Munich Security Report2023: Re-Vision

Munich Security Report 2023
Re:vision
February 2023

February 2023
Re:vision
Tobias Bunde
Sophie Eisentraut
Natalie Knapp
Leonard Schütte
Julia Hammelehle
Isabell Kump
Amadée Mudie-Mantz
Jintro Pauly

Foreword
Executive Summary
1 Introduction
Munich Security Index 2023
Spotlight Ukraine
2 Human Rights: Universell-Out
3
Global Infrastructures: My Way or No Highway
4 Development Cooperation: Strings Attached
5 Energy Security: Refueled
6 Nuclear Order: Atomized
Food for Thought
Notes
Endnotes
List of Figures
Image Sources
List of Abbreviations
Team
Acknowledgments
Latest MSC Publications
About
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Table of Contents

6
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 FOREWARD
Foreword
Dear Reader,
Just a few days after last year’s Munich Security Conference concluded,
Russia began its unprovoked and brutal aggression against Ukraine.
Since that fateful decision, the world has changed dramatically. As
German Chancellor Scholz famously noted, the Russian invasion marks
a Zeitenwende, a watershed, which forces us to rethink previous
assumptions. Zeitenwende incidentally was also the name of an MSC
Report published in October 2020 calling for a more robust approach
in German foreign policy. As the changes in the Munich Security Index –
an exclusive annual index of risk perceptions, which we developed
together with our partner Kekst CNC – indicate, people around the
world feel that we are indeed witnessing a turning point for world politics,
and have adapted their views as a result.
The invasion of Ukraine also reveals a few simple things. First, Vladimir
Putin’s decision to use military force against a peaceful neighbor has
demonstrated that powerful actors believe they can ignore even the
minimum standards of international law, such as the principle of
territorial integrity. As the chapters of this Munich Security Report show,
the Russian war against Ukraine is just the most brazen attack on the
rules-based order. Revisionist actors are trying to undermine the status
quo and change the international order in many different ways.
Second, we are far from helpless. Revisionism can be resisted.
The Ukrainian people, first and foremost, have demonstrated a remarkable
resilience and determination in the face of blunt aggression. The vast
Christoph Heusgen

7
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 FOREWORD
majority of UN member states have condemned the invasion and the
attempted annexation of Ukrainian regions, and many countries have
introduced sanctions against Russia and provided Ukraine with political,
economic, and military support. However, Ukraine has not won the war yet,
and will need the support of all those who believe in the rule of law.
Third, the fact that a considerable number of actors have not condemned
Russia’s aggression shows that it is not enough for us to simply defend
the status quo. If we do not address the resentment that countries in
Africa, Latin America, and Asia feel toward the international order,
which has not always served their interests, we will struggle to win
the fence-sitters as allies in the defense of key rules and principles.
As this report argues, we need a vision of the international order that
more people can subscribe to, as well as a larger coalition of responsible
stakeholders, if we want to preserve the core principles of this order.
At this year’s Munich Security Conference, we will thus not only focus
on pushing back against revisionism, but also on creating a positive
vision for a more peaceful and prosperous world.
This year’s conference is also a Zeitenwende for the MSC, as Wolfgang
Ischinger, after 14 years at its helm, has handed over the chairmanship
to me. I am deeply grateful to him and look forward to building on his
legacy – together with the wonderful MSC team and all of you.
Yours,
Ambassador Christoph Heusgen
Chairman of the Munich Security Conference

8
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

9
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023
Executive Summary
Debates about different visions for the future international
order are often abstract and theoretical. By invading Ukraine,
Russian President Vladimir Putin has made the clash of
competing visions a brutal and deathly reality. The world’s
liberal democracies are awakening to the challenges posed by
autocratic revisionists, and have taken the first important steps
to pushing back. But for liberal-democratic principles to prevail
over the autocratic variants, democracies must revamp their
vision of a desirable international order. A re-envisioned liberal,
rules-based international order is needed to strengthen
democratic resilience in an era of fierce systemic competition
with autocratic regimes. But to make this vision more
attractive among the wider international community and
help it win the contest for the future international order,
democracies must also take into account legitimate criticism
and concerns among the wider international community.
On February 24, 2022, Russia not only launched a war against Ukraine that
has already caused tens of thousands of Ukrainian civilian casualties, forced
millions to flee their homes, and inflicted war damages of hundreds of billions
of euros. With its brutal and unprovoked invasion of a sovereign state, Moscow
has also mounted an attack against the foundational principles of the post–
World War II order. The attempt by an authoritarian power to eliminate a
democracy as a sovereign nation-state is not the only sign, however, that
autocratic revisionism is intensifying. China’s tacit support for Russia’s war,
its military posturing to assert its own sphere of influence in East Asia, and
its comprehensive efforts to promote an autocratic alternative to the liberal,
rules-based international order epitomize the broader autocratic challenge.
When asked about the main fault line in global politics today, the most
prominent divide mentioned among those surveyed for the Munich Security
Index 2023 is indeed that between democracies and dictators.
However, the relevance of the democracy–autocracy cleavage varies across
policy fields. Whether a country is a democracy or not is clearly not the only
factor that shapes the contest for the future international order. The mere
fact that many governments from Africa, Latin America, and Asia have not
been willing to speak up against Russia’s aggression shows that powerful
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
10
autocrats are not alone in their deep dissatisfaction with existing international
norms and institutions – and that simply defending the status quo is not
enough to effectively push back against autocratic revisionists.
Human rights (Chapter 2) have been a major flashpoint in the growing systemic
competition. China, supported by Russia, is at the forefront of broader
authoritarian pushback against international human rights and the
mechanisms built to protect them. The vision that Beijing is pursuing, Western
observers worry, is nothing less than to create a world safe for autocracy. Among
others, China seeks to ensure that collective rights, as defined and upheld by
the state, take precedence over individual civil and political liberties. But
disagreement on human rights is also evident within and among the democratic
states of the world. Certainly influenced by the experience of Western
colonialism and imperialism, many non-Western democracies show greater
concern for sovereignty and non-interference than their Western counterparts,
and are thus reluctant to support robust action in the name of human rights.
Global infrastructures (Chapter 3) have likewise become an important site of
geo
political competition. Democratic and autocratic camps openly compete
to imbue physical and digital infrastructures with their governance visions.
In the digital realm, China is spearheading a group of autocratic states intent
on promoting their techno-authoritarian vision, while the transatlantic
partners are only gradually converging on a shared vision of an open digital
infrastructure. Regarding the global trade infrastructure, the fault lines are
messier. Many governments are increasingly viewing interdependencies as
both vulnerabilities and conduits for coercion. As a result, weaponization of
trade links abounds, while all major powers are increasingly resorting to
protectionism. A new vision for global trade infrastructure that serves mutual
prosperity while limiting vulnerabilities is not yet in sight.
Development cooperation (Chapter 4) has not been spared from systemic
competition either. Health and food security as well as climate finance have
become key policy fields where competing narratives of a desirable development
order are playing out. Beijing is promoting its own model of development
cooperation, supposedly free from conditionalities, as a distinct alternative to the
US and European models, which emphasize the importance of democracy, good
governance, free markets, accountability, and transparency. But while China’s
growing engagement falls on fertile ground in many developing countries, this is
often less a matter of conviction than of a lack of alternatives and deep grievances
with the existing development order that has not yielded sufficient benefits.

11
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Even if it does not neatly display a democracy–autocracy fault line, the new
energy order (Chapter 5) increasingly reflects geopolitical considerations rather
than market logic. Russia’s autocratic revisionism and its weaponization of fossil
fuel exports have made energy dependency on autocratic great powers a major
concern for Western liberal democracies. They now need to ensure that their
efforts to wean themselves off Russian oil and gas do not simultaneously
further increase their dependence on other autocracies, including China
(for critical raw materials) and Qatar (for gas).
Revisionist autocracies present various challenges to the nuclear order and
strategic stability (Chapter 6). Most importantly, Russian threats of using nuclear
weapons in the war against Ukraine have raised concerns around the globe.
China has significantly invested in additional nuclear capabilities without
increasing transparency. And North Korea and Iran present their own
challenges to the nuclear order. Given the deteriorating security environment,
democratic nuclear powers have reiterated their commitment to nuclear
deterrence, while the prospects for arms control initiatives have dimmed.
Disappointment with the lack of disarmament, in turn, has led to frustration
in many parts of the world, including in the “Global South,” where many
countries envisage a different kind of nuclear order.
World leaders may not agree on much these days – but many of them share the
sentiment that the world is entering a critical decade in the contest for the future
international order. While 2022 will be remembered for ramped-up autocratic
revisionism, it has also demonstrated that revisionists can be resisted and
that liberal ideas are still able to inspire. The extraordinary resilience and
determination of the Ukrainian people, as documented in the Munich
Security Index 2023 (Spotlight Ukraine), has galvanized international support
for their country’s struggle against the aggressor and instilled a new sense of
purpose into democratic countries and governance formats. Liberal democracies
need to use this momentum. If they succeed in re-envisioning the liberal,
rules-based order as one that better represents the many countries in the world
that have hitherto been confined to the role of rule-takers, as one that better
delivers on its promises, and as one that truly benefits everyone equally, they
may enlarge the coalition of committed stakeholders and render the order much
more resilient. If the revisionist moment we are currently experiencing spurs the
renewal of this liberal, rules-based order, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
and the people of Ukraine will have played a big part in this achievement.

INTRODUCTION
12
12

13
13
Re:vision
What are the consequences of Russia’s war on
Ukraine? Is the world witnessing a revisionist
moment? What are the main fault lines in the global
contest of different visions for the future of the
international order? And how can the coalition
defending the vision of a liberal, rules-based
order be enlarged and strengthened?
Introduction
1

INTRODUCTION
14
Re:vision
On February 24, 2022, Russia not only launched a war against Ukraine; with
its brutal and unprovoked invasion of a sovereign state, it also mounted an
attack against the foundational principles of the post–World War II order.1
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, tens of thousands of Ukrainian
civilians have been killed, millions have been forced to flee their homes,
and war damages have run into the hundreds of billions of euros.3
Russia’s
revisionist war has cost innocent lives throughout Ukraine’s territory – from the
Donbas to the Western oblasts (Figure 1.1). While there are innocent victims in
every war, Russia’s aggression is extraordinarily brutal. War crimes are not just
a byproduct of the war, but an essential feature of Russian warfare in Ukraine.
In clear violation of humanitarian law, the Russian military continues to attack
not just military targets, but often aims at civilian infrastructure to increase
human suffering and break the Ukrainian resistance. Countless cases of sexual
violence committed by Russian soldiers and mercenaries are documented,
and Russian authorities have abducted thousands of Ukrainian children.4
On Russian TV shows, analysts casually fantasize about nuclear escalation
or call for ever more punishment against Russia’s neighboring country.5
Compassion with Ukrainians seems almost completely absent in Russian
society.6
With the ruthlessness of its aims and the brutality of its means,
this Russian war evokes memories of the worst episodes in European history.
Debates about different visions for the future international order and its
guiding principles – at the Munich Security Conference or elsewhere – are
often abstract and theoretical. But the plight of the Ukrainians demonstrates
that the clash of different visions can become a matter of life and death.
Even for many people not directly affected, the Russian invasion represents
what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has called a Zeitenwende, a watershed.7
In all countries polled for the Munich Security Index, except for Japan,
majorities see the Russian invasion as a turning point in world politics
(Figure 1.2). But where is world politics turning?
The Revisionist Moment: Russia and China and Their Autocratic Vision
Russian President Vladimir Putin has long complained about a world order
ostensibly dominated by the West – especially by the United States.9
For him,
the war represents “the beginning of a radical breakdown of the US-style
world order [and] the transition from liberal-globalist American egocentrism
to a truly multipolar world.”10
A Russian victory in Ukraine, and the failure
Tobias Bunde and
Sophie Eisentraut
“This battle is not only for
the territory – for this or
another part of Europe.
This battle is not only for
life, freedom, and security
of Ukrainians or any
other nation, which Russia
attempts to conquer. This
struggle will define in
what world our children
and grandchildren will live
and then their children
and grandchildren.”2
Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
Ukrainian President,
US Congress, December 22,
2022
“We are in the midst of a
strategic competition to
shape the future of the
international order.”8
Joseph Biden, US President,
preface to the US National
Security Strategy, October 12,
2022

