optimally
plausible claim, that is,
an approximately valid causal inference.34 Figure 8.8 displays
causal argumentation

in the quasi-experimental tradition founded by Donald T.
Campbell, a tradition
based on the fundamental premise that causal argumentation in
real-life policy
settings requires the formulation, testing, and elimination of
rival hypotheses.35
Figure 8.8 shows that rival hypotheses used to challenge the
warrant change the
initial qualifier from “definitely worthwhile” (QI) to “perhaps”
(QII).
Sign
Reasoning from sign is based on indicators and their referents.
The presence of a
sign indicates the presence of an event, condition, or process,
because the sign and
what it refers to occur together. Examples are indicators of
institutional perform-
ance such as “organizational report cards,” “benchmarks,” and
“best practices.”36
Another example is the widely used set of indicators (actually
indices) of economic
performance—“leading,” “lagging,” and “coincident” economic
indicators—published
periodically by the Conference Board. Signs are not causes. As
we saw earlier,
33See the discussion of the “activity theory of causation” in
Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell,
Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field
Settings (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin,
1979), ch. 1.
34The preeminent source on validity questions in the social and
behavioral sciences is Shadish, Cook,

and Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs
for Generalized Causal Inference.
35Rival hypotheses are also known as “threats to validity.” See
Donald T. Campbell, Methodology and
Epistemology for Social Science: Collected Papers, ed. E. S.
Overman (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988). The example is from Campbell’s “Reforms as
Experiments,” in the Overman edition.
36For example, William T. Gormley Jr. and David L. Weimer,
Organizational Report Cards (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
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causality must satisfy additional requirements not expected of
signs. Figure 8.9
displays argumentation from sign based on a correlation
coefficient and probability
value (p-value).
Figure 8.9 makes an important distinction between signs and
causes. In
modern statistical analysis, measures of correlation, regression,
and statistical
Moreover, the statistical
phenomenon of regression
toward the mean is often
found in time series of
this kind.
WARRANT
Connecticut Governor Abraham
Ribicoff contended that the
crackdown on speeding is
responsible for saving 40 lives in
1956, a reduction of 12.3 percent
from the 1955 death toll. The
program is “definitely worthwhile,”
said Ribicoff.
CLAIM
Data on Connecticut
traffic fatalities between

1955 and 1956 show a
12.3 percent decline.
INFORMATION
“definitely
worthwhile...”
QUALIFIER I
Considering the
objection, a
better word is
“perhaps.”
QUALIFIER II
We reduced fatalities “by enforcing the
law, something the safety experts said
couldn’t be done because the people
wouldn’t be behind it,” said Ribicoff.
WARRANT
But fatalities in 1955
were at an all time high.
In 1956, fatalities
regressed toward the
average (mean) number
of fatalities in the time
series. This and not the
policy was the real
cause of the decline.
OBJECTION
FIGURE 8.8

Argumentation from practical cause—rival explanations of the
effects of the
connecticut crackdown on speeding
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significance (e.g., chi-square, t, and F values) are signs that
refer to covariation.
Covariation is a necessary but not sufficient condition of
causation. In Figure 8.9,

the rebuttal, R, states a causal relation between participation in
Head Start
programs and increased graduation rates. It is a causal relation
because students
who participated had higher graduation rates; those who did not
had lower grad-
uation rates; the program came before the graduation in time;
and there was,
in addition, a positive correlation between participation and
graduation. It is
positive, moderate in strength (r � 0.61), and statistically
significant (p � 0.05).
The objection, O, successfully challenges the argument from
sign, which mistak-
enly infers that Head Start is ineffective. The initial qualifier QI
(“probably”)
becomes QII (“probably not”).
Arguments from sign—whether presented as organizational
report cards,
benchmarks, or correlation coefficients—are at best statements
of covariation
or coincidence. Although covariation must be present for a
causal relation to
exist, causation requires that we fulfill certain conditions. John
Stuart Mill,
Head Start programs are not effective
in preparing disadvantaged students
for graduation.
CLAIM
According to the expert, the larger
the number of students enrolled in
Head Start programs, the smaller

the percentage of graduates. The
correlation between number of
students enrolled and number of
graduates is negative (r = – 0.14)
and statistically significant (p < 0.01).
INFORMATION
This is
probably true.
QUALIFIER I
An expert in a cable news
show reported that participation
in Head Start programs causes
students to fail. The larger the
number of participants in these
programs, the lower the
graduation rate.
WARRANT
But participants should be compared to non-participants.
A peer-reviewed study compared participants and non-
participants in Head Start programs. Participants were 3 times
more likely to graduate than non-participants (r = 0.57, p <
0.01).
OBJECTION
No, it is probably
untrue, considering
the strong objection
and weak rebuttal.
QUALIFIER II
However, this does not “prove” causation.

REBUTTAL
Causation is more or less plausible, not perfect.
OBJECTION
FIGURE 8.9
Argumentation from sign—quantitative indicators such as
correlation coefficients and
P-values do not “prove” causation
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the nineteenth-century English philosopher, presented a set of
methods (some-
times called “canons”) of inductive inference designed to
discover causal
relations. Mills’s methods are broadly employed today in the
social and behav-
ioral sciences, policy analysis, and program evaluation.37 The
methods are those
of agreement, difference, agreement and difference (the so-
called “joint
method”), concomitant variation, and residues. The basic idea
of the first three
methods is as follows:
� If on two or more occasions a presumed effect has only one
antecedent
condition in common, then that condition is probably the cause
of the
presumed effect. If on the first occasion, presumed effect Y is
preceded
by conditions X1, X3, and X5, and on the second occasion the
presumed
effect Y is preceded by conditions X2, X3, and X6, then X3 is
probably
the cause of Y.
� If a presumed effect and a presumed noneffect share every
antecedent
condition except one, which occurs along with the presumed
effect, then
that condition is probably the cause of the presumed effect. If
the presumed
effect Y and the presumed noneffect ~ Y share antecedent
conditions X1,

X2, X5, and X6, but do not share condition X3, which occurs
along with
presumed effect Y, then X3 is probably the cause of Y.
� If two or more occasions when a presumed effect occurs have
only one
antecedent in common, whereas two or more occasions when a
presumed effect
does not occur have nothing in common except the absence of
that antecedent
condition, then the antecedent condition in which the presumed
effects and
presumed noneffects differ is probably the cause. If on two or
more occasions
when presumed effect Y occurs it is accompanied solely by
antecedent condition
X3, whereas two or more occasions when presumed effect Y
does not occur
have nothing in common except the absence of antecedent
condition X3, then
X3 is probably the cause of Y.
The method of concomitant variation, which we know today as
correlation
(covariation, association), does not require additional comment
here, except to say
that it is a necessary condition of causation. The method of
residues is similar
to what we now call the analysis of residual (error) variance in
econometrics.
The logic is that what is “left over” when we have explained the
effects of all the
(presumed) causes of a phenomenon are the “residues” of other
possible (and
usually unknown) causes. To know whether we are analyzing
causation or correla-

tion, however, requires that we first employ the first three
methods, because no
statistical analyses, however advanced, are sufficient to
establish causation.
Statistics provides signs, not causes.
37Quasi-experimental design in program evaluation is based
very largely on Mills’s methods. The best
example is Cook and Campbell, Quasi-Experimentation, ch. 1,
who critique and go beyond Mills’s
methods. For another critique and reformulation, see William N.
Dunn, “Pragmatic Eliminative
Induction,” Philosophica 60, no. 2 (1997), Special issue
honoring Donald T. Campbell. Comparative
political science, comparative sociology, comparative public
policy, and experimental psychology have
also drawn on Mills’s methods.
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Motivation
In motivational arguments, claims assert that an action should
be adopted because
of the motivating power of intentions, goals, or values.
Motivational arguments
seek to demonstrate that the intentions, goals, or values
underlying a recommended
course of action are such as to warrant its acceptance, adoption,
or performance. It
is often sufficient to know that large or important groups
actually desire to follow
the course of action stated in the claim.
Argumentation from motivation represents a form of reasoning
that philoso-
phers since Aristotle have called the practical syllogism, or
practical inference.
In practical inference, the major premise or warrant, W,
describes some desired state
or end of action, whereas the minor premise or information, I,
relates a course of
action to this desired state as a means to an end. The conclusion
or claim,
C, consists of a recommendation to act in a certain way to
secure the desired state or
end. Whereas in theoretical inference acceptance of a general

proposition or law
leads to the conclusion or claim, in practical inference
acceptance of a premise about
goals, values, or intentions leads to a conclusion or claim about
actions that are in
accordance with the premises.38 Claims in practical inference
are usually designed to
understand actions, whereas claims in theoretical inference seek
to explain events.39
Practical reasoning is of great importance to policy analysis, a
field in which one
of the chief problems is to explain actions in terms of goals,
values, and intentions:
The practical syllogism provides the sciences of man with
something long missing
from their methodology: an explanation model in its own right
which is a definite
alternative to the subsumption-theoretic covering law model
[i.e., deductive-
nomological explanation—author]. Broadly speaking, what the
subsumption-
theoretical model is to causal explanation and explanation in the
natural sciences,
the practical syllogism is to teleological explanation and
explanation in history
and the social sciences.40
Motivational argumentation not only provides an alternative
explanatory model
for policy analysis but also compels us to conceptualize policy
making as a politi-
cal process. Arguments from motivation force analysts to think
in terms of the
goals, values, and intentions of policy actors and to “enter the

phenomenological
world of the policy maker.”41 Motivational arguments also
bring us closer to
questions of values and ethics, which in other modes of policy
argumentation are
frequently and regrettably separated from “factual” matters.
Figure 8.10 presents
an argument from motivation that is challenged by another
argument from
motivation and an argument from classification. In this
example, QI, (“definitely”)
becomes QII (“probably”) after the rebuttal.
38von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, pp. 22–27.
39Ibid., pp. 22–24. See also Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas A.
McCarthy, eds., Understanding and
Social Inquiry (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1977); and Rein, Social Science and
Public Policy (Baltimore, MD: Penguin 1976), pp. 14–15, 139–
70.
40von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, p. 27.
41R. A. Bauer, Study of Policy Formation (New York: Free
Press, 1971), p. 4.
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Intuition
In reasoning from intuition, policy claims are based on
assumptions about the
insight of participants in the policy-making process. Policy-
relevant information
consists of factual reports or expressions of opinion. The
function of the warrant
is to affirm that inner mental states (insight, judgment,
understanding) of producers
of information make them specially qualified to offer opinions
or advice. The policy
claim may simply reiterate the report or opinion supplied in the
information.
Consider this example of early military policy:
When in 1334 the Duchess of Tyrol, Margareta Maultasch,
encircled the
castle of Hochosterwitz in the province of Carinthia, she knew
only too well
that the fortress, situated on an incredibly steep rock rising high

above the
valley floor, was impregnable to direct attack and would yield
only to a long
siege. In due course, the situation of the defenders became
critical: they were
down to their last ox and had only two bags of barley corn left.
Margareta’s
situation was becoming equally pressing, albeit for different
reasons: her
troops were beginning to be unruly, there seemed to be no end
to the siege in
sight, and she had similarly urgent military business elsewhere.
At this point
the commandant of the castle decided on a desperate course of
action, which
to his men must have seemed sheer folly; he had the last ox
slaughtered, had its
abdominal cavity filled with the remaining barley, and ordered
the carcass
Congress should pass the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA).
CLAIM
A recent survey shows that the majority
of citizens are motivated by the desire to
prevent discrimination against women.
INFORMATION
Definitely
QUALIFIER I
If not definitely,
probably, given
the weak but

important
objection.
QUALIFIER II
The ERA is needed to
prevent discrimination
against women.
WARRANT
However, gender equality is a precondition of all
other values including representative government.
REBUTTAL
But our system of government is a republic,
where representatives of the people make policy.
Most members of Congress are against the ERA.
OBJECTION
FIGURE 8.10
Argumentation from motivation—support for the equal rights
amendment
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thrown down the steep cliff onto a meadow in front of the
enemy camp. Upon
receiving this scornful message from above, the discouraged
duchess abandoned
the siege and moved on.42
Figure 8.11 serves to emphasize some of the unique advantages
of insight, judg-
ment, and tacit knowledge in developing creative solutions to
problems. However,
it also points to difficulties. Although policy scholars urge that
intuition, judgment,
and tacit knowledge be incorporated into policy analysis,43 it is
seldom possible
42Quoted in Paul Watzlawick, John Weakland, and Richard
Fisch, Change: Principles of Problem
Formation and Problem Resolution (New York: W. W. Norton &

Company, 1974), p. xi.
The men should throw down
the last ox.
CLAIM
The commandant believes that throwing
down the last slaughtered ox will cause
the duchess to abandon the siege.
INFORMATION
Probably
QUALIFIER
The commandant has
proved to be capable of
sound intuitive judgments.
WARRANT
However, the Commandant has never
communicated with the Duchess, directly or
through an intermediary.
REBUTTAL
The commandant understands (tacitly knows)
that the duchess will abandon the siege if
there is no longer any opposition.
BACKING
But the commandant has a
secret deal with the Duchess.

OBJECTION
FIGURE 8.11
Argumentation from intuition—a counterintuitive solution
avoids certain death
43For example, Yehezkel Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences
(New York: American Elsevier Publishing,
1971), p. 52; Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The Art of Judgment: A
Study of Policy Making (New York: Basic
Books, 1965); and Edgar S. Quade, Analysis for Public
Decisions (New York: American Elsevier, 1975),
pp. 4–5. Some observers have also commented favorably on the
possibility of drug-induced changes in
the mental states of policy makers. See Kenneth B. Clark, “The
Pathos of Power: A Psychological
Perspective,” American Psychologist 26, no. 12 (1971): 1047–
57.
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to identify in advance the methods of reasoning that are likely
to yield insight or
creativity. A creative act, observes Churchman, “is an act that
cannot be designed
beforehand, although it may be analyzable in retrospect. If this
is the correct meaning
of creativity, then no intelligent technician can be creative.”44
Analogy
Reasoning from analogies and metaphors is based on
similarities between
relationships found in a given case and relationships found in a
metaphor, analogy,
or allegory (Figure 8.12). For example, the claim that
government should
“quarantine” a country by interdicting illegal drugs—with the
illegal drugs
presented as an “infectious disease”—is based on reasoning that
because quarantine
has been effective in cases of infectious diseases, interdiction
will be effective in the
case of illegal drugs. In arguments from analogy, claims are
based on assumptions
that relationships among two or more cases (not the cases
themselves) are essentially

Congress should pass the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA).
CLAIM
The ERA is analogous to the
prevention of discrimination
against women.
WARRANT
Public opinion polls show that
most citizens are against
discrimination against women.
INFORMATION
Certainly
QUALIFIER I
Because both types of legislation
demonstrates the general
relationship between legislation and
the prevention of discrimination.
BACKING
But this is a false analogy. Legislation
against racial discrimination was
accomplished through an Executive
Order, not an amendment to the
constitution. The latter is not politically
feasible at present.
OBJECTION
Considering the strong

objection, this is not
feasible.
QUALIFIER II
FIGURE 8.12
Argumentation from analogy—the equal rights amendment and
false analogy
44Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems, p. 17.
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similar. For example, claims about ways to reduce employment
discrimination
against women are sometimes based on assumptions about the
success of policies
designed to reduce discrimination against ethnic minorities.45
Parallel Case
Reasoning from parallel case focuses on similarities among two
or more cases of
policy making (Figure 8.13). For example, a reason that a local
government should
strictly enforce pollution standards is that a parallel policy was
successfully imple-
mented in a similar local government elsewhere. Here, the claim
is based on the
assumption that the results of policies adopted in similar
circumstances are worth-
while or successful. Government agencies in the United States
and abroad often face
similar problems, and policy claims may be based on their
common experiences.
The British experiences with comprehensive medical care and
city planning
45Lineberry, American Public Policy, p. 28.
The United States should adopt the
Dutch model and decriminalize the
use of illegal drugs.
CLAIM
The Netherlands has

been successful in
decriminalizing
the use of illegal drugs.
INFORMATION
This seems
plausible.
QUALIFIER I
The proposal
lacks merit,
considering the
strength of the
objection.
QUALIFIER II
Because the United States and the
Netherlands have similar problems with
drug addicts in urban centers. Both
countries are industrial democracies in
which there is broad public support for
policies to deal with the use of illegal
drugs.
WARRANT
But this is a false parallel. Dutch political
culture is tolerant and oriented toward
rehabilitation, whereas American political
culture is less tolerant and oriented toward
punishment. Two-thirds of inmates in
United States federal prisons are there for
offenses which include the use of illegal
drugs.

