MSC2025- Multipolarization_–Munich Security Report 2025
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MSC 2025 February 2025
![The same is true for other challengers today. Several indicators suggest that
China and the US are playing in a different league than the other G7 and BRICS
states (Figure 1.1). And while China trails the United States in nominal GDP
and GDP per capita, it is already the world’s largest economy in terms of
purchasing power parity. Likewise, its military spending is second only to
the United States’, and US analysts have been watching China’s military
modernization efforts with increasing concern.24
As a result of “the most
dramatic military buildup since World War II,”25
some analysts conclude that
“in some areas, [China] has already matched or surpassed America.”26
While
Russia is still the only nuclear superpower on a par with the US, China seems
to be on track to become its second “nuclear peer.”27
According to Lind’s metrics,
all the other states lack either the economic or military capabilities to join the
great-power ranks. While Germany and Japan can be considered latent great
powers due to their economic strength, their respective grand strategies
render them unlikely to make the necessary military investments to clear the
great-power threshold. Despite its nuclear arsenal, Russia is “a regional power
with significant national capabilities” but not a great power, either. Finally,
although India’s continued rise could shift the system to multipolarity in the
future, it clearly remains below the threshold for now.28
At present, India has
about a third of China’s defense spending and less than a quarter of its nominal
GDP. And while Brazil exhibits some characteristics of a great power, South
Africa falls short in almost all dimensions (Figure 1.1).
For another group of scholars, such rather restrictive criteria are misleading,
obscuring the emergence of a multipolar world. They either accept a lower
threshold for achieving great-power status or doubt that a state needs to be a
great power in all dimensions to be considered a “pole.” From this point of
view, a multipolar world does not mean that there have to be several powers
with roughly equal capabilities, “it just requires that significant power is
concentrated in more than two states.”29
Based on this broader definition,
states such as Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, or Russia can clearly be
considered “important global powers.”30
Compared to most other states, the G7
and the BRICS – which, with the exception of Russia, are covered by the Munich
Security Index – stand out in several dimensions, even if not in all of them.31
Nowhere is “multipolarization” more advanced than in the economic realm,
as several emerging economies have seen impressive growth. In terms of
purchasing power parity, the members of the BRICS already surpassed
the G7 in 2018. Following the enlargement of the bloc in 2024, which saw
the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, BRICS
nations account for about 40 percent of global trade and 40 percent of
crude oil production and exports.32
“Communist China is the
most powerful adversary
the United States has
faced in living memory.
This is no exaggeration.
We sometimes forget
that past enemies,
including Nazi Germany
and Soviet Russia, had
smaller economies than
we did. Each tried to take
over its neighbors and
hurt our country in the
process. Each failed
because America outbuilt
and outgunned it.”23
Marco Rubio, then–US
Senator, foreword to the
report “The World China
Made,” September 9, 2024
Introduction
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![This perceived implausibility of a two-bloc world is driving the rise of the
narrative of an emerging multipolar order. In ideological terms, many argue,
the future order may be much messier. We may be living in a world where
multiple orders co-exist or compete and where little is left of near-universal
rules, principles, and patterns of cooperation. In such a “multi-order”62
or
“multiplex”63
world, the liberal order may not necessarily disappear.
But its reach will increasingly be restricted to the West, or what is left of it.64
What is emerging, then, is a new system “characterized by plurality of
power and identity,”65
where several major poles pursue their own visions
of order, with unique sets of rules, values, and institutions. In this world
of multiple orders, Russia, which has long seen itself as a “civilizational”
pole,66
is working towards a Russian-led Eurasian order, as outlined in the
new security treaties Moscow proposed to the US and NATO in late 2021.
China, for its part, is establishing a Beijing-led order in East Asia and may
be trying to expand it further to align with the geography of its Belt and
Road Initiative.67
This era of increasing political “diversity” may also see
the emergence of other (regional) “poles” whose order models prove attractive
to different degrees. But, all told, peaceful coexistence between the different
orders is rather unlikely, given that it is far from clear whether the major
ordering poles can agree on at least some rules, principles, and structures
of cooperation to manage inter-order relations.
In sum, just as we can observe a trend toward a multipolarity of power, we can
see a similar trend in ideological terms. What used to be the global standard in
the post–Cold War era, namely Western political and economic liberalism, is
increasingly contested again. But instead of being replaced by one clear-cut
alternative, it seems to be eroding from within while simultaneously giving
way to multiple contestations.
Promises and Perils of the Emerging Multipolar (Dis)Order
As the eight following chapters of this report demonstrate, there are clear
differences between the potential “poles” (Chapters 2–9) in terms of whether
politicians view a multipolar order as a cause for hope or concern. Even
within countries, the changes seem to be engendering mixed feelings
(Figure 7.1). This is hardly surprising, given how difficult it is to predict
changes due to multipolarization. Another reason for why some societies
look at a multipolar future with optimism while others look at it with dread
may well be the way these societies assess the unipolar past and the liberal
international order. People who feel they have not benefitted equally from
this order may be much more positive about a multipolar alternative.69
Put
“[R]egional crises and the
strong push from the
Global South and BRICS
Plus are making us
reassess the order of a
world that is no longer
just multipolar but
deeply fragmented.”68
Giorgia Meloni, Italian
President of the Council of
Ministers, Chamber of
Deputies, December 17, 2024
Introduction
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![differently, for these people, many of whom are in the countries of the Global
South, “the past was not as good as we [in the West] tend to think, and the
future is not as bad as we fear.”70
In fact, when asked about the prospects for
peace and prosperity, respect for international rules, and global problem-
solving in a multipolar world, respondents in the “BICS” countries were,
on aggregate, more optimistic than respondents in the G7 countries (Figure 1.4).
For multipolar optimists, a world where several powers keep each other in
check and there are more actors able to constrain Washington should be a
more peaceful and stable one.71
Many of these optimists do not perceive
Washington as “an anchor of stability, but rather a risk to be hedged against.”72
In support of their position, they need look no further than the land grabs with
which Donald Trump recently threatened Canada, Greenland, and Panama.73
According to this optimistic reading, multipolarization may also improve
multilateral cooperation. Above all, it may help bring about the long-demanded
reform of international institutions, rendering global governance more
representative of non-Western states and ensuring that it provides more
inclusive benefits than it did during the unipolar period.74
The inclusion of the
African Union in the Group of 20 (G20) during India’s G20 presidency may be a
case in point. Optimists also believe that emerging powers can be expected to
contribute to the provision of global public goods and constructively support
conflict prevention or crisis diplomacy. They see the increasing number of
global actors actively engaging in crisis diplomacy as a positive sign and are
Figure 1.4
Respondents’ perspectives on a multipolar world, November 2024,
share agreeing minus share disagreeing with each statement
Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference
-20–-11 -10–0 1– 10 11– 20 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60
It is a world where the concerns of weaker/
developing countries are better taken into account
It is a world where international
law is broken less frequently
It is a world where prosperity is distributed
more equally among countries
It is a more peaceful world
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24
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![“authoritarian international law.”96
If the pessimists are right, the “age of
impunity,”97
in which human rights violations and other crimes
go too often unpunished, is here to stay.
Managing Multipolarization: Toward Depolarization?
Recent trends suggest that the negative effects of greater multipolarity are
prevailing as divides between major powers grow. For instance, global defense
spending has hit a new record, and new arms races are looming.98
At the
same time, in Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine, among others, attempts at conflict
resolution are failing or have not even begun; and a confrontational climate
summit in Azerbaijan is just one of many examples of increasingly deficient
global problem-solving. Before our eyes, we are seeing the negative scenario of
a more multipolar world materialize – a more conflictual world without shared
rules and effective multilateral cooperation. Rather than generating more
inclusive global benefits, it comes with fragmentation that is shrinking
the proverbial global pie, potentially triggering “lose-lose” dynamics where
everyone will be worse off in the long run.99
It is far from clear what might initiate the process of “depolarization” that
could set multipolarity on a positive track. Some believe that international
organizational reform is key. This reasoning suggests that the divisions
accompanying greater multipolarity could be mitigated if global governance
structures became more inclusive of the new power centers by encouraging,
as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz put it, their “greater participation in and
integration into the international order […] to keep multilateralism alive in a
multipolar world.”101
Yet the suggestion that the integration of new poles
alone will breed the type of consensus needed to create an order that works
for the benefit of all is far from a foregone conclusion. Doubters need only
look to the five major powers with permanent seats on the UN Security
Council and their inability to agree on solutions to any of the major conflicts
of today.
Reforms that mostly reflect changes in material power may thus not be
sufficient. As some have suggested, ideological reforms of the international
order may be needed to create a new working consensus among the major
powers that also benefits the wider world. Put differently, they argue that for
multipolarity to work, we might have to rethink some of the order’s rules and
norms.102
This, however, begs the question of which rules must be preserved
under any circumstances, which rules are particularly contested, and which
principles could and might have to be adjusted.
“In times of increasing
polarization, expressions
such as ‘deglobalization’
have become
commonplace. But it is
impossible to ‘deplanetize’
our life in common.
We are condemned to
the interdependence of
climate change.”100
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
Brazilian President,
UN General Assembly,
September 24, 2024
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![is the opposite of enlightened. Indeed, Moscow’s talk of “indivisible
security” only serves as a smoke screen for its pursuit of a Russian sphere
of influence.112
And although China would clearly like its vision for the
international order – with its concepts of common security and common
development that resonate in some parts of the world – to be perceived as
seeking the common good, the order it pursues, just like Russia, is one of
major power privilege and not of sovereign equality.113
Finally, major actors
in the Global South seem less focused on averting the growing polarization
of global politics and more on adapting to or exploiting it. The bridge-building
between the Global North and the Global South that some of these states
have officially committed themselves to would be a highly welcome remedy
for polarization. But in many of these countries, the dominant approach in
an increasingly fragmented global environment is to assert narrow interests,
which often means glossing over the fact that smaller states do not have
this opportunity.114
What makes things worse is that, almost everywhere, the pursuit of
enlightened foreign policies is being hampered by growing domestic
polarization and the shrinking political leeway that accompanies it.
Domestic polarization, in short, is playing a major role in preventing leaders
from building the necessary global consensus. Worse yet, leaders may even
have incentives to frustrate international agreement – simply because they
“thrive […] in a Hobbesian, transactional, all-against-all world.”116
Put
differently, polarization on the international level may help some leaders
consolidate power at home. Global efforts to reduce dangerous divides
between countries, preserve basic rules and norms, or create new ones, and
efforts to coordinate responses to a wide range of global threats will thus not
succeed if depolarization cannot be accomplished within countries. The
quest to build a more peaceful, sustainable, and just order starts at home.
“We are moving to a
multipolar world, but we
are not there yet. We are
in a purgatory of polarity.
And in this purgatory,
more and more countries
are filling the spaces of
geopolitical divides, doing
whatever they want with
no accountability.”115
António Guterres,
UN Secretary-General,
UN General Assembly,
September 24, 2024
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![MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
34
The Munich Security Index combines the crucial components that make
a risk more serious. Public perceptions of trajectory are combined with
imminence and severity alongside a measure to give equal weight to
perceptions of preparedness.
Index components
Overall
Question 1 – How great is the overall risk to your
country?
For each of the following, please say how great a risk it poses to
your country.
• Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the lowest and 10 the greatest risk]
Imminence
Question 4 – How imminent is the risk?
For each of the following, please say how imminent a threat
you think it is.
•
Answer scale 1 – 8 [with 1 now or in the next few months
and 8 never]
• Rescaled to 0 – 10 and reversed1
Preparedness
Question 5 – How prepared is your country?
For each of the following, please say how prepared your country is
to deal with this threat.
• Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the least and 10 the most prepared]
• Reversed2
Index scores To produce the final risk index score for each risk in each country we add the
mean scores for all five of the inputs above – overall risk, trajectory,
severity, imminence, and preparedness. The resulting total is then rescaled to
run from 0 to 100 for ease of interpretation. The final risk index score is an
absolute figure (with 100 the highest and 0 the lowest possible risk index
score) that can be compared between demographics, countries, and over time.
Trajectory
Question 2 – Will the risk increase or decrease over
the next twelve months?
Please say for each of the following whether you think the risk
posed in your country will increase, decrease, or stay the same in
the next year.
•
Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the strongest decrease, 5 no change,
and 10 the strongest increase]
Severity
Question 3 – How severe would the damage be if it
happened?
For each of the following, please say how bad you think the
damage would be in your country if it were to happen or become
a major risk.
• Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 very low and 10 very severe damage]
Explaining the Index
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![“We were being ripped
off by European nations
both on trade and on
NATO. […] If you don’t
pay, we’re not going to
protect you.”7
Donald Trump, then–US
presidential candidate,
presidential debate,
September 10, 2024
the erstwhile Washington Consensus on free trade and withdrew the US
from Afghanistan.
Trumpism still fundamentally diverges from Bidenism on the grand strategic
level. Unlike his predecessors, who shared the conviction that the US was “the
indispensable nation […] that holds the world together,”8
Trump’s vision lacks
“any outsized ethos of responsibility” for the international order.9
Indeed, his
toying with the idea of coercively absorbing Greenland, Panama, and Canada,
and his pledge to “expan[d] our territory”, suggests that he will not feel bound
by key international norms.10
Trump’s opposition to the status quo is twofold.
First, he maintains that the order allows others to “rip off” the US.11
Highlighting the fact that the US has the largest trade deficit in the world,
he has berated China but also partners like the EU, Canada, and Mexico
“because we’re being treated very badly by most of [them].”12
For Trump, US
allies in Europe and East Asia tend to be liabilities rather than assets.13
And
he has withdrawn funding from and criticized international institutions for
being unfair. Indeed, in net terms, the first Trump administration disengaged
from more international organizations and agreements than any other
post–Cold War administration (Figure 2.1).
Second, many in the Republican Party assert that the US is no longer the global
superpower with indefinite resources to underwrite the international order.
Whereas President Biden, when asked whether the US could support Ukraine
Cases of US engagement with or disengagement from international
organizations and agreements, 1989–2024, by administration
Figure 2.1
Data: Tim Heinkelmann-Wild. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Engagement
Disengagement
0
-10
-20 30 40
20
10
Biden 2021–2025
Obama II 2013–2017
Trump I 2017–2021
Obama I 2009–2013
Bush Jr. II 2005–2009
Clinton II 1997–2001
Bush Jr. I 2001–2005
Clinton I 1993–1997
Bush Sr. 1989–1993
56
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![“[In a] world of scarcity,
we can’t support Ukraine
and the Middle East and
contingencies in East
Asia.”14
J.D. Vance, then–US Senator,
Munich Security Conference,
February 18, 2024
and Israel at the same time, insisted that “we’re the United States of America
for God’s sake, the most powerful nation […] in the history of the world,”15
President Trump has repeatedly attested to America’s “decline.”16
Indeed,
the notion of “resource scarcity” has become a central premise of Republican
foreign policy thinking.17
At first sight, this argument is hard to sustain
(Figure 1.1). US defense spending still dwarfs that of any other actor. The US
remains the only global military power with a vast network of alliances, and it
is currently upgrading its nuclear arsenal.18
It is also the largest economy in
the world in nominal terms, and the gap to China has actually widened
since 2021; US GDP per capita is almost six times larger than China’s.19
The US
dollar remains the dominant global reserve currency,20
and the US has
recently become a net energy exporter for the first time since the 1940s.21
Indeed, 90 percent of respondents in the 2025 Munich Security Index consider
the US a great power – a higher figure than for any other country (Figure 1.3).
However, many worry that these indicators obscure underlying US weaknesses.
Indeed, the defense spending gap has narrowed and, when adjusted for
purchasing power, is much smaller than commonly assumed (Figure 2.2).
The war in Ukraine also exposed the West’s depleted stocks of key weapons
Nominal defense spending in constant USD (2022)
Data: ifo Institute. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Defense spending adjusted for military purchasing power parities
Figure 2.2
Defense expenditures of the world's largest spenders adjusted for
military purchasing power, 2023, USD billions
0 200 400 600 800
100 300 500 700 900
US
European NATO
China
Russia
Ukraine
India
France
South Korea
Japan
UK
Germany
Poland
Italy
Turkey
Spain
South Korea between India and France
nominal: 47bn
adjusted: 96bn
Japan between Germany and Poland
nominal: 52bn
adjusted: 68bn
Human rights
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![“We have not seen this
kind of military buildup
since Germany in the
1930s. […] We need
to begin focusing the
nation on the threat
that [China] is.”27
Michael Waltz, then–US
Representative, Atlantic
Council, October 28, 2024
not only expedite the economic decoupling from Beijing and sharply increase
bilateral tensions, but also render coordination with European states more
difficult. The Trump administration is also likely to continue preventing China
from accessing US technology that could aid its military rise. There is less
consensus among Republicans on the degree to which China needs military
balancing. While some argue it is imperative for the US to defend Taiwan to deny
Chinese hegemony over Asia, and hence push for significantly reinforcing the US
force posture in the Indo-Pacific, Trump has been equivocal on whether he would
defend the island and sowed doubt on US alliance commitments in the region.34
As a corollary of prioritizing China, the Trump administration could abdicate
its historic role as Europe’s security guarantor. While some Republicans warn
that the “cost of deterrence is considerably less than the cost of war,”35
the
US will likely shift the bulk of the burden of defending the continent onto
European NATO allies, no longer considering the security, democratic stability,
or prosperity of Europe strategic priorities.36
For Ukraine, the consequences
could be vast. On the campaign trail, Trump mocked Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelenskyy as “maybe the greatest salesman” for securing US
military assistance and vowed to end the war within 24 hours.37
Recently,
he struck a more supportive tone, saying that “the only way you’re going to
reach an agreement is not to abandon [Ukraine],”38
and expressed hope to
end the war “long before six months.”39
In December, Keith Kellogg, Trump’s
envoy for Ukraine and Russia, explained that the US could threaten Ukraine
with cutting off supplies while threatening Russia with removing constraints
on supplies to Ukraine, to induce both parties to the negotiation table to
achieve a ceasefire along current lines.40
NATO membership for Kyiv is likely
not in the cards. Ukraine may not be able to accept such terms as it feels that
without credible security guarantees, Russia would use the ceasefire to
reconstitute its forces to attack again.41
And there are no indications that
Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to temper his maximalist goals of
regime change and a de facto veto over Ukraine’s future foreign policy.
For NATO, Trumpism will also involve enormous consequences. While a formal
US withdrawal from the Alliance is unlikely, the credibility of both Article 5 and
the US nuclear umbrella are in doubt, as Trump has suggested conditioning
NATO’s collective defense guarantees on Allies spending as much as five
percent of GDP on defense. Moreover, people in Trump’s orbit have developed
plans to significantly reduce the US military footprint in Europe and transform
the Alliance into what some have called a “dormant NATO.”42
Given Europe’s
sluggish rearmament and dependency on the US, such withdrawals could
create a security vacuum, exposing Europe to Russian aggression toward the
Human rights
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![What is China’s vision for global order, and how is it
received internationally? How do China’s military,
economic, and diplomatic strategies support – or
contradict – its vision? How does increasing pushback
from countries all over the world impact China?
Pole Positioning
3
Randolf Carr and
Paula Köhler
China is the world’s most prominent advocate of a new multipolar order: “An
equal and orderly multipolar world means every country can find its place
[…] and play its due role,” announced Chinese President Xi Jinping last July.1
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is pushing to realign global governance
institutions and promoting alternative structures, like BRICS, ostensibly to
better reflect the “redistribution of power” towards the rising non-Western
world.2
However, in jousting for “pole position” with the United States, Beijing
often disregards the very countries it claims to uplift and the principles it
touts. Thus, many see this advocacy as mere window dressing for naked power
politics.3
Its considerable success in rallying the discontents of the current
global order notwithstanding, China’s economic and military progress face
homegrown obstacles. Moreover, Beijing’s power plays are drawing more and
more resistance from its neighbors as well as European states; and under
the new Trump administration, US efforts to hamstring China will likely
intensify. If the CCP doubles down on its current course, China itself may
help derail any hope of an “orderly multipolar world.”
He Says, Xi Says: China’s Vision for Global Order
In pushing for multipolarity, China is portraying itself as an advocate for
the countries of the so-called Global South. Like many of them, China views
the current order as distorted by the West’s dominance over international
institutions, double standards, and supposed “Cold War mentality.”4
Beijing’s
vision promises to “democratize international relations,”5
uphold the UN
Charter, and give disaffected countries equal say and room to maneuver
within international institutions and rules. But it also promotes the CCP’s
ideas: Its “right to development” prioritizes economic progress for the many
over political and civil rights for the individual; and in its understanding,
Human rights
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![However, the EU’s vision for the international order has been facing headwinds
for some time. Recent power shifts have emboldened revisionist countries, such
as Russia and China, which are seeking greater benefits from and influence over
the order.8
Meanwhile, the US has become increasingly dissatisfied with the
order it once helped build, as its influence has been waning.9
This discontent
with the liberal order has translated into increasing international gridlock,
with many international institutions unable to address pressing global
challenges. Moreover, the rise of nationalist populism in many Western
societies has created a backlash against economic and cultural globalization,
fueling protectionism across the globe that challenges the EU’s free trade
model.10
At the same time, the EU’s capacity to address these challenges
has been shrinking, exacerbated by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU,
with its power resources in relative decline (Figure 4.1). More recently,
these headwinds have become a perfect storm for the EU, putting three
key elements of its liberal vision in jeopardy.
Eye of the Storm: Shattered Security Architecture
Russia’s war against Ukraine has destroyed Europe’s cooperative security
architecture, testing “the norm against territorial conquest […] in the most
threatening and vivid way since the end of World War II.”11
Europeans have
responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by delivering weapons and
significantly increasing defense spending. The number of European states
that are both in the EU and NATO and meet NATO’s two-percent target for
defense spending has risen from four in 2021 to an estimated 16 in 2024.12
Yet
these increases remain insufficient, given Ukraine’s needs and warnings
that Russia could expand its war effort into NATO territory within five to
The EU’s share of key indicators, 2005–2023, percent of global total
Figure 4.1
Data: Eurostat; SIPRI; IMF; UN. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Defense spending
GDP Population
Exports (goods)
2023
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 15
14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
30
35
0
15
5
10
20
25
Brexit
72
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-72-320.jpg)
![eight years.13
Putin’s regime is already issuing nuclear threats and launching
aggressive hybrid attacks on European countries, including election
interference, as recently seen in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania. A Russian
victory over Ukraine would embolden Moscow to intensify these attacks and
pursue its imperial ambitions across the post-Soviet space.
Compounding the crisis, the new US administration has signaled a potential
reduction in security assistance to the continent, forcing Europe to assume a
greater share of the burden of deterring Russia and supporting Ukraine. During
the presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly suggested reducing aid to Ukraine
and claimed he could end the war within 24 hours, raising concerns that Kyiv
might be pressured into negotiating from a position of weakness.15
In January,
however, he said that he hoped the war would be over “long before six months.”16
Furthermore, he has made continued US membership in NATO contingent on
European nations paying their “fair share,” going as far as to demand they spend
five percent of GDP on defense.17
EU member states thus face a triple challenge.
First, they have to raise defense spending amid fiscal constraints and increasing
domestic backlash. Second, they must overcome the perennial fragmentation of
their defense industrial base and significantly deepen cooperation both among
themselves and with non-EU European Allies, notably Norway and the UK.18
Third, they should concretize the promised “ironclad security guarantees” for
Ukraine established in the recent joint declaration by multiple European foreign
ministers,19
either by charting a realistic path toward NATO membership or
through robust bilateral arrangements.
Economic Thunder: Securitized Interdependence
The global geoeconomic turn threatens to undermine the EU’s traditional
economic model. The EU has been the exemplar of the post–Cold War era of
hyperglobalization. As one of the world’s most open economies and the actor
with the largest number of trade agreements, the EU has long promoted the
WTO (Figure 4.2). In December 2024, after 25 years of negotiations, the EU
signed a deal with the South American Mercosur bloc, potentially establishing
the world’s largest trade zone, which would be an important step in the EU’s
quest to diversify its trade relations. Yet final ratification is still pending and
some key member states remain opposed to the deal. Overall, the EU’s role
as a champion of free trade and benign economic interdependence is
increasingly out of step with the growing securitization of economic relations.
The pandemic, rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China,
Beijing’s increasing economic coercion, and Russia’s war on Ukraine have led
key international actors to prioritize national security over considerations of
economic efficiency.21
As a result, the WTO is paralyzed and the specter of a
“A safe Ukraine means
a safer Poland, Sweden,
Norway, Europe, and
the whole West. […] If
Ukraine loses, we all
lose.”14
Donald Tusk, Polish Prime
Minister, Nordic-Baltic
Summit, November 28, 2024
“If we don’t spend more
together now to prevent
war, we will pay a much,
much, much higher price
later to fight it.”20
Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary
General, Carnegie Europe,
December 12, 2024
73
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THE EUROPEAN UNION](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-73-320.jpg)
![scenario, these trade wars could lead to the breakdown of the WTO, with welfare
losses for the EU far exceeding those arising from bilateral trade disputes.27
Amid these challenges, it is imperative that the EU diversifies its trade relations
and forges new partnerships with countries of the so-called Global South,
though the difficulties in concluding the trade agreement with Mercosur serve
as a stark reminder that the EU will, at times, have to make painful concessions.28
Illiberal Winds: Shaking Democratic Foundations
The European model of liberal democracy is facing unprecedented internal
contestation, exacerbated by external pressures and interference. Political
extremes – especially the far right – have been gaining traction since the early
2000s, a trend underscored by the 2024 European Parliament elections.29
This trend is also taking hold in the European Council and Council, where –
at the time of writing – seven governments include far-right parties (Figure 4.3).
Austria, where the far-right Freedom Party was tasked with forming a
government for the first time in January, could soon join this group.
Fragmentation and polarization have also weakened France and Germany, the
EU’s two traditional policy drivers. After a crushing defeat in the European
Parliament elections, with the far-right National Rally coming in first, French
President Emmanuel Macron called a snap election, that resulted in a hung
parliament and a center-right minority government led by Michel Barnier.
This government was ousted just three months later by a no-confidence vote,
leaving complex budget negotiations to the next minority government under
Seat distribution in the European Parliament and European Council,
2004–2024, percent
Figure 4.3
Data: European Parliament; various sources. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Liberals
Christian Democrats/center right
Greens Far right–extreme right Left–far left Others
Socialists/center left
European Council
0
40
20
60
100
80
European Parliament
2004 2009 2014 2019 2024 2004 2009 2014 2019 2024
Liberals
Christian Democrats/center right Socialists/center left
“For a very long time,
we took [democracy]
for granted […]. But
today our democracies
are under threat.”32
Ursula von der Leyen,
European Commission
President, European
Parliament Plenary,
July 18, 2024
75
THE EUROPEAN UNION](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-75-320.jpg)
![François Bayrou. Meanwhile, Germany’s coalition government collapsed in
November after months of infighting over the budget, triggering a snap election
in February 2025, ahead of which the far right is rising in the polls and a new
far-left party could enter the Bundestag.30
Polarization is also contributing to
trends of democratic backsliding and rule of law violations in several EU
member states, challenging the EU’s credibility as a promoter of democracy
and universal values abroad.31
Divisions between and within member states are further complicating joint
decision-making, often resulting in lowest-common-denominator compromises.
Unlike trade policy, where qualified majority voting applies, foreign and
security policy decisions require unanimity. Hungary’s months-long blockade
of funds to partially reimburse weapon deliveries to Ukraine is a case in point.33
Looking ahead, these divisions could stifle ambitions to create major new
funding instruments aimed at arresting the EU’s economic and military
decline. Compounding the challenge, the new US administration could
exacerbate internal divisions. Analysts anticipate that the second Trump
presidency will embolden illiberal and populist movements in Europe,
normalizing and amplifying their rhetoric and policy positions.34
President
Trump’s preference for bilateral and transactional diplomacy could also prevent
a unified stance toward the US, as European states vie for preferential reations.35
Europe’s Choice: Brace or Be Blown Away
Europe is facing the most challenging geopolitical situation since the end of
the Cold War. Russia’s raging war threatens to destroy both Ukraine and the
European security order, while geoeconomic tensions and structural economic
weaknesses are jeopardizing Europe’s prosperity. Meanwhile, internal
polarization is undermining the EU’s credibility and capacity to act. These
pressures are set to intensify with the new US administration, which may
reduce its security commitment to Europe, launch trade wars, and embolden
populist movements that deepen Europe’s internal divisions. The EU and its
member states have responded by increasing defense spending and devising
economic security strategies. Yet this will not suffice to protect the pillars of
the liberal order, especially as the US grows increasingly unwilling to shoulder
an unequal burden.36
The extent to which the Trump administration follows
through on its announcements will determine whether the EU must recalibrate
its relationship with the US or go as far as to emancipate itself from Washington
to become a more autonomous pole. Either way, to arrest its decline and
reclaim influence, the EU must reinvent itself. This is a herculean task, but
if the EU is really made in crisis, this is the time to prove it.
“Our Europe is mortal […].
It can die, and it all
depends on our choices.
These choices have to
be made now.”57
Emmanuel Macron,
French President,
Sorbonne University,
April 25, 2024
76
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![forums and acts as a bridge between the Global North and the Global
South.13
In this regard, the inclusion of the African Union in the G20, which
was achieved under India’s G20 presidency, is seen as a particular success.
But India’s foreign policy has not only become more self-confident; some
argue it has also become more assertive.15
As suggested by reporting in
The Washington Post about an alleged Indian assassination program in
Pakistan, this includes a greater willingness to take on India’s enemies abroad.16
Accusations that Indian agents were involved in the assassination of a Sikh
Canadian national in British Columbia in 2023 add to this impression.17
Weighing One’s Options: India’s Multi-Alignment
For India to raise its status on the global stage, Jaishankar argued in his 2020
book, the country needs “to extract as much [sic] gains from as many ties as
possible.”18
Multi-alignment is hardly a new approach for India. It breathes
the desire for strategic autonomy that already informed New Delhi’s Cold War
non-alignment policy.19
Yet India now pursues it with much more vigor, as is
apparent in the way the country has sought closer cooperation with Western
democracies while also keeping close ties with these countries’ competitors
and rivals. With Washington, New Delhi has developed a close strategic
partnership, especially on technology and defense.20
In May 2022, both countries
launched the US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies. With
the EU and individual European countries, India has intensified cooperation
on connectivity and supply chain resilience, as evidenced in the planned
India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and the already operational
EU-India Trade and Technology Council. At the same time, and despite
deteriorating relations between Russia and the West, Indian leaders have
continued to forge bonds with Moscow.21
After his 2024 re-election, Modi’s
first state visit led him to Russia. The prime minister’s “bear hug”22
with Putin,
which roughly coincided with Russian missiles striking a children’s hospital
in Kyiv, drew criticism from Kyiv and some Western capitals. Western
governments are also disappointed at the fact that, since 2021, Indian
purchases of discounted Russian oil products have grown nearly 20-fold
and have thus helped fund Moscow’s war effort.23
Precisely because of its good relations with both the West and Russia, some
have urged India to serve as a mediator in Russia’s war against Ukraine.24
Indian leaders, including Modi during his visit to Ukraine in August 2024,
have indeed acted as messengers between Kyiv and Moscow. Yet observers
are doubtful that New Delhi is capable and willing to assume a more proactive
“We are the voice of the
Global South!”14
Narendra Modi, Indian Prime
Minister, Economic Times
World Leaders Forum,
August 31, 2024
89
INDIA](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-89-320.jpg)
![How is Japan affected by current geopolitical upheavals?
As a major beneficiary and staunch supporter of the liberal
international order, what is Japan’s approach to preserving
it? What diplomatic, military, and economic resources can
Tokyo bring to bear, and what obstacles does it face?
A New Normal
7
Randolf Carr “The existing order is being seriously challenged. […] Changes in power
balances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, are occurring,” reads the
2024 edition of Japan’s annual defense white paper. As a result, “Japan is
facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of
World War II.”1
Deeply invested in liberal internationalism and US primacy,
Japan is especially perturbed by the end of the unipolar moment, the rise of
China, and the prospect of a new multipolar order. However, Tokyo has also
been preparing for that eventuality longer than most, with a multifaceted
regional strategy to fortify a liberal rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific.
Moreover, a raft of recent measures indicates Japan’s willingness to
shoulder more responsibility for defending itself and the order it so highly
values. However, mutually reinforcing domestic and international obstacles
spell trouble for Tokyo’s well-intentioned initiatives.
Liberal Order in Crisis: The Biggest Loser?
In Japan, both policy-makers and the public view the global redistribution
of power away from the US towards China and the so-called Global South with
trepidation. Having strategically adapted to and worked within changing
rules of the global landscape over the decades,2
Japan is a quintessential
status quo power. It is a big winner and chief supporter of US leadership in
the liberal international order, which enabled Japan to globalize and prosper
economically. The long unassailable US security umbrella over the Pacific
allowed it to do so while eschewing some tools of “normal” middle-to-great-
power politics, most notably significant defense budgets.3
To Japanese policy-makers, the “multipolarization” now touted as inevitable by
some national leaders is associated with danger.5
In the Munich Security Index
survey, 54 percent of Japanese respondents report feeling “concern” about
95
JAPAN](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-95-320.jpg)
![insistently warn that, if Beijing’s designs on Taiwan or the South China Sea
are not sufficiently deterred, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”10
Thus, Japan might not only be the biggest strategic loser should the liberal
international order break down; it is also a “frontline state” in the effort to
maintain it.11
Increasingly, Tokyo is stepping up its contributions.
Indo-Pacific Strategy: Be the Order You Wish to See in the World
Rather than let the Indo-Pacific become China’s sphere of influence or a mere
battleground of US-China competition, Japan has been doing its utmost to
shape a multipolar, orderly, and rules-based region.12
Since its inception in
2016, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has been the strategic framework
for Tokyo’s efforts. These include promoting infrastructure investment,
regional connectivity and integration, and capacity-building for maritime
security, all while working to reinforce shared rules in those fields.13
Most
notably perhaps, Tokyo catalyzed economic integration by taking a lead
negotiating role in two regional free trade agreements in 2018 and 2022. The
success of Japan’s engagement strategy is evident in the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, several European nations, and,
most importantly, India and the US all latching onto FOIP with their own
strategy documents.14
Likewise, Japan has driven intensified cooperation in
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the US, India, and Australia and has
embraced US-Japan trilateral formats with South Korea and the Philippines,
respectively.15
To advocate for East Asian security concerns, Japan has also
placed great importance on the G7, as the only Asian nation in the group, and
has intensified cooperation with NATO. Since the Ukraine invasion, Japanese
leaders have been regular guests at NATO summits and welcomed the idea of
a liaison office in Tokyo.
The overall goal of Japan’s FOIP, rather than explicitly containing China, is for
the region’s other powers to collectively counterbalance Beijing’s growing
influence. The more capable, interlinked, and invested in norms the countries
in the region are, the more resilient they should be to Chinese coercion.17
Thus, while perhaps falling short of being a regional pole in its own right,
Japan acts as a crucial catalyst of regional integration. Key to its “network
power” is Japan’s credibility: For ASEAN states, decades of Japanese
trade and investment have yielded tangible benefits, and Japan holds “sterling
credentials” as a model citizen of the liberal (trade) order.18
However, at a time
when its rivals increasingly play hardball, Tokyo has also realized that
diplomatic power alone is not enough.
“Japan will continue to
[…] make a proactive
contribution to realizing
and maintaining
international peace and
security, with a view to
leading the increasingly
divided and confrontational
international community
toward cooperation.”16
Iwaya Takeshi, Japanese
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
press release, January 10,
2025
97
JAPAN](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-97-320.jpg)
![G7 and NATO, and, at the prodding of the US, have themselves placed tough
high-tech export restrictions on China. Consequently, Japan is still widely seen
as an economic and technological powerhouse abroad (Figure 7.3), although its
GDP is stagnating. Since 2014, annual growth has been just 0.6 percent on
average and is expected to hover around that level until the end of the decade.25
But even as its growth stalls, Japan has impactful levers in its economic toolkit.
Tokyo was toughening up its security policy even before the invasion of
Ukraine prompted Europe’s Zeitenwende. However, the defense and economic
measures of the last two years have spelled a real “security renaissance.”26
Strategic Headwinds: Typhoon Season
Faced with new threats and a reeling liberal international order, Japan is
doubling down on its networked Indo-Pacific strategy and adopting the
defense and economic tools of a “normal” power. However, these efforts face
such headwinds that they may sputter before really getting off the ground.
Domestically, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru leads a minority government
after taking an electoral beating in October 2024.28
How to finance the
defense budget increases remains an unsolved problem, compounded by
a historically weak Japanese yen diminishing Tokyo’s buying power.29
Underlying all this are Japan’s aging society and weak economic growth.
Ishiba appears to have little political capital for advancing his predecessors’
ambitious initiatives.30
This is particularly true should Tokyo come under
pressure from President Trump. Japan no longer has a “Trump whisperer”
like the late Prime Minister Abe to wrangle a capricious US administration.31
The agreement governing financial support for US deployments on the
islands is up for renewal in 2027, so Washington could press Tokyo to pay more
for military protection.32
If Trump leans on bilateralism, some of Japan’s
burgeoning trilateral cooperations with other Indo-Pacific powers may
atrophy absent US convening power.33
Recent geopolitical rapprochement
with South Korea, always tenuous due to lingering historical issues, is already
on life support as a Japan-skeptical government appears poised to take
over in Seoul.34
Finally, getting roped further into a US-China trade war
could not just hurt Japan economically. It may also damage its standing
with multi-aligned partners in Southeast Asia.35
Japan might yet successfully overcome its internal limitations to continue
down the path towards “normalcy.” But as it does, it may have to reckon with
the fact that being surrounded not only by more belligerent rivals but also
less stable partners is the new normal.
“There is a great deal of
respect and expectations
for Japan. […] However,
at the same time, as
Japan’s economic power
weakens, and moreover,
as China overtakes us, it
seems Japan’s presence
is losing the brilliance it
once had.”27
Kamikawa Yōko, former
Japanese Minister of Foreign
Affairs, press conference,
August 20, 2024
100
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![stating that Ukraine and Russia were equally responsible for the war.24
After
taking office in 2023, he proposed a “peace club” of neutral countries that
should mediate between Ukraine and Russia. This was followed by a push
for negotiations together with China in 2024, which included a six-point
plan for a political settlement.25
Both attempts failed. Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the Chinese-Brazilian initiative “destructive,”
because it did not mention the need to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity.26
At the same time, Brazil has vocally criticized what it perceives as Western
double standards, particularly regarding Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.
Lula has repeatedly slammed Israel for what he sees as a “disproportionate”
response to the Hamas terror attacks of October 7, sparking criticism by
comparing it to the Holocaust.27
Non-alignment also shapes Brazil’s relations with China and the US.
While China has become Brazil’s largest trading partner and second-largest
investor, the US remains its largest direct investor and second-largest
trading partner (Figure 8.1).29
Since choosing sides could result in economic
losses, Brazil seeks to maintain good relations with both. However, its
positioning between the great powers is also subject to domestic controversy.
Lula’s government was, for instance, divided on the decision not to join
“The Chinese-Brazilian
proposal is […]
destructive.”28
Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
Ukrainian President,
Metrópoles, September 11,
2024
Brazil’s trade (imports and exports) with key partners, USD billions
Figure 8.1
Data: Trading Economics. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
EU US
China
2023
2012 13 15
14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
120
160
140
0
60
20
40
80
100
Global Infrastructures
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BRAZIL](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-105-320.jpg)
![“[T]he international
community cannot
proclaim the importance
of international law and
the importance of the
UN Charter in some
situations and not in
others as if the rule of
law only applies to a
select few.”12
Naledi Pandor, then–South
African Minister of
International Relations and
Cooperation, BRICS dialogue
with developing countries,
June 11, 2024
“South Africa’s policy
of active non-alignment
is not reactive but an
affirmative agenda.
It is not about being
neutral or abstaining from
world affairs, but putting
forward a unifying agenda
through dialogue to
achieve peace […].”23
Ronald Lamola, South African
Minister of International
Relations and Cooperation,
parliamentary budget vote
debate, July 11, 2024
foreign policy tenet that goes back to the ANC’s history as a liberation movement:
a deep-seated distrust of the West, particularly the US.5
Pretoria’s stance on global institutions, meandering between reform and
rejection, mirrors the two pillars. South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism
and the UN as its “centerpiece” has remained at the core of its foreign policy
declarations.6
And its involvement within global bodies has been substantial,
for example, it has been a non-elected member of the UN Security Council
three times in under 15 years and is currently pursuing a genocide case against
Israel at the International Court of Justice.7
Pretoria has consistently coupled
engagement with demands for reform. For South Africa, the “unrepresentative
and biased nature” of global institutions perpetuates structural inequalities
and allows the West to use them for its own priorities “at the expense of the
developing world.”8
Experiences over the past decades have strengthened
this perception: Pretoria has denounced Western promises of global
governance reforms as “empty,”9
the vaccine distribution during Covid-19
as “vaccine apartheid,”10
and the application of international law such as in
Iraq, Libya, or currently in Gaza as selective.11
The public’s views on multipolarity reflect the wide criticism of the current
international order (Figure 1.4). Frustrations about Western policies and
more pronounced anti-Western sentiments of President Nelson Mandela’s
successors have triggered South Africa’s shift from engagement within global
institutions to bodies outside them – and partners outside the West.13
In the
case of the International Criminal Court (ICC), South Africa’s stance has
shifted from ardent support to near exit. Under President Jacob Zuma, the
country’s withdrawal from the ICC was only halted by the South African High
Court. Zuma’s successor, President Cyril Ramaphosa, only refrained from
further withdrawal attempts after a back-and-forth.14
In contrast to South
Africa’s former success as a bridge-builder between countries of the Global
North and South and a driver of joint global policies, under Ramaphosa,
Pretoria has continued Zuma’s tilt toward non-Western powers, BRICS in
particular.15
While South Africa asserts that it sees BRICS not as “anti-West”
but as a “development platform,”16
this is difficult to sustain as Beijing and
Moscow increasingly use the format for revisionist aims.17
Pretoria’s homage
to BRICS as a body that “embraces progressive ideals and seeks […] a more
inclusive, equitable, and development-oriented world” seems hollow in light
of the revisionist geopolitical and coercive economic approaches of members
such as China, Russia, or Iran.18
For some observers, South Africa’s focus on
BRICS illustrates that in its choice of partners, opposition to the West takes
precedence over democracy, international law, and human rights.19
112
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![South Africa’s stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine also illustrates its skew
toward anti-Westernism. Rhetorically, Pretoria asserts its position of “active
non-alignment,” declaring its refusal to “align with any of the global powers”
while pointing to its historic commitment to the principles of the UN Charter
and dialogue and negotiations.20
Its actual policies, however, reveal a
persistent sense of loyalty toward Russia due to the Soviet Union’s support of
the ANC’s anti-apartheid struggle and a “peculiar interpretation of
non-alignment as anti-Western.”21
South Africa echoes Moscow’s narrative of
the invasion, portraying the war as a contest between Russia and the West
and a reaction to US provocation.22
Its joint naval exercise with Russia during
the war’s first anniversary is difficult not to interpret as siding with Moscow.
In addition to the ANC’s political orientation, economic interests have
driven South Africa’s shift to emerging powers – BRICS and China in
particular.24
However, as a small, open economy with historically close ties
with the West, economic pragmatism has also moderated Pretoria’s stance
toward Europe and the US. Europe has remained South Africa’s most
important trading partner (Figure 9.1), and in recent years, the US has
accounted for its fastest-growing export market.25
A US Congress bill that
calls for a review of South African–US relations due to Pretoria’s foreign
policies has put South Africa’s preferential access to the US market under
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) into question. While the
Biden administration renewed Pretoria’s access to the program in December,
under President Trump, the future of AGOA is uncertain, and trade relations
might from now on be tied to how countries align with US geopolitical
interests, particularly vis-à-vis China.26
Eager to preserve its access to the
US market, Pretoria has been trying to soften tensions with the US.27
South Africa’s trade relations with selected countries/regions,
2023, percent of total goods traded
Figure 9.1
Data: South African Revenue Service. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Europe
Africa
BRIC
US
Other
China:
India:
Brazil:
Russia:
17
6
1
1 24
8
19
24
26
“South African
officials have made
a miscalculation by
aligning themselves with
Russia and China. […]
My hope is that they
choose otherwise.”28
Jared Moskowitz, Member of
the House of Representatives,
US Congress, March 21, 2024
Global Infrastructures
113
SOUTH AFRICA](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-113-320.jpg)
![16. Donald J. Trump, “Remarks at a Campaign Rally in Detroit,
Michigan,” Detroit, October 18, 2024, https://perma.cc/45UM-8YEP.
17. See Jennifer Lind, “Back to Bipolarity: How China’s Rise Trans-
formed the Balance of Power,” International Security 49:2 (2024),
7–55; Cliff Kupchan, “Bipolarity Is Back: Why It Matters,”
The Washington Quarterly 44:4 (2021), 123–139, https://doi.org/10.
1080/0163660X.2021.2020457.
18. Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics, New
York City: Columbia University Press, 2018.
19. The White House, “National Security Strategy,” Washington, DC,
October 2022, https://perma.cc/7RPC-7HZJ, 23.
20. On the notion of the pacing challenge, see Cameron Carlson,
Troy Bouffard, and Ryan Burke, “Defining Pacing Threats and
Challenges to Homeland Defense and Security,” Journal of
Indo-Pacific Affairs 7:4 (2024), 3–11.
21. Lind, “Back to Bipolarity,” 42–45.
22. Lind, “Back to Bipolarity,” 9.
23. Marco Rubio, “The World China Made: ‘Made in China 2025’
Nine Years Later,” September 9, 2024: Marco Rubio Website,
https://perma.cc/Q2DK-G825, 3.
24. For a recent overview, see US Department of Defense, “Military
and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
China 2024: Annual Report to Congress,” Washington, DC: US
Department of Defense, December 2024, https://perma.cc/RJT3
-SZPR.
25. Andrew Erickson, “What the Pentagon’s New Report on Chinese
Military Power Reveals About Capabilities, Context, and
Consequences,” War on the Rocks, December 19, 2024.
26. “Where China Leads,” The Economist, November 9, 2024, p. 52.
27. Brad Roberts et al., “China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer:
Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” Livermore:
Center for Global Security Research, Spring 2023, https://perma
.
cc/5UL5-GATX.
28. Lind, “Back to Bipolarity,” 50–54.
29. Emma Ashford and Evan Cooper, “Yes, the World Is Multipolar,”
Foreign Policy, October 5, 2023.
30. Ashford and Cooper, “Yes, the World Is Multipolar.”
31. The setup of the MSI mirrors the widespread perception that the
world is becoming more multipolar.
32. Stewart Patrick, “BRICS Expansion, the G20, and the Future
of World Order,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, October 9, 2024, https://perma.cc/38LZ
-9PJ2. Indonesia joined the bloc in 2025.
33. Kaja Kallas, “European Council: Press Remarks by High
Representative Kaja Kallas Upon Arrival,” Brussels: European Union
External Action, December 19, 2024, https://perma.cc/52G2-ZUYD.
34. Bilahari Kausikan, “Polarity Is What States Make of It,”
Foreign Affairs 102:6 (2023), 166–168, 167.
35. Kausikan mentions his native Singapore – “as a financial center, a
port in global trade, and a critical hub for oil refining” – as well as
larger states “such as Australia, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and
South Korea.” See Kausikan, “Polarity Is What States Make of It,” 167.
36. Vladimir Putin, “Valdai Discussion Club Meeting,”
Sochi: Valdai Discussion Club, November 7, 2024, http://
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/75521.
37. William C. Wohlforth, “Polarity and International Order: Past
and Future,” in: Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International
Relations, 418–9
38. Randall Schweller, “An Emerging World That Defies Historical
Analogy,” in: Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International Relations.
39. For a definition of “polarity” that emphasizes the perception of
status, see Benjamin Zala, “Polarity Analysis and Collective
Perceptions of Power: The Need for a New Approach,”
Journal of Global Security Studies 2:1 (2017), 2–17,
https://doi:10.1093/jogss/ogw025.
40. Frank Whelon Wayman introduced the notions of “power polarity”
and “cluster polarity” to distinguish between two dimensions of
polarization, power concentration and coalition configuration,
which have to be assessed individually. For instance, a system
can be shaped by power polarity and cluster multipolarity at the
same time. See Frank Whelon Wayman, “Bipolarity and War: The
Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns Among
Major Powers, 1816-1965,” Journal of Peace Research 21:1 (1984), 61–78.
For a contemporary discussion and application, see Keersmaeker,
Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory,
19–24. Forsby argues that the “overall security relations in the
system [are] shaped not only by the relative distribution of power,
but also [by] the relative distribution of mutually incompatible
systemic identities.” See Andreas B. Forsby, “The Nexus of Systemic
Power and Identity: Structural Variations of the US-China Great
Power Rivalry,” in: Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International
Relations, 232.
41. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70:1
(1990), 23–33. Previous Munich Security Reports have dealt with the
liberal moment and its demise in more detail. See, for instance,
Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2020: Westlessness,”
Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2020,
https://doi.org/10
.47342/IAQX5691. Arguably, power unipolarity
corroborated ideological unipolarity – and the other way around.
42. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest
16 (1989), 3–18.
43. There is a vast literature on the crisis of the liberal international order
and the contestation of the so-called “liberal script.” See, for example,
G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?,” Inter-
national Affairs 94:1 (2018), 7–23, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241;
Tanja A. Börzel, Johannes Gerschewski, and Michael Zürn (eds.),
The Liberal Script at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Conceptions,
Components, and Tensions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024,
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198924241.001.0001.
44. See, for example, Jan Zielonka, Counter-Revolution: Liberal
Europe in Retreat, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
45. See Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is
Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither,” Foreign Affairs 96:3 (2017),
42–44.
46. Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” Foreign
Affairs 86:4 (2007), 59–69.