Data:
Victor
Pinchuk
Foundation.
Illustration:
Victor
Pinchuk
Foundation/Munich
Security
Conference
Figure
1.1
Examples
of
Russian
war
crimes
in
Ukraine,
2022
This
is
officially
conﬁrmed
information
according
to
investigations
by
Ukraine’s
law
enforcement
agencies.
The
real
numbers
are
much
higher
and
growing
every
day.
Kramatorsk:
Missile
strike
on
a
train
station
Korosten:
Bombing
of
residential
buildings
in
the
city
Zhytomyr
Oblast
The
Autonomous
Republic
of
Crimea
Kherson
Oblast
Poltava
Oblast
Dnipropetrovsk
Oblast
Rivne
Oblast
Sumy
Oblast
Chernihiv
Oblast
Zaporizhzhia
Oblast
Cherkasy
Oblast
Kyiv
Oblast
Vinnytsia
Oblast
Odesa
Oblast
Khmelnytskyi
Oblast
Chernivtsi
Oblast
Ivano-
Frankivsk
Oblast
Mykolaiv
Oblast
Kirovohrad
Oblast
Lviv
Oblast
Ternopil
Oblast
Zakarpattia
Oblast
March
10
Ochakiv:
Shelling
of
residential
buildings
June
28
Serhiivka:
Missile
strike
hitting
a
nine-story
apartment
building
July
1
April
8
Kharkiv:
Shelling
of
the
city
May
26
Lysychansk:
Shelling
of
civilians
lining
up
for
water
June
27
Chasiv
Yar:
Shelling
of
the
city
July
9
Chaplyne:
Shelling
of
the
settlement
August
24
Marhanets:
Shelling
of
the
city
August
10,
2022
Sarny:
Shelling
of
the
city
June
25
Lviv:
Rocket
strike
injuring
civilians
March
26
Kyiv:
Shooting
at
a
car,
killing
civilians
February
26
Mokhnatyn:
Shooting
of
civilians,
incl.
teenage
twins
March
14
Bucha:
Shooting
at
a
car
with
a
man
and
pregnant
woman
inside
March
4
Vesele:
Shooting
at
a
car
with
a
family
of
ﬁve
inside
March
24
Voznesensk:
Shelling
of
the
city
August
20
Dachne:
Shelling
of
the
settlement
March
1
Yahidne:
Consequences
of
the
Russian
military’s
stay
in
the
village
February
25
Sumy:
Airstrike
on
residential
areas
March
7
Kyiv:
Shelling
of
a
residential
building
Kreminna:
Shelling
of
a
nursing
home
March
11
Sviatohirsk:
Exhumation
of
a
mass
burial
October
10
Kherson:
Shelling
of
the
city
center
with
rockets
December
24
Kharkiv:
Shelling
of
dormitories
August
18
Bilopillia:
Artillery
shelling
of
the
city
and
hospital,
killing
a
child
November
30
June
26
Vyshhorod:
Rocket
attack
on
the
city
November
24
Mariupol:
Airstrike
on
a
theater
March
16
Irpin:
Shooting
at
car
with
a
family
inside
March
6
Cherkasy:
Missile
attack
on
the
city
and
suburbs
June
26
Kremenchuk:
Missile
attack
on
a
mall
June
27
Kupiansk:
Shooting
at
an
evacuation
convoy
of
civilian
vehicles
September
25
Izium:
Shelling
of
a
residential
high-rise
building
September
17
Lyman:
Exhumation
of
a
mass
burial
October
11
Volyn
Oblast
Civilans
killed:
8,852
(incl.
452
kids)
Civilians
wounded:
11,933
(incl.
876
kids)
1
6
1
6
6
13
4
12
4
16
14
32
50
24
204
33
120
24
119
156
212
Luhansk
Oblast
696
983
Kharkiv
Oblast
2,452
1,704
Donetsk
Oblast
2,907
2,032
488
1,259
108
426
294
962
608
646
482
719
2,087
703
Killed
civilians
Wounded
civilians
1
15
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION
16
of the West to prevent it, would be “a potent symbol of a new post-Western
era, the collapse of the old order and the rise of a new, authoritarian-friendly
multipolarity.”11
Putin’s war would have been less likely if this vision were not supported by
a much more powerful revisionist, who shares the Russian leader’s core
grievances with the liberal thrust of the international order and his desire
for a sphere of influence: Chinese President Xi Jinping. Just a few weeks
before Moscow invaded Ukraine, Putin and Xi issued a joint statement about
the beginning of a “new era,” characterized by much deeper Chinese–
Russian cooperation. According to the statement, both countries share a
“The current developments
in the world are not so
much about Ukraine as
about attempts to shape
a new international
order.”12
Sergey Lavrov, Russian
Foreign Minister, MGIMO
University, March 23, 2022
Neither/don’t know Disagree
Agree
powered by
Munich Security
Index
Do you agree or disagree
that the invasion of
Ukraine is a turning point
in world politics?
Data and illustration: Kekst CNC,
commissioned by the Munich Security Conference
Figure 1.2
Citizens’ views on the invasion of Ukraine as a turning point
in world politics, October–November 2022, percent
Ukraine
Italy
UK
Germany
Canada
China
France
US
Brazil
Japan
India
7
24
27
30
32
34
36
30
32
35
36
87
68
65
60
59
58
58
57
56
55
53
45 46 9
5
8
8
10
10
8
6
13
12
10
10
South Africa

17
“I think [the Russia-China
joint statement] is
the culmination of a
long-standing campaign.
It’s an act of defiance.
It’s a clear revisionist
manifesto. It’s a manifesto
to review the world
order.”16
Josep Borrell, EU High
Representative, Munich
Security Conference,
February 20, 2022
friendship “without limits,” which includes “strong mutual support for
the protection of their core interests.”13
In this spirit, Beijing has not only
refused to condemn Russia’s war of aggression; Chinese media has also
amplified Russian war propaganda, blaming NATO for the start of the war and
“shrouding the Russian regime’s culpability.”14
It may be true that Beijing
has also been careful not to associate itself too closely with Russia’s war on
Ukraine. At times, it has even distanced itself from Moscow and publicly
condemned Russian threats to use nuclear weapons.15
But given the close
coordination of the world’s most powerful autocrats in response to the war
in Ukraine, it is difficult not to see the Russian invasion through the lens of
a broader contest between different visions for the international order.
Chinese–Russian collaboration to subvert and reshape elements of the inter-
national order are hardly a new phenomenon. For many years, both countries,
with China in the driver’s seat, have been trying to bring about an order that
favors non-democratic forms of governance and the narratives and interests
of autocrats in the international system – a world, in short, “where liberal
values carry no merit or moral freight in their own right.”17
To this end, Moscow
and Beijing have often coordinated their votes at the United Nations. In the
realm of human rights, which has recently seen Beijing prevent the discussion
of a UN report documenting massive human rights violations committed
against Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims, this joint effort has been particularly
obvious (Chapter 2). But efforts to push back against liberal rules and principles
and replace them with autocratic ones has also been evident in many other
realms of the international system (Chapters 3 and 4).
Yet none of their efforts to revise existing elements of the post–World War II
order have been as fundamental and brazen as Russia’s attack against the
principles of non-aggression and territorial integrity. Putin has left no doubt
that in his attempt to reestablish the Russian empire, he no longer feels
bound by even the minimum standards of international law. Instead, he
seeks to replace them with 19th-century principles of unconstrained power
politics that allow big countries to carve out regional spheres of influence,
irrespective of the wishes of local populations.18
Just as Moscow seeks to dominate Russia’s “near abroad,” Beijing has tried to
assert its sphere of influence in East Asia, often by selectively interpreting
international law. Although it promised a “one country, two systems” model
for Hong Kong, China introduced a national security law in 2020 that has
effectively reduced Hong Kong’s autonomy.20
Beijing has also doubled down
“External attempts to
suppress and contain
China may escalate at
any time. […] We must
[…] be more mindful of
potential dangers, be
prepared to deal with
worst-case scenarios, and
be ready to withstand
high winds, choppy
waters, and even
dangerous storms.”19
Xi Jinping, Chinese
President, 20th Party
Congress, October 16, 2022
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION
18
on its policies in the South China Sea, fortifying its artificial islands, pushing
more ambitious territorial claims, and intimidating its neighbors.21
It has
refused to accept the 2016 ruling of the Arbitration Tribunal in the South
China Sea Arbitration case, which rejected China’s expansive maritime claims.22
Perhaps most importantly, the Chinese government has intensified the pursuit
of unification with Taiwan.23
While Xi stressed that China would continue to
seek a peaceful solution, he also warned that China would “never promise
to renounce the use of force” and “reserve the option of taking all measures
necessary.”24
In the past year, Beijing massively stepped up its military
intimidation of Taipei, including via repeated incursions into Taiwan’s air
defense identification zone (Figure 1.3) and increased military activities in
the Taiwan Strait.25
This Chinese belligerence has provoked a significant rise
in the perceived risk of China invading Taiwan among the respondents
surveyed for the Munich Security Index.26
Some analysts fear that Chinese
Number of PLA aircraft crossing
the median line in the Taiwan Strait
Number of PLA aircraft entering
Taiwan’s air defense identiﬁcation zone
Number of days with PLA
aircraft entering Taiwan’s
air defense identiﬁcation zone
Figure 1.3
Escalating military intimidation of Taiwan by the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), September 2020–December 2022
*Data includes events up to (and including) December 20, 2022.
Data: Mercator Institute for China Studies.
Illustration: Munich Security Conference
250
300
150
100
50
200
350
450
400
Sept Dec Mar June Sept Dec Dec*
Mar June Sept
2020 2021 2022

19
“I myself have a strong
sense of urgency that
‘Ukraine today may be
East Asia tomorrow.’”29
Fumio Kishida, Japanese
Prime Minister, IISS
Shangri- La Dialogue,
September 21, 2022
“Beijing’s vision would
move us away from the
universal values that
have sustained so much
of the world’s progress
over the past 75 years.”30
Antony Blinken, US Secretary
of State, George Washington
University, May 26, 2022
leadership might adopt a more hawkish foreign policy to distract from looming
economic woes. Together with the consolidation of Xi’s power, with fewer
checks and balances, and his “securitization of everything,”27
this could prove
a toxic cocktail. Russia’s war against Ukraine is “the 21st century’s first imperial
war,”28
but it may not be the last.
Although Chinese and Russian aspirations are clearly at odds with the principles
of sovereign equality and territorial integrity, both countries like to portray
themselves as defenders of the UN Charter. Aware that their attempted
authoritarian overhaul of the international system requires support in the
“Global South,” Russia and China purport to envision a multipolar world that
grants greater say to other centers of power beyond the traditional West.
Yet Sino-Russian revisionism is now facing resistance. China’s assertive
policies are already producing a backlash that is undermining Beijing’s
global ambitions.31
Moreover, the humiliating setbacks that Ukrainian
forces have inflicted on the Russian offensive, together with international
sanctions, have weakened Russia’s military and economy while also dealing
a blow to the image of competent authoritarian rule.32
Recent protests in
China – and also in Iran – suggest that “the inevitable overreach by societies
who try to control human beings is ultimately not sustainable.”33
Moreover,
evidence is mounting that there are more limits to the supposed “no limits”
partnership than Beijing and Moscow would like to admit. It is thus far from
clear whether authoritarian great powers will emerge stronger from the
war in Ukraine. But even if they don’t, there is no room for complacency.
The past year provided ample evidence on how enormously disruptive and
destructive authoritarian revisionism has become.
Acquiescence in Revisionism: The Order Going South
Notwithstanding unequivocal violations of the UN Charter, many countries
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have proven unwilling to speak up against
Russia’s brutal attack and isolate Moscow economically and diplomatically.
Often called “fence-sitters,” the new “non-aligned,” or “hedging middle,” a
significant number of states have refused to take sides in the war against
Ukraine.34
In fact, while the overwhelming majority of countries condemned
Russia’s invasion (141 countries) and the attempted annexation of additional
parts of Ukraine (143 countries) in votes at the UN General Assembly in
March and October (Figure 1.4), those that abstained or voted against the
condemnation – among them large and influential countries such as India and
South Africa – are home to almost 50 percent of the global population.35
INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION
20
Given the massive ripple effects of Russia’s war, especially for poorer
countries, it is hardly surprising that material support for Ukraine has
only come from the world’s rich democracies and that few other countries
have introduced sanctions against Russia. In fact, not a single state from
Africa or Latin America is part of the loose coalition that has imposed
sanctions on Russia.37
But many politicians in the West were bothered by
a perceived lack of empathy for Ukraine, the reluctance to take a stand
against the violation of key norms and principles, and the fact that some
governments even exploited Russia’s war to advance their countries’
economic interests. From the dominant Western perspective, many countries
in the “Global South” were wittingly or unwittingly complicit in Russian
efforts to weaken international norms.38
Disappointment with the way
Brazil, South Africa, and India – and the “Global South” more broadly –
have responded to the Russian invasion is also evident in the results of the
Munich Security Index (Figure 1.5).
“Russia’s war marks a
new reality. It requires
each and every one of
us to take a firm and
responsible decision,
and to take a side.”36
Annalena Baerbock, German
Foreign Minister, Eleventh
Emergency Special Session
of the UN General Assembly,
March 1, 2022
Figure 1.4
Voting summary, UN General Assembly resolution on
“The Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of
the Charter of the United Nations,” October 12, 2022
Data: United Nations. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Yes (143 members) No (5 members) Abstentions (35 members)
Non-voting (10 members)

Figure 1.5
Evaluation of the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by
citizens of different countries, share saying the country or organization
has “done well” minus share saying it has “done badly,”
October–November 2022, percent
powered by
Munich Security
Index
Japan +28 +17 +3 -6 -1 0 -2 +3 -11 -11 -22 -6 -31 -23 -25 -24 -24 -24 -34
Germany +17 +19 +17 +22 +23 +12 +9 +19 +13 +7 +9 -18 +6 -5 -12 -6 -11 -17 -33
France +23 +23 +7 -1 +11 +13 +7 +11 -2 -7 -10 -15 -2 -20 -23 -22 -25 -23 -23
United Kingdom +52 +33 +43 +24 +14 +24 +20 +25 +12 +16 +9 +2 +12 -2 -4 -1 -3 -14 -32
Canada +43 +24 +21 +24 +16 +17 +16 +11 +6 +8 +6 -5 +0 -5 -7 -5 -4 -12 -34
United States +37 +30 +25 +22 +18 +18 +18 +18 +14 +12 +15 +3 +8 +4 +3 +6 +4 -1 -23
Brazil +16 +19 +18 +19 +13 +8 +15 +8 +17 +8 +16 +5 +8 +9 +17 +9 +10 +9 -8
Italy +9 -2 +9 +11 +10 -1 +2 0 +2 -4 +9 +3 -10 -4 -4 -1 -6 -11 -23
South Africa +21 +18 +18 +15 +16 +14 +16 +7 +12 +9 +9 +12 +13 +3 +8 -1 +3 +4 -3
China +12 +4 +16 +19 +21 +17 +21 +17 +21 +21 +11 +30 +28 +28 +31 +30 +31 +22 +40
India +25 +29 +29 +29 +29 +28 +27 +28 +30 +24 +32 +22 +26 +25 +28 +23 +29 +52 +10
Ukraine +60 +76 +77 +72 +43 +61 +47 +32 +36 +39 +29 +44 -2 -1 -7 -13 -15 -27 -37
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
C
a
n
a
d
a
F
r
a
n
c
e
E
U
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
N
A
T
O
I
t
a
l
y
G
7
J
a
p
a
n
T
u
r
k
e
y
U
N
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
B
r
a
z
i
l
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
“
G
l
o
b
a
l
S
o
u
t
h
”
I
n
d
i
a
C
h
i
n
a
-40 – -31 -30 – -21 -20 – -11 -10 – -1 0 – 10 11 – 20 21 – 30 31 – 40 41 – 50 51 – 60 61 – 70 71 – 80
21
Yet it would be too simplistic to conclude that the “Global South” has
turned against the existing order. There are many examples of countries
from the “Global South” that spoke up against Russia’s attack of key
principles of the post–World War II order. Kenya’s Permanent Representative
to the UN Martin Kimani launched a passionate defense of the norm against
territorial conquest, while the Permanent Representative of Fiji to the
UN Satyendra Prasad strongly criticized Russia’s invasion as a clear
violation of the UN Charter.39
Moreover, almost every Pacific Island state
voted in favor of the March 2 resolution.40
For these and other small
INTRODUCTION