OBJECTION
FIGURE 8.13
Argumentation from parallel case—the dutch model and false
parallel
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(“new towns”), and the Dutch and Swiss approaches to the

decriminalization of
illegal drugs, have influenced debates about urban policy and
drug policy in the
United States. The experience of some states in adopting
taxation, open housing,
and equal employment opportunity policies has been used as a
basis for policy at the
federal level.46 A variation of argumentation from parallel case
is an argument
based on the experience of the same agency over time. Past
policies in the same
agency are used to support claims that the agency should adopt
particular courses of
action, usually those that are marginally different from the
status quo. Claims about
federal and state budgetary policies are typically based on
assumptions about simi-
larities with past policies adopted in the same agency.47
Ethics
Reasoning from ethics is based on the rightness or wrongness,
goodness or
badness, of policies or their consequences (Figure 8.14). For
example, policy
claims are frequently based on moral principles stating the
conditions of a “just”
or “good” society, or on ethical norms prohibiting lying in
public life. Moral
principles and ethical norms go beyond the values and norms of
particular individ-
uals or groups. In public policy, many arguments about
economic benefits and
costs involve unstated or implicit moral and ethical reasoning.
The warrant in an
argument from ethics provides reasons for accepting a claim by
associating it with

some moral principle or ethical rule. The claim is that the
person, situation,
or condition referred to in the information should be regarded as
valuable or
worthless, or that a policy described in the information should
or should not
be adopted.
To illustrate ethical argumentation, consider Figure 8.14. Here,
the evaluative
claim, C, is that “the existing distribution of income in the
United States is unjust.”
The information, I, is the following:
In 1975, the top 20 percent of American families received 41
percent of all
income, whereas the bottom 20 percent received 5.4 percent. In
1989, the top
and bottom percentages were 46.0 and 3.8 percent; in 2007 they
were 49.0
and 3.4 percent. From 1975 to 2007, average incomes increased
by about
3 percent, and winners compensated losers through social
service and welfare
programs. But the United States has the greatest income
equality of any indus-
trialized state.
The warrant, W, is the Pareto rule, named after the Italian
economist and sociologist
Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923). The Pareto rule is a simple ethical
principle supported by
many policy economists.48 The rule states that “an optimum
distribution of income in
society is one in which some individuals benefit without others
losing.” The backing, B,

46Ibid.
47See, for example, Aaron Wildavsky’s now classic treatment
of incremental policy making in
The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1964). See also the
discussion of models of policy change in Chapter 2.
48See Peter G. Brown, “Ethics and Policy Research,” Policy
Analysis 2 (1976): 332–35.
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for the warrant is “Since income is earned through ability, hard
work, and one’s own
labor.” The objection, O, is “But many of the winners receive
income through fraud,
discrimination, and unearned inheritance.” The partial rebuttal,
R, is “However,
persons have a right to their own family’s property” (Figure
8.14).
Figure 8.14 shows how an important contending moral
principle, John
Rawls’s principle of “justice as fairness,” can also serve as an
objection to the
Pareto principle. The example of Pareto optimality demonstrates
that a widely
accepted ethical rule, although it supports claims about a just
society, does not
The existing distribution of income
in the United States is just.
CLAIM
In 1975, the top 20 percent American
households received 41 percent of all
income, while the bottom 20 percent
received 5.4 percent. In 1989, the top and
bottom percentages were 46.7 percent
and 3.8 percent, while in 2007 they were
49 percent and 3.4 percent. But from 1975
to 2007, average incomes increased while
losers were compensated through social
service and welfare programs. However,
the U.S has the greatest income inequality

of any industrialized country.
INFORMATION
Evidently, the
distribution
is just.
QUALIFIER I
Because a just distribution
of income is one where
at least one person benefits
without others losing
(Pareto Optimality). If there
are losers, they can be
compensated by winners,
creating a state of “Virtual
Pareto Optimality” (also
known as the Kaldor–Hicks
corollary.)
WARRANT
Since income is received
through ability, hard work,
and one’s own labor.
But the losers are becoming
worse off without adequate
compensation. Between 1975
and 2007, the income of the
bottom 20 percent declined from
5.4 percent to 3.4 percent, a
decline of nearly 60 percent.
This is not just.
BACKING OBJECTION

This is not evident,
considering the
strength of the
objections.
QUALIFIER II
But the winners receive
income through fraud,
discrimination, and
family inheritance.
OBJECTION
However, families have
a right to their own
property.
REBUTTAL
Because a just distribution of income is
one where those worse off are made
better off. This is John Rawls’s principle
of justice as fairness.
WARRANT
FIGURE 8.14
Argumentation from ethics—income distribution and justice as
fairness
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apply to situations involving fraud, discrimination, and
inheritance. By engaging
in the systematic analysis of underlying ethical and moral
reasoning, parties to a
debate are also compelled to clarify the meaning of key
concepts such as entitlement,
which are more complex than may be apparent at first glance.
Parties making a
claim also may be compelled to consider whether particular
ethical rules, such as
Pareto and Rawlsian optimality, violate their own moral
convictions. Proponents
of the Pareto rule may see that its application violates moral

convictions about
the necessity of basing principles of entitlement on ability and
work. If this is
done for welfare recipients, why not for heirs to estates? In
short, the analysis
of ethical argumentation can help us probe ethical rules and
moral principles to
determine whether they are general in their applicability and
internally consistent.49
Ethical argumentation, it should be emphasized, differs from
each of the other
modes of reasoning in one essential respect: Whereas each of
the other modes
takes values as “given”—for example, values that are described
in public opinion
surveys are a basis for arguments from motivation (Figure
8.10)—the process of
ethical argumentation attempts to discover whether there are
good reasons to
make ethical claims.
EVALUATING POLICY ARGUMENTS
The evaluation of policy arguments facilitates critical thinking
in public policy
analysis. So far, we have looked at the structure of arguments,
the process of argu-
mentation, and modes of reasoning employed in making policy
claims. This enables
the identification of hidden or tacit assumptions and shows how
the plausibility of a
claim, as expressed in its qualifier, changes as a result of
objections and rebuttals
introduced in the course of policy argumentation.
We now turn to specific criteria for evaluating arguments. Some

of these criteria
come from propositional logic, a discipline that offers criteria
for determining—
without qualification and with deductive certainty—the formal
validity of
arguments.50 Other criteria originate in a continuously evolving
body of standards
for assessing the informal validity of arguments.51 Still other
criteria come from
procedures employed by methodologists who work in the
hermeneutics and inter-
pretationist (Verstehende) traditions. These traditions have long
been concerned
with discovering and accurately representing the meaning of
human actions,
whether expressed in the form of written texts or as spoken
language.52 Finally,
some criteria originate in philosophical pragmatism, an
epistemology and method-
ology that is useful for evaluating entire systems of
argumentation.53
49MacRae, Social Function of Social Science, pp. 92–94.
50Classic sources on formal logic include Irving M. Copi, An
Introduction to Logic (New York:
Macmillan, 1953).
51See Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, An Introduction to Reasoning,
Part V: Fallacies: How Arguments
Go Wrong, pp. 129–97.
52The classic treatise on hermeneutics, originally published in
1960, is Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth
and Method (New York: Seabury, 1975).
53See Rescher, Induction.
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Evaluating Policy Arguments 369
Some Hermeneutic Guidelines
Hermeneutics investigates the meanings of human texts. It is
perhaps the most com-
prehensive and systematic of the qualitative methodologies. The
term qualitative,
contrary to a common misunderstanding in the social
sciences,54 is not simply the
logical complement of “quantitative,” in the sense that
qualitative refers to that
which is not quantitative or statistical. For this reason, it is

inappropriate to employ
the term qualitative to small-n case study research or the
discrete (versus continu-
ous) level of measurement. Rather, qualitative methods—also
known as hermeneu-
tic, interpretive, ethnographic, or constructivist methods—are
expressly designed to
investigate the meanings of individual and collective action.55
Statistical and other
forms of quantitative analysis are not appropriate for this
purpose.
Human texts refer not only to written documents that are
products of human
action, for example, legislative transcripts and laws that
originate as policy debates;
they also refer to the actions themselves, whether or not they
have been expressed in
written form. Among various ways to demonstrate the
importance of hermeneutic
guidelines to the evaluation of policy arguments, a focus on
ethical argumentation is
most revealing. Consider alternative ethical arguments about a
prisoner captured by
soldiers from the opposing army:
� Argument A. The prisoner is not a member of a regular
fighting force. He is
a common criminal, a terrorist who lies when interrogated about
terrorist plots
and other military secrets. Because he does not qualify formally
as a prisoner
of war, he should not be protected against “inhumane treatment”
and torture.
� Argument B. The prisoner is a freedom fighter who is

combating the terror
and oppression inflicted by the enemy. He is a loyal soldier who
has a moral
duty to mislead interrogators about military secrets. He should
be protected as
a prisoner of war.
� Argument C. The prisoner is a member of a fighting force
constituted by a
standing army. He is a prisoner of war whose loyalty demands
that he mislead
interrogators about military secrets. As such, he should receive
the protections
against inhumane treatment afforded any prisoner of war.
The evaluation of these arguments can benefit from guidelines
for the interpretation
of written or oral argumentation (Procedural Guide 8.2).
The main function of arguments A and B is rhetorical, not
dialectical or logical-
empirical. Although the use of A and B as rebuttals to each
other would contribute to
the dialectical function, this is not the main purpose of A and B.
A and B do present
evidently factual statements, some of which appear to be
empirically sound and uncon-
troversial. A prisoner was captured, he was involved as a
combatant, and he was not
telling the truth. What is disputed are two main issues: Is it is
morally and legally right
to lie under the circumstances? Does the soldier qualify as a
prisoner of war?
54See, for example, a widely used text by Gary King, Robert
Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing

Social Inquiry: The Logic of Inference in Qualitative Research
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1994).
55For an extended critical essay on the meaning of qualitative
see John Searle, The Construction of
Social Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
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Other guidelines also apply. The quotation marks around some

of the words
(“prisoner of war” and “inhumane treatment”) conceal or
obscure meanings. The
contexts of A and B are also important for understanding the
arguments. Given the
history of many conflicts, it is not surprising that both sides
regard opponents as
terrorists. The principle of hermeneutic charity encourages
giving the benefit of the
doubt to each party, for example, by trying to understand that
both seek to
be treated equally. The one side contests the moral and legal
acceptability of attacks
on their troops (and on civilians) by out-of-uniform combatants,
arguing that such
practices are unfair. The other side affirms the moral and legal
acceptability of such
acts, on grounds that such acts are fair when one side has a
preponderance of mod-
ern weaponry. Finally, both arguments make liberal use of
pejoratives—“extremist,”
“criminal,” “terrorist,” “propagandists,” “freedom fighter,”
“oppression”—that
obscure rather than clarify moral and legal issues.
If we were to rephrase the arguments, introducing rebuttals and
replacing absolute
with qualified claims, it would look something like argument C.
Argument C has the
BOX 8.2
Guidelines for Interpreting Arguments
� Policy argumentation has three major
functions: to generate debate that improves the

validity, soundness, and efficacy of policies
(dialectical function); to present optimally
valid and empirically sound conclusions
(logical-empirical function); and to persuade
others to accept policy arguments (rhetorical
function), apart from the validity, soundness, or
usefulness of the arguments.
� Look for concealed meanings in words,
sentences, and entire arguments. A word or
sentence may not mean what it says on the
surface. Example: “He is a good socialist” may
not mean that the person described performs
well as a socialist; it rather may mean that the
person’s identity as a socialist is associated
with some kind of weakness or flaw.
� Distinguish between the surface meaning of a
word, sentence, or argument and its meaning in
the context of the arguer. Try to identify any
differences in your understanding from that of
the arguer. Example: “The mayor should not
have publicly acquiesced to the demonstrators’
demands.” Several potential misinterpretations
are possible: Someone other than the mayor
should have acquiesced; the mayor should not
have acquiesced in public; the mayor should
not have acquiesced at all.
� Observe the principle of hermeneutic charity,
which requires that disagreements about
meaning be resolved by accepting, or trying to
understand, what the arguer is trying to say.
Example: Critics of arguments presented in
quantitative language often label such

arguments (and the arguers) as “logical
positivists,” notwithstanding the fact that
quantification, per se, has little to do with
logical positivism. A charitable effort to
understand what the arguer actually believes
can solve this problem.
� Look for terms that are used pejoratively to
discredit a person or policy. On the surface,
these terms can be neutral; but in context, they
are often pejorative. Examples: “This is just
another new bureaucracy.” “These are the
arguments of typical ‘tree-huggers.’ ” “The
report, written by a bunch of ‘qualitative’
researchers, is unacceptable.”
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advantage of isolating the contested issue, which is one of
conflicting obligation:
In the ethics of war, there has been a widespread understanding
that prisoners who
mislead interrogators about military secrets are displaying
courage, honor, patriotism,
and other virtues. Here, the same understanding would
presumably apply to both sides.
Guidelines from Informal and Formal Logic
Hermeneutic guidelines are designed to enhance the
understanding of meanings.
Questions concerning the soundness, credibility, or plausibility
of arguments do not
arise, because the aim is to achieve an accurate interpretation of
what arguers mean.
By contrast, the fields of informal and formal logic provide
guidelines for recognizing
and assessing the significance of informal fallacies.56 Here as
elsewhere the term
guideline is used in place of “rule,” because there is no way to
determine with
certainty whether an argument is fallacious. Hence the analysis
of informal fallacies
does not permit all or none conclusions.
As we saw in the first part of this chapter, numerous modes of
argumentation

are generally recognized as appropriate to policy discourse.
Arguments of the
following kind are formally valid:
� Hypothetical syllogism. If p implies q, and q implies r, then p
implies r. Or:
p)q, q ); r, ∴ p ) r () � implies). Example: A transitive
preference ordering
is one form of the hypothetical syllogism. Given three projects,
A, B, and C, if
A p B, and B p C, then A p C (p � preferred to). This formally
valid argument
can be empirically unsound.
� Modus ponens. Modus ponens (method of affirming) asserts
that if p implies
q, and p occurs, then q will occur. If p ) q, and p, then q.
Example: If invest-
ment I in a project produces outcome O, and investment I is
made, then
outcome O will result. Although this argument is formally valid,
the conclusion
assumes that no causally relevant factor other than I is present,
a situation that almost never exists. This formally valid
argument can be
empirically unsound.
� Modus tollens. Modus tollens (method of denying) asserts
that if p implies q,
and q does not occur, then p is not a cause . If p ) q, and q does
not occur (~ q),
then p is not a cause (~ p). Example: If investment I in a
program produces
outcome O, and O does not occur, then I is not a cause. This
formally valid
argument can be empirically unsound.