47. Marina Nord et al., “Democracy Report 2024: Democracy
Winning and Losing at the Ballot,” Gothenburg, March 2024,
https://perma.cc/WR7A-7YBV.
48. For some, this follows a historical pattern. See, for instance,
Matthew Kroenig, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy
Versus Autocracy From the Ancient World to the U.S. and China,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso
/9780190080242.001.0001.
49. The White House, “National Security Strategy.”
50. Jessica Chen Weiss, “A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise
and the Future of Global Politics,” Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2019.
51. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, “The Axis of
Upheaval,” Foreign Affairs 103:3 (2024), 50–63.
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![List of Figures
Possible deviations from a total of 100 percent in the visualized data
result from rounding.
1 Introduction: Multipolarization
1.1 Comparison of the G7 and BRICS across various (great-power)
indicators
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on open
data sources:
For “democracy” (2023, scale 0–1), see Marina Nord et al.,
“Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the
Ballot,” Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute,
March 2024, https://perma.cc/9M4K-CV2C, 62. The numbers are
retrieved from the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), “which
captures both electoral and liberal aspects of democracy and
goes from the lowest (0) to the highest (1) levels of democracy.”
For “rule of law” (2024, scale 0–1), see World Justice Project,
“WJP Rule of Law Index 2024,” Washington DC, https://perma.cc
/ZWR3-KBQJ. The index calculates scores for eight factors and
44 sub-factors to measure a country’s adherence to the rule of
law. For “press freedom” (2024, scale 0–100, rounded to one
decimal place), see Reporters Without Borders, “World Press
Freedom Index 2024,” Paris, 2024, https://perma.cc/6WJ7-SDR3.
This index measures press freedom across five distinct categories
or indicators: political context, legal framework, economic context,
sociocultural context, and safety. For “perception of corruption”
(2023, scale 0–100), see Transparency International, “2023
Corruption Perceptions Index,” Berlin, 2023, https://perma.cc
/7M3R-SWV5. According to Transparency International, this
index “aggregates data from a number of different sources that
provide perceptions by business people and country experts of
the level of corruption in the public sector.” For “military spending”
(2023, USD billions, rounded to one decimal place), “military
spending, share of GDP” (2023, percent), and “military spending
per capita” (2023, USD, rounded to one decimal place), see
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI
Military Expenditure Data Base,” Stockholm, 2025, https://doi
.org/10.55163/CQGC9685. The figures for all countries relate to
2023. The figures for China and Russia are both SIPRI estimates.
The reason why the twelve countries appear to perform relatively
low in “military spending as share of GDP” is because their
performance is assessed globally, including in comparison to
countries such as Ukraine, which spends up to 36.65 percent. For
“number of active troops” (2023, thousands), see International
Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance 2024,”
London, February 2024, https://perma.cc/R892
-W5CY. For
“nuclear warheads” (2024, estimates), see Hans M. Kristensen
and Matt Korda, “World Nuclear Forces,” in: Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (eds.), Yearbook 2024:
Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm,
2024, https://perma.cc/D6Y4-258N, 272. The figures are estimates
based on assessments from the authors. Countries not in the
possession of nuclear warheads, namely Canada, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa, are marked in grey. For
“GDP, nominal” (2024, USD trillions, rounded to one decimal
place), “GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity” (2024, USD
trillions, rounded to one decimal place), “GDP per capita, nominal”
(2024, USD thousands, rounded to one decimal place), and “GDP
per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity ” (2024, USD
thousands, rounded to one decimal place), see IMF, “World
Economic Outlook (October 2024),” Washington DC, 2024,
https://perma.cc/438H-B4C4. For “global trade” (2023, percent
of total, rounded to one decimal place); World Bank, “World
Development Indicators,” Washington DC, 2025, https://perma.cc/
BC7R-AL8J. This indicator depicts the total exports and imports
of goods and services (current USD) of each country in relation
to the total global imports and exports of all countries in the
databank. For “foreign direct investment net outflow” (2023,
percent of GDP, rounded to one decimal place) and “foreign
direct investment net inflow” (2023, percent of GDP, rounded to
one decimal place), see World Bank, “World Bank Open Data,”
Washington DC, 2025, https://perma.cc/6STY-L9Q3. For “general
government gross debt” (2024, percent of GDP, rounded to one
decimal place), see IMF, “World Economic Outlook (October
2024),” Washington DC, 2024, https://perma.cc/E6VA-N899.
The higher the number, the worse a country’s performance
on this indicator. For “reserve currencies held by central banks”
(2024, percent, rounded to two decimal places), see IMF,
“Currency Compositions of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves
(COFER),” Washington DC, 2025, https://perma.cc/RF5H-XN3E.
The figures indicate the currency’s share of total allocated
reserves in the fourth quarter of 2024. In the IMF data table,
shares for currencies from Brazil, India, Russia, and South
Africa are not listed separately (but as “others”) and are therefore
only specified as being lower as the share of the smallest currency
in the data table (Swiss francs: 0.17 percent).” For each of the three
European G7 countries, the share of the Euro is indicated. For
“connectedness” (2022, scale 0–100), see Steven A. Altman and
Caroline R. Bastian, “DHL Global Connectedness Report,”
New York: NYU Stern, 2024, https://www.dhl.com/global-
en/microsites/core/global-connectedness/tracker.html, 21.
According to the report, “the DHL Global Connectedness Index
ranks countries based on their international trade, capital,
information, and people flows. It assesses these flows along
two dimensions: depth (size of international flows relative to
domestic activity) and breadth (distribution of flows across
origin/ destination countries).” For “innovation” (2023, scale
0–100), see Soumitra Dutta et al. (eds.), “Global Innovation Index
2024: Unlocking the Promise of Social Entrepreneurship,”
Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization, 2024,
https://doi.org/10.34667/tind.50062, 18. For “research
development spending” (2020–2022, percent of GDP), see World
Bank Group, “World Development Indicators,” Washington DC,
2025, https://perma.cc/55FA-C9ET. Latest data for Russia and
Canada from 2022, for Brazil and South Africa from 2020, for all
other countries from 2021. For “critical technologies” (2023,
number of top 5 positions), see Jamie Gaida et al., “ASPI’s Critical
Technology Tracker - The Global Race for Future Power,”
Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023,
https://perma.cc/C448-84P8, 51-55. The figures indicate the
number of technologies, out of a total of 44, in which a country is
among the top five performing countries worldwide. Performance
is measured by a country’s high-impact research output, which
ASPI regards as a “key performance measure of scientific and
technological capability […] [as it] reveals where countries,
universities and companies around the world have a competitive
advantage in this measure across the 44 technologies.” For
“unemployment rate” (2024, percent of total labor force, rounded
to one decimal place), see IMF, “World Economic Outlook
(October 2024),” Washington DC, 2024, https://perma.cc/M4ZB-
YHPG. There is no data available for India. The higher the number,
Appendix
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![the worse a country’s performance on this indicator. For “monetary
poverty rate” (2019-2022, percent of population), see World Bank,
“World Development Indicators,” Washington DC, 2025,
https://perma.cc/MX76-S8UB. The figures indicate the poverty
head count ratio, which is the percentage of the country’s
population living in “absolute poverty” below the international
poverty line (IPL). The IPL is set at 3.65 US dollars/day for lower-
middle-income countries and 6.85 US dollars/day for upper-middle-
income and high income countries, both at 2017 international
prices. Latest data for the US and Brazil from 2022, for the UK,
Russia, India, and China from 2021, for Germany, France, and
Italy from 2020, and Canada from 2019; there is no data available
for Japan and South Africa. The higher the number, the worse a
country’s performance on this indicator. For “human development”
(2022, scale 0–1, rounded to two decimal places), see Human
Development Reports, “Human Development Index (HDI),” New
York: UN Development Programme, 2025, https://perma.cc/JP8M-
UV98. The index measures a country’s average performance in
three dimensions of human development: life expectancy at
birth, mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and
more, expected years of schooling for children of school entering
age, and gross national income per capita. For “economic
inequality” (2022, scale 1–0), see Joe Hasell et al., “Economic
Inequality,” Oxford: Our World in Data, 2024, https://perma.cc/
8VQ2-CXWK. The numbers are retrieved from the Gini coefficient,
which “measures inequality on a scale from 0 to 1. Higher values
indicate higher inequality. Inequality is measured here in terms
of income before taxes and benefits.” For “gender equality”
(2024, gender gap scale 0–1), see Statista, “The Global Gender
Gap Index 2024,” New York, 2025, https://perma.cc/44M9-FC5S.
According to Statista, the index “benchmarks national gender
gaps on economic, political, education, and health-based criteria.”
For “soft power” (2024, scale 0–100), see Brand Finance, “Global
Soft Power Index 2024,” London, 2024, https://perma.cc/CH7M-
PJYY. For “diplomacy, number of diplomatic missions” (2023),
see Lowy Institute, “Global Diplomacy Index,” Sydney, 2024,
https://perma.cc/P8UR
-W5KF. This indicator measures the
diplomatic reach of a country based on the number of its diplomatic
missions worldwide (embassies, high commissions, consulates-
general and consulates, permanent missions or delegations to
multilateral organizations, and representative offices or delegations
to countries/territories where there is no formal diplomatic
relationship) between July and November 2023. For “humanitarian
aid” (2024, percent of global spending), see OCHA Financial
Tracking Service (FTS), “Humanitarian Aid Contributions,”
New York, 2025, https://perma.cc/6FJC-NZNJ. There is no data
available on India. For “number of universities in the top 200”
(2025), see Times Higher Education, “World University Rankings
2025,” London, 2025, https://perma.cc/5T57
-JVQJ. For “share of
students from abroad” (percent), see UNESCO Institute for
Statistics, processed by Our World in Data, “Share of Students
From Abroad” [dataset]; UNESCO Institute for Statistics,
“UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) - Education” [original
data], Oxford, 2024, https://perma.cc/ZGX4-YMNC. The figures
show the international students as a share of the country’s
overall tertiary enrolment in 2022. Germany, Italy, Japan,
Canada, and South Africa show numbers for 2021. For “population”
(July 1, 2023, in millions, rounded to one decimal place),
“population growth rate” (2023, in percent, rounded to two
decimal places), “median age” (July 1, 2023, in years, rounded
to one decimal place), and “life expectancy” (at birth, in years,
rounded to one decimal place), see UN, Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Population
Prospects 2024, Online Edition,” New York, 2024, https://perma.cc/
L5AG-6MZT. For “age dependency ratio” (2023, percent, rounded
to one decimal space), see UN, World Population Prospects,
processed by Our World in Data, “Total Dependency Ratio, Age
Total – UN WPP,” [dataset]; UN, “World Population Prospects”
[original data], Oxford, 2024, https://
perma.cc/7YXK-M26J.
According to Our World in Data, the age dependency ratio “is the
sum of the young population (under age 15) and elderly population
(age 65 and over) relative to the working-age population (ages 15
to 64).” The higher the number, the worse a country’s performance
on this indicator. For “happiness” (scale 0–10, rounded to two
decimal places), see John F. Helliwell et al. (eds.), “World
Happiness Report 2024,” Oxford: University of Oxford, Wellbeing
Research Centre, 2024, https://perma.cc/P857-F6GG, 15-17.
Numbers are retrieved from Figure 2.1, in which “countries are
ranked according to their self-assessed life evaluations […],
averaged over the years 2021–2023.”
1.2 Respondents’ perspectives on the international order and the
number of poles in it, November 2024, percent
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data
provided by Kekst CNC.
1.3 Respondents’ perspectives on which countries are great
powers, November 2024, share saying the respective country
is a great power
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference
by Kekst CNC. In response to the question “Which of the following
countries is a great power?” respondents were given the following
options: “Is a great power,” “Is not a great power,” and “Don’t know.”
1.4 Respondents’ perspectives on a multipolar world, November
2024, share agreeing minus share disagreeing with each
statement
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference
by Kekst CNC. In response to the question “Thinking about a
multipolar world, do you agree or disagree with the following?”
respondents were presented with the following claims: “It is a
world where international law is broken less frequently,” “It is a
world where the concerns of weaker/developing countries are
better taken into account,” “It is a world where prosperity is
distributed more equally among countries,” and “It is a more
peaceful world.” For each of these claims, respondents were able
to say whether they “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither
agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” or
“don’t know.” Figures shown here represent the net responses
agreeing minus the net responses disagreeing.
1.5 Respondents’ views on different types of cooperation, July/
November 2024, percent
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data
provided by Kekst CNC. In response to the question, “Thinking
about world politics, do you agree or disagree with the
following? In the future, my country should prioritize bilateral
relations with other countries rather than invest in multilateral
initiatives and international organizations” respondents were
given the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,”
“neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly
disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the
net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area
representing the rest. More information about the survey results
from July 2024 can be found in Sophie Eisentraut, “Standard
Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of
International Rules,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich
Security Brief 1, September 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/
LDPB2956.
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![3 China: Pole Positioning
3.1 Changes in China’s military capabilities, 1999–2024, number of
equipment pieces and percent
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data
provided by IISS. Figures for 1999 are based on IISS, “The
Military Balance 1999–2000,” London: Oxford University
Press, 1999, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1352-0237(00)00239-2.
Figures for 2024 are based on the forthcoming report IISS,
“The Military Balance 2025,” London: Routledge, February
2025. 1999 data has been adjusted to reflect 2024 classifications
of the Military Balance.
3.2 Import barriers imposed by the world’s 50 largest economies
vis-à-vis China between 2020 and 2024
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference
by MERICS based on Claus Soong and Jacob Gunter, “It’s Not Us,
It’s You: China’s Surging Overcapacities and Distortive Exports Are
Pressuring Many Developing Countries too,” Berlin: MERICS,
China Global Competition Tracker 3, November 27, 2024, https://
perma.cc/6UEN-NFC3. The figure illustrates import barriers
introduced in the last five years. Tracked import barriers include
anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, tariffs, quotas, import bans, VAT (for
e-commerce), standards/certification requirements, and safeguard
measures. Icons indicate at least one, but often more, measure(s) in
that category of goods. Most tracked measures are China-specific.
Some country-agnostic measures were included because they
target goods where a large portion of a country’s total imports of
that good originate from China. The borders on this map are not
intended to be exhaustive and do not imply official endorsement.
3.3 China’s key economic and demographic trends, 2004–latest
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on World
Bank, “Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US$ –
China),” Washington: World Bank, https://perma.cc/54YC-GPRC;
Statista, “China: Quarterly FDI Inflows 1998–2024,” Hamburg:
Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1422705/china
-quarterly-value-of-foreign-direct-investment-inflows-according-to
-bop/; IMF, “General Government Debt, Percent of GDP,”
Washington: IMF, https://perma.cc/Y8AK-V6ZX; ILO,
“Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age – ILO Modelled Estimates, May
2024 (%) – Annual,” Washington: ILO, https://perma.cc/E8XZ-KBKZ;
UN Population Division, “Percentage of Population by Broad Age
Group, 60+,” New York: UN Population Division, https://perma.cc
/7QXQ-4HY7. Net foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are
determined by the balance of payments (FDI inflows minus FDI
outflows). Youth unemployment refers to the share of the labor force
aged 15–24 who are without work but available for and seeking
employment. The share of the population aged 60 and older is
depicted due to China’s statutory retirement age being 60 for men
and 58 for women.
4 European Union: A Perfect Polar Storm
4.1 The EU’s share of key indicators, 2005–2023, percent of
global total
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. Export data is
based on Eurostat, “Share of European Union EU27 (From 2020)
in the World Trade,” Brussels: European Union, October 17, 2024,
https://perma.cc/PY5P-JXCY. Data on defense spending is based
on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI
Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm: SIPRI, 2023,
https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685. Data on GDP is based on
IMF, “World Economic Outlook,” Washington, DC: IMF, October
2024, https://perma.cc/VW87-K645. Data on the EU population
is based on Eurostat, “Population Change – Demographic Balance
and Crude Rates at National Level,” Brussels: European Union,
October 17, 2024, https://perma.cc/VY3X-BNCX. Data on the
global population is based on UN, “World Population Prospects
2024,” https://perma.cc/K2MR-7ZVE. Data is provided in current
prices (where applicable). For each year, the EU’s share corresponds
to the total share of all EU member states, considering the entries
of Romania (2007), Bulgaria (2007), and Croatia (2013), and the
withdrawal of the United Kingdom (2021).
4.2 The EU’s trade agreements around the world, 2024
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. Data on trade
agreements is based on European Commission, “EU Trade
Relationships by Country/Region,” Brussels, 2024, https://
perma.cc/8J9F-7V9L. Data on the EU’s top trading partners is
based on European Commission, “European Union, Trade in
Goods With Extra EU27,” Brussels, 2024, https://perma.cc/D26T
-S4QB. The borders on this map are not intended to be
exhaustive and do not imply official endorsement.
4.3 Seat distribution in the European Parliament and European
Council, 2004–2024, percent
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. Data on seat
distribution in the European Parliament is based on European
Parliament, “Political Groups in the European Parliament,”
Brussels: European Union, November 13, https://perma.cc/L2FT
-3D6B. The data on the seat distribution in the European Council
is based on various public sources. The data reflects the
distribution of seats in the European Parliament and the
European Council at the time of the respective constitutive
session of the European Parliament, considering the entries of
Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia, as well as the withdrawal of the
United Kingdom. “Christian Democrats/Center Right” refers to
members of the European People’s Party; “Socialists/Center Left”
refers to members of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and
Democrats; “Liberals” refers to members of Renew Europe and,
prior to 2019, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe;
“Greens” refers to members of the Greens/European Free Alliance;
“Far Right-Extreme Right” includes members of the European
Conservatives and Reformists, Europe of Sovereign Nations (since
2024), Patriots for Europe (since 2024), Identity and Democracy
(2019 – 2024); “Left-Far Left” refers to members of The Left, prior
to 2021, European United Left/Nordic Green Left; “Others” refers
to non-attached members of the European Parliament or
independent heads of state/government in the European Council,
respectively. The categorization of European party families is
loosely based on Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, Political
Parties in the European Union, London: Red Globe Press, 1997.
5 Russia: The Czar’s Gambit
5.1 Perceptions of Russia, 2021–2024, share of respondents saying
Russia is an ally minus share saying Russia is a threat
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference
by Kekst CNC. In response to the question “Please say whether
you think Russia poses a threat or is an ally to your country or
neither [0-10, where 0 is ‘threat,’ 5 is neither, and 10 is ‘ally’].”
The scores run from a potential –100 (if 100 percent of a
population said that x was a threat) to +100 (if 100 percent of
a population said that x was an ally).
142
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/multipolarizationmunichsecurityreport2025-250215065559-6a902b36/85/MSC2025-Multipolarization_-Munich-Security-Report-2025-142-320.jpg)
MSC2025- Multipolarization_–Munich Security Report 2025
- 1. Munich Security Report 2025 February 2025 Multipolarization
- 3. February 2025 Multipolarization Munich Security Report 2025 Editors Tobias Bunde Sophie Eisentraut Leonard Schütte Managing Editor Natalie Knapp Report Team Randolf Carr Julia Hammelehle Nicole Koenig Paula Köhler Isabell Kump Jintro Pauly Production Support Kathrin Strahl Fynn-Niklas Franke
- 5. Table of Contents Foreword6 Executive Summary 9 1 Introduction: Multipolarization 13 Munich Security Index 2025 32 2 United States: Maga Carta 55 3 China: Pole Positioning 63 4 European Union: A Perfect Polar Storm 71 5 Russia: The Czar’s Gambit 79 6 India: Modi-fied Status 87 7 Japan: A New Normal 95 8 Brazil: Lula Land 103 9 South Africa: The Fate of Good Hope 111 Food for Thought 119 Appendix 123 Endnotes123 List of Figures 139 Image Sources 145 List of Abbreviations 145 Team146 Acknowledgments147 Selected MSC Publications 148 About150
- 6. Foreword Dear Reader, In the early years of the Munich Security Conference more than 60 years ago, the world was shaped by the bipolar confrontation between two rival camps. This focused the agenda of the Internationale Wehrkunde- Begegnung, as the conference was called back then, on deterrence and defense. While geopolitical confrontation has returned to Europe and to the agenda of the Munich Security Conference, it is obvious that almost everything else has changed. Today, we live in a different world. It does not make sense to discuss European security in isolation of global trends. Nor can we discuss “hard” security without considering other important developments – ranging from advances in technology and changing economic relations to global warming – affecting security more broadly defined. Perhaps most importantly, more actors than ever before, well beyond just two superpowers, play important roles in the international order. Since I took over as chairman of the Munich Security Conference, it has been a priority for me to ensure that the debates in Munich reflect this emerging world, by inviting guests from a broader range of countries to share their perspectives. While the world may not yet be truly multipolar (and perhaps never will be), we already live in a world shaped by “multipolarization,” as this year’s Munich Security Report argues. The notion of multipolarization describes both a global shift of power to a larger number of actors around the world as well as increasing polarization on the international Christoph Heusgen 6 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 7. and domestic levels. Focusing on a number of countries that are often considered (potential) “poles” in an emerging multipolar order, the authors show that there are different views about what a future order should look like – both among the key actors but also within them. As many people around the world hope, a multipolar world could turn out to be fairer, more just, perhaps even more peaceful. But it could also reverse progress, fuel inequalities, damage human rights, constrain global problem-solving, and make war more likely. If we want to preserve common ground in a world shaped by more actors and increasing polarization, we all have to recommit to those rules laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that everyone has agreed to. A multipolar world must not become a world in which every pole acts as it pleases nor where the rule of law is undermined both internationally and at home. As always, I would like to thank our various partners who shared analyses and contributed data or infographics to the report. I wish you a thought-provoking read! Yours, Ambassador Christoph Heusgen Chairman of the Munich Security Conference Foreword 7
- 8. 8 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 9. Executive Summary It has become a truism of foreign policy debates that the world is becoming ever more “multipolar.” While the extent to which today’s world is already multipolar is debatable, the world’s “multipolarization” is a fact: On the one hand, power is shifting toward a larger number of actors who have the ability to influence key global issues. On the other hand, the world is experiencing increasing polarization both between and within many states, which is hampering joint approaches to global crises and threats. Today’s international system shows elements of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, and nonpolarity. Yet an ongoing power shift toward a greater number of states vying for influence is clearly discernible. And multipolarization is not only evident in the diffusion of material power but also in the fact that the world has become more polarized ideologically. Political and economic liberalism, which shaped the unipolar post–Cold War period, is no longer the only game in town. It is increasingly contested from within, as demonstrated by the rise of nationalist populism in many liberal democracies. But it is also challenged from without, as evidenced in a growing ideological bifurcation between democracies and autocracies, as well as in the emergence of a world, in which multiple order models co-exist, compete, or clash. Across the world, this multipolarization engenders mixed feelings. The optimistic reading highlights opportunities for more inclusive global governance and greater constraints on Washington, long seen as too dominant a power by many. In the pessimistic reading, multipolarization increases the risk of disorder and conflict and undermines effective cooperation. While the Munich Security Index 2025 suggests that in aggregate, people in the G7 countries are less optimistic about a more multipolar world than respondents in the “BICS” countries (BRICS minus Russia), national views on multipolarity are shaped by distinct perspectives on the current international order and a desirable future one. Donald Trump’s presidential victory has buried the US post–Cold War foreign policy consensus that a grand strategy of liberal internationalism would best serve US interests (Chapter 2). For Trump and many of his supporters, the US-created international order constitutes a bad deal. As a consequence, the US may be abdicating its historic role as Europe’s security guarantor – with significant consequences for Ukraine. US foreign policy in the coming years Executive Summary 9
- 10. will likely be shaped by Washington’s bipolar contest with Beijing. This, however, may well accelerate the multipolarization of the international system. China is the world’s most prominent and powerful proponent of a multipolar order, portraying itself as an advocate for countries of the so-called Global South (Chapter 3). Yet many in the West see Beijing’s advocacy for multipolarity as a rhetorical cover for pursuing great-power competition with the US. Despite China’s considerable success in rallying the discontents of the current global order, the country’s economic and military progress faces a series of homegrown obstacles. Moreover, under President Trump, US efforts to hamstring China will likely intensify – but Beijing could also benefit from US withdrawal from inter‑ national commitments or Washington’s alienation of long-standing partners. For the EU, which embodies the liberal international order, the growing contestation of core elements of the order poses a particularly grave challenge (Chapter 4). Russia’s war against Ukraine and the rise of nationalist populism in many European societies, among others, are putting key elements of the EU’s liberal vision in jeopardy. Donald Trump’s re-election could intensify these challenges and revive the debate about whether the EU needs to become an autonomous pole in international politics. But it may also embolden populist movements that deepen Europe’s internal divisions and undermine the EU’s capacity to address the crises it confronts. In this century, no state has made greater efforts to upend the international order than Russia. Moscow envisions a multipolar world order made up of “civilizational states,” as Russia perceives itself (Chapter 5). Smaller countries – for Russia, Ukraine counts as such – fall within a civilizational state’s sphere of influence. Despite discrepancies between Moscow’s self-image and its actual power base, Russia is successfully disrupting efforts to stabilize the international order. At the same time, it faces increasing economic problems and the consequences of imperial overstretch. Whether the country can implement its vision of multipolar spheres of influence will depend on the pushback of others. Indian leaders’ criticism of the existing international order and their embrace of the notion of multipolarity is inseparably linked to India’s quest for a place among the world’s leading powers (Chapter 6). While New Delhi has been making strides in raising India’s international profile, it also faces challenges. Externally, China is growing its strategic footprint among India’s neighbors. Domestically, India’s economy suffers from structural weaknesses and the nation’s political and cultural pluralism are in decline. And while New Delhi has positioned itself as 10 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 11. a voice of the Global South, its policy of multi-alignment raises doubts whether India is willing to take on a more prominent role in global peace-making efforts. Japan is a quintessential status quo power (Chapter 7). Deeply invested in liberal internationalism and US primacy, it is especially perturbed by the end of the unipolar moment, the rise of China, and the prospect of a new multipolar order. Among those surveyed for the Munich Security Index 2025, Japanese respondents are the most concerned about the world becoming more multipolar. However, Tokyo has also been preparing longer than most for these geopolitical changes. Moreover, a raft of recent measures indicates Japan’s willingness to defend itself and the order it values. Brazilian leaders view the emergence of a multipolar order as an opportunity to reform outdated power structures and give countries of the Global South a stronger voice (Chapter 8). For this reason, Brazil put global governance reform at the top of the agenda for its G20 presidency last year, along with other priorities of the Global South such as poverty reduction and food security. With its significant natural resources, Brazil has the potential to further grow its global clout, shaping global debates on food, climate, and energy security. Yet Brazil’s traditional non-alignment strategy may well become more difficult to uphold amid rising geopolitical tensions and a second Trump term. South Africa’s embrace of the notion of multipolarity cannot be separated from its criticism of the existing international order, especially of unrepre- sentative international institutions (Chapter 9). Pretoria also regularly criticizes Western states for applying international law selectively. South Africa has long been perceived as Africa’s “natural leader” and an interna- tional moral exemplar. But as anti-Westernism has risen in the country and South Africa’s record of promoting human rights and international law has deteriorated, the country’s international stature has also taken a hit. Visions of multipolarity are thus also polarized. This makes it increasingly difficult to adapt the existing order peacefully, avoid new arms races, prevent violent conflicts within and among states, allow for more inclusive economic growth, and jointly address shared threats like climate change, which respondents to the Munich Security Index have consistently rated highly. As the great and not-so-great powers cannot tackle these challenges alone, their cooperation will be crucial. That many in the international community still value rules-based multilateralism was evident in last year’s adoption of the Pact for the Future. But for this cooperation to materialize, the world could well use some “depolarization.” 2025 will show whether this is in the cards – or whether the world will grow yet more divided than it is. Executive Summary 11
- 12. MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 12
- 13. Is the world really entering an era defined by multipolarity? What are the (potential) poles of such an order? How polarized are they? What are the implications of a multipolarized order? And how can the international community manage multipolarization? Multipolarization The notion of “multipolarity,” though far from new, has become the buzzword of the day. Judging from political speeches and strategy papers, we are witnessing the emergence of a new multipolar order – or are already living in it.1 As a simplified version of this narrative has it, the bipolar era of the Cold War gave way to a unipolar post–Cold War period, defined by US global hegemony. Now, we find ourselves at the dawn of an increasingly multipolar era.2 Yet there are widely differing interpretations of what “multipolarity” might mean. And what leaders’ references to “multipolarity” lack in conceptual clarity, they surely deliver in terms of emotionality. These appeals to multipolarity have been variously characterized as expressions of hope for global change, as “part of a power play” meant to court countries in the so-called Global South, or even as evidence of “intellectual avoidance” by those who prefer to ignore the dynamics of ramped-up bloc confrontation.3 At its core, the debate over “multipolarity” reflects different views on the present and future international order. While there are many reasons to question whether the world is indeed already multipolar or will ever truly become so, today’s world is – in more than one sense – shaped by “multipolarization.” On the one hand, “multipolarization” describes an ongoing power shift toward a world where a greater number of actors are vying for influence. On the other hand, it also captures the international and domestic polarization that comes with increasingly incompatible visions for the international order, making it ever more difficult for actors to agree on common solutions to shared global problems. Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut Introduction 13
- 14. Pole Positions: Uni-, Bi-, Multi-, or Nonpolarity? The first dimension of “multipolarization” captures the widely perceived trend toward “multipolarity.” In its most basic definition, “polarity” refers to the number of great powers in the international system. In a unipolar system, there is just one great power without any other rival powers. A bipolar system has two great powers, and a multipolar system has more than two powers, usually at least four or five.5 These definitions may make it seem easy to classify the present system, yet even scholars of polarity struggle to interpret the current global order. There is no agreement on whether the world today is uni-, bi-, multi-, or even nonpolar. Nor is there consensus on which actors could be considered the relevant “poles” in the contemporary or future international order, as there are disputes on the definition of a great power and on the necessary threshold to qualify for that status.6 For some analysts, the world remains unipolar. While few still think of the United States as an all-powerful “hyperpower,” defined by former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine as “a country that is dominant or predominant in all spheres,”7 these analysts maintain that the global power shifts are less dramatic than often believed. Drawing on various key metrics, members of this school of thought argue that the US will remain the sole superpower: “The world is neither bipolar nor multipolar, and it is not about to become either.”8 Some dimensions of the international system indeed continue to look very unipolar. According to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the US still accounts for almost 40 percent of nominal global defense spending – with China, the second-largest spender, not even accounting for half of US military expenditure (Figure 1.1).9 In contrast to all its potential competitors, the US has a truly global network of allies and partners and manages at least 128 overseas military bases in more than 50 countries around the world.10 Likewise, the military-technological superiority of the United States and the rapid advancements in the complexity of military technology mean that China and other potential challengers have a harder time catching up than rising powers in previous eras did.11 And while Donald Trump’s election may signal the end of the Pax Americana and bring about a redefinition of the US’s global role as the guardian of the international order, nothing suggests that Washington will give up its “top-dog” position in the near future. Indeed, the Trump administration may increase investment in defense and try to push back against China’s continuous rise (Chapter 3). “This economic, political, and cultural rebalancing has now reached a point where we can contemplate real multipolarity. The BRICS itself is a statement of how profoundly the old order is changing.”4 Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Indian External Affairs Minister, BRICS outreach session in Kazan, October 24, 2024 14 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 15. Other sectors beyond the military also continue to be characterized by what could be described as a unipolar distribution of power. For instance, economists speak of a “unipolar currency world,” with the US dollar as the dominant global currency.12 Central banks around the world still rely on the US dollar as the key reserve currency (Figure 1.1).13 The dollar also remains the most widely used currency for trade and other international transactions. While the BRICS countries have announced their intention to create a BRICS currency to reduce global dependence on the US dollar, the path to financial multipolarity, or “de-dollarization,” seems steep and long and is certain to provoke pushback from the US. Even the BRICS Development Bank still operates mainly in US dollars.14 From the perspective of the “unipolar” school, these and other examples show that those who argue that the world is already multipolar focus too much “on potential rather than realized power.”15 Other analysts conclude that the trends point toward a new bipolar era, in which the US and China are the only superpowers – with everyone else lacking either the economic or military capabilities to clear the great-power threshold.17 In short, this group of scholars sees “the narrowing power gap between China and the United States and the widening power gap between China and any third-ranking power” as bringing about a new bipolar system.18 China does not, they suggest, need to fully catch up with the United States for the system to become bipolar. Beijing just needs to be able to engage in a serious great-power competition with Washington. From the US perspective, this is clearly true. The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy of October 2022 described the People’s Republic of China as “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”19 Notwithstanding Russia’s war against Ukraine and other potential threats, China has become the “pacing challenge” driving US military planning.20 For the new Trump administration, which is concerned with US decline, China is clearly the top national security concern (Chapter 2). And as some scholars point out, comparisons with both historical and contemporary competitors suggest that the system is already bipolar. If we compare China’s relative capabilities to the Soviet Union’s at its Cold War peak, China is already the more powerful challenger to the United States – in almost all dimensions.21 As political scientist Jennifer Lind concludes: “If the USSR was a superpower then, China is one today. The world is bipolar.”22 “And together we will make America powerful again. We will make America healthy again. We will make America strong again. We will make America safe again. And we will make America great again.”16 Donald Trump, then candidate for US president, campaign rally in Detroit, October 18, 2024 Introduction 15
- 16. 16 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 G e r m a n y I n d i a R u s s i a B r a z i l U S U K C a n a d a F r a n c e J a p a n I t a l y S o u t h A f r i c a Figure 1.1 Comparison of the G7 and BRICS across various (great-power) indicators C h i n a 0.77 0.69 0.28 0.81 0.06 0.77 0.76 0.81 0.73 0.76 0.58 0.04 Democracy, scale 0–1 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.83 0.43 0.78 0.8 0.72 0.79 0.66 0.56 0.47 Rule of law, scale 0–1 66.6 58.6 31.3 83.8 29.9 77.5 81.7 78.7 62.1 69.8 73.7 23.4 Press freedom, scale 0–100 69 36 39 78 26 71 76 71 73 56 41 42 Perception of corruption, scale 0–100 916 22.9 83.6 66.8 109.5 74.9 27.2 61.3 50.2 35.5 2.8 296 Military spending, USD billions 29.2 2.2 3.9 4.7 2.2 3.6 2.2 3.2 4.1 2.4 0.4 18.3 GDP, nominal, USD trillions 29.2 4.7 16 6.0 6.9 4.3 2.6 4.4 6.6 3.6 1 37.1 GDP, PPP, USD trillions 86.6 10.3 2.7 55.5 14.9 52.4 53.8 48 32.8 40.2 6.3 13 GDP per capita, nominal, USD thousands 86.6 22.1 11.1 70.9 47.3 62.6 62.8 65.9 53 61 15.7 26.3 GDP per capita, PPP, USD thousands 11.2 1.2 2.7 6.6 1.4 3.5 2.4 3.5 3.1 2.5 0.4 10.8 Global trade, percent of total 1.6 1.2 0.4 1.8 0.5 1.9 3.9 1.3 4.3 1.3 -0.7 1 FDI net outflow, percent of GDP 1.3 3 0.8 0.4 -0.5 -2.6 2.2 0.3 0.5 1.8 0.9 0.2 FDI net inflow, percent of GDP 121 87.6 83.1 62.7 19.9 102 106 112 251 137 75 90.1 General government gross debt, percent of GDP 57.4 20 4.97 2.74 20 5.82 20 2.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 Reserve currencies held by central banks, percent 57 52 52 64 49 69 59 61 55 58 54 50 Connectedness, scale 0–100 62.4 32.7 38.3 58.1 29.7 61 52.9 55.4 54.1 45.3 28.3 56.3 Innovation, scale 0–100 3.5 1.1 0.6 3.1 0.9 2.9 1.6 2.2 3.3 1.5 0.6 2.4 Research development spending, percent of GDP 44 0 29 14 1 29 4 2 4 7 0 44 Critical technologies, number of top 5 positions 4.1 7.2 3 2.6 4.3 6.2 7.3 2.5 7 33.7 5.1 Unemployment rate, percent 2 23.5 44 0.5 2 0.7 0.7 0.5 1.7 17 Monetary poverty rate, percent of population 0.93 0.76 0.64 0.95 0.82 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.72 0.79 Human development, scale 0–1 0.63 0.68 0.63 0.46 0.58 0.46 0.5 0.46 0.54 0.53 0.75 0.57 Economic inequality, scale 1–0 78.8 48.8 49.8 69.8 57.7 71.8 64.4 67.3 70.6 62 43.7 71.2 Soft power, scale 0–100 271 205 194 217 230 225 157 249 251 206 114 274 Diplomacy, number of diplomatic missions 42.5 0 7.7 0 6 1.6 2 3.5 0.7 0 0 Humanitarian aid, percent of global spending 0.75 0.72 0.64 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.78 0.66 0.7 0.79 0.68 Gender equality, gender gap scale 0–1 Data: Various sources, providing the latest comparable data (see endnotes). Illustration: Munich Security Conference low performance high 344 211 1,438 84.5 145 68.7 39.3 66.4 124 59.5 63.2 1,423 Population, millions 0.58 0.41 0.89 0.35 -0.3 0.7 1.22 0.17 -0.5 -0.2 1.32 -0.2 Population growth rate, percent 53.9 44 47 58 51.8 57.8 53 62.6 69.9 57.1 48.4 44.7 Age dependency ratio, percent 38 33.9 28.1 45.1 39.5 39.8 40.3 41.8 49 47.5 28.2 39.1 Median age, years 79.3 75.8 72 81.4 73.2 81.3 82.6 83.3 84.7 81.6 66.1 78 Life expectancy, years 7.26 6.12 4.1 6.72 5.54 6.81 6.44 6.56 6.23 6.62 5.08 6.36 Happiness, scale 0–10 4.9 0.2 0.1 11.2 8.5 21.6 17.4 9.1 5.6 3.4 2.9 0.4 Share of students from abroad, percent 55 1 0 20 1 25 8 5 5 3 1 13 Number of universities in the top 200 3.2 1.1 2.4 1.5 5.9 2.3 1.3 2.1 1.2 1.6 0.7 1.7 Military spending, share of GDP, percent 2,694 106 59 802 758 1,106 702 947 407 604 46 208 Military spending per capita, USD 5,044 0 172 0 5,580 225 0 290 0 0 0 500 Nuclear warheads, estimates 1,326 367 1,476 181 1,100 144 67 204 247 161 69 2,035 Number of active troops, thousands
- 17. The same is true for other challengers today. Several indicators suggest that China and the US are playing in a different league than the other G7 and BRICS states (Figure 1.1). And while China trails the United States in nominal GDP and GDP per capita, it is already the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. Likewise, its military spending is second only to the United States’, and US analysts have been watching China’s military modernization efforts with increasing concern.24 As a result of “the most dramatic military buildup since World War II,”25 some analysts conclude that “in some areas, [China] has already matched or surpassed America.”26 While Russia is still the only nuclear superpower on a par with the US, China seems to be on track to become its second “nuclear peer.”27 According to Lind’s metrics, all the other states lack either the economic or military capabilities to join the great-power ranks. While Germany and Japan can be considered latent great powers due to their economic strength, their respective grand strategies render them unlikely to make the necessary military investments to clear the great-power threshold. Despite its nuclear arsenal, Russia is “a regional power with significant national capabilities” but not a great power, either. Finally, although India’s continued rise could shift the system to multipolarity in the future, it clearly remains below the threshold for now.28 At present, India has about a third of China’s defense spending and less than a quarter of its nominal GDP. And while Brazil exhibits some characteristics of a great power, South Africa falls short in almost all dimensions (Figure 1.1). For another group of scholars, such rather restrictive criteria are misleading, obscuring the emergence of a multipolar world. They either accept a lower threshold for achieving great-power status or doubt that a state needs to be a great power in all dimensions to be considered a “pole.” From this point of view, a multipolar world does not mean that there have to be several powers with roughly equal capabilities, “it just requires that significant power is concentrated in more than two states.”29 Based on this broader definition, states such as Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, or Russia can clearly be considered “important global powers.”30 Compared to most other states, the G7 and the BRICS – which, with the exception of Russia, are covered by the Munich Security Index – stand out in several dimensions, even if not in all of them.31 Nowhere is “multipolarization” more advanced than in the economic realm, as several emerging economies have seen impressive growth. In terms of purchasing power parity, the members of the BRICS already surpassed the G7 in 2018. Following the enlargement of the bloc in 2024, which saw the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, BRICS nations account for about 40 percent of global trade and 40 percent of crude oil production and exports.32 “Communist China is the most powerful adversary the United States has faced in living memory. This is no exaggeration. We sometimes forget that past enemies, including Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, had smaller economies than we did. Each tried to take over its neighbors and hurt our country in the process. Each failed because America outbuilt and outgunned it.”23 Marco Rubio, then–US Senator, foreword to the report “The World China Made,” September 9, 2024 Introduction 17
- 18. Others point out that the unprecedented degree of interdependence, “characterized by a global web of supply chains of a complexity and density never seen before,” means that the threshold is even lower: “Any state that controls an important international resource or plays a significant international role in some domain cannot be dismissed as a bit player.”34 As a result, states that would usually not be considered “poles” can play outsized roles in world politics. For instance, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey may not be “great powers” but are certainly power brokers in and sometimes beyond their regional environment.35 Finally, some scholars do not think that the world is moving toward either bi- or multipolarity. Rather, they argue that the diffusion of power means that today’s club of great powers wields much less influence than those of the past. Today’s great powers are less likely to form a distinct group, and their “ability to settle order questions among themselves and formalize relations of “Europe also should not underestimate our own power. We are a great power if we act together.”33 Kaja Kallas, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, press remarks, December 19, 2024 Figure 1.2 Respondents’ perspectives on the international order and the number of poles in it, November 2024, percent 35 24 10 32 28 33 5 34 34 22 12 31 49 19 3 30 47 21 10 23 46 16 11 27 23 28 7 42 34 35 7 23 25 9 21 45 31 31 9 29 37 22 12 29 26 25 11 38 Data: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference. Illustration: Munich Security Conference All Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan South Africa UK US We live in a world in which the US and China dominate We live in a world in which the US is still the dominant superpower We live in a world in which powers beyond the US and China can have a strong and independent influence on global affairs Don’t know 18 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 19. dominance over the rest of the system is less now than in 1815, 1918, and 1948.”37 In that sense, talk of multipolarity may mask a trend toward “nonpolarity,” in which the reach of the great-power club is more limited than before, as power is more widely distributed, comes in various forms, and cannot be easily translated from one domain to another.38 If seemingly objective criteria for assessing polarity do not provide clear-cut results, the most decisive criterion may be how many states are perceived as great powers by others.39 While we do not have data on how political leaders assess polarity today, public perceptions mirror the different scholarly interpretations of today’s order (Figure 1.2). Among the respondents in this year’s Munich Security Index, about one-third think that we live in a world where the US is still the dominant superpower; another third think we live in one where the US and China dominate. About a quarter believe we live in a world where powers beyond the US and China can have a strong and independent influence on global affairs. When asked about which countries are great powers, respondents converge on the US, China, and Russia, with an average of more than 80 percent of all respondents agreeing that these countries are great powers (Figure 1.3). While these three powers stand out, the public disagrees on the status of the others. If we are to believe the majority of respondents in the G7 and “BICS” countries (BRICS minus Russia), today’s international system has between three to nine great powers: In India, the majority believes in nine great powers; the majority in Germany perceives only three. Some striking patterns are visible: France, for instance, is considered a great power by half of its own citizens and by majorities outside of the G7 but not by majorities in other G7 countries. While in India, 78 percent of respondents see their country as a great power, the only other countries where majorities share this view are other Asian countries, i.e., China and Japan. India is only considered a great power by minorities in all non-Asian countries, including in fellow BRICS countries Brazil and South Africa. In contrast, although only 22 percent of Germans think of Germany as a great power, majorities in all other countries do so, except in Japan and the UK. A similar trend emerges for Japan: Majorities in all other countries except for China, Germany, and the UK think of it as a great power, but only about a quarter of Japanese do. “Even a trained swimmer will not go very far upstream, regardless of the tricks or even doping they might use. The current of global politics, the mainstream, is running from the crumbling hegemonic world towards growing diversity, while the West is trying to swim against the tide.”36 Vladimir Putin, Russian President, Valdai Discussion Club, November 7, 2024 Introduction 19
- 20. In sum, today’s international system displays elements of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, and nonpolarity. What you see depends on where you look. The trend may point toward “multipolarization” in the sense of a shift toward a world in which more actors have become influential actors. But it is unclear whether it makes sense to speak of the “multipolarity” known from previous historical eras. At the very least, it does not tell us much if we do not consider how the various poles relate to each other and whether their interpretations of the international order converge, compete, or clash. Figure 1.3 Respondents’ perspectives on which countries are great powers, November 2024, share saying the respective country is a great power Rating received by Rating from Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference 0 – 10 51 – 60 11 – 20 61 – 70 21 – 30 71 – 80 31 – 40 81 – 90 41 – 50 91 – 100 Canada South Africa India Brazil China United Kingdom United States Japan Italy U n i t e d S t a t e s C h i n a R u s s i a U n i t e d K i n g d o m J a p a n G e r m a n y I n d i a F r a n c e C a n a d a S a u d i A r a b i a S o u t h K o r e a I r a n I t a l y B r a z i l T u r k e y S o u t h A f r i c a M e x i c o 89 32 87 19 80 11 56 14 50 10 51 11 42 38 35 31 29 All 90 29 87 27 81 21 55 18 53 17 52 14 46 43 36 34 32 France 92 26 90 19 84 19 45 15 61 13 52 9 47 50 37 35 33 92 14 86 26 77 21 41 11 24 14 35 8 64 37 33 22 11 89 32 86 74 10 52 48 12 45 11 41 34 27 36 32 94 34 89 42 80 34 68 23 80 19 74 17 31 57 49 40 51 Germany 94 20 93 7 88 8 23 11 36 7 22 5 45 22 16 21 20 93 26 93 19 87 13 49 15 64 11 52 7 44 37 30 32 28 89 35 83 22 19 72 18 55 19 14 54 16 51 18 31 33 38 33 31 86 20 44 81 31 66 21 30 23 58 19 52 61 58 21 24 82 40 76 40 78 37 68 30 67 30 57 78 30 56 39 53 41 90 41 88 36 26 86 78 26 62 31 70 25 36 53 39 47 47 20 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 21. Ideological Polarization: Orders of Multitude? The “multipolarization” we are witnessing also points to a trend toward ideological multipolarity. This dimension of polarity does not refer to the material distribution of power but to the relations between the poles based on the ideas they promote. Just as international systems can be polarized in terms of power, they can also be polarized ideologically.40 Indeed, whether the emerging order will be marked by ideological unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, or nonpolarity may have even more dramatic consequences for the world than polarities of power. What the “unipolar moment” was to the distribution of power, the “liberal moment” was to the realm of ideas.41 Following the oft-quoted “end of history,” Western interpretations of democracy and market economy seemed set to conquer the world.42 But this ideational unipolarity is gone. While liberal ideas remain attractive to people around the world, they have become increasingly contested – both from within and without.43 In the heartlands of the liberal international order, most liberal democracies have witnessed the rise of illiberal forces at home. In some, this backlash has amounted to an illiberal “counter-revolution.”44 To a certain degree, this domestic polarization may even be seen as the result of rising multipolarity, as considerable parts of the public in Western democracies are worried about their relative decline (Figure 1.12). According to proponents of this point of view, the liberal international order has given unfair benefits to rising powers, most notably China and the “globalist” elites at home.45 Most importantly, the coalition supporting Donald Trump is at least partly motivated by the perception that the US is bearing the lion’s share of the global burden while others are taking advantage of it (Chapter 2). But the predominance of liberal ideas has also been challenged by the “return of authoritarian great powers,”46 which have promoted alternative ideas and often also offered support to governments resisting liberal reforms. For the past 15 years, a “wave of autocratization” has shifted the global ideological balance of power. In 2023, 42 countries were moving towards autocracy, while only 18 countries were transitioning toward democracy. Seventy-one percent of the global population lived in autocratic countries, up from 48 percent in 2013.47 There is no denying the fact anymore that, in most parts of the world, liberal democracy is under pressure or even in retreat. Introduction 21