22
countries, the end of their legal guarantee of territorial integrity would be
particularly worrisome.
Even among the countries unwilling to unambiguously side with Ukraine,
there are stark differences, with each state possessing “its own unique set of
interests, concerns, and objectives” with regard to Russia and the broader
international order.42
These may include the desire to stay on the sidelines of
growing geopolitical rivalry; a perception of the war as a conflict exclusively
between Europeans over European security; and vulnerability to Russian
coercion that comes with dependence on Moscow.43
They may also include a
preoccupation with what governments regard as more proximate threats,
including food insecurity. In fact, the repercussions of Russia’s war, such as
rising prices for food and energy, have disproportionately harmed countries
from the “Global South” – a fact that Western states did not take seriously
enough at first.44
At the same time, other influential states such as India,
Turkey, or Saudi Arabia are quite actively hedging their bets in the current
geopolitical standoff – both when it comes to Ukraine but also on many
other policy issues.45
Rather than being guided by deep feelings about the
international order, their responses to the war in Ukraine and their stances
in the broader international contest over the international order seem to be
guided by much more pragmatic reasoning.46
Yet frustrations about the existing order abound in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. It would be far too easy to trivialize these resentments as irrelevant
to states’ responses to the war in Ukraine – or as insignificant to their behavior
in other arenas of the global order contest. Many of these countries “have
steadily lost faith in the legitimacy and fairness of the international system,”48
which has neither granted them an appropriate voice in global affairs, nor
sufficiently addressed their core concerns. Most recently, this has included
too little help with rising food prices, access to energy, the acquisition of
Covid-19 vaccines, mounting sovereign debt, and the consequences of the
climate crisis (Chapters 4 and 5).
To many states, these failures are deeply tied to the West. They find that the
Western-led order has been characterized by postcolonial domination,
double standards, and neglect for developing countries’ concerns, rather
than by liberal principles and true multilateralism.49
Thus in many parts of
the world, the concept of a “multipolar” or “post-Western” order does not
need much advertising. The West’s immediate response to the war in Ukraine
certainly did not help. Rather than assisting countries in tackling spiking
“Russia’s attack on
Ukraine [...] is a flagrant
violation of the United
Nations Charter. It is
bad for every country,
but especially for small
states like Singapore.
Our security, our very
existence, depend on
the international rule
of law.”41
Lee Hsien Loong,
Singaporean Prime Minister,
May Day Rally, May 1, 2022
INTRODUCTION

23
food and energy prices, the West reprimanded them for not showing enough
solidarity with Kiev. For countries that have experienced the West as a
fence-sitter to the devastating wars and conflicts in their own regions, many
of them much more deadly than the war in Ukraine, the request not to stay
neutral in a European war certainly rung hollow. While G7 countries have
pledged to address the detrimental global consequences of the war, for some
analysts, the West’s initial messaging on Ukraine “has taken its tone-deafness
to a whole new level.”50
Yet as revealed in the Munich Security Index, dissatisfaction with the West in
key countries in the “Global South” does not translate into a desire to see China
and Russia exercise more influence over the future international order.
Respondents in India, Brazil, and South Africa mostly want a greater role for
developing nations when it comes to shaping international rules. But when
asked to rate the attractiveness of rules made by Russia and China as opposed
to rules made by the US and Europe (Figure 1.6), their choices were surprisingly
clear. Alienation from the existing international order and its main guardians
does not seem to equate to general support for autocratic revisionism.
Call to Order? The Defenders of the Liberal-Democratic Vision
From the perspective of the world’s liberal democracies, the Russian invasion
of Ukraine has been a wake-up call to defend the principles of the liberal, rules-
based international order against autocratic challengers. After the end of the
Cold War, they believed that the liberal vision based on the triad of human
rights, liberal democracy, and market economy had triumphed and would
conquer the whole globe over time. But despite its undeniable achievements,
key elements of this liberal vision have lost both domestic and international
support.51
The storming of the US Capitol on January 6, 2021, has been the
most dramatic symbol of the erosion of liberal-democratic norms, which
threatens not only the stability of liberal democracies, but also the
liberal international order. The fact that the liberal-democratic model is
increasingly contested in some Western democracies has undeniably
encouraged revisionist powers to promote their alternative vision much
more assertively.
Yet the past year has – for all its horrendous developments – also demonstrated
that liberal ideas can still inspire. With their extraordinary resilience and
determination (Spotlight Ukraine), the Ukrainian people have galvanized
international support for their country’s struggle against the aggressor. In
the eyes of the world, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy turned out
“Europe has to get out
of the mindset that
Europe’s problems are
the world’s problems but
the world’s problems are
not Europe’s problems.”47
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar,
Indian Foreign Minister,
GLOBSEC 2022 Bratislava
Forum, June 3, 2022
INTRODUCTION

24
Figure
1.6
Citizens’
views
on
whose
rules
they
would
prefer
to
live
by,
October–November
2022,
percent
US
Economically
developing
countries
China
Russia
Europe
Germany
80
8
7
1
4
Italy
77
11
8
2
3
Data
and
illustration:
Kekst
CNC,
commissioned
by
the
Munich
Security
Conference
powered
by
Munich
Security
Index
France
70
12
11
4
4
UK
67
18
10
2
3
Canada
34
48
14
3
2
Japan
27
58
12
1
2
Brazil
27
51
16
3
3
South
Africa
21
29
38
7
6
India
13
34
24
8
21
US
9
79
7
3
3
2
China
2
81
2
13
INTRODUCTION

25
“With unimaginable
courage and determination,
the Ukrainian people are
putting their lives on the
line for democracy – not
only for their own nation
but for democracy writ
large for the world. […]
The Ukrainian people are
making the fight for all
of us. We must help
them.”52
Nancy Pelosi, then–Speaker
of the US House of
Representatives, floor
speech on the Ukraine
Democracy Defense Lend-
Lease Act, April 28, 2022
“Today the victim is
Ukraine. Tomorrow it
could be any one of us
[…]. The vision of a
world in which only
naked power wins is not
only wrong and immoral
but can lead to a
conflagration engulfing
the entire world.”54
Andrzej Duda, Polish
President, UN General
Assembly, September 20,
2022
to be the inspiring democratic hero standing up to the autocratic villain in
Moscow – “a metaphor-in-miniature for the worldwide, slow-motion wrestle
between the forces of democracy and autocracy.”53
Russia’s aggression and Ukraine’s response have also instilled a new sense
of purpose into democratic alliances such as the G7, NATO, and the EU,
overcoming feelings of “Westlessness” and “helplessness” that had worried
observers in previous years.55
Speaking in Warsaw in March 2022, US President
Joseph Biden summarized a widely shared perception: “Russia has managed
to cause something I’m sure [Putin] never intended: the democracies of the
world are revitalized with purpose and unity found in months that we’d once
taken years to accomplish.”56
Against this backdrop, German Foreign Minister
Annalena Baerbock spoke of a “transatlantic moment” – a sentiment shared
at many MSC events during the past year that led to the “Transatlantic
To-Do List.”57
But as this renewed sense of purpose extends beyond the
transatlantic area, the war on Ukraine has strengthened the idea of values-
based cooperation between liberal democracies on a global scale. Some
again refer to the “free world” or the “Global West,” made up of “rich liberal
democracies with strong security ties to the US” and “defined more by ideas
than actual geography.”58
While a significant majority of governments
around the world have condemned Russia’s war in Ukraine, it is this group
of like-minded democracies that has helped Ukraine persevere – politically,
economically, and militarily.
Contravening Russia’s imperial fantasies, EU leaders have made clear that
they envision a European future for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and
have granted the former two the status of candidate countries.59
In addition,
the EU has imposed a series of unprecedented sanctions on Moscow, financed
arms supplies for Ukraine, and launched a training mission for the Ukrainian
armed forces. While NATO allies have made clear that they will not engage
their own forces, to avoid a broader NATO–Russia war, they have upped
their individual and collective support. Although critics believe that they
should do more, the degree of Western support is unprecedented, and has
certainly exceeded expectations in Moscow.
Since they see Russia’s war as a broader assault on the European order and
the international rule of law, people in the West have not only changed
their views on Ukraine, but also reevaluated their security environment in
general. As new data from the Munich Security Index shows, differences in
views on Russia, which were considerable before the invasion, have sharply
INTRODUCTION

26
declined or even disappeared. While respondents in all G7 countries are now
more willing to oppose Russia economically and militarily, the shifts in France,
Germany, and Italy have been the most dramatic (Figure 1.7). It seems as if
Russia’s blunt war of aggression has finally driven home the message that
revisionists must be confronted – even in those societies that had long ignored
the writing on the wall.61
0 %
-10 %
powered by
Munich Security
Index
-20 %
-30 %
Canada
UK
China
India
India
Brazil
South Africa
South Africa
Brazil
China
US
US
Japan
Germany
France
Canada
Italy
Italy
Figure 1.7
Citizens’ preferences for their country’s response to Russia, share
saying that their country should oppose Russia minus share saying
that their country should cooperate with Russia, October–November
2022, percent
Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned
by the Munich Security Conference
What do you think your
country should do in
response to Russia as a
military and economic
power?
20 %
10 % 30 %
-20 %
-30 %
-40 %
-50 %
-60 % -10 % 0 % 40 % 50 % 60 %
Oppose Russia
militarily
Cooperate with
Russia militarily
Cooperate
with
Russia
economically
Oppose
Russia
economically
50 %
40 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
-40 %
-50 %
-60 %
-70 %
France
Germany Japan
UK
Survey values from November 2021
Size of circle = size of population
INTRODUCTION

27
At its 2022 Madrid Summit, NATO issued its new Strategic Concept, which
refers to Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’
security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.”62
NATO
members also announced more forward-deployed combat formations
and pre-positioned equipment on the Eastern flank, and the aim to
increase high-readiness forces from 40,000 to 300,000 troops. As NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted, “this constitutes the biggest
overhaul of our collective deterrence and defense since the Cold War.”63
On a national level, many governments have reexamined their respective
strategic postures. Sweden and Finland decided to abandon their
traditional non-aligned policy and have applied to join NATO. Countries
such as Poland, which have long warned about Russian revisionism,
are doubling down on defense investments and buying more heavy
equipment.64
Germany, where Zeitenwende was chosen as the “word of
the year,” has decided to raise defense spending, make many overdue
investments, and discard some of its traditional foreign policy beliefs
that turned out to be outdated.65
While Berlin is working on a new national
security strategy, Japan – another influential power often accused of
punching below its weight – has already published a new one. Tokyo not
only announced that it would double its defense spending, aiming to
reach two percent of its GDP by 2027, but also embraced a controversial
“counterstrike capability” to hit back against a potential aggressor.66
All these developments are bad news for autocratic revisionists, who
had banked on the passivity and indecisiveness of liberal democratic
governments.
Russia’s war on Ukraine has also served as a catalyst for rethinking the
Western approach to China, which had already begun to shift in recent years.67
In the long run, Beijing is clearly seen as a far more powerful and ambitious
revisionist challenger to the international order than Moscow, and public
opinion on China has changed considerably. Yet concern among the G7
countries is less pronounced, and views on how to deal with China are far
less coherent than with respect to Russia (Figure 1.8). Whereas some fear
that a China policy that is too confrontational will render a new Cold War
almost inevitable, others worry that the world’s democracies are not heeding
the lessons learned from Russia’s war, risking another, potentially more
dramatic, policy failure.68
While the world’s liberal democracies are slowly awakening to the challenges
posed by autocratic revisionists and have taken the first important steps to
“These are tough times
for many. But the price
we pay as NATO Allies
is measured in money.
While the Ukrainians,
they pay a price which is
measured in blood. And
if we allow Putin to win,
all of us will have to pay
a much higher price.
Authoritarian regimes
around the world will
learn that they can get
what they want with
brute force.”60
Jens Stoltenberg, NATO
Secretary General, 68th
Annual Session of the NATO
Parliamentary Assembly,
November 21, 2022
INTRODUCTION

28
What do you think your
country should do in
response to the rise of
China as a military and
economic power?
powered by
Munich Security
Index
Figure 1.8
Citizens’ preferences for their country’s response to the rise of
China, share saying that their country should oppose China minus
share saying that their country should cooperate with China,
Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned
by the Munich Security Conference
Oppose China
militarily
Cooperate with
China militarily
Cooperate
with
China
economically
Oppose
China
economically
20 %
10 % 30 %
-20 % -10 % 0 % 40 % 50 % 60 %
0 %
-10 %
-20 %
-30 %
40 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
-40 %
-50 %
India
India
France
US
US
Germany
Germany
Japan
Japan
Italy
Italy
Brazil
Brazil
South Africa
South Africa
Canada
Canada UK
UK
France
Survey values from November 2021
Size of circle = size of population
pushing back against these states’ subversive efforts, the much bigger
task still lies ahead: swiftly conceiving a positive vision for a desirable
international order and developing a compelling strategy for it to succeed in
the ongoing contest for the order.
INTRODUCTION

29
Global Divisions: Framing the Debate
One of the few things that world leaders can agree on is that the world is
entering what the new US National Security Strategy calls a “decisive decade”
for the future shape of the international order. Notions such as Zeitenwende,
“historical crossroads,” or “inflection point” are omnipresent.69
While
material power will matter, this struggle is also, and perhaps foremost,
about competing visions.
Leaders have tried to frame this contest for the international order using
different dichotomies: democracies versus autocracies, rich versus poor, West
versus the rest, or those that support the rules-based order versus those that do
not. As data from the Munich Security Index shows, these framings resonate
to different degrees, but none dominates the perceptions of the respondents
in the 12 countries polled (Figure 1.9). As the chapters in this report show in
more detail, there remain different cleavages, depending on the topic.
Still, looking at the big picture, the systemic competition between liberal-
democratic and autocratic visions and their respective proponents has become
increasingly central to the contest for the international order. While the
revisionists have tried to describe the ongoing struggle as a competition
between the West and the rest, even respondents in China, Brazil, India, and
South Africa do not see this as a major geopolitical fault line today (Figure 1.9).
Instead, many democratic leaders have described the current struggle as a
competition between democracies and autocracies.72
This framing captures
a significant part of the ongoing contest and resonates comparatively well,
with between a quarter and a third of the respondents seeing it as the dominant
fault line in global politics today. Indeed, it is hard to deny that the most
worrisome attacks against the post-1945 order come from “powers that layer
authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy,” as the US National
Security Strategy puts it.73
Conversely, democracies remain the key supporters
of the liberal, rules-based order. As UN voting data shows, there is a clear link
between regime type and voting patterns regarding key international norms
(Figure 1.10). And without the support of the liberal democracies of the world,
Ukraine would not have been able to withstand Russian aggression.
However, the relevance of the regime-type fault line clearly varies across
policy fields, as the chapters in this report demonstrate. Issues such as
human rights (Chapter 2) or the governance of global infrastructures
(Chapter 3) and development (Chapter 4), which are intimately tied to the
liberal core of the rules-based order, are much more prone to provoking
“We are living through a
watershed era. And that
means that the world
afterwards will no longer
be the same as the
world before. The issue
at the heart of this is
whether power is allowed
to prevail over the law.
Whether we permit Putin
to turn back the clock to
the nineteenth century
and the age of the great
powers. Or whether we
have it in us to keep
warmongers like Putin
in check.”71
Olaf Scholz, German
Chancellor, German
Bundestag, February 27,
2022
“We are at a crossroads.
We are in for probably
the most dangerous,
unpredictable and at
the same time most
important decade since
the end of World War II.”70
Vladimir Putin, Russian
President, Valdai Discussion
Club, October 27, 2022
INTRODUCTION