We now turn to modes of argumentation that are generally
recognized as
formally invalid, inappropriate, or unsound—however
persuasive they may appear on
first glance. These modes of argumentation are called fallacies.
A fallacy is
an argument that is weakened or seriously flawed because it
uses irrelevant or
inadequate information, erroneous or unsound reasoning, or
inappropriate and
misleading language. Table 8.2 provides a listing of fallacies
and guidelines that are
helpful in recognizing them.
56The terms informal logic and informal fallacy are used in the
discipline of logic, in which formal logic
and formal fallacy are also distinguished.
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TABLE 8.2
Guidelines for Identifying Invalid Arguments and Fallacies
Fallacy Guideline
Affirming the
Consequent
A matter of formal (propositional) logic. A logically invalid
argument is the
following: If p then q, and q, then p (p ) q, q, therefore p). “The
paradigm of ‘proof
through prediction,’ ” notes Merton, “is, of course, logically
fallacious: If A
(hypothesis), then B (prediction). B is observed. Therefore, A is
true.”* If the
strict enforcement of speeding causes traffic accidents to
decline, and traffic
accidents decline, then strict enforcement was the cause. In
scientific research, this
form of argument, although formally invalid, can be useful
because a hypothesis
may be improved by testing conditions other than B, that is,
rival hypotheses.

Denying the
Antecedent
Again, a matter of formal logical validity. If p then q, and not-
p, then not-q (p )
q, ~ p, therefore ~ q) is fallacious. Example: Because market
economies are
democracies, and country X is not a market economy, it is not a
democracy.
False Analogy The comparison of two relationships believed to
be similar disregards
important differences that make the comparison relatively
unsound. Example:
Because drug addiction is like an infectious disease,
quarantining addicts is
the only policy that will work.
False Parallel The comparison of two cases believed to be
similar disregards important
differences that make the comparison unsound. The
acquiescence of the
United States in World War II led to genocide and ethnic
cleansing.
The United States cannot acquiesce in ethnic cleansing in the
Balkans.
Hasty
Generalization
In making a generalization from particular instances of a case, a
failure to
recognize that there are too few instances of the case, or that
the instances are
exceptional rather than typical. In conducting opinion surveys,

an inadequate
sample size will yield too few instances, and a failure to use
random sampling—
with which every element or instance has an equal chance of
being selected—is
likely to yield exceptional conclusions rather than those typical
of the population.
Example: “Focus group” interviews with fifteen typical voters
conducted before
the election show that there is greater support for candidate A
than candidate B.
False Cause In making a claim about cause and effect, arguing
that a single cause is
responsible for an effect, but without examining other plausible
causes. False
causes also stem from confusing statistical correlation or
covariance with
causality and inferring cause from temporal sequence alone
(post hoc fallacy).
Examples: Excessive government spending is responsible for
the slow growth of
GDP (single false cause). That economic conditions affect
social well-being is
evident from the statistically significant positive correlation (r
� 0.74, p � 0.05)
between suicide and unemployment (false cause based on
correlation). After
the Reagan (or Clinton) administration took office, we had the
highest
unemployment (or government spending) in twenty years (post
hoc fallacy).
Fallacy of
Composition

Concluding that something is true of the whole because it is true
of its parts.
The fallacy of composition (also called the aggregative or
holistic fallacy)
involves all parts, not just a sample, so it differs from the
fallacy of hasty
generalization (see earlier entry). Example: Vehicle safety
studies of the severity
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Fallacy Guideline
of damage suffered by test robots riding at different speeds in
automobiles show
that speed and severity of damage are strongly and positively
correlated. This is
striking evidence that “speed kills!” But studies of fatal
accidents show that
approximately 20 percent of fatal accidents are related to
speeding.
Fallacy of Division Concluding that something is true of the
parts because it is true of the whole
(also called the individualistic fallacy). Example: Because the
per capita
income of a country has increased, everyone is better off. In
many countries,
however, this is false. Persons who are better off become even
better off,
whereas those worse off become even worse off. Another
example is using the
arithmetic mean and other averages to describe a group, without
examining
differences among the group’s members (e.g., outliers in a
scatter plot).
Fallacy of the
Slippery Slope
Concluding on the basis of insufficient or inadequate evidence
that if one
event occurs, then others will follow in an inevitable or
uncontrollable
sequence. Example: If the legislature passes a new law
requiring stricter

registration of handguns, it will lead to government confiscation
of all guns.
Begging the
Question
A claim is assumed as a reason or evidence. Example: With a
force of
500,000 troops we will be able to invade Iraq and topple
President Saddam
Hussein. It will take this many troops to do the job.
Ad Hominem An individual’s personal characteristics are used
as part of an argument, when
such characteristics are irrelevant to an issue. Examples: (1) An
eminent natural
scientist concludes that welfare reform is unsound. (2) The
argument of the
environmentalists is deeply flawed. After all, these “tree
huggers” are just socialists
in disguise. and (3) Theories of economic development are
products of Western
thinking. Obviously, they are inapplicable to the non-Western
world. Note that when
personal characteristics are relevant, no ad hominem fallacy is
involved. For
example, “expert witnesses” in court cases should have
appropriate expertise.
Ad Populum The characteristics or beliefs of a group or
community are used as part of an
argument, when the characteristics or beliefs are irrelevant to
the issue.
Example: The majority of the community believes that fluoride
causes cancer.

Appeal to Tradition A claim is based on conformity to tradition,
when tradition is largely or
entirely irrelevant to the issue. Examples: (1) We have always
done it this
way. (2) The Founding Fathers would be appalled by the
senator’s proposal.
and (3) The successful disciplines have succeeded because they
have emulated
physics. This should be the model the social sciences, if they
want to succeed.
Accent A misplaced emphasis on a word, phrase, or portion of
an argument results in
misunderstanding or misinterpretation. The use of italics,
boldface print,
variable fonts, photos, clip art, and colors can accentuate the
importance of
relatively sound or plausible, as well as relatively unsound or
implausible,
arguments or parts of arguments. A leading example of the
fallacy of accent
is quoting or extracting information, reasons, or arguments out
of context.
* Robert K. Merton Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed.
(Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1957), p. 99n. The same point is made
by
Donald T. Campbell, Epistemology and Methodology for Social
Science: Selected Essays (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1988), p.
168.
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has examined in detail the structure
and process of policy argumentation, focusing
on contrasts among types of claims, the identifi-
cation and arrangement of elements of policy
arguments, and the effects of objections and
rebuttals on the dynamics of argumentation.
The chapter also contrasted different modes of
policy reasoning and offered guidelines for the
identification and assessment of common
fallacies that weaken or seriously flaw policy

arguments. Policy argumentation is central to
policy analysis and the policy-making process.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Use three (3) of the following terms to con-
struct definitive, designative, evaluative, and
advocative claims. There should be twelve (12)
claims in all.
crime fiscal crisis
pollution human rights
terrorism ethnic cleansing
quality of life unemployment
global warming poverty
2. Develop a policy argument on the basis of one
or more of the terms in question 1.
3. Convert the argument in question 2 into a policy
debate by providing an objection and a rebuttal.
4. Explain why the qualifier changed (if it did)
after introducing the objection and rebuttal. If
the qualifier did not change, why not?
5. Define the term fallacy. Does the commission
of a formal fallacy such as affirming the conse-
quent invalidate an argument? Is the same true
for informal fallacies, for example, false analogy
or ad populum?
DEMONSTRATION EXERCISES
1. Obtain an online or hard copy of the interna-
tional affairs section of a newspaper. Identify

and describe as many modes of argument as
you can. Would you expect to find different
modes of argument in academic journals than
in newspapers? Explain.
2. Read the letters to the editor in a newspaper,
magazine, or online bulletin board or blog. Find
as many examples of formal and informal falla-
cies as you can. A variation of this exercise is to
break into groups to complete the assignment.
3. Read Case 8.1 (Pros and Cons of Balkan
Intervention), which is drawn from an editorial
in the Los Angeles Times. Use the argument-
mapping procedures presented in this chapter
to analyze the pros and cons (or strengths and
weaknesses) of the recommendation that the
United States should not intervene in the
Balkans. In doing this exercise, either display
the elements of argument with Microsoft Draw
or use Rationale, the special computer program
for mapping the structure of policy arguments.
4. Write a one-page analysis in which you assess
the overall plausibility of the claim “The con-
flict in Bosnia is somebody else’s trouble. The
United States should not intervene militarily.”
Prepare an argument map and hand it in with
your one-page analysis.
5. Following is an argument map in which the
warrants, backings, objections, rebuttals, and
qualifiers have been scrambled.57 Rearrange
the elements to make a persuasive argument
and counterargument. Study Case 8.2 as an

example.
57This was done with a sub-program in Rationale.
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Bibliography 375
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alker, H. R., Jr. “The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides’
Melian Dialogue.” American Political Science

Review 82, no. 3 (1988): 805–20.
Anderson, C. W. “Political Philosophy, Practical
Reason, and Policy Analysis.” In Confronting
Values in Policy Analysis. Edited by F. Fischer
and J. Forester. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
Publications, 1987.
Apthorpe, R., and D. Gasper, eds. Arguing
Development Policy: Frames and Discourses.
London: Frank Cass, 1996.
Dunn, W. N. “Policy Reforms as Arguments.” In
The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and
Planning. Edited by F. Fischer and J. Forester.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993.
Fischer, D. H. Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic
of Historical Thought. New York: Random
House, 1970.
Fischer, F. Evaluating Public Policy. Chicago:
Nelson Hall, 1995.
Fischer, F., and J. Forester, eds. The Argumentative
Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1993.
Gasper, D., and R. V. George. “Analyzing Argumen-
tation in Planning and Public Policy: Improving
and Transcending the Toulmin- Dunn Model.”
Environment and Planning B: Planning and
Design 25 (1998): 367–90.
Majone, G. Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in
the Policy Process. New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 1989.
McCloskey, D. N. The Rhetoric of Economics.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.
Mitroff, I. I., R. O. Mason, and V. Barabba. The
1980 Census: Policy Making Amid Turbulence.
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1985.
The Senate should
not authorize the use
of force in Libya.
Risky and
uncertain
The U.S. has
an obligation
to intervene.
Without a
doubt.
The leader is a brutal
dictator who has no
interest except his
own
The Minister of
Foreign Affairs is
reported to be a
supporter of terrorism.
Economic sanctions are a better
alternative. They have worked in
the past in Asia.

An intervention is unwarranted. It is
an artificial creation of the President
and no vital interests are at stake.
The actions of the Libyan Army are
a clear violation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
There is no assurance
the dissident groups
will not oppose the
U.S. later.
The museum holds
ancient treasures and
historical artifacts.
Diplomatic options
have not been
exhausted.
This is a civil war and
the U.S. should not
intervene in the internal
affairs of a state.
The war may not be
winnable unless the
U.S. puts “boots on
the ground.”
Dissident groups are engaged
in armed conflict with the
Libyan Army, which is winning.

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Roe, E. Narrative Policy Analysis. Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1994.
Scriven, M. Reasoning. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.
Stone, D. Policy Paradox: The Art of Political
Decision Making. Rev Ed. New York: W. W.
Norton, 2002.

Toulmin, S., R. Rieke, and A. Janik. An Introduction
to Reasoning. 2d ed. New York: Macmillan, 1984.
Van Gelder, Tim. “The Rationale for Rationale.” Law,
Probability & Risk 6, nos. 1–4 (2007): 23–42.
CASE 8.1 PROS AND CONS OF BALKAN
INTERVENTION58
“Must the agony of Bosnia-Herzegovina be
regarded, with whatever regrets, as somebody else’s
trouble? We don’t think so, but the arguments on
behalf of that view deserve an answer. Among them
are the following:
� The Balkan conflict is a civil war and unlikely to
spread beyond the borders of the former
Yugoslavia. Wrong. Belgrade has missiles trained
on Vienna. Tito’s Yugoslavia claimed, by way of
Macedonia, that northern Greece as far south as
Thessaloniki belonged under its sovereignty.
Those claims may return. “Civil” war pitting
non-Slavic Albanians against Serbs could spread
to Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece.
� The United States has no strategic interest in the
Balkans. Wrong. No peace, no peace dividend.
Unless the West can impose the view that ethnic
purity can no longer be the basis for national
sovereignty, then endless national wars will
replace the Cold War. This threat has appeared
in genocidal form in Bosnia. If it cannot be
contained here, it will erupt elsewhere, and the
Clinton administration’s domestic agenda will be
an early casualty.

� If the West intervenes on behalf of the Bosnians,
the Russians will do so on behalf of the Serbs,
and the Cold War will be reborn. Wrong. The
Russians have more to fear from “ethnic
cleansing” than any people on Earth. Nothing
would reassure them better than a new, post-Cold
War Western policy of massive, early response
against the persecution of national minorities,
including the Russian minorities found in every
post-Soviet republic. The Russian right may favor
the Serbs, but Russian self-interest lies elsewhere.
� The Serbs also have their grievances. Wrong.
They do, but their way of responding to these
grievances, according to the State Department’s
annual human rights report, issued this past
week, “dwarfs anything seen in Europe since Nazi
times.” Via the Genocide Convention, armed
intervention is legal as well as justified.
� The UN peace plan is the only alternative.
Wrong. Incredibly, the plan proposes the
reorganization of Bosnia-Herzegovina followed
by a cease-fire. A better first step would be a
UN declaration that any nation or ethnic group
proceeding to statehood on the principle of ethnic
purity is an outlaw state and will be treated as
such. As now drafted, the UN peace plan, with a
map of provinces that not one party to the
conflict accepts, is really a plan for continued
‘ethnic cleansing.’” �
58From the Los Angeles Times, January 24, 1993, p. A7.