- 22. For some, liberal hegemony has been replaced by open competition between democracies and autocracies, with the world increasingly being divided into two geopolitical camps based on political regime type.48 The 2022 US National Security Strategy speaks of a “contest to write the rules of the road” with China, Russia, and other states that pursue an illiberal model of international order.49 Those convinced of a worsening clash between a liberal-democratic vision for the international order and a vision geared at “a world safe for autocracy”50 can not just point to Putin’s all-out war against Ukraine, which is entering its fourth year. They can also refer to the increasingly close cooperation between autocratic revisionists in pursuit of their global illiberal agendas. In this regard, the so-called “axis of upheaval,” consisting of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, has attracted particular attention.51 Russia has been aided in sustaining its war of aggression in Ukraine by drones from Iran, troops from North Korea, and, as NATO recently suggested, weapons components shipped from China.52 From this perspective, the global responses to Russia’s war of aggression have served as a catalyst for the emergence and consolidation of what some have called the “Global West” and “Global East.”53 Moreover, in various policy fields, among them human rights, global infrastructure, and development cooperation, there is a clear democracy–autocracy cleavage in the competing governance visions.54 This development is also reflected in the pervasive democracy- autocracy fault line perceived by people in many parts of the world.55 Others point out that the democracy-autocracy dichotomy oversimplifies today’s messy marketplace of order models. From this point of view, there are too many international dynamics that do not fit with a democracy-autocracy binary.57 A case in point is cooperation within the framework of the BRICS, which includes both democratic and autocratic members. So, too, is the fact that many countries in the Global South – variously called the non-aligned or the “hedging middle”58 – refuse to see the world through the prism of rigid blocs and avoid taking sides in the growing systemic competition.59 Seeking to maximize their policy space, these countries are neither willing to adopt the Western democracy-versus-autocracy framing nor to be enlisted in a China- or Russia-led anti-Western coalition. Moreover, skeptics have reason to question whether the consolidation of geopolitical blocs will survive the rise of illiberal populists in liberal democracies, who often demonstrate close ideological affinities with autocratic foreign governments. Rather, polarization and an illiberal-nationalist backlash could undermine the idea of a cohesive West and reinvigorate debates about “Westlessness.”60 All this suggests that “a neat, two-bloc world looks unlikely.”61 “Russia, China, but also North Korea and Iran, are hard at work to try to weaken North America and Europe. To chip away at our freedom. They want to reshape the global order. Not to create a fairer one, but to secure their own spheres of influence.”56 Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General, Carnegie Europe, December 12, 2024 22 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 23. This perceived implausibility of a two-bloc world is driving the rise of the narrative of an emerging multipolar order. In ideological terms, many argue, the future order may be much messier. We may be living in a world where multiple orders co-exist or compete and where little is left of near-universal rules, principles, and patterns of cooperation. In such a “multi-order”62 or “multiplex”63 world, the liberal order may not necessarily disappear. But its reach will increasingly be restricted to the West, or what is left of it.64 What is emerging, then, is a new system “characterized by plurality of power and identity,”65 where several major poles pursue their own visions of order, with unique sets of rules, values, and institutions. In this world of multiple orders, Russia, which has long seen itself as a “civilizational” pole,66 is working towards a Russian-led Eurasian order, as outlined in the new security treaties Moscow proposed to the US and NATO in late 2021. China, for its part, is establishing a Beijing-led order in East Asia and may be trying to expand it further to align with the geography of its Belt and Road Initiative.67 This era of increasing political “diversity” may also see the emergence of other (regional) “poles” whose order models prove attractive to different degrees. But, all told, peaceful coexistence between the different orders is rather unlikely, given that it is far from clear whether the major ordering poles can agree on at least some rules, principles, and structures of cooperation to manage inter-order relations. In sum, just as we can observe a trend toward a multipolarity of power, we can see a similar trend in ideological terms. What used to be the global standard in the post–Cold War era, namely Western political and economic liberalism, is increasingly contested again. But instead of being replaced by one clear-cut alternative, it seems to be eroding from within while simultaneously giving way to multiple contestations. Promises and Perils of the Emerging Multipolar (Dis)Order As the eight following chapters of this report demonstrate, there are clear differences between the potential “poles” (Chapters 2–9) in terms of whether politicians view a multipolar order as a cause for hope or concern. Even within countries, the changes seem to be engendering mixed feelings (Figure 7.1). This is hardly surprising, given how difficult it is to predict changes due to multipolarization. Another reason for why some societies look at a multipolar future with optimism while others look at it with dread may well be the way these societies assess the unipolar past and the liberal international order. People who feel they have not benefitted equally from this order may be much more positive about a multipolar alternative.69 Put “[R]egional crises and the strong push from the Global South and BRICS Plus are making us reassess the order of a world that is no longer just multipolar but deeply fragmented.”68 Giorgia Meloni, Italian President of the Council of Ministers, Chamber of Deputies, December 17, 2024 Introduction 23
- 24. differently, for these people, many of whom are in the countries of the Global South, “the past was not as good as we [in the West] tend to think, and the future is not as bad as we fear.”70 In fact, when asked about the prospects for peace and prosperity, respect for international rules, and global problem- solving in a multipolar world, respondents in the “BICS” countries were, on aggregate, more optimistic than respondents in the G7 countries (Figure 1.4). For multipolar optimists, a world where several powers keep each other in check and there are more actors able to constrain Washington should be a more peaceful and stable one.71 Many of these optimists do not perceive Washington as “an anchor of stability, but rather a risk to be hedged against.”72 In support of their position, they need look no further than the land grabs with which Donald Trump recently threatened Canada, Greenland, and Panama.73 According to this optimistic reading, multipolarization may also improve multilateral cooperation. Above all, it may help bring about the long-demanded reform of international institutions, rendering global governance more representative of non-Western states and ensuring that it provides more inclusive benefits than it did during the unipolar period.74 The inclusion of the African Union in the Group of 20 (G20) during India’s G20 presidency may be a case in point. Optimists also believe that emerging powers can be expected to contribute to the provision of global public goods and constructively support conflict prevention or crisis diplomacy. They see the increasing number of global actors actively engaging in crisis diplomacy as a positive sign and are Figure 1.4 Respondents’ perspectives on a multipolar world, November 2024, share agreeing minus share disagreeing with each statement Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference -20–-11 -10–0 1– 10 11– 20 21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 It is a world where the concerns of weaker/ developing countries are better taken into account It is a world where international law is broken less frequently It is a world where prosperity is distributed more equally among countries It is a more peaceful world C a n a d a F r a n c e G e r m a n y I t a l y J a p a n I n d i a S o u t h A f r i c a +28 +9 +18 +14 +12 +44 +45 +13 -10 -3 +11 +6 +45 +41 +20 +1 -14 -3 +3 +35 +38 +7 -7 -20 U n i t e d K i n g d o m +37 +24 +26 +12 -9 -11 U n i t e d S t a t e s +37 +24 +25 +19 C h i n a +50 +42 +51 +41 B r a z i l +35 +39 +16 +15 +32 +29 24 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 25. “An equal and orderly multipolar world means every country can find its place in a multipolar system and play its due role pursuant to international law, so that the process of multipolarization is stable and constructive on the whole.”75 Xi Jinping, Chinese President, conference marking the 70th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, June 28, 2024 “What is most worrying now is that literally any scenario is possible. We have not had a situation like this since 1945. I know it sounds devastating, especially to people of the younger generation, but we have to mentally get used to a new era. We are in a prewar era.”84 Donald Tusk, Polish Prime Minister, interview, March 29, 2024 encouraged by the fact that countries such as Brazil are suggesting solutions to crises on other continents. As the optimists see it, the more centers of power, the more shoulders to bear the burden of global leadership. From this perspective, a multipolar order may even be attractive to a former hegemon tired of acting as the world’s policeman and supplier of global public goods. Moreover, some hope that the move from US-led unipolarity to multipolarity will strengthen international law by reducing Western states’ ability to selectively apply the rules and principles of the order.76 For those who subscribe to this view, multipolarity should constrain “hegemonic power, which, unrestrained, represents a threat to international rules and norms.”77 Last but not least, the optimistic reading expects a multipolar order to exhibit greater tolerance towards the world’s cultural and political diversity. The celebration of “massive diversity,”78 which is especially prevalent in Chinese and Russian accounts of multipolarity, chimes well with postcolonial instincts directed against Western ideas in many parts of the world.79 For those with a less optimistic reading, a multipolar order promises to be “a recipe for chaos.”80 Perhaps most importantly, there are good reasons to believe that the two aspects of “multipolarization” – the rise of new centers of power and the growing ideological polarization of the international system – will increase the risk of great-power war.81 Rather than leading to a stable balance of power, the rise of new and ideologically diverse power centers may trigger new arms races, both nuclear and conventional, with the potential for crises and escalation.82 While the world’s leading powers have not fought a major war against each other for almost 80 years – a remarkable but exceptional period in world history – scholars warn that too many people are taking this achievement for granted.83 Moreover, even if the great powers manage to avoid war between them, increasing competition does not bode well for conflicts in other parts of the world. Rising great-power tensions have already made it more difficult to agree on and fund peacekeeping operations, let alone peace enforcement ones. Recent examples include China’s and Russia’s opposition to a new peacekeeping mission to Haiti and Russia’s decision to block a resolution calling for a ceasefire and humanitarian access in Sudan.85 For some, “peacekeeping is becoming yet another casualty of today’s messy, multipolar world.”86 This is even more worrisome, as the world is currently experiencing a record number of armed conflicts.87 Researchers are observing an increasing internationalization of Introduction 25
- 26. internal conflicts, a trend that is reportedly “driven by heightened great-power competition and the more assertive foreign-policy stances of many emerging powers, set against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical fragmentation.”88 There are now more powers engaged in crisis diplomacy than ever before, with a number of new actors entering the scene, but their joint rate of success is underwhelming, as too often they work against each other. The problem goes beyond issues of war and peace. Without global leadership of the kind provided by the United States for the past several decades, it is hard to imagine the international community providing global public goods like freedom of navigation or tackling even some of the many grave threats confronting humanity. Skeptics argue that the multipolarized world faces a massive “global leadership deficit,”89 as many countries possess negative power – being able to block or disrupt collective decision-making – but positive power is in short supply.90 Rather than being “a way to fix multilateralism,”91 as suggested by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, multipolarity may be accelerating its erosion. The signals from Washington increasingly indicate that the US no longer wants to be the guardian of the liberal international order, but it is far from clear which other countries may be willing and able to provide much-needed global public goods. Freedom of navigation is just one example. Reports suggest that when the Houthi attacks disrupted vital shipping routes in the Red Sea, Beijing pushed Tehran to rein in the Houthis – not for the sake of safe international shipping but solely to ensure the safe passage of Chinese ships.92 From the perspective of the multipolar pessimists, we might soon end up in a world where all actors tend to their own short-term self-interests to the detriment of long-term multilateral cooperation. The widespread preference for bilateral deals rather than inclusive multilateral cooperation revealed in the Munich Security Index 2025 (Figure 1.5) suggests that the type of cooperation needed to address the world’s most pressing problems is increasingly hard to obtain. Furthermore, a multipolar world may also undermine universal rules and norms. As the former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has argued, “when the number of participants in a game increases, the natural response should be to strengthen the rules governing the game.”93 But rather than strengthening international law, multipolarization may well move us away from an order that does have standards, even if they are sometimes implemented inconsistently, and towards an order without any standards at all.94 Evidence of this can be found in the revisionist approach to international rules adopted by some of the new poles of influence and the lack of pushback against this norm contestation from others. Moreover, 26 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 27. the presence of more great powers may mean even more actors claiming special rights for themselves – or different legal systems shaped by the respective regional hegemons. Under the guise of promoting multipolarity, China and Russia increasingly seem to be seeking to “partition the world into spheres of regional unipolarity.”95 Last but not least, while multipolarity may well bring greater respect for cultural diversity, it may simultaneously be accompanied by efforts to curb universal norms meant to constrain governments’ behavior and protect the individual. Legal scholars have already warned about an emerging Figure 1.5 Respondents’ views on different types of cooperation, July/November 2024, percent 17 8 76 19 12 70 26 13 61 33 10 58 26 14 60 32 11 57 40 9 51 39 12 49 41 12 47 46 12 42 49 11 40 54 10 37 52 11 37 39 18 43 51 13 35 50 16 34 58 20 22 Neither/don’t know Agree Disagree Data: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference. Illustration: Munich Security Conference The data for Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, and Turkey is from July 2024. The data for the G7 and “BICS” countries is from November 2024. Pakistan Nigeria India Indonesia Turkey Mexico Saudi Arabia South Africa Brazil US France Canada UK China Germany Italy Japan Thinking about world politics, do you agree or disagree? In the future, my country should prioritize bilateral relations with other countries rather than invest in multilateral initiatives and international organizations. Introduction 27
- 28. “authoritarian international law.”96 If the pessimists are right, the “age of impunity,”97 in which human rights violations and other crimes go too often unpunished, is here to stay. Managing Multipolarization: Toward Depolarization? Recent trends suggest that the negative effects of greater multipolarity are prevailing as divides between major powers grow. For instance, global defense spending has hit a new record, and new arms races are looming.98 At the same time, in Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine, among others, attempts at conflict resolution are failing or have not even begun; and a confrontational climate summit in Azerbaijan is just one of many examples of increasingly deficient global problem-solving. Before our eyes, we are seeing the negative scenario of a more multipolar world materialize – a more conflictual world without shared rules and effective multilateral cooperation. Rather than generating more inclusive global benefits, it comes with fragmentation that is shrinking the proverbial global pie, potentially triggering “lose-lose” dynamics where everyone will be worse off in the long run.99 It is far from clear what might initiate the process of “depolarization” that could set multipolarity on a positive track. Some believe that international organizational reform is key. This reasoning suggests that the divisions accompanying greater multipolarity could be mitigated if global governance structures became more inclusive of the new power centers by encouraging, as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz put it, their “greater participation in and integration into the international order […] to keep multilateralism alive in a multipolar world.”101 Yet the suggestion that the integration of new poles alone will breed the type of consensus needed to create an order that works for the benefit of all is far from a foregone conclusion. Doubters need only look to the five major powers with permanent seats on the UN Security Council and their inability to agree on solutions to any of the major conflicts of today. Reforms that mostly reflect changes in material power may thus not be sufficient. As some have suggested, ideological reforms of the international order may be needed to create a new working consensus among the major powers that also benefits the wider world. Put differently, they argue that for multipolarity to work, we might have to rethink some of the order’s rules and norms.102 This, however, begs the question of which rules must be preserved under any circumstances, which rules are particularly contested, and which principles could and might have to be adjusted. “In times of increasing polarization, expressions such as ‘deglobalization’ have become commonplace. But it is impossible to ‘deplanetize’ our life in common. We are condemned to the interdependence of climate change.”100 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazilian President, UN General Assembly, September 24, 2024 28 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 29. Some liberal rules that have circumscribed national sovereignty or prescribed neoliberal economic practices have become a particular bone of contention.103 Some believe that scaling them back – at least in their more intrusive variants – will hardly be avoidable. This is not just because of pushback from the world’s growing number of autocrats, but also because of a widespread “mood of cultural decolonization” that emphasizes sovereignty over the spread of liberal ideas.104 Even governments that have long engaged in promoting democracy and accountability for human rights abuses seem to have stopped believing in the universal applicability of these ideas.105 Meanwhile, the discourse of leaders from the Global South on international rules is often difficult to interpret. It is unclear whether they are demanding greater consistency in applying existing international rules or calling for new principles and rules.106 While leaders’ language is often vague in this regard, people in many parts of the world still see merit in existing international rules: In all countries surveyed for the Munich Security Conference in July 2024, absolute majorities think that the current international rules and principles represent the values and needs of most countries.107 And there is good reason to believe that the rules and principles laid down in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights still have merit in a multipolar world. After all, they were drafted to prevent the type of fragmentation that resulted in two world wars and the associated atrocities. While Russia and some like-minded states tried to block an agreement at the Summit of the Future,108 the fact that UN members eventually agreed on a meaningful document is clear evidence of a widespread commitment to rules-based multilateralism in the framework of the UN.109 Any effort to reform the existing order in a way that reflects greater multipolarity but still serves the international community at large will depend on the major powers defining their own interests broadly and with a view to the long term – in a way that could also be called “enlightened.” Yet few of the old and new powers are doing so. And some of those who still define their interests more broadly, among them European states and Japan, are desperately clinging to the hope that the status quo can be maintained. As such, they risk becoming “the defenders of last resort for the world of yesterday.”110 And while the US might once have felt “a special responsibility to shape a liberal order that benefits the wider world,” critics fear that, under President Trump’s leadership, it might behave “in the same narrowly self-interested, frequently exploitive way as many great powers throughout history.”111 Russia’s foreign policy, which is primarily aimed at disruption, Introduction 29
- 30. is the opposite of enlightened. Indeed, Moscow’s talk of “indivisible security” only serves as a smoke screen for its pursuit of a Russian sphere of influence.112 And although China would clearly like its vision for the international order – with its concepts of common security and common development that resonate in some parts of the world – to be perceived as seeking the common good, the order it pursues, just like Russia, is one of major power privilege and not of sovereign equality.113 Finally, major actors in the Global South seem less focused on averting the growing polarization of global politics and more on adapting to or exploiting it. The bridge-building between the Global North and the Global South that some of these states have officially committed themselves to would be a highly welcome remedy for polarization. But in many of these countries, the dominant approach in an increasingly fragmented global environment is to assert narrow interests, which often means glossing over the fact that smaller states do not have this opportunity.114 What makes things worse is that, almost everywhere, the pursuit of enlightened foreign policies is being hampered by growing domestic polarization and the shrinking political leeway that accompanies it. Domestic polarization, in short, is playing a major role in preventing leaders from building the necessary global consensus. Worse yet, leaders may even have incentives to frustrate international agreement – simply because they “thrive […] in a Hobbesian, transactional, all-against-all world.”116 Put differently, polarization on the international level may help some leaders consolidate power at home. Global efforts to reduce dangerous divides between countries, preserve basic rules and norms, or create new ones, and efforts to coordinate responses to a wide range of global threats will thus not succeed if depolarization cannot be accomplished within countries. The quest to build a more peaceful, sustainable, and just order starts at home. “We are moving to a multipolar world, but we are not there yet. We are in a purgatory of polarity. And in this purgatory, more and more countries are filling the spaces of geopolitical divides, doing whatever they want with no accountability.”115 António Guterres, UN Secretary-General, UN General Assembly, September 24, 2024 30 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 31. Key Points Although it is unclear whether we are already living in a truly multipolar system, today’s world is characterized by “multipolarization.” While the world today displays elements of uni-, bi-, multi-, or even nonpolarity, it is clearly being shaped by a changing global distribution of power, with a larger number of actors having the ability to influence key global issues. But the world is also experiencing increasing polarization, both at the international level and within many countries’ domestic politics. For many politicians and citizens around the globe, a more multipolar world holds significant promise. But increasing competition among the various “poles” and their order models is already impeding joint approaches to global crises and threats. As few states still pursue foreign policies focused on the common good – and domestic divides are further complicating such attempts – it is far from clear how a process of depolarization that could set multipolarity on a positive track could be initiated. 1 2 3 4 Introduction 31
- 32. MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 32 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 Munich Security Index 2025 Respondents from the G7 and “BICS” countries (BRICS countries without Russia) share acute concerns about non-traditional risks but are increasingly polarized vis-à-vis geopolitical threats. While people from both the G7 and BICS countries worry about cyberattacks, economic crises, and environmental threats, views on the major powers diverge significantly. Compared to the first iteration of the Munich Security Index (MSI) in 2021, the risks posed by Russia and Iran have risen the most among all the indicators in the index among G7 countries, while the risk posed by China has remained relatively steady (Figure 1.8). In contrast, respondents in BICS countries consider China much less threatening today than they did four years ago, dropping 16 positions in the index since 2021, and continue to view Russia and Iran among the smallest risks in the index (Figure 1.9). Since 2021, the MSC and Kekst CNC have collected data to answer core questions that help understand global risk perceptions: Do people think that the world is becoming a riskier place? Is there a global consensus on some of the grave risks that humanity is facing today? And how prepared do societies feel to tackle these threats? By combining five metrics, the index provides an in-depth view of how 11 countries view 33 major risks over time. This edition of the MSI is based on representative samples of 1,000 people from each G7 and BICS nation. The total sample thus amounts to 11,000 people. Polling was conducted between November 14 and November 29, 2024, using industry-leading online panels. The local surveys were carried out by trusted and reputable fieldwork partners in compliance with the European Society for Opinion and Market Research code. Respondents were selected according to stratified quotas for gender, age, residency, formal education, and income to ensure representativeness. The final data was then weighted to exactly match the quotas. The margin of error was 3.1 percent. Polling in autocracies always comes with difficulties, as respondents may not feel like they can freely express their views. The results from China in particular should therefore be interpreted with caution. Following last year’s drop in global risk perceptions, the MSI registers aggregate increases in 20 risk indicators, while ten indicators saw overall decreases, and two remained steady (Figure 1.7). Following the election of US President Donald Trump, the perceived risk posed by the US increased sharply among the G7 countries – especially in Germany and Canada – as well as India, remained (roughly) the same in China and Brazil, and decreased in South Africa. While last year’s MSI showed somewhat improved
- 33. 33 MUNICH SECURITY INDEX perceptions of Russia, risk perceptions of Moscow in Canada, France, Germany, India, and the UK have increased. Heightened risk perceptions of the US and Russia are perhaps also connected to increased fears of trade wars and the use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor, respectively. Strikingly, only Germany and the UK see China as more of a risk than last year. Compared to last year, fears of the coronavirus pandemic, energy supply disruptions, and radical Islamic terrorism decreased significantly in most countries. Non-traditional risks nonetheless remain top concerns for respondents around the world. The three environmental risks included in the index – extreme weather and forest fires, the destruction of natural habitats, and climate change generally – rank as the aggregate first, second, and third greatest risks (Figure 1.6). In India, Brazil, and Italy, the top three risks are all environmental in nature. Cyberattacks are considered the fourth greatest risk in aggregate, ranking among the top three in the US, the UK, and Canada. Russia is the greatest concern in the UK, Canada (tied), and Germany (tied), and the second greatest in the US. China stands out as none of its top risks – among them the US, the use of biological weapons by an aggressor, and the use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor – feature among the top risks in any other country. The wider geopolitical competition continues to shape respondents’ views of other countries, but the conflict in the Middle East and the US elections also appear to have had an impact. All G7 countries see Iran, China, and Russia more as threats than allies, though none of them are seen as more of a threat than an ally in any of the BICS countries, with the exception of China in India and Iran in Brazil (Figure 1.10). Chinese respondents remain the only ones who see the US as more of a threat than an ally. Compared to last year, the standings of Israel, the US, and Russia fell significantly (Figure 1.11). At the other end of the spectrum, South Korea, Poland, Turkey, and the UK saw the biggest improvements. Finally, respondents in the G7 and BICS countries strikingly diverge in how they perceive the trajectory of their country’s fortune (Figure 1.12). No G7 country except the US believes that they will be more secure and wealthy in ten years’ time, evincing a widespread sense of decline. In contrast, majorities in China and India believe that they will be in a better economic and security position in ten years, with respondents in Brazil and South Africa roughly evenly split.
- 34. MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 34 The Munich Security Index combines the crucial components that make a risk more serious. Public perceptions of trajectory are combined with imminence and severity alongside a measure to give equal weight to perceptions of preparedness. Index components Overall Question 1 – How great is the overall risk to your country? For each of the following, please say how great a risk it poses to your country. • Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the lowest and 10 the greatest risk] Imminence Question 4 – How imminent is the risk? For each of the following, please say how imminent a threat you think it is. • Answer scale 1 – 8 [with 1 now or in the next few months and 8 never] • Rescaled to 0 – 10 and reversed1 Preparedness Question 5 – How prepared is your country? For each of the following, please say how prepared your country is to deal with this threat. • Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the least and 10 the most prepared] • Reversed2 Index scores To produce the final risk index score for each risk in each country we add the mean scores for all five of the inputs above – overall risk, trajectory, severity, imminence, and preparedness. The resulting total is then rescaled to run from 0 to 100 for ease of interpretation. The final risk index score is an absolute figure (with 100 the highest and 0 the lowest possible risk index score) that can be compared between demographics, countries, and over time. Trajectory Question 2 – Will the risk increase or decrease over the next twelve months? Please say for each of the following whether you think the risk posed in your country will increase, decrease, or stay the same in the next year. • Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the strongest decrease, 5 no change, and 10 the strongest increase] Severity Question 3 – How severe would the damage be if it happened? For each of the following, please say how bad you think the damage would be in your country if it were to happen or become a major risk. • Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 very low and 10 very severe damage] Explaining the Index 34
- 35. 35 Besides a risk heatmap (page 36) that features the G7 countries, Brazil, China, India, and South Africa and how they score on each of the 33 risks covered, the index also includes an overview of how risk perceptions have changed over time (pages 38–39) as well as an overview of how countries perceive other states (page 51). The index also provides more detailed insights into the individual risk profiles of the countries surveyed (pages 40–50). Change in index score Change in the risk index score since the last Munich Security Index was published. The last edition of the index was based on surveys conducted in October and November 2023. Share thinking risk is imminent Percentage of respondents who answered “now or in the next few months,” “in the next year,” and “in the next 5 years” in answer to the question “For each of the following, please say how imminent a threat you think it is. Share feeling unprepared Percentage of respondents who rated their country’s preparedness as less than 4 on a 0 – 10 scale in answer to the question “For each of the following, please say how prepared your country is to deal with this threat.” Question 1 Overall Question 2 Trajectory Question 3 Severity Question 4 Imminence Question 5 Preparedness reversed rescaled + reversed Country profiles Index score Extreme weather and forest fires Destruction of natural habitats Climate change generally 0 – 10 51 – 60 11 – 20 61 – 70 21 – 30 71 – 80 31 – 40 81 – 90 41 – 50 91 – 100 added rescaled 0 – 50 0 – 100 0 – 10 0 – 10 0 – 10 0 – 10 0 – 10 + + + + Mean scores 71 69 69 Change in index score +10 +7 +9 Share feeling unprepared 28 29 28 Share thinking risk is imminent 63 60 58 MUNICH SECURITY INDEX
- 36. 36 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 Figure 1.6 The risk heatmap, November 2024, score Italy China India United States United Kingdom South Africa Canada Germany Japan In the United States and China, respondents were not asked to assess the risk from their own country. E x t r e m e w e a t h e r a n d f o r e s t fi r e s C l i m a t e c h a n g e g e n e r a l l y D e s t r u c t i o n o f n a t u r a l h a b i t a t s R u s s i a C y b e r a t t a c k s o n y o u r c o u n t r y E c o n o m i c o r fi n a n c i a l c r i s i s i n y o u r c o u n t r y R i s i n g i n e q u a l i t y M a s s m i g r a t i o n a s a r e s u l t o f w a r o r c l i m a t e c h a n g e R a d i c a l I s l a m i c t e r r o r i s m D i s i n f o r m a t i o n c a m p a i g n s f r o m e n e m i e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z e d c r i m e P o l i t i c a l p o l a r i z a t i o n R a c i s m a n d o t h e r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n D i v i s i o n s a m o n g s t m a j o r g l o b a l p o w e r s C h i n a U s e o f n u c l e a r w e a p o n s b y a n a g g r e s s o r I r a n E n e r g y s u p p l y d i s r u p t i o n C i v i l w a r o r p o l i t i c a l v i o l e n c e D i v i s i o n s a m o n g s t w e s t e r n p o w e r s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s F o o d s h o r t a g e s U s e o f c h e m i c a l w e a p o n s a n d p o i s o n s b y a n a g g r e s s o r A f u t u r e p a n d e m i c U s e o f b i o l o g i c a l w e a p o n s b y a n a g g r e s s o r T r a d e w a r s A u t o n o m o u s r o b o t s / a r t i fi c i a l i n t e l l i g e n c e B r e a k d o w n o f d e m o c r a c y i n m y c o u n t r y N o r t h K o r e a R a p i d c h a n g e t o m y c o u n t r y ’ s c u l t u r e R i g h t - w i n g t e r r o r i s m U n i t e d S t a t e s T h e c o r o n a v i r u s p a n d e m i c 82 51 51 78 62 55 76 58 49 59 46 52 67 55 42 62 53 42 65 47 40 63 38 39 59 55 61 39 63 51 France 74 57 56 74 67 58 70 63 53 73 53 52 69 64 55 70 58 51 69 64 51 70 53 47 74 60 64 48 58 56 68 68 60 64 63 61 70 69 43 78 60 59 76 62 47 70 65 49 69 56 52 78 46 59 77 66 67 37 74 60 70 62 71 69 58 54 44 41 53 63 37 58 72 51 34 67 59 53 59 43 43 56 58 65 64 54 59 59 50 52 47 51 58 53 45 60 57 52 66 54 52 56 52 48 46 48 47 48 47 48 48 40 40 59 44 47 48 Brazil 82 69 50 80 63 54 81 59 60 48 44 55 64 45 58 68 53 39 70 62 48 54 53 40 44 57 66 58 60 49 70 49 57 73 47 53 69 52 58 70 71 53 69 48 44 60 61 68 65 48 42 54 59 40 45 43 57 60 60 57 69 59 52 51 63 56 64 56 51 67 61 49 69 62 55 67 60 43 63 56 51 58 48 50 61 49 72 50 56 56 64 53 56 51 56 55 59 58 52 50 60 60 45 75 58 54 69 61 43 62 62 49 53 49 49 63 57 47 61 56 61 52 59 60 51 46 54 42 39 51 43 43 23 45 43 49 28 36 39 25 41 46 42 40 42 37 45 41 35 44 44 42 42 38 32 40 38 31 37 38 37 38 18 34 39 22 23 31 39 17 32 28 27 32 30 26 30 33 38 22 34 39 34 33 49 40 38 43 43 26 24 42 26 37 21 41 27 46 48 32 28 35 38 Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference 0 – 10 51 – 60 11 – 20 61 – 70 21 – 30 71 – 80 31 – 40 81 – 90 41 – 50 91 – 100 24 19 27 34 17 31 30 17 16 22 33 E u r o p e a n U n i o n
- 38. 38 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 38 Figure 1.8 The G7 risk bump chart, aggregate ranking of risks by the G7 countries, 2021−2024 Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference -1--10 +0 +1-+10 +11-+20 +21-+25 -21--30 -11--20 Climate change generally 2021 2023 2022 2024 Disinformation campaigns from enemies Racism and other discrimination International organized crime Russia Political polarization Trade wars Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Divisions amongst western powers and institutions Food shortages Iran Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Right-wing terrorism Civil war or political violence North Korea Breakdown of democracy in my country Rapid change to my country’s culture Autonomous robots/artificial intelligence United States European Union China Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Radical Islamic terrorism Rising inequality Economic or financial crisis in your country A future pandemic The coronavirus pandemic Cyberattacks on your country Extreme weather and forest fires Destruction of natural habitats Cyberattacks on your country (+3) Divisions amongst major global powers China (-2) Iran (+8) Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor (+8) Political polarization (+0) Racism and other discrimination (-4) Use of biological weapons by an aggressor (+0) Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor (+0) Divisions amongst western powers and institutions (+0) Trade wars (-4) Autonomous robots/artificial intelligence (+7) Civil war or political violence (+2) North Korea (+2) Energy supply disruption A future pandemic (-20) Food shortages (-6) Rapid change to my country’s culture (+0) Right-wing terrorism (-5) Breakdown of democracy in my country (-3) United States (-1) The coronavirus pandemic (-27) International organized crime (+3) Radical Islamic terrorism (-1) Rising inequality (-1) Disinformation campaigns from enemies (+4) Mass migration as a result of war or climate change (+3) Economic or financial crisis in your country (+1) Climate change generally (-4) Destruction of natural habitats (-1) Russia (+13) Extreme weather and forest fires (-1) 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 31 32 30 29 28 27 26 24 23 22 21 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 31 32 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 4 20 31 32 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 2 3 4 5 7 8 10 1 18 European Union (-2) 33 20 25 9 19 6
- 40. 40 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 40 Canada The Coronavirus pandemic United States Rapid change to my country’s culture Breakdown of democracy in my country Russia Destruction of natural habitats China Civil war or political violence Political polarization Energy supply disruption Use of biological weapons by an aggressor North Korea Racism and other discrimination A future pandemic Climate change generally Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Divisions amongst major global powers Right-wing terrorism Food shortages Cyberattacks on your country Extreme weather and forest fires Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Economic or financial crisis in your country Radical Islamic terrorism Disinformation campaigns from enemies Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor International organized crime Iran Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Rising inequality Trade wars Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score is the share of respondents who feel that cyberattacks are imminent 67% Environmental and geopolitical threats are leading concerns in Canada. Extreme weather and forest fires (69 points) and Russia (69) are tied for the highest risk index scores. The Russian threat has increased significantly (by 5 points) since the last MSI, while cyberattacks (67) and the destruction of natural habitats (67) follow closely behind. The threat of a trade war is up eight places even if it is still in 19th place as a perceived risk. The risk posed by the US is up 21 index points, the largest increase across all countries surveyed, tied with Germany. While Russia ranks as a top concern for Canadians, 40 percent feel unprepared for it. Similarly, nuclear and biological weapons show high “unpreparedness” concerns (45 percent and 44 percent respectively) despite low risk index scores of 52 and 56 points, respec- tively. 69 +1 25 68 56 +0 32 53 61 +4 31 57 51 -1 43 38 64 +3 27 67 56 +10 26 60 58 +5 27 62 49 +0 20 44 67 +4 27 67 56 +6 27 55 60 +4 36 52 50 +2 29 48 63 +1 29 62 53 -1 31 51 69 +5 40 58 56 +4 28 55 61 +0 28 56 51 +4 34 42 63 +1 26 59 55 +0 30 55 56 +2 45 42 49 +1 27 48 48 +4 31 48 43 +3 32 38 43 +21 32 45 67 +1 27 63 56 +5 22 66 59 +5 24 63 50 +4 29 48 62 +0 38 51 52 +0 44 38 32 -7 16 49 European Union 17 +2 24 24 1 2 3
- 41. 41 41 MUNICH SECURITY INDEX France Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference is the share of respondents who feel that the risk of radical Islamic terrorism in France is imminent 69% The top threats are closely clustered: radical Islamic terrorism, climate change, and extreme weather and forest fires all share the highest risk index score (74), while Russia follows closely at 73. This suggests that French respondents perceive multiple serious threats of equal magnitude, rather than having one dominant concern. There has been a significant increase in concern about the US (a rise of 12 index points) and Russia (a rise of seven points). Energy concerns are declining significantly. Energy supply disruption has seen one of the largest decreases (by six points) in risk perception, dropping to a risk index score of 53. United States The coronavirus pandemic Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Right-wing terrorism Climate change generally Russia Cyberattacks on your country Food shortages Civil war or political violence North Korea Breakdown of democracy in my country Energy supply disruption Trade wars Rapid change to my country’s culture Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Racism and other discrimination China Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Extreme weather and forest fires Radical Islamic terrorism Divisions amongst major global powers Economic or financial crisis in your country Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Destruction of natural habitats A future pandemic Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Disinformation campaigns from enemies International organized crime Iran Political polarization Rising inequality Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score 74 -6 22 69 60 +2 25 56 69 +5 29 67 53 +1 21 51 70 +5 26 64 57 +5 21 61 64 +0 33 56 51 +2 31 40 74 +5 26 65 58 +3 22 56 64 +4 21 57 53 -1 33 47 70 +8 30 64 56 +2 30 41 74 +5 26 66 58 +5 27 45 67 +1 22 68 53 -6 26 49 70 -1 33 60 56 +2 30 40 63 +0 24 56 51 +5 29 41 48 -3 27 44 47 -2 21 54 37 -4 14 57 73 +7 35 63 58 +5 23 59 64 +4 31 57 52 +3 24 57 69 +4 21 69 55 +7 35 45 33 +12 29 39 European Union 19 +0 23 30 1 2 3
- 42. 42 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 42 Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Germany Change in index score European Union Food shortages The coronavirus pandemic A future pandemic Energy supply disruption Mass migration as a result of war or climate change North Korea Breakdown of democracy in my country Radical Islamic terrorism Cyberattacks on your country International organized crime Destruction of natural habitats United States Economic or financial crisis in your country Rising inequality Rapid change to my country’s culture Divisions amongst major global powers Extreme weather and forest fires Climate change generally Civil war or political violence Political polarization Disinformation campaigns from enemies Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Racism and other discrimination Iran China Trade wars Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Right-wing terrorism Russia For the second year in a row, mass migration as a result of war or climate change is at the top of the list of perceived threats for German respondents, although it is tied with the threat from Russia this year. Germany shows significantly increased concern about Russia since last year, up five places to become the second overall risk among the public. The risk posed by Russia is up by 11 points since the last MSI and the highest among all countries surveyed. The threat of an economic or financial crisis has risen substantially in German risk perceptions, with an increase of seven index points since the last MSI, and 40 percent of respondents feeling unprepared for it. 78 -2 48 70 64 +1 35 60 69 +0 42 62 59 +4 37 63 74 +5 36 77 60 +7 59 45 66 +6 40 62 49 +8 46 44 77 +3 39 76 62 +2 47 58 68 +4 30 73 52 +0 39 50 70 +7 40 66 60 +3 49 54 78 +11 49 65 63 +1 32 70 68 +4 36 67 56 +4 43 50 70 +2 37 65 60 +7 58 46 65 +10 60 49 47 +5 44 39 46 -2 37 45 43 -1 29 50 37 -4 36 37 27 +4 32 37 21 -10 21 50 76 +6 40 76 61 +10 39 61 67 +6 37 72 49 +21 40 52 69 +1 40 68 59 +2 27 68 1 2 3 is the share of respondents who feel unprepared for the threat posed by Russia 49%
- 43. 43 43 MUNICH SECURITY INDEX Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference The coronavirus pandemic United States North Korea Energy supply disruption Climate change generally Cyberattacks on your country Racism and other discrimination Food shortages Russia Right-wing terrorism A future pandemic China Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Rapid change to my country’s culture International organized crime Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Disinformation campaigns from enemies Breakdown of democracy in my country Political polarization Destruction of natural habitats Extreme weather and forest fires Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Trade wars Rising inequality Civil war or political violence Iran Radical Islamic terrorism Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Divisions amongst major global powers Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Economic or financial crisis in your country Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score Italy is the share of respondents who feel that the risk of extreme weather and forest fires is imminent 70% Environmental issues are Italy’s top three concerns – extreme weather and forest fires (82 index points), climate change (78), and the destruction of natural habitats (76) rank highest on the risk index, with all three showing increases since last year. The heightened sentiments of immanence (between 65 and 70 percent) for these issues underscore their perceived urgency. There has been a dramatic shift in how Italian respondents perceive the risk posed by radical Islamic terrorism, dropping by eight index points. Meanwhile, concerns about cyberattacks have increased by three points and now rank higher. Weapons-related threats show a striking preparedness gap. While nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons have relatively low risk index scores (between 51 and 53), they have some of the highest scores for respondents feeling unprepared at 49 percent. 82 +4 39 70 55 +2 30 54 62 -4 34 56 47 +2 33 43 65 +1 32 59 51 -1 49 39 58 +0 31 55 40 +2 33 35 76 +3 38 65 53 +2 49 41 59 -8 30 60 42 +3 33 35 63 -4 37 58 51 +3 24 55 78 +3 36 65 55 -4 41 50 61 +1 29 64 46 -4 41 42 63 +1 26 62 51 -1 49 39 55 +0 30 55 39 +2 28 46 39 -3 36 34 38 -6 35 32 34 +4 36 38 67 +3 29 69 52 +3 30 55 59 +0 44 50 42 +1 38 37 62 +0 29 64 49 +1 27 43 26 -7 20 42 European Union 24 -2 28 32 1 2 3
- 44. 44 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 44 Japan Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference Right-wing terrorism European Union Rapid change to my country’s culture Racism and other discrimination United States China Russia North Korea Economic or financial crisis of your country Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Trade wars Breakdown of democracy in my country Iran Political polarization Disinformation campaigns from enemies Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Radical Islamic terrorism Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Civil war or political violence The coronavirus pandemic Extreme weather and forest fires Climate change generally Energy supply disruption Destruction of natural habitats A future pandemic Cyberattacks on your country Divisions amongst major global powers Use of biological weapons by an aggressor International organized crime Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Food shortages Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Rising inequality Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score is the ranking of the threat posed by China 2nd place Environmental risks are major concerns in Japan – climate change ranks highest with a risk index of 73, and it has increased by three points since last year. Along with extreme weather and forest fires (70) and the destruction of natural habitats (69), environmental risks are also perceived as some of the most imminent threats. The risks posed by China, Russia, and North Korea remain near the top of the index, though with the latter two having fallen slightly. With index scores of 71 and 68, respectively, Japanese respondents consider China and North Korea as bigger risks than anyone else. There is a notable disconnect between risk perception and preparedness for certain threats. For instance, the threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons threats have some of the highest scores for respondents feeling unprepared (around 42 percent) despite having relatively low risk index scores (between 57 and 61). 73 +3 25 60 69 -3 26 62 70 +2 24 57 71 -2 35 46 70 -4 35 49 58 +1 21 45 65 +0 32 54 49 +4 24 47 54 -1 28 43 60 +3 33 39 57 -5 41 26 60 -1 29 51 48 +1 27 39 48 -4 32 37 69 +1 25 55 53 -1 25 44 57 -6 42 27 61 -5 42 30 48 +0 16 55 53 +2 23 53 59 -3 33 36 57 -4 27 53 60 -1 29 42 68 -1 35 49 52 +0 26 37 45 -7 32 36 44 +1 28 29 43 -2 25 33 43 +10 26 34 42 +0 25 33 47 +1 26 46 40 -4 28 30 30 +3 24 25 1 2 3
- 45. 45 45 MUNICH SECURITY INDEX Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference is the rise in ranking of the perceived risk of the use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor +12 Russia remains the UK’s main security concern, maintaining its top position in the risk ranking with a risk index score of 75. The threat from Russia is complemented by a rise in concern about nuclear weapons, which has jumped 12 positions, and chemical weapons, rising nine positions. Environmental concerns show a notable decline in relative priority, with extreme weather and forest fires falling 12 positions, climate change dropping ten positions, and the destruction of natural habitats dropping eight positions. Mass migration as a result of war or climate change and an economic or financial crisis remain central concerns of UK respondents. After Germany and France, the UK is tied with Italy for the third highest index score (63) for mass migration among all the countries surveyed. United States Right-wing terrorism The coronavirus pandemic Cyberattacks on your country Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Iran Breakdown of democracy in my country Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Racism and other discrimination Trade wars Civil war or political violence Rapid change to my country’s culture Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions A future pandemic Radical Islamic terrorism Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Destruction of natural habitats North Korea Rising inequality Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Russia Climate change generally Disinformation campaigns from enemies China Economic or financial crisis in your country Food shortages Energy supply disruption Divisions major global powers Extreme weather and forest fires International organized crime Political polarization Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared United Kingdom Change in index score 75 +9 33 65 58 +2 32 49 60 +9 34 49 52 +4 29 56 62 +4 25 61 55 +6 20 59 59 +5 19 64 49 +5 27 43 63 +3 33 59 56 -4 24 56 60 +0 22 57 49 +8 24 49 61 +6 21 67 53 -1 22 61 69 +8 20 72 57 +2 28 59 60 -2 24 58 50 +11 20 57 61 +2 22 64 54 +1 21 58 58 -3 23 53 47 +2 18 55 45 -1 20 42 43 +4 28 41 28 -4 15 47 62 +11 33 47 56 +8 22 54 59 +8 34 48 49 +7 28 48 61 +6 30 57 52 +1 18 63 26 +10 26 35 European Union 16 +1 21 27 1 2 3
- 46. 46 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 46 Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference is the share of respondents who feel cyberattacks on the US are imminent 68% Cyberattacks remain the main security concern in the US, maintaining the top spot in the risk ranking, with a risk index score of 66. This is reinforced by a rise in concern among US respondents about Russia as well as disinformation campaigns from enemies, which take second and third place, respectively. Like in all G7 countries except Japan, the perception of the threat from trade wars is up notably in the US, from the 27th to the 15th ranked risk. Concerns about extreme weather and forest fires and the destruction of natural habitats have increased by two index points each since last year to 58 and 59 points, respectively, though environmental risks still score lower in the US than in any other G7 country. United States The coronavirus pandemic Energy supply disruption Right-wing terrorism Russia Extreme weather and forest fires Economic or financial crisis in your country Food shortages Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence A future pandemic North Korea Racism and other discrimination Radical Islamic terrorism Rising inequality Destruction of natural habitats Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Divisions amongst major global powers Rapid change to my country’s culture Civil war or political violence Disinformation campaigns from enemies Cyberattacks on your country Breakdown of democracy in my country China Trade wars Political polarization International organized crime Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Climate change generally Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Iran Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score 66 +1 19 68 51 +4 19 60 54 -7 19 57 47 -2 14 53 59 -5 22 63 48 -8 27 51 52 +2 23 51 46 -2 21 54 59 -2 21 65 48 -4 19 42 52 -1 17 48 47 -6 24 51 57 -6 19 54 48 -6 23 52 60 -2 19 58 50 -3 20 45 53 +0 19 54 47 -2 20 60 58 +2 23 56 48 -4 19 52 52 -4 26 51 45 +0 19 45 44 -5 24 48 40 -1 20 48 27 -8 16 46 European Union 17 -5 13 29 59 +2 21 60 48 -10 16 55 52 +0 23 57 47 -7 22 49 56 -5 18 59 48 -1 17 49 1 2 3
- 47. 47 47 MUNICH SECURITY INDEX Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference are all climate-related Top 3 risks Environmental issues dominate Brazilian respondents’ concerns, with the top three risks all being environmental in nature: extreme weather and forest fires (at 82 index points), the destruction of natural habitats (81), and climate change (80). These not only have the highest risk index scores across all countries surveyed but also show consistent or increasing concern since the last MSI. Domestic concerns such as rising inequality also score high on the index and cluster near the top. With an index score of 69, Brazilian respondents are more concerned about political polarization than any other country. Geopolitical threats are viewed as relatively minor concerns, with Russia (index score of 48), China (44), North Korea (39), the US (38), and the EU (31) ranking at the bottom of Brazil’s risk index. These all show slight declines in concern, suggesting that Brazilian respondents views domestic and environmental challenges as more pressing than international political tensions. Brazil United States North Korea The coronavirus pandemic Right-wing terrorism Destruction of natural habitats Rising inequality Cyberattacks on your country China International organized crime Radical Islamic terrorism Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Rapid change to my country’s culture Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Iran Economic or financial crisis in your country Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Civil war or political violence Russia Energy supply disruption Climate change generally Extreme weather and forest fires Breakdown of democracy in my country Disinformation campaigns from enemies Food shortages Political polarization Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions A future pandemic Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Divisions amongst major global powers Trade wars Racism and other discrimination Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score 82 +2 37 70 58 +0 31 51 63 -2 29 64 49 -7 46 42 69 +0 30 66 54 +0 29 54 59 +0 31 55 45 -2 42 44 80 +1 36 69 55 -2 36 56 60 -1 34 52 48 -3 42 45 66 -3 33 64 53 +1 31 49 81 +2 37 69 57 -2 30 58 62 +0 33 57 48 +1 31 49 68 -1 36 59 53 -3 48 47 58 +2 33 52 44 -9 41 44 44 -3 39 43 40 -1 33 46 39 -2 39 39 70 -1 34 63 54 -6 30 57 60 -4 36 54 46 -1 26 49 64 -2 36 60 50 -6 47 43 38 -1 36 42 European Union 31 -3 33 36 1 2 3
- 48. 48 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 48 China Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference Russia North Korea Rapid change to my country’s culture Iran Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Disinformation campaigns from enemies Food shortages Destruction of natural habitats Breakdown of democracy in my country Economic or financial crisis in your country Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Right-wing terrorism Energy supply disruption The coronavirus pandemic Rising inequality Extreme weather and forest fires Civil war or political violence Racism and other discrimination Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor United States International organized crime A future pandemic Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Cyberattacks on your country Radical Islamic terrorism Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Trade wars European Union Divisions amongst major global powers Political polarization Climate change generally Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score is the share of respondents who feel unprepared for the risk posed by the US 7% The US is viewed as China’s top security concern, ranking highest on the risk index at 42 points, and rising two positions compared to last year. Weapons of mass destruction collectively represent a significant concern cluster, with biological weapons (with an index score of 40), nuclear weapons (39), and chemical weapons (39) all ranking near the top of the risk index. There has been a notable increase in concern by Chinese respondents about both the coronavirus pandemic and a future pandemic, increasing by five and three index points respectively. With positions six and seven in the ranking, no other country ranks the risks higher. 42 +0 7 32 34 +0 10 37 38 -4 6 35 30 +0 8 29 39 -3 10 38 32 +3 9 27 37 +0 7 27 26 +3 8 18 39 +0 10 30 33 +2 7 26 38 -1 7 38 28 +4 10 23 38 +3 8 34 31 +2 10 26 40 -1 8 30 33 +1 8 27 38 -2 8 31 30 +1 9 25 38 +5 10 34 32 -1 10 29 34 +0 9 28 23 +5 11 20 22 +2 11 20 22 +4 14 23 18 +0 20 20 17 +1 20 21 39 +3 7 29 32 +3 8 27 37 -1 7 34 27 -1 9 25 38 -2 7 36 31 -1 6 29 1 2 3