30
Rich
versus
poor
countries
Democracies
versus
dictators
The
West
versus
the
rest
of
the
world
Don’t
know
China
versus
the
rest
of
the
world
Countries
that
support
a
rules-based
order
versus
countries
that
do
not
Data
and
illustration:
Kekst
CNC,
commissioned
by
the
Munich
Security
Conference
powered
by
Munich
Security
Index
Brazil
Canada
China
46
20
13
3
26
26
9
16
4
19
3
14
Figure
1.9
Citizens’
views
on
the
main
fault
line
in
global
politics,
October–November
2022,
percent
29
20
France
India
15
7
South
Africa
5
25
25
22
15
11
3
24
UK
Italy
US
Japan
27
24
16
9
4
21
29
28
15
8
4
17
29
15
23
5
5
22
Ukraine
Germany
34
16
25
7
5
13
34
17
14
10
7
18
32
16
14
6
6
25
25
34
14
9
6
12
23
25
25
10
6
11
INTRODUCTION

31
“Some would have us
believe that there is the
West on one side that
will defend outmoded
values to serve its
interests and on the
other side, the rest of the
world that has suffered
so much and seeks to
cooperate by supporting
the war or by looking
the other way. I object
to this division […].”74
Emmanuel Macron,
French President, UN General
Assembly, September 20, 2022
splits between a democratic and an autocratic vision of order (Figure 1.10).
But thinking only in terms of democracies versus autocracies risks brushing
over the fact that the contest between authoritarian and democratic visions
“is being waged within states as much as between them.”75
Most importantly,
however, it risks missing other relevant dynamics in the global order contest
and hampering global collective action in important respects.76
On trade
(Chapter 3), energy (Chapter 5), or nuclear weapons (Chapter 6), for example,
the constellation of state interests is more complex. Moreover, to solve many
of the world’s global problems, particularly climate change and global health
crises, democracies need the support of non-democratic states.77
Even the new
US National Security Strategy, built on the democracy–autocracy dichotomy,
acknowledges that while cooperation among democracies is key, the United
States will “work with any country that supports a rules-based order.”78
Some have thus argued that the real division runs “between those who
adhere to a rules-based international order and those who adhere to no law
at all but the law of the strongest.”79
States that might not like the liberal
thrust of many international rules still have a strong interest in preserving
an order where countries generally feel bound by international law. In other
words, “countries do not have to be democracies to join forces in countering
Russia’s aggression.”80
Singapore, for instance, is not a democracy, but is
among those countries that have not only condemned Russia’s aggression,
but also imposed targeted sanctions as a response. The revisionists, though,
Recent votes in the UN General Assembly, by regime type,
percent
Figure 1.10
Abstained
In favor Against
Data: David L. Sloss and Laura A. Dickinson. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Democracies
Vote to condemn Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine
Vote to suspend Russia from
the UN Human Rights Council
12
7 16
100 88
Hybrid states
21
79 54
44
Autocracies
48
45 31
53
2
INTRODUCTION

32
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 INTRODUCTION

33
have long tried to discredit the concept of a rules-based order as a Western
invention, too. For Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, selectively
applied “rules” are a Western “counterweight to the universal principles of
international law enshrined in the UN Charter.”81
Adding insult to injury,
Russia, together with China, even co-founded the “Group of Friends in
Defense of the Charter of the United Nations.”82
But while it is difficult to
imagine a more flagrant violation of the Charter than Russia’s attempt to
forcibly annex part of another country, the autocratic revisionists’ attempts
to question the West’s commitment to the international rule of law fall on
fertile ground in some parts of the world where leading Western nations
have not always played by these rules.
Visions in Order
The combination of authoritarian efforts to subvert the global order and the
widespread reluctance to confront this type of revisionism in many parts
of the “Global South” is an urgent call to action for all those who seek to
preserve an international order based on rules that apply to and are respected
by all states. In fact, in all the countries surveyed for the Munich Security
Index, 50 percent or more of the respondents stated that they still see a need
for international rules that apply to all states equally. What is thus urgently
needed is a reinvigorated vision of the liberal, rules-based international order
that ensures that existing international rules and principles are attractive
to a much broader global constituency. With the exception of Germany,
where 63 percent of respondents agree that international politics need to
be governed by universal rules and principles, agreement is stronger among
the respondents from China (63 percent), India (61 percent), South Africa
(61 percent), and Brazil (57 percent) than among the respondents from all the
G7 countries (54 percent on average). At the same time, Chinese respondents’
strong support for the idea that international politics should be based on
rules that apply to all countries equally suggests that the rules respondents
have in mind might not be the same in all the societies surveyed.
To be sure, the autocratic vision of the international order is not as attractive
a contender as Russia and China would hope. Judging from the results of the
Munich Security Index, neither Russia nor China are seen as offering an
appealing vision to the world. While the respondents mostly believe that the
two countries have a very or somewhat clear vision for the global order
(Figure 1.11), almost no one outside of China or Russia wants to live in a world
shaped mainly by the two autocracies (Figure 1.6). To paraphrase Winston
Churchill, many states seem to perceive the liberal, rules-based international
INTRODUCTION

34
Figure
1.11
Citizens’
views
on
whether
a
country
or
group
of
countries
has
a
vision
for
the
global
order,
self-perception
compared
to
the
perception
of
others,
October–November
2022,
percent
A
very
clear
vision
No
vision
A
somewhat
clear
vision
Don’t
know
40
20
0
60
80
100
Others’
views
Does
Russia
have
a
vision?
28
28
27
18
powered
by
Munich
Security
Index
Data
and
illustration:
Kekst
CNC,
commissioned
by
the
Munich
Security
Conference
*Brazil,
India,
South
Africa
Does
the
US
have
a
vision?
US’s
view
29
34
17
20
Others’
views
34
37
13
16
Does
the
EU
have
a
vision?
EU
members’
view
15
41
25
19
Others’
views
27
42
14
17
Does
China
have
a
vision?
Others’
views
30
31
18
20
China’s
view
46
36
16
3
Do
economically
developing
countries
have
a
vision?
Developing
countries’*
views
21
39
24
17
Others’
views
10
36
29
25
INTRODUCTION

35
order as the worst type of international order – except for all the others.
Beyond autocratic revisionists, much of the dissatisfaction with the order
does not seem to be inspired by a fundamental opposition toward the liberal
vision per se, but rather by frustrations with its failure to live up to its ideals.
For the order, this is still a liability. Without seriously reckoning with
past mistakes and the comprehensive reforms that derive from this, the
attractiveness of the liberal international vision is likely to continue to
wane. Thus, to prevail over the autocratic vision for the international order,
liberal democracies need a three-pronged strategy.
First, they need to recognize the autocratic challenge for what it is: the
attempt to fundamentally transform the international order. For too long,
many have underestimated this challenge and thus allowed autocratic
revisionists to slowly but surely push the boundaries of the order. Russia’s war
against Ukraine should be a wake-up call, as it foreshadows the order that
autocratic revisionists have in mind. It is a reminder of the benefits of a
liberal vision based on human rights, democracy, and the rule of law – and
should motivate the necessary resistance to this alternative vision.
Second, liberal democracies need to nurture a strong global community of
like-minded states. Given the eroding consensus in many democracies on
the liberal-internationalist policies that informed the “liberal order building”84
after World War II, building domestic support for a new “grand strategy of
democratic solidarity”85
is of paramount importance. To this end, liberal
democracies need to refine their own visions of a desirable order and make
clear what they want to achieve – not just what they want to avoid. In contrast
to China, which is very confident in its own vision for the international order,
in France, Germany, and Italy, the three EU countries polled for the Munich
Security Index, only 15 percent believe that the EU has a very clear vision of
how it would like the international order to be run, while 25 percent believe
it has no vision at all (Figure 1.11).
Third, liberal democracies need to build a larger coalition of states beyond
the liberal-democratic core. While strengthening values-based cooperation
among the world’s liberal democracies is necessary, it is clearly not sufficient.
For too long, democracies have overestimated the attractiveness of the
liberal, rules-based international order. The wake-up call provided by
Russia’s war and the diffidence of many countries from the “Global South”
has roused them from their complacency, reminding them that the
international order, just like democracy itself, is in constant need of
“This is the time to invest in
the power of democracies.
This work begins with the
core group of our like-
minded partners: our
friends in every single
democratic nation on this
globe. We see the world
with the same eyes. And
we should mobilize our
collective power to shape
global goods.”83
Ursula von der Leyen,
President of the European
Commission, 2022 State
of the Union Address,
September 14, 2022
INTRODUCTION

36
renewal.86
Given the grievances and widespread perception of exclusion
among many states of the world, merely defending the status quo will
not be enough. While the international order needs no revision, it is
clearly in need of reform. To win the hearts and minds of “not yet aligned”
governments and societies, liberal democracies need to re-envision the
order as one that better represents the many countries that have hitherto
been confined to the role of rule-takers, as one that better delivers on its
promises, and as one that truly benefits everyone equally.
As such, this moment of crisis for the liberal international order might also
be its greatest chance for renewal. If its proponents succeed in enlarging
the coalition of committed stakeholders, the revisionist moment will
remain just that – a moment confined to history rather than the birth of
an authoritarian international order. And President Zelenskyy and the
Ukrainian people will have played a big part in this achievement.
“To stand against global
politics of fear and
coercion; to defend the
sovereign rights of smaller
nations as equal to those
of larger ones; to embrace
basic principles like
freedom of navigation,
respect for international
law, and arms control —
no matter what else we
may disagree on, that is
the common ground
upon which we must
stand.”87
UN General Assembly,
September 21, 2022
INTRODUCTION

37
Russia’s war against Ukraine is not only a human tragedy
for the Ukrainian people. It also demonstrates that even
the key principles of the international order are under
attack from autocratic revisionists.
Russia and China promote a version of the international
order in which the interests of autocratic leaders take
precedence over liberal-democratic values. Liberal
democracies are slowly waking up to the challenge.
The defenders of the liberal vision can push back
effectively if they recognize the fundamental nature
of the revisionist challenge and swiftly reinvigorate their
own vision of a desirable international order.
To be successful, these defenders need to do more than
just nurture the global coalition of liberal democracies.
They must also build a larger coalition willing to actively
defend the key principles of the liberal order. This demands
paying due respect to the legitimate resentment that
many countries of the “Global South” have toward the
existing order. Simply defending the status quo will not
do the trick. They need to re-envision it.
Key Points
1
2
3
4
INTRODUCTION

MUNICH SECURITY INDEX
38
The world is becoming a riskier place. The Russian war of aggression and its
ramifications have dramatically increased risk perceptions among citizens
around the world. But these traditional security threats only add to, not
replace, citizens’ existing concerns about China or transnational risks like
climate change. The Munich Security Index 2023 is thus a testament to a
new age in global politics marked by an omnipresent sense of insecurity.
Since 2021, the MSC and Kekst CNC have collected data to answer core ques-
tions that help understand citizens’ risk perceptions: do people think that the
world is becoming a riskier place? Is there a global consensus on some of the
grave risks that humanity is facing today? And how prepared do societies
feel to tackle these threats? By combining five metrics, the index provides an
in-depth view of how twelve countries view 32 major risks and how these
perceptions change over time. This edition of the index is based on
representative samples of 1,000 people from each G7 country, BRICS countries,
except Russia (“BICS”), and Ukraine. The total sample thus amounts to
12,000 people. This edition is exceptional because the MSC and Kekst CNC
decided not to poll in Russia and instead include Ukraine. Against the
background of the war and intensifying repressions, conducting meaningful
surveys in Russia is difficult and may lead to unreliable responses. Instead, the
index includes a sample from Ukraine as one of the main sites where competing
order visions are playing out. The polling was conducted from October 19 to
November 7 using industry-leading online panels, with stratified quotas and
weights to gender, age, and region to ensure representativeness. But polling
in Ukraine, which took place from November 8 to 28, came with immense
difficulties. Fieldwork began as Russia was intensifying its bombing of civilian
infrastructure. The ensuing blackouts meant Ukrainians struggled to access
the internet. Surveying by phone therefore had to complement online surveys.
The result of three weeks of fieldwork is a unique snapshot of how Ukrainians
feel about the war, their allies, and the future.
Overall, the Munich Security Index 2023 registers an increase in 20 risk
indicators compared to the previous survey, which itself recorded significantly
higher risk awareness than in the preceding year (Figure 1.13). The Russian
war of aggression is the central driving force of heightened perception of
risk. In all countries surveyed bar India, the risk index score for Russia rose
significantly. While Russia was not seen as a top five risk in any of the G7
countries only a year ago, citizens in five G7 countries now consider Moscow

39
the number one risk (Figure 1.12). Differences in risk perceptions between
citizens in G7 countries and others are profound, however. Notwithstanding
sizeable increases in the risk index scores in Brazil, China, and South Africa,
Russia ranks fairly low in four BRICS countries. China continues to be a
significant concern but is considered less of a threat than Russia in all
countries, including Japan and the US. The wider ramifications of Russia’s
war also feature prominently in citizens’ risk perceptions. An economic or
financial crisis is now the aggregate number one risk, likely fueled by rampant
inflation worldwide, which the Russian war has contributed to. Energy supply
disruption ranks a top risk in the UK and South Africa and is considered a
significant risk in most other countries. Amid Putin’s nuclear posturing,
weapons of mass destruction have risen significantly in citizens’ risk awareness,
with concern highest in Ukraine, Germany, and Japan.
While differences between G7 countries and four BRICS countries on
Russia’s war abound, perceptions of environmental risks are widely shared.
On aggregate, climate change ranks as the second highest risk, followed by
destruction of natural habitats in third, and extreme weather and forest fires
in fourth. In Brazil, India, and Italy, environmental risks top the ranking.
Contrary to fears that Russia’s war on Ukraine would distract from other
pressing threats, citizens continue to be acutely aware of so-called non-
traditional security concerns that particularly beset poorer countries. Only a
few risks have fallen in citizens’ perceptions. For instance, the risks of the
coronavirus pandemic plummeted in the rankings in all countries except
China – a manifestation of Beijing’s failed zero-Covid policy (Figure 1.13).
Both the Russian war and the growing systemic competition also shape
citizens’ views of other countries. Russia, like its satellite Belarus, is
overwhelmingly considered a threat except by China, India, and South
Africa (Figure 1.14). Views among G7 countries have converged; Italy,
which held positive views of Russia in the last index, now clearly sees Russia
as a threat. China is also considered more of a threat than an ally in all
G7 countries while viewed as more of an ally in South Africa and Brazil.
Japanese and German citizens hold the most critical views of China.
Compared to the last index, Ukraine is the biggest winner in perceptions
as an ally (Figure 1.15). Poland’s central role in assisting Ukraine has
helped it see the second biggest improvement in views, while the US
continues the trend of the past edition by further improving its reputation.
powered by
Munich Security
Index