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CASE 8.2 IMAGES, ARGUMENTS, AND THE
SECOND PERSIAN GULF CRISIS, 1990–91
The analysis of policy arguments can be employed to
investigate the ways that policy makers represent or
structure problems (Chapter 3). We can thereby
identify the images, or problem representations, that
shape processes of making and justifying decisions.
For example, during times of crisis, the images that
U.S. policy makers have of another country affect

deliberations about the use of peacekeeping and
negotiation, the imposition of economic sanctions, or
the use of deadly force. This case looks at the
deliberations surrounding the U.S. decision to use
military force to produce an Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait during the Second Persian Gulf Crisis of
1990–91.
It is important to recognize that there have been
three Persian Gulf crises since 1980. The First
Persian Gulf Crisis, which involved eight years of
war between Iraq and Iran, lasted from September
1980 to August1988. An estimated half-million
civilians and military combatants died in the conflict.
The Third Gulf Crisis began in 2003 and
appeared to be coming to a conclusion in 2011, as
occupying U.S. and coalition troops continued a
steady withdrawal from Iraq. Between 2003 and
2010, it is estimated that between 700,000 and
1.5 million Iraqi civilians died as a direct
and indirect result of the war, and some
11,800 members of the Iraqi security forces and
police were killed.59 There were nearly 4,500 U.S.
military deaths and another 220 among coalition
forces, about one-half of whom were British.
The Second Persian Gulf Crisis may be conveniently
dated to August 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
Seven months later, on March 3, 1991, a cease-fire was
signed.60 When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States
began sending troops and Patriot missiles to defend
Saudi Arabia and Israel. The purpose was to defend
against Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on Riyadh, Tel Aviv,
and Haifa. An economic embargo was also put in place

along with a U.S.-UN Security Council demand for an
immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. Over the next five
months, Saddam Hussein failed to comply. At that
point, a Security Council resolution was passed giving
Iraq until January 15, 1991, to withdraw. The
resolution authorized intervention by a U.S.-led
coalition after that date.
Prior to the deadline for the withdrawal from
Kuwait, the U.S. Senate debated the merits of U.S.
intervention. Two policy alternatives were
presented. One of these, the Dole-Warner
resolution, supported the Bush administration and
the United Nations by authorizing the use of
military force to compel a withdrawal. The other
resolution, the Mitchell-Nunn resolution, called for
the continued use of sanctions. The vote in favor of
the Dole-Warner resolution was 52–47.
Political scientist Richard Cottam and cognitive
political psychologist James Voss show how the images
59Hannah Fischer, “Iraq Casualties: U.S. Military Forces and
Iraqi Civilians, Police, and Security
Forces.” U.S. Congressional Research Service Report (June 11,
2010).
60Earlier, on February 15, the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr led
a revolt against Saddam Hussein’s
regime, partly in response to President George H. W. Bush’s
earlier call on February 2 for Iraqis to over-
throw Hussein’s government. In the same month, the Kurds in
Northern Iraq also rose up in an attempt
to overthrow Saddam’s regime.
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of another state can be investigated by focusing on
indicators of the perceived motivation, capability,
culture, and decision processes of that state:61
� Ally Image. The image of the ally is known by
finding in foreign policy discourse indicators
referring to the mutually beneficial goals of the
ally, to the ally’s adequate but often less than
possible military and economic capabilities, the

ally’s comparably civilized culture, and the ally’s
well-managed and popularly supported process of
governmental decision making.
� Enemy Image. The image of the enemy state
is known by finding in foreign policy discourse
indicators referring to the aggressive, evil, and
expansionistic motivations of the enemy; to the
enemy’s comparable but penetrable military and
economic capabilities; to the enemy’s comparably
civilized culture; and to the enemy’s monolithic
and undemocratic process of governmental
decision making.
� Radical Image. The image of the radical
state is known by finding in foreign policy
discourse indicators referring to fanatic or
extremist motivations, to the radical state’s use
of terror to compensate for its inferior military
and economic capabilities, to the radical state’s
less than civilized culture, and to a decision
process that is well organized and clever.
� Degenerate Image. The image of the
degenerate state is known by finding in foreign
policy discourse indicators referring to leaders
motivated by the accumulation and preservation
of personal power, to the degenerate state’s
inferior and declining military and economic
capabilities, to the degenerate state’s less than
civilized culture, and to a confused and
disorganized decision process.
� Imperial Image. The image of the imperial
state is known by finding in foreign policy
discourse indicators referring to motivations

based on nationalism and modernization in the
interests of the people, to the imperial state’s
need for external help because of inferior military
and economic capabilities, to the imperial state’s
less than civilized culture, and to poorly managed
decision processes that require military and
economic assistance.
In the Second Persian Gulf Crisis, Senate debates
were held on January 10, 11, and 12 of 1991.The
arguments put forth in the debates contain indicators of
the images just described.62 For example, one supporter
of the Dole-Warner resolution, whose position was
nearly identical to that of the White House, was
Senator Bryan (D-Nebraska). He argued in terms
indicating a traditional enemy image of Iraq: “Hussein
now has under arms more men than Hitler when the
German Army marched into the Rhineland . . . more
tanks than when the Panzer Divisions crushed
France . . . and most chilling of all, much closer to
having a nuclear weapon than Adolf Hitler ever was.”
This is not the image of a radical or terrorist
state, but that of a traditional aggressive and
expansionistic state. Senator Roth (D-Delaware)
reinforced this image: “Hussein has demonstrated
that with the Cold War fading, the real threat to
freedom-loving nations is the proliferation of arms in
the hands of despotic dictators. Intercontinental
missiles, chemical, biological, and nuclear arms can
turn unstable Third World nations into first-rate
military powers.” By contrast, Senator Cohen
(R-Maine), another supporter of Dole-Warner, used
an argument suggesting the image of a radical or
terroristic state: “Not one of us . . . is safe from the
violence currently being inflicted in Kuwait . . . Our

61The images are based on Richard W. Cottam, Foreign Policy
Motivation: A General Theory and a
Case Study (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977).
The descriptions of images and use of
quotations are based on Voss et al., “Representations of the
Gulf Crisis as Derived from the U.S. Senate
Debate,” pp. 279–302 in Donald A. Sylvan and James F. Voss,
eds. Problem Representation in Foreign
Policy Decision Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
62All statements were extracted from The Congressional Record
(January 9, 10,11) by Voss et al.,
“Representations of the Gulf Crisis as Derived from the U.S.
Senate Debate.”
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Case 8.2 379
The Senate should authorize
the use of force under the Dole-
Warner resolution.
CLAIM (52)
The Dole-Warner resolution supports
U.N. Security Council Resolution 678
of November 29, 1990 authorizing
U.S. military intervention to force an
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
INFORMATION (98)
Since Iraq has a large military (37), regional
political aspirations (32), and petroleum
reserves that give economic control (16).
Because Iraq is a threat
to the security of the
region and the world.
WARRANT (51)
Because the U.S.
has an obligation to
intervene.
WARRANT (16)

Immediately and
without hesitation.
BACKING (16-37)
Since the U.S. is a member of the U.N.,
committed to Israel and moderate Arab
states, and opposed to human rights
violations.
BACKING (16)
QUALIFIER (30)
But the authorization is unwarranted.
It is an artificial creation of the
President and no vital interests are
at stake.
OBJECTION (37)
But sanctions are working. GNP is
cut in half and imports and exports
have been reduced by 90−97%.
OBJECTION (47)
But available
diplomatic options
have not been pursued.
OBJECTION (33)
However, sanctions have not produced
a withdrawal. They will cause economic
problems for allies and cause the
suffering of innocent persons.

REBUTTAL (34)
However, diplomacy
has not worked in the
past and will not
work now.
REBUTTAL (9)
FIGURE C8.2
Senate arguments supporting and opposing U.S. involvement
under security council
resolution 678 authorizing military intervention to force the
withdrawal of Iraq from
Kuwait (November 29, 1990)
security is only a Pan Am 103 away at any moment.”
Senator Hatch (R-Utah) used similar language:
“We have a major political interest in preventing
Hussein from radicalizing the Arab world.”
Among the supporters of the Mitchell-Nunn
resolution were Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware),
who argued: “Yes, we have interests in the Middle
East. We wish to support the free flow of oil. We
wish to promote stability, including the securing of
Israel. But we have not heard one cogent argument
that any vital American interest is at stake in a way
that impels us to war.” As for military capability,
Senator Patrick Moynihan (D-New York) argued
that “The Iraqis do not (even) have the technology
to print their own paper money.” In support of the
continued use of economic sanctions, Senator Frank
Lautenberg (D-New Jersey) argued: “Historical
analysis of the use of economic sanctions suggests
that they can be effective over time in forcing the

withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.”
Figure C8.1 maps the arguments supporting the
resolution sponsored by Bob Dole (R-Kansas) and John
Warner (R-Virginia).The figure also maps the
objections of senators favoring the counter-resolution
sponsored by George Mitchell (D-Maine) and Sam
Nunn (D-Georgia). Rebuttals to objections are also
displayed. The numbers in parentheses are the numbers
of votes for the different parts of the argument
supporting military intervention. The votes were along
party lines, except for two Democrats who voted for the
Dole-Warner Resolution. Because two senators were
not present for the vote, the total number is 98 votes.
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The Senate debate includes arguments that
appear to be the consequence of at least three
images of Iraq. Arguments supporting the Dole-
Warner Resolution authorizing a military attack
appear to be a consequence of images of Iraq as a
radical-terrorist state, or a degenerate state.
In turn, arguments offered in support of the
continuation of economic sanctions appear
to originate in an image of Iraq as a conventional
enemy state such as Germany during World War II.
The main point is that images drive problem
representations, which in turn drive processes
of argumentation surrounding critical issues of
foreign and domestic policy. �
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I
PART
Methodology of Policy
Analysis
Problem
Structuring
Forecasting
Monitoring Prescription
POLICY
PROBLEMS
POLICY
ACTIONS
Evaluation
EXPECTED

OUTCOMES
OBSERVED
OUTCOMES
Practical
Inference
POLICY
PERFORMANCE
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2
O B J E C T I V E S

By studying this chapter, you should be able to
The Process of Policy
Analysis
1
CHAPTER
� Define and illustrate phases of
policy analysis.
� Describe elements of integrated
policy analysis.
� Distinguish four strategies of policy
analysis.
� Contrast reconstructed logic and
logic-in-use.
� Distinguish prospective and
retrospective policy analysis.
� Describe the structure of a policy
argument and its elements.
� Understand the role of argument
mapping in critical thinking.
� Interpret scorecards, spreadsheets,
influence diagrams, decision trees,
and argument maps.
Policy analysis is a process of multidisciplinary inquiry aiming
at thecreation, critical assessment, and communication of
policy-relevant infor-mation. As a problem-solving discipline, it

draws on social science methods,
theories, and substantive findings to solve practical problems.1
1For a sample of alternative definitions see Harold D. Lasswell,
A Pre-view of Policy Sciences
(New York: American Elsevier Publishing, 1971); Yehezkel
Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences: Concepts
and Applications (New York: American Elsevier Publishing,
1971); Edward S. Quade, Analysis for
Public Decisions, 3d rev. ed., ed. Grace M. Carter (New York:
North Holland Publishing, 1989); David
L. Weimer and Aidan R. Vining, Policy Analysis: Concepts and
Practice, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1992); Duncan Mac Rae Jr., The Social
Function of Social Science (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1976).
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Methodology of Policy Analysis 3
METHODOLOGY OF POLICY ANALYSIS
As used here, the word methodology refers to a process of
reasoned inquiry
aimed at finding solutions to practical problems. The aim of
methodology is to

help us understand not only the products of policy inquiry but
also the processes
employed to create these products.2 The methodology of policy
analysis is not
confined to the analytical routines of specialized social science
fields—for
example, benefit-cost analysis in economics or implementation
analysis in
political science—because none of these holds a privileged
place in policy inquiry.
Nor is the methodology of policy analysis constrained by the
doctrines and
principles of obsolescent philosophies of science such as logical
positivism, which
mistakenly claimed that scientific knowledge, properly
understood, is objective,
value free, and quantitative.3 On the contrary, policy analysis is
methodologically
eclectic; its practitioners are free to choose among a wide range
of scientific
methods, qualitative as well as quantitative, as long as these
yield reliable
knowledge. In this context, policy analysis includes art, craft,
and reasoned
persuasion, all of which are scientific to the extent that they
succeed in producing
reliable knowledge.4 Ordinary commonsense knowing and well-
winnowed
practical wisdom—both products of evolutionary learning
across generations of
2Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for
Behavioral Science (San Francisco, CA:
Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 23–24.
3Logical positivism (or logical empiricism) was abandoned by
most philosophers of science more than

50 years ago, although its epistemological pillars—the
correspondence theory of truth, the empirical
criterion of meaning, and quantificationism—are still venerated
by many social scientists. For alterna-
tives to logical positivism in economics and political science
see Daniel Bromley, Sufficient Reason:
Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic
Institutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2006); Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds.
Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse
Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield,
2004); Deirdre N. McCloskey, The
Rhetoric of Economics, 2nd ed., Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1998; Stephen Thomas
Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey, The Cult of Statistical
Significance: How the Standard Error Costs
Us Jobs, Justice, and Lives. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 2008. Paul Diesing, How Does
Social Science Work? Reflections on Practice (Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991);
and Mary Hawkesworth, Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis
(Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1988).
4Larry Laudan has argued that the demarcation between science
and non-science, including art and
craft, is a pseudo-problem that should be replaced by focusing
on the distinction between reliable and
unreliable knowledge. It is not necessary to ask whether
knowledge is “scientific,” only whether it is
reliable. “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” in R.S.
Cohen and L. Laudan, Physics, Philosophy
and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum.
Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
Vol.76 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983), pp. 111–127. Aaron
Wildavsky and others have used the terms art
and craft to characterize policy analysis. See Aaron Wildavsky,

Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and
Craft of Policy Analysis (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1979); and
Iris Geva-May and Aaron Wildavsky,
An Operational Approach to Policy Analysis: The Craft,
Prescriptions for Better Analysis (Boston, MA:
Kluwer, 1997). The term policy science(s) is Harold Lasswell’s.
See the short methodological history of
the policy sciences in Ronald Brunner, “The Policy Movement
as a Policy Problem,” in Advances in
Policy Studies since 1950, vol. 10, Policy Studies Review
Annual, ed. W. N. Dunn and R. M. Kelly
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1992), pp. 155–97 and
contributions to Michael Moran,
Martin Rein, and Robert E. Goodin, eds. The Oxford Handbook
of Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford
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4 CHAPTER 1 The Process of Policy Analysis
problem solvers—often permit conclusions that are more
trustworthy and
reliable than those produced by means of policy analysis and
other specialized
forms of professional and scientific inquiry.5
The rationale for policy analysis is pragmatic. For this reason, it
is unmistakably
different from social science disciplines that prize knowledge
for its own sake. The
policy-relevance of these disciplines depends not on their status
as sciences but on
the extent to which they are successful in illuminating and
alleviating practical
problems, problems that come in complex bundles that are at
once economic,
political, cultural, ethical, and more. Practical problems do not
arrive in separate
disciplinary packages addressed to departments of economics
and political
science—to name two of the most important policy disciplines.
In today’s world,
multidisciplinary policy analysis seems to provide the best fit
with the manifold
complexity of public policy making.
POLICY ANALYSIS—A MULTIDISCIPLINARY
FRAMEWORK
Policy analysis is partly descriptive. It relies on traditional
social science disciplines
to describe and explain the causes and consequences of policies.
But it is also
normative, a term that refers to value judgments about what

ought to be, in con-
trast to descriptive statements about what is.6 To investigate
problems of efficiency
and fairness, policy analysis draws on normative economics and
decision analysis
as well as ethics and other branches of social and political
philosophy—all of which
are about what ought to be. This normative orientation stems
from the fact that
analyzing policies demands that we choose among desired
consequences (ends) and
preferred courses of action (means). The choice of ends and
means requires contin-
uing trade-offs among competing values of efficiency, equity,
security, liberty, and
democracy.7 The importance of normative reasoning in policy
analysis was well
stated by a former undersecretary in the Department of Housing
and Urban
Development: “Our problem is not to do what is right. Our
problem is to know
what is right.”8
5On the contrasts between scientific and professional
knowledge on one hand, and ordinary
commonsense knowing on the other, see Charles E. Lindblom
and David K. Cohen, Usable
Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1979). On the frequent soundness of evolved practical
knowledge—but the periodic need for
supplemental scientific testing—see Donald T. Campbell,
“Evolutionary Epistemology,” in
Methodology and Epistemology for Social Science: Selected
Papers, ed. E. S. Overman (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989).