- 49. 49 49 MUNICH SECURITY INDEX are all climate-related Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference India Russia European Union North Korea United States Energy supply disruption Iran Extreme weather and forest fires Cyberattacks on your country China Food shortages Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence The coronavirus pandemic Right-wing terrorism Trade wars Racism and other discrimination Breakdown of democracy in my country Political polarization Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Disinformation campaigns from enemies Economic or financial crisis in your country Rising inequality Destruction of natural habitats Climate change generally Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Radical Islamic terrorism Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Rapid change to my country’s culture Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor A future pandemic Mass migration as a result of war or climate change Divisions amongst major global powers Civil war or political violence International organized crime Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score Top 3 risks Environmental and climate concerns dominate Indian respondents’ top risks, with climate change generally at 54 points, followed by extreme weather and the destruction of natural habitats, both with an index score of 51. Geopolitical threats show increased concern but remain relatively low priority. While Russia, the US, and the EU saw significant increases in their risk scores (by five, six, and seven points, respectively), they remain at the bottom of Indian respondents’ risk ranking, suggesting these powers are viewed as relatively minor threats. In contrast, China is considered the eigth greatest risk, falling one position compared to last year. Cyberattacks are a significant concern, ranking fourth overall with a risk index score of 49. This high ranking, combined with 52 percent of respondents feeling that the risk is imminent, suggests it is viewed as one of the more pressing threats. 1 2 3 54 +0 11 52 42 +0 13 40 44 +2 12 44 39 +1 12 41 46 +4 10 49 41 +1 9 43 43 +0 11 42 35 +2 11 41 51 +1 11 46 42 +1 13 44 43 +2 12 39 37 +1 11 39 45 -1 13 46 40 +0 11 44 51 +3 11 51 42 +2 12 43 44 -3 11 50 39 +2 12 39 46 -1 10 49 41 +1 12 42 42 +0 13 44 35 +1 12 38 28 +5 12 36 25 +3 12 33 24 +6 13 31 49 -1 11 52 42 +1 12 42 43 +1 13 50 36 +2 12 38 45 -2 12 43 40 +1 12 40 23 22 +5 +7 14 12 32 30
- 50. 50 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 50 50 Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference is the ranking of the perceived risk of an economic or financial crisis South Africa European Union North Korea Iran Right-wing terrorism United States Energy supply disruption Extreme weather and forest fires International organized crime China Mass migration as a result of war or climate change The coronavirus pandemic Use of nuclear weapons by an aggressor Trade wars Use of chemical weapons and poisons by an aggressor Radical Islamic terrorism Rising inequality Autonomous robots/ artificial intelligence Cyberattacks on your country Russia Rapid change to my country’s culture Climate change generally Economic or financial crisis in your country Disinformation campaigns from enemies Food shortages Breakdown of democracy in my country Destruction of natural habitats Use of biological weapons by an aggressor Divisions amongst major global powers Political polarization Divisions amongst Western powers and institutions Civil war or political violence A future pandemic Racism and other discrimination Index score Share thinking risk is imminent Share feeling unprepared Change in index score 1st place Economic and energy concerns dominate South African respondents’ top risks, with the threats of an economic or financial crisis and energy supply disruption both scoring 72 on the risk index. However, both risks have fallen in terms of index score. Environmental issues cluster near the top of South African respondents’ concerns, with climate change, extreme weather and forest fires, and the destruction of natural habitats all ranking in the top five positions and scoring between 69 and 71 points on the risk index. There has been a notable increase in concern about international organized crime in South Africa, up five positions this year to become the eighth place risk. South African respondents remain more concerned about food shortages than any other country, even with the risk dropping by 13 index points since last year. 72 -11 36 62 58 -9 30 52 64 -7 28 65 51 -2 45 42 69 -2 30 65 54 -2 28 47 59 -7 33 55 43 +1 37 41 71 -2 27 65 56 -5 31 53 62 -6 26 61 44 -7 41 43 65 -13 35 57 53 -3 30 49 72 -18 33 66 58 +0 32 53 63 -3 30 60 51 -3 32 49 67 -8 32 63 53 -2 33 57 58 -4 32 60 41 -1 24 47 41 -7 37 44 40 -7 36 42 37 -3 35 41 70 -3 31 66 54 +0 46 40 59 -3 38 55 43 -2 33 42 64 -1 35 58 51 -2 46 44 34 34 -7 -3 35 38 38 33 1 2 3
- 52. 52 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 -10 – -1 -20 – -11 -30 – -21 0 – 10 11 – 20 21 – 30 Figure 1.11 Respondents’ perceptions of other countries as threats or allies, change between October−November 2023 and November 2024, percent Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference U n i t e d S t a t e s United Kingdom South Africa Japan Italy Brazil China Canada United States India Germany France I s r a e l R u s s i a I r a n U k r a i n e F r a n c e S o u t h A f r i c a B e l a r u s H u n g a r y I n d i a M o l d o v a J a p a n T a i w a n C a n a d a G e r m a n y A u s t r a l i a F i n l a n d C h i n a I t a l y G e o r g i a S w e d e n P o l a n d B r a z i l U n i t e d K i n g d o m T u r k e y S o u t h K o r e a -3 +9 +3 -5 -1 +3 -2 -4 -4 -1 +2 -15 -11 -8 -9 -8 -2 -11 -4 -4 -3 -11 -4 -5 +3 -12 -8 +2 -6 -9 -5 +2 +1 +1 +16 -1 +0 -2 +2 +3 +6 +6 +9 +5 -1 +0 +4 -3 +0 -2 +6 +1 +8 +6 -3 -3 +2 +4 -2 -5 +2 +1 +4 +0 -8 -1 +1 -5 -4 -7 +5 +15 +7 -5 +3 -5 -9 +2 +1 -6 +3 -1 -3 +8 +1 +2 -1 +7 +2 +6 +0 +2 +4 +0 +2 +1 +0 +5 +0 +1 +6 +0 +3 -4 -2 +2 -4 +5 -6 +3 +2 +4 -3 +0 +3 +1 +7 +2 +7 -6 +3 +0 +0 +6 +3 +8 -3 +3 +2 +2 +8 +12 +6 +1 +9 +8 +3 +0 +2 -6 +7 -2 +7 +10 +2 +0 +3 +2 +3 +2 +4 +5 -1 -6 -4 +4 +7 +5 +10 +7 -2 +1 +5 -3 +4 +8 +6 -1 +8 +2 +2 +1 +4 +9 -4 +12 +2 +0 +4 +10 -4 +0 +8 -5 +3 -6 +4 +5 +4 +6 +8 +4 +7 +5 +6 +1 +5 -1 -3 +3 -2 +3 +4 +1 -1 +8 +10 +6 +10 +1 +7 +8 +9 +0 +3 +4 +8 +0 +11 +2 -1 +8 +10 +4 +2 +6 +5 +11 +11 +12 +11 +10 +4 +15 +12 +17 +7 +5 +1 +9 +4 +4 +4 +2 +6 -6 -1 +2 -2 -3 +4 -6 +5 +8 +9 +9 +7 -1 +8 -3 -5 -2 +2 -4 -5 -7 -8 +11 +11 +4 +4 +4 +4 +7 52 52
- 53. 53 53 Neither/don’t know Disagree Agree Figure 1.12 Respondents’ perspectives on whether their country will be more secure and wealthy in ten years’ time, November 2024, percent Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference China more secure more wealthy 24 63 30 60 11 13 India more secure more wealthy 58 28 24 55 18 17 United States more secure more wealthy 33 34 35 38 32 28 South Africa more secure more wealthy 29 34 30 35 36 37 Brazil more secure more wealthy 36 29 30 36 34 34 Canada more secure more wealthy 42 40 24 27 34 33 United Kingdom more secure more wealthy 36 36 24 24 41 40 Italy more secure more wealthy 38 18 44 32 18 51 France more secure more wealthy 29 22 49 29 18 52 Germany more secure more wealthy 33 16 32 17 52 52 54 Japan more secure more wealthy 33 31 13 13 56
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- 55. Why has the post–Cold War consensus on US foreign policy broken down? What is the Trump administration’s vision for the international order? What will it mean for global politics? Maga Carta 2 Donald Trump’s presidential victory has buried the US post–Cold War foreign policy consensus. Even before the elections, the assumption that the US remained the unrivaled leader of the world with a historic responsibility for, as well as deep interests in, maintaining the international order had become increasingly contested.1 As a result of China’s dramatic rise in military and economic power, the US failure to deter wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the diffusion of influence in world politics, many in the US foreign policy community advocated adapting the US grand strategy forged during the “unipolar moment” in the wake of the Cold War.2 President Trump will likely bring this change about. For him, the US-created international order constitutes a bad deal: “We’ve made other countries rich while the wealth, strength, and confidence of our country has disappeared over the horizon.”3 Instead, he promises more selective, often unilateral, international engagement, only when narrowly construed US interests are at stake. Trumpism will likely usher in a new era of US foreign policy, which will cause reverberations across the globe. Past the Post–Cold War Consensus There had long been an unassailable bipartisan consensus that a grand strategy of liberal internationalism – supporting democracy and human rights, free trade, and international institutions and alliances – backed up by military primacy, would best serve US interests, even if that commitment had always been selective in practice.4 Voting behavior in Congress on foreign policy exhibited a comparatively high degree of bipartisanship, with politics often stopping “at the water’s edge.”5 Trump had first pierced this consensus, but Joseph Biden’s victory in the 2020 elections raised the possibility that Trump was a mere aberration. In reality, Bidenism was already a partial emancipation from this consensus. The Biden administration did return to some international organizations and agreements that Trump had left. It revived existing alliances and built new ones, rallied the West in support of Ukraine against Russia’s attack, and strongly backed Israel.6 But Biden also cemented the break with Leonard Schütte Human rights 55 UNITED STATES
- 56. “We were being ripped off by European nations both on trade and on NATO. […] If you don’t pay, we’re not going to protect you.”7 Donald Trump, then–US presidential candidate, presidential debate, September 10, 2024 the erstwhile Washington Consensus on free trade and withdrew the US from Afghanistan. Trumpism still fundamentally diverges from Bidenism on the grand strategic level. Unlike his predecessors, who shared the conviction that the US was “the indispensable nation […] that holds the world together,”8 Trump’s vision lacks “any outsized ethos of responsibility” for the international order.9 Indeed, his toying with the idea of coercively absorbing Greenland, Panama, and Canada, and his pledge to “expan[d] our territory”, suggests that he will not feel bound by key international norms.10 Trump’s opposition to the status quo is twofold. First, he maintains that the order allows others to “rip off” the US.11 Highlighting the fact that the US has the largest trade deficit in the world, he has berated China but also partners like the EU, Canada, and Mexico “because we’re being treated very badly by most of [them].”12 For Trump, US allies in Europe and East Asia tend to be liabilities rather than assets.13 And he has withdrawn funding from and criticized international institutions for being unfair. Indeed, in net terms, the first Trump administration disengaged from more international organizations and agreements than any other post–Cold War administration (Figure 2.1). Second, many in the Republican Party assert that the US is no longer the global superpower with indefinite resources to underwrite the international order. Whereas President Biden, when asked whether the US could support Ukraine Cases of US engagement with or disengagement from international organizations and agreements, 1989–2024, by administration Figure 2.1 Data: Tim Heinkelmann-Wild. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Engagement Disengagement 0 -10 -20 30 40 20 10 Biden 2021–2025 Obama II 2013–2017 Trump I 2017–2021 Obama I 2009–2013 Bush Jr. II 2005–2009 Clinton II 1997–2001 Bush Jr. I 2001–2005 Clinton I 1993–1997 Bush Sr. 1989–1993 56 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 57. “[In a] world of scarcity, we can’t support Ukraine and the Middle East and contingencies in East Asia.”14 J.D. Vance, then–US Senator, Munich Security Conference, February 18, 2024 and Israel at the same time, insisted that “we’re the United States of America for God’s sake, the most powerful nation […] in the history of the world,”15 President Trump has repeatedly attested to America’s “decline.”16 Indeed, the notion of “resource scarcity” has become a central premise of Republican foreign policy thinking.17 At first sight, this argument is hard to sustain (Figure 1.1). US defense spending still dwarfs that of any other actor. The US remains the only global military power with a vast network of alliances, and it is currently upgrading its nuclear arsenal.18 It is also the largest economy in the world in nominal terms, and the gap to China has actually widened since 2021; US GDP per capita is almost six times larger than China’s.19 The US dollar remains the dominant global reserve currency,20 and the US has recently become a net energy exporter for the first time since the 1940s.21 Indeed, 90 percent of respondents in the 2025 Munich Security Index consider the US a great power – a higher figure than for any other country (Figure 1.3). However, many worry that these indicators obscure underlying US weaknesses. Indeed, the defense spending gap has narrowed and, when adjusted for purchasing power, is much smaller than commonly assumed (Figure 2.2). The war in Ukraine also exposed the West’s depleted stocks of key weapons Nominal defense spending in constant USD (2022) Data: ifo Institute. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Defense spending adjusted for military purchasing power parities Figure 2.2 Defense expenditures of the world's largest spenders adjusted for military purchasing power, 2023, USD billions 0 200 400 600 800 100 300 500 700 900 US European NATO China Russia Ukraine India France South Korea Japan UK Germany Poland Italy Turkey Spain South Korea between India and France nominal: 47bn adjusted: 96bn Japan between Germany and Poland nominal: 52bn adjusted: 68bn Human rights 57 UNITED STATES
- 58. systems and the atrophied state of the US defense industrial base.22 War games show that the US could run out of key munition in less than a week in a war over Taiwan.23 These weaknesses are augmented by China’s rapid rearmament and growth of its defense industrial base (Chapter 3).24 China is shrinking the capability gaps across conventional domains and could reach quantitative nuclear parity by the mid-2030s.25 The bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy attests that China “has largely negated the US military advantage in the Western Pacific.”26 The contestation of the post–Cold War consensus is also increasingly reflected in public opinion.28 For the first time since polling started, only a minority of Republicans (47 percent) supported an active US role in world affairs in 2023 (in 2024, the number increased slightly).29 57 percent say that the US needs to reduce its role in the world due to limited resources and domestic woes, compared to 35 percent of Democrats. On most foreign policy issues, except trade and China, the partisan gap is also wide.30 Only 43 percent of Republicans hold favorable views on NATO compared to 75 percent among Democrats.31 And as the Munich Security Index shows, there are notable partisan gaps on US military assistance for Ukraine and Israel (Figure 2.3). Priority Order The Trump administration will mostly view its foreign policy through the prism of its rivalry with China.32 During the election campaign, Trump floated a 60 percent tariff on Chinese goods and a plan to revoke China’s “permanent normal trade relations status” to reduce the vast trade deficit.33 This policy would US respondents’ perspectives on US military assistance for Ukraine and Israel, November 2024, percent Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference Figure 2.3 ... maintain its current levels of assistance ... increase its assistance ... terminate its assistance Don’t know ... reduce its assistance Ukraine Israel When thinking about US military assistance for Ukraine/Israel, please choose the statement that comes closest to your view. The US should … Democrats 34 35 16 6 9 Republicans 19 33 27 16 5 Republicans 33 37 18 7 5 Democrats 21 35 20 15 9 58 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 59. “We have not seen this kind of military buildup since Germany in the 1930s. […] We need to begin focusing the nation on the threat that [China] is.”27 Michael Waltz, then–US Representative, Atlantic Council, October 28, 2024 not only expedite the economic decoupling from Beijing and sharply increase bilateral tensions, but also render coordination with European states more difficult. The Trump administration is also likely to continue preventing China from accessing US technology that could aid its military rise. There is less consensus among Republicans on the degree to which China needs military balancing. While some argue it is imperative for the US to defend Taiwan to deny Chinese hegemony over Asia, and hence push for significantly reinforcing the US force posture in the Indo-Pacific, Trump has been equivocal on whether he would defend the island and sowed doubt on US alliance commitments in the region.34 As a corollary of prioritizing China, the Trump administration could abdicate its historic role as Europe’s security guarantor. While some Republicans warn that the “cost of deterrence is considerably less than the cost of war,”35 the US will likely shift the bulk of the burden of defending the continent onto European NATO allies, no longer considering the security, democratic stability, or prosperity of Europe strategic priorities.36 For Ukraine, the consequences could be vast. On the campaign trail, Trump mocked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as “maybe the greatest salesman” for securing US military assistance and vowed to end the war within 24 hours.37 Recently, he struck a more supportive tone, saying that “the only way you’re going to reach an agreement is not to abandon [Ukraine],”38 and expressed hope to end the war “long before six months.”39 In December, Keith Kellogg, Trump’s envoy for Ukraine and Russia, explained that the US could threaten Ukraine with cutting off supplies while threatening Russia with removing constraints on supplies to Ukraine, to induce both parties to the negotiation table to achieve a ceasefire along current lines.40 NATO membership for Kyiv is likely not in the cards. Ukraine may not be able to accept such terms as it feels that without credible security guarantees, Russia would use the ceasefire to reconstitute its forces to attack again.41 And there are no indications that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to temper his maximalist goals of regime change and a de facto veto over Ukraine’s future foreign policy. For NATO, Trumpism will also involve enormous consequences. While a formal US withdrawal from the Alliance is unlikely, the credibility of both Article 5 and the US nuclear umbrella are in doubt, as Trump has suggested conditioning NATO’s collective defense guarantees on Allies spending as much as five percent of GDP on defense. Moreover, people in Trump’s orbit have developed plans to significantly reduce the US military footprint in Europe and transform the Alliance into what some have called a “dormant NATO.”42 Given Europe’s sluggish rearmament and dependency on the US, such withdrawals could create a security vacuum, exposing Europe to Russian aggression toward the Human rights 59 UNITED STATES
- 60. “My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.”47 Donald Trump, US President, inaugural address, January 20, 2025 end of the decade. This dire prospect is not predestined, however, because Trump’s pressure could also force the Europeans to, finally, seize the responsibility for defending their continent. This would, as former NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg put it, “remind the incoming administration that, far from being a burden, the transatlantic relationship is a key strategic asset in this era of great-power competition.”43 The Middle East may constitute the exception to the logic of prioritization. The Trump administration could maintain significant US involvement in the region, at least in the short to medium term. President Trump not only picked several stalwart defenders of Israel for his cabinet; he also told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “do what you have to do” in the campaign against Hamas and Hezbollah, reflecting his staunch support for Israel during his first term.44 In what would be a reversal of decades-long US policy, he cast doubt on the desirability of a two-state solution to the conflict.45 Furthermore, the Trump administration has signaled that it wants to resume the maximum pressure campaign on Iran to halt its progress toward a nuclear bomb and seek a broader regional realignment by normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.46 The Trump administration’s narrow pursuit of national interests will also have far-reaching consequences for countries in the so-called Global South.48 The administration’s overriding focus on China means it will likely try to forge close relations with those countries it considers critical in containing Beijing, such as India, but others will be low on the agenda.49 Trump’s possible withdrawal from key international institutions like the Paris Agreement, his critique of the UN, and his transactional approach to development spending could also alienate many countries in the Global South and drive them to hedge against the US,50 thus fueling the very process of “multipolarization” (Chapter 1). Furthermore, US protectionism could deal a major blow to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and would accelerate the fragmentation of the world economy, with the Global South particularly affected.51 The New World Trump’s presidential victory marks the end of the post–Cold War consensus. By engaging more selectively and prioritizing the bipolar contest with China, the Trump administration could accelerate the multipolarization of the international system as other actors will (have to) assume greater responsibility for certain regions or policy issues. The next four years could thus conclude the fundamental debate about whether the US being active in the world contains or fuels global disorder.52 People in Kyiv, Taipei, Gaza, Tel Aviv, and elsewhere will be watching anxiously. 60 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 61. Key Points The post–Cold War consensus that the US remained the unrivaled leader of the world, with deep interests in, and responsibility for, maintaining the international order, was already under pressure before the US elections. Donald Trump’s victory buried it. For President Trump, the order was a bad deal for the US, allowing rivals and partners to benefit disproportionally from US leadership – thus contributing to US decline. Instead, he promises more selective international engagement only when narrowly construed interests are at stake. The Trump administration will prioritize containing China’s rise and supporting Israel. But the US security commitment to NATO and Ukraine will likely suffer, as will US involvement in multilateral institutions. The next four years will show whether a more selectively engaged US fuels or contains global disorder. As other actors will (have to) step up to fill the gap, the multipolarization of the international system could accelerate. 1 2 3 4 Human rights 61 UNITED STATES
- 62. 62 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 63. What is China’s vision for global order, and how is it received internationally? How do China’s military, economic, and diplomatic strategies support – or contradict – its vision? How does increasing pushback from countries all over the world impact China? Pole Positioning 3 Randolf Carr and Paula Köhler China is the world’s most prominent advocate of a new multipolar order: “An equal and orderly multipolar world means every country can find its place […] and play its due role,” announced Chinese President Xi Jinping last July.1 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is pushing to realign global governance institutions and promoting alternative structures, like BRICS, ostensibly to better reflect the “redistribution of power” towards the rising non-Western world.2 However, in jousting for “pole position” with the United States, Beijing often disregards the very countries it claims to uplift and the principles it touts. Thus, many see this advocacy as mere window dressing for naked power politics.3 Its considerable success in rallying the discontents of the current global order notwithstanding, China’s economic and military progress face homegrown obstacles. Moreover, Beijing’s power plays are drawing more and more resistance from its neighbors as well as European states; and under the new Trump administration, US efforts to hamstring China will likely intensify. If the CCP doubles down on its current course, China itself may help derail any hope of an “orderly multipolar world.” He Says, Xi Says: China’s Vision for Global Order In pushing for multipolarity, China is portraying itself as an advocate for the countries of the so-called Global South. Like many of them, China views the current order as distorted by the West’s dominance over international institutions, double standards, and supposed “Cold War mentality.”4 Beijing’s vision promises to “democratize international relations,”5 uphold the UN Charter, and give disaffected countries equal say and room to maneuver within international institutions and rules. But it also promotes the CCP’s ideas: Its “right to development” prioritizes economic progress for the many over political and civil rights for the individual; and in its understanding, Human rights 63 CHINA
- 64. sovereignty shall not be infringed over questions of values or governance.6 This interpretation of multipolar order tries to reconcile an appeal to the Global South with Beijing’s desire to act, without outside interference, as a great power and regional hegemon. Unsurprisingly, the Chinese public is overwhelmingly convinced of the benefits of a more multipolar world for peace and prosperity (Figure 1.4). But even in China, some acknowledge that, as it pursues great-power competition with the US, calling for multipolarity is merely “a globally politically correct stance.”7 In Washington, and increasingly in other Western capitals, many see the CCP’s overriding goal as winning a strategic competition with the US and upending core elements of the liberal international order. Some still caution against raising the stakes of competition with China or overstating its global ambitions,9 but the consensus is hardening that greater pushback against Beijing is necessary.10 For many, China intensifying its opportunistic cooperation with Russia and other revisionist actors, like Iran and North Korea, has laid bare that the CCP’s purported principles fall by the wayside when it serves its strategic interests. China has become an indispensable supporter of Russia’s war in Ukraine: Since 2022, it has not only helped Russia withstand Western sanctions by sending dual-use goods worth nine billion US dollars and boosted trade – to the point that 38 percent of Russia’s goods imports are now Chinese.11 It is also allegedly helping Russia build combat drones.12 The continuing war gives Beijing a pretense to malign NATO and is straining its transatlantic competitors’ military, economic, and political resources.13 Meanwhile, Beijing is using its diplomatic clout to rally discontents of the current global order to its cause. China is trying to position the BRICS grouping, whose newly expanded membership now accounts for nearly half the world’s population and more than a third of global GDP, as a counterweight to the G7.14 Though BRICS is often still seen as a disorganized group with few concrete joint projects, it is a powerful vehicle for the CCP to denounce Western double standards and failures of global governance.15 But while President Xi announced China would “lead the reform of the global governance system,”16 it has, for instance, blocked serious paths to UN Security Council reform.17 It aims to dilute international institutions’ liberal DNA by inserting CCP principles into their documents and placing Chinese officials in leadership positions.18 Moreover, China is increasing its military and economic power, obstacles and conflicts notwithstanding, and putting it to use towards strategic competition – often in contravention of its purported multipolar principles. “Multipolarity and economic globalization are the prevailing trends in the advancement of human society. But there are different views on how they should look like.”8 Wang Yi, Director of the CCP Central Committee Foreign Affairs Commission, press meeting, March 7, 2024 64 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 65. The Emperor’s New Boats: China’s Military Posture China aims to field a “world-class military” in the Indo-Pacific and to do so without the threat of US intervention.19 In certain areas, China’s capacity for regional power projection already surpasses that of the US.20 It procures at a pace five to six times faster than the US and numerically has the largest maritime fighting force worldwide.21 China’s overall shipbuilding capacity is 230 times that of the US, with its Jiangnan Shipyard alone having more than all US shipyards taken together.22 In 2024, Beijing also confirmed that it is working on a fourth, possibly nuclear-powered, aircraft carrier.23 In addition to its significant conventional buildup (Figure 3.1), China’s operational nuclear arsenal is projected to grow to more than 1,000 warheads by 2030, up from around 600 in 2024.24 Yet Beijing’s military goals face internal obstacles. Combat experience is almost nonexistent, force integration remains low, and logistical issues persist.25 Corruption also remains a serious problem: In recent months, President Xi removed several top military officials from their positions, among them two former defense ministers, to be investigated for corruption.26 Abroad, pushback to China’s military buildup and power plays is also increasing. Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea are investing Change in China’s military capabilities, 1999–2024, number of equipment pieces and percent Figure 3.1 Data: IISS. Illustration: Munich Security Conference 2024 1999 Principal surface combatants Intercontinental ballistic missile launchers Active personnel Combat aircraft Sub- marines 71 -17% -17% 59 53 38 102 2,480,000 3,759 2,404 2,035,000 148 Short-range ballistic missile launchers 225 150 +50% +50% -18% -18% -36% -36% Medium intermediate- range ballistic missile launchers 46 352 +665% +665% +290% +290% +93% +93% Human rights 65 CHINA
- 66. heavily in defense and seek stronger security ties with the US in response to Chinese intimidation and breaches of international law.27 Indeed, in the past year, Chinese provocations reached a new level. In June, in the South China Sea, the Chinese coast guard rammed a Philippine boat in waters unlawfully claimed by Beijing,28 injuring several sailors. The Philippines called it out as “the most aggressive action ever conducted” by China in the area.29 In October 2024, China’s military staged its largest “rehearsal” for a blockade of Taiwan yet, practicing port closures and ground assaults.30 The intensifying exercises back up US concerns that, by 2027, Xi wants his military to be able to take the island.31 Beijing may preach “indivisible security,” which condemns ensuring one’s own security “at the expense of others.”32 But its efforts to create a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific contravene international rules and betray a “might makes right” view of world order.33 Crazy Rich Asians? China’s Economic Clout China’s economy is its leaders’ greatest asset on the world stage, but perhaps also their greatest concern. China is projected to account for 21 percent of global economic growth in the coming five years.34 The backbone of this success are future-oriented industries. China is ranked the world leader in as many as 37 of 44 critical technologies.35 The world also depends on it for rare earth elements used in key high-tech products, with China mining 60 percent and processing 66 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 Figure 3.2 Import barriers imposed by the world’s 50 largest economies vis-à-vis China between 2020 and 2024 Data and illustration: MERICS No China-focused measures identified Commodities Basic manufactured goods Advanced manufactured goods E-commerce Commodities Basic manufactured goods Advanced manufactured goods Turkey Thailand Kenya Brazil Mexico Argentina New Zealand Indonesia Australia Ukraine Kazakhstan Egypt India Iran Pakistan United States Canada United Kingdom Guatemala Colombia Chile Peru Morocco Nigeria Ghana South Africa South Korea Vietnam Japan Taiwan Malaysia EU-27
- 67. nearly 90 percent of global supply.36 Chinese companies have left the competition in photovoltaics far behind and may do so in electric vehicles (EVs) as well.37 To increase its edge and resilience, the CCP is pursuing a policy of “dual circulation:” To strengthen “internal circulation,” it is investing heavily in onshoring supply chains in strategic industries for the sake of economic security.39 To promote “external circulation,” it is opening up trade routes and export markets for Chinese goods. China is already the top trading partner for over 120 countries.40 It also exerts additional economic influence over the 150 countries signed up to its Belt and Road Initiative for infrastructure investment.41 With this dual strategy, Beijing insulates its economy against outside pressures, be it trade restrictions, sanctions, or natural shocks. Meanwhile, it uses its trade partners’ dependence on Chinese exports or market access for political advantage.42 This often comes in the form of economic coercion, such as import and export restrictions, boycotts, or tourism limits to punish unwanted behavior, as smaller countries ranging from Lithuania to Mongolia have experienced.43 Countries around the world are taking measures in response to China’s economic tactics (Figure 3.2). Since 2022, the US has continuously tightened “Through theft, market distorting subsidies, and strategic planning, Beijing now leads in many of the industries that will determine geopolitical supremacy in the 21st century.”38 Marco Rubio, then–US Senator, press release, September 2024 China’s key economic and demographic trends, 2004–most recent Figure 3.3 Youth unemployment rate, percent Share of population aged 60 and older, percent 2014 0 5 10 15 20 0 20 5 10 15 Net foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, USD billions 2024 2004 11 15 9 General government debt as a share of GD�, percent� 2024 2004 2014 21 11 15 Q1–Q3 2024 0 100 200 300 0 30 60 90 2014 2004 -17 268 268 68 2023 2004 2014 84 26 40 Data: IMF; World Bank; International Labour Organization; UN Population Division. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Human rights 67 CHINA
- 68. export controls on semiconductors, trying to withhold the components China requires for its high-tech sector and military.44 If President Trump makes good on a campaign promise to levy tariffs of 60 percent on Chinese imports, China could lose around 0.7 percent of its GDP.45 In October 2024, the EU introduced tariffs of up to 45 percent on Chinese EVs out of concern about subsidy and overcapacity practices.46 Europe will likely also come under pressure from the new US administration to further toughen its China policies. But China’s cheap exports are also prompting many developing countries, including some of its BRICS partners, to draw up barriers as they try to move up the value chain.47 China also remains dependent on the dollar-centric financial system. Its efforts at “de-dollarization,” to replace the dollar with the Chinese yuan, have made little inroads globally.49 Not only external but also internal constraints weigh on China’s economy. Relatively poor recent GDP growth, an aging population plus dramatic youth unemployment, a troubled real estate sector, high government debt, decreasing capital inflow, and dependence on food imports may mean China’s growth is peaking (Figure 3.3).50 Also, its position as the world’s largest bilateral lender, especially to unstable economies, increasingly looks like a liability.51 Calls for China to provide more debt relief to countries struggling with repayment are growing, but Beijing remains reluctant.52 Beijing’s securitization of trade relations and protection of industrial sectors run counter to both global trade rules and its commitment to “inclusive, balanced globalization.”53 Changes Unseen Since 2017: Global Order and US-China Competition While advancing its narrative of a supposedly emerging multipolar world, China is amassing significant capabilities to challenge the US as the dominant world superpower. Yet it increasingly faces internal structural headwinds and pushback from abroad. The strongest pushback comes from Washington, where the consensus is to more resolutely oppose China (Chapter 2). Beijing, in turn, is projecting confidence that it can withstand a “Trump shock.”54 Moreover, Trump’s distancing from alliances and international institutions could even hand China opportunities. The CCP could underscore its narrative of the US as a destabilizing force in the world and would face less resistance to embedding its own initiatives into the international system.55 And although Beijing faces pushback from Europe and the “non-American West” too, it may also have chances to exploit new divisions between the US and its partners.56 However, if Beijing responds to increased international opposition by doubling down on coercion and rule-breaking, it may jeopardize its standing with like-minded countries while further undermining the chances of an “orderly multipolar world.” “With huge subsidies, China currently produces more than it sells due to weak domestic demand, leading to an oversupply of subsidized Chinese goods, such as electric cars and steel, resulting in unfair trade.”48 Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, press conference, May 6, 2024 68 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 69. Key Points China’s advocacy for a multipolar order is well received in the so-called Global South but is ultimately a rhetorical cover for amassing power to compete strategically with the US. Its support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and other military and economic power plays expose these contradictions. China lacks reliable allies but is increasingly cooperating with other revisionist actors. It is rallying countries around its promise to reform the global order, for instance in the BRICS group. China’s continuously growing capabilities for military power projection in the Indo-Pacific rival and, in some ways, exceed those of the US. The US and Indo-Pacific actors have responded by rearming and strengthening defense ties. China is set on insulating and weaponizing its economic strength, but structural obstacles and pushback from abroad may slow down its economic rise. China must brace for stiffer confrontation with the new US administration but may also benefit from its retrenchment from international commitments. 1 2 3 4 5 Human rights 69 CHINA
- 70. MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 70
- 71. What challenges does the EU’s liberal vision for the international order face? How and why are the EU’s security, economic, and democratic models in crisis? And what will be the likely impact of the new US administration on the EU? Over the past decade, the contestation of the liberal international order has increased, challenging the EU’s vision for the world. Today, these pressures are coming to a head, culminating in a triple crisis for the EU: Russia’s war against Ukraine has destroyed Europe’s cooperative security architecture; the increasing weaponization of economic interdependencies is threatening the EU’s economic model; and the European model of liberal democracy faces unprecedented internal and external contestation. Donald Trump’s re-election could intensify these crises and revive the debate about whether the EU needs to become, in the words of the French President Emmanuel Macron, a “third pole” with greater autonomy.1 Into the Headwinds: A Liberal Power in a Post-Liberal World The EU embodies the post–Cold War zeitgeist of the liberal international order.2 Though not always consistently, it has sought to promote liberal values abroad.3 The EU’s large single market and its regulatory propensity have allowed it to externalize its norms to shape global rules – the so-called “Brussels Effect.”4 Through its enlargement policy, the EU has drawn candidate countries into its orbit by requiring them to adopt its vast body of laws. The EU has also been a strong supporter of the multilateral institutions that underpin the liberal international order. It has played a major role in the creation of the International Criminal Court and is a long-standing supporter of the UN, the WTO, and environmental agreements.5 Its member states and institutions together are the largest financial contributor to the UN system, with a total share of around 33 percent, and the leading donor of official development assistance, accounting for 42 percent.6 The EU has thus been a central driver and beneficiary of the transformation of the pre-1990 order into the post–Cold War order of “postnational liberalism,”7 in which international institutions and rules curtail national sovereignty in pursuit of liberal values. Nicole Koenig and Leonard Schütte A Perfect Polar Storm 4 71 THE EUROPEAN UNION
- 72. However, the EU’s vision for the international order has been facing headwinds for some time. Recent power shifts have emboldened revisionist countries, such as Russia and China, which are seeking greater benefits from and influence over the order.8 Meanwhile, the US has become increasingly dissatisfied with the order it once helped build, as its influence has been waning.9 This discontent with the liberal order has translated into increasing international gridlock, with many international institutions unable to address pressing global challenges. Moreover, the rise of nationalist populism in many Western societies has created a backlash against economic and cultural globalization, fueling protectionism across the globe that challenges the EU’s free trade model.10 At the same time, the EU’s capacity to address these challenges has been shrinking, exacerbated by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, with its power resources in relative decline (Figure 4.1). More recently, these headwinds have become a perfect storm for the EU, putting three key elements of its liberal vision in jeopardy. Eye of the Storm: Shattered Security Architecture Russia’s war against Ukraine has destroyed Europe’s cooperative security architecture, testing “the norm against territorial conquest […] in the most threatening and vivid way since the end of World War II.”11 Europeans have responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by delivering weapons and significantly increasing defense spending. The number of European states that are both in the EU and NATO and meet NATO’s two-percent target for defense spending has risen from four in 2021 to an estimated 16 in 2024.12 Yet these increases remain insufficient, given Ukraine’s needs and warnings that Russia could expand its war effort into NATO territory within five to The EU’s share of key indicators, 2005–2023, percent of global total Figure 4.1 Data: Eurostat; SIPRI; IMF; UN. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Defense spending GDP Population Exports (goods) 2023 2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 15 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 30 35 0 15 5 10 20 25 Brexit 72 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 73. eight years.13 Putin’s regime is already issuing nuclear threats and launching aggressive hybrid attacks on European countries, including election interference, as recently seen in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania. A Russian victory over Ukraine would embolden Moscow to intensify these attacks and pursue its imperial ambitions across the post-Soviet space. Compounding the crisis, the new US administration has signaled a potential reduction in security assistance to the continent, forcing Europe to assume a greater share of the burden of deterring Russia and supporting Ukraine. During the presidential campaign, Trump repeatedly suggested reducing aid to Ukraine and claimed he could end the war within 24 hours, raising concerns that Kyiv might be pressured into negotiating from a position of weakness.15 In January, however, he said that he hoped the war would be over “long before six months.”16 Furthermore, he has made continued US membership in NATO contingent on European nations paying their “fair share,” going as far as to demand they spend five percent of GDP on defense.17 EU member states thus face a triple challenge. First, they have to raise defense spending amid fiscal constraints and increasing domestic backlash. Second, they must overcome the perennial fragmentation of their defense industrial base and significantly deepen cooperation both among themselves and with non-EU European Allies, notably Norway and the UK.18 Third, they should concretize the promised “ironclad security guarantees” for Ukraine established in the recent joint declaration by multiple European foreign ministers,19 either by charting a realistic path toward NATO membership or through robust bilateral arrangements. Economic Thunder: Securitized Interdependence The global geoeconomic turn threatens to undermine the EU’s traditional economic model. The EU has been the exemplar of the post–Cold War era of hyperglobalization. As one of the world’s most open economies and the actor with the largest number of trade agreements, the EU has long promoted the WTO (Figure 4.2). In December 2024, after 25 years of negotiations, the EU signed a deal with the South American Mercosur bloc, potentially establishing the world’s largest trade zone, which would be an important step in the EU’s quest to diversify its trade relations. Yet final ratification is still pending and some key member states remain opposed to the deal. Overall, the EU’s role as a champion of free trade and benign economic interdependence is increasingly out of step with the growing securitization of economic relations. The pandemic, rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China, Beijing’s increasing economic coercion, and Russia’s war on Ukraine have led key international actors to prioritize national security over considerations of economic efficiency.21 As a result, the WTO is paralyzed and the specter of a “A safe Ukraine means a safer Poland, Sweden, Norway, Europe, and the whole West. […] If Ukraine loses, we all lose.”14 Donald Tusk, Polish Prime Minister, Nordic-Baltic Summit, November 28, 2024 “If we don’t spend more together now to prevent war, we will pay a much, much, much higher price later to fight it.”20 Mark Rutte, NATO Secretary General, Carnegie Europe, December 12, 2024 73 CLIMATE THE EUROPEAN UNION
- 74. “policy-led geoeconomic fragmentation” of the world economy into competing blocs looms large.22 These trends are unfolding while the EU is suffering from internal economic woes and sluggish growth. Recent reports identify several causes, including an aging workforce, low productivity growth due to weaknesses in the tech sector, insufficiently integrated capital markets, and inadequate levels of investment.23 Following Trump’s electoral victory, pressures on the EU’s economic model could escalate. If implemented, Trump’s plans to impose both universal tariffs of ten percent and unilateral tariffs of 60 percent on Chinese goods could lead to trade wars with significant repercussions for European economies. As the US is the EU’s top trade partner, a trade war between them would not only cause considerable welfare losses;24 the US tariffs against China would also divert Chinese goods to the European market, thus intensifying existing tensions over Beijing’s market-distorting practices of flooding the European market with cheap, heavily subsidized exports.25 Economists therefore warn of a “second China shock” that could destroy “Europe’s core industries.”26 In a worst-case Europe Folgendes kann nicht abgebildet werden: +Singapore ist 2 Kategorien zuordnet (2 + 3) +Seychelles +Mauritius +Comoros +Samoa +Kapverden +Andorra +San Marino +Liechtenstein *Faroe Islands +Barbados +Antigus and Barbuda +Grenada +Solomon Islands +St Vincent and the Grenadines +St Lucia +Trindad and Tobago Zweite Korrekturschleife MSC eingebaut (27.11.) Trade agreement in place but update being negotiated EU Trade agreement concluded but not ratified or signed No trade agreement or negotiations paused/suspended Trade agreement in place The EU’s trade agreements around the world, 2024 Figure 4.2 Data: European Commission; Eurostat. Illustration: Munich Security Conference 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 US China UK Switzerland Turkey 16.7 14.6 10.1 6.4 4.1 Norway Japan South Korea India Russia 3.6 2.6 2.6 2.2 1.8 The EU’s top ten trading partners, 2023, percent of total EU trade (goods) Copy Edits von Katharina liegen bei der MSC 74 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 75. scenario, these trade wars could lead to the breakdown of the WTO, with welfare losses for the EU far exceeding those arising from bilateral trade disputes.27 Amid these challenges, it is imperative that the EU diversifies its trade relations and forges new partnerships with countries of the so-called Global South, though the difficulties in concluding the trade agreement with Mercosur serve as a stark reminder that the EU will, at times, have to make painful concessions.28 Illiberal Winds: Shaking Democratic Foundations The European model of liberal democracy is facing unprecedented internal contestation, exacerbated by external pressures and interference. Political extremes – especially the far right – have been gaining traction since the early 2000s, a trend underscored by the 2024 European Parliament elections.29 This trend is also taking hold in the European Council and Council, where – at the time of writing – seven governments include far-right parties (Figure 4.3). Austria, where the far-right Freedom Party was tasked with forming a government for the first time in January, could soon join this group. Fragmentation and polarization have also weakened France and Germany, the EU’s two traditional policy drivers. After a crushing defeat in the European Parliament elections, with the far-right National Rally coming in first, French President Emmanuel Macron called a snap election, that resulted in a hung parliament and a center-right minority government led by Michel Barnier. This government was ousted just three months later by a no-confidence vote, leaving complex budget negotiations to the next minority government under Seat distribution in the European Parliament and European Council, 2004–2024, percent Figure 4.3 Data: European Parliament; various sources. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Liberals Christian Democrats/center right Greens Far right–extreme right Left–far left Others Socialists/center left European Council 0 40 20 60 100 80 European Parliament 2004 2009 2014 2019 2024 2004 2009 2014 2019 2024 Liberals Christian Democrats/center right Socialists/center left “For a very long time, we took [democracy] for granted […]. But today our democracies are under threat.”32 Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President, European Parliament Plenary, July 18, 2024 75 THE EUROPEAN UNION
- 76. François Bayrou. Meanwhile, Germany’s coalition government collapsed in November after months of infighting over the budget, triggering a snap election in February 2025, ahead of which the far right is rising in the polls and a new far-left party could enter the Bundestag.30 Polarization is also contributing to trends of democratic backsliding and rule of law violations in several EU member states, challenging the EU’s credibility as a promoter of democracy and universal values abroad.31 Divisions between and within member states are further complicating joint decision-making, often resulting in lowest-common-denominator compromises. Unlike trade policy, where qualified majority voting applies, foreign and security policy decisions require unanimity. Hungary’s months-long blockade of funds to partially reimburse weapon deliveries to Ukraine is a case in point.33 Looking ahead, these divisions could stifle ambitions to create major new funding instruments aimed at arresting the EU’s economic and military decline. Compounding the challenge, the new US administration could exacerbate internal divisions. Analysts anticipate that the second Trump presidency will embolden illiberal and populist movements in Europe, normalizing and amplifying their rhetoric and policy positions.34 President Trump’s preference for bilateral and transactional diplomacy could also prevent a unified stance toward the US, as European states vie for preferential reations.35 Europe’s Choice: Brace or Be Blown Away Europe is facing the most challenging geopolitical situation since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s raging war threatens to destroy both Ukraine and the European security order, while geoeconomic tensions and structural economic weaknesses are jeopardizing Europe’s prosperity. Meanwhile, internal polarization is undermining the EU’s credibility and capacity to act. These pressures are set to intensify with the new US administration, which may reduce its security commitment to Europe, launch trade wars, and embolden populist movements that deepen Europe’s internal divisions. The EU and its member states have responded by increasing defense spending and devising economic security strategies. Yet this will not suffice to protect the pillars of the liberal order, especially as the US grows increasingly unwilling to shoulder an unequal burden.36 The extent to which the Trump administration follows through on its announcements will determine whether the EU must recalibrate its relationship with the US or go as far as to emancipate itself from Washington to become a more autonomous pole. Either way, to arrest its decline and reclaim influence, the EU must reinvent itself. This is a herculean task, but if the EU is really made in crisis, this is the time to prove it. “Our Europe is mortal […]. It can die, and it all depends on our choices. These choices have to be made now.”57 Emmanuel Macron, French President, Sorbonne University, April 25, 2024 76 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 77. Key Points The EU’s liberal vision for the international order has been facing headwinds for some time, and these winds have now turned into a perfect storm. Russia’s war against Ukraine has destroyed the cooperative security architecture in Europe and undermined the global norm against territorial conquest. The increasing securitization of economic interdependencies around the world is undermining the EU’s free trade agenda and risks aggravating Europe’s structural economic weaknesses. Rising illiberalism and growing polarization are undermining the EU’s capacity to act and credibility as a promoter of liberal values abroad. The new US administration could dramatically intensify these crises by reducing its security commitment to Europe, launching trade wars, and deepening internal divisions. 1 2 3 4 5 77 THE EUROPEAN UNION
- 78. 78 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 79. What is Russia’s vision for the international order, and does it possess the capabilities to realize it? How long can Russia still incur the staggering costs of its war against Ukraine and other geopolitical endeavors? And how do recent political developments abroad, from the return of US President Donald Trump to the sudden fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, impact Russia? No state has upended the international order more in this century than Russia. It has structurally destabilized its neighborhood and violated its neighbors’ sovereignty.1 With its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it escalated these efforts and unleashed Europe’s deadliest war since 1945.2 According to Russian President Vladimir Putin, this war is not merely about Ukraine, but also about “the principles on which the new international order will be based.”3 Although Putin claims his envisioned order is one of “sovereign equality,” Russia’s imperial behavior suggest the opposite would be true, at least for smaller states.4 Furthermore, there are legitimate doubts regarding Russia’s ability to establish its desired order. Russia’s Vision: All Civilizations Are Equal, but Some States Are More Civilizational Than Others Russia rejects the US-led unipolar order that emerged after the Cold War, claiming that the US and its allies abuse their dominant position in it.5 It argues that this order is in decline and proposes multipolarity as a fairer alternative.6 Russia seeks to lay the groundwork for this through the BRICS grouping, whose 2024 Kazan summit it chaired and which recently welcomed Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates as new members.7 Russia also uses this format to court states in the so-called Global South, promising them greater international influence and capitalizing on their dissatisfaction with the current order.8 Jintro Pauly The Czar’s Gambit 5 79 RUSSIA