40
The Munich Security Index combines the crucial components that make
a risk more serious. Public perceptions of trajectory are combined with
imminence and severity alongside a measure to give equal weight to
perceptions of preparedness.
Index components
Overall
Question 1 – How great is the overall risk to your
country?
For each of the following, please say how great a risk it poses to
your country.
• Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the lowest and 10 the greatest risk]
Imminence
Question 4 – How imminent is the risk?
For each of the following, please say how imminent a threat
you think it is.
•
Answer scale 1 – 8 [with 1 now or in the next few months
and 8 never]
• Rescaled to 0 – 10 and reversed2
Preparedness
Question 5 – How prepared is your country?
For each of the following, please say how prepared your country is
to deal with this threat.
• Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the least and 10 the most prepared]
• Reversed3
Index scores To produce the final risk index score for each risk in each country we add the
mean scores for all five of the inputs above – overall risk, trajectory,
severity, imminence, and preparedness. The resulting total is then rescaled to
run from 0 to 100 for ease of interpretation. The final risk index score is an
absolute figure (with 100 the highest and 0 the lowest possible risk index
score) that can be compared between demographics, countries, and over time.
Trajectory
Question 2 – Will the risk increase or decrease over
the next twelve months?
Please say for each of the following whether you think the risk
posed in your country will increase, decrease, or stay the same in
the next year.
•
Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 the strongest decrease, 5 no change,
and 10 the strongest increase]
Severity
Question 3 – How severe would the damage be if it
happened?
For each of the following, please say how bad you think the
damage would be in your country if it were to happen or become
a major risk.
• Answer scale 0 – 10 [with 0 very low and 10 very severe damage]
Explaining the Index

41
Country profiles
Besides a risk heatmap (see page 42) that features all twelve countries
surveyed and how they score on each of the 32 risks covered, the Munich
Security Index also includes an overview of how risk perceptions have
changed since the last Munich Security Index was published (see page 43).
The index also provides more detailed insights into the individual risk
profiles of the twelve countries surveyed (pages 44-55).
Change in index score
Change in the risk index score since the last Munich Security Index was published. The 2022
version of the index was based on surveys conducted in November of 2021.
Share thinking risk is imminent
Percentage of respondents who answered “now or in the next few months,” “in the next year,”
and “in the next 5 years” in answer to the question “For each of the following, please say how
imminent a threat you think it is.
Share feeling unprepared
Percentage of respondents who rated their country’s preparedness as less than 6 on a 0 – 10
scale in answer to the question “For each of the following, please say how prepared your country
is to deal with this threat.”
Question 1
Overall
Question 2
Trajectory
Question 3
Severity
Question 4
Imminence
Question 5
Preparedness
reversed
rescaled
+
reversed
Index score
Extreme weather
and forest fires
Destruction of natural habitats
Climate change generally
0 – 10 51 – 60
11 – 20 61 – 70
21 – 30 71 – 80
31 – 40 81 – 90
41 – 50 91 – 100
added
rescaled
0 – 50
0 – 100
0 – 10 0 – 10 0 – 10 0 – 10 0 – 10
+ + + +
Mean
scores
71
69
69
Change in
index score
+10
+7
+9
Share feeling
unprepared
28
29
28
Share thinking
risk is imminent
63
60
58

42
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The
risk
heatmap,
October–November
2022,
score
Data
and
illustration:
Kekst
CNC,
commissioned
by
the
Munich
Security
Conference
powered
by
Munich
Security
Index
In
the
United
States
and
China,
citizens
were
not
asked
to
assess
the
risk
from
their
own
country.
91
56
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42
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0
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61
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–
30
71
–
80
31
–
40
81
–
90
41
–
50
91
–
100

43
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 MUNICH SECURITY INDEX
United
Kingdom
China
R
u
s
s
i
a
Germany
India
Brazil
South
Africa
United
States
Japan
Canada
Italy
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Figure
1.13
The
change
heatmap,
October–November
2022,
change
in
index
score
since
November
2021
Data
and
illustration:
Kekst
CNC,
commissioned
by
the
Munich
Security
Conference
+0
–
+5
+6
–
+10
+11
–
+15
+16
–
+20
-15
–
-11
-10
–
-6
-25
–
-21
-30
–
-26
-20
–
-16
-5
–
-1
+21
–
+25
powered
by
Munich
Security
Index
In
the
United
States
and
China,
citizens
were
not
asked
to
assess
the
risk
from
their
own
country.
+25
+4
+8
+25
+14
+1
+18
+4
-4
+18
+4
-2
+20
+4
+20
-5
+11
+8
+7
+6
+9
+0
+7
+1
+6
+2
+22
+4
+6
+21
+1
-7
+20
+3
+3
+24
+4
+5
+14
+3
+12
-2
+7
+6
+13
+4
+6
+1
+8
+3
+10
-2
+22
+3
-1
+17
+3
-1
+10
+1
+4
+12
+3
-1
+10
-1
+10
-7
+6
+2
-3
+1
+0
+1
-1
-2
+1
+2
-2
+16
+3
+0
+13
+2
-1
+7
+4
-4
+3
+6
-6
+8
+1
+9
+3
+5
+2
+3
-1
+7
-2
+4
+0
-1
+1
+15
+5
-4
+8
+0
+0
+1
-2
-7
-5
-1
-5
+2
-1
+3
+2
+4
-5
-1
-5
-5
-1
-5
-2
-6
-18
-6
+22
+20
+16
+14
+22
+18
+10
+19
+16
+10
+14
+19
+6
+14
+17
+22
+11
+1
+23
+11
+20
+16
+18
+12
+2
+18
+18
+22
+3
+1
+15
+4
-3
+15
+16
-5
-3
+6
+0
-2
+6
-2
-3
+4
+2
+1
+2
+3
+0
-6
+22
+7
+3
+14
+1
-3
+7
+6
-4
+12
+2
-1
+8
+3
+8
+1
+10
+2
+4
-1
+3
+2
+7
+3
+1
-1
+12
+1
+1
+10
+1
+1
+4
+2
-1
+4
+0
+2
+2
-1
+4
+6
+1
+0
-1
-2
-1
+2
+1
+0
+3
-1
+9
-1
+4
-7
-2
-16
-2
-11
-19
-5
-13
-1
-3
+1
+2
-1
-2
-5
-4
-1
-4
-3
-4
-9
-9
-10
-12
-11
-14
-10
-10
-11
-13
-11
-11
-10
-12
-12
-11
-11
-10
-11
-9
-2
-6
+2
+4
-7
-6
+1
-6
+1
-5
+1
+0
-5
-5
+1
+0
+10
+16
+7
-1
-11
-7
-3
-3
-5
-3
-12
-2
-6
-14
-9
-10
-15
-29
-8
-18
-8
-17
-3
-5
-9
-25
+15
+13
-11
-17
-7
-15
-5
-16
-14
-22
-13
-18
-10
-11
-11
-11
-9
-12
-9
-11

44
Canada
European Union
United States
Radical Islamic terrorism
Breakdown of democracy
in my country
Extreme weather
and forest fires
Economic or financial crisis
in your country
Food shortages
Rapid change to my country’s
culture
Political polarization
Autonomous robots-
artificial intelligence
Trade wars
Right-wing terrorism
Iran
Civil war or political violence
Cyberattacks on your country
Racism and other discrimination
Disinformation campaigns
from enemies
The coronavirus pandemic
Divisions amongst Western
powers and institutions
Russia
Mass migration as a result
of war or climate change
China
Energy supply disruption
North Korea
Rising inequality
Use of biological weapons
by an aggressor
A future pandemic
Use of chemical weapons and
poisons by an aggressor
International organized crime
Use of nuclear weapons
by an aggressor
Data and illustration: Kekst CNC, commissioned by the Munich Security Conference
Index score Share thinking
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
is the index score
increase of the risk
of an economic or
financial crisis.
+12
Change in
index score
Canadian respondents remain
the least anxious nation
among the G7 and “BICS.”
When asked how safe the
world is, only 41 percent said
that they felt it is unsafe –
compared to 46 percent of US
respondents and 58 percent
of German respondents.
Despite a significant increase
in the risk posed by Russia –
jumping up 22 points and 16
places to an index score of 69
– Canadian respondents
remain relatively unperturbed.
The perceived risk posed by
extreme weather events and
forest fires has also slightly
decreased (by three points to
68), as has the risk of climate
change, which is down by
four points.
The perceived risk of an
economic or financial crisis
has significantly increased
among Canadian respondents
– by 12 points since
November 2021. This puts
Canada in the middle of the
G7 regarding this risk, with a
smaller increase than in the
UK (+24 points) but a larger
change than in France (+6
points).
1
2
3
69 +22 39
63
54 − 26
58
57 +14 42
47
46 +7 35
42
65 -4 29
62
51 +2 26
56
54 +8 44
46
43 +3 27
46
68 -1 27
65
51 -7 21
54
55 +8 44
49
43 -15 16
64
60 +3 37
56
48 +2 26
48
68 -3 28
67
53 +1 24
62
57 +2 25
67
45 +1 26
52
61 -1 25
65
49 -1 20
64
54 +6 28
56
42 +3 26
45
41 +3 26
42
39 +4 28
35
23 -5 27
30
67 +12 29
66
51 +10 33
51
55 +7 24
61
43 -3 27
50
58 +7 29
60
46 +1 23
51
14 -3 22
26

45
France
European Union
United States
in my country
Autonomous robots-
Extreme weather
and forest fires
Rising inequality
by an aggressor
North Korea
China
from enemies
culture
Economic of financial crisis
in your country
A future pandemic
Russia
Iran
by an aggressor
Food shortages
Trade wars
Mass migration as a result of
war or climate change
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
is the decrease
in rank of the
perceived risk of
radical Islamic
terrorism.
-6
Change in
index score
In France, as in many other
places, the perceived threat
posed by Russia has
skyrocketed – from rank 25 to
number one. However, French
respondents are less
concerned than the rest of
their European counterparts
about the risks posed by
nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons, as well as
by cyberattacks.
French respondents’ concerns
about radical Islamic
terrorism remain the highest
of all countries surveyed, but
have fallen considerably in
both relative and absolute
terms. In November 2021,
radical Islamic terrorism was
seen as the most serious risk
facing France – it has now
dropped to seventh place.
French respondents perceive
a lower level of absolute
climate risk than their
German or Italian counter-
parts. However, in relative
terms, climate change is seen
as a highly pressing threat,
with extreme weather events,
climate change, and the
destruction of natural habitats
ranked as the second, third,
and fifth most serious risks,
respectively. Concerns about
energy supply disruptions
appear to have done little
to diminish perceptions of
climate risks.
1
2
3
70 +22 28
59
56 +6 27
49
63 -5 27
57
53 +2 19
52
66 -2 24
63
55 +4 19
56
57 -6 18
62
47 -2 27
41
68 -3 25
59
56 +1 24
49
62 +16 23
60
48 +3 17
52
64 -11 19
65
53 +0 21
51
69 -1 24
62
56 +6 26
49
62 +2 20
59
48 -17 14
66
65 +6 24
63
54 -11 19
58
57 +4 25
52
46 +3 25
39
45 -3 19
52
42 +2 20
44
22 -7 23
32
68 − 25
66
55 +1 16
58
59 +15 23
49
48 +1 28
42
64 +0 23
62
53 +1 29
47
19 -3 20
33

46
European Union
Index score
United States
Share thinking
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
North Korea
is the increase in
the perceived risk
of an economic or
financial crisis.
+18
Germany
Change in
index score
Russia
Autonomous robots-
in my country
in your country
Rising inequality
Extreme weather and forest fires
culture
A future pandemic
by an aggressor
China
by an aggressor
Radical islamic terrorism
from enemies
Food shortages
Trade wars
Iran
German respondents are
extremely concerned about
the threat posed by Russia,
which receives a German risk
index score of 78 – higher than
in any other country surveyed,
bar Ukraine. The increase in
the perceived Russia risk since
the invasion of Ukraine has
been enormous. Last year,
Russia was ranked 18th out of
32 potential risks. Now it is
first. Associated perceived
risks, such as the use of
nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons, have also increased
significantly, each climbing 20
points or more on Germany’s
risk index.
Worries about the economy
are very strong, with the risk
of an economic or financial
crisis having climbed 18
points to 75, and the
perceived threat of energy
supply disruption is also
significant at 68. Rising
inequality is rated as the fifth
most serious risk facing the
country.
German respondents
continue to show
comparatively high levels of
concern about climate change
– extreme weather events, the
destruction of natural habitats,
and climate change are all
among the ten most serious
risks facing the country.
However, the perceived
severity of each of these risks
has marginally decreased since
November 2021.
1
2
3
78 +25 45
67
62 +7 27
68
68 − 39
67
52 -5 25
64
74 +6 39
71
59 +2 27
68
62 +20 54
50
45 +1 31
51
75 +18 36
72
61 +8 29
69
65 +25 54
51
50 -15 27
62
73 -2 37
68
56 +18 34
59
75 +4 39
70
61 -6 31
67
67 +0 31
72
51 +9 37
53
73 -2 37
71
58 +4 33
56
62 +20 53
51
43 +7 40
36
42 -29 20
67
42 +4 37
43
31 +2 34
34
24 +1 31
35
74 +6 36
74
60 +14 37
59
63 +8 45
57
47 +4 33
50
70 -4 35
64
56 +11 38
54