6One classic statement of the difference between positive and
normative knowledge in economics is
Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1953). This
same positive-normative distinction is present throughout the
social sciences.
7Deborah Stone, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision
Making, rev ed. (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2001).
8Robert C. Wood, “Foreword” to The Study of Policy
Formation, ed. Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth
J. Gergen (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. v. Wood is quoting
President Lyndon Johnson.
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Policy Analysis—A Multidisciplinary Framework 5
Policy-Relevant Information
Policy analysis is designed to provide policy-relevant
information about five types of
questions:
� Policy problems. What is the problem for which a potential
solution is sought?
Is global warming a human-made consequence of aircraft and

motor vehicle
emissions? Or is global warming a consequence of periodic
fluctuations in the
temperature of the atmosphere? What alternatives are available
to mitigate
global warming? What are the potential outcomes of these
alternatives and what
is their value or utility?
� Expected policy outcomes. What are the expected outcomes
of policies designed
to reduce harmful emissions? Because periodic natural
fluctuations are difficult or
impossible to control, what is the likelihood that emissions can
be reduced by
raising the price of gasoline and diesel fuel, compared with
requiring that aircraft
and motor vehicles use biofuels?
� Preferred policies. Which policies should be chosen,
considering not only
their expected outcomes in reducing harmful emissions, but also
the value of
reduced emissions in terms of economic costs and benefits?
Should distribu-
tional criteria involving environmental justice be used along
with criteria of
economic efficiency?
� Observed policy outcomes. What policy outcomes are
observed, as distin-
guished from the outcomes expected before a preferred policy is
implemented?
Did the preferred policy actually result in reduced emissions?
Were other
factors such as political opposition to governmental regulation

responsible for
the limited achievement of emissions targets?
� Policy performance. To what extent do observed policy
outcomes con-
tribute to the reduction of global warming through emissions
controls? What
are the benefits and costs of government regulation to present
and future
generations?
Answers to these questions yield five types of information,
which are policy-
informational components. These components are shown as
rectangles in
Figure 1.1.9
A policy problem is an unrealized need, value, or opportunity
for improvement
attainable through public action.10 Knowledge of what problem
to solve requires
information about a problem’s antecedent conditions (e.g.,
school dropouts as an
antecedent condition of unemployment), as well as information
about values (e.g.,
safe schools or a living wage) whose achievement may lead to
the problem’s
solution. Information about policy problems plays a critical role
in policy analysis,
9The framework was originally suggested by Walter Wallace,
The Logic of Science in Sociology
(Chicago: Aldine Books, 1971). Wallace’s framework addresses
research methodology in sociology,
whereas Figure 1.1 addresses the methodology of policy
analysis.

10Compare James A. Anderson, Public Policymaking: An
Introduction, 7th ed. (Boston, MA:
Wadsworth, 2011); Charles O. Jones, An Introduction to the
Study of Public Policy, 2d ed. (North
Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1977), p. 15; and David Dery,
Problem Definition in Policy Analysis
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1984).
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FIGURE 1.1
The process of integrated analysis
because the way a problem is defined shapes the search for
available solutions.

Inadequate or faulty information may result in a fatal error:
defining the wrong
problem.11
Expected policy outcomes are likely consequences of one or
more policy alterna-
tives designed to solve a problem. Information about the
circumstances that gave rise
to a problem is essential for producing information about
expected policy outcomes.
Such information is often insufficient, however, because the
past does not repeat itself
completely, and the values that shape behavior may change in
the future. For this
reason, information about expected policy outcomes is not
“given” by the existing
situation. To produce such information may require creativity,
insight, and the use of
tacit knowledge.12
11Defining the wrong problem is a type III error, as contrasted
with type I and type II errors committed
when the level of statistical significance (alpha) is set too high
or too low in testing the null hypothesis.
An early statement of this contrast is Ian I. Mitroff and Thomas
R. Featheringham, “On Systematic
Problem Solving and the Error of the Third Kind,” Behavioral
Sciences 19, no. 6 (1974): 383–93.
12Dror, Ventures in Policy Sciences; Sir Geoffrey Vickers, The
Art of Judgment: A Study of Policy
Making (New York: Basic Books, 1965); and C. West
Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems;
Basic Concepts of Systems and Organization (New York: Basic
Books, 1971).
Problem

Structuring
Forecasting
POLICY
PROBLEMS
PREFERRED
POLICIES
Evaluation
EXPECTED
OUTCOMES
OBSERVED
OUTCOMES
Practical
Inference
POLICY
PERFORMANCE
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A preferred policy is a potential solution to a problem. To select
a preferred policy,
it is necessary to have information about expected policy
outcomes as well as informa-
tion about the value or utility of these expected outcomes.
Another way to say this is
that factual as well as value premises are required for policy
prescriptions. Fact alone—
for example, the fact that one policy produces more of some
quantity than another—do
not justify the choice of a preferred policy. Factual premises
must be joined with value
premises involving efficiency, equality, security, democracy, or
some other value.
An observed policy outcome is a present or past consequence of
implementing a
preferred policy. It is sometimes unclear whether an outcome is
actually an effect of
a policy, because some effects are not policy outcomes; many
outcomes are the result
of other, extra-policy factors. It is important to recognize that
the consequences of
action cannot be fully stated or known in advance, which means
that many conse-
quences are neither anticipated nor intended. Fortunately,
information about such
consequences can be produced ex post (after policies have been
implemented), not
only ex ante (before policies are implemented).
Policy performance is the degree to which an observed policy

outcome con-
tributes to the solution of a problem. In practice, policy
performance is never perfect.
Problems are rarely “solved”; most often, problems are
resolved, reformulated, and
even “unsolved.”13 To know whether a problem has been
solved, resolved, reformu-
lated, or unsolved requires information about observed policy
outcomes, as well as
information about the extent to which these outcomes contribute
to the opportunities
for improvement that gave rise to a problem.
Policy-Informational Transformations
The five types of policy-relevant information are
interdependent. The arrows connect-
ing each pair of components represent policy-informational
transformations, whereby
one type of information is changed into another, so that the
creation of information at
any point depends on information produced in an adjacent
phase. Information about
policy performance, for example, depends on the transformation
of prior information
about observed policy outcomes. The reason for this dependence
is that any assess-
ment of how well a policy achieves its objectives assumes that
we already have reliable
information about the outcomes of that policy. The other types
of policy-relevant
information are dependent in the same way.
Information about policy problems is a special case.
Information about policy
problems usually includes some problem elements—for
example, potential solutions

or expected outcomes—and excludes others. What is included or
excluded affects
which policies are eventually prescribed, which values are
appropriate as criteria of
policy performance, and which potentially predictable outcomes
warrant or do not
warrant attention. At the risk of being overly repetitious, it is
worth stressing again
that a fatal error of policy analysis is a type III error—defining
the wrong problem.14
13Russell L. Ackoff, “Beyond Problem Solving,” General
Systems 19 (1974): 237–39.
14Type I and type II errors are also known as false positives
and false negatives. Other sources on type III
errors include A. W. Kimball, “Errors of the Third Kind in
Statistical Consulting,” Journal of the American
Statistical Association 52 (1957): 133–42; Howard Raiffa,
Decision Analysis (Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley, 1968), p. 264; and Ian I. Mitroff, The Subjective Side
of Science (New York: Elsevier, 1974).
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Policy-Analytic Methods
The five types of policy-relevant information are produced and
transformed by
using policy-analytic methods. All methods involve judgments
of different
kinds:15 judgments to accept or reject an explanation, to affirm
or dispute the
rightness of an action, to prescribe or not prescribe a policy, to
accept or reject a
prediction, and to formulate a problem in one way rather than
another.
In policy analysis, these procedures have special names:
� Problem structuring. Problem-structuring methods are
employed to produce
information about which problem to solve. One example of
problem-structuring
methods is the influence diagram and decision tree presented in
Case 1.3 of this
chapter (The Influence Diagram and Decision Tree—Structuring
Problems of
Energy Policy and International Security). Other examples of
problem-structuring
methods include critical thinking tools such as argument
mapping (Case 1.4:
The Argument Map—Problem Structuring in National Defense

and Energy
Policy). Chapter 3 of this book covers problem-structuring
methods and their
application.
� Forecasting. Forecasting methods are used to produce
information about
expected policy outcomes. Although many kinds of forecasting
methods are
covered in Chapter 4, an example of a simple forecasting tool is
the score-
card described in Case 1.1 (The Goeller Scorecard—Monitoring
and
Forecasting Technological Impacts). Scorecards, which are
based on the
judgments of experts, are particularly useful in identifying
expected
outcomes of science and technology policies.
� Prescription. Methods of prescription are employed to create
information
about preferred policies. An example of a prescriptive method is
the spread-
sheet (Case 1.2: The Spreadsheet—Evaluating the Benefits and
Costs of
Energy Policies). The spreadsheet goes beyond the
identification of expected
policy outcomes by expressing consequences in terms of
monetary benefits
and costs. Benefit-cost analysis and other methods of
prescription are
presented in Chapter 5.
� Monitoring. Methods of monitoring are employed to produce
information
about observed policy outcomes. The scorecard (Case 1.1) is a

simple method
for monitoring observed policy outcomes as well as for
forecasting expected
policy outcomes. Chapter 6 covers methods of monitoring in
detail.
� Evaluation. Evaluation methods are used to produce
information about the
value or utility of observed policy outcomes and their
contributions to policy
performance. Although evaluation methods are covered more
fully in
Chapter 7, the spreadsheet (Case 1.2) may be used for
evaluation as well as
prescription.
The first method, problem structuring, is about the other
methods. For this reason, it
is a metamethod (method of methods). In the course of
structuring a problem, analysts
typically experience a “troubled, perplexed, trying situation,
where the difficulty is, as
15John O’Shaughnessy, Inquiry and Decision (London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1972).
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it were, spread throughout the entire situation, infecting it as a
whole.”16 Problem
situations are not problems; problems are representations of
problem situations.
Hence, problems are not “out there” in the world, but they stem
from the interaction
of thought and external environments. Imagine a graph showing
the growth of
defense expenditures as a percentage of gross domestic product.
The graph represents
a problem situation, not a problem, because one analyst will see
the graph as evidence
of increasing national security (more of the budget is allocated
to defense), while
another interprets the graph as an indication of a declining
budget for social welfare
(less of the budget can be allocated to social services). Problem
structuring, a proce-
dure for testing different representations of a problem situation,
is the central
guidance system of policy analysis.
Policy-analytic methods are interdependent. It is not possible to
use one
method without first having used others. Thus, although it is
possible to monitor
past policies without forecasting their future consequences, it is
usually not possi-
ble to forecast policies without first monitoring them.17
Similarly, analysts can
monitor policy outcomes without evaluating them, but it is not
possible to evaluate

an outcome without first establishing that it is an outcome in
the first place. Finally,
to select a preferred policy requires that analysts have already
monitored,
evaluated, and forecasted outcomes.18 This is yet one more way
of saying that
policy prescription is based on factual as well as value
premises.
Figure 1.1 supplied a framework for integrating methods from
different policy-
relevant disciplines. Some methods are used solely or primarily
in some disciplines,
and not others. Program evaluation, for example, employs
monitoring to investigate
whether a policy is causally relevant to an observed policy
outcome. Although
program evaluation has made extensive use of interrupted time-
series analysis,
regression discontinuity analysis, causal modeling, and other
techniques associated
with the design and analysis of field experiments,19
implementation research within
political science has not. Instead, implementation researchers
have relied mainly on
techniques of case study analysis.20 Another example comes
from forecasting.
Although forecasting is central to both economics and systems
analysis, economics
has drawn almost exclusively on econometric techniques.
Systems analysis has made
greater use of qualitative forecasting techniques for
synthesizing expert judgment,
for example, the Delphi technique.21
16John Dewey, How We Think (Boston, MA: D.C. Heath and