- 80. “Together with our partners in Eurasian integration and other sovereign development centers, we will continue to build a multipolar world and an equal and indivisible security system.”9 Vladimir Putin, Russian President, presidential inauguration ceremony, May 7, 2024 “The more powerful a state is, the further its strategic fronts extend beyond its state borders and the larger is the strategic space on which such a country exerts economic, political, socio-cultural influence. This is the zone of national interests of the state.”19 Dmitri Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, World Youth Festival, March 4, 2024 As reasonable as Russia’s vision of equal and inclusive multipolarity may sound, the devil is in the details. Russia advocates for a multipolar order in which not states but “civilizations,”10 groups of states with supposedly close historical and cultural ties, are sovereign and equal.11 Only powerful “civilizational states” are entitled to sovereignty and leadership roles within their civilizations.12 Smaller states have no full sovereignty: They fall within a civilizational state’s sphere of influence.13 Russia self-identifies as a civilizational state and demands a dominant role in the world order:14 Its 2023 Foreign Policy Concept proclaims Russia’s “special position as a unique country-civilization” and its “historically unique mission aimed at maintaining global balance of power.”15 This helps to explain its war of aggression against Ukraine. Since Russia regards Ukraine as part of a Russian-led civilization, it considers notions of equality and state-sovereignty inapplicable to Ukraine. Therefore, it deems its brutal invasion to be legitimate. Crucially, Russia’s claimed sphere of influence goes beyond Ukraine: It encompasses the entire former Soviet Union.16 Given Russia’s December 2021 proposal that NATO essentially withdraw from Eastern and Central Europe, it may even extend further.17 Russia’s envisioned world order, therefore, looks more like a new imperialist Concert of Europe than an inclusive multipolar order.18 Russia’s Capabilities: A Mediocre Hand Played Well Russia’s capabilities do not always match its self-proclaimed world- leading status.20 Russia falls outside the global top ten of the largest economies, ranking behind Italy, Canada, and Brazil.21 Its declining population of 145.4 million is smaller than those of Pakistan, Nigeria, or Bangladesh.22 Its military spending is more impressive, however: at 428 billion US dollars (adjusted for purchasing power parity), it ranks third behind the US and China (Figure 2.2). Nevertheless, NATO’s estimated collective defense spending of 1.390 trillion US dollars (PPP) dwarfs this number (Figure 2.2). Only Russia’s nuclear arsenal – the world’s largest by number of warheads – is truly world leading.23 Yet Russia has played its mediocre hand well. After its botched 2022 offensive in Ukraine,24 it has turned the tide and steadily won terrain in 2024.25 It has ramped up its defense industry, annually delivering 1,500 tanks and 3,000 armored fighting vehicles to the Russian military.26 This compares to 660 tanks and 3,103 armored fighting vehicles delivered to Ukraine by partners since 2022.27 Using deception, coercion, and exorbitant financial incentives, it has recruited Russians and foreigners to replenish its high losses in Ukraine.28 Last November, Russia furthermore convinced North 80 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 81. Korea’s regime to contribute at least 11,000 soldiers to its war effort.29 Meanwhile, through sanction evasion and smart monetary policies, Russia has so far kept its economy afloat.30 Finally, by investing in formats such as BRICS and diverting trade to new partners like China,31 Russia has prevented diplomatic and economic isolation.32 Indeed, many people in other BRICS states still view Russia favorably despite the war (Figure 5.1). Notwithstanding its limited capabilities in many areas, Russia is still widely perceived as a great power in the countries surveyed for the Munich Security Index (Figure 1.3). Once again, Russia lives up to its reputation as a geopolitical “honey badger,” posing a serious challenge to stronger rivals.33 In addition to its conventional war in Ukraine, it is menacing Europe through large-scale disinformation campaigns, election interference, sabotage attacks, assassination attempts, and nuclear saber-rattling.34 Through its “Africa Corps,” a reincarnation of the Wagner Group, Russia has expanded its geopolitical influence in various African states, often sidelining the US and European states.35 By employing a wide range of methods across various theaters, Russia puts constant pressure on its geopolitical adversaries. Copy Edits / Kommentare MSC eingebaut (09.01.) Figure 5.1 India South Africa Brazil Italy US Canada China UK Germany Japan France Perceptions of Russia, 2021–2024, share of respondents saying Russia is an ally minus share saying Russia is a threat Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference More of an ally More of a threat 0 30 10 20 40 -20 -40 -30 -50 -70 -60 -10 50 60 May 2021 May 2022 Nov 2022 Nov 2023 Nov 2024 Nov 2021 Import barriers imposed 81 RUSSIA
- 82. For Russia, this strategy may yet pay off. The incoming administration in the US, a country that has been a key partner to Ukraine, has signaled it wants a swift, negotiated end to Russia’s war against Ukraine.36 If Ukraine’s partners pursue an end to the war at all costs, Russia may use this to obtain a favorable ceasefire agreement. For example, it could exploit this eagerness for peace to solidify its control over all occupied territories while preventing Ukraine from receiving NATO membership or other credible security guarantees. This would allow Russia to plan a new military effort to force all of Ukraine back into its claimed sphere of influence.37 The new US administration’s exact plan to end the war is not yet clear, however.38 If it takes a tougher line on Russia than expected, the latter’s future may look bleak. Russia’s Future: A Bearish Outlook Cracks have recently started appearing in Russia’s geopolitical posture, raising doubts about its durability. Russia’s casualties in Ukraine are mounting: Independent sources estimate 120,000 Russian soldiers had died in Ukraine by June 2024.40 Recently, UK Defense Minister John Healey claimed a monthly record of 41,980 Russian dead and wounded in October 2024.41 To compensate these enormous losses, Russia has to offer new recruits astronomical payments, amounting to more than ten times the average income in some regions.42 It is also recruiting increasingly older, less combat-effective men: In October, the average age of recruits in Moscow was almost 50.43 Russia faces similar challenges in replacing lost equipment. 80 percent of its “production” of tanks and armored vehicles consists of refurbished “The rise in prices for the vast majority of goods and services shows that demand is outrunning the expansion of economic capacity and the economy’s potential.”39 Elvira Nabiullina, Russian Central Bank Governor, State Duma’s plenary session, November 19, 2024 Figure 5.2 Estimated new production Estimated refurbishment from storage Visually-confirmed losses Russia’s main battle tank production, refurbishment, and losses, December 2023 – November 2024, average number per month Data: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Julian Cooper; IISS; Oryx; RUSI. Illustration: Munich Security Conference 120 130 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Figure x.x Visually-confirmed losses Russia's main battle tank production, refurbishment, and losses, December 2023 – November 2024, average number per month 100 89 25 82 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 83. stockpiled equipment (Figure 5.2).44 A comparable situation exists for artillery systems and munitions.45 Options to expand production are limited: Russians killed in Ukraine or fleeing their country since 2022 have caused a labor shortage.46 Hence, the output of Russia’s defense industry will drop significantly when key stockpiles run out. When that will happen is difficult to predict, as estimates vary as to the quantity and quality of the remaining equipment.47 Russia also faces economic uncertainty. Its 2024 GDP growth of 3.8 percent and unemployment rate of 2.4 percent seem impressive, but other indicators are less positive.48 The ruble has weakened significantly, trading at 104 against the US dollar in December 2024, compared to 53 in June 2022.49 Enormous military spending – almost 30 percent of government expenditure – has pushed annual inflation to 8.4 percent.50 The Central Bank’s staggering base rate of 21 percent has not quelled this trend, yet it risks causing stagflation and mass bankruptcies.51 Russia’s revenue from energy exports has also declined, with its daily average revenue dropping to 611 million euros in November 2024 from the April 2022 peak value of over 1.1 billion euros.52 Nevertheless, energy exports remain a key source of income, meaning a drop in oil prices could spell serious trouble for Russia’s economy.53 While increased trade with China partly offsets Russia’s economic challenges, this too comes at the price of dependency. Chinese-Russian trade is not only much more important to Russia than to China, but that disparity has grown significantly (Figure 5.3). Figure 5.3 Russian exports to China Chinese imports from Russia Chinese exports to Russia Russian imports from China 2020 2022 2021 2023 2019 0 30 10 20 40 Trade in goods between China and Russia, 2019–2023, percent of total import/export value Data: IMF. Illustration: Munich Security Conference 83 RUSSIA
- 84. The spiraling costs of the war against Ukraine have also limited Russia’s ability to project power beyond Ukraine, in a sign of increasing imperial overstretch.54 In 2023, Russia failed to help Armenia, its Collective Security Treaty Organization ally, when Azeri forces overran Nagorno-Karabakh, prompting Armenia to suspend its participation in the military alliance.55 To make matters worse, Russian air defense units accidentally shot down an Azeri civilian aircraft in December 2024, killing 38 people on board and straining relations with Azerbaijan.56 And Russia’s influence may wane in yet another Caucasus state as Georgia’s pro-Russian government is struggling to quell a popular uprising triggered by its decision to suspend EU accession talks and irregularities in the 2024 elections.57 Also in 2024, Russia was unable to prevent the sudden collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, which undid years of Russian military efforts to prop up its ally. Russia now risks losing its air and naval bases in Syria, which are vital for its operations in the Middle East and Africa.58 Finally, Russia’s tech sector has suffered from repercussions of the war against Ukraine, marginalizing the country’s role in the global digital economy and geopolitical tech race. Foreign investment in Russian tech companies has dwindled.59 The labor shortage has disproportionally affected tech companies, as mostly young, highly educated Russians have fled abroad since 2022.60 In 2023, the international parent company of Russian tech giant Yandex divested from its Russian assets. This caused a split of the company in which it lost its AI-research department to an Amsterdam-based successor company.61 Russia: A Potemkin Power Despite the self-confidence with which Russia proclaims its special position in the world order, a discrepancy between its self-image and its actual power base remains. Nonetheless, it has established itself as a global actor that challenges superior geopolitical rivals. Through a clever instrumentalization of its limited capabilities and a ruthless indifference toward the hardship it inflicts on the citizens of other states as well as its own, the Russian regime is able to play an outsized role in global affairs. It is becoming increasingly difficult for Russia to maintain this posture, however, as the costs of its geopolitical undertakings – especially its war against Ukraine – rise ever higher. Faced with economic uncertainty, imperial overstretch, and a highly attritional war, it is uncertain if Russia can continue its imperialist endeavors. This will in part depend on the international community, which has to decide whether it will give Russia space to do so or instead pressure it into respecting the rules-based international order. “We need to be aware that today’s generation of old rulers will leave us in ruins. The understanding that Russia’s resources are limitless, that Russia can be at war for ever, that Russia is a country where people’s patience is limitless, is a propagandist image by and large.”62 Ekaterina Schulmann, Non-Resident Scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, Munich Security Conference, February 17, 2024 84 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 85. Key Points Russia frames the multipolar world order as a fairer, more inclusive alternative to the US-led unipolar order. It actively uses this narrative to win over states in the so-called Global South for its cause. Russia’s envisioned multipolar order, however, does not consider states as equals. Instead, this order would be made up of a few “sovereign and equal civilizational states” and their respective spheres of influence. Despite its limited capabilities, Russia successfully challenges stronger rivals in its effort to establish its desired world order and assert its claimed sphere of influence. For how long Russia can continue to play this outsized geopolitical role is unclear, as it faces increasing economic problems and imperial overstretch. Much may depend on how much pressure the international community is willing to put on Russia in the near future. 1 3 4 2 85 RUSSIA
- 86. MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 86
- 87. What is at the core of Indian leaders’ criticism of the international order? What role does multi-alignment play in New Delhi’s pursuit of a global leadership role? And which domestic factors pose a risk to India’s global ambitions? Modi-fied Status 6 Sophie Eisentraut “When India articulates a stance on a global platform, the world pays attention.”1 With these words, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi addressed the Indian diaspora in New York in September 2024.2 Indians share this view of their country’s growing global clout.3 Among the countries surveyed for the Munich Security Index 2025, Indians are the second-most confident when it comes to their country’s power trajectory (Figure 6.1). And New Delhi can back up this widespread optimism with many accomplishments. As one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, it has recently overtaken the UK, its former colonial power, as the world’s fifth-largest economy in nominal GDP; it is projected to rank third by 2027. The country’s huge technological potential was evidenced by a successful lunar mission in 2023, which made India the first country to land near the moon’s south pole. And India’s large population – it is now the world’s most populous country – is a source of tremendous human capital. Moreover, New Delhi is well aware that Western states have developed “stakes” in a powerful India.4 They see the world’s largest democracy as a counterweight to China in the geopolitically significant Indo-Pacific region and as a bridge to countries in the so-called Global South.5 Gaining Weight: India’s Status Quest As a result, Western states are now paying much closer attention to Indian leaders’ criticism of the existing international order. In contrast to Beijing and Moscow, New Delhi is not “trying to assail the international system as it is currently constructed.”6 69 percent of Indians surveyed for the Munich Security Index in July 2024 agreed that existing international rules represent the values and needs of their country.7 Rather than being geared at international rules and principles, New Delhi’s criticism is geared at Western dominance of the international order and the way it has constrained the ambitions of India and other countries in the Global South. Outdated structures of global governance, 87 INDIA
- 88. which do not reflect the current distribution of power in the world, are a particular point of contention. In this vein, the country’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has described the UN, where India pursues a permanent veto-wielding Security Council seat, as “a frozen 1945-invented mechanism.”8 India’s frustration with the existing order is thus inseparably linked to what Modi, after his first re-election in 2019, described as the quest “to regain the rightful position of India in the world order.”9 This status quest is also a key reason why Indian leaders are embracing the notion of multipolarity. For New Delhi, multipolarity is “the natural state of the world,” to which the world is now returning after a period of Western dominance.10 On the global stage, Indian representatives have adopted a style that proudly conveys India’s claim to a place among the world’s leading powers.11 This has been evident in the summits New Delhi has recently hosted, among them the 2023 G20 Summit, as well as three Voice of Global South summits in 2023 and 2024. For Indians, these summits have been evidence of their country’s growing convening power. Indian leaders have also used them to portray their country as “a power that seeks to unite in a divided world.”12 They have positioned India as an actor that amplifies the voice of developing countries in international India Respondents’ views on their country’s power trajectory, November 2024, scale from 1 (not powerful at all) to 10 (extremely powerful) Figure 6.1 Data: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Erneutes Feedback MSC eingebaut (19.12.) Copy Editing erledigt Country’s power in 10 years Country’s power today 4.5 5.0 4.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.5 8.5 7.0 8.0 +0.5 China -0.3 US -0.2 Germany +0.3 Canada +0.8 South Africa -0.1 France -0.1 UK 0 Italy +0.6 Brazil -0.1 Japan +0.7 India 8,2 7,5 88 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 89. forums and acts as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South.13 In this regard, the inclusion of the African Union in the G20, which was achieved under India’s G20 presidency, is seen as a particular success. But India’s foreign policy has not only become more self-confident; some argue it has also become more assertive.15 As suggested by reporting in The Washington Post about an alleged Indian assassination program in Pakistan, this includes a greater willingness to take on India’s enemies abroad.16 Accusations that Indian agents were involved in the assassination of a Sikh Canadian national in British Columbia in 2023 add to this impression.17 Weighing One’s Options: India’s Multi-Alignment For India to raise its status on the global stage, Jaishankar argued in his 2020 book, the country needs “to extract as much [sic] gains from as many ties as possible.”18 Multi-alignment is hardly a new approach for India. It breathes the desire for strategic autonomy that already informed New Delhi’s Cold War non-alignment policy.19 Yet India now pursues it with much more vigor, as is apparent in the way the country has sought closer cooperation with Western democracies while also keeping close ties with these countries’ competitors and rivals. With Washington, New Delhi has developed a close strategic partnership, especially on technology and defense.20 In May 2022, both countries launched the US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies. With the EU and individual European countries, India has intensified cooperation on connectivity and supply chain resilience, as evidenced in the planned India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and the already operational EU-India Trade and Technology Council. At the same time, and despite deteriorating relations between Russia and the West, Indian leaders have continued to forge bonds with Moscow.21 After his 2024 re-election, Modi’s first state visit led him to Russia. The prime minister’s “bear hug”22 with Putin, which roughly coincided with Russian missiles striking a children’s hospital in Kyiv, drew criticism from Kyiv and some Western capitals. Western governments are also disappointed at the fact that, since 2021, Indian purchases of discounted Russian oil products have grown nearly 20-fold and have thus helped fund Moscow’s war effort.23 Precisely because of its good relations with both the West and Russia, some have urged India to serve as a mediator in Russia’s war against Ukraine.24 Indian leaders, including Modi during his visit to Ukraine in August 2024, have indeed acted as messengers between Kyiv and Moscow. Yet observers are doubtful that New Delhi is capable and willing to assume a more proactive “We are the voice of the Global South!”14 Narendra Modi, Indian Prime Minister, Economic Times World Leaders Forum, August 31, 2024 89 INDIA
- 90. peacemaker role.25 Continued “strategic opportunism”26 by India vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine is deemed more likely. Strategic opportunism is also evident in the way India has increased cooperation with Western formats like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), while also being an active member of major non-Western platforms, among them the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. When asked about BRICS at the Munich Security Conference 2024, Jaishankar suggested that in contrast to other members of the grouping, India perceived itself as a non-Western rather than an anti-Western state.27 While New Delhi may thus help prevent BRICS from being “weaponized”28 against the West, as some suggest, the grouping also serves Indian interests. Above all, it helps India raise its profile and provides it with leverage in its push for a less Western-centric order, particularly in the realms of finance and trade.29 Regional Weight Loss: The China Challenge For New Delhi, multi-alignment with both the West and Russia is also a sensible approach vis-à-vis China, which India believes poses a serious threat to its national security and global aspirations.31 China is the strategic glue for New Delhi’s partnership with Washington, which shares India’s apprehensions, and for cooperation within the Quad, which is aimed at counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific region. But Beijing is also the reason why New Delhi does not want to alienate Russia. While India has significantly increased its arms trade with Western suppliers and boosted investments in its arms production at home, between 2019 and 2023, Russia was still India’s largest weapons supplier (Figure 6.2).32 Moreover, New Delhi fears that a more internationally isolated Russia would slip “deeper into the Chinese embrace,”33 undermining Moscow’s role as a necessary counterweight against Beijing. To India, China poses a “direct territorial challenge.”34 Although New Delhi and Beijing reached an agreement last October to disengage troops in two remaining friction points in Eastern Ladakh, a region that saw deadly clashes between Indian and Chinese soldiers in 2020, a comprehensive solution to their border dispute is yet to be found.35 At the same time, Beijing has been expanding its strategic footprint in what Indian leaders see as an attempt to “encircle India both economically and strategically.”36 In the Indian Ocean, China has been building port facilities that India worries might be used for naval purposes.37 Meanwhile, Beijing’s trade with several South Asian nations is already dwarfing India’s own trade with neighboring countries.38 With the exception of Bhutan, all of India’s neighbors are now participants in China’s infrastructure and investment project, the Belt and Road Initiative.39 Even “Do we have multiple options? The answer is yes. Is that a problem? Why should it be a problem? If I’m smart enough to have multiple options you should be admiring me, you shouldn’t be criticizing me.”30 Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Indian External Affairs Minister, Munich Security Conference, February 17, 2024 90 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 91. India itself has become more economically dependent on China, which became its biggest trading partner in 2023 and whose investments and technology India needs for its growth.40 While India is “globally rising,” some have thus argued that it is “regionally declining.”41 Heavy Weight: Domestic Risks But China is not the only challenge to India’s ability to pull its weight. On the domestic side, observers point to the structural weaknesses of India’s economy and the risks posed by a decline in political and cultural pluralism.42 After all, India faces tremendous challenges converting its impressive economic growth into good jobs for its people. At purchasing power parity, India ranks third globally in terms of total GDP.43 In GDP per capita, however, it ranks 150th in the world – below the other BRICS countries (Figure 6.3).44 Youth unemployment is at 18 percent, while the labor force participation rate for women is at just 28 percent.45 Poverty reduction remains a serious challenge, as shown by the 2024 Global Hunger Index, which attests that India faces a “serious” level of hunger, ranking it 105th out of 127 countries examined.46 Meanwhile, the recent wedding of an Indian media mogul, estimated to have cost 600 million US dollars, has drawn attention to the fact that India remains a highly unequal country, where the richest one percent hold 40 percent of India’s wealth.47 To some observers, this was an important reason why Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lost its parliamentary majority in the 2024 elections: many people felt “the economy is not delivering for ordinary people.”48 Moreover, although New Delhi seems optimistic about India India’s top three arms suppliers per five-year period, 2009–2023, share of total imports Figure 6.2 Data: SIPRI. Illustration: Munich Security Conference France US Russia Rest Israel Erneutes Feedback MSC eingebaut (19.12.) 3rd India’s top three arms suppliers per five-year period, 2009–2023, share of total imports Figure x.x Data: SIPRI. Illustration: Munich Security Conference 80 100 0 30 10 20 40 60 70 90 50 France US Russia Rest Israel 2009–13 2014–18 2019–23 1st 2nd 80 100 0 20 40 60 2016– 20 2nd 3rd 1st 2009– 13 2010– 14 2011– 15 2012– 16 2013– 17 2014– 18 2015– 19 2017– 21 2018– 22 2019– 23 Copy Editing erledigt 91 INDIA
- 92. Donald Trump returning to the White House – Modi was one of the first global leaders to emphatically congratulate him on his re-election – a Trump administration may well bring economic troubles for India should it decide to levy taxes on Indian exports.49 What Modi and his BJP sell as the basis of India’s growing global clout, namely their “project of nation-building” based on a Hindu nationalist ideology, also involves significant risks.50 The project seeks to infuse the country’s large Hindu majority – around 80 percent of its population – with greater pride in their culture and religion.51 The use of “Bharat,” the name for India in Hindu, is part of this endeavor. To many observers, so is “stirring up resentment of the country’s 200 million Muslims,” which make up around 14 percent of India’s population.52 Although there is much support for a Hindu majoritarian agenda in India – in a Pew Research Center survey, 64 percent of Indians said that being Hindu is very important to being truly Indian53 – this agenda is clearly divisive.54 It also has a “track record of prompting violence and unrest.”55 Observers have thus pointed to the risks of growing Hindu nationalism for Modi’s vision for a more powerful India, which come in the form of domestic social and political instability.56 India’s impressive rise is thus not devoid of contradictions. But none of them can mask the fact that New Delhi is making strides toward achieving the recognition it believes it deserves. India Erneutes Feedback MSC eingebaut (19.12.) India’s GDP and GDP per capita compared to G7 and BRICS countries, 2024 Figure 6.3 Data: IMF. Illustration: Munich Security Conference GDP (PPP; billion) GDP per capita (PPP) China US India Germany UK Russia Brazil Italy Japan France Canada South Africa US Germany France Italy China Canada Japan Brazil UK Russia South Africa India 0 20,000 40,000 0 40,000 80,000 Copy Editing erledigt 92 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 93. Key Points Indian leaders’ criticism of the existing international order and their embrace of the notion of multipolarity is inseparably linked to India’s quest for a place among the world’s leading powers. New Delhi has been making strides when it comes to raising India’s international profile. Among other achievements, India can point to fast economic growth and a successful lunar mission. Indian leaders have also positioned New Delhi as an actor that amplifies the voice of developing countries in international forums and acts as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South. For India, multi-alignment is the most promising approach to elevating the country’s position on the global stage and dealing with the challenges posed by China. In this vein, New Delhi has both sought closer cooperation with Western democracies while also keeping close ties with these countries’ competitors and rivals, Russia most of all. As India rises globally, its influence in its neighborhood has been challenged by China’s growing strategic footprint in both the Indian Ocean and among South Asian nations. Moreover, domestic challenges to India’s global aspirations are found in the structural weaknesses of India’s economy and the risks posed by a decline in political and cultural pluralism. 1 2 3 4 93 INDIA
- 94. MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 94
- 95. How is Japan affected by current geopolitical upheavals? As a major beneficiary and staunch supporter of the liberal international order, what is Japan’s approach to preserving it? What diplomatic, military, and economic resources can Tokyo bring to bear, and what obstacles does it face? A New Normal 7 Randolf Carr “The existing order is being seriously challenged. […] Changes in power balances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, are occurring,” reads the 2024 edition of Japan’s annual defense white paper. As a result, “Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II.”1 Deeply invested in liberal internationalism and US primacy, Japan is especially perturbed by the end of the unipolar moment, the rise of China, and the prospect of a new multipolar order. However, Tokyo has also been preparing for that eventuality longer than most, with a multifaceted regional strategy to fortify a liberal rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, a raft of recent measures indicates Japan’s willingness to shoulder more responsibility for defending itself and the order it so highly values. However, mutually reinforcing domestic and international obstacles spell trouble for Tokyo’s well-intentioned initiatives. Liberal Order in Crisis: The Biggest Loser? In Japan, both policy-makers and the public view the global redistribution of power away from the US towards China and the so-called Global South with trepidation. Having strategically adapted to and worked within changing rules of the global landscape over the decades,2 Japan is a quintessential status quo power. It is a big winner and chief supporter of US leadership in the liberal international order, which enabled Japan to globalize and prosper economically. The long unassailable US security umbrella over the Pacific allowed it to do so while eschewing some tools of “normal” middle-to-great- power politics, most notably significant defense budgets.3 To Japanese policy-makers, the “multipolarization” now touted as inevitable by some national leaders is associated with danger.5 In the Munich Security Index survey, 54 percent of Japanese respondents report feeling “concern” about 95 JAPAN
- 96. the prospect of a multipolar world, the most of any country by a large margin (Figure 7.1). The crisis of international norms and institutions, rising political and economic illiberalism, a more dominant China, and, under President Donald Trump, more volatile great-power competition and a likely more erratic US role in Asia – all of these threaten the foundations of Japanese security and prosperity. Moreover, Japan’s three nuclear-armed neighbors – China, Russia, and North Korea – are growing more belligerent. North Korean missile tests reached record levels in the last three years, with many landing in the waters around Japan.6 In 2024, China and Russia stepped up military maneuvers around Japan, including violations of its seas and airspace.7 Most of all, Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine shook Tokyo’s strategic thinking.8 Japan vociferously condemns Moscow’s breach of the UN Charter and participates in sanctions on Russia. At nearly ten billion euros, it is Ukraine’s third-largest source of financial and humanitarian aid.9 Japanese leaders Figure 7.1 Respondents’ hopes and concerns associated with multipolarity, July/November 2024, percent The data for Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey is from July 2024. The data for the G7 and “BICS” countries is from November 2024. Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference Hope Neither Don’t know Concern Some say the world is moving towards multipolarity, where not only the US and China, but many other countries are influential players. If you think about a multipolar order, what is your dominant feeling? All Saudi Arabia China Pakistan South Africa Mexico UK India Italy Germany US Indonesia Canada Nigeria Turkey France Brazil Japan 44 14 48 17 14 8 33 3 59 13 9 58 7 6 56 10 5 51 16 5 56 9 7 39 23 10 34 25 12 41 18 4 54 10 15 36 16 4 52 6 13 40 15 8 28 23 7 40 10 10 18 19 8 21 24 27 28 29 30 31 28 33 33 34 31 40 41 43 54 38 43 9 “The geopolitical crisis surrounding our country has risen to the point where war could break out at any moment.”4 Ishiba Shigeru, Japanese Prime Minister, Hudson Institute, September 25, 2024 96 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 97. insistently warn that, if Beijing’s designs on Taiwan or the South China Sea are not sufficiently deterred, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”10 Thus, Japan might not only be the biggest strategic loser should the liberal international order break down; it is also a “frontline state” in the effort to maintain it.11 Increasingly, Tokyo is stepping up its contributions. Indo-Pacific Strategy: Be the Order You Wish to See in the World Rather than let the Indo-Pacific become China’s sphere of influence or a mere battleground of US-China competition, Japan has been doing its utmost to shape a multipolar, orderly, and rules-based region.12 Since its inception in 2016, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) has been the strategic framework for Tokyo’s efforts. These include promoting infrastructure investment, regional connectivity and integration, and capacity-building for maritime security, all while working to reinforce shared rules in those fields.13 Most notably perhaps, Tokyo catalyzed economic integration by taking a lead negotiating role in two regional free trade agreements in 2018 and 2022. The success of Japan’s engagement strategy is evident in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, several European nations, and, most importantly, India and the US all latching onto FOIP with their own strategy documents.14 Likewise, Japan has driven intensified cooperation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with the US, India, and Australia and has embraced US-Japan trilateral formats with South Korea and the Philippines, respectively.15 To advocate for East Asian security concerns, Japan has also placed great importance on the G7, as the only Asian nation in the group, and has intensified cooperation with NATO. Since the Ukraine invasion, Japanese leaders have been regular guests at NATO summits and welcomed the idea of a liaison office in Tokyo. The overall goal of Japan’s FOIP, rather than explicitly containing China, is for the region’s other powers to collectively counterbalance Beijing’s growing influence. The more capable, interlinked, and invested in norms the countries in the region are, the more resilient they should be to Chinese coercion.17 Thus, while perhaps falling short of being a regional pole in its own right, Japan acts as a crucial catalyst of regional integration. Key to its “network power” is Japan’s credibility: For ASEAN states, decades of Japanese trade and investment have yielded tangible benefits, and Japan holds “sterling credentials” as a model citizen of the liberal (trade) order.18 However, at a time when its rivals increasingly play hardball, Tokyo has also realized that diplomatic power alone is not enough. “Japan will continue to […] make a proactive contribution to realizing and maintaining international peace and security, with a view to leading the increasingly divided and confrontational international community toward cooperation.”16 Iwaya Takeshi, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, press release, January 10, 2025 97 JAPAN
- 98. Military and Economic Power: Just Act Normal? In recent years, Japan has gone from fighting with one hand tied behind its back to punching closer to its weight. Efforts to loosen Japan’s pacifist military restrictions first accelerated controversially under late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and then took an ambitious leap in December 2022. A trio of new strategy documents outlines Japan’s plans to increase defense spending from just over one percent of GDP to two percent by 2027. A substantial portion is allocated to acquiring “stand-off defense capabilities” – long-range missiles for counterstrikes into enemy territory – as a deterrent by the end of 2025 (Figure 7.2). In the fiscal year through March 2025, defense spending has climbed by 16 percent, despite economic growth of just 0.2 percent.19 Japan has also progressively relaxed its strict arms transfer limitations. Besides promoting defense exports, this has enabled Japan to engage in a number of new co-development projects in the past two years: a next-generation fighter with the UK and Italy, cruise missiles with Australia, missile interceptors with the US, and destroyers with Indonesia. While less wide-ranging reforms were highly contentious in earlier years, domestic opposition to the new defense plans is muted.20 The invasion of Ukraine has driven home the fact Figure 7.2 Japan’s increased defense spending targets as of 2024, JPY trillions In 2024, on average, one trillion Japanese yen was equivalent to 6.6 billion US dollars Data: Ministry of Defense of Japan. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Stand-off defense capabilities Integrated air and missile defense capabilities Unmanned defense capabilities Cross-domain operation capabilities (space, cyber, Self-Defense Force equipment) Command and control/intelligence-related functions Mobile deployment capabilities/civil protection Munitions and missilies Sustainment, maintenance of equipment, operational availability Improvement of facility resilience Research, development, and reinforcement of the defense production base 0 2 4 6 8 10 Other (education and training, fuel, etc.) Under the Defense Buildup Program (fiscal year 2023–2027) Under the previous plans (fiscal year 2019–2023) JAPAN Copy Edits / Kommentare MSC eingebaut (09.01.) Fußnote och im Schaubild einfügen 98 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 99. that the current security environment necessitates a more “normal” spectrum of defense capabilities and that “only countries willing to defend themselves will be helped by others.”21 Particularly with a view to keeping President Trump engaged in the US-Japan alliance, Tokyo is eager to demonstrate that it is pulling its weight. Before its leap towards defense “normalization,” Japan had already adopted a more hard-nosed approach to its economic security. After becoming the target of Chinese economic coercion in 2010, Tokyo set itself goals of “strategic autonomy” – securing access to inputs for critical industries – and “strategic indispensability” – cultivating Japanese industries that hold choke points in international supply chains as a deterrent.22 Indeed, Japanese companies hold over 50 percent of global market share in many high-tech components.23 Tokyo has also invested several billion US dollars into domestic semiconductor production.24 Since 2022, Japan’s wide-ranging economic security legislation has served as a blueprint for measures in other developed economies. Japanese leaders have put resilience against economic coercion on the agenda in the Benötigen wir die Legende im Schaubild? Figure 7.3 Respondents’ views on economic and technological power, November 2024, share rating the respective country highly minus share rating the country lowly Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference -20 – -11 -10 – -1 1 – 10 11 – 20 21 – 30 31 – 40 41 – 50 51 – 60 61 – 70 71 – 80 81 – 90 Rating from All Canada France Germany Italy Japan US UK China Brazil India South Africa South Africa Brazil Italy India France Canada Russia UK Germ any Japan China US +75 +75 +71 +70 +75 +64 +78 +75 +71 +90 +73 +78 +68 +68 +67 +71 +74 +25 +65 +73 +84 +65 +83 +54 +54 +50 +49 +66 +24 +56 +56 +32 +79 +68 +64 +42 +38 +34 +26 +42 +22 +40 +34 +40 +64 +59 +59 +38 +34 +21 +17 +32 +16 +37 +38 +37 +58 +64 +63 +37 +32 +26 +19 +35 +2 +33 +32 +49 +60 +63 +54 +34 +32 +28 +25 +35 +16 +37 +23 +31 +57 +47 +42 +32 +21 +26 +18 +27 +14 +27 +24 +40 +53 +57 +44 +22 +19 +7 +14 +14 +19 +20 +17 +17 +19 +67 +27 +21 +10 +8 +2 +17 +6 +21 +7 +32 +45 +49 +36 +5 -8 -3 -13 -9 -9 +3 -7 +24 +25 +41 +12 +2 -10 -8 -16 -7 -13 +2 -5 +17 +8 +36 +15 Rating received by 99 JAPAN
- 100. G7 and NATO, and, at the prodding of the US, have themselves placed tough high-tech export restrictions on China. Consequently, Japan is still widely seen as an economic and technological powerhouse abroad (Figure 7.3), although its GDP is stagnating. Since 2014, annual growth has been just 0.6 percent on average and is expected to hover around that level until the end of the decade.25 But even as its growth stalls, Japan has impactful levers in its economic toolkit. Tokyo was toughening up its security policy even before the invasion of Ukraine prompted Europe’s Zeitenwende. However, the defense and economic measures of the last two years have spelled a real “security renaissance.”26 Strategic Headwinds: Typhoon Season Faced with new threats and a reeling liberal international order, Japan is doubling down on its networked Indo-Pacific strategy and adopting the defense and economic tools of a “normal” power. However, these efforts face such headwinds that they may sputter before really getting off the ground. Domestically, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru leads a minority government after taking an electoral beating in October 2024.28 How to finance the defense budget increases remains an unsolved problem, compounded by a historically weak Japanese yen diminishing Tokyo’s buying power.29 Underlying all this are Japan’s aging society and weak economic growth. Ishiba appears to have little political capital for advancing his predecessors’ ambitious initiatives.30 This is particularly true should Tokyo come under pressure from President Trump. Japan no longer has a “Trump whisperer” like the late Prime Minister Abe to wrangle a capricious US administration.31 The agreement governing financial support for US deployments on the islands is up for renewal in 2027, so Washington could press Tokyo to pay more for military protection.32 If Trump leans on bilateralism, some of Japan’s burgeoning trilateral cooperations with other Indo-Pacific powers may atrophy absent US convening power.33 Recent geopolitical rapprochement with South Korea, always tenuous due to lingering historical issues, is already on life support as a Japan-skeptical government appears poised to take over in Seoul.34 Finally, getting roped further into a US-China trade war could not just hurt Japan economically. It may also damage its standing with multi-aligned partners in Southeast Asia.35 Japan might yet successfully overcome its internal limitations to continue down the path towards “normalcy.” But as it does, it may have to reckon with the fact that being surrounded not only by more belligerent rivals but also less stable partners is the new normal. “There is a great deal of respect and expectations for Japan. […] However, at the same time, as Japan’s economic power weakens, and moreover, as China overtakes us, it seems Japan’s presence is losing the brilliance it once had.”27 Kamikawa Yōko, former Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, press conference, August 20, 2024 100 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 101. Key Points As a major winner of liberal internationalism, Japan views the current crisis of global order and the prospect of multipolarity with special concern. To fortify its neighborhood against domination by China, Japan has promoted regional norms and integration through its Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. With its 2022 strategy overhaul and defense spending hike, Japan has taken a leap towards adopting defense capabilities that match its geopolitical weight. In the economic realm, Japan’s strong regional ties and economic security policies give it significant influence and agenda-setting power. Domestic political and economic weaknesses and international headwinds may hinder Japan from fully implementing the security policy measures it initiated. 1 2 3 4 5 101 JAPAN
- 102. MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 102
- 103. What is Brazil’s main criticism of the international order, and what does its vision of “cooperative multipolarity” imply? How are Brazil’s policy of non-alignment and its ambition to build bridges playing out? And how is Brazil influencing global food, climate, and energy debates? In 2022, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, commonly known as Lula, heralded the start of his third presidency by declaring that “Brazil is back.”1 This came after his predecessor, Jair Bolsonaro, had almost completely withdrawn Brazil from the international stage.2 Bolsonaro had described the World Health Organization and environmental protection as national security threats and proposed withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on climate change.3 After a narrow victory, Lula returned Brazil to its traditional foreign policy course of strong multilateral engagement.4 For Brazil’s G20 presidency last year, as well as its role as host of this year’s BRICS Summit and the UN Climate Conference COP30 in Belém, Lula announced that Brazil would act as a bridge between the so-called Global South and Global North.5 However, multilateral engagement does not equate to unwavering support for the system as it is. Brazil has been skeptical of the current global order, seeing it as a manifestation of global inequality.6 Embracing Multipolarity Under Lula, Brazil has promoted a vision of a global order that is based on the concept of “cooperative multipolarity,” originally coined by former Foreign Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota.7 Based on international law, the universality of human rights, and the rejection of the use of force, the concept highlights the importance of more inclusive global governance mechanisms for stability and security.8 Brazil views the greater distribution of power among countries as an opportunity to rebalance outdated power structures and give countries of the Global South a stronger say in international decision-making (Figure 1.4). Accordingly, it put global governance reform at the top of the agenda of last year’s G20 presidency, along with other priorities of the Global South, such as poverty reduction and food security. Nicole Koenig and Isabell Kump Lula Land 8 Global Infrastructures 103 BRAZIL
- 104. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2024, Lula criticized the lack of permanent seats for Latin America and Africa on the UN Security Council (UNSC), calling it an “unacceptable echo of domination from the colonial past.”9 Brazil proposed reforms to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, including making the composition of senior management more regionally representative.10 It also suggested boosting the banks’ lending practices by rechanneling Special Drawing Rights to multilateral development banks to unlock resources for vulnerable countries to help them deal with the climate crisis.11 In addition, Brazil used its G20 presidency to initiate discussions on a two-percent tax on the world’s super-rich to raise funds to help poorer countries deal with climate change impacts. Brazil’s vision of multipolarity is not anti-Western but rather critical of Western domination.13 The country has repeatedly condemned unilateral actions by Western states.14 This included sanctions that have not been approved by the UNSC, notably those imposed by the US and the EU on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine.15 Brazil also rejects the framing of a global struggle between democracies and autocracies, adopted by the Biden administration, among others.16 Emphasizing the principle of non-interference, Brazil is eager to cooperate with a variety of countries, regardless of their form of government. As a founding member of BRICS, it seeks to promote the group as a platform that amplifies the influence of the Global South in the international system and deepens economic relations among its members.17 Lula has, for instance, supported the creation of a common currency to facilitate trade and investment among the BRICS nations and has described the group’s New Development Bank as an alternative to the Western- dominated Bretton Woods institutions.18 Even so, Brazil rejects the Chinese and Russian framing of BRICS as an anti-Western club.19 Despite being critical of the West and the current order, Brasília actively engages in formats and organizations that it deems Western-centric.20 For instance, it applied for membership in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2017. If Brazil were to join, it would be the only country to simultaneously be a member of BRICS, the G20, and the OECD. A Non-Aligned Bridge-Builder Brazil views the emergence of a multipolar order as an opportunity to increase its influence as a “middle power” and bridge-builder.21 Its foreign policy is shaped by a tradition of independence and non-alignment.22 The country has sought to position itself as an impartial mediator in conflicts such as the war in Ukraine.23 In 2022, Lula irritated Western partners by “The future will be multipolar. Accepting this reality paves the way for peace.”12 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazilian President, G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, November 18, 2024 104 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 105. stating that Ukraine and Russia were equally responsible for the war.24 After taking office in 2023, he proposed a “peace club” of neutral countries that should mediate between Ukraine and Russia. This was followed by a push for negotiations together with China in 2024, which included a six-point plan for a political settlement.25 Both attempts failed. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the Chinese-Brazilian initiative “destructive,” because it did not mention the need to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity.26 At the same time, Brazil has vocally criticized what it perceives as Western double standards, particularly regarding Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. Lula has repeatedly slammed Israel for what he sees as a “disproportionate” response to the Hamas terror attacks of October 7, sparking criticism by comparing it to the Holocaust.27 Non-alignment also shapes Brazil’s relations with China and the US. While China has become Brazil’s largest trading partner and second-largest investor, the US remains its largest direct investor and second-largest trading partner (Figure 8.1).29 Since choosing sides could result in economic losses, Brazil seeks to maintain good relations with both. However, its positioning between the great powers is also subject to domestic controversy. Lula’s government was, for instance, divided on the decision not to join “The Chinese-Brazilian proposal is […] destructive.”28 Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukrainian President, Metrópoles, September 11, 2024 Brazil’s trade (imports and exports) with key partners, USD billions Figure 8.1 Data: Trading Economics. Illustration: Munich Security Conference EU US China 2023 2012 13 15 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 120 160 140 0 60 20 40 80 100 Global Infrastructures 105 BRAZIL
- 106. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with some members viewing it as an opportunity to attract investment and others warning of negative effects on relations with the US and the EU.30 More generally, voters of right-wing parties, including Bolsonaro’s, seem to be much more in favor of alignment with the US than voters of left-wing parties, including Lula’s, who prefer a more balanced stance toward the great powers.31 Trump’s re-election could put this balancing act to the test. His threat to impose a 100 percent tariff on the BRICS countries if they were to create an alternative currency suggests that Brazil’s strategy may come under pressure.32 Brazil’s ambition to build bridges is reflected in its approach to its own neighborhood. Accounting for roughly one third of GDP, population, military spending, and exports in Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazil is a regional heavyweight (Figure 8.2). It seeks to promote closer integration and a stronger voice for the region in global decision-making. Under Lula, Brazil rejoined regional organizations such as the Union of South American Nations and has intensified regional cooperation on transnational challenges like organized crime. However, Brazil has also been described as a “leader without followers,” not least due to its failed attempts to rally the region behind its initiatives and integration efforts.33 For example, Brazil’s attempts to drive greater integration of the Mercosur trade bloc – also including Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay – have been hampered by internal divides and protectionist policies. Argentinian President Javier Milei’s comments about leaving the bloc in Brazil’s share of key indicators, 2023/2024, percent of regional total Figure 8.2 Data: IMF; World Bank. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Rest of Latin America and the Caribbean Brazil Military spending Population GDP Exports 36 33 33 64 68 67 73 27 106 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 107. August 2023 could have jeopardized the trade deal with the EU, which was recently finalized after 25 years of negotiations.34 Milei also announced his intention to pursue a bilateral trade deal with the new US administration, calling on his Mercosur partners to free him from the “prison” of having to negotiate as a bloc.35 A Constrained Issue-Specific Power There are at least two issues where Brazil’s global clout is set to grow. The first is food security. As the world’s second largest exporter of agricultural products, leading in soy, meat, and sugar (Figure 8.3), Brazil is a major agripower.36 Countries such as Egypt and China heavily depend on Brazilian produce. For instance, 67.9 percent of China’s soybean imports come from Brazil.37 Lula successfully raised food security on the G20’s agenda and called the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty, with more than 88 signatories, the “most important legacy” of Brazil’s presidency.38 However, the country’s agripower also comes with fragilities. The Brazilian economy is highly dependent on commodity exports, including agricultural products, making it vulnerable to price volatility and market fluctuations.39 In 2023, 36 percent of Brazil’s total agricultural exports went to a single destination: China.40 At the same time, Brazil is the world’s largest importer of fertilizers, with one quarter of its supply coming from Russia.41 This dependency influenced Brazil’s reluctance to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Bolsonaro admitted, limiting the country’s credibility as a mediator in the war.42 Brazil’s share of global food exports, 2023, percent Figure 8.3 Data: International Trade Centre. Illustration: Munich Security Conference US Paraguay Brazil Argentina India Thailand Rest of the world Australia Soybeans Maize or corn Sugar products Meat and edible meat offal 4 9 57 30 11 38 26 26 7 6 24 14 8 63 65 14 Global Infrastructures 107 BRAZIL
- 108. The second issue is the energy transition and the global fight against climate change. Brazil’s critical mineral reserves make it indispensable for the development of clean technologies. It holds 94 percent of the world’s niobium, 22 percent of its graphite, 16 percent of its nickel, and 17 percent of its rare earth elements – all vital components in green technologies.43 In the fight against climate change, Brazil already plays a key role due to its 60 percent share of the Amazon basin. Lula introduced measures to correct Bolsonaro’s regressive climate policies, which include restoring Brazil’s greenhouse gas reduction targets and pledging to achieve zero deforestation in the Amazon.44 However, green ambitions appear to be colliding with economic interests. The construction of a new highway, cutting across the Amazon, threatens to fuel deforestation once again.45 Lula has also supported plans for fossil fuel exploration in the Amazon, with some areas located in nature reserves.46 Clashes between green and economic ambitions were also on display at the G20 Summit, where Brazil pushed for a more ambitious timeline for carbon neutrality but also agreed with Argentina to facilitate the importation of natural gas obtained through fracking.47 Bridging Over Troubled Water With its vision of cooperative multipolarity, its strategy of non-alignment, and its strong ties to both Western and non-Western institutions, Brazil is well positioned to act as a bridge between the Global South and Global North. During its recent G20 presidency, it successfully put concerns of the Global South on the agenda. However, amid rising geopolitical tensions and Trump’s second term, it will be increasingly difficult for Brazil to act as a global agenda-setter and maintain its strategy of non-alignment. Its G20 priorities, including more ambitious climate action and the proposed wealth tax, will be even harder to implement. Initiatives within BRICS and cooperation with China could come under pressure as the Chinese-US rivalry intensifies. Internal polarization could also increase ahead of the 2026 elections, with Bolsonaro having expressed hope that Trump’s return to the White House could help his own comeback.48 Brazil’s vision of cooperative multipolarity may thus clash with the reality of a more uncooperative geopolitical context and polarization at home. “Trump is back, and it’s a sign we’ll be back, too.”49 Jair Bolsonaro, former Brazilian President, Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2024 108 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 109. Key Points Under Lula, Brazil sees the emergence of a multipolar order as an opportunity to rebalance outdated power structures and give the countries of the Global South a stronger voice in international decision-making. Brazil’s foreign policy is characterized by a strategy of non-alignment. It seeks to position itself as a neutral mediator in international conflicts, such as in Ukraine, and to maintain equidistance between the US and China. With its significant natural resources, Brazil has the potential to shape global debates on food, climate, and energy security. But while its agripower comes with vulnerabilities and dependencies, Lula’s green ambitions appear to be clashing with economic interests. Playing the role of a global agenda-setter and pursuing non-alignment may become more difficult amid rising geopolitical tensions and President Trump’s second term. The new US administration could also strengthen Bolsonaro and his supporters, contributing to internal polarization. 1 2 3 4 109 BRAZIL
- 110. MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 110 110