47
European Union
United States
Autonomous robots-
Extreme weather
and forest fires
in your country
culture
North Korea
A future pandemic
in my country
Russia
Iran
from enemies
China
Use of chemical weapons
and poisons by an aggressor
Rising inequality
Trade wars
by an aggressor
by an aggressor
Food shortages
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
Change in
index score
is the index score
gap between male
and female Italians
when it comes to
climate risks.
9
Italy
Climate change is the top
risk perceived by Italian
respondents. In fact, the top
three risks in Italy are all
ecological ones, with
climate change replacing
extreme weather events as
the top risk this year. There is
a slight gender gap in the
perception of climate change,
with the index score for Italian
women being 86, while that
for men is 77. However, the
risk is felt evenly across
Italians of different ages,
levels of education, and
incomes.
The risk of an economic or
financial crisis is the fourth-
ranked risk in Italy and the
first nonecological risk on
the list. It has moved up two
places and 12 points since
November 2021.
The risk posed by Russia has
risen 22 points, but with an
index score of 67, it still
only ranks sixth among Italian
respondents. It is the second
lowest among all G7 countries
surveyed after the US (where
it has a score of 66).
1
2
3
82 +4 36
69
58 -2 27
64
63 − 36
63
47 -2 22
54
67 +2 32
65
51 +10 34
48
58 +10 53
47
39 -3 34
35
78 -1 36
68
55 +3 28
58
60 +17 53
48
43 -17 15
65
65 +0 26
70
50 -1 39
48
82 +1 37
73
58 +3 30
58
62 +2 27
67
45 +1 33
43
67 +22 42
60
51 +6 35
50
58 +10 52
47
39 +3 34
40
35 -1 33
34
30 -7 25
41
28 +1 33
35
76 +12 35
71
51 -8 21
54
59 -1 25
65
40 +1 27
46
63 +1 35
61
48 -6 27
54
22 -1 27
32

48
Japan
European Union
United States
culture
China
Extreme weather
and forest fires
by an aggressor
in my country
Iran
Trade wars
Rising inequality
Autonomous robots-
by an aggressor
Russia
Food shortages
North Korea
A future pandemic
from enemies
in your country
is how many places
the use of nuclear
weapons by an
aggressor has
moved up in the
ranking of risks.
+9
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
Change in
index score
Russia is now the top threat
for Japanese respondents.
It is up nine places and 16
points since November 2021,
meaning that the top two
perceived threats in Japan are
other countries: apart from
Russia, Japanese respondents
also worry about China. Japan
is the only country among the
G7 or “BICS” that has more
than one country among its
top five risks – since North
Korea is fifth on the list, it
actually has three.
Among Japanese
respondents, the use of
nuclear weapons by an
aggressor has also seen a big
jump in the risk ranking –
up nine places since
November 2021. It now
constitutes the third biggest
perceived risk.
Perceptions of climate risks
are down marginally for the
first time in Japan by four
points, with 53 percent of
Japanese respondents feeling
that climate change is a risk
that will manifest itself within
the next five years.
1
2
3
74 +16 36
54
58 +7 32
37
63 -6 25
50
45 +1 24
44
67 +3 33
49
51 -2 27
45
59 +3 27
44
41 +6 24
31
67 +13 42
39
56 +2 27
51
63 − 34
39
43 +0 31
35
63 +9 42
37
48 +0 22
44
71 +0 33
50
57 -3 21
51
63 -1 30
53
45 +7 27
36
66 -4 25
53
49 +4 26
41
58 -5 16
68
40 +3 27
25
38 +3 26
31
38 +1 25
26
31 -5 25
22
67 -1 27
59
51 +2 23
41
62 +8 43
38
42 +4 25
38
63 -5 23
52
46 +5 30
34
27 -1 26
18

49
is how much food
shortages have
risen in the index.
From
15 to
4
Heightened fear of multiple
risks pervades the UK. Chief
among them is an economic
or financial crisis, which has
moved up 24 points since
November 2021. Concern is
greatest among the oldest
members of the surveyed
population: the score is 88
among those aged over 65,
while it is 68 among those
under 35. However,
perceptions of the risk posed
by an economic or financial
crisis do not differ much
between respondents with a
higher (77) and respondents
with a lower income (79).
Energy supply disruption,
rather than Russia itself, tops
the list of risks that UK
respondents think their
country faces. But the UK is
only second to Ukraine in
terms of the perceived
imminence of the Russia
threat. 70 percent of UK
respondents also think that
this risk is likely to increase,
rather than decrease, over the
next few months.
Food shortages are another
risk that has risen a long way
up the ranking in the UK since
November 2021. It is up 11
places and up 20 points (from
49 to 69). It is a risk perceived
more keenly by women (75)
than men (62), on average.
1
2
3
European Union
United States
Autonomous robots-
Russia
Food shortages
by an aggressor
North Korea
Trade wars
Iran
culture
Division amongst Western
Rising inequality
A future pandemic
in your country
by an aggressor
from enemies
in my country
China
Extreme weather and forest fires
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
United Kingdom
Change in
index score
80 − 34
78
54 +6 18
65
61 +4 25
63
49 +13 29
47
65 +3 25
59
51 -7 16
59
58 +12 26
54
44 +3 25
46
76 +24 33
73
53 +8 21
60
59 +6 28
57
45 -2 17
56
62 +21 24
54
50 -8 18
56
77 +22 27
68
54 +1 16
63
59 +10 28
64
48 +1 20
57
65 +5 25
62
51 +4 21
53
57 +3 29
59
44 +4 22
43
41 -18 14
64
38 +3 20
43
16 -6 24
26
69 +20 32
72
53 +7 23
56
58 +14 25
53
45 +6 23
48
61 +4 16
67
49 -2 16
62
16 -7 19
28

50
of US adults feel
the threat from
Russia is imminent.
62%
Russia has jumped to being
the top risk perceived by US
respondents – up 13 places
in just one year. There is little
polarization in US views
about the risk Russia
presents. Democrats give
Russia an index score of 67,
while Republicans see a
somewhat greater risk, giving
it a score of 71.
There has been no
corresponding increase in the
perceived risk posed by China.
It is down two places and up
one point, with an overall
index score of 61. There is,
however, a marked partisan
split – just as in November
2021. The index score among
Democrats is 59, and among
Republicans 70.
Among older age groups in
the US, political polarization
is a risk keenly felt. US adults
aged 65 or older give
polarization a risk index score
of 89, making it their greatest
concern. Those aged 35 or
younger give polarization a
score of 48 and do not see it
as one of their top five
concerns.
1
2
3
United States
European Union
Trade wars
Autonomous robots-
in your country
from enemies
in my country
Iran
Food shortages
North Korea
Russia
by an aggressor
China
Rising inequality
Use of nuclear weapons by
an aggressor
culture
A future pandemic
Extreme weather
and forest fires
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
Change in
index score
66 +12 22
62
54 +4 19
52
59 +1 22
60
51 +3 20
58
63 − 28
64
52 -5 19
54
55 -1 23
56
48 +2 16
53
64 -2 19
64
54 -1 25
53
58 +10 17
54
49 +0 18
51
61 +1 21
60
52 +1 17
53
66 +4 27
64
54 +2 25
56
59 +2 21
58
49 -3 16
55
61 +4 27
63
52 -1 22
54
54 +2 20
51
46 +6 18
53
41 -16 14
59
41 +0 20
47
23 +1 15
36
64 +1 23
65
54 +1 17
57
58 -1 28
54
49 +1 18
56
60 +0 19
65
51 -1 20
61

51
Ukraine
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
of Ukrainians
say they feel
unprepared for
energy supply
disruptions.
14%
Other than Russia itself, the
top risk Ukrainians perceive is
energy supply disruption.
What is remarkable is that a
people whose energy grid is
under almost daily kinetic
attack is not the country with
the highest risk index score
for energy supply disruptions
– it only ranks third. People in
South Africa and the UK are
more worried about this risk.
The reason Ukrainians are
relatively less worried is that
they feel prepared for what is
happening and many believe
that the worst is already
behind them. Only 45 percent
of Ukrainian respondents
believe that the problem of
energy supply disruption is
likely to get worse in the next
12 months compared to 72
percent in South Africa and
70 percent in the UK. Only
14 percent of Ukrainians
feel that their country is
unprepared for energy supply
disruptions – compared to
47 percent in South Africa and
34 percent in the UK.
Of the nuclear, biological,
and chemical risks faced by
Ukraine, it is the threat of
chemical weapons that is
perceived as the most
pressing. The risk of chemical
weapons has a risk index
score of 72 – compared to
64 for nuclear weapons and
63 for biological weapons.
1
2
Russia 81 6
95
Trade wars 43 15
68
Cyberattacks on your country 61 9
85
The coronavirus pandemic 29 12
76
from enemies
68 8
88
37 20
68
Political polarization 44 13
76
Radical Islamic terrorism 18 17
43
in your country
75 20
86
Right-wing terrorism 40 16
56
56 19
84
Autonomous robots-
28 21
55
by an aggressor
63 41
59
Food shortages 35 12
57
Energy supply disruption 76 14
92
A future pandemic 40 28
65
Climate change generally 59 29
67
Civil war or political violence 29 15
51
by an aggressor 64 48
48
International organized crime 35 17
62
Rising inequality 44 18
68
culture
18 15
51
Breakdown of democracy in
my country
13 16
34
North Korea 12 24
40
United States 1 47
12
72 37
69
Iran 39 11
69
Extreme weather
and forest fires
53 20
77
China 19 30
43
Destruction of natural habitats 63 24
73
Racism and other discrimination 31 15
60
European Union 1 43
10

52
is the index score
decrease in the
perceived threat
posed by rising
inequality.
-18
The risk perception by
Brazilian respondents is down
almost across the board, with
only the perceived risk of
Russia and Iran and the use of
nuclear or chemical weapons
having increased since
November 2021. Particularly
notable are the 19, 18, and
16-point decreases seen for
the risk of an economic or
financial crisis, rising in
equality, and food shortages,
respectively. Each of these
decreases bucks international
trends of increased perceived
risks.
Ecological risks now make up
the three greatest perceived
threats facing Brazil. While
concern about each of these
risks has decreased in the
past 12 months, it remains
high in global comparison.
While having moderately
increased, Brazilian
respondents’ perception of
the risks posed by both Russia
and energy supply disruptions
remains very low compared to
other countries surveyed.
Ranking 22nd and 26th,
respectively, out of 32
potential threats, risk
perceptions are lower only
in India and China. Younger
people are the most
concerned, with 18- to
24-year-olds rating the
Russian risk at 55, and
respondents older than 65
rating it at 43.
1
2
3
Brazil
European Union
United States
North Korea
Extreme weather
and forest fires
Iran
in my country
Russia
Autonomous robots-
by an aggressor
from enemies
Trade wars
Cyberattacks in your country
China
culture
in your country
Rising inequality
A future pandemic
by an aggressor
Food shortages
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
Change in
index score
71 -11 33
66
55 -2 27
57
64 -1 34
60
47 -22 25
56
67 -18 34
63
53 +1 51
43
57 -16 35
51
43 -1 37
46
71 -13 34
64
53 +4 52
44
59 -14 30
54
45 -9 39
41
66 -19 35
62
48 -3 30
49
71 -12 34
66
55 -4 38
52
61 -4 35
57
46 -3 35
49
66 -2 32
63
53 -7 29
56
56 -5 27
55
38 -2 43
39
37 +2 37
36
36 -1 38
35
34 -6 36
37
69 -4 29
68
53 -1 52
43
58 -5 34
51
45 − 34
44
65 -9 28
67
48 +9 42
45
31 -2 34
36

53
China
is the index score
rise in the perceived
risk of the corona-
virus pandemic.
+13
North Korea
Iran
A future pandemic
Russia
Trade wars
in my country
culture
Food shortages
Extreme weather
and forest fires
Autonomous robots-
from enemies
by an aggressor
United States
by an aggressor
Rising inequality
European Union
in your country
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
Change in
index score
The coronavirus and a future
pandemic are the top two
risks perceived by Chinese
respondents. With a risk index
score increase of 13 points,
Chinese respondents’ concern
about the coronavirus
pandemic is completely
bucking the global trend of
an overall decline in risk
perception. The perceived risk
of a future pandemic is up by
five places, with lower-income
Chinese respondents being
the most concerned (56) and
higher-income Chinese
respondents the least
concerned (46).
While overall, China’s index
scores remain below the
global average, the pattern
this year is one of increasing
worries among Chinese
respondents. All five of the
top perceived risks have
increased by 10 points or
more.
The perceived risk posed by
the US has increased by
seven points since November
2021, but it is worth noting
that it is still only the seventh-
ranked risk among Chinese
respondents – climate
change, biological weapons,
and extreme weather events
produce much more concern
among those surveyed.
1
2
3
51 +13 4
59
40 +16 5
41
44 +14 5
39
38 +18 5
39
46 +14 5
40
39 +17 6
41
41 +19 5
40
36 +22 6
35
47 +16 4
43
40 +15 9
41
44 +10 4
45
38 − 4
33
46 +7 9
46
39 +18 7
40
48 +15 5
58
40 +18 6
41
44 +11 4
48
38 +20 7
37
46 +10 4
45
39 +12 5
44
40 +18 6
39
35 +23 8
33
33 +22 11
35
32 +22 10
34
30 +20 11
32
47 +10 3
48
40 +16 5
42
44 +14 3
46
37 +16 7
39
45 +11 4
50
39 +19 6
38
+13

54
is the decrease
in rank of the
perceived risk of
the coronavirus
pandemic.
India
European Union
United States
in my country
Russia
China
by an aggressor
Iran
North Korea
Trade wars
Food shortages
from enemies
culture
by an aggressor
Rising inequality
in your country
Racism and other
discrimination
Extreme weather
and forest fires
Autonomous robots-
A future pandemic
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
Change in
index score
-13
Climate change has moved to
the top of the risk list in India,
up one place since November
2021. It is a risk that is most
pronounced among higher-
income Indian respondents,
with an index score of 61,
compared to only 47 among
lower-income respondents.
The risk that China poses has
moved up to second place,
with 49 percent of Indian
respondents feeling that the
threat posed by China is
imminent and likely to
manifest itself in the next
five years.
The use of nuclear weapons
by an aggressor is down to
third place in the ranking of
risks among the Indians
surveyed. Cyberattacks are
ranked fourth. The largest fall
in index scores is recorded for
the coronavirus pandemic,
which is down 13 places and
now ranked as the 20th most
worrying risk for Indian
respondents.
1
2
3
53 -11 12
53
45 -11 12
48
47 -11 15
47
42 − 11
45
49 -12 14
49
43 -11 9
46
45 -13 13
46
39 -11 12
43
50 -14 11
55
43 -12 12
49
47 -14 11
48
40 -11 12
42
48 -9 13
50
42 -10 11
48
51 -11 10
49
44 -11 13
49
47 -9 11
49
41 -13 14
42
49 -9 14
52
42 -18 10
52
45 -9 14
47
30 -12 11
35
29 -11 13
33
27 -10 13
36
26 -10 11
32
50 -11 11
52
43 -11 11
49
46 -10 12
50
39 -10 16
40
47 -12 13
50
42 -10 13
45
25 -10 13
32