Company, 1933), p. 108. The original
statement of the difference between a problem and a problem
situation is attributable to philosophical
pragmatists including Charles Sanders Peirce.
17An exception is predictions made on the basis of expert
judgment. The explanation of a policy is not
necessary for predicting its future consequences. Strictly
speaking, a prediction is a causal inference,
whereas a projection, extrapolation, or “rational forecast” is
not.
18Causation may be assumed but not understood. Recipes claim
only that a desired result is a conse-
quence of action. Joseph L. Bower, “Descriptive Decision
Theory from the ‘Administrative’ Viewpoint,”
in The Study of Policy Formation, ed. Bauer and Gergen, p. 10.
19See, for example, William R. Shadish, Thomas D. Cook, and
Donald T. Campbell, Experimental and
Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal Inference
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2002).
20Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy
Coalition Framework: An Assessment,”
in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. P. A. Sabatier (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 117–66.
21See Chapter 5.
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FIGURE 1.2
Forms strategies of policy analysis
FOUR STRATEGIES OF ANALYSIS
Relationships among policy-informational components, policy-
analytic methods,
and policy-informational transformations provide a basis for
contrasting four
strategies of policy analysis (Figure 1.2).
Prospective and Retrospective Analysis
Prospective policy analysis involves the production and
transformation of informa-
tion before policy actions are taken. This strategy of ex ante
analysis, shown as the
right half of Figure 1.2, typifies the operating styles of
economists, systems analysts,
operations researchers, and decision analysts.
The prospective strategy is what Williams means by policy
analysis.22 Policy
analysis is “a means of synthesizing information to draw from it
policy alternatives
and preferences stated in comparable, predicted quantitative and

qualitative terms
as a basis or guide for policy decisions; conceptually, it does
not include the
gathering of information [emphasis in original].” Policy
research, by contrast,
22Walter Williams, Social Policy Research and Analysis: The
Experience in the Federal Social Agencies
(New York: American Elsevier, 1971), p. 8.
Problem
Structuring
Forecasting
EXPECTED
OUTCOMES
OBSERVED
OUTCOMES
POLICY
PERFORMANCE
RETROSPECTIVE (ex post):
What happened and what
difference does it make?
PROSPECTIVE (ex ante):
What will happen and
what should be done?
PROBLEM FINDING:
What problem

should be solved?
PROBLEM SOLVING:
What is the solution
to the problem?
POLICY
PROBLEMS
PREFERRED
POLICIES
Evaluation
Practical
Inference
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Four Strategies of Analysis 11
refers to “all studies using scientific methodologies to describe
phenomena and/or
determine relationships among them.” Prospective analysis
often creates wide gaps
between preferred solutions and actual efforts to implement

them. Perhaps no more
than 10 percent of the work actually required to achieve a
desired set of policy
outcomes is carried out before policies are implemented: “It is
not that we have too
many good analytic solutions to problems. It is, rather, that we
have more good
solutions than we have appropriate actions.”23
Retrospective policy analysis is displayed as the left half of
Figure 1.2. This
strategy of ex post analysis involves the production and
transformation of informa-
tion after policies have been implemented. Retrospective
analysis characterizes the
operating styles of three groups of analysts:
� Discipline-oriented analysts. This group, composed mainly of
political
scientists, economists, and sociologists, seeks to develop and
test discipline-
based theories that describe the causes and consequences of
policies. This
group is not concerned with the identification of specific policy
goals or with
distinctions between “policy” variables that are subject to
policy manipula-
tion and those that are not.24 For example, the analysis of the
effects of party
competition on government expenditures provides no
information about
specific policy goals; nor is party competition a variable that
policy makers
can manipulate to change public expenditures.
� Problem-oriented analysts. This group, again composed

mainly of political
scientists, economists, and sociologists, seeks to describe the
causes and conse-
quences of policies. Problem-oriented analysts, however, are
less concerned with
the development and testing of theories believed to be important
in social science
disciplines than with identifying variables that may explain a
problem. Problem-
oriented analysts are not overly concerned with specific goals
and objectives,
primarily because the practical problems they analyze are
usually general in
nature. For example, the analysis of aggregate data on the
effects of gender,
ethnicity, and social inequality on national achievement test
scores provides
information that helps explain a problem (e.g., inadequate test
performance) but
does not provide information about policy variables that can be
manipulated.
� Applications-oriented analysts. A third group includes
applied economists,
applied sociologists, applied psychologists, and applied
anthropologists, as
well as analysts from professions such as public administration,
social work,
and evaluation research. This group also seeks to describe the
causes and
consequences of public policies and programs and is not
concerned with the
development and testing of discipline-based theories. This
group is concerned
not only with manipulable policy variables but also with the
identification of

specific policy goals and objectives. Information about specific
goals and
objectives provides a basis for monitoring and evaluating
outcomes and
23Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little,
Brown, 1971), pp. 267–68.
24James S. Coleman, “Problems of Conceptualization and
Measurement in Studying Policy Impacts,” in
Public Policy Evaluation, ed. Kenneth M. Dolbeare (Beverly
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impacts of policies. For example, applications-oriented analysts
may address
early childhood reading readiness programs that can be
manipulated in order
to achieve higher scores on reading tests.
The operating styles of the three groups reflect their
characteristic strengths
and limitations. Discipline-oriented as well as problem-oriented
analysts seldom
produce information that is directly useful to policy makers.
Even when problem-
oriented analysts investigate important problems such as
educational opportunity,
energy conservation, crime control, or national security, the
resultant information
is often macronegative. Macronegative information describes
the basic (or “root”)
causes and consequences of policies, usually by employing
aggregate data to show
why policies do not work. By contrast, micropositive
information shows what
policies and programs do work under specified conditions.25 It
is of little practical
value to policy makers to know that the crime rate is higher in
urban than
rural areas, but it is practically important to know that a
specific form of gun
control reduces the commission of serious crimes or that
intensive police
patrolling is a deterrent.
Even when applications-oriented analysts provide micropositive
information,
they may find it difficult to communicate with practitioners of
ex ante policy

analysis, who in most cases are professional economists. In
agency settings,
ex ante analysts, whose job it is to find optimally efficient
solutions, often have
limited access to information about policy outcomes produced
through retrospec-
tive analysis. For their part, practitioners of ex ante analysis
often fail to specify
in sufficient detail the kinds of policy-relevant information that
will be most
useful for monitoring, evaluating, and implementing their
recommendations.
Often, the intended outcomes of a policy are so vague that
“almost any evalua-
tion of it may be regarded as irrelevant because it missed the
‘problem’ toward
which the policy was directed.”26 Legislators, for example,
usually formulate
problems in general terms in order to gain acceptance, forestall
opposition, or
maintain neutrality.
Contrasts among the operating styles of policy analysts suggest
that disci-
pline-oriented and problem-oriented analysis are inherently less
useful than
applications-oriented analysis—that retrospective (ex post)
analysis as a whole
is perhaps less effective in solving problems than prospective
(ex ante) analysis.
Although this conclusion may have merit from the point of view
of policy
makers who want advice on what actions to take, it overlooks
several important
benefits of retrospective analysis. Retrospective analysis,
whatever its shortcom-

ings, places primary emphasis on the results of action and is not
content with
information about expected policy outcomes, as is the case with
prospective
analysis. Discipline-oriented and problem-oriented analysis may
offer new
frameworks for understanding policy-making processes,
challenging conven-
tional formulations of problems, questioning social and
economic myths, and
shaping the climate of opinion in a community or society.
Retrospective analysis,
25Williams, Social Policy Research and Analysis, p. 8.
26Ibid. p. 13; and Alice Rivlin, Systematic Thinking for Social
Action (Washington, DC: Brookings,
1971).
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Four Strategies of Analysis 13
however, “has been most important in its impact on intellectual
priorities and
understandings, and not nearly so effective in offering solutions
for specific

political problems.”27
Descriptive and Normative Analysis
Figure 1.2 also captures another important contrast, the
distinction between
descriptive and normative strategies of policy analysis.
Descriptive policy analysis
parallels descriptive decision theory, which refers to a set of
logically consistent
propositions that describe or explain action.28 Descriptive
decision theories may be
tested against observations obtained through monitoring and
forecasting.
Descriptive theories, models, and conceptual frameworks
originate for the most part
in political science, sociology, and economics. The main
function of these theories,
models, and frameworks is to explain, understand, and predict
policies by identify-
ing patterns of causality. The principal function of approaches
to monitoring such as
field experimentation is to establish the approximate validity of
causal inferences
relating policies to their presumed outcomes.29 In Figure 1.2,
the descriptive form of
policy analysis can be visualized as an axis moving from the
lower left (monitoring)
to the upper right (forecasting).
Normative policy analysis parallels normative decision theory,
which refers to a set
of logically consistent propositions that evaluate or prescribe
action.30 In Figure 1.2,
the normative strategy of policy analysis can be visualized as an
axis running from the
lower right (prescription) to upper left (evaluation). Different

kinds of information are
required to test normative and descriptive decision theories.
Methods of evaluation and
prescription provide information about policy performance and
preferred policies, for
example, policies that have been or will be optimally efficient
because benefits
outweigh costs or optimally equitable because those most in
need are made better off.
One of the most important features of normative policy analysis
is that its propositions
rest on disagreements about values such as efficiency, equity,
responsiveness, liberty,
and security.
Problem Finding and Problem Solving
The upper and lower halves of Figure 1.2 provide another
important distinction.
The upper half points to methods that are designed for problem
finding, whereas the
lower designates methods for problem solving. The problem-
finding strategy has to
do with the discovery of elements that go into the definition of
problems, and not to
their solution. How well do we understand the problem? Who
are the most impor-
tant stakeholders who affect and are affected by the problem?
Have the appropriate
objectives been identified? Which alternatives are available to
achieve objectives?
27Janet A. Weiss, “Using Social Science for Social Policy,”
Policy Studies Journal 4, (Spring 1976): 237.
28Bower, “Descriptive Decision Theory,” p. 104.
29See Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-
Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues

for Field Settings (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1979);
Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, Experimental
and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Generalized Causal
Inference.
30Bower, “Descriptive Decision Theory,” pp. 104–05.
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Which uncertain events should be taken into account? Are we
solving the “right”
problem rather than the “wrong” one?
Problem-solving methods, located in the lower half of Figure
1.2, are designed to
solve rather than find problems. The problem-solving strategy is

primarily technical
in nature, in contrast to problem finding, which is more
conceptual. Problem-solving
methods such as econometrics are useful in answering questions
about policy causa-
tion, statistical estimation, and optimization. How much of the
variance in a policy
outcome is explained by one or more independent variables?
What is the probability
of obtaining a coefficient as large as that obtained? Another
problem-solving method
is benefit-cost analysis. What are the net benefits of different
policies? What is their
expected utility or payoff?
Segmented and Integrated Analysis
Integrated policy analysis links the four strategies of analysis
displayed in Figure 1.2.
Retrospective and prospective strategies are joined in one
continuous process.
Descriptive and normative strategies are also linked, as are
methods designed to find
as well as solve problems. Practically speaking, this means that
policy analysts bridge
the several main pillars of multidisciplinary policy analysis,
especially economics and
political science. Today, this need is not being properly met by
specialized social
science disciplines, which tend to practice segmented policy
analysis. The job of
bridging segmented disciplines—to convert intellectual
knowledge into practical
knowledge—is carried out by multidisciplinary professions
including public adminis-
tration, planning, management, and policy analysis. The
American Society for Public

Administration (ASPA), the National Association of Schools of
Public Affairs and
Administration (NASPAA), the American Planning Association
(APA), the
International Association of Schools and Institutes of
Administration (IASIA), the
Academy of Management (AM), the Operations Research
Society of America
(ORSA), and the Association for Public Policy and Management
(APPAM) are
organizations that represent these professions. So far, these
professions have been
more open to the disciplines of economics and political science
than those disciplines
have been open to them, notwithstanding a consensus among
policy scholars and
practitioners that the substance and methods of these and other
disciplines are
essential for producing policy-relevant information.
In summary, the framework for integrated policy analysis
(Figure 1.1) helps
examine the assumptions, strengths, and limitations of methods
employed in disci-
plines that tend to be overly segmented and excessively
specialized to be useful in
practical problem solving. The framework identifies and relates
major elements of
policy analysis—policy-informational components, policy-
analytic methods, and
policy-informational transformations—enabling us to see the
particular roles
performed by methods of problem structuring, monitoring,
evaluation, forecasting,
and prescription. The framework (Figure 1.2) identifies
different strategies of policy

analysis: prospective (ex ante) and retrospective (ex post),
descriptive and normative,
and problem finding and problem solving. The framework
integrates these strategies
of analysis and explains why we have defined policy analysis as
a problem-solving
discipline that links social science theories, methods, and
substantive findings to solve
practical problems.
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The Practice of Policy Analysis 15
THE PRACTICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS
Reconstructed Logic versus Logic-in-Use
The process of integrated policy analysis is a logical
reconstruction (reconstructed
logic). The process of actually doing policy analysis never
completely conforms to this
reconstruction, because all logical reconstructions are abstract
representations of
stylized practices endorsed by the scientific community.31 By
contrast, the logic-in-use
of practicing analysts, as distinguished from the logical
reconstruction of their use of

reason and evidence to solve practical problems, always varies
from methodological
“best practices” due to personal characteristics of analysts, their
professional social-
ization, and the institutional settings in which they work.
� Cognitive styles. The personal cognitive styles of analysts
predispose them
toward different modes of acquiring, interpreting, and using
information.32
Corporations, nonprofit organizations, and public agencies such
as the U.S.
Department of Corrections and the National Science Foundation
use the
Myers-Briggs test as a training and personnel selection
diagnostic.
� Analytic roles. In agency settings, most analysts are largely
insulated from
politics. As such, they are primarily “technicians.” Others
perform roles that,
in addition to technical content, are political. These
“politicians” are actively
committed to advancing the interests of political leaders or
officials to whom
they report. Other activist analysts are “entrepreneurs” who
seek greater
influence in policy making.33
� Institutional incentive systems. Policy “think tanks”
encourage different
orientations toward analysis, including the “humanistic-value-
critical” and
the “scientific.”34 Institutional rewards and punishments affect
the validity

of conclusions and recommendations.35
� Institutional time constraints. Analysts working in
governmental settings are
often subject to tight institutional time constraints (three to
seven days is typical).
They work with much greater speed, and perhaps greater
efficiency, than analysts
in academic settings or think tanks. Understandably,
government analysts rarely
collect original data; nor do they employ complex and time-
consuming
techniques.36
31On reconstructed logic and logic-in-use, see Kaplan, Conduct
of Inquiry, pp. 3–11.
32Studies using the Myers-Briggs type indicator (Jungian
personality types) suggest different cognitive
styles among scientists, managers, and analysts. References
provided by the Myers and Briggs
Foundation at www.myersbriggs.org. See also Ian I. Mitroff and
Ralph H. Kilmann, Methodological
Approaches to Social Science (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass,
1978).
33Arnold Meltsner, Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976);
Robert A. Heineman, William T. Bluhm, Steven A. Peterson,
and Edward N. Kearney, The World of the
Policy Analyst. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1990.
34Pamela Doty, “Values in Policy Research,” in Values, Ethics,
and the Practice of Policy Analysis, ed.
William N. Dunn (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1983).
35Donald T. Campbell, “Guidelines for Monitoring the
Scientific Competence of Preventive Intervention
Research Centers: An Exercise in the Sociology of Scientific
Validity,” Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion,

Utilization 8, no. 3 (1987): 389–430.
36See P. J. Cook and J. W. Vaupel, “What Policy Analysts Do:
Three Research Styles,” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 4, no. 3 (1985): 427–28.
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� Professional socialization. The different disciplines and
professions that make
up policy analysis socialize their members into different norms
and values.
Analyses of published papers suggest that analysts employ
formal-quantitative as
well as informal-narrative approaches, although sound policy
recommendations

sometimes require formal-quantitative procedures.37
� Multidisciplinary teamwork. Much of the analysis conducted
in public
agencies is carried out by multidisciplinary teams. Some
members have
primary responsibility for the particular types of analysis
displayed in
Figure 1.2. Team members trained in economics and decision
analysis are
typically more qualified to perform prospective (ex ante)
analysis, whereas
team members trained in applied sociology, applied political
science, and
program evaluation are usually better at retrospective (ex post)
analysis.
The effectiveness of teams depends on everyone acquiring an
operational
understanding of analytic methods employed throughout the
process of
integrated policy analysis.
Methodological Opportunity Costs
Integrated analysis has opportunity costs. Given limited time
and resources, it is
difficult to conduct systematic economic, political, and
organizational analyses
simultaneously. Multiple triangulation,38 or what Cook calls
critical multiplism,39
responds to some of the inadequacies of logical positivism.40
Positivism now
appears as a one-sided methodology and epistemology claiming
that true statements
about the world must be logically and empirically verifiable,
expressed in a formal

(ideal) language such as mathematical statistics, and confirmed
by means of state-
ments that correspond to objective reality. Objective reality,
rather than a reality
constituted by subjective meaningful actions and institutions, is
the foundation of
true statements. Logical positivism, as Cook argues, was the
dominant methodology
of policy analysis and program evaluation during the era of
President Lyndon
Johnson’s War on Poverty. The advantage of critical multiplism
over logical
positivism is that multiplism provides a better approximation of
what is true by
employing procedures that triangulate from a variety of
perspectives on what is
worth knowing and what is known about policies.41
37An early but representative overview of approaches is Janet
A. Schneider, Nancy J. Stevens, and Louis
G. Tornatzky, “Policy Research and Analysis: An Empirical
Profile, 1975–1980,” Policy Sciences 15
(1982): 99–114.
38The methodology of triangulation is analogous to practices
employed in geodesic surveys; cartography;
navigation; and, more recently, satellite tracking. The position
or location of an object is found by means
of bearings from two or more fixed points or electronic signals
a known distance apart.
39Cook advanced critical multiplism as an alternative to logical
positivism. See Thomas D. Cook,
“Postpositivist Critical Multiplism,” in Social Science and
Social Policy, ed. R. Lane Shotland and
Melvin M. Mark (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1985),
pp. 21–62.
40A critical assessment of logical positivism is Mary E.