- 111. Julia Hammelehle The Fate of Good Hope 9 What are South Africa’s key foreign policy tenets, and what is its vision for the international order? How does Pretoria aim to contribute to translating that vision into practice? What enables and constrains South Africa’s foreign policy? How do internal and external developments influence its regional and global stature? In 2024, 30 years after the end of apartheid, South Africa experienced a “second transition.”1 Following years of political disillusion and economic decay in the country, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its absolute majority in parliament, forcing it to form a coalition government for the first time. As this Government of National Unity succeeded in aligning parties across political and ethnic lines and keeping radical parties out, the country hopes for a new dawn. Pretoria continues to aspire to an international leadership role. Given South Africa’s regional political and economic weight, coupled with unique soft power derived from its history of democratic transition and reconciliation, Pretoria has long been perceived as Africa’s “natural leader” and international moral exemplar.2 Over the past decades, however, this status has dwindled: material and soft power have declined, an inconsistent track record on human rights and the implementation of international law has undermined South Africa’s “moral high ground,” and growing anti-Westernism has weakened its role as a bridge-builder between countries of the so-called Global South and Global North.3 Between Transformation and Revisionism: South Africa’s Vision for the International Order South Africa’s foreign policy guidelines over the past three decades reflect its strong commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, international law, and multilateralism as an “external corollary” of its history of democratic transition and struggle against apartheid.4 Yet they also illustrate the second Global Infrastructures 111 SOUTH AFRICA
- 112. “[T]he international community cannot proclaim the importance of international law and the importance of the UN Charter in some situations and not in others as if the rule of law only applies to a select few.”12 Naledi Pandor, then–South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, BRICS dialogue with developing countries, June 11, 2024 “South Africa’s policy of active non-alignment is not reactive but an affirmative agenda. It is not about being neutral or abstaining from world affairs, but putting forward a unifying agenda through dialogue to achieve peace […].”23 Ronald Lamola, South African Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, parliamentary budget vote debate, July 11, 2024 foreign policy tenet that goes back to the ANC’s history as a liberation movement: a deep-seated distrust of the West, particularly the US.5 Pretoria’s stance on global institutions, meandering between reform and rejection, mirrors the two pillars. South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism and the UN as its “centerpiece” has remained at the core of its foreign policy declarations.6 And its involvement within global bodies has been substantial, for example, it has been a non-elected member of the UN Security Council three times in under 15 years and is currently pursuing a genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.7 Pretoria has consistently coupled engagement with demands for reform. For South Africa, the “unrepresentative and biased nature” of global institutions perpetuates structural inequalities and allows the West to use them for its own priorities “at the expense of the developing world.”8 Experiences over the past decades have strengthened this perception: Pretoria has denounced Western promises of global governance reforms as “empty,”9 the vaccine distribution during Covid-19 as “vaccine apartheid,”10 and the application of international law such as in Iraq, Libya, or currently in Gaza as selective.11 The public’s views on multipolarity reflect the wide criticism of the current international order (Figure 1.4). Frustrations about Western policies and more pronounced anti-Western sentiments of President Nelson Mandela’s successors have triggered South Africa’s shift from engagement within global institutions to bodies outside them – and partners outside the West.13 In the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC), South Africa’s stance has shifted from ardent support to near exit. Under President Jacob Zuma, the country’s withdrawal from the ICC was only halted by the South African High Court. Zuma’s successor, President Cyril Ramaphosa, only refrained from further withdrawal attempts after a back-and-forth.14 In contrast to South Africa’s former success as a bridge-builder between countries of the Global North and South and a driver of joint global policies, under Ramaphosa, Pretoria has continued Zuma’s tilt toward non-Western powers, BRICS in particular.15 While South Africa asserts that it sees BRICS not as “anti-West” but as a “development platform,”16 this is difficult to sustain as Beijing and Moscow increasingly use the format for revisionist aims.17 Pretoria’s homage to BRICS as a body that “embraces progressive ideals and seeks […] a more inclusive, equitable, and development-oriented world” seems hollow in light of the revisionist geopolitical and coercive economic approaches of members such as China, Russia, or Iran.18 For some observers, South Africa’s focus on BRICS illustrates that in its choice of partners, opposition to the West takes precedence over democracy, international law, and human rights.19 112 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 113. South Africa’s stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine also illustrates its skew toward anti-Westernism. Rhetorically, Pretoria asserts its position of “active non-alignment,” declaring its refusal to “align with any of the global powers” while pointing to its historic commitment to the principles of the UN Charter and dialogue and negotiations.20 Its actual policies, however, reveal a persistent sense of loyalty toward Russia due to the Soviet Union’s support of the ANC’s anti-apartheid struggle and a “peculiar interpretation of non-alignment as anti-Western.”21 South Africa echoes Moscow’s narrative of the invasion, portraying the war as a contest between Russia and the West and a reaction to US provocation.22 Its joint naval exercise with Russia during the war’s first anniversary is difficult not to interpret as siding with Moscow. In addition to the ANC’s political orientation, economic interests have driven South Africa’s shift to emerging powers – BRICS and China in particular.24 However, as a small, open economy with historically close ties with the West, economic pragmatism has also moderated Pretoria’s stance toward Europe and the US. Europe has remained South Africa’s most important trading partner (Figure 9.1), and in recent years, the US has accounted for its fastest-growing export market.25 A US Congress bill that calls for a review of South African–US relations due to Pretoria’s foreign policies has put South Africa’s preferential access to the US market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) into question. While the Biden administration renewed Pretoria’s access to the program in December, under President Trump, the future of AGOA is uncertain, and trade relations might from now on be tied to how countries align with US geopolitical interests, particularly vis-à-vis China.26 Eager to preserve its access to the US market, Pretoria has been trying to soften tensions with the US.27 South Africa’s trade relations with selected countries/regions, 2023, percent of total goods traded Figure 9.1 Data: South African Revenue Service. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Europe Africa BRIC US Other China: India: Brazil: Russia: 17 6 1 1 24 8 19 24 26 “South African officials have made a miscalculation by aligning themselves with Russia and China. […] My hope is that they choose otherwise.”28 Jared Moskowitz, Member of the House of Representatives, US Congress, March 21, 2024 Global Infrastructures 113 SOUTH AFRICA
- 114. Power Shifts: Opportunities and Constraints for South Africa’s Foreign Policy As anti-Westernism has increasingly overshadowed Pretoria’s commitment to international law and multilateralism, South Africa’s international stature as a bridge-builder and normative force has dwindled. Its decline in hard and soft power, coupled with its contested role on the continent and domestic democratic discontent and economic woes, have further constrained the country’s international position. While being Africa’s leading economy, South Africa faces major economic challenges and a declining relative weight on the continent and globally. In 2024, South Africa is set to account for the largest nominal GDP among African countries, surpassing Egypt and Nigeria.29 In 2023, it accounted for around 13 percent of Africa’s GDP and attracted 10 percent of the continent’s foreign direct investment (FDI).30 In Southern Africa, Pretoria is the economic heavyweight with a share of GDP and FDI inflows of around 60 percent.31 Yet, while still substantial, South Africa’s relative economic clout in Africa is declining. And compared to the world’s economic powers and its BRICS peers, its GDP is just a fraction – and is expected to further decrease (Figure 9.2). South Africa has significant economic strengths, such as a rich endowment with critical minerals central for clean energy and digital technologies. It accounts, for example, for around 70 percent of global platinum and around 40 percent of manganese and chromium production.32 Yet South Africa suffers from economic woes, including electricity shortages, deficient infrastructure, and endemic corruption.33 In contrast to other middle-income countries, growth has been anemic since the global financial crisis in 2008.34 South Africa’s 114 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025 South Africa’s share of GDP of selected groups of countries, 1994, 2024, 2040, percent Figure 9.2 1994 2040 2024 Data: Allianz; IMF. Illustration: Munich Security Conference 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Africa Southern Africa BRICS
- 115. unemployment rate of around 30 percent is among the world’s highest, more than one out of five people live in extreme poverty, and inequality is at staggering levels.35 The economy’s brittle state significantly limits Pretoria’s resources for diplomacy and the military – the foreign and defense ministers have both recently announced new budget cuts despite already-strained resources and defense spending at a mere 0.7 percent of GDP in 2023.36 While Pretoria retains the largest defense budget in sub-Saharan Africa, its share of regional spending has dropped from 27 percent in 2011 to 14.5 percent in 2023.37 Two decades of underfunding have left their mark, leading to a stark contrast between the government’s ambition to play a pivotal role in regional peacekeeping and the limitations of its forces.38 In South Africa’s current deployments in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, the troops are “floundering.”39 Demographics fuel Pretoria’s declining weight. South Africa’s population of 64 million is the continent’s sixth largest, but just about half the size of Egypt’s and Ethiopia’s and less than a third of Nigeria’s. By 2040, Nigeria’s population will exceed South Africa’s by more than a factor of four due to higher growth rates.40 Declining material power challenges South Africa’s regional and international position. Even more significant is Pretoria’s loss of its once formidable soft power. Xenophobic violence against other African nationals has eroded its standing on the continent,41 spurring the perception among some that South Africa “remains a state apart,” considering itself more advanced than its African peers.42 Pretoria’s trade and economic policies, seen by some as favoring national rather than regional interests, or its push for the chairmanship of the African Union in 2012 against established procedures added to persistent suspicions about its hegemonic aspirations in Africa.43 South Africa’s moral authority further declined in light of its “instinctive” solidarity with and defense of states under Western pressure, even when these states were charged with gross human rights violations.44 Examples include Pretoria’s reactions to crises such as in Zimbabwe and Darfur.45 The rampant corruption and populist style of government under the Zuma presidency have added to Pretoria’s eroding authority.46 Domestically, the public’s disillusion about corruption has been a major driver in the steep decline in satisfaction with democracy.47 Approval of the country’s direction hit a low point before the 2024 elections, with a mere 13 percent “We are citizens of one country and yet we occupy different worlds, separated by high walls and great distances.”51 Cyril Ramaphosa, South African President, presidential inauguration, June 19, 2024 Global Infrastructures 115 SOUTH AFRICA
- 116. indicating that they see their country on the right track (Figure 9.3).48 Persistent inequality, with race as a key factor, has further fueled democratic disengagement and rising polarization.49 Economic decline, corrosion of democratic institutions, and rising populism along ethnic lines have fed into a downward spiral.50 On to the Middle Ground? The outcome of the 2024 general election initially raised fears that South Africa would continue down that road of populism and economic decline.52 Voter turnout was at a record low; staunchly populist parties came in third and fourth, accounting for around a quarter of votes.53 With the formation of the Government of National Unity, fears turned into hope.54 While frictions among and within coalition parties will persist, the first months of the term have run relatively smoothly, improving the country’s prospects.55 Economic pragmatism and a more centrist cabinet could help bring about a more “middle-of-the-road foreign policy.”56 However, to revive South Africa’s international stature and potential as a regional and international bridge- builder, the ANC will need to reflect on its long-held foreign policy beliefs and recommit to reform rather than revisionism. South Africa’s G20 presidency this year provides an opportunity to make the country’s domestic “second transition” also a moment of transition for its foreign policy. South Africa South Africans’ views on the state of democracy, corruption, and the overall direction of the country, 2011–2024, percent Figure 9.3 Korrekturen MSC eingebaut (20.12.) Änderungsvorschlag für Fußnote 1 nicht übernehmen? *Results from 2011–2021 are from face-to-face Afrobarometer surveys, whereas the 2024 survey was conducted by phone. Given the differences in methodologies, distortions may occur. Data: Afrobarometer. Illustration: Munich Security Conference Fairly/very satisfied with the government’s handling of corruption Country going in the right overall direction Fairly/very satisfied with the state of democracy Logo Afrobarometer 2021 2018 2015 2011 2024* 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 116 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 117. Key Points Given South Africa’s regional political and economic weight and its unique soft power derived from its history of democratic transition, Pretoria has long been perceived as the “natural leader” of the African continent and an international moral authority. This status has, however, declined. As anti-Westernism has risen under Mandela’s successors and overshadowed South Africa’s commitment to international law and human rights, the country’s international stature and potential as a bridge- builder between the Global North and South have dwindled. South Africa’s loss of hard and soft power, coupled with a contested regional position and a fragile domestic situation, has further constrained its international leadership role. Economic pragmatism and a more centrist coalition might provide an opening for a more moderate South African foreign policy. Yet to revive Pretoria’s international position, the African National Congress will need to reassess long-held foreign policy beliefs and recommit to its declared principles of democracy, international law, human rights, and multilateralism. 1 2 3 4 Global Infrastructures 117 SOUTH AFRICA
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- 119. Books Shami Chakrabarti Human Rights: The Case for Defence London: Allen Lane Penguin Random House, 2024 In times where human rights are increasingly coming under attack, Chakrabarti offers a refreshingly optimistic perspective. She outlines historic struggles for greater justice, equality, and peace, while also offering a human rights perspective that can inform solutions to challenges such as climate change or new technologies. Marietje Schaake The Tech Coup: How to Save Democracy From Silicon Valley Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2024 According to Schaake, resistance to regulations by big technology companies poses a massive risk to democratic societies. Schaake paints a frightening picture of the challenges, which include technology’s exploitation by autocrats, but also offers solutions for safeguarding democracies. Peter Sparding No Better Friend? London: Hurst Publishers, 2024 Sparding takes a deep dive into one of the most important and complex friendships globally: the German- American one. This key transatlantic relationship has become more volatile and complicated in the past few decades and will continue to be tested – by the rise of China, among other developments. Sparding succeeds in recounting historic elements while writing a timely and truly needed book. Rachel Adams The New Empire of AI: The Future of Global Inequality Cambridge: Polity Press, 2025 Adams sheds light on many risks stemming from AI as well as AI’s impact on global inequality. She assesses AI as an inequality multiplier that will be felt everywhere, not only in poorer nations but also in wealthier parts of the world. Her work calls for decentralized use of AI – to actually build a better world for all. Food for Thought Hal Brands (ed.) War in Ukraine: Conflict, Strategy, and the Return of a Fractured World Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2024 Brands assembles a dream team of leading experts for a collection of essays that offer a deep and comprehensive assessment of the Ukraine war. They cover the origins of the Russian aggression, the geopolitical consequences of the war in Europe and beyond, and the future of Russian-Chinese relations. Ernest Scheyder The War Below: Lithium, Copper, and the Global Battle to Power Our Lives New York: Simon and Schuster, 2024 Mines supply the world with the critical materials needed for the green energy transition. But they are also deeply controversial, partly due to their impact on sensitive ecosystems. Scheyder provides extraordinary insights into the less-visible struggles and tensions that accompany the global energy transition. Food for Thought 119
- 120. Reports Rosa Balfour and Sinan Ülgen (eds.) “Geopolitics and Economic Statecraft in the European Union” Brussels: Carnegie Europe, November 2024, https://perma.cc/6BVA-26KX Carnegie Europe’s report explores how the EU can use its political and economic leverage to shape a foreign policy fit for the future. Suggesting the EU should embrace the tools of economic statecraft at its disposal, the report offers options for increasing Europe’s strategic autonomy, resilience, and competitiveness. Antônio Sampaio “Urbanization and Organized Crime: The Challenge to Global Peace, Security and Human Rights in the Urban Century” Vienna: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, August 2024, https://perma.cc/98WX-FVWB. Sampaio paints an eye-opening picture of the correlation between urbanization and organized crime. He shows that countries undergoing rapid urbanization tend to have lower resilience against organized crime. He offers recommen- dations, highlighting the need to adapt urban peacebuilding and national urban security strategies. Richard Youngs Democratic Crossroads: Transformations in Twenty First-Century Politics Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024 Youngs highlights opportunities for democratic renewal to be found amid crises like climate change or the Covid-19 pandemic. He dives into innovative strategies for democratic resilience. Yet he also warns that if democracies don’t improve their practices, authoritarianism will rise and democracies further decline. Sten Rynning NATO: From Cold War to Ukraine, a History of the World’s Most Powerful Alliance New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2024 Rynning traces the full history of NATO across its 75 years of existence, with a focus on how it navigated diplomacy and nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, while also daring to look at NATO’s future and its role in managing and solving the conflicts of today. Marcel Dirsus How Tyrants Fall: And How Nations Survive London: John Murray/Hachette, 2024 Tyrants always have more enemies than friends. Dirsus draws on interviews with rebels, dissidents, and soldiers to examine the downfall of dictatorships. He argues that since World War II, 69 percent of dictators have ended up exiled, imprisoned, or killed – proving that dictators live in fear. Peter S. Goodman How the World Ran out of Everything: Inside the Global Supply Chain New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2024 Goodman investigates the failures of global supply chains, painfully revealed in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. He intertwines various stories of workers keeping supply chains running under worsening and unjust working conditions. The reader is urged to reflect on every package arriving on their door- step and its hidden societal costs. Nathan A. Paxton and Jaime M. Yassif “Disincentivizing Bioweapons: Theory and Policy Approaches” Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 2024, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ disincentivizing-bioweapons-theo- ry-and-policy-approaches/. This collection of essays makes sugges- tions for how to reduce states’ incentives to create bioweapons. The analyses aim to foster the development of innovative international policy solutions aimed at reducing biological threats. Camille Grand “Defending Europe With Less America” London: European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2024, https://perma.cc/98WX-FVWB. Europe faces the herculean task of defending itself with less US support. Touching upon the sorry state of Euro- pean militaries, Grand elaborates on Europe’s defense responsibilities. He calls for rebuilding military readiness and the creation of a “full force package” to ensure Europe’s security. 120 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 121. Grzegorz Stec and Helena Legarda “The Europe-China Resilience Audit: Insights for Advancing European Resilience” Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, October 2024, https://perma.cc/7CYG-TCBU. Europe needs to foster its resilience vis-à-vis China, striking a balance between managing risks while not compromising its own economic growth. Legarda and Stec map resilience- buildingeffortsacrossEuropeancountries and show where greater coherence among them is needed. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs “Global Humanitarian Review 2025” New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, December 2024, https://perma.cc/DJ7X-4CWB. This UN report discloses the world’s shortcomings with impressive clarity: In 2025, 305 million people worldwide will require urgent humanitarian assistance and protection due to man-made conflicts and the climate crisis. The report, which also offers ideas on how to alleviate global suffering, should jolt political leaders into action. Stephen Heintz “A Logic for the Future” New York: Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 2024, https://perma.cc/KS9L-TR5D. It is easy to despair given the interlocking crises of today. Yet Heintz offers a hopeful account of a resilient, adaptable humankind that can take on the challenge of envisioning a new international system. This includes a reformed UN, less bureaucratic international organizations, and more networked global governance. Creon Butler “Closing the Climate Finance Gap” London: Chatham House, November 2024, https://www.chathamhouse. org/2024/11/ closing-climate-finance-gap. The world faces a climate finance gap – a huge discrepancy between the trillions of dollars needed for climate action and the amount of private and public funding made available. This is particularly problematic for developing countries. Butler’s thorough report shows how to increase international financing and how to use existing money more effectively. Chris Bradley et al. “The Next Big Arenas of Competition” New York: McKinsey Global Institute, October 2024, https://perma.cc/6UG2-KM3G. This report identifies 18 future arenas marked by high growth and dynamism that could significantly reshape the global economy. They include e-commerce, AI, space, biotech, obesity drugs, cybersecurity, and cloud services. In the coming 15 years, up to 48 trillion US dollars in revenue could be generated in these arenas. Food for Thought 121
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- 123. Endnotes 1 Introduction: Multipolarization Suggested citation: Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Introduction: Multipolarization,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 13—31, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-1. 1. For instance, Germany’s first National Security Strategy, published in 2023, notes: “We are living in an era that is increasingly multipolar and marked by rising systemic rivalry.” See The Federal Government, “Robust. Resilient. Sustainable: Integrated Security for Germany,” Berlin, 2023, https://perma.cc/BW4U-K8PE, 23. 2. See, for instance, then-EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell: “Over the last three decades, we have seen a rapid transformation in the distribution of power around the world. We went from a bipolar configuration between 1945 and 1989 to a unipolar configuration between 1989 and 2008, before entering in what we today could call ‘complex multipolarity.’” Josep Borrell, “Multipolarity Without Multilateralism,” Brussels: European External Action Service, September 24, 2023, https://perma.cc/ Y9FU-KGPA. 3. Jo I. Bekkevold, “No, the World Is Not Multipolar,” Foreign Policy, September 22, 2023. 4. Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, “Remarks by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the BRICS Outreach Session in Kazan,” New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, October 24, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38461 /Remarks_by_External_Affairs_Minister_Dr_S_Jaishankar_at _the_BRICS_Outreach_Session_in_Kazan. 5. For an overview of various definitions of “polarity” and a summary of the literature, see Goedele de Keersmaeker, Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory: Post-Cold War and the 19th Century Compared, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, as well as Nina Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International Relations: Past, Present, Future, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. 6. For a discussion of the literature, see Keersmaeker, Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory, 30–34. A key point of contention relates to the question of whether a state needs to excel in all crucial sectors to be considered a great power or whether it is sufficient to be strong in some. In a classic formulation, Kenneth Waltz maintained: “The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.” See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979, 131. 7. “To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a Hyperpower,” International Herald Tribune, February 5, 1999. 8. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Myth of Multipolarity: American Power’s Staying Power,” Foreign Affairs 102:3 (2023), 76–91, 78. Also see Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Once and Future Superpower: Why China Won’t Overtake the United States,” Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2016. 9. SIPRI estimates are higher than official Chinese figures, but do not inflate the Chinese budget as some other recent estimates have done. For an overview of the debate on assessing Chinese military spending, see M. Taylor Fravel, George J. Gilboy, and Eric Heginbotham, “Estimating China’s Defense Spending: How to Get It Wrong (and Right),” Texas National Security Review 7:3 (2024), 40–54, https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/54043. Similar to SIPRI, the authors estimate that Chinese defense spending amounts to around 36 percent of comparable US defense spending in 2024. 10. For a recent overview of the overseas bases, see Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Overseas Basing: Background and Issues for Congress,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 10, 2024, https://perma.cc/W2BW-348K. 11. Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage,” International Security 43:3 (2019), 141–189, https://doi:10.1162/ISEC_a_00337. 12. Felix Gerding and Jonathan S. Hartley, “De-Dollarization? Not So Fast,” Economic Letters 238 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1016 /j.econlet.2024.111665. 13. Although its dominance has decreased, 57 percent of the allocated reserves are in US dollars, while only 20 percent are in euros, almost 6 percent in Japanese yen, and close to 5 percent in pounds sterling – all currencies of US allies. The Chinese renminbi accounts for just a little more than 2 percent. See International Monetary Fund, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, December 20, 2024, https://perma.cc/45FL-A7GT. 14. Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., “BRICS Financial and Monetary Initiatives – the New Development Bank, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, and a Possible New Currency,” Sochi: Valdai Discussion Club, October 3, 2023, https://perma.cc/H6K6-PL9A. 15. Pål Røren, “Unipolarity Is Not Over Yet,” Global Studies Quarterly 4:2 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksae018, 2. Appendix Quotations originally in British English have been adapted to American English. In some cases, stylistic adjustments were made to quotes. Appendix 123
- 124. 16. Donald J. Trump, “Remarks at a Campaign Rally in Detroit, Michigan,” Detroit, October 18, 2024, https://perma.cc/45UM-8YEP. 17. See Jennifer Lind, “Back to Bipolarity: How China’s Rise Trans- formed the Balance of Power,” International Security 49:2 (2024), 7–55; Cliff Kupchan, “Bipolarity Is Back: Why It Matters,” The Washington Quarterly 44:4 (2021), 123–139, https://doi.org/10. 1080/0163660X.2021.2020457. 18. Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics, New York City: Columbia University Press, 2018. 19. The White House, “National Security Strategy,” Washington, DC, October 2022, https://perma.cc/7RPC-7HZJ, 23. 20. On the notion of the pacing challenge, see Cameron Carlson, Troy Bouffard, and Ryan Burke, “Defining Pacing Threats and Challenges to Homeland Defense and Security,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 7:4 (2024), 3–11. 21. Lind, “Back to Bipolarity,” 42–45. 22. Lind, “Back to Bipolarity,” 9. 23. Marco Rubio, “The World China Made: ‘Made in China 2025’ Nine Years Later,” September 9, 2024: Marco Rubio Website, https://perma.cc/Q2DK-G825, 3. 24. For a recent overview, see US Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual Report to Congress,” Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, December 2024, https://perma.cc/RJT3 -SZPR. 25. Andrew Erickson, “What the Pentagon’s New Report on Chinese Military Power Reveals About Capabilities, Context, and Consequences,” War on the Rocks, December 19, 2024. 26. “Where China Leads,” The Economist, November 9, 2024, p. 52. 27. Brad Roberts et al., “China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer: Implications for U.S. Nuclear Deterrence Strategy,” Livermore: Center for Global Security Research, Spring 2023, https://perma . cc/5UL5-GATX. 28. Lind, “Back to Bipolarity,” 50–54. 29. Emma Ashford and Evan Cooper, “Yes, the World Is Multipolar,” Foreign Policy, October 5, 2023. 30. Ashford and Cooper, “Yes, the World Is Multipolar.” 31. The setup of the MSI mirrors the widespread perception that the world is becoming more multipolar. 32. Stewart Patrick, “BRICS Expansion, the G20, and the Future of World Order,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 9, 2024, https://perma.cc/38LZ -9PJ2. Indonesia joined the bloc in 2025. 33. Kaja Kallas, “European Council: Press Remarks by High Representative Kaja Kallas Upon Arrival,” Brussels: European Union External Action, December 19, 2024, https://perma.cc/52G2-ZUYD. 34. Bilahari Kausikan, “Polarity Is What States Make of It,” Foreign Affairs 102:6 (2023), 166–168, 167. 35. Kausikan mentions his native Singapore – “as a financial center, a port in global trade, and a critical hub for oil refining” – as well as larger states “such as Australia, India, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea.” See Kausikan, “Polarity Is What States Make of It,” 167. 36. Vladimir Putin, “Valdai Discussion Club Meeting,” Sochi: Valdai Discussion Club, November 7, 2024, http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/75521. 37. William C. Wohlforth, “Polarity and International Order: Past and Future,” in: Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International Relations, 418–9 38. Randall Schweller, “An Emerging World That Defies Historical Analogy,” in: Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International Relations. 39. For a definition of “polarity” that emphasizes the perception of status, see Benjamin Zala, “Polarity Analysis and Collective Perceptions of Power: The Need for a New Approach,” Journal of Global Security Studies 2:1 (2017), 2–17, https://doi:10.1093/jogss/ogw025. 40. Frank Whelon Wayman introduced the notions of “power polarity” and “cluster polarity” to distinguish between two dimensions of polarization, power concentration and coalition configuration, which have to be assessed individually. For instance, a system can be shaped by power polarity and cluster multipolarity at the same time. See Frank Whelon Wayman, “Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns Among Major Powers, 1816-1965,” Journal of Peace Research 21:1 (1984), 61–78. For a contemporary discussion and application, see Keersmaeker, Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory, 19–24. Forsby argues that the “overall security relations in the system [are] shaped not only by the relative distribution of power, but also [by] the relative distribution of mutually incompatible systemic identities.” See Andreas B. Forsby, “The Nexus of Systemic Power and Identity: Structural Variations of the US-China Great Power Rivalry,” in: Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International Relations, 232. 41. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70:1 (1990), 23–33. Previous Munich Security Reports have dealt with the liberal moment and its demise in more detail. See, for instance, Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2020: Westlessness,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2020, https://doi.org/10 .47342/IAQX5691. Arguably, power unipolarity corroborated ideological unipolarity – and the other way around. 42. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?,” The National Interest 16 (1989), 3–18. 43. There is a vast literature on the crisis of the liberal international order and the contestation of the so-called “liberal script.” See, for example, G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?,” Inter- national Affairs 94:1 (2018), 7–23, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241; Tanja A. Börzel, Johannes Gerschewski, and Michael Zürn (eds.), The Liberal Script at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Conceptions, Components, and Tensions, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198924241.001.0001. 44. See, for example, Jan Zielonka, Counter-Revolution: Liberal Europe in Retreat, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 45. See Jeff D. Colgan and Robert O. Keohane, “The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither,” Foreign Affairs 96:3 (2017), 42–44. 46. Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs 86:4 (2007), 59–69. 47. Marina Nord et al., “Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot,” Gothenburg, March 2024, https://perma.cc/WR7A-7YBV. 48. For some, this follows a historical pattern. See, for instance, Matthew Kroenig, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy Versus Autocracy From the Ancient World to the U.S. and China, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso /9780190080242.001.0001. 49. The White House, “National Security Strategy.” 50. Jessica Chen Weiss, “A World Safe for Autocracy? China’s Rise and the Future of Global Politics,” Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2019. 51. Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, “The Axis of Upheaval,” Foreign Affairs 103:3 (2024), 50–63. 124 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 125. 52. David A. Sanger, “For First Time, NATO Accuses China of Supplying Russia’s Attacks on Ukraine,” New York Times, July 7, 2024; Hal Brands, “The Looming Eurasian Menace,” The Washington Post, January 1, 2025. 53. For the concept of the “Global West,” see Gideon Rachman, “Xi Jinping’s China and the Rise of the ‘Global West’,” Financial Times, October 24, 2022. For the “three worlds,” see G. John Ikenberry, “Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the Competition to Shape Global Order,” International Affairs 100:1 (2024), 121–138, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiad284. As previous data from the Munich Security Index has shown, Russia’s war of aggression has indeed triggered a convergence in public opinion among the G7 countries. See Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Zeitenwende for the G7: Insights From the Munich Security Index Special G7 Edition,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 3, June 2022, https://doi.org/10.47342/JDIE4364. 54. Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2023, https://doi .org/10.47342/ZBJA9198. 55. When asked about the main divide in global politics today, those surveyed for the Munich Security Index 2023 most prominently mentioned that between democracies and dictatorships. See Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Introduction: Re:vision,” in: Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2023: Re-vision,” 14–37. 56. Mark Rutte, “‘To Prevent War, NATO Must Spend More’: Speech by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at the Concert Noble, Brussels,” Brussels: Carnegie Europe, December 12, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_231348.htm. 57. They are described in Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2023.” 58. Michael J. Mazarr et al., “Understanding Influence in the Strate- gic Competition With China,” Washington, DC: RAND, June 30, 2021, https://perma.cc/5JSX-3YM2. 59. Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Introduction: Re:vision,” in Munich Security Report 2023. Also see Ikenberry, “Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the Competition to Shape Global Order.” 60. Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2020.” 61. Charles A. Kupchan, “A U.S. Strategy of Judicious Retrenchment,” in: Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International Relations, 369. 62. Trine Flockhart, “The Coming Multi-Order World,” Contemporary Security Policy 37:1 (2016), 3–30, https://doi.org/10.1080 /13523260. 2016.1150053. 63. Amitav Acharya, “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order,” Ethics International Affairs 31:3 (2017), 271–285, https://doi.org/10.1017/S089267941700020X. 64. Flockhart, “The Coming Multi-Order World.” 65. Flockhart, “The Coming Multi-Order World,” emphasis added. Acharya speaks of the “cultural, ideological and political diversity” that characterizes the new order. See Amitav Acharya, “What is a Multiplex World Order?,” InternationalAffairsBlog, February 6, 2024. 66. Bobo Lo argues that in the worldview shared by Putin and the Russian elite “Russia is not only a great power but also one of the principal centers of global civilization.” See Bobo Lo, “Between Aspiration and Reality: Russia in the World (Dis)order,” Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Russie.Eurasie. Visions 134, June 2024, https://perma.cc/E74P-PUUC. 67. Trine Flockhart and Elena A. Korosteleva, “War in Ukraine: Putin and the Multi-Order World,” Contemporary Security Policy 43:3 (2022), 466–481, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091591. Flockhart and Korosteleva argue that while the orders that emerge will likely be closely aligned with regional centers of power and their respective spheres of influence, these orders may not necessarily be tied to geography, as an Islamic-led, nongeographic “Sharia order” is equally conceivable. 68. Giorgia Meloni, “President Meloni’s Address to the Chamber of Deputies Ahead of the European Council Meeting on 19 December,” Rome: Italian Government, December 17, 2024, https://perma.cc/S5LE-J6GX. 69. For more on perceptions that the existing order has not delivered on its promise to grow the pie for the benefit of all, see Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Introduction: Lose-Lose?”, in: Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, and Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose?, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/ BMQK9457, 13–25. 70. Oliver Stuenkel, “The New World Order and the Global South,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 40:2 (2024), 397–98, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grae008. 71. Numerous scholars have cast doubt on Kenneth Waltz’s claim that multipolar systems tend to be more crisis-prone. For a critique of the alleged peacefulness of unipolar systems, see Nuno P. Monteiro, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” International Security 36:3 (Winter 2011), 9–40. 72. Rana Foroohar, “US Looks Like a Big Emerging Market,” Financial Times, October 1, 2024; Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2024. 73. Damien Cave, “‘Here We Go Again’: Trump’s Territorial Ambitions Rattle a Weary World,” New York Times, January 8, 2025. 74. Bunde, Eisentraut, and Schütte, Munich Security Report 2024. 75. Xi Jinping, “Full Text: Address by Chinese President Xi Jinping at ‘BRICS Plus’ leaders’ dialogue,” Kazan, October 24, 2024, https://perma.cc/L7DS-MYP5. 76. Sophie Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, September 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/LDPB2956, 13. 77. Gabuev and Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS.” 78. Shaun Breslin, China Risen? Studying Chinese Global Power, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2021, 192. 79. Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev, “Culture,” in: The Power Atlas: Seven Battlegrounds of a Networked World. Berlin: ECFR; Stiftung Merca- tor, December 2021, 148–71, https://perma.cc/9GCY-VMMS. 80. Dani Rodrik, “Middle Powers Will Make a Multipolar World,” Project Syndicate, November 11, 2024. Also see Robert J. Lieber, “Polarity, Non-Polarity, and the Risks of A-Polarity,” in: Græger et al. (eds.), Polarity in International Relations, 186. 81. Matthew Kroenig, “International Relations Theory Suggests Great-Power War Is Coming,” Foreign Policy, August 27, 2022. 82. In particular in the nuclear realm, “multipolarization” promises to be of major concern. While nuclear deterrence is often credited with preventing major war among the nuclear powers, it is questionable whether the fragile balance of terror can also function in a world in which there are not just two nuclear superpowers but possibly three, as well as a number of nuclear-armed great and middle powers – many of whom have become increasingly hostile to each other. For more on the challenges of nuclear multipolarity, see Steven E. Miller, “A Nuclear World Transformed: The Rise of Multilateral Disorder,” Daedalus 149:2 (2020), 17–36, https://doi.org /10.1162/DAED_a_01787; Caitlin Talmadge, “Multipolar Deterrence in the Emerging Nuclear Era,” in: Vipin Narang/Scott D. Sagan Appendix 125
- 126. (eds.), The Fragile Balance of Terror. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2023, 13–38, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501767036-002. 83. See Paul Poast, “As Living Memory of World War II Fades, Its Lessons Are Being Forgotten,” World Politics Review, January 10, 2025; Tanisha M. Fazal and Paul Poast, “War Is Not Over: What the Optimists Get Wrong About Conflict,” Foreign Affairs, October 15, 2019. However, Fazal and Poast point out that US soldiers fought against Chinese and Soviet soldiers in the Korean War, and US and Chinese forces clashed in the Vietnam War. Great powers were also involved in proxy wars. 84. Gloria Rodríguez-Pina, “Donald Tusk: ‘We Are in a Pre-War Era. I Don’t Exaggerate’,” El País, March 29, 2024. 85. Annika S. Hansen et al., “Five Trends in UN Peace Operations – And Five Calls to Action,” Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations, forthcoming. 86. “Out With a Wimper. The Patchy Record of Peacekeepers in Africa Is Being Replaced by Something Worse,” The Economist, January 4, 2024, 31–32, 32. 87. This is the joint finding of various institutes focusing on conflict research. See Peace Research Institute Oslo, “New Data Shows Record Number of Armed Conflicts,” Oslo: Peace Research Insti- tute Oslo, June 10, 2024, https://perma.cc/2B5E-B78P; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “UCDP: Record Number of Armed Conflicts in the World,” Uppsala: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, June 3, 2024, https://perma.cc/7A8B-2769. 88. Irene Mia, “Editor’s Introduction,” in: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (ed.), The Armed Conflict Survey 2024. London: Routledge, Armed Conflict Survey Series, 2024, 5–12. 89. Ian Bremmer and Cliff Kupchan, “2025 Top Risks Report: Risk 1: The G-Zero Wins,” Eurasia Group, January 6, 2025, https://perma.cc/2QK5-SHZ9. 90. Randall Schweller, “An Emerging World That Defies Historical Analogy,” in: Polarity in International Relations, 402. 91. Bekkevold, “No, the World Is Not Multipolar.” 92. Ahmed Aboudouh, “Yes, China Pressured Iran on Red Sea Attacks – but Only to Protect Its Own Ships,” Chatham House, February 7, 2024, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/02/yes-china-pressured- iran-red-sea-attacks-only-protect-its-own-ships. 93. Josep Borrell, “Multipolarity Without Multilateralism,” Brussels: European External Action Service, September 24, 2023, https://perma.cc/Y9FU-KGPA. 94. Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules.” 95. Axel de Vernou and Will Kielm, “An American Grand Strategy for Middle Powers,” The National Interest, August 24, 2023. Some of this thinking reminds of Carl Schmitt and his Großraum concept. See Stefan Auer, “Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: The Ukraine Crisis and the Return of Geopolitics,” International Affairs 91:5 (2015), 953–968, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12392; Tokujin Matsudaira, “Tianxia, or Another Grossraum? US-China Competition and Paradigm Chance in the International Legal Order,” Chicago Journal of International Law 23:1 (2022), 130–143. 96. Tom Ginsburg, “Authoritarian International Law?,” American Journal of International Law 114:2 (2020), 221–260, https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.3. 97. David Miliband, “Our Age of Impunity,” New York Times, February 17, 2023. Also see “Atlas of Impunity,” n.a.: David Miliband, Eurasia Group, and Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 16, 2024, https://perma.cc/K79P-6HUC. 98. SIPRI, “Global Military Spending Surges Amid War, Rising Tensions and Insecurity,” Stockholm: SIPRI, April 2024, 22, https://perma.cc/LH6H-394E. 99. Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Introduction: Lose-Lose?,” in: Bunde, Eisentraut, and Schütte, Munich Security Report 2024. 100. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Speech by President Lula at the Opening of the 79th UN General Assembly in New York,” New York, September 24, 2024, https://perma.cc/T7WT-TS2U. 101. Olaf Scholz, “The Global Zeitenwende: How to Avoid a New Cold War in a Multipolar Era,” Foreign Affairs 102:1 (2023), 22–38, 36. 102. For example, in their proposal for a new “Concert of Powers,” Richard Haass and Charles Kupchan argue that such a global concert would “constitute a setback to the liberalizing project launched by the world’s democracies after World War II,” but that “this scaling back of expectations is unavoidable given the twenty-first century’s geopolitical realities.” See Richard N. Haass and Charles A. Kupchan, “The New Concert of Powers: How to Prevent Catastrophe and Promote Stability in a Multipolar World,” Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2021. 103. Tanja A. Börzel and Michael Zürn, “Contestations of the Liberal International Order: From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism,” International Organization 75:2 (2021), 282–305, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000570. 104. Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev, “Culture,” in: The Power Atlas. 105. Sophie Eisentraut, “Human Rights: Universell-Out,” in: Bunde et al., Munich Security Report 2023, 63–73, 69. 106. Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules.” 107. Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules,” 27. 108. Colum Lynch, “UNGA 79 Special Edition: Russian-led Autocratic Coalition Upends Future Summit,” Devex, September 20, 2024. 109. Hylke Dijkstra, “The UN Summit of the Future: Leadership, Layering, and the Limits of Liberal International Order,” Global Governance 30:3-4 (2024), 361–370, 10.1163/19426720-03003004; Jennifer Peltz and Edith M. Lederer, “At the UN, World Leaders Try to Lay Out a Vision for the Future – and Actually Make It Happen,” AP News, September 23, 2024. 110. Jana Puglierin, “Multilateral Changes: Turn and Face the Strange,” Berlin: ECFR, July 12, 2023, https://perma.cc/TXZ9 -J2QF. 111. Hal Brands, “An ‘America First’ World: What Trump’s Return Might Mean for Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, May 27, 2024. 112. Sergey Lavrov, “Text of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Mr. Sergey Lavrov’s Written Message on Indivisibility of Security Addressed to the Heads of Foreign/External Affairs Ministers/ Secretaries of the US, Canada and Several European Countries,” Moscow: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, February 1, 2022, https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1796679/. 113. Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Alternative Order: And What America Should Learn From It,” Foreign Affairs 103:3 (2024), 8–24. 114. Mathew Burrows and Robert A. Manning, “Empowered Middle Powers and Potential Unthinkable Alliances,” Washington, DC: Stimson Center, March 21, 2024, https://perma.cc/F4GP-PGRJ. 115. Lula da Silva, “Speech by President Lula at the Opening of the 79th UN General Assembly in New York.” 126 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 127. 116. Mathew Burrows and Robert A. Manning, “Top Ten Global Risks for 2025,” Washington, DC: Stimson Center, January 13, 2025, https://perma.cc/VSP8-UEQ2. 2 United States: Maga Carta Suggested citation: Leonard Schütte, “United States: Maga Carta,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 55—61, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-2. 1. Emma Ashford, First Among Equals: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2025; Majda Ruge and Jeremy Shapiro, “Polarized Power: The Three Republican ‘Tribes’ That Could Define America’s Relationship With the World,” Berlin: ECFR, November 17, 2022, https://perma.cc/CJX2-98HS; Celia Belin, “Leaders, Realists, Progressives: The Three Democratic ‘Tribes’ That Could Shape European Relations With America,” Berlin: ECFR, April 11, 2023, https://perma.cc/9TDQ-7HNR. 2. Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70:1 (1990), 23–33. 3. Donald J. Trump, “Inaugural Address,” The White House: Washington, DC, January 20, 2017, https://perma.cc/3RXC-PADH. 4. Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Is America Back? Contestations, US Foreign Policy, and the Liberal International Order,” in: Tanja A. Börzel et al. (eds.), Polarization and Deep Contestations: The Liberal Script in the United States. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, 188–207, 193; Lora Anne Viola, “Accounting for Illiberalism in American Liberal Internationalism,” in: Börzel et al. (eds.), Polarization and Deep Contestations, 167–187. 5. Gordon Friedrichs and Jordan Tama, “Polarization and US Foreign Policy: Key Debates and New Findings,” International Politics 59 (2022), 767–785, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-022-00381-0. 6. John Ismay, Edward Wong, and Pablo Robles, “A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China,” The New York Times, April 26, 2024. 7. Riley Hoffman, “Harris-Trump Presidential Debate Transcript,” ABC News, September 11, 2024. 8. Peter Wehner, “A Speech That May Well Define Biden’s Presidency,” The Atlantic, October 20, 2023. 9. Hal Brands, “An ‘America First’ World: What Trump’s Return Might Mean for Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, May 27, 2024. 10. Gideon Rachman, “Trump Risks Turning the US Into a Rogue State,” Financial Times, January 13, 2025; Donald Trump, “The Inaugural Address,” Washington, DC: US Capitol, January 20, 2025, https://perma.cc/JRC6-P2UT. 11. Hoffmann, “Harris-Trump Presidential Debate Transcript.” 12. Eric Cortellessa, “Full Transcripts of Donald Trump’s Interviews With TIME,” Time, April 12, 2024. 13. Leonard Schütte, “Why NATO Survived Trump: The Neglected Role of Secretary-General Stoltenberg,” International Affairs 97:6 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab167. 14. J. D. Vance, “Europe Must Stand on Its Own Feet on Defense. Speech at Munich Security Conference,” Munich, February 18, 2024, https://perma.cc/7P3U-GXH3. 15. Joseph Biden, interviewed by Scott Pelley, CBS News, October 15, 2023, https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=87253. 16. Joe Scarborough, “Donald Trump Says America is in Decline. He Couldn’t Be More Wrong,” MSNBC, August 19, 2024. 17. Alexander Velez-Green and Robert Peters, “The Prioritization Imperative: A Strategy to Defend America’s Interests in a More Dangerous World,” Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, August 1, 2024, https://perma.cc/3K5K-XAUN. 18. Hans Kristensen et al., “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federa- tion of American Scientists, March 29, 2024, https://perma.cc /H9JH-PTB3. 19. IMF, “World Economic Outlook: GDP per Capita, Current Prices,” New York: IMF, October 2024, https://perma.cc/H4BA-X2J5; “America’s Economy Is Bigger and Better Than Ever: Will Politics Bring It Back to Earth?,” The Economist, October 17, 2024. 20. “China’s Yuan Is Nowhere Close to Displacing the Greenback: The Only Way the Dollar Will Lose its Supreme Role Is at America’s Own Hand,” The Economist, October 14, 2024. 21. Robert Rapier, “U.S. Energy Independence Soars to Highest Level in Over 70 Years,” Forbes, May 2, 2023. 22. Seth G. Jones, “Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment: The Challenge to the U.S. Defense Industrial Base,” Washington, DC: CSIS, Report, January 2023, https://perma.cc/2H75-RJPG. 23. Jones, “Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment.” 24. Madelyn R. Creedon et al., “America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States,” Washington, DC: United States Congress, October 2023, https://perma.cc/XY6Q-E43M. 25. Creedon et al., “America’s Strategic Posture,” 91; Seth G. Jones, “China Is Ready for War: And Thanks to a Crumbling Defense Industrial Base, America Is Not,” Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2024. 26. Creedon et al., “America’s Strategic Posture,” v. 27. Michael Waltz, “Elections 2024: Rep. Waltz on Leadership and the Future of US Foreign Policy,” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, October 28, 2024, https://perma.cc/8Y8K-5RLL. 28. Friedrichs and Tama, “Polarization and US Foreign Policy.” 29. Dina Smeltz et al., “America’s Foreign Policy Future: Public Opinion and the 2024 Election,” Chicago: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, November 1, 2024, https://perma.cc/YWS2-YNE6. 30. Jacob Poushter and Laura Clancy, “What Are Americans’ Top Foreign Policy Priorities?,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, April 23, 2024, https://perma.cc/E6GJ-46LW; Smeltz et al., “America’s Foreign Policy Future: Public Opinion and the 2024 Election.”; Craig Kafura, “American Views of China Hit All-Time Low,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, October 24, 2024, https://perma.cc/CGB8-9PK9. 31. Richard Wike et al., “Growing Partisan Divisions Over NATO and Ukraine,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, May 8, 2024, https://perma.cc/WJ2P-YMN8. 32. Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. 33. Megan Hogan, Warwick J. McKibbin, and Marcus Noland, “Economic Implications of Revoking China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) Status,” Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief 9, September 2024, https://perma.cc/TLK9-VX4J. 34. Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021; Lili Pike, “Where Trump’s Cabinet Stands on China: China Hawks Dominate, but Elon Musk Could Soften the Administration’s Stance,” Foreign Policy, November 18, 2024; International Crisis Group, “The Next U.S. Administration and China Policy,” Brussels: Appendix 127
- 128. International Crisis Group, United States Report 10, October 17, 2024, https://perma.cc/5G39-87L5. 35. Alex Rogers, “Mitch McConnell: ‘We’re in a Very, Very Dangerous World Right Now’,” Financial Times, December 11, 2024. 36. Leonard Schütte, “Seize the Burden: A European Initiative to Put NATO on a Sustainable Footing,” Washington, DC: American- German Institute, Transatlantic Perspectives, June 10, 2024, https://perma.cc/X7EP-6YTT. 37. Natalie Allison, “Trump Rallies MAGA Base, Courts Black Voters in Detroit,” Politico, June 15, 2024. 38. Eric Cortellessa, “Donald Trump: 2024 TIME Person of the Year,” TIME, December 12, 2024. 39. Tim Lester and Daria Tarasova-Markina, ” Ukraine Losing Ground on the Battlefield as Trump Team Pushes Ceasefire,” CNN, January 13, 2025. 40. Keith Kellogg and Dan Negrea, “What Donald Trump’s Ukraine Strategy Could Look Like,” The National Interest, December 20, 2023. 41. Fredrik Wesslau, “The Pitfalls for Europe of a Trump-Putin Deal on Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, November 27, 2024. 42. Sumantra Maitra, “Pivoting the US Away From Europe to a Dormant NATO,” Washington, DC: Center for Renewing America, Policy Brief, February 16, 2023, https://perma.cc/NDM2-7BC2. 43. Jens Stoltenberg, “The Reality of Europe’s Fears About Trump Depends More on Us Than Him,” FinancialTimes, November 9, 2024. 44. Isaac Arnsdorf et al., “Trump Signals Support in Call With Netanyahu: ‘Do What You Have to Do,’” The Washington Post, October 25, 2024; Brian Osgood, “What Have Trump Administration Nominees Said About Israel and Its Wars?,” Aljazeera, November 17, 2024. 45. Cortellessa, “Full Transcripts of Donald Trump’s Interviews With TIME.” 46. Shalom Lipner, “Israel’s Trump Delusion: Why Netanyahu’s Ambition to Remake the Middle East Is Unlikely to Succeed,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2024. 47. Trump, “The Inaugural Address,” January 20, 2025. 48. Stephan Klingebiel, Max-Otto Baumann, and Andy Summer, “Trump’s Second Term and the Global South: Prospects and Perils,” Global Policy, November 11, 2024. 49. Akhil Ramesh, “Why India Is One of the Biggest Winners in Trump’s Election,” The Hill, November 27, 2024; Will Brown, “Reste Calme: Why Europeans Should Take a Measured Approach Towards Trump in Africa,” Berlin: ECFR, November 26, 2024, https://perma.cc/3SCY-XZG8. 50. Leslie Vinjamurie and Max Yoeli, “America’s Last Chance With the Global South: In an Age of Great-Power Competition, Washington Needs the G-20,” Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2024. 51. Kristalina Georgieva, “The Price of Fragmentation: Why the Global Economy Isn’t Ready for the Shocks Ahead,” Foreign Affairs 102: 5 (2023), 131–142, 135. 52. See debate between primacists and restrainers in US foreign policy, for example Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016; Ashford, First Among Equals. 3 China: Pole Positioning Suggested citation: Randolf Carr and Paula Köhler, “China: Pole Positioning,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 63—69, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-3. 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “The Conference Marking the 70th Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Held in Beijing, Xi Jinping Attends the Conference and Delivers an Important Address,” Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, June 28, 2024, https://perma.cc/KP9J-FMKA. 2. Kremlin, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” Moscow: Kremlin, February 4, 2022, https://perma.cc/KQL9-XEWT. 3. “What China Means When It Says ‘Peace’,” The Economist, July 11, 2024. 4. Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Alternative Order: And What America Should Learn From It,” Foreign Affairs 103:3 (2024), 8–24. 5. Joshua Eisenman and Eric Heginbotham, “Building a More ‘Democratic’ and ‘Multipolar’ World: China’s Strategic Engagement with Developing Countries,” China Review 19:4 (2019), 55–84. 6. Michael Schuman, Jonathan Fulton, and Tuvia Gering, “How Beijing’s Newest Global Initiatives Seek to Remake the World Order,” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Issue Brief, June 21, 2023, https://perma.cc/62B3-3D79; Jerker Hellström, “Sovereignty,” n.a.: Decoding China, https://perma.cc/RMZ6-F96P. 7. Yan Xuetong, “Emerging Bipolarity in the Current Global Order,” Hong Kong: China-US Focus, May 16, 2023, https://perma.cc /5RDL-UW2A. 8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Elaborates on an Equal and Orderly Multipolar World and a Universally Beneficial and Inclusive Economic Globalization,” Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, March 7, 2024, https://perma.cc/7KLB-YVTH. 9. Rush Doshi et al., “What Does America Want From China? Debating Washington’s Strategy—and the Endgame of Competition,” Foreign Affairs, July/ August 2024. 10. Economy, “China’s Alternative Order”; Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher, “No Substitute for Victory: America’s Competition With China Must Be Won, Not Managed,” Foreign Affairs 103:3 (2024), 25–39. 11. Oriana Skylar Mastro, “China’s Agents of Chaos: The Military Logic of Beijing’s Growing Partnerships,” Foreign Affairs, October 22, 2024. 12. “Exclusive: Russia Has Secret War Drones Project in China, Intel Sources Say,” Reuters, September 25, 2024. 13. Natalie Sabanadze, Abigael Vasselier, and Gunnar Wiegand, “China-Russia Alignment: A Threat to Europe’s Security,” Berlin: MERICS, June 26, 2024, https://perma.cc/4EQL-M5JQ. 14. Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2024. 128 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