55
of South African
respondents say
that they are
unprepared for
energy supply
disruptions.
47%
South Africa
European Union
North Korea
Autonomous robots-
Iran
in your country
Rising inequality
United States
Cyberattacks on
your country
by an aggressor
China
by an aggressor
in my country
by an aggressor
Food shortages
A future pandemic
Extreme weather and
forest fires
Trade wars
from enemies
culture
Russia
risk is imminent
Share feeling
unprepared
Change in
index score
Among South African
respondents, energy supply
disruptions receive the
highest index score of any risk
in any G7 or “BICS” country
surveyed. This is due to 83
percent of South Africans
saying that the consequences
would be very severe, and 47
percent saying that they feel
unprepared for it. 72 percent
of South African respondents
think that energy supply
disruptions will get worse
rather than better over the
next year.
South African respondents
are overall the most likely to
be concerned about food
shortages, with 66 percent
feeling that it is a significant
risk overall. This does not,
however, mark a change from
last year. South Africa’s index
score for food shortages is up
by one point to 77, and 8
points away from that of any
other country surveyed.
South Africa also has the
highest index score among all
the countries surveyed for the
perceived risk of an economic
or financial crisis. The risk of
an economic or financial crisis
was already the top risk
among South African
respondents in November
2021. In the past year, the G7
and “BICS” countries have been
playing catch-up with South
Africa.
1
2
3
91 − 47
75
61 -2 37
53
70 -5 30
65
54 +0 33
51
74 -6 29
69
57 +15 46
47
65 -1 35
59
45 +2 34
43
77 +1 37
68
59 -1 31
54
68 -5 36
60
49 -25 19
64
70 -5 30
67
56 +3 48
41
81 -5 38
69
60 -5 29
59
69 -1 35
59
54 -4 43
47
72 -7 31
66
56 +8 49
45
61 -9 26
58
42 +1 38
41
42 +0 40
39
39 +4 41
40
39 +5 43
35
76 -6 36
68
58 -1 34
50
66 -5 30
62
47 -2 35
45
70 -5 29
64
54 +2 48
41
38 +0 39
36

-10
–
-1
-20
–
-11
-30
–
-21
-40
–
-31
-50
–
-41
-60
–
-51
0
–
10
11
–
20
21
–
30
31
–
40
41
–
50
-100
–
-61
56
powered
by
Munich
Security
Index
U
K
Germany
Japan
Ukraine
France
UK
China
Italy
US
Canada
South
Africa
Brazil
India
U
S
C
a
n
a
d
a
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
A
u
s
t
r
a
l
i
a
F
r
a
n
c
e
I
t
a
l
y
J
a
p
a
n
U
k
r
a
i
n
e
P
o
l
a
n
d
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
S
w
e
d
e
n
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
G
e
o
r
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i
a
T
a
i
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a
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B
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a
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i
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l
d
o
v
a
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s
t
o
n
i
a
I
n
d
i
a
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o
u
t
h
K
o
r
e
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u
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r
y
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r
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e
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C
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i
n
a
B
e
l
a
r
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s
R
u
s
s
i
a
Figure
1.14
Citizens’
perceptions
of
other
countries,
share
saying
country
is
an
ally
minus
share
saying
country
is
a
threat,
October–November
2022,
percent
Data
and
illustration:
Kekst
CNC,
commissioned
by
the
Munich
Security
Conference
28
44
27
24
21
21
28
24
19
17
12
8
20
-2
14
-2
10
9
2
15
15
12
9
19
44
50
40
55
55
42
43
40
60
62
39
34
30
31
32
24
48
51
35
85
23
35
47
44
50
86
82
42
35
46
38
43
36
34
46
54
54
46
38
47
36
51
30
64
55
55
34
33
34
33
35
24
26
23
16
18
40
51
48
32
44
43
37
44
41
45
25
49
40
49
31
74
66
77
69
58
33
39
53
46
37
33
31
29
30
51
47
48
44
35
33
42
61
64
55
56
33
25
29
43
27
20
18
20
17
44
40
42
44
40
36
40
42
47
47
42
38
77
90
75
52
32
36
49
13
14
20
51
13
27
18
36
16
15
39
28
30
30
25
26
11
14
25
18
36
50
46
20
18
15
12
62
39
14
19
20
18
11
24
23
16
17
28
20
25
39
27
31
27
26
24
11
10
27
21
18
47
48
44
14
28
18
23
78
60
7
40
17
-51
-8
-54
-6
19
9
18
25
-38
-10
-51
32
19
29
14
-27
-26
-50
9
2
17
-5
-46
-13
-60
21
24
35
17
-1
29
34
28
28
14
17
10
5
15
25
15
19
-39
4
-45
32
22
26
13
41
38
34
34
44
46
-25
21
-21
-41
16
-3
-29
-85
-97
20
-2
-13
61
-41
-35
-51
17
0
17
-13
51
–
60
61
–
70
71
–
80
81
–
90

57
Figure 1.15
Perceptions of other countries as threats or allies,
change between November 2021 and October–November 2022,
group average
Perception among
G7 countries
+29
+5
+6
-9
+7
+1
+5
+8
+3
+6
-30
+7
-4
+5
+12
+5
+6
-12
+7
+0
+5
Ukraine
South Korea
Poland
Canada
UK
Hungary
Turkey
India
Finland
Russia
Estonia
Brazil
US
Belarus
Germany
Australia
South Africa
Taiwan
China
Japan
Italy
Perception among
“BICS” countries
+10
+5
+7
+4
+9
+5
+6
+9
+5
+6
-3
+7
+4
+6
+10
+5
+6
+1
+7
+5
+6
Ukraine
Australia
Estonia
France
US
Belarus
South Africa
Canada
UK
Russia
Poland
Germany
Hungary
Brazil
South Korea
Turkey
Italy
China
Taiwan
Finland
Japan
Global perception
+22
+5
+6
-4
+7
+2
+5
+8
+4
+5
-20
+7
+0
+5
+11
+4
+6
-6
+7
+2
+5
Ukraine
Taiwan
Poland
Canada
Estonia
Hungary
Turkey
India
Japan
Russia
US
Brazil
Australia
Belarus
Germany
UK
South Africa
Finland
China
South Korea
Italy
powered by
Munich Security
Index
-30 – -21 -20 – -11 -10 – -1 +0 – +10 +11 – +20 +21 – +30
Perceived as a greater
threat than in Nov. 2021
Perceived as a greater
ally than in Nov. 2021

58
The results of running the Munich Security Index in Ukraine are evidence
of Ukrainian unity, resilience, and bullishness in face of Russian aggression.
Astonishingly, only six percent of Ukrainians feel unprepared to take on
Russia’s invasion, and even during a winter marked by blackouts and shortages
they feel more prepared to face the risk of energy supply disruption than any
G7 public. Ukraine’s Western orientation is also unequivocal. The vast
majority of Ukrainians want to live in a world shaped by European and, to a
lesser extent, US rules (Figure 1.16). Russian and Chinese visions of order
have virtually no purchase in Ukraine.
In striking contrast to some Western policy-makers, whose concerns about
further military escalation appear to hamstring more determined support,
Ukrainians have not been intimidated by Russian threats. As devastating
as the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against a city or on the battlefield
would be, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians say they would still refuse
to surrender if it occurred (Figure 1.17). Moreover, nothing short of a complete
Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, suffices
for most Ukrainians as acceptable conditions for a ceasefire (Figure 1.18).
Even a Russian withdrawal from previously occupied areas would be
unacceptable for the majority of Ukrainians if it does not also include Crimea.
Premature peace negotiations, calls for which are particularly vocal in
some Western capitals, would thus likely meet fierce resistance among the
Ukrainian population.
The transatlantic partners also need to start planning for how to ensure
Ukraine’s long-term security from Russian attacks. Ukrainian citizens are
deeply aware of the lasting threat Putin’s Russia poses and overwhelmingly
believe that they require Western security guarantees (Figure 1.19). What
these could look like is still unclear. But most Ukrainians believe that they
will need permanent arms supplies from the West. A clear majority also
fears that outside of NATO, Ukraine will never be secure, which is corroborated
by the fact that Ukrainians place much less faith in the EU to protect them
than in NATO.
These patterns are also reflected in Ukrainians’ evaluation of other countries’
responses to the war (Figure 1.20). Those polled judge all G7 countries, as well
as Turkey, unequivocally positively. But there are meaningful differences
among them – unsurprising given the variation in material support provided,
Spotlight Ukraine
SPOTLIGHT UKRAINE

59
messaging, and urgency with which countries responded to the war. The
UK tops the ranking, closely followed by the US, and Canada, while Western
European states trail the Anglophone countries by around 30 percentage
points. Meanwhile, Ukrainians perceive China and India to have responded
particularly badly, but all actors from the “Global South” score negatively in
the ranking.
SPOTLIGHT UKRAINE
Figure 1.16
Ukrainian citizens’ views on whose rules they would prefer to live by,
November 2022, percent
powered by
Munich Security
Index
Don’t know/refusal
Europe Economically developing countries
China Russia
US
63
22
2
1
12
Would you rather live in
a world with international
rules shaped mostly
by…?

60
Figure 1.18
Ukrainian citizens’ views on acceptable ceasefire terms,
Neither/don’t know
Unacceptable Acceptable
11
9
80
7
8
85
1
2
97
5 93
2
Russia removes all troops from
Ukraine, including Crimea
Russia removes all troops from
Ukraine, except from Crimea
Russia keeps troops in the
occupied territories
Russia withdraws to the demarcation
line of February 24, 2022
Carry on fighting
Figure 1.17
Ukrainians evaluating whether they should carry on fighting or
surrender in different scenarios, November 2022, percent
Regular conventional bombing
of Ukrainian cities by Russia
Use of a tactical nuclear weapon
over the Black Sea by Russia
against a Ukrainian city by Russia
on the battlefield by Russia
95
2
3
91
4
4
89
6
5
89
6
6
Don’t know/refusal
Surrender
SPOTLIGHT UKRAINE

61
Figure 1.19
Ukrainian citizens’ views on security arrangements after the war,
Neither/don’t know
Disagree Agree
83
11
6
We will never be secure as long
as Putin sits in the Kremlin
75
17
8
We will never be secure without
Western security guarantees
65
22
13
We will never be secure
outside of NATO
72
22
6
We will never be secure without
permanent arms supplies by the West
63
31
5
We trust the US/NATO more than the
EU to help us defend against Russia
SPOTLIGHT UKRAINE
Figure 1.20
Ukrainian evaluation of the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
of different countries and organizations, share saying the country or
organization has “done well” minus share saying it has “done badly,”
S
o
u
t
h
A
f
r
i
c
a
-13
T
u
r
k
e
y
+44
U
N
-2
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
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+43
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+76
U
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+77
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+61
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powered by
Munich Security
Index
-40 – -31 -30 – -21 -20 – -11 -10 – -1 +21 – +30 +31 – +40 +41 – +50 +61 – +70 +71 – +80
Perceived as done badly Perceived as done well

62
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 HUMAN RIGHTS

63
Universell-Out
What does authoritarian revisionism of human
rights look like? Why are the United States, Europe,
and other liberal democracies not better at pushing
back? And why are democratic countries from
different regions of the world less aligned on
human rights decisions than one would expect?
Human Rights
2

Universell-Out
More than seven decades ago, the international community of states, albeit
much smaller at that time, defined a set of fundamental human rights to be
considered universal, inalienable, and indivisible.1
In line with the duty to
uphold and defend these core rights and freedoms, its members enshrined
these values in a landmark document: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR). Although the group of drafters included people from all
regions of the world and from highly diverse cultural, political, and religious
backgrounds, it managed to spell out “a common standard of achievements
for all peoples and all nations” that it believed would help achieve lasting
peace and security and prevent the atrocities of the Second World War from
ever happening again.2
The UDHR was adopted in the UN General Assembly
with no dissenting votes, and later inspired a plethora of other global and
regional human rights norms and treaties, including the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.3
About 70 years later, the very understanding of human rights as universal
aspirations can no longer be taken for granted. In 2022, Freedom House,
whose indicators are largely derived from the UDHR, registered the 16th
consecutive year of deterioration of political rights and civil liberties around
the world.5
And its dire findings are shared by other human rights
measures and by many experts in the field.6
At the same time, the “age of
impunity,” as former UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband has called it, has
squarely arrived (Figure 2.1). Even for the most egregious human rights
abuses, it often seems impossible to hold perpetrators to account. The war
zones of the world are a drastic case in point. Rather than respecting the
rights of civilians, combatants in many parts of the world are killing,
torturing, or deporting civilians, deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure,
and willfully undermining humanitarian aid.7
Russia’s war against the
civilian population in Ukraine is not just condoned – it is an actual part of
the strategy. The “brutal standard of warfare” it reflects is unfortunately also
found in many other places in the world.8
While international human rights are under assault, their universality has
also become contested. Powerful autocrats are now depicting the UDHR as
“an unrepresentative Western document,”9
while their efforts to establish an
authoritarian variant of international law – one meant to shield governments
that violate fundamental rights and freedoms – are already in full swing.10
“It’s a mistake to think of
human rights as a nice
little side issue that we’ll
get to when we have
time. If you look at the
big issues of the world
[…], [s]ecurity threats
tend to emanate from
unaccountable dictators
who are serving
themselves, not what
their people want.”4
Kenneth Roth, then−Executive
Director of Human Rights
Watch, Munich Security
Conference, February 19,
2022
Sophie Eisentraut
64

HUMAN RIGHTS
“Russia is waging a
genocidal war in Ukraine,
shocking the world with
the magnitude of its war
crimes. It is targeting
civilians, destroying
civilian infrastructure,
and using mass killings,
torture, and rape as
weapons of war. This is
not an accident but rather
a feature of the Russian
way of war.”13
Kaja Kallas, Estonian Prime
Minister, Foreign Affairs
Magazine, December 8, 2022
But disagreement on human rights norms and mechanisms is also evident
inside and among the democratic states of the world. With systemic rivalry
set to widen rather than narrow these divides, efforts to revive the spirit of
universality that originally inspired the human rights project are facing
serious headwinds.
China’s Human Rights Revisionism: Rights Make Might
China, supported by Russia, is at the forefront of authoritarian pushback
against international human rights norms and the mechanisms built to
protect them. Both Beijing and Moscow have long viewed efforts to promote
human rights by the US and its European allies as an existential threat to
their regimes’ security and stability. Recently, however, Beijing has replaced
its defensive stance – focused on shielding its repressive regime from external
criticism – with a much more assertive approach aimed at advancing an
alternative vision for human rights.11
The vision it pursues, Western
observers worry, is nothing less than a world safe for autocracy, with a
much more limited role for liberal human rights and the global promotion
of fundamental values.
Although a Chinese representative had served on the drafting committee
of the UDHR, Beijing is now denouncing many fundamental rights and
freedoms enshrined in the declaration as “Western.”12
These “so-called
Human Rights
geprooft, 2. Feedback MSC
The growing impunity crisis, various indicators
Figure 2.1
Civilians account for
84 percent of war casualties
in the post–Cold War period –
a 22-percentage-point increase
from the Cold War itself
Attacks on health facilities
have increased by 90 percent
in the past ﬁve years
The number of aid workers
killed has doubled in the
past decade
Nearly 200 million people
in humanitarian need –
that’s 70 percent of all people
in need – are living in countries
with very high or extreme
humanitarian access constraints
Data: International Rescue Committee.
Impunity
crisis
65