Hawkesworth, “Epistemology and Policy
Analysis,” in Advances in Policy Studies since 1950, ed. Dunn
and Kelly, pp. 293–328; and
Hawkesworth, Theoretical Issues in Policy Analysis.
41Cook, “Postpositivist Critical Multiplism,” p. 57.
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Critical Thinking and Public Policy 17
A disadvantage of multiplism lies in its costs. Triangulation
among multiple
disciplinary perspectives, along with the use of multiple
methods, measures, and
data sources, involves trade-offs and opportunity costs.42 When
single methods
such as econometric modeling are employed to achieve
measurement precision
and statistical generalizability, analysts forgo opportunities to
acquire a deeper
understanding of policies that is possible through ethnographic
interviews, case
studies, and other qualitative methods. A leading
econometrician, noting that
economists are unique among social scientists because they are
trained only to

analyze data, not to collect it, observes that “empirical work can
be greatly
enhanced by being sensitive to the context of the problem (the
data-generating
process) and knowing a lot about one’s data.”43 Similar trade-
offs apply to
methods of research synthesis, or meta-analysis, which purchase
measurement
precision and generalized policy causation at the expense of a
deeper understand-
ing of contexts of policy-making.44
Ethnographic interviews, by contrast, involve high information
costs because
they require the collection of substantial primary data through
interviews.
However, they also lack precision and seldom permit the
generalization of policy
causation to other settings. Although greater precision and
generalizability can be
obtained by means of field studies and field experiments, these
are expensive,
especially when they are employed in conjunction with mixed
(quantitative and
qualitative) methods. To be sure, triangulation among
convergent (and divergent)
perspectives, methods, and measures may enhance the validity
of policy analysis
and other applied social sciences.45 But the time and financial
constraints make
trade-offs inevitable.
CRITICAL THINKING AND PUBLIC POLICY
The world of the policy analyst is complex. Analysts must sift
through and evalu-
ate a large volume of available quantitative and qualitative data,

make difficult
choices among sources of information, select appropriate
methods and techniques,
and employ effective strategies for communicating the results of
analysis through
oral briefings and documents (see Chapter 9). These practical
challenges place a
premium on critical thinking—that is, the capacity to organize,
synthesize, and
evaluate diverse sources of reasoning and evidence. One method
available for this
42See David Brinberg and Joseph E. McGrath, Validity and the
Research Process (Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications, 1985). For Brinberg and McGrath and other
methodological pragmatists, the choice
of methods is similar to an optimization problem in decision
analysis. See C. West Churchman,
Prediction and Optimal Decision: Philosophical Issues of a
Science of Values (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1961); and Russell Ackoff, Scientific Method:
Optimizing Applied Research Decisions
(New York: John Wiley, 1962).
43Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics, 4th ed.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 83–84.
44See Lawrence Rudner, Gene V. Glass, David L. Evartt, and
Patrick J. Emery, A User’s Guide to the
Meta-Analysis of Research Studies. ERIC Clearinghouse on
Assessment and Evaluation, University of
Maryland, College Park, 2002. http://echo.edres.org
45The case for triangulation in its many forms is found in
Campbell, Methodology and Epistemology
for Social Science, ed. Overman.
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purpose is the analysis of policy arguments. By analyzing
policy arguments, we are
able to identify and probe the assumptions underlying
competing policy claims,
recognize and evaluate objections to these claims, and
synthesize policy-relevant
information from different sources.
The Structure of Policy Arguments
Policy arguments are the main vehicle carrying debates about
public policies.46
Although social scientists may rightly pride themselves on
methodological special-
ization, they too often forget that “public policy is made of

language. Whether in
written or oral form, argument is central to all stages of the
policy process.”47
The structure of a policy argument can be represented as a set
of seven elements
(Figure 1.3):48
Policy claim (C). A policy claim is the conclusion of a policy
argument.
Arguments also include other elements, including policy-
relevant infor-
mation (I), warrants (W), backings (B), qualifiers (Q),
objections (O),
and rebuttals (R). The movement from policy-relevant
information to
claim implies therefore, thus, or so. Policy claims are of
different types.
Some are normative: “Congress should pass the amendments to
the
Fair Employment Practices Act.” Some are descriptive: “The
use of the
Internet will double in the next ten years.”
Policy-relevant information (I). Policy-relevant information
provides the
grounds for a policy claim. These grounds may be statistical
data, experi-
mental findings, expert testimony, common sense, or political
judgments.
Policy-relevant information is a response to the question: What
information
is relevant to the claim? Information is the starting point of a
new argument
and the end of a previous one. Policy arguments may lead to
complex

argument chains, trees, or cycles.
Warrant (W). The warrant is a reason to support a claim.
Warrants may be
economic theories, ethical principles, political ideas,
professional authority,
and so forth.49 A warrant answers the question: Why does this
reason
support the claim? Different types of warrants are related to
arguments
46See Frank Fischer and John Forester, ed., The Argumentative
Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993). Earlier works on
policy argumentation are Ian I. Mitroff
and Richard O. Mason, Creating a Dialectical Social Science
(Boston: D. Reidel, 1981); William N.
Dunn, “Reforms as Arguments,” Knowledge: Creation,
Diffusion, Utilization 3 (1982): 293–326;
Donald T. Campbell, “Experiments as Arguments,” Knowledge:
Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 3
(1982): 327–47; Giandomenico Majone, Evidence, Argument,
and Persuasion in the Policy Process
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); and Stone,
Policy Paradox and Political Reason.
47Majone, Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion, p. 1.
48This structural model of argument is part of the computer
software called Rationale 2, which was de-
veloped by Tim van Gelder and his colleagues in Australia.
URL: www.austhink.com. The classic struc-
tural model is presented in Stephen Toulmin, The Uses of
Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1958); and Stephen Toulmin, A. Rieke, and A. Janik, An
Introduction to Reasoning (New York:
Macmillan, 1984).
49Different kinds of warrants yield the “modes” of policy

argument presented in Chapter 8.
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Critical Thinking and Public Policy 19
FIGURE 1.3
Elements of a policy argument
Source: Created with Rationale 2. Melbourne: Austhink
Consulting, 2010. www.austhink.com
made in different disciplines and professions. For example, law
uses case
comparisons and rules of evidence, whereas economics uses
theories and
component laws such as the law of diminishing utility of
money. Policy
makers as well as social scientists employ causal warrants such
as “Ethnic
cleansing will be deterred by air strikes that establish NATO’s
credibility in
A policy claim is the
conclusion of a policy
argument. There are four

types of policy claims:
definitional, descriptive,
evaluative, and
advocative.
CLAIM
Policy-relevant information provides
taken-for-granted facts to support a
policy claim. Policy-relevant
information may be statistical data,
experimental findings, expert
testimony, common sense, or
political judgments.
INFORMATION
A warrant is a reason to
support a policy claim.
Warrants may be economic
theories, ethical principles,
political ideas, authority, and
so forth. Most arguments have
multiple warrants.
WARRANT
A qualifier expresses the approximate
truth of a claim, considering the strength
of information, warrants, backings,
objections, and rebuttals. Qualifiers may
be stated statistically (p < 0.01) or in
everyday language (“probably,” “not
likely,” “apparently,” “unlikely”).
QUALIFIER
A backing justifies or

“backs up” a warrant
by providing good
reasons for believing
the warrant.
BACKING
An objection opposes or challenges
a qualifier by identifying special
conditions or exceptions which
reduce confidence in the strength
of the qualifier.
OBJECTION
An objection opposes or challenges
a backing by identifying special
conditions or exceptions that
reduce confidence in the truth of
the backing.
OBJECTION
A rebuttal opposes or
challenges an
objection by
identifying special
conditions or
exceptions that
reduce confidence
in the truth of the
objection,
REBUTTAL
An objection opposes
or challenges

information by
identifying special
conditions or
exceptions that
reduce confidence in
the truth of the
information.
OBJECTION
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the region.” The warrant, which provides a justification for
accepting a
claim, answers the question: Considering the information, what

reasons
make the claim true?
Qualifier(Q). The qualifier expresses the degree to which a
claim is approxi-
mately true, given the strength of the information, warrants, and
backings,
as well as objections and rebuttals. Although social scientists
may state
qualifiers in the language of formal probability (p � 0.01 or t �
2.24),
ordinary language is the normal mode of qualifying claims with
such terms
as certainly, absolutely, necessarily, probably, in all likelihood,
presumably,
apparently, and barring unforeseen circumstances. The qualifier
answers the
question: How strong or credible is the claim? It is primarily
through
processes of argumentation and debate that policy makers,
policy analysts,
and other policy stakeholders adjust or even abandon
arguments. Such
changes, when they occur, are motivated by the strength of
objections and
rebuttals offered by those who have a stake in policies.
Backing (B). The backing is an additional reason to support or
“back up” the
warrant. The backing answers the question: Why does the
warrant support
the claim? with a more general reason, assumption, or argument
that begins
with because. Different kinds of backings are characteristically
employed by
members of different disciplines and professions. Backings may

be scientific
laws, appeals to the authority of experts, or ethical and moral
principles.
For example, consider the warrant presented earlier: “Ethnic
cleansing will
be deterred by air strikes that establish NATO’s credibility in
the region.”
The backing for warrants advocating the use of coercive force is
frequently
an informal statement of the law of diminishing utility: “The
greater the
cost of an alternative, the less likely it will be pursued.”
Objection (O). An objection opposes or challenges the
information, warrant,
backing, or qualifier by identifying special conditions or
exceptions that
reduce confidence in the truth of the information, warrant,
backing, or
qualifier. An objection answers the question: Are there special
circum-
stances or exceptions that threaten the credibility of the
warrant? Analysts
who pay attention to objections are more likely to take a critical
perspec-
tive toward a policy argument, identifying weak or hidden
assumptions,
anticipating unintended consequences, or questioning possible
rebuttals to
objections. Thereby, analysts can be self-critical, challenging
their own
assumptions and arguments.
Rebuttal(R). A rebuttal is an objection to an objection.
Rebuttals oppose or
challenge objections by identifying special conditions or

exceptions that
reduce confidence in the truth of the objection. Rebuttals
answer the ques-
tion: Are there special circumstances or exceptions that threaten
the cred-
ibility of the objection? Most policy arguments have objections
and rebut-
tals, because policy making involves bargaining, negotiation,
competition,
and compromise among opponents and proponents of policies.
The frames of reference, perspectives, and reasons of policy
makers and analysts
are found in their underlying warrants, backings, objections,
and rebuttals.
Therefore, identical policy-relevant information is interpreted in
distinctly different
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Demonstration Exercises 21
ways. A decrease in crime rates in urban areas may be
welcomed by the urban poor,
viewed with skepticism by owners of central city businesses,
rejected by criminolo-

gists who attribute urban crime rates to changes in
unemployment and homelessness,
and hailed as an achievement by elected officials. By examining
contending
arguments and their underlying assumptions, analysts can
uncover and critically
assess reasoning and evidence that otherwise goes unnoticed.
Equally important is
what it brings to analysts themselves—they can probe their own
assumptions by
examining the objections, qualifications, and exceptions to their
own conclusions.
REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. What does it mean to define policy analysis as
a process of inquiry as distinguished from a set
of methods?
2. Describe the dynamics of policy-informational
components, policy-analytic methods, and
policy-informational transformations.
3. Contrast segmented and integrated policy
analysis. Give examples.
4. How does normative decision theory differ
from descriptive decision theory?
5. List some of the key differences between prob-
lem solving and problem finding.
6. Contrast retrospective and prospective analy-
sis. Which social science disciplines tend to spe-
cialize in prospective analysis? Retrospective
analysis?