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US Department of Defense, “Senior Defense Official Briefs on 2024 China Military Power Report,” Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, December 18, 2024, https://perma.cc/G8DP-39JZ. 20. “In Some Areas of Military Strength, China Has Surpassed America,” The Economist, November 4, 2024; M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s ‘World-Class Military’ Ambitions: Origins and Implications,” The WashingtonQuarterly 43:1 (2020), 85–99, https://doi.org/10.1080 /0163660X.2020.1735850. 21. Seth G. Jones, “China Is Ready for War: And Thanks to a Crumbling Defense Industrial Base, America Is Not,” Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2024. 22. Matthew P. Funaiole, “The Threat of China’s Shipbuilding Empire,” Washington, DC: CSIS, May 10, 2024, https://perma.cc/263D-PAPN. 23. David Rising and Didi Tang, “A Look at the Research Revealing China’s Work on Prototype Nuclear Reactor to Power Aircraft Carrier,” AP News, November 12, 2024. 24. US Department of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024: Annual Report to Congress,” Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, Decem- ber 2024, https://perma.cc/RJT3-SZPR. 25. “In Some Areas of Military Strength, China Has Surpassed America,” The Economist, November 4, 2024. 26. “China’s Military Corruption Crackdown Explained,” France 24, November 28, 2024. 27. Fenella McGerty, “Asian Defence Spending Grows, China’s Grows More,” London: IISS, May 22, 2024, https://perma.cc/6DBD-YJFR. 28. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, “Press Release: The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs. The People’s Republic of China),” The Hague: The Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 12, 2016, https://perma.cc/8R6W-J56D. 29. Derek Grossman, “The Philippines’ and Vietnam’s South China Sea Strategies Have Failed,” Santa Barbara: RAND, July 15, 2024, https://perma.cc/5WZZ-R7E6. 30. “Chinese Blockade Would Be Act of War, Taiwan Says,” CNN, October 23, 2024; Ryo Nakamura and Rintaro Tobita, “China’s Drills Appear to Be ‘Rehearsal’ for Taiwan Invasion: U.S. Admiral,” Nikkei Asia, May 29, 2024. 31. Noah Robertson, “How DC Became Obsessed With a Potential 2027 Chinese Invasion of Taiwan,” Defense News, May 7, 2024. 32. Kevin Yao and Yew Lun Tian, “China’s Xi Proposes ‘Global Security Initiative’, Without Giving Details,” Reuters, April 22, 2022. 33. “What China Means When It Says ‘Peace’.” 34. Alexandre Tanzi, “China Outweighs G7 as Leading Driver of Global Economic Growth,” Bloomberg, April 18, 2024. 35. Jamie Gaida et al., “ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker,” Barton: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 1, 2023, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/critical-technology-tracker. 36. Gracelin Baskaran, “What China’s Ban on Rare Earths Processing Technology Exports Means,” Washington, DC: CSIS, January 8, 2024, https://perma.cc/8GLY-ZYNK. 37. Alexander Lipke, Janka Oertel, and Daniel O’Sullivan, “Trust and Trade-Offs: How to Manage Europe’s Green Technology Dependence on China,” Berlin: ECFR, May 29, 2024, https://perma.cc/LDW7-99NZ. 38. “Rubio Releases Report: ‘The World China Made: Made in China 2025 Nine Years Later’,” Washington, DC: Rubio.Senate.gov, September 9, 2024, https://perma.cc/BZC2-G98S. 39. Leonard Schütte, “My Way or No Highway: Global Infrastructures,” in Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision. Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2023, https://perma.cc/56FN-UA4Q. 40. Mark A. Green, “China Is the Top Trading Partner to More Than 120 Countries,” Washington, DC: Wilson Center, January 17, 2023, https://perma.cc/U247-7EZZ. 41. Spencer Feingold, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Turns 10. Here’s What to Know,” Geneva: World Economic Forum, November 20, 2023, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/11/china-belt -road-initiative-trade-bri-silk-road/. 42. Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard and Janka Oertel, The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People, Berlin: ECFR, 2024. 43. Matthew Reynolds and Matthew P. Goodman, “Deny, Deflect, Deter: Countering China’s Economic Coercion,” Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2023, https://perma.cc/ZRL2-P4TD, 12. 44. Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, and Leonard Schütte, “Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/BMQK9457. 45. Aurélien Saussay, “The Economic Impacts of Trump’s Tariff Proposals on Europe,” London: LSE, Grantham Foundation, October 2024, https://perma.cc/ZY68-8MM. 46. Paul Fraioli, “The EU’s Approach to Tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicles,” Washington, DC: IISS, Strategic Comments 30-27, October 2024, https://perma.cc/HQ9X-K5NH. 47. JacobGunterandClausSoong,“It’sNotUs,It’sYou:China’sSurging Overcapacities and Distortive Exports Are Pressuring Many DevelopingCountriesToo,”Berlin:MERICS,ChinaGlobalCompetition Tracker 3, November 2024, https://perma.cc/2MLR-CB3E. 48. “Von Der Leyen Calls for ‘Fair Competition’ With China,” Pluralia, May 6, 2024 49. Serkan Arslanalp, Barry Eichengreen, and Chima Simpson-Bell, “Dollar Dominance in the International Reserve System: An Update,” Washington, DC: IMF, June 11, 2024, https://perma.cc/EGK7-37MF. 50. Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “The End of China’s Rise: Beijing Is Running Out of Time to Remake the World,” Foreign Affairs, October 1, 2021; Yanzhong Huang, “Tipped Power Balance: China’s Peak and the US Resilience,” Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, February 22, 2024, https://perma.cc/6W4U-LRHT. 51. Kiel Institute for the World Economy, “Defaults on Chinese Debts: Developing Countries Risk Prolonged Debt Overhang,” Kiel: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, February 4, 2022, https://perma .cc/ Z2GB-A2UK; Sebastian Horn, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch, “China’s Overseas Lending,” Journalof International Economics 133 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.jinteco.2021.103539; Jacob Gunter et al., “China’s Global Debt Holdings Are Increasingly a Liability for Beijing,” Berlin: MERICS, China Global Competition Tracker 2, July 2023. Appendix 129
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Yu Xiang, “Is China’s Economy Ready for the Trump Shock?,” Hong Kong: China-US Focus, November 22, 2024, https://perma .cc/ 2LAZ-VU7Z; Yan Xuetong, “Why China Isn’t Scared of Trump: US-Chinese Tensions May Rise, but His Isolationism Will Help Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, December 20, 2024. 55. William Matthews, “Trump’s ‘America First’ Foreign Policy Will Accelerate China’s Push for Global Leadership,” London: Chatham House, November 14, 2024. 56. John S. van Oudenaren, “Multipolar Mirage: The PRC’s Pivot to Europe,” Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 24:11, May 24, 2024, https://perma.cc/4BQT-QHNR. 4 European Union: A Perfect Polar Storm Suggested citation: Nicole Koenig and Leonard Schütte, “European Union: A Perfect Polar Storm,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/ Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 71—77, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-4. 1. “France’s Macron: EU Shouldn’t Follow US or China on Taiwan,” Deutsche Welle, April 9, 2023. 2. G. John Ikenberry, A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020. 3. Franziska Petri, “EU Support for International Institutions: On the Rise or in Decline?,” Brussels: ENSURED, Research Report, April, 2024, https://perma.cc/B3KY-7HY2; Leonard Schütte and Hylke Dijkstra, “The Show Must Go On: The EU’s Quest to Sustain Multilateral Institutions Since 2016,” Journal of Common Market Studies 61:5 (2023), 1318–1336, https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13466. 4. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. 5. Martijn Groenleer, “The United States, the European Union, and the International Criminal Court: Similar Values, Different Interests?,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 13:4 (2015), 923–944, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mov054. 6. European External Action Service, “EU Funding to the UN System,” Brussels: EEAS, September 20, 2024, https://perma.cc/C7CF-C4LL. 7. Tanja A. Börzel and Michael Zürn, “Contestations of the Liberal International Order: From Liberal Multilateralism to Postnational Liberalism,” International Organization 75:2 (2021), 282–305, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000570. 8. Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Leonard Schütte, Julia Hammelehle, Isabell Kump, Amadée Mudie-Mantz, and Jintro Pauly, “Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2023, https://doi.org/10.47342/ZBJA9198. 9. Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, Andreas Kruck, and Bernhard Zangl, “The Cooptation Dilemma: Explaining US Contestation of the Liberal Trade Order,” Global Studies Quarterly 4:2 (2024), https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksae024. 10. For an overview, see David A. Lake, Lisa L. Martin, and Thomas Risse, “Challenges to the Liberal Order: Reflections on International Organization,” International Organization 75:2 (2021), 225–257, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818320000636, and Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Introduction: Lose-Lose?,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose?, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2024, 13–25, https://doi.org/10.47342/BMQK9457. 11. Tanisha M. Fazal, “The Return of Conquest? Why the Future of Global Order Hinges on Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs 101:3 (2022), 20–27. 12. NATO, “Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024),” press release, June 17, 2024, https://perma.cc/KR4Y-ZLVE. 13. Nicolas Camut, “Putin Could Attack NATO in ‘5 to 8 Years,’ German Defense Minister Warns,” Politico, January 19, 2024. 14. 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Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, “Joint Declaration,” Paris: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, December 12, 2024, https://perma.cc/5EPZ-M45U. 20. Mark Rutte, “To Prevent War, NATO Must Spend More,” Brussels: Carnegie Europe, December 12, 2024, https://perma.cc/2QGQ-UG2Q. 21. Leonard Schütte, “Economics: Trade Off,” in: Tobias Bunde/ Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose?, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2024, 79–85, https://doi.org/10.47342/BMQK9457. 22. Petros C. Mavroidis and Andre Sapir, “Key New Factors Likely to Shape the EU’s Trade Agenda in the Next Five-Year Term,” Brussels: European Parliament, Briefing: Requested by the INTA Committee, April 2024, https://perma.cc/6A67-4VZ5; Shekhar Aiyar, Andrea Presbitero, and Michele Ruta (eds.), Geoeconomic Fragmentation: The Economic Risks From a Fractured World Economy, Paris: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2023. 23. Mario Draghi, “The Future of European Competitiveness: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe,” Brussels: EU, September, 2024, https://perma.cc/68GP-XHXA; Enrico Letta, “Much More Than a Market: Empowering the Single Market to Deliver a Sustainable Future and Prosperity for all EU Citizens,” Brussels: European Council, https://perma.cc/N5JF-4XSF. 24. Gabriel Felbermayr, Julian Hinz, and Rolf J. 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Anna Gora and Pieter de Wilde, “The Essence of Democratic Backsliding in the European Union: Deliberation and Rule of Law,” Journal of European Public Policy 29:3 (2020), 342–362, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1855465. 32. Ursula von der Leyen, “Statement at the European Parliament Plenary by President Ursula von der Leyen, Candidate for a Second Mandate 2024-2029,” Brussels: European Parliament, July 18, 2024, https://perma.cc/U28U-HT6G. 33. Maria Psara, “What Is the European Peace Facility and Why Hungary Is Blocking the Disbursements to Ukraine,” Euronews, October 14, 2024. 34. Sophie Tanno, “Europe’s Far Right Feels Emboldened by Trump’s Win but It Could Be Short-Lived,” CNN, December 1, 2024. 35. Ian Bond et al., “Can Europe Navigate Trump 2?,” London: Centre for European Reform, Insight, November 8, 2024, https://perma.cc/4HVD-3S3V. 36. Hal Brands, “An ‘America First’ World: What Trump’s Return Might Mean for Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, May 27, 2024. 37. Emmanuel Macron, “Europe – It Can Die: A New Paradigm at the Sorbonne,” Paris: Sorbonne, April 26, 2024, https://perma.cc/C4NY-S364. 5 Russia: The Czar’s Gambit Suggested citation: Jintro Pauly, “Russia: The Czar’s Gambit,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 79—85, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-5. 1. Rod Thornton and Manos Karagiannis, “The Russian Threat to the Baltic States: The Problems of Shaping Local Defense Mechanisms,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29:3 (2016), 331–351, https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2016.1200359, 333–35; Ibrahim Muradov, “The Russian Hybrid Warfare: The Cases of Ukraine and Georgia,” Defence Studies 22:2 (2022), 168–191, 175–85. 2. “Enduring Mayhem: Images From Year 3 of the War in Ukraine: A Photographic Chronicle of the Third Year of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.,” The New York Times, n.d. 3. Vladimir Putin, “Valdai International Discussion Club Meeting,” Sochi: Valdai Discussion Club, October 5, 2023, http://en.kremlin .ru/events/president/transcripts/72444. 4. Vladimir Putin, “Valdai Discussion Club Meeting,” Sochi: Valdai Discussion Club, November 7, 2024, http://en.kremlin.ru/ events/president/transcripts/statements/75521. 5. Putin, “Valdai Discussion Club Meeting.” 6. Putin, “Valdai International Discussion Club Meeting.” 7. Vladimir Putin, “Restricted-Format Meeting of the BRICS Summit,” Kazan: 16th BRICS Summit, October 23, 2024, https://perma.cc/2SKT-LLQU. 8. Bobo Lo, “Between Aspiration and Reality: Russia in the World (Dis) order,” Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Russie. Eurasie.Visions 134, June 2024, https://perma.cc/E74P-PUUC, 12–13.; Sophie Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, September 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/LDPB2956, 10–14. 9. Vladimir Putin, “Vladimir Putin Has Been Sworn In as President of Russia,” Moscow: Kremlin, May 7, 2024, https://perma.cc/PS52-VGAF. 10. Putin, “Valdai International Discussion Club Meeting.”; Irina Antonova and Maria Lagutina, “Russia’s Perspective of a New World Order: From Multipolarity to Polycentricity,” in: Maria Lagutina/ Natalia Tsvetkova/Alexander Sergunin (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Russian International Relations Studies. London: Routledge, 2023, 263–86, https://perma.cc/KW9G-N92L, 266. 11. Putin, “Valdai Discussion Club Meeting.” 12. Putin, “Valdai Discussion Club Meeting”; Jeffrey Mankoff, “The War in Ukraine and Russia’s Quest to Reshape the World Order,” Survival 66:5 (2024), 99–126, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2024.2403219, 99; Elena Chebankova, “Russia’s Idea of the Multipolar World Order: Origins and Main Dimensions,” Post-Soviet Affairs 33:3 (2017), 217–234, 221. 13. Mankoff, “The War in Ukraine and Russia’s Quest to Reshape the World Order,” 104; Chebankova, “Russia’s Idea of the Multipolar World Order,” 222–23. 14. Miskimmon, Alister, and Ben O’Loughlin, “Russia’s Narratives of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric World,” Politics and Governance 5:3 (2017), 111–120, 115–16; Mankoff, “The War in Ukraine and Russia’s Quest to Reshape the World Order,” 102. 15. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 31, 2023, https:// www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/. 16. Mankoff, “The War in Ukraine and Russia’s Quest to Reshape the World Order,” 104. 17. Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2022: Turning the Tide - Unlearning Helplessness,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Report 2022, February 2022, https://doi.org/10.47342/QAWU4724, 96. 18. Mankoff, “The War in Ukraine and Russia’s Quest to Reshape the World Order,” 104; Britannica, “Concert of Europe,” Chicago: Britannica, n.d., https://perma.cc/JCC7-HG2P. 19. Dmitri Medvedev, “Медведев Рассказал о Стратегических Границах Слабеющих Стран ,” Sochi: World Youth Festival, March 4, 2024, https://perma.cc/7C7C-3Z4V. 20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation.” 21. IMF, “GDP, Current Prices: Billions of U.S. Dollars,” Washington, DC: IMF, 2024, https://perma.cc/8PNX-UV9Q. 131 Appendix
- 132. 22. UN, “Total Population By Sex,” n.a.: UN, 2024, https://perma.cc/ V5BR-4KRM; “Russia Is Putting Pressure on Women to Boost the Birth Rate — but Demographers Say the Main Problem Is Too Many People Dying,” Meduza, October 22, 2024.4, 14. 23. Nataliya Bugayova, Frederick W. Kagan, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Denying Russia’s Only Strategy for Success,” Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats Project, March 27, 2024, https://perma.cc/P3AK-K8B2, 5; Hans Kristensen et al., “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, March 29, 2024, https://perma.cc/H9JH-PTB3. 24. Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, “A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War,” Survival 64:3 (2022), 7–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044, 8–13. 25. Constant Méheut and Josh Holder, “Russia’s Swift March Forward in Ukraine’s East,” The New York Times, October 31, 2024. 26. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024,” London: RUSI, February 13, 2024, https://perma.cc/4DYZ-6N2L. 27. Jakub Janovsky et al., “Answering The Call: Heavy Weaponry Supplied To Ukraine,” n.a.: Oryx, 2024, https://perma.cc/QD7U -KH44. 28. “Desperate for New Army Recruits, Russian Authorities Resort to Planting Drugs and Posting Fake Job Ads,” Meduza, November 13, 2024; Vanessa Buschschlüter, “Cuba Uncovers Russia-Ukraine War Trafficking Ring,” BBC, September 5, 2023; Bhadra Sharma and Jeffrey Gettleman, “A Small Country Far From Ukraine Is Sending Hundreds to War, on Both Sides,” The New York Times, October 20, 2023. 29. Helen Regan, “Zelensky Confirms Deadly Clashes With North Korean Troops as Putin Says He’s Willing to Talk With Trump,” CNN, November 8, 2024. 30. James Byrne et al., “Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine,” London: RUSI, August 2022, https://perma.cc/9ZKM-36WN, 5; Eshe Nelson, “The Woman Steering Russia’s War Economy,” The New York Times, May 9, 2022. 31. Stewart Patrick, “BRICS Expansion, the G20, and the Future of World Order,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna- tional Peace, Article, October 9, 2024, https://perma.cc/38LZ -9PJ2; “China-Russia 2023 Trade Value Hits Record High of $240 Bln - Chinese Customs,” Reuters, January 12, 2024. 32. Alexander Gabuev and Alexander Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2024. 33. Mikhail Korostikov, “Russia Is the Honey Badger of International Relations,” Berlin: Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, Commentary, December 15, 2017, https://perma.cc/ZT4K-69ZA. 34. “‘Menacing, but it Changes Nothing’: Strategic Weapons Expert Maxim Starchak Answers Questions About the Experimental Ballistic Missile System Russia Just Fired at Ukraine,” Meduza, November 23, 2024; Lillis et al., “Exclusive: US and Germany Foiled Russian Plot to Assassinate CEO of Arms Manufacturer Sending Weapons to Ukraine,” CNN, July 11, 2024; Robbie Gramer and Amy Mackinnon, “Russia Ramps Up Sabotage Operations in Europe,” Foreign Policy, June 13, 2024; Anna Clara Arndt and Liviu Horowitz, “Nuclear Rhetoric and Escalation Management in Russia’s War Against Ukraine: A Chronology,” Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 3, 2022, https:// perma.cc/LX7A-BR9C; Pieter Haeck, “Russian Propaganda Network Paid MEPs, Belgian PM Says,” Politico, March 28, 2024; Sarah Rainsford and Laura Gozzi, “Moldova Says ‘Yes’ to Pro-EU Constitutional Changes by Tiny Margin,” BBC, October 21, 2024; Oana Popescu-Zamfir, “Romania’s Election Crisis: A Stark Warning for NATO Nations on Russian Meddling,” n.a.: ECFR, December 10, 2024, https:// perma.cc/8KCX-UU2M. 35. Filip Bryjka and Jędrzej Czerep, “Africa Corps: A New Iteration of Russia’s Old Military Presence in Africa,” Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, PISM Report, May 2024, https://perma.cc/M3TD-QLFW, 13–24. 36. Edith M Lederer, “Trump Says He Can End the Russia-Ukraine War in One Day. Russia’s UN Ambassador Says He Can’t,” AP News, July 2, 2024; Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, “America First, Russia, Ukraine,” Washington, DC: America First Policy Insti- tute, April 29, 2024, https://perma.cc/A8YC-WT7B, 16. 37. Elie Tenenbaum and Leo Litra, “Ukraine’s Security Now Depends on Europe: A Deal to End the War Must Include Ironclad Assurances,” Foreign Affairs, December 3, 2024. 38. Roman Kot and Kateryna Danishevska, “Unclear strategies: How Trump Envisions Ending the War in Ukraine,” RBC-Ukraine, December 9, 2024. 39. Elvira Nabiullina, “Elvira Nabiullina’s Speech at State Duma’s Plenary Session,” Moscow: State Duma, November 19, 2024, https://perma.cc/NGE6-457F. 40. Mediazona, “Russian Losses in the War With Ukraine,” n.a.: Mediazona, November 22, 2024, https://perma.cc/AUA5-L8W6. 41. “Russian Casualties Reached Record High in October, UK Defense Minister Says,” The Kyiv Independent, November 9, 2024. 42. “Putin’s Warrior Middle Class: How Sustainable Is Russia’s Cash- for-Recruitment Tactic?,” The Moscow Times, November 27, 2024; Katya Bonch-Osmolovskaya and Sonya Savina, “More Soldiers at All Costs,” IStories, August 1, 2024. 43. “The Russian Army Is Increasingly Relying on Older Recruits — but Frontline Soldiers Say ‘Grandpas’ Aren’t Fit for War,” Meduza, October 10, 2024. 44. Watling and Reynolds, “Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024.” 45. “Might Russia Run Out of Big Guns?,” The Economist, March 20, 2024. 46. “In-Demand and Unaccommodated,” Meduza, April 22, 2024. 47. Dara Massicot and Richard Conolly, “Russian Military Reconstitution: 2030 Pathways and Prospects,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Return of Global Russia, September 2024, https://perma.cc/3FDA-8FVM, 38–40.; Maria Snegovaya et al., “Back in Stock? The State of Russia’s Defense Industry After Two Years of the War,” Washington, DC: CSIS, April 22, 2024, https://perma.cc /ZB63-PXEQ, 7–9; Covert Cabal, “Russia’s Looming Serious Tank Shortage: Tank Count Using Latest Bought Satellite Imagery,” n.a.: Covert Cabal, July 6, 2024, https://perma.cc/4GUJ-VVJZ. 48. Bank of Russia, “Macroeconomic Survey of the Bank of Russia,” Moscow: Bank of Russia, December 2024, https://perma.cc/5NFC -37SS. 49. XE, “US Dollar to Russian Ruble Exchange Rate Chart,” n.a.: XE, November 29, 2024, https://perma.cc/D4CY-89RG. 50. Bank of Russia, “Macroeconomic Survey of the Bank of Russia”; Darya Korsunskaya and Alexander Marrow, “Everything for the Front’: Russia Allots a Third of 2024 Spending to Defence,” Reuters, October 2, 2023. 51. Ben Aris, “Russia Faces a Wave of Bankruptcies as Borrowing Costs Skyrocket,” The Moscow Times, November 11, 2024; Maxim Katz, “К Чему Пришла Экономика России к Концу 2024 Года ,” n.a.: Youtube, December 12, 2024, https://perma.cc/KR2C-6YHP. 132 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 133. 52. Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, “November 2024 — Monthly Analysis of Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions,” n.a.: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, Monthly Analysis of Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions November 2024, December 10, 2024, https://perma.cc/5MXY-SDP3. 53. Pierre-Marie Meunier, “Russia Is on a Slow Path to Bankruptcy, But How Slow?,” War on the Rocks, September 11, 2024. 54. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000, London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, 515. 55. Thomas de Waal, “Putin’s Hidden Game in the South Caucasus: Azerbaijan’s Rise, Georgia’s Drift, and Russia’s Quest for a Gateway to Iran and the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, June 3, 2024. 56. “Azerbaijan’s President Says Russia Unintentionally Shot Down Crashed Jetliner,” France 24, December 29, 2024. 57. Ani Chkhikvadze, “Georgia’s Pro-Europe Protesters Are Facing Down Police Violence,” Foreign Policy, December 12, 2024; OSCE, “Georgia’s Elections Marred by an Uneven Playing Field, Pressure and Tension, but Voters Were Offered a Wide Choice: International Observers,” Tblisi: OSCE, October 27, 2024, https://perma.cc/77W2-R5C7. 58. Thomas Graham, “What Assad’s Fall Means for Russia in the Middle East,” New York: CFR, Expert Brief, December 10, 2024, https://perma.cc/X4GV-9PJ2. 59. Masha Borak, “How Russia Killed Its Tech Industry,” MIT Technology Review, April 4, 2023. 60. Atlantic Council, “The toll on Russia From Its War in Ukraine, by the Numbers,” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, New Atlanticist, February 23, 2024, https://perma.cc/TTZ6-T87K. 61. “Yandex Goes Dutch,” Meduza, May 9, 2023. 62. Ekaterina Schulman, “Spotlight: Future of Russia,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 17, 2024, https:// securityconference.org/en/msc-2024/agenda/event/spotlight-russia/. 6 India: Modi-fied Status Suggested citation: Sophie Eisentraut, “India: Modi-fied Status,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 87—93, http://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-6. 1. “India Is Voice of Global South; the World Listens When We Speak: PM Modi,” DD World, September 23, 2024. 2. Also see the wordplay on “modi-fication” in Sreeram Chaulia, Modi Doctrine: The Foreign Policy of India’s Prime Minister, New Delhi: Bloomsbury India, 2016. 3. Christine Huang, Moira Fagan, and Sneha Gubbala, “Indians’ Views of India,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, August 29, 2023, https://perma.cc/S3UW-53A2. 4. Ashley J. Tellis, “‘What Is in Our Interest’: India and the Ukraine War,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 25, 2022, https://perma.cc/N3J6-5RG3. 5. Sophie Eisentraut, “Strategic Convergence Under the Radar: Europe and India After Russia’s Invasion,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Analysis 2, February 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/GDRN9936. 6. Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2024. 7. Sophie Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, September 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/LDPB2956, 28. 8. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, “Opening Remarks by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Foreign Ministers’ Session on G20 of the Voice of Global South Summit,” n.a.: Government of India, January 13, 2023, https://perma.cc/SSH8-Y7DH. 9. Narendra Modi quoted in T. V. Paul, The Unfinished Quest: India’s Search for Major Power Status From Nehru to Modi, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, 6. 10. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (ed.), The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, Gurugram: HarperCollins Publisher India, 2020, 12.; see also Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, interviewed by Jörg Lau und Anna Sauerbrey, Die Zeit, February 21, 2024, https://perma.cc/4PZV-NACT. 11. Rishi Iyengar, “Modi’s Messenger to the World,” Foreign Policy, April 5, 2024. 12. Happymon Jacob, Sidharth Raimedhi, and Gaurav Saini, “Power and Purpose: Indian Foreign Policy 2023,” New Delhi: Council for Strategic and Defense Research, 2024, https://perma.cc/EE7Y -PYXM, 13; Ian Hall, “India 2023: Tactical Wins and Strategic Setbacks in Foreign Policy?,” Asia Maior 34 (2023), 301–321, 301. 13. Happymon Jacob, “How to Thwart China’s Bid to Lead the Global South,” Foreign Affairs, December 25, 2023; Kiran Sharma, “India Hosts Online Summit to Amplify Voice of Global South,” Nikkei Asia, January 13, 2023. 14. “‘We Are the Voice of the Global South’: PM Narendra Modi Highlights India’s Role at ET World Leaders Forum,” The Economic Times, September 2, 2024. 15. Rohan Mukherjee, “A Hindu Nationalist Foreign Policy: Under Modi, India Is Becoming More Assertive,” Foreign Affairs, April 4, 2024. 16. Gerry Shih, “In India’s Shadow War With Pakistan, a Campaign of Covert Killings,” The Washington Post, December 31, 2024. 17. Mukherjee, “A Hindu Nationalist Foreign Policy.” 18. Jaishankar, The India Way, 12. 19. Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan‑Breiner, “India in the Emerging World Order,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 6, 2023, https://perma.cc/7TNP-MBXL. 20. Anuttama Banerji, “India in 2023: Year of India-U.S. Bilateral Exchanges Burgeoning Defense Ties,” Washington, DC: Stimson Center, January 28, 2024, https://perma.cc/X5DX-RM5V; James Crabtree, “Forget the Bear Hug: India’s Gradual Turn From Russia, Towards the West,” n.a.: ECFR, July 25, 2024, https:// perma.cc/8L4E-MWFV. 21. Nirupama Rao, “Strategic Autonomy Is Nothing to Fear,” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2024. 22. Crabtree, “Forget the Bear Hug: India’s Gradual Turn From Russia, Towards the West.” 23. Gerry Shih, Mary Ilyushina, and Catherine Belton, “Modi Bear-hugs Putin in Moscow, Marking Deep Ties Between Russia and India,” The Washington Post, July 9, 2024. 24. “India Has Credibility to be Mediator in Ukraine War: Ex-British PM David Cameron,” The Hindu, October 21, 2024. 25. Julia Friedrich, “B(R)ICS-Staaten als Vermittler im Ukraine- Krieg?,” n.a.: Länder-Analysen, November 15, 2024, https:// perma.cc/RF25-BFZ5. Appendix 133
- 134. 26. Raj Verma, “Russia–Ukraine War and India’s Quest for Leading Power Status,” Global Policy 15:4 (2024): 778–782. 27. US Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar at the Munich Security Conference,” Washington, DC: US Department of State, February 17, 2024, https://perma.cc/VAW4-GQG3. 28. Samir Saran, “5 Ways in Which India-Russia Relationship Will Shape the World in 2025,” New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, December 20, 2024, https://perma.cc/8PAF-HZNW. 29. Dani Rodrik, “Middle Powers Will Make a Multipolar World,” Project Syndicate, November 11, 2024. 30. US Department of State, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar at the Munich Security Conference.” 31. Tobias Scholz, “Großmachtstreben im Indischen Ozean,” Internationale Politik, April 29, 2024; Raja Mohan, “For Biden and Modi, Interests Prevail Over Ideology,” Foreign Policy, June 21, 2023. 32. Pieter D. Wezeman et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2023,” Stockholm: SIPRI, SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2024, https://perma.cc/5QP5-9M4V; Chivvis and Geaghan‑Breiner, “India in the Emerging World Order.” 33. K. C. Singh, “A Play of Shadows Amid Modi’s Reset in Moscow,” The Asian Age, July 10, 2024; Daniel S. Hamilton and Angela Stent, “Can America Win Over the World’s Middle Powers?,” Foreign Affairs, November 14, 2023. 34. Stuti Bhatnagar, “Modi’s Diplomatic Triumphs Haven’t Solved India’s Enduring Challenges,” WorldPoliticsReview, February 21, 2024. 35. Murali Krishnan, “India-China Border Dispute: Can the Peace Last?,” Deutsche Welle, November 6, 2024. 36. “Winning Friends and Buying Influence: How China Is Encircling India,” Times of India, July 30, 2021. 37. Paul, The Unfinished Quest, 24. 38. Happymon Jacob, “The End of South Asia: A Region in Name Only,” Foreign Affairs, July 22, 2024; Suparna Karmakar, “Reimagining India’s Engagement With BIMSTEC,” New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, ORF Issue Brief 404, September 2020, https://perma.cc/K2X2-FXBV, 4. 39. Bhatnagar, “Modi’s Diplomatic Triumphs Haven’t Solved India’s Enduring Challenges.” 40. Sushant Singh, “Modi’s China Bind,” Foreign Policy, July 16, 2024. 41. Happymon Jacob, “The Paradox of India’s Global Rise, Its Regional Decline,” The Hindu, May 4, 2024. 42. Ramachandra Guha, “India’s Feet of Clay: How Modi’s Supremacy Will Hinder His Country’s Rise,” Foreign Affairs, February 20, 2024; “How Strong Is India’s Economy?,” TheEconomist, April 25, 2024. 43. CIA World Factbook, “Country Comparisons: Real GDP (Purchasing Power Parity),” n.a.: CIA World Factbook, 2024, https://perma.cc/LJ7G-5N5P. 44. CIA World Factbook, “Country Comparisons: Real GDP Per Capita,” n.a.: CIA World Factbook, 2024, https://perma.cc/6D5Z-LDCA. 45. Anusha Rathi, “5 Charts That Explain India,” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2024. The numbers on women workforce participation refer to formal employment in 2022. 46. Global Hunger Index, “India,” n.a.: Global Hunger Index, 2024, https://www.globalhungerindex.org/india.html. 47. Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “Ambani Wedding: After Months of Celebrations, the ‘Windsors of India’ Finally Set to Marry,” The Guardian, July 12, 2024; “India’s Richest 1% Own More Than 40% of Total Wealth: Oxfam,” The Hindu, January 16, 2023. 48. “A Shock Election Result in India Humbles Narendra Modi,” The Economist, June 4, 2024; Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “India Steps Back From the Brink: How Indian Voters Constrained Modi – and Saved Their Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2024. 49. Richard M. Rossow, “U.S.-India Insight: U.S.-India Under Trump 2.0 – A Return to Reciprocity,” Washington, DC, CSIS, November 11, 2024, https://perma.cc/88QA-4R4U. 50. Ravi Agrawal, “The New Idea of India,” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2024; Ian Hall, Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy, Bristol: Bristol University Press, 2019, https://doi.org/10.2307 /j.ctvpwhf20, 19; Sushant Singh, “Why Modi Can’t Make India a Great Power: Government-Backed Intolerance Is Tearing the Country Apart,” Foreign Affairs, September 4, 2023. 51. Agrawal, “The New Idea of India.” 52. Agrawal, “The New Idea of India”; Singh, “Why Modi Can’t Make India a Great Power.” 53. Pew Research Center, “Religion in India: Tolerance and Segregation,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, June 29, 2021, https:// perma.cc/K8KX-FDEZ. 54. “A Shock Election Result in India Humbles Narendra Modi.” 55. Singh, “Why Modi Can’t Make India a Great Power.” 56. Singh, “Why Modi Can’t Make India a Great Power”; Guha, “India’s Feet of Clay”; Ian Bremmer, “The Road Ahead for Modi and India,” Project Syndicate, June 5, 2024. 7 Japan: A New Normal Suggested citation: Randolf Carr, “Japan: A New Normal,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 95—101, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-7. 1. Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2024,” Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, July 12, 2024, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/index.html. 2. Akita Hiroyuki, “How Has Japan’s Domestic Political Mood Swayed Its Foreign and National Security Policy?,” in: Tsuruoka Michito (ed.), Japan in an Era of Geopolitics: A New Foreign and Security Policy Direction. Tokyo: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Japan, 2024, 29–46. 3. Soeya Yoshihide, “International Politics and Security After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Japan,” in: Tsuruoka Michito (ed.), Japan in an Era of Geopolitics. 4. Ishiba Shigeru, “Shigeru Ishiba on Japan’s New Security Era: The Future of Japan’s Foreign Policy,” Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, September 25, 2024, https://perma.cc/S5C2-F96B. 5. H. D. P. Envall, “Japan and the Dangers of Multipolarisation,” in: Benjamin Zala (ed.), National Perspectives on a Multipolar Order: Interrogating the Global Power Transition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021, 144–68. 6. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database,” Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 12, 2024, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns -north-korea-missile-test-database/. 7. “Japan Says Strongly Alarmed by Airspace Breaches by Russia, China,” Kyodo News, September 24, 2024. 134 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 135. 8. Mireya Solís, Japan’s Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Indo- Pacific, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2023. 9. Pietro Bomprezzi et al., “Ukraine Support Tracker Data,” Kiel: Kiel Institute for the World Economy, October 31, 2024, https://www . ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker. 10. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, “Keynote Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue,” Tokyo: Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, June 10, 2022, https://perma.cc /BX5X-32KW; The Government of Japan, “The First Policy Speech by Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru,” Tokyo: The Government of Japan, October 4, 2024, https://perma.cc/83L2-YWWC 11. Funabashi Yoichi and G. J. Ikenberry (eds.), The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism: Japan and the World Order, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2020, 3. 12. Thomas Wilkins, “Japan and Multipolarity in the Indo-Pacific: National Mobilisation and Resilience,” Sydney: United States Studies Centre, February 29, 2024, https://perma.cc/UBR5-KGUH. 13. Kondoh Hisahiro, “Japan’s Strategic Interests in the Global South: Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Washington, DC: CSIS, May 21, 2024, https://perma.cc/9P7M-XSU6. 14. Randolf Carr, “Indo-Pacific: A Sea Change,” in, MunichSecurityReport 2021: Between States of Matter – Competition and Cooperation. Munich: Munich Security Conference, June 2021, 69–84. 15. Simran Walia, “US-Japan Alliance Under Trump 2.0 Administration,” Modern Diplomacy, December 21, 2024. 16. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Summary of Japan’s Term as a Non-Permanent Member of the United Nations Security Council (Statement by Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi),” Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 10, 2025, https:// www.mofa.go.jp/press/statement/pressite_000001_00900.html. 17. Oba Mie, “Japan and ASEAN: Changing Partnership and Its Prospects,” in: Tsuruoka Michito (ed.), Japan in an Era of Geopolitics. 18. Mireya Solís, “The Underappreciated Power: Japan After Abe,” Foreign Affairs, October 13, 2020. 19. Simon Preker and Maximilian Ernst, “Zeitenwende in der Japanischen Sicherheitspolitik: Die Bedeutung Taiwans im Kontext Japanischer Sicherheitsinteressen,” in: D. Chiavacci/I. Wieczorek (eds.), Japan 2024: Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Munich: IUDICUM, 1. Aufl., Japan Jahrbuch der Vereinigung für sozialwissenschaftliche Japanforschung e.V. 47, 2024, 67–82. 20. Watanabe Tsuneo, “What’s New in Japan’s Three Strategic Documents,” Washington, DC: CSIS, February 13, 2023, https://perma.cc/YQ6V-N3JK. 21. Mireya Solís, “At Hiroshima, Will an Energized Japan Reconnect a Fracturing World?,” Lawfare, May 17, 2023, https://perma.cc/EG4B -8BLJ. 22. Suzuki Kazuto, “The Liberal International Order and Economic Security,” in: Hosoya Yuichi, Kundnani, Hans (ed.), The Transformation of the Liberal International Order: Evolutions and Limitations. Singapore: Springer, 2023, 119–25. 23. Solís, “The Underappreciated Power.” 24. Shiraishi Shigeaki, “Japan’s Economic Security Policy: Current Status and Challenges,” Tokyo: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Japan, July 26, 2024, https://perma.cc/LNX4-JKJA. 25. IMF, “Real GDP Growth – Japan,” Washington, DC: IMF, October 2024, https://perma.cc/J3Q8-RA83. 26. Wilkins, “Japan and Multipolarity in the Indo-Pacific.” 27. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Extraordinary Press Conference by Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko,” Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, August 20, 2024, https:// www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaikenwe_000001_00088.html. 28. Mireya Solís, “Can the US-Japan Alliance Stay the Course as Japanese Voters Reset Their Politics?,” Washington, DC: Brookings, October 30, 2024, https://perma.cc/9NSV-JLRT. 29. River Akira Davis and Hisako Ueno, “The Yen Is Plunging. So Is Japan’s Defense Budget.,” The New York Times, July 8, 2024. 30. Solís, “Can the US-Japan Alliance Stay the Course as Japanese Voters Reset Their Politics?” 31. Motoko Rich, “Lessons for World Leaders From Japan’s Former Trump-Whisperer,” The New York Times, November 7, 2024. 32. Tatsumi Yuki, “Trump Wins: Can the Indo-Pacific Region Withstand?,” Washington, DC: Stimson Center, November 6, 2024, https://perma.cc/43ST-PR55. 33. IISS, “Japan and the US Under a Second Trump Presidency With Dr. Sheila Smith and Dr. Jeffrey Hornung,” Washington, DC: IISS, Japan Memo, December 13, 2024, https://perma.cc/HTH2-76LU. 34. IISS, “Japan and the US Under a Second Trump Presidency With Dr. Sheila Smith and Dr. Jeffrey Hornung.” 35. Stephen Nagy and Linh Ha, “Indo-Pacific Connector? Japan’s Role in Bridging ASEAN and the Quad,” Journal of East Asian Affairs 37:1 (2024), 128–160. 8 Brazil: Lula Land Suggested citation: Nicole Koenig and Isabell Kump, “Brazil: Lula Land,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 103—109, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-8. 1. Georgina Rannard, “COP27: Brazil Is Back on the World Stage, Lula Tells Climate Summit,” BBC, November 16, 2022. 2. Irene Mia, “Brazil’s (Geopolitical) Moment?,” Washington, DC: IISS, April 17, 2024, https://perma.cc/3JPM-HBG5. 3. Rodrigo Viga Gaier, “Brazil’s Bolsonaro Scraps Pledge to Quit Paris Climate Deal,” Reuters, October 26, 2018; “Bolsonaro Threatens WHO Exit as Brazil’s Coronavirus Toll Soars,” Al Jazeera, June 6, 2020. 4. Oliver Della Costa Stuenkel, “Brazil’s Role in the Global Order After Bolsonaro,” Boston: The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University, Rising Powers Initiative Working Paper 3, 2021, https://perma.cc/43W6-JARE, 3. 5. Nik Martin, “Did Brazil’s G20 Summit Deliver on Its Promises?,” Deutsche Welle, November 21, 2024. 6. Claudia Zilla, “Brasiliens Streben nach Entwicklung und Autonomie,” in: Barbara Lippert/Stefan Mair (eds.), Mittlere Mächte –einflussreiche Akteure in der internationalen Politik. Berlin: SWP, SWP-Studie 1, January 2024, 57–60, https://doi:10.18449/2024S01, 58–59. 7. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, “Is the World Ready for Cooperative Multipolarity?,” Rising Powers Quarterly 2:2 (2017), 15–29. 8. Patriota, “Is the World Ready for Cooperative Multipolarity?,” 15–29. 9. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Speech by President Lula at the Opening of the 79th UN General Assembly in New York,” New York, September 24, 2024, https://perma.cc/T7WT-TS2U. 10. Vince Chadwick, “Devex Invested: Inside Brazil’s G20 Vision for Multilateral Development Banks,” Devex, July 9, 2024. 11. Chadwick, “Devex Invested: Inside Brazil’s G20 Vision for Multi- lateral Development Banks.” Appendix 135
- 136. 12. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “Speech by President Lula at the Second Session of the G20 Leaders’ Meeting: Reform of Global Governance Institutions,” Rio de Janeiro, November 18, 2024, https://perma.cc/937U-G3NH. 13. Sinikukka Saari et al., “A Post-Western Global Order in the Making? Foreign Policy Goals of India, Turkey, Brazil and South Africa,” Helsinki: FIIA, FIIA briefing paper 373, October 2023, https://perma.cc/5QTP-PD6J, 3. 14. Anthony W. Pereira, “Brazil: Geopolitical Challenges in a Multipolar World,” Rising Powers Quarterly 2:2 (2017), 11. 15. Christopher S. Chivvis and Beatrix Geaghan-Breiner, “Brazil in the Emerging World Order,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 18, 2023, https://perma.cc/S7R7-76NY. 16. Joseph Biden, “Remarks by President Biden in State of the Union Address,” Washington, DC: The White House, March 1, 2022, https://perma.cc/2JRE-MZP5. 17. Jack Tapay-Cueva and David Dong, “What Brazil’s ‘Multipolar’ Foreign Policy Means for the Bretton Woods Institutions,” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, August 23, 2023, https://perma.cc/9PCH-3K4N. 18. “Brazil’s Lula Urges BRICS to Create Alternative Payment Methods,” Reuters, October 23, 2024; Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “President Lula’s Speech During the Open Plenary Session of the BRICS Summit,” Kazan, October 23, 2024,https://perma.cc/2ATR-XWV4. 19. Alexander Gabuev and Oliver Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2024; Shashi Tharoor, “The Growing Tension Within the BRICS,” The Washington Post, October 23, 2024. 20. Chadwick, “Devex Invested: Inside Brazil’s G20 Vision for Multi- lateral Development Banks.” 21. Monika Sawicka, “Brazil’s International Activism: Roles of an Emerging Middle Power,” International Affairs 100:3 (2024), 1356–1357, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae110. 22. Saari et al., “A Post-Western Global Order in the Making?,” 6. 23. AdlerandLong,“Lula’sForeignPolicy?EncouragingaMultipolar World.” 24. “Brazil’s Ex-President Lula Claims Zelenskiy Equally to Blame for War,” The Guardian, May 4, 2022. 25. Presidência da República, “Brazil and China Present Joint Proposal for Peace Negotiations With the Participation of Russia and Ukraine,” Press Release, May 23, 2024, https://perma.cc/38YL-KDGM. 26. Alex Willemyns, “At UN, Zelensky Rejects China-Brazil Peace Plan,” Radio Free Asia, September 25, 2024. 27. “Brazil’s Lula Doubles Down on Claim Israel Committing Genocide in Gaza,” The Times of Israel, February 24, 2024. 28. Elena Giordano, “Zelenskyy Accuses Brazil of Being Pro-Russia, Slams Peace Proposal,” Politico, September 12, 2024. 29. Hussein Kalout and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães, “Hedging Between the US and China: Brazil Protecting Itself to Survive,” Rio de Janeiro: CEBRI, CEBRI-Journal 4, 2023, https://perma.cc /A7B9-F244, 25; Tapay-Cueva and Dong, “What Brazil’s ‘Multipolar’ Foreign Policy Means for the Bretton Woods Institutions.” 30. Eugenia Perozo, “Brazil Eyes China’s Belt and Road Initiative. US Says to Reconsider,” Investment Monitor, October 24, 2024. 31. Latinobarómetro, “Latinobarómetro 2023,” Santiago: Latino- barómetro, 2023, https://perma.cc/626J-UBQK. 32. Holly Honderich, “Trump Threatens 100% Tariff on Brics Nations if They Try to Replace Dollar,” BBC, December 1, 2024. 33. Sean Burges, “How to Stay a Leader Without Followers: Brazil’s Foreign Policy Under Lula III,” CEBRI-Revista 3:9 (2024), 38–57, 39, 44. 34. Max Klaver, “What Milei Means for Mercosur,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2023. 35. Janaína Figueiredo, “Milei Calls Mercosur a ‘Prison’ for Member Countries,” O Globo 100, December 7, 2024. 36. Gabriel Araújo, “Brazil Feeds Some 10% of World’s Population, Research Finds,” Reuters, March 5, 2021. 37. International Trade Centre, “Trade Map,” Geneva: International Trade Centre, n.d., https://perma.cc/9EGW-BERV. 38. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, “President Lula’s Speech at the Pre-Launch of the Global Alliance Against Hunger and Poverty,” Rio de Janeiro: Presidência da República, July 24, 2024, https://perma.cc/T8XR-6AAN. 39. Peter Kingstone, “Brazil’s Reliance on Commodity Exports Threatens Its Medium- and Long-Term Growth Prospects,” Americas Quarterly, July 19, 2012. 40. Ministério da Agricultura e Pecuária, “At COSBAN, Minister Fávaro Highlights Strong Brazil-China Trade Relations,” Brasília: Ministério da Agricultura e Pecuária, June 6, 2024, https://perma.cc/WZY5-3QCR. 41. Tareq Helou, “Brazil’s Reliance on Russian Fertilizers: A Vulnerability Turned Geopolitical?,” Brugge: United Nations University CRIS, June 15, 2022, https://perma.cc/2PBL-6F33. 42. “‘Brazil Needs Fertilizers to Help Feed the World, We Can’t Condemn Russia’ Admits Bolsonaro,” MercoPress, July 27, 2022; Carla Hobbs, José Ignacio Torreblanca, and Pawel Zerka, “Brazil: Europe’s Bridge to the Global South,” ECFR, Policy Brief 560, November 2024, https://perma.cc/QLV2-GMTT, 16. 43. Nicholas Pope and Peter Smith, “Brazil’s Critical and Strategic Minerals in a Changing World,” Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute, October 2023, https://perma.cc/4AMT-JLZC, 1, 7. 44. Jule Könneke, “The German-Brazilian Partnership for a Socially Just and Ecological Transformation: Bilateral Cooperation as Catalyst for the UN Climate Process,” Berlin: SWP, SWP Comment 31, July 2024, https://doi:10.18449/2024C31, 3. 45. Philip M. Fearnside, “BR-319 Highway Hearings: An Attack on Brazil’s Interests and Amazonia’s Future (Commentary),” Mongabay, October 26, 2021. 46. Philip M. Fearnside, “Brazil’s ‘End-of-the-World’ Auction for Oil and Gas Drilling (Commentary),” Mongabay, December 16, 2023. 47. Constance Malleret, “Diplomatic Wins Won’t Help Lula Heal Brazil’s Divisions,” World Politics Review, December 2, 2024. 48. Samantha Pearson, “Bolsonaro Is Making a Comeback Bid in Brazil and Betting on Trump’s Help,” The Wall Street Journal, November 29, 2024. 49. Pearson, “Bolsonaro Is Making a Comeback Bid in Brazil and Betting on Trump’s Help.” 9 South Africa: The Fate of Good Hope Suggested citation: Julia Hammelehle, “South Africa: The Fate of Good Hope,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, 111—117, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623-9. 1. Monica Mark in Gideon Rachman, “Can South Africa’s National Unity Government Succeed?,” The Financial Times Podcast, June 20, 2024, The Rachman Review, https://perma.cc/T99Z-K7BT. 2. See, for example, James Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader: South Africa’s Continental Role Since Apartheid, Abingdon: Routledge, 2018, 9. 136 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 137. 3. David Pilling, “South Africa’s Russia Stance Shows It Has Lost the Moral High Ground,” Financial Times, February 23, 2023. 4. Deon Geldenhuys, “The Weak Domestic Base of South Africa’s Good Global Citizenship,” South African Journal of International Affairs 22:4 (2015), 411–428, https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.20 15.1123648, 411. 5. On South Africa’s foreign policy principles, see, for example, the strategic plans of the South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, the 2011 White Paper, or the 2023 National Interest Document. See South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, “Strategic Plans of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation,” Pretoria: South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, n.a., https://perma.cc/N4HT-NUMG; South African Government, “Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu: White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” Pretoria: South African Government, May 13, 2011, https://perma.cc/4JHK-TEGG; South African Department of International Relations and Cooper- ation, “Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and Its Advancement in a Global Environment,” Pretoria: South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, 2023, https://perma.cc/DP86-M2YG. 6. Cyril Ramaphosa, “President Cyril Ramaphosa: 79th Session of the UN General Assembly,” New York: UN General Assembly, September 24, 2024, https://perma.cc/3NHT-SP96. 7. Steven Friedman, “South Africa’s Quest to Retake the Moral High Ground,” Foreign Affairs, February 8, 2024. 8. See, for example, South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, “Framework Document on South Africa’s National Interest and Its Advancement in a Global Environment,” 20–21. 9. Ronald Lamola, “Address by Minister Ronald Lamola, During the Thucydides Trap – Challenges and Opportunities for Africa, Held at the MISTRA Head Office on 11 October 2024,” Johannesburg: Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, October 11, 2024, https://perma.cc/XCE5-5T7K. 10. Cyril Ramaphosa, “Cyril Ramaphosa Says the World Must End Vaccine Apartheid,” The Economist, November 8, 2021. 11. See, for example, Ramaphosa, “President Cyril Ramaphosa: 79th Session of the UN General Assembly.” 12. Naledi Pandor, “Statement by Minister Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries,” Nizhny Novgorod, June 11, 2024, https://perma.cc/AD48-K4D4. 13. Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 40. 14. John Eligon, “South Africa’s Shifting Stance on a Sensitive Question: Quit the I.C.C.?,” The New York Times, August 26, 2023. 15. See, for example, Christopher Williams and Mihaela Papa, “Rethinking ‘Alliances’: The Case of South Africa as a Rising Power,” African Security 13:4 (2020), 325–352, https://doi.org/10.1 080/19392206.2020.1871796, 340. On Pretoria’s former key role as a bridge-builder between countries of the Global North and South, see, for example, Dan Krause, Südliche Demokratien und der Streit über die Internationale Ordnung: Analyse der Positionen Indiens und Südafrikas zur Responsibility to Protect, Opladen/ Berlin/Toronto: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2024, https://doi.org/ 10.3224/84742740, 280–281. Also see Chris Alden and Garth Le Pere, “South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Ambiguity?,” Review of African Political Economy 31:100 (2004), 283–297, https://doi.org/10.1080/0305624042000262293, 292. 16. See, for example, Foreign Minister Lamola in Emsie Ferreira, “South Africa Is Eager to Facilitate Russia-Ukraine Peace Talks, Says Minister Lamola,” The Mail Guardian, November 7, 2024. 17. Alexander Gabuev and Alexander Stuenkel, “The Battle for the BRICS: Why the Future of the Bloc Will Shape Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, September 24, 2024. 18. Naledi Pandor, “Statement by Minister Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of the Republic of South Africa at the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries,” Nizhny Novgorod, https://perma.cc/AD48-K4D4. 19. Priyal Singh, “Wheels Come Off South Africa’s Hollow Version of Non-Alignment,” Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, May 22, 2023, https://perma.cc/8XC6-CF5Q. Also see Michelle Gavin in Council of Councils, “The BRICS Summit 2023: Seeking an Alternate World Order?,” New York: Council of Councils, Global Memo, August 31, 2023, https://perma.cc/3XFX-42H8. 20. See, for example, The Presidency of the Republic of South Africa, “Presidency Asserts Responsibility and Stance on South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” press release, October 27, 2024, https://perma.cc/ CR6B -FNHS. On South Africa’s historic approach of quiet diplomacy see Alexander Beresford, “A Responsibility to Protect Africa From the West? South Africa and the NATO Intervention in Libya,” International Politics 52:3 (2015), 288–304, https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2015.11, 294–300. 21. On South Africa’s anti-imperial nostalgia see, for example, Thom Loyd, “The Politics of Anti-Imperial Nostalgia: South Africa’s Response to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Slavic Review 83:1 (2024), 15–23, https://doi.org/10.1017/slr.2024.318. On Pretoria’s perspective on non-alignment see Janis van der Westhuizen, “Ukraine, the 2023 BRICS Summit and South Africa’s Non-Alignment Crisis,” Contemporary Security Policy (2024), 1–15, 3. On its historic non-alignment position and siding with the Soviet Union see Andre Fourie, “Non-Alignment as a Foreign Policy Orientation of the African National Congress,” Politikon 19:2 (1992), 81–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/02589349208704969, 96. 22. van der Westhuizen, “Ukraine, the 2023 BRICS Summit and South Africa’s Non-Alignment Crisis,” 5. Also see, for example, Ronald Lamola, interviewed by Ravi Agrawal, September 26, 2024, Foreign Policy, https://perma.cc/726A-BRFW. 23. Ronald Lamola, “Budget Vote Speech ‘A Foreign Policy Agenda to Address the Needs of our People’,” Pretoria: South African Department of International Relations and Cooperation, July 11, 2024, https://perma.cc/3MQU-34XD. 24. Williams and Papa, “Rethinking ‘Alliances’: The Case of South Africa as a Rising Power,” 338–339. 25. Gracelin Baskaran and Yash Ramkolowan, “South Africa’s Reliance on Preferential Access to the US Market and the Potential Impact of an AGOA Exit,” Washington, DC: Brookings, November 2023, https://perma.cc/PV33-LMCY, 4. 26. Ronak Gopaldas, “Agoa, Agoing, Agoner? Risks of US Trade Policy for Africa,” Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, September 19, 2024, https://perma.cc/R28M-8GGF. Also see Peter Fabricius, “Uncertain Future: How a Trump Presidency Could Reshape South Africa’s Economic Landscape,” Daily Maverick, November 9, 2024. 27. Peter Fabricius, “Donald Trump’s Second Presidency Starting Shortly Presents a Major Challenge to SA,” Daily Maverick, January 12, 2024. 28. Congressman John James, “Reps. James, Moskowitz Bill on South African Relationship Passes Through Committee,” press release, March 21, 2024, https://perma.cc/2VNA-EDH9. 29. IMF, “GDP, Current Prices: Billions of U.S. Dollars,” Washington, DC: IMF, 2024, https://perma.cc/NR4T-SJ6G. 30. On GDP see IMF, “GDP, Current Prices: Billions of U.S. Dollars,” Washington, DC: IMF, 2024, https://perma.cc/88W6-W6ZU. On FDI see UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2024: Investment Appendix 137
- 138. Facilitation and Digital Government,” New York: UNCTAD, 2024, https://perma.cc/NAQ4-LAB6, 157. 31. On GDP see IMF, “GDP, Current Prices.” On FDI see UNCTAD, “World Investment Report 2024,” 157. Southern Africa includes Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Note that South Africa is also among the top sources of intra-African FDI. See Prachi Agarwal et al., “Exploring Data on Foreign Direct Investment to Support Implementation of the AfCFTA Protocol on Investment,” London: ODI, ODI Data analysis, September 2024, https://perma.cc/Q8DQ-QL2R, 44–45. 32. For platinum, see US Geological Survey, “Platinum-Group Metals Statistics and Information,” Reston: US Geological Survey, January 2024, https://perma.cc/EZ2M-LAJM. For manganese, see US Geological Survey, “Manganese Statistics and Information,” Reston: US Geological Survey, January 2024, https://perma .cc/ 6VP6-X995. For chromium, see US Geological Survey, “Chromium Statistics and Information,” Reston: US Geological Survey, January 2024, https://perma.cc/DY3N-WE3H. Figures for the three minerals apply to 2023 and are estimates. 33. Arkebe Oqubay, Fiona Tregenna, and Imraan Valodia (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the South African Economy, Oxford University Press, 2021, v. 34. World Bank Group, “Unlocking South Africa’s Potential: Leverag- ing Trade for Inclusive Growth and Resilience,” Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2024, https://perma.cc/8KKL-LQCN, 1. 35. On South Africa’s unemployment rates in global comparison see ILO, “Unemployment Rate (%) - Annual: ILOSTAT Data Explorer,” Geneva: ILO, 2024, https://perma.cc/DC9H-YDUF. For the most recent figures for South Africa see Statistics South Africa, “Quarterly Labour Force Survey,” Pretoria: Statistics South Africa, n.a., https://perma.cc/7U7W-TE4Q. On poverty levels see World Bank Group, “Macro Poverty Outlook for South Africa: October 2024,” Washington, DC: World Bank Group, October 1, 2024, https://perma.cc/7RT9-AZVN. Note that the figures for the lower middle- and upper-middle-income poverty lines are considerably higher at 41.1 and 62.6 percent, respectively. 36. SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm: SIPRI, 2024, https://perma.cc/L95P-U96T. 37. Bastian Giegerich et al., The Military Balance 2024, London: IISS, 2024, 458. Note that South Africa’s share of the African continent’s expenditures has also markedly declined. Algeria’s military expenditures are more than six times higher, Morocco’s nearly two times; Nigeria and Egypt are about on par. See SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.” 38. See, for example, Theo Neethling, “The SANDF After 30 Years: Walking the Tightrope Between External and Internal Operations on a Shoestring Budget,” The Strategic Review for Southern Africa 46:1 (2024), 10–37, https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v46i1.4975, 24–25. 39. Why South Africa’s Army Is Floundering in Congo,” The Economist, August 8, 2024. 40. UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision: Total Population by Sex,” New York: UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2024, https://perma.cc/GZN4 -8VKQ. 41. Olusola Ogunnubi and Olumuyiwa Babatunde Amao, “South Africa’s Emerging ‛Soft Power’ Influence in Africa and its Impending Limitations: Will the Giant Be Able to Weather the Storm?” African Security 9:4 (2016), 299–319, https://doi.org/10.1080/19392 206.2016.1242978, 309. 42. Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 52–55; 129–130. Also see, for example, Jean-Paul Marthoz, “The Challenges and Ambiguities of South Africa’s Foreign Policy,” Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, NOREF Report, September 2012, https://perma.cc/ALB6-LNRP, 8. 43. Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 51–52; 58–60. Also see Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa in the Company of Giants: The Search for Leadership in a Transforming Global Order,” International Affairs 89:1 (2013), 111–129, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12007, 123–124. 44. Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 30–32. Also see, for example, Michael Gerson, “The Despot’s Democracy,” The Washington Post, May 28, 2008. 45. Hamill, Africa’s Lost Leader, 30–31. On Darfur as an example of the tensions between South Africa’s commitment to human rights on the one hand and anti-imperialism and Pan-Africanism on the other see Laurie Nathan, “Interests, Ideas and Ideology: South Africa’s Policy on Darfur,” African Affairs 110:438 (2011), 55–74, https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adq058. On these tensions and the divergent expectations of South Africa’s international partners also see Karen Smith, “South Africa and the Responsibility to Protect: From Champion to Sceptic,” International Relations 30:3 (2016), 391–405, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117816659596, 392. 46. See for example Daniel D. Bradlow, Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, and AnaSofia Bizos, “Lessons Learned and the Path Forward,” in: Daniel D. Bradlow/Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.), Values, Interests and Power: South African Foreign Policy in Uncertain Times. Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2020, 253–273, 255. 47. Afrobarometer, “African Insights 2024: Democracy at Risk – the People’s Perspective,” Accra: Afrobarometer, 2024, https://perma.cc/26QP-Y3QN, 27. 48. Afrobarometer, “Unemployment, Unreliable Electricity Supply, and Corruption Are South Africans’ Top Concerns, Afrobarometer Pre-Election Telephone Survey Shows,” Pretoria: Afrobarometer, May 23, 2024, https://perma.cc/2D3J-E2F7, 1. 49. On race as a key factor in inequality in South Africa see Aroop Chatterjee, Léo Czajka, and Amory Gethin, “Wealth Inequality in South Africa, 1993–2017,” The World Bank Economic Review 36:1 (2022), 19–36, https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhab012, 22–23; 30; 40; 56. Also see Simone Schotte, Rocco Zizzamia, and Murray Leibbrandt, “Social Stratification, Life Chances and Vulnerability to Poverty in South Africa,” Cape Town: Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit, University of Cape Town, Working Paper 208, August 2017, https://perma.cc/ZRL6-EW9X. 50. Brian Levy et al., “South Africa: When Strong Institutions and Massive Inequalities Collide,” Washington, DC/Cape Town: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, University of Cape Town, March 2021, https:// perma.cc/5YKG-DM9Q, 7, 41, 59. On revived colored nationalism in South Africa, also see William Shoki, “The Story of South Africa No Longer Makes Sense,” The New York Times, May 28, 2024. 51. Cyril Ramaphosa, “Address by President Cyril Ramaphosa on the Occasion of the Presidential Inauguration,” Pretoria: Government of South Africa, June 19, 2024, https://perma.cc/8M93-3UH8. 52. “South Africa Stands on the Brink of Salvation—or Catastrophe,” The Economist, June 1, 2024. 53. Electoral Commission of South Africa, “Results Dashboard: 2024 National and Provincial Elections,” Centurion: Electoral Commission of South Africa, 2024, https://perma.cc/PYN3 -UVCS. 54. “A Remarkable New Era Begins in South Africa,” The Economist, June 14, 2024. 55. John McDermott, “South Africa’s Coalition Government Needs to Deliver,” The Economist, November 20, 2024. 56. Priyal Singh, “How Will SA’s New Coalition Government Steer Foreign Policy?,” Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, ISS Today, July 2, 2024, https://perma.cc/92M3-ULM5. 138 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 139. List of Figures Possible deviations from a total of 100 percent in the visualized data result from rounding. 1 Introduction: Multipolarization 1.1 Comparison of the G7 and BRICS across various (great-power) indicators Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on open data sources: For “democracy” (2023, scale 0–1), see Marina Nord et al., “Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot,” Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute, March 2024, https://perma.cc/9M4K-CV2C, 62. The numbers are retrieved from the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), “which captures both electoral and liberal aspects of democracy and goes from the lowest (0) to the highest (1) levels of democracy.” For “rule of law” (2024, scale 0–1), see World Justice Project, “WJP Rule of Law Index 2024,” Washington DC, https://perma.cc /ZWR3-KBQJ. The index calculates scores for eight factors and 44 sub-factors to measure a country’s adherence to the rule of law. For “press freedom” (2024, scale 0–100, rounded to one decimal place), see Reporters Without Borders, “World Press Freedom Index 2024,” Paris, 2024, https://perma.cc/6WJ7-SDR3. This index measures press freedom across five distinct categories or indicators: political context, legal framework, economic context, sociocultural context, and safety. For “perception of corruption” (2023, scale 0–100), see Transparency International, “2023 Corruption Perceptions Index,” Berlin, 2023, https://perma.cc /7M3R-SWV5. According to Transparency International, this index “aggregates data from a number of different sources that provide perceptions by business people and country experts of the level of corruption in the public sector.” For “military spending” (2023, USD billions, rounded to one decimal place), “military spending, share of GDP” (2023, percent), and “military spending per capita” (2023, USD, rounded to one decimal place), see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Data Base,” Stockholm, 2025, https://doi .org/10.55163/CQGC9685. The figures for all countries relate to 2023. The figures for China and Russia are both SIPRI estimates. The reason why the twelve countries appear to perform relatively low in “military spending as share of GDP” is because their performance is assessed globally, including in comparison to countries such as Ukraine, which spends up to 36.65 percent. For “number of active troops” (2023, thousands), see International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Military Balance 2024,” London, February 2024, https://perma.cc/R892 -W5CY. For “nuclear warheads” (2024, estimates), see Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “World Nuclear Forces,” in: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (eds.), Yearbook 2024: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm, 2024, https://perma.cc/D6Y4-258N, 272. The figures are estimates based on assessments from the authors. Countries not in the possession of nuclear warheads, namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa, are marked in grey. For “GDP, nominal” (2024, USD trillions, rounded to one decimal place), “GDP, adjusted for purchasing power parity” (2024, USD trillions, rounded to one decimal place), “GDP per capita, nominal” (2024, USD thousands, rounded to one decimal place), and “GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity ” (2024, USD thousands, rounded to one decimal place), see IMF, “World Economic Outlook (October 2024),” Washington DC, 2024, https://perma.cc/438H-B4C4. For “global trade” (2023, percent of total, rounded to one decimal place); World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” Washington DC, 2025, https://perma.cc/ BC7R-AL8J. This indicator depicts the total exports and imports of goods and services (current USD) of each country in relation to the total global imports and exports of all countries in the databank. For “foreign direct investment net outflow” (2023, percent of GDP, rounded to one decimal place) and “foreign direct investment net inflow” (2023, percent of GDP, rounded to one decimal place), see World Bank, “World Bank Open Data,” Washington DC, 2025, https://perma.cc/6STY-L9Q3. For “general government gross debt” (2024, percent of GDP, rounded to one decimal place), see IMF, “World Economic Outlook (October 2024),” Washington DC, 2024, https://perma.cc/E6VA-N899. The higher the number, the worse a country’s performance on this indicator. For “reserve currencies held by central banks” (2024, percent, rounded to two decimal places), see IMF, “Currency Compositions of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER),” Washington DC, 2025, https://perma.cc/RF5H-XN3E. The figures indicate the currency’s share of total allocated reserves in the fourth quarter of 2024. In the IMF data table, shares for currencies from Brazil, India, Russia, and South Africa are not listed separately (but as “others”) and are therefore only specified as being lower as the share of the smallest currency in the data table (Swiss francs: 0.17 percent).” For each of the three European G7 countries, the share of the Euro is indicated. For “connectedness” (2022, scale 0–100), see Steven A. Altman and Caroline R. Bastian, “DHL Global Connectedness Report,” New York: NYU Stern, 2024, https://www.dhl.com/global- en/microsites/core/global-connectedness/tracker.html, 21. According to the report, “the DHL Global Connectedness Index ranks countries based on their international trade, capital, information, and people flows. It assesses these flows along two dimensions: depth (size of international flows relative to domestic activity) and breadth (distribution of flows across origin/ destination countries).” For “innovation” (2023, scale 0–100), see Soumitra Dutta et al. (eds.), “Global Innovation Index 2024: Unlocking the Promise of Social Entrepreneurship,” Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization, 2024, https://doi.org/10.34667/tind.50062, 18. For “research development spending” (2020–2022, percent of GDP), see World Bank Group, “World Development Indicators,” Washington DC, 2025, https://perma.cc/55FA-C9ET. Latest data for Russia and Canada from 2022, for Brazil and South Africa from 2020, for all other countries from 2021. For “critical technologies” (2023, number of top 5 positions), see Jamie Gaida et al., “ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker - The Global Race for Future Power,” Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2023, https://perma.cc/C448-84P8, 51-55. The figures indicate the number of technologies, out of a total of 44, in which a country is among the top five performing countries worldwide. Performance is measured by a country’s high-impact research output, which ASPI regards as a “key performance measure of scientific and technological capability […] [as it] reveals where countries, universities and companies around the world have a competitive advantage in this measure across the 44 technologies.” For “unemployment rate” (2024, percent of total labor force, rounded to one decimal place), see IMF, “World Economic Outlook (October 2024),” Washington DC, 2024, https://perma.cc/M4ZB- YHPG. There is no data available for India. The higher the number, Appendix 139
- 140. the worse a country’s performance on this indicator. For “monetary poverty rate” (2019-2022, percent of population), see World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” Washington DC, 2025, https://perma.cc/MX76-S8UB. The figures indicate the poverty head count ratio, which is the percentage of the country’s population living in “absolute poverty” below the international poverty line (IPL). The IPL is set at 3.65 US dollars/day for lower- middle-income countries and 6.85 US dollars/day for upper-middle- income and high income countries, both at 2017 international prices. Latest data for the US and Brazil from 2022, for the UK, Russia, India, and China from 2021, for Germany, France, and Italy from 2020, and Canada from 2019; there is no data available for Japan and South Africa. The higher the number, the worse a country’s performance on this indicator. For “human development” (2022, scale 0–1, rounded to two decimal places), see Human Development Reports, “Human Development Index (HDI),” New York: UN Development Programme, 2025, https://perma.cc/JP8M- UV98. The index measures a country’s average performance in three dimensions of human development: life expectancy at birth, mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more, expected years of schooling for children of school entering age, and gross national income per capita. For “economic inequality” (2022, scale 1–0), see Joe Hasell et al., “Economic Inequality,” Oxford: Our World in Data, 2024, https://perma.cc/ 8VQ2-CXWK. The numbers are retrieved from the Gini coefficient, which “measures inequality on a scale from 0 to 1. Higher values indicate higher inequality. Inequality is measured here in terms of income before taxes and benefits.” For “gender equality” (2024, gender gap scale 0–1), see Statista, “The Global Gender Gap Index 2024,” New York, 2025, https://perma.cc/44M9-FC5S. According to Statista, the index “benchmarks national gender gaps on economic, political, education, and health-based criteria.” For “soft power” (2024, scale 0–100), see Brand Finance, “Global Soft Power Index 2024,” London, 2024, https://perma.cc/CH7M- PJYY. For “diplomacy, number of diplomatic missions” (2023), see Lowy Institute, “Global Diplomacy Index,” Sydney, 2024, https://perma.cc/P8UR -W5KF. This indicator measures the diplomatic reach of a country based on the number of its diplomatic missions worldwide (embassies, high commissions, consulates- general and consulates, permanent missions or delegations to multilateral organizations, and representative offices or delegations to countries/territories where there is no formal diplomatic relationship) between July and November 2023. For “humanitarian aid” (2024, percent of global spending), see OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS), “Humanitarian Aid Contributions,” New York, 2025, https://perma.cc/6FJC-NZNJ. There is no data available on India. For “number of universities in the top 200” (2025), see Times Higher Education, “World University Rankings 2025,” London, 2025, https://perma.cc/5T57 -JVQJ. For “share of students from abroad” (percent), see UNESCO Institute for Statistics, processed by Our World in Data, “Share of Students From Abroad” [dataset]; UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) - Education” [original data], Oxford, 2024, https://perma.cc/ZGX4-YMNC. The figures show the international students as a share of the country’s overall tertiary enrolment in 2022. Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and South Africa show numbers for 2021. For “population” (July 1, 2023, in millions, rounded to one decimal place), “population growth rate” (2023, in percent, rounded to two decimal places), “median age” (July 1, 2023, in years, rounded to one decimal place), and “life expectancy” (at birth, in years, rounded to one decimal place), see UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “World Population Prospects 2024, Online Edition,” New York, 2024, https://perma.cc/ L5AG-6MZT. For “age dependency ratio” (2023, percent, rounded to one decimal space), see UN, World Population Prospects, processed by Our World in Data, “Total Dependency Ratio, Age Total – UN WPP,” [dataset]; UN, “World Population Prospects” [original data], Oxford, 2024, https:// perma.cc/7YXK-M26J. According to Our World in Data, the age dependency ratio “is the sum of the young population (under age 15) and elderly population (age 65 and over) relative to the working-age population (ages 15 to 64).” The higher the number, the worse a country’s performance on this indicator. For “happiness” (scale 0–10, rounded to two decimal places), see John F. Helliwell et al. (eds.), “World Happiness Report 2024,” Oxford: University of Oxford, Wellbeing Research Centre, 2024, https://perma.cc/P857-F6GG, 15-17. Numbers are retrieved from Figure 2.1, in which “countries are ranked according to their self-assessed life evaluations […], averaged over the years 2021–2023.” 1.2 Respondents’ perspectives on the international order and the number of poles in it, November 2024, percent Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by Kekst CNC. 1.3 Respondents’ perspectives on which countries are great powers, November 2024, share saying the respective country is a great power Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In response to the question “Which of the following countries is a great power?” respondents were given the following options: “Is a great power,” “Is not a great power,” and “Don’t know.” 1.4 Respondents’ perspectives on a multipolar world, November 2024, share agreeing minus share disagreeing with each statement Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In response to the question “Thinking about a multipolar world, do you agree or disagree with the following?” respondents were presented with the following claims: “It is a world where international law is broken less frequently,” “It is a world where the concerns of weaker/developing countries are better taken into account,” “It is a world where prosperity is distributed more equally among countries,” and “It is a more peaceful world.” For each of these claims, respondents were able to say whether they “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” or “don’t know.” Figures shown here represent the net responses agreeing minus the net responses disagreeing. 1.5 Respondents’ views on different types of cooperation, July/ November 2024, percent Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by Kekst CNC. In response to the question, “Thinking about world politics, do you agree or disagree with the following? In the future, my country should prioritize bilateral relations with other countries rather than invest in multilateral initiatives and international organizations” respondents were given the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest. More information about the survey results from July 2024 can be found in Sophie Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, September 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/ LDPB2956. 140 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 141. Munich Security Index 2025 All illustrations and data in this section are based on the survey conducted by Kekst CNC. For the detailed method underpinning the index, see pages 32–35. Explaining the index 1. The answer scale is reversed to account for the natural direction of time. More imminent, being sooner, is closer on our answer scale and less imminent, being later, is further away on our answer scale, but we in fact want to give a higher score to risks that are more imminent – hence we reverse. 2. The answer scale is reversed because higher answer scores for each of the five inputs should be associated with more serious risk. Without rescaling, it is exactly the reverse: high answer scores are associated with high risk preparedness and thus with less serious risk. 1.6 The risk heatmap, November 2024, score Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. 1.7 The change heatmap, November 2024, change in index score since October–November 2023 Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. Fieldwork for the previous Munich Security Index, published in the Munich Security Report 2024 and used as a reference point here, took place between October 24 and November 16, 2023. 1.8 The G7 risk bump chart, aggregate ranking of risks by G7 countries, 2021–2024 Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. The numbers in brackets signify changes in ranking between November 2021 and November 2024. The risk of energy supply disruption was only added to the index in October/ November 2022. The risk of divisions amongst major global powers was only added to the index in November 2024. 1.9 The “BICS” risk bump chart, aggregate ranking of risks by Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, 2021–2024 Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. The numbers in brackets signify changes in ranking between November 2021 and November 2024. The risk of energy supply disruption was only added to the index in October/November 2022. The risk of divisions amongst major global powers was only added to the index in November 2024. 1.10 Respondents’ perceptions of other countries, share saying country is an ally minus share saying country is a threat, November 2024, percent Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “For each country jurisdiction below please say, on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 being threat and 10 being ally, whether you think they pose a threat or are an ally to your country.” The scores run from a potential -100 (if 100 percent of a population said that x was a threat) to +100 (if 100 percent of a population said that x was an ally). 1.11 Respondents’ perceptions of other countries as threats or allies, change between October−November 2023 and November 2024, percent Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In answer to the question “For each country jurisdiction below please say, on a scale of 0 to 10, 0 being threat and 10 being ally, whether you think they pose a threat or are an ally to your country.” The scores run from a potential -100 (if 100 percent of a population said that x was a threat) to +100 (if 100 percent of a population said that x was an ally). Fieldwork for the previous Munich Security Index, published in the Munich Security Report 2024 and used as a reference point here, took place between October 24 and November 16, 2023. 1.12 Respondents’ perspectives on whether their country will be more secure and wealthy in ten years’ time, November 2024, percent Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by Kekst CNC. In response to the questions “Thinking about world politics. Do you agree or disagree with the following: In ten years’ time my country will be more wealthy?” and “Thinking about world politics. Do you agree or disagree with the following: In ten years’ time my country will be more secure?” respondents were given the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest. 2 United States: Maga Carta 2.1 Cases of US engagement with or disengagement from international organizations and agreements, 1989–2024, by administration Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on Tim Heinkelmann-Wild, After Exit: Alternative Leadership and Institutional Resilience after Hegemonic Withdrawal, PhD Thesis, Munich: Ludwig-Maximilian University, 2024. The disengagement category includes termination of membership in agreements and international organizations, non-ratification of agreements, and complete budget cuts of international organizations. Non-ratifications were assessed four years after the signing of the agreement to allow for all relevant actors to be (re-)elected and thus provide ample time to ratify the agreement. The engagement category includes accessions to international organizations and treaties and the termination of acts of disengagement. 2.2 Defense expenditures of the world’s largest spenders adjusted for military purchasing power, 2023, USD billions Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on Florian Dorn, “Defense Spending for Europe’s Security – How Much Is Enough?,” Munich: ifo Institute, EconPol Policy Brief 66, November 2024, https://perma.cc/HG63-G98G, 6. Adjusting nominal defense spending for “military purchasing power parities” allows taking differences in costs of military personnel (such as salaries) and equipment across countries into account. 2.3 US respondents’ perspectives on US military assistance for Ukraine and Israel, November 2024, percent Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In response to the prompt “When thinking about US military assistance for Ukraine/Israel, please choose the statement that comes closest to your view,” respondents were given the following options: The US should “increase its assistance,” “maintain its current levels of assistance,” “reduce its assistance,” “terminate its assistance,” and “don’t know.” Appendix 141
- 142. 3 China: Pole Positioning 3.1 Changes in China’s military capabilities, 1999–2024, number of equipment pieces and percent Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by IISS. Figures for 1999 are based on IISS, “The Military Balance 1999–2000,” London: Oxford University Press, 1999, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1352-0237(00)00239-2. Figures for 2024 are based on the forthcoming report IISS, “The Military Balance 2025,” London: Routledge, February 2025. 1999 data has been adjusted to reflect 2024 classifications of the Military Balance. 3.2 Import barriers imposed by the world’s 50 largest economies vis-à-vis China between 2020 and 2024 Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by MERICS based on Claus Soong and Jacob Gunter, “It’s Not Us, It’s You: China’s Surging Overcapacities and Distortive Exports Are Pressuring Many Developing Countries too,” Berlin: MERICS, China Global Competition Tracker 3, November 27, 2024, https:// perma.cc/6UEN-NFC3. The figure illustrates import barriers introduced in the last five years. Tracked import barriers include anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, tariffs, quotas, import bans, VAT (for e-commerce), standards/certification requirements, and safeguard measures. Icons indicate at least one, but often more, measure(s) in that category of goods. Most tracked measures are China-specific. Some country-agnostic measures were included because they target goods where a large portion of a country’s total imports of that good originate from China. The borders on this map are not intended to be exhaustive and do not imply official endorsement. 3.3 China’s key economic and demographic trends, 2004–latest Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on World Bank, “Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, Current US$ – China),” Washington: World Bank, https://perma.cc/54YC-GPRC; Statista, “China: Quarterly FDI Inflows 1998–2024,” Hamburg: Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1422705/china -quarterly-value-of-foreign-direct-investment-inflows-according-to -bop/; IMF, “General Government Debt, Percent of GDP,” Washington: IMF, https://perma.cc/Y8AK-V6ZX; ILO, “Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age – ILO Modelled Estimates, May 2024 (%) – Annual,” Washington: ILO, https://perma.cc/E8XZ-KBKZ; UN Population Division, “Percentage of Population by Broad Age Group, 60+,” New York: UN Population Division, https://perma.cc /7QXQ-4HY7. Net foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are determined by the balance of payments (FDI inflows minus FDI outflows). Youth unemployment refers to the share of the labor force aged 15–24 who are without work but available for and seeking employment. The share of the population aged 60 and older is depicted due to China’s statutory retirement age being 60 for men and 58 for women. 4 European Union: A Perfect Polar Storm 4.1 The EU’s share of key indicators, 2005–2023, percent of global total Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. Export data is based on Eurostat, “Share of European Union EU27 (From 2020) in the World Trade,” Brussels: European Union, October 17, 2024, https://perma.cc/PY5P-JXCY. Data on defense spending is based on Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm: SIPRI, 2023, https://doi.org/10.55163/CQGC9685. Data on GDP is based on IMF, “World Economic Outlook,” Washington, DC: IMF, October 2024, https://perma.cc/VW87-K645. Data on the EU population is based on Eurostat, “Population Change – Demographic Balance and Crude Rates at National Level,” Brussels: European Union, October 17, 2024, https://perma.cc/VY3X-BNCX. Data on the global population is based on UN, “World Population Prospects 2024,” https://perma.cc/K2MR-7ZVE. Data is provided in current prices (where applicable). For each year, the EU’s share corresponds to the total share of all EU member states, considering the entries of Romania (2007), Bulgaria (2007), and Croatia (2013), and the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (2021). 4.2 The EU’s trade agreements around the world, 2024 Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. Data on trade agreements is based on European Commission, “EU Trade Relationships by Country/Region,” Brussels, 2024, https:// perma.cc/8J9F-7V9L. Data on the EU’s top trading partners is based on European Commission, “European Union, Trade in Goods With Extra EU27,” Brussels, 2024, https://perma.cc/D26T -S4QB. The borders on this map are not intended to be exhaustive and do not imply official endorsement. 4.3 Seat distribution in the European Parliament and European Council, 2004–2024, percent Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. Data on seat distribution in the European Parliament is based on European Parliament, “Political Groups in the European Parliament,” Brussels: European Union, November 13, https://perma.cc/L2FT -3D6B. The data on the seat distribution in the European Council is based on various public sources. The data reflects the distribution of seats in the European Parliament and the European Council at the time of the respective constitutive session of the European Parliament, considering the entries of Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia, as well as the withdrawal of the United Kingdom. “Christian Democrats/Center Right” refers to members of the European People’s Party; “Socialists/Center Left” refers to members of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; “Liberals” refers to members of Renew Europe and, prior to 2019, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; “Greens” refers to members of the Greens/European Free Alliance; “Far Right-Extreme Right” includes members of the European Conservatives and Reformists, Europe of Sovereign Nations (since 2024), Patriots for Europe (since 2024), Identity and Democracy (2019 – 2024); “Left-Far Left” refers to members of The Left, prior to 2021, European United Left/Nordic Green Left; “Others” refers to non-attached members of the European Parliament or independent heads of state/government in the European Council, respectively. The categorization of European party families is loosely based on Simon Hix and Christopher Lord, Political Parties in the European Union, London: Red Globe Press, 1997. 5 Russia: The Czar’s Gambit 5.1 Perceptions of Russia, 2021–2024, share of respondents saying Russia is an ally minus share saying Russia is a threat Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In response to the question “Please say whether you think Russia poses a threat or is an ally to your country or neither [0-10, where 0 is ‘threat,’ 5 is neither, and 10 is ‘ally’].” The scores run from a potential –100 (if 100 percent of a population said that x was a threat) to +100 (if 100 percent of a population said that x was an ally). 142 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 143. 5.2 Russia’s main battle tank production, refurbishment, and losses, December 2023 – November 2024, average number per month Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. Data on losses of Russian main battle tanks is from Jakub Janovsky et al., “Attack on Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” n.a.: Oryx, 2024, https:// perma.cc/7L2F-S9FC; Jakub Janovsky et al., “Attack on Europe: Documenting Ukrainian Equipment Losses During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” n.a.: Oryx, 2024, https://perma.cc/78PX-XC55. To establish the average monthly number of lost Russian main battle tanks, the author took the number of destroyed, abandoned, and captured Russian tanks by December 1, 2024 (3,441) and subtracted from that the number of Russian tanks destroyed, abandoned, and captured by December 1, 2023 (2,370) as well as the number of Ukrainian tanks captured by Russia between December 1, 2023 and December 1, 2024 (7). This number was divided by 12, which yielded an average of 89 tanks (rounded) per month. Data on Russian production and refurbishment of main battle tanks is from Julian Cooper, “Military Production in Russia Before and After the Start of the War With Ukraine: To What Extent Has It Increased and how Has This Been Achieved,” RUSI Journal 169:4 (2024), 15; Dara Massicot and Richard Conolly, “Russian Military Reconstitution: 2030 Pathways and Prospects,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Return of Global Russia, September 2024, https://perma.cc/3FDA-8FVM, 39; Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Russian Military Objectives and Capacity in Ukraine Through 2024,” London: RUSI, February 13, 2024, https://perma.cc/4DYZ-6N2; Michel Yohann and Michael Gjerstad, “Equipment Losses in Russia’s War on Ukraine Mount,” London: IISS, Military Balance Blog, February 12, 2024, https://perma.cc /4TFT-C76K. For new production, Massicot and Conolly estimate production of 20 tanks per month, Watling and Reynolds of 25 per month, and Cooper of 29.17 per month (350 per year). For this graph, an estimate of 25 was used. Watling and Reynolds estimate 100 tanks per month for refurbishment, while Michel and Gjerstad estimate 98.33 to 106.67 per month (1,180 to 1,280 per year). For this graph, an estimate of 100 was used. 5.3 Trade in goods between China and Russia, 2019–2023, percent of total import/export value Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on IMF, “Trade of Goods Selected Indicators: China, P.R.: Mainland,” Washington, DC: IMF, 2023, https://perma.cc/BZ5D-2Z2C; IMF, “Trade of Goods Selected Indicators: Russian Federation,” Washington, DC: IMF, 2023, https://perma.cc/BZ5D-2Z2C; IMF, “International Trade in Goods (by Partner Country) (IMTS),” Washington, DC: IMF, 2023, https://betadata.imf.org/en/Data -Explorer?datasetUrn=IMF.STA:IMTS_DOT(1.0.1). 6 India: Modi-fied Status 6.1 Respondents’ views on their country’s power trajectory, November 2024, scale from 1 (not powerful at all) to 10 (extremely powerful) Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by Kekst CNC. In response to the questions “On a scale from 1–10, how powerful is country X today?” and “On a scale from 1–10, how powerful will country X be in 10 years?” respondents rated their own country. On the 1–10 scale, 1 represented “not powerful at all” and 10 represented “extremely powerful.” The figures shown are means. 6.2 India’s top three arms suppliers per five-year period, 2009–2023, share of total imports Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” Stockholm: SIPRI, 2024, https://doi .org/10.55163/SAFC1241. Note that SIPRI provides arms transfer data for five-year periods. 6.3 India’s GDP and GDP per capita compared to G7 and BRICS countries, 2024 Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on “World Economic Outlook Database, October 2024,” Washington, DC: IMF, October 22, 2024, https://perma.cc/SB9X-FUZ4. 7 Japan: A New Normal 7.1 Respondents’ hopes and concerns associated with multipolarity, July/November 2024, percent Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. More information about the survey results from July 2024 can be found in Sophie Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, September 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/LDPB2956. 7.2 Japan’s increased defense spending targets as of 2024, JPY trillions Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on Ministry of Defense of Japan, “Defense of Japan 2024,” Tokyo: Ministry of Defense of Japan, July 12, 2024, https://www.mod.go .jp/en/publ/w_paper/index.html, 232. 7.3 Respondents’ views on economic and technological power, November 2024, share rating the respective country highly minus share rating the country lowly Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC. In response to the prompt “Please rate these countries on a scale from 1–10 in the realm of economics and technology” respondents rated each of the listed countries. On the 1–10 scale, 1–3 represents a “low” rating, 8–10 represents a “high” rating. The figures shown for each country are the differences of the percentage of “high” ratings and the percentage of “low” ratings received. 8 Brazil: Lula Land 8.1 Brazil’s trade (imports and exports) with key partners, USD billions Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on Trading Economics, “Brazil Exports by Country,” New York: Trading Economics, 2024, https://perma.cc/6DGM-UAVZ, and Trading Economics, “Brazil Imports by Country,” New York: Trading Economics, https://perma.cc/4UJG-HX5W. The figure includes data on all imports and exports from and to Brazil conducted with China, the US, and EU member states. The category “EU” includes all current 27 member states of the EU, with data on Croatia added from 2013 onward (date of EU accession). It also includes data on imports and exports with the UK until January 2021, when the UK left the EU. 8.2 Brazil’s share of key indicators, 2023/2024, percent of the regional total Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on IMF, “Latin America and the Caribbean,” Washington, DC, https:// perma.cc/67QW-6GH4; IMF, “GDP, Current Prices,” Washington, DC, https://perma.cc/74ZA-5PSH; World Bank, “Military Appendix 143
- 144. Expenditure (Current USD) – Latin America Caribbean (Excluding High Income),” Washington, DC, https://perma.cc /HD8Z-26WP, and World Bank, “Exports of Goods and Services (Current US$) – Latin America Caribbean (Excluding High Income), Brazil,” Washington, DC, https://perma.cc/HPD5 -PG4Q. The exports and military spending data are from 2023, while the GDP and population data are from 2024. 8.3 Brazil’s share of global food exports, 2023, percent Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on International Trade Centre, “Trade Map,” Geneva: International Trade Centre, https://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx. 9 South Africa: The Fate of Good Hope 9.1 South Africa’s trade relations with selected countries/regions, 2023, percent of total goods traded Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on South African Revenue Service, “Reports: Bilateral Trade,” Pretoria: South African Revenue Service, 2024, https://perma.cc/VT3J -JJKR. For the selected regions, the data provided refers to the total cumulative bilateral trade in goods from January to December 2023. Note that the figures do not include the categories “unclassified” and “ship/aircraft” of the original data set. Also, note that the figures for Africa do not include South African reimports other than those from the original data. For a breakdown of the geographic classifications, see the original dataset. 9.2 South Africa’s share of GDP of selected groups of countries, 1994, 2024, 2040, percent Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. GDP data for 1994 and 2024 is based on IMF, “GDP, Current Prices: Billions of US Dollars,” Washington, DC: IMF, 2024, https://perma.cc/88W6-W6ZU. The projections for 2040 were exclusively provided by Allianz. Calculations are based on nominal GDP (current US dollars) and rounded figures. Southern Africa includes Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Note that BRICS only includes the original five countries and not the extended group. 9.3 South Africans’ views on the state of democracy, corruption, and overall direction of the country, 2011–2024, percent Illustration by the Munich Security Conference. The 2011– 2021 data on satisfaction with democracy and opinions on the government’s management of corruption is based on Afrobarometer, “African Insights 2024: Democracy at Risk – the People’s Perspective,” Accra: Afrobarometer, 2024, https://perma.cc/26QP-Y3QN, figure 26, 27. The 2024 data on democracy is based on Afrobarometer, “Unemployment, Unreliable Electricity Supply, and Corruption Are South Africans’ Top Concerns, Afrobarometer Pre-Election Telephone Survey Shows,” Pretoria: Afrobarometer, May 23, 2024, https://perma.cc/2D3J-E2F7, figure 2, 2–3. The 2024 data on corruption was exclusively provided by Afrobarometer. The 2011– 2024 data on the views on the overall direction of the country is based on Afrobarometer, “Unemployment, Unreliable Electricity Supply, and Corruption Are South Africans’ Top Concerns, Afrobarometer Pre-Election Telephone Survey Shows,” Figure 3, 3. Note that results from 2011–2021 are from standard face-to-face Afrobarometer surveys, whereas the 2024 survey was conducted telephonically. Given the differences in methodologies, distortions may occur. In response to the question “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa?” respondents were given the following options: “not at all satisfied,” “not very satisfied,” “fairly satisfied,” “very satisfied,” “South Africa is not a democracy,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses “fairly” and “very satisfied.” In response to the question, “How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Fighting corruption in government?” respondents were given the following options: “very badly,” “fairly badly,” “fairly well,” “very well,” and “Do not know. Have not heard enough.” The figures shown here combine the net responses “fairly” and “very well.” In response to the question “Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction?” respondents chose between “wrong direction” and “right direction.” 144 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 145. Image Sources Alan Santos/PR/ Palácio do Planalto P. 25 (Xi) Alexandros Michailidis/Shutterstock.com P. 23 Alexey Smyshlyaev/Shutterstock.com P. 82 A.PAES/Shutterstock.com P. 96 BW Press/Shutterstock.com P. 108 Dimitris Papamitsos P. 19, 80 (Putin) Dominic Dudley/Shutterstock.com P. 112 (Lamola) EPP P. 25 (Tusk), P. 73 (Tusk) Exposure Visuals/Shutterstock.com P. 89 Gage Skidmore P. 15, 17, 56, 60, 67 Jürgen Nowak/Shutterstock.com P. 28, 104 KAZUHIRO NOGI via Getty Images P. 100 Kyodo News via Getty Images P. 97 Maxim Elramsisy/Shutterstock.com P. 59 MSC/Alexandra Beier P. 14, 90 MSC/Andreas Schaad P. 84 MSC/Axel Heimken P. 105 MSC/Balk P. 64 MSC/Karl-Josef Hildenbrand P. 22, P. 73 (Rutte) MSC/Marc Mueller P. 80 MSC/Michaela Stache P. 57 Nico van Blerk/Shutterstock.com P. 112 (Pandor) Tierney L. Cross/Bloomberg via Getty Images P. 113 The Presidency Republic of South Africa P. 115 All other images: MSC/Kuhlmann Book and report covers Allen Lane Penguin Random House; Carnegie Europe; Chatham House; European Council on Foreign Relations; HarperCollins Publishers; Hurst Publishers; John Hopkins University Press; John Murray/Hachette; McKinsey Global Institute; Mercator Institute for China Studies; Nuclear Threat Initiative; Oxford University Press; Princeton University Press; Polity Press; Rockefeller Brothers Fund; Simon and Schuster; The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Yale University Press. List of Abbreviations AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act AI artificial intelligence ANC African National Congress ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BRI Belt and Road Initiative BRICS Intergovernmental organization originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates joined the organization in 2024 and Indonesia joined in 2025. CCP Chinese Communist Party CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization EU European Union EVs electric vehicles FDI foreign direct investment FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific GDP gross domestic product G7 Group of Seven of the world’s advanced economies G20 Group of Twenty ICC International Criminal Court ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development UN United Nations UNCTAD UN Trade and Development UNSC UN Security Council US United States WTO World Trade Organization Appendix 145
- 146. Editors Dr. Tobias Bunde is Director of Research Policy at the Munich Security Conference and Professor of International Security at the Hertie School. Dr. Sophie Eisentraut is Head of Research Publications at the Munich Security Conference. Dr. Leonard Schütte is a Senior Researcher at the Munich Security Conference. Natalie Knapp is a Senior Publications Manager at the Munich Security Conference. Editorial Board Ambassador Dr. Christoph Heusgen is Chairman of the Munich Security Conference. Dr. Benedikt Franke is Vice-Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Munich Security Conference. Report Team Randolf Carr is a Senior Policy Advisor at the Munich Security Conference. Julia Hammelehle is a Senior Policy Advisor at the Munich Security Conference. Dr. Nicole Koenig is Head of Policy at the Munich Security Conference. Paula Köhler is a Policy Advisor at the Munich Security Conference. Isabell Kump is a Policy Advisor at the Munich Security Conference. Jintro Pauly is a Policy Advisor at the Munich Security Conference. Kathrin Strahl is a Graphic Designer at the Munich Security Conference. Fynn-Niklas Franke is a Publications Manager at the Munich Security Conference. Managing Editor Team We would like to thank the entire team at the Munich Security Conference for their indispensable support in completing this Munich Security Report, especially Paula Boden, Dr. Nora Kürzdörfer, Anna-Lena Nolte, Felicitas Remer, and Rainer Rudolph. 146 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 147. Acknowledgments This report was made possible by the generous support from many organizations and their teams. We would like to thank Kekst CNC for the collaboration on the Munich Security Index: Kevin Soady (Partner), Dr. Tom Lubbock (Senior Advisor), James Johnson (Senior Advisor), Joe Alder (Senior Research Associate), and Julian Gallie (Senior Research Associate). We would like to thank McKinsey for production support: Tanja Barrall (Creative Specialist), Julia Rosenfeld (Client Copy Editor), Juliane Schäfer (Senior Media Designer), and Katharina Steffen-Stewart (Client Copy Editor). The Munich Security Conference would like to thank the following organizations for their cooperation: Afrobarometer, Allianz, IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies), and MERICS (Mercator Institute for China Studies). We would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their considerable support: Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny (Afrobarometer), Bernhard Bartsch (MERICS), Florian Dorn (ifo Institute), James Hackett (IISS), Tim Heinkelmann-Wild (LMU Munich), Asafika Mpako (Afrobarometer), Wanda Nick (MERICS), and Jean-Pierre Schnaubelt (Allianz). Appendix 147
- 148. Sophie Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, September 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/LDPB2956. Accusations that the West is guilty of double standards seem omnipresent these days. According to many governments in the so-called Global South, Western states all too frequently deviate from their ostensible foreign policy principles or follow them inconsistently. But criticism of Western double standards has not only become more vocal. It has also become a proxy debate about the value of universal rules and principles as such. Nicole Koenig, “From Soft Talk to Hard Power: Ten To-Dos for the European Defence Union,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Analysis 3, September 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/YSBO6544. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen started her second term vowing to build a “real European Defence Union.” This Union can become an important enabler of a stronger European pillar within NATO. The EU’s new leadership team should swiftly agree on a concrete defense to-do list and rally member states behind it. Ten priority items stand out. Isabell Kump and Amadée Mudie- Mantz, “Fragmented and Multi-Aligned: Key Takeaways From the Munich Leaders Meeting in Rio de Janeiro,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Debrief 2, December 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/RYFC9534. From November 19 to 21, 2024, the Munich Security Conference hosted a Munich Leaders Meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The event brought together 80 decision-makers and experts from all over the world. The discussions revealed diverging views on the global order but also highlighted the potential for greater cooperation with countries of Latin America and the Caribbean – and for collaboration within the region itself. Randolf Carr and Paula Köhler, “AI-pocalypse Now? Disinformation, AI, and the Super Election Year,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Analysis 4, October 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/VPRS3682. AI-enhanced disinformation was predicted to wreak havoc on elections around the world in 2024. However, the real negative effect of AI seems to have been limited. Several factors can explain why AI disinformation mostly fell flat, but they should not give rise to complacency. Technological and societal trends around AI indicate that greater disruptions to democratic processes are on the horizon. No. 1/2024 Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules Munich Security Brief September 2024 Standard Deviation Selected MSC Publications 148 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 149. Leonard Schütte, “Remedy for Longevity: A European Burden-Seizing Initiative for NATO to Age Well,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Opinion 2, July 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/GEGG7367. Celebrations of NATO’s 75th anniversary should not obscure the fact that centrifugal forces are pulling the US away from Europe. If European NATO Allies merely watch this shift happening, they will cede further control over their security. Instead, they should recreate the transatlantic bargain by launching an initiative to seize the bulk of the burden of conventionally defending Europe. Randolf Carr and Nicole Koenig, “Dark Clouds and Silver Linings: Key Takeaways From the Munich Security Conference 2024,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Debrief 1, February 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/HIQV3321. The conference’s sixtieth anniversary was one of superlatives, but also had to address a superlative number and breadth of crises and challenges. Still, some key themes emerged over the weekend: the need to insulate trans atlantic unity from isolationism; the call of “now” for European action; the search for ways out of the Middle East’s vicious cycle; the reimagining of global order; and, across the board, the finding – or missing – of silver linings. Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose?, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/BMQK9457. The Munich Security Report 2024 explores the lose-lose dynamics that are spurred if ever more governments prioritize relative payoffs rather than engaging in positive-sum cooperation or investing in an international order that, despite its obvious flaws, can still help grow the proverbial pie for the benefit of all. The report also stimulates the debate on how the transatlantic partners and like-minded states can balance two difficult requirements: bracing for a much more competitive geopolitical environment, where relative-gains thinking is unavoidable, and reviving the type of cooperation without which more inclusive global growth and solutions to pressing global problems can hardly be attained. Sophie Eisentraut, “Strategic Convergence Under the Radar: Europe and India After Russia’s Invasion,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Analysis 2, February 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/GDRN9936. Russia’s war on Ukraine revealed differences between India and Europe over perceptions of the international order on the whole and how to deal with Moscow in particular. Many Europeans began to worry that the war had exposed the limits of closer cooperation with New Delhi. Under the radar, however, the strategic challenges that both Europe and India face and the lessons both sides have drawn from this conflict, remarkably, have converged since the beginning of Russia’s war. Survey data collected for the Munich Security Index 2024 highlights three areas where stra- tegic overlap can serve as the basis for enhanced Indo-European cooperation. Lose-Lose? | Munich Security Report 2024 Munich Security Report 2024 February 2024 Amid growing geopolitical tensions and rising economic uncertainty, many governments are no longer focusing on the absolute benefits provided by the international order and global cooperation, but are increasingly concerned that they are gaining less than others. Yet prioritizing relative payoffs may well spur lose-lose dynamics – jeopardizing cooperation and undermining an order that, despite its obvious flaws, can still help grow the proverbial pie for the benefit of all. The transatlantic partners and like-minded states now face a difficult balancing act. On the one hand, they have to brace for a much more competitive geopolitical environment, where relative-gains thinking is unavoidable. On the other hand, they have to revive positive-sum cooperation, without which more inclusive global growth and solutions to pressing global problems can hardly be attained. Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, and Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose?, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2024, https://doi.org/10.47342/BMQK9457. securityconference.org Lose-Lose? Appendix 149
- 150. About About the Munich Security Conference (MSC) The Munich Security Conference is the world’s leading forum for debating international security policy. In addition to its annual flagship conference, the MSC regularly convenes high-profile events around the world. The MSC publishes the annual Munich Security Report and other publications on specific security issues. About the Munich Security Report (MSR) Since its first edition in 2015, the Munich Security Report (MSR) has compiled data, analyses, and maps to illustrate current security policy issues. The annual flagship report serves as a discussion starter for the Munich Security Conference in February and is targeted at an expert audience as well as the interested public. Special editions of the MSR offer deeper analyses of key actors, regions, or issues. Editorial Board Ambassador Dr. Christoph Heusgen, Dr. Benedikt Franke Design Concept MetaDesign Cover/MSI Design and Layout Kathrin Strahl Printed by Königsdruck Stiftung Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz gGmbH Karolinenplatz 3, 80333 Munich www.securityconference.org research@securityconference.org Visit our app and social media channels: www.linktr.ee/MunSecConf Bibliographical Information Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, and Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623. DOI: 10.47342/EZUC8623 ISSN (print): 2365-2179 ISSN (online): 2365-2187 Disclaimer The information and data in the Munich Security Report has been obtained from sources that the authors believe to be reliable, accurate, and trustworthy. However, we cannot guarantee their accuracy or completeness. Should you wish to reproduce parts of this Munich Security Report, please ensure that you acknowledge the original source and consult with the contributing organization or institution. This report went to print on January 20, 2025. 150 MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2025
- 151. It has become a truism of foreign policy debates that the world is becoming ever more “multipolar.” While the extent to which today’s world is already multipolar is debatable, the world’s “multipolarization” is a fact: On the one hand, power is shifting toward a larger number of actors who have the ability to influence key global issues. On the other hand, the world is experiencing increasing polarization both between and within many states. For many politicians and citizens around the globe, a more multipolar world holds significant promise. But recent trends suggest that the negative effects of greater multipolarity are prevailing as divides between major powers grow and competition among different order models stands in the way of joint approaches to global crises and threats. Meanwhile, domestic polarization is preventing governments from pursuing “enlightened” foreign policies that could help build global consensus and benefit the international community at large. Under these conditions, efforts to preserve basic rules and norms – or create new ones – and attempts to coordinate responses to a wide range of global threats will hardly be successful. Setting multipolarity on a positive track thus has to start with a process of “depolarization.” Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, and Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, https://doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623. securityconference.org