7. Discuss the strengths and limitations of critical
multiplism.
8. Contrast the “logic-in-use” and the “recon-
structed logic” of policy analysis. Provide
examples.
9. How can argumentation mapping assist analysts
to become critical thinkers?
DEMONSTRATION EXERCISES
1. Scorecards provide a useful overview of the
observed and expected outcomes of different
policies. When using the scorecard for monitor-
ing and forecasting the outcomes of the two
speed limits (Case 1.2), the 55 mph speed limit
seems preferable to the 65 mph speed limit.
Compare the scorecard (Figure C1.2) with the
spreadsheet (Figure C1.3). Does the comparison
change your conclusions about the performance
of the 55 mph speed limit? What does this tell us
about the differences between monitoring and
evaluation in policy analysis? What are the
implications for the distinctions among different
types of policy analysis?
2. Influence diagrams and decision trees are useful
methods for structuring policy problems. The
diagram and tree displayed in Figure 1.2 help
identify policy stakeholders, policy alternatives,
uncertain outcomes and events, probabilities of
these outcomes and events, and valued

CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has provided a framework for
policy analysis that identifies the role of
policy-analytic methods in creating and trans-
forming policy-relevant information. The four
regions of this framework call attention to
similarities and differences among methods of
policy analysis and point to the origins of these
methods in different social science disciplines
and professions, thus clarifying the meaning of
multidisciplinary inquiry. No one methodol-
ogy is appropriate for all or most problems.
Given the need to choose among methods,
methodological choices can be viewed as an
optimization problem involving trade-offs and
opportunity costs. The actual work of practic-
ing analysts demands critical thinking. The
analysis of policy arguments is well suited for
this purpose.
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outcomes (valued outcomes are objectives).
Consider the influence diagram that represents
the problem of energy supply in 1973 and
1974, when the OPEC oil embargo posed sig-
nificant challenges both to U.S. energy supply
and national security. How does Figure C1.3
help us formulate the problem? What do the ar-
rows suggest about the causes of the energy
shortage as well as the causes of the decline in
traffic fatalities? What does the influence
diagram suggest about the conditions that gave
rise to the 55 mph speed limit and its effective-
ness? After comparing the influence diagram
with the decision tree (which is based on the
influence diagram), describe why these two
problem representations are good examples of
descriptive and normative decision theory.
3. Create an argument map based on the influ-
ence diagram presented in Case 1.3. Begin with
the following claim: “The United States should
return to the 55 mph speed limit in order to
conserve fuel and save lives.” Include in your
map as many warrants, backings, objections,
and rebuttals as you can. Assuming that the
original qualifier was certainly, indicate
whether the qualifier changes as we move from

a simple, static, uncontested argument to a
complex, dynamic, and contested argument.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Campbell, Donald T. Methodology and Epistemology
for Social Science: Selected Papers. Edited by
E. Samuel Overman. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988.
Diesing, Paul. How Social Science Works: Reflections
on Practice. Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University
Press, 1991.
Dunn, William N., and Rita Mae Kelly. Advances
in Policy Studies since 1950. New Brunswick,
NJ: Transactions Books, 1992.
Fischer, Frank, and John Forester. The Argumentative
Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1993.
Hawkesworth, Mary E. Theoretical Issues in
Policy Analysis. Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1988.
Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry:
Methodology for Behavioral Science. San
Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1964.
Mac Rae, Duncan Jr. The Social Function of Social
Science. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1976.
Stone, Deborah. Policy Paradox: The Art of
Political Decision Making. Rev Ed. New York:

W. W. Norton, 2001.
Toulmin, Stephen R. Return to Reason. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.
Van Gelder, Tim. “The Rationale for Rationale.”
Law, Probability, and Risk 6 (2007): 23–42.
When advanced technologies are used to achieve
policy goals, sociotechnical systems of considerable
complexity is created. Although it is analytically
tempting to prepare a comprehensive economic
analysis of the costs and benefits of such policies,
most practicing analysts do not have the time or
the resources to do so. Given the time constraints
of policy making, many analyses are completed in a
period of several days to a month, and in most
cases policy analyses do not involve the collection
and analysis of new data. Early on in a project,
policy makers and their staffs typically want an
CASE 1.1 THE GOELLER SCORECARD—
MONITORING AND FORECASTING
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACTS
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Case 1.1 23
50E.S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions (New York:
American Elsevier, 1975), p. 65.
TABLE C1.1
Scorecard
Social Impacts CTOL VTOL TACV
TRANSPORTATION
Passengers (million miles) 7 4 9
Per trip time (hours) 2 1.5 2.5
Per trip cost ($) $17 $28 $20
Reduced congestion (%) 0% 5% 10%
FINANCIAL
Investment ($ millions) $150 $200 $200
Annual subsidy ($ millions) 0 0 90
ECONOMIC
Added jobs (thousands) 20 25 100
Added sales ($millions) 50 88 500
COMMUNITY
Noise (households) 10 1 20
Added air pollution (%) 3% 9% 1%
Petroleum savings (%) 0% –20% 30%
Displaced households 0 20 500

Taxes lost ($millions) 0 0.2 2
Landmarks destroyed None None Fort X
DISTRIBUTIONAL
Low-income trips (%) 7% 1% 20%
Low-income household
Noise annoyance (%) 2% 16% 40%
SOurce: Goeller (1974); Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions
(1975), p. 60.
NOte: Conventional takeoff and landing aircraft (CTOL);
vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL);
tracked air-cushion vehicle (TACV).
overview of the problem situation and the potential
impacts of alternative policies. Under these
circumstances, the scorecard is appropriate.
The Goeller scorecard, named after Bruce Goeller
of the RAND Corporation, is appropriate for this
purpose.Table C1.1 shows the impacts of
alternative transportation systems. Some of the
impacts involve transportation services used by
members of the community, whereas others involve
impacts on low-income groups. In this case, as
Quade observes, the large number of diverse
impacts are difficult to value in dollar terms,
making a benefit-cost analysis impractical and even
impossible.50 Other impacts involve financial and
economic questions such as investments, jobs
created, sales, and tax revenues. Other impacts are
distributional because they involve the differential
effects of transportation. �

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24
In 1972 and 1973, the United States and other
petroleum-dependent countries experienced the
first of several oil crises precipitated by a
dramatic increase in the price of crude oil by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).The response of American and European
leaders was to adopt maximum speed limits of 55
mph and 90 kph, respectively. In the United
States, the National Maximum Speed Limit
(NMSL) was designed to reduce the consumption
of gasoline by requiring that all vehicles on
interstate highways travel at a maximum of 55

mph, a speed that would maximize fuel efficiency
for most vehicles.
Soon after the implementation of the 55 mph
speed limit, it was discovered that the new policy
not only reduced fuel consumption, but apparently
caused a dramatic decline in traffic fatalities and
injuries as well. Therefore, long after the OPEC oil
crisis was over, the speed limit was retained,
although it was no longer needed to respond to the
energy crisis that prompted its passage in 1973.
Indeed, the 55 mph speed limit was retained for
more than 20 years until it was officially repealed
in November 1995.51
Heated debates preceded the repeal. Senator
John C. Danforth of Missouri, an influential
advocate of the policy, argued that the repeal would
save one minute per day per driver but result in an
additional 600 to 1,000 deaths. The Washington Post
and the New York Times joined the opposition,
reporting that, although fatalities would surely rise,
the savings in time was trivial. Later, Secretary of
Transportation Pena announced that the Clinton
administration was firmly opposed to abandoning the
speed limit.
This was the right moment for an evaluation of
the benefits and costs of the NMSL. A spreadsheet is
a simple but powerful tool for doing so. The
scorecard, as we saw in Case 1.1, is a useful tool for
monitoring and forecasting impacts when benefit-
cost analysis is not feasible or desirable. On the
scorecard, policy alternatives are arrayed in columns
along the top of the matrix and policy impacts are

listed in each row. Spreadsheets, by contrast, are
appropriate and useful for prescribing preferred
policies and evaluating their outcomes. Spreadsheets
display the benefits and costs of observed or
expected policy outcomes, creating information
about policy performance as well as preferred
policies (see Figure 1.1).
Table C1.2 displays a spreadsheet used to
evaluate the effects of the 55 mph speed limit
at the end of 1974, one year after the policy was
implemented. To show the differences between
the spreadsheet and the scorecard, Table C1.2
also displays the same information as a
scorecard. �
51On April 2, 1987, Congress enacted the Surface
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act, permitting 40 states to experiment with speed limits up to
65 mph.
CASE 1.2 THE SPREADSHEET—EVALUATING THE
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ENERGY POLICIES
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Case 1.3 25
(continued)
TABLE C1.2
Scorecard and Spreadsheet
(a) Scorecard
65 MPH
OUTCOMES (Base Case)* 55 MPH
Fatalities 54,052 45,196
Miles traveled (billions) 1,313 1,281
Hours driving (billions) 20.2 21.9
Gallons fuel consumed (billions) 46.8 43.3
Fuel efficiency (mpg) 14.9 16.1
Traffic citations (millions) 5,711 7,425
Property damage (million cases) 25.8 23.1
*The base case is the policy against which the new policy is
compared.
(b) Spreadsheet
OBJECTIVES 65MPH 55MPH Difference Value $ Billions
I Fatalities (000s) 54.1 45.2 8.856 $240,000.00 $ 2.13
II Hours driving (billions) 20.2 21.9 �1.7 5.05 �8.59
III Gallons fuel consumed
(billions)
46.8 43.3 3.5 0.53 1.86

IV Traffic citations (000s) 5,711 7,425 �1,714 3.94 �0.0068
V Property damage
cases (000s)
25,800 23,100 2,700 363.00 0.98
Benefits (I � III � V) 4.97
Costs (II � IV) �8.60
Net Benefits (B–C) $ �3.63
Along with other policy-analytic methods discussed
earlier in this chapter (Figure 1.1), the influence
diagram and decision tree are useful tools for
structuring policy problems.52 The influence
diagram (Figure C1.3) displays the policy, the
National Maximum Speed Limit, as a rectangle.
A rectangle always refers to a policy choice or
decision node, which in this case is the choice
52The diagram and tree were created with the Decision
Programming Language (DPL), which is available from
Syncopation
Software at http://www.syncopation.com. Educational,
professional, and commercial versions of DPL 7.0 are available.
CASE 1.3 THE INFLUENCE DIAGRAM AND
DECISION TREE—STRUCTURING PROBLEMS OF
ENERGY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
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Travel
Time
Fuel
Used
Net
Benefits
Injuries
Fatalities
Miles
Traveled
Employment

Recession
OPEC
Oil Crisis
NMSL
FIGURE C1.3
Influence diagram and decision tree
between adopting and not adopting the national
maximum speed limit of 55 mph. To the right and
above the decision node are uncertain events,
represented as ovals, which are connected to the
decision node with arrows showing how the speed
limit affects or is affected by them. The rectangles
with shaved corners represent valued policy
outcomes or objectives. The objectives are to lower
fuel consumption, reduce travel time, reduce
injuries, and avert traffic fatalities. To the right of
the objectives is another shaved rectangle, which
designates the net benefits (benefits less costs) of
the four objectives.The surprising result of using
the influence diagram for problem structuring is
the discovery of causally relevant economic events,
such as the recession and unemployment, which
affect miles driven, which in turn affect all four
objectives. The “root cause” appears to be the
OPEC oil embargo.
The decision tree is another representation of the
influence diagram. Whereas the influence diagram
shows how policy choices and uncertain events affect
the achievement of objectives, the decision tree displays
the monetary value of these objectives. In this abridged

and simplified decision tree, there are two branches
that represent the alternatives but also the OPEC oil
embargo, the recession, the costs of miles traveled, and
the dollar benefits of reducing fatalities. The bolded
branches show the events with the greatest likelihood
of occurring or that already have occurred. �
Yes
Yes
OPEC
Oil Crisis
Renew
NMSL
Recession FatalitiesMiles
Traveled
Yes
Down 10% (32 billion miles)
$2.77 per 100 Miles Traveled
$2,77 per 100 Miles Traveled
Down 3%
$2.77 per 100 Miles Traveled
Unchanged
Down 20% (8,900 fatalities)
$240,000 per Fatality Averted

Down 5%
Down 10%
No
No No
(b) Decision Tree
(a) Influence Diagram
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CASE 1.4 THE ARGUMENT MAP—PROBLEM
STRUCTURING IN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
TRANSPORTATION POLICY
The role of causal arguments in transforming policy-
relevant information into policy claims may be
illustrated by Allison’s well-known study of foreign
policy decision making during the Cuban missile
crisis of October 1962.53 Showing how different
explanatory models yield different conclusions,
Allison argues that government policy analysts think
about problems of foreign policy in terms of implicit

conceptual models that shape their thought; most
analysts explain the behavior of governments in
terms of a model that assumes the rationality of
political choices (rational actor model); alternative
models, including those that emphasize
organizational processes (organizational process model)
and bureaucratic politics (bureaucratic politics model),
provide a basis for improved explanations.
In 1962, the policy alternatives open to the
United States ranged from no action and diplomatic
pressure to secret negotiations, invasion, surgical air
strikes, and blockade. Among the several claims
made at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, let us
consider the policy actually adopted by the United
States: “The United States should blockade Cuba.”
In this case, the policy-relevant information (I) is
“The Soviet Union is placing offensive missiles in
Cuba.” The warrant states that “the blockade will
force the withdrawal of missiles by showing the
Russians that the United States is determined to use
force.” In providing reasons to accept the warrant,
the backing (B) supports the warrant by stating that
“an increase in the cost of an alternative reduces the
likelihood of that alternative being chosen.”54 The
backing (B) represents a general theoretical
proposition, or law, within the rational policy model.
After the objection (O) has successfully challenged
the warrant, the qualifier (Q) changes from absolutely
to doubtful.
Allison’s account shows how the use of multiple
competing explanations can facilitate critical
thinking. The use of multiple competing models
moves the analysis from a simple uncontested

argument (Figure C1.4.1) to a new argument that is
complex, contested, and dynamic (Figure C1.4.2).
This change occurs because a serious objection has
been raised about the warrant and the backing of the
claim. The objection states: “But Soviet leaders may
fail to convince their naval units to depart from
established organizational routines.” The warrant
for this objection is: “The bulk of research on
organizations shows that major lines of
organizational behavior tend to be straight. Behavior
at time t+1 differs little from behavior at time t.55
The blockade will not work.” The warrant for the
objection is again a general proposition or law
within the organizational process model, otherwise
known as the disjointed incremental theory of policy
change.
Simple uncontested maps of arguments about
the 55 mph speed limit are presented alongside of
the arguments about the Cuban missile crisis
(Figures C1.4.1a and C1.4.1b).The comparisons
show that the simple argument maps represent
uncritical thinking. By contrast, the complex,
dynamic, and contested maps of the same crises
(Figures C1.4.2a and C1.4.2b) illustrate what is
meant by critical thinking. �
53Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban
Missile Crisis,” American Political Science
Review 3002, no. 3 (1969): 689–718.
54Allison, “Conceptual Models,” p. 694.
55Ibid., p. 702.
(continued)

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FIGURE C1.4.1
Simple argument maps are static and uncontested
Reliable intelligence
reports confirm that the
Soviet Union is placing
I
A blockade will show Soviet
leaders that the States means
business and is prepared to
use force.

W
Very
probably
Qsupports supports
C
(a) The Cuban Missile Crisis—Simple Uncontested Argument
There was a decline
of 8,300 traffic fatalities
in the year following the
implementation of the
55 MPH speed limit.
I
The speed limit was
responsible for the
decline in traffic
fatalities.
W
Certainly
Q
support
Congress should
reinstate the 55
MPH speed limit.

C
(b) The 55 mph Speed Limit—Simple Uncontested Argument
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Case 1.4 29
C
Because an increase
in the cost of an action
reduces the likelihood
that it will be taken.
B
But considering the
objections, the claim
is doubtful.
O

Given that reliable intelli-
gence reports confirm that
the Soviet Union is placing
I
Because a blockade will show
Soviet leaders that the States
means business and is
prepared to use force.
W
Absolutely
Q weaklysupport
weakly
support
strongly
opposes
But Soviet leaders may fail to
convince their naval units
to depart from established routines.
O
strongly
opposes
Because the bulk of research on
organizations shows that major lines of
behavior tend to be straight: Behavior at
time t + 1 differs little from behavior at
time t. The blockade will not work.

W
strongly
supports
(a) The Cuban Missile Crisis—Dynamic Contested Argument
(continued)
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FIGURE C1.4.2
Complex argument maps are dynamic and contested
Congress should
reinstate the 55

MPH speed limit.
C
Since it is obvious that the decline is
due to the speed limit. No other factors
can explain the decline, which is the
largest in U.S. history.
B
But this is not
certain at all.
O
Given that there was a decline of
8,300 traffic fatalities in the year
following the implementation
of the 55 MPH speed limit.
I
Because the speed
limit was responsible
for the decline in
traffic fatalities.
W
Certainly
Q
support
support opposes
But most of the decline was due to the 1974
recession, the rise in unemployment, the

doubling of gasoline prices, and the consequent
sharp decline in miles driven, which drastically
reduced the exposure to accidents.
O
opposes
(b) The 55 mph Speed Limit—Simple Uncontested Argument
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