66
universal values,”14
as China refers to them, are decried as unrepresentative
of the values and needs of other countries in the world, developing ones in
particular.15
They are also branded as instruments of Western cultural
imperialism more generally and “an excuse to keep China down”
specifically.16
In line with this reasoning, Beijing, with Russia’s support, has pushed
alternative conceptions of human rights. While there are many facets to this
undertaking (Figure 2.2), two stand out: the championing of economic, social,
and cultural rights over civil and political ones, and the reorientation of
international law toward an absolute defense of national sovereignty. In this
spirit, China is arguing that a country’s development needs may well legitimize
restrictions on civil and political rights, while Russia highlights that
traditional values may justify the denial of minority rights.18
To reassert the
principle of sovereignty against external interference in the name of human
rights, both countries cast the West as revisionist and themselves as
defenders of the status quo.19
To win support for these ideas, China regularly
hosts conferences such as the South-South Human Rights Forum, which
engage developing and emerging countries, particularly African states.20
At the same time, China and Russia have continued their efforts to erode
core human rights institutions and mechanisms, chief among them the
UN Human Rights Council. By cooperating with the members of the “Like-
Minded Group,” a coalition of mostly authoritarian countries, Beijing and
Moscow have worked to curb the ability of the human rights system to
independently monitor human rights situations and reprimand those who
abuse fundamental freedoms. These efforts are far from new. But as China
has extended its political and economic clout in the world, and thus its
economic and financial leverage over other countries, its ability to mute
human rights critics and win support for its own interpretation of human
rights has visibly grown.21
In 2017, China sponsored its first solo resolution at
the UN Human Rights Council, one that insinuates that respect for human
rights is contingent on economic development – and it passed by a wide
margin.22
Moreover, in a recent UN Human Rights Council vote, Western
countries failed to mobilize a majority against China, even for the limited
aim of discussing the situation of human rights in Xinjiang. The report that
would have served as the basis for this discussion – one that suggests that
the human rights violations committed against Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims
may amount to crimes against humanity – almost did not “see the light of
day” due to intense Chinese pressure.23
“China […] redefine[s]
the international rules of
play by establishing a
narrative that says that
these rules are centered
on […] US power and
that what had previously
been a universally
established consensus
is now something that
they can legitimately
contest.”17
Emmanuel Macron,
French President,
Conference of Ambassadors,
September 1, 2022
HUMAN RIGHTS

67
Chinese efforts to redefine international human rights standards,
selected concepts promoted by Beijing
Figure 2.2
Common values. In juxtaposition to universal values, Chinese officials
advocate “common values,” which suggests that human rights should be
subject to cultural and regional interpretations, and that even though
states might find common ground, they can largely define and implement
human rights as they see fit.
Community with a shared future. In China’s vision of a “community with
a shared future,” states should refrain from criticizing each other regarding
the upholding of values and rights.
State sovereignty and non-interference. China’s government routinely
refers to the UN Charter to demand non-interference by other countries
when they bring up human rights violations in China. In doing so, it largely
negates the status of human rights as a founding principle of the UN.
By placing state sovereignty above everything else, China undermines
efforts to codify and expand the Responsibility to Protect.
Collective human rights. China’s government characterizes collective
rights, as defined and upheld by the state, as taking precedence over
individual human rights. Notions of collective human rights provide the
Chinese party state with a pretext for curtailing individual civil and political
liberties and the rights of minorities in the name of the greater public good.
Right to development. China has long promoted the right to subsistence
and development as the “foremost” human right, with notions of human
rights that put a premium on individual freedoms and political rights being
an afterthought.
Right to security. Security as a collective right is increasingly promoted
by China as a precondition for development. Placing public and national
security first helps legitimize severe restrictions on civil liberties.
Democratization of human rights norms. China regularly promotes the
“democratization” of UN forums and norm setting, arguing that it seeks to
make the UN more equitable and representative of developing countries.
This also includes championing the equal acceptance of values and
political practices that may deviate from the liberal-democratic ones
embedded in UN human rights laws.
HUMAN RIGHTS

68

69
While they are at the forefront of human rights revisionism, China and Russia
are not the only autocracies that have ramped up their pushback against
this core pillar of the liberal international order. Over the past years, other
authoritarian regimes have also become much more active in sponsoring
human rights resolutions and thereby reshaping global norms on human
rights.24
The Challenge From Within: Popular Illiberals
For many years, liberal democracies, supported by civil society organizations,
have tried to resolve the tension between state sovereignty and the protection of
individual rights, which is inherent in international law, in favor of the latter.
Guided by a vision of much stronger global human rights protection, they have
sought to advance an understanding of international law whereby state
sovereignty is conditional on respect for human rights. Western democracies
and their partners have also sought to build and strengthen the tools needed to
protect human rights and hold the world’s human rights offenders accountable –
at least the very worst ones. Most recently, a German court convicted a
Syrian war criminal based on the principle of “universal jurisdiction.” This
principle allows states to prosecute serious abuses of international law
even when the crimes in question were not committed on their territory
and neither the victims nor the perpetrators are citizens of that state.25
With the rise of illiberal populists, pressure on civil and political rights has
grown significantly in democratic societies themselves.26
Among other things,
these forces have been “demonizing” religious and cultural minorities,
undermining the checks and balances necessary for accountable rule, and
challenging essential liberties such as freedom of speech.27
In the United
States, conflicts over rights are now a core element of what some have called
an ongoing “culture war.”28
Last year’s US Supreme Court rulings have dealt
a significant blow to women’s rights. In Europe, some of the most evident
violations of minority rights come in the form of illegal pushback of refugees
and migrants at EU country borders. In many ways, autocratic populists
are adopting the same anti-universalist narrative as China, protesting the
“globalist” idea that governments everywhere in the world ought to be bound
by the same rules and standards.29
As a result, in nations where such populist
forces have managed to gain office, they have often harmed both their country’s
domestic human rights record and international efforts to protect human
rights. Former US President Donald Trump’s global human rights track
record, including his affection for authoritarian strongmen, is particularly
well documented.30
HUMAN RIGHTS

70
China and Russia have been happy to reinforce these illiberal trends. But even
without China’s help, growing systemic rivalry might harm the human rights
project. Faced with harsh geopolitical competition from Russia and China,
policy-makers in the US and Europe might become much more unwilling to forgo
their “unsavory alliances” with repressive and demagogic regimes.31
At the
same time, the growing “us versus China” narrative boosts ethno-nationalist
sentiments and lends itself to exploitation by those who thrive on mongering
hate. In the US, xenophobic violence against Chinese immigrants as well as
hate crimes committed against Asian Americans have already increased.32
Thus while the efforts of liberal democracies to strengthen and protect
human rights continue, they are faced with growing obstacles.
Divisions Among Democracies: Human Rights Headed South
Nothing would be a better rebuke to autocratic allegations that human
rights are “Western” than concerted action by democratic countries from
every region of the world. Yet democracies from within and beyond the
West have not always seen eye to eye on international human rights – and
in light of “hardening bloc politics over human rights,”33
these rifts may
very well grow in the future.
Over the past few decades, countries that respect human rights have often
failed to vote together on human rights resolutions. Alignment between the
EU and African democracies has been particularly weak (Figure 2.3).
Moreover, despite having fundamentally different democratic and human
rights records from one another, emerging powers from the “Global South”
have often allied themselves more closely with each other than with the EU
on core human rights decisions.34
Overall, many non-Western democracies
have shown greater concern for sovereignty and non-interference than their
Western counterparts, European states in particular. As a result, they have
repeatedly proven reluctant to embrace the external promotion of liberal
human rights norms and standards.35
Cultural differences may very well contribute to varying human rights
approaches. Although any distinction of this sort risks being overly simplistic,
some scholars distinguish “thin” societies of the West, which tend to
concentrate on individual freedoms, from many “thick” societies of the
“Global South” that focus on “the well-being of society as a whole.”36
But
scholars also highlight widespread suspicion of the West among many
“Southern” states. Governments of countries that have experienced Western
colonialism and imperialism might not necessarily question the legitimacy
HUMAN RIGHTS

71
of human rights norms as such, but they may still regard these values and
robust actions in their name as a threat to their newfound independence.37
While these sentiments are all but new, some detect a new trend of “cultural
decolonization” that will likely see differences grow as societies celebrate
cultural differences and push back against universalist ideas.38
China certainly knows how to exploit these dynamics and sentiments in its
favor. It is actively courting the “Global South,” African states in particular,
with the notion of “human rights suitable for developing countries,” purporting
that its own understanding of human rights is much more attuned to these
countries’ needs.40
And together with Russia, Beijing eagerly caters to anti-
Western sentiments and suspicions, pointing to overbearance and double
standards in Western human rights practices and portraying the West’s
human rights agenda as not actually motivated by a belief in universal values,
but as a desperate attempt to prevent its own decline.41
Reviving Human Rights as a Cross-Regional Project:
Versatile Universality?
If these trends are allowed to continue, the future international order will
have little resemblance to the one that the international community pledged
to bring about seven decades ago. Efforts to push back against emboldened
autocrats will not succeed if countries with good human rights records
cannot restore human rights as a cross-regional project. But how can the
notion of universality be revived among the democratic states of the world?
“China will […] oppose
interference in others’
internal affairs and
double standard[s] under
the pretext of human
rights issues and make
relentless efforts for
global human rights
governance that is more
equitable, reasonable,
and inclusive.”39
Wang Wenbin, Chinese
Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson,
press conference,
February 28, 2022 Human Rights
geprooft; 1. Feedback MSC
Voting coincidence with the EU on human rights votes in the
UN General Assembly, 2021–2022, percent
Figure 2.3
Data and illustration: ECFR
Free 47 70 n/a 50 93
Partly free 45 41 88 50 n/a
Not free 43 41 33 34 96
Africa Asia–
Paciﬁc
Eastern
Europe
Latin
America
Western Europe
and others
HUMAN RIGHTS

72
How can they win the support of governments that might not necessarily be
“ideologically committed to the project of authoritarian international law”
but are currently acquiescing to it?42
Some steps are obvious. If Western democracies want to reduce suspicions
regarding their human rights policies, they cannot allow themselves to apply
double standards when implementing basic human rights. It is also evident
that without extensive exchange across regions, cultures, and religions, any
effort to revive the old human rights consensus is bound to fail. Other steps,
however, are much more controversial. By refocusing on a smaller set of
core human rights – “a universal minimum standard,” some suggest – this
lost consensus might be reestablished.43
But while a narrower focus may help
bridge divides that threaten the human rights project – divides that China
and others exploit for that very reason – an attempt to water down the liberal
human rights agenda in the service of broader global agreement also comes
with obvious downsides.
While it is far from clear whether the spirit of universality can be revived,
there are also reasons for hope. There is ample evidence that fundamental
human rights, such as the desire to live in dignity and free from oppression,
have a strong appeal far beyond the traditional West, including inside the
world’s most oppressive regimes. In Iran, undeterred by violent repression,
people are taking to the streets to demand core rights and freedoms. Millions
of people everywhere in the world are regularly “voting with their feet,”
leaving their own repressive countries for refuge in liberal states rather than
in Russia or China.44
And the results of the World Values Survey provide
ample evidence that “the ‘West’ is not the sole guardian of liberal values.”45
Meanwhile, in all countries surveyed for the Munich Security Index, except
for China and India, more people disagree than agree that it would be a
good thing if China had more say over the rules that govern international
politics (Figure 3.2). Those who seek to portray universally shared human
rights standards as incompatible with a more pluralist, multipolar order are
currently those who speak with the loudest voice. They can still be proven
wrong. But without a clear vision of how to revive the human rights project,
the window to do so is closing rapidly.
HUMAN RIGHTS

73
More than seven decades after the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted, human rights
are not only in a dire state in many parts of the world,
but the very notion of human rights as universal
aspirations has become contested.
Beijing has replaced its defensive behavior by a
much more assertive approach to human rights. It is
denouncing fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined
in the UDHR as Western and is instead promoting an
alternative vision of human rights governance.
Emboldened autocrats are not the only challenge.
Promoted by right-wing nationalist movements, illiberal
ideas are now deeply entrenched in democratic societies
themselves. And democracies from different parts of
the world often do not see eye to eye on international
human rights norms and mechanisms.
With systemic competition set to amplify rather than
narrow existing divides among governments, efforts to
revive the spirit of universality that originally inspired
the human rights project face serious headwinds. But
protests in Iran and elsewhere also suggest that among
people human rights have not lost their global appeal.
Key Points
1
2
3
4
HUMAN RIGHTS

GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURES
74

75
My Way or
No Highway
Why have global infrastructures become main sites
of geopolitical competition? Do Europe and the US
share visions for key global infrastructures? Why is
the global trade infrastructure eroding, and what
comes next? And how are democratic and autocratic
visions playing out in the race to shape physical and
digital infrastructures?
Global Infrastructures
3

76
My Way or No Highway
Global infrastructures create connectivity between peoples and economies.
But establishing such connections is neither a mere technical exercise, nor
do these connections necessarily reduce conflict.1
Instead, power politics
is increasingly permeating global infrastructures. Whoever controls these
infrastructures enjoys structural power: they can set the rules of the game
in their favor and render other states dependent on them.2
For example,
the fact that China has so far not systematically violated the US and EU
sanctions against Russia in the wake of the war on Ukraine is largely due to
Beijing’s fear of secondary US sanctions, given US control over the global
financial architecture.3
As a result, shaping global infrastructures has
become a central prize in the systemic competition.
The existing trade infrastructure was largely designed to encourage free
trade, market forces, and interdependence. But emerging powers like China
seek to reassert the primacy of the state over the trade infrastructure as
security concerns increasingly drive economic policy. The US is also pursuing a
more protectionist vision, and even the EU has had to adopt defensive economic
instruments while scrambling to defend the open trade infrastructure in
this geoeconomic age. Meanwhile, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has
unleashed a race to construct physical infrastructure in Eurasia and Africa,
and brought rival autocratic and democratic visions of governance to the fore.
And major powers are competing to shape the emerging digital infrastructure
that is set to shape states’ prosperity and security in the decades to come.
China is spearheading a group of autocratic states intent on promoting
their techno-authoritarian vision for the digital age, while the transatlantic
partners are only gradually converging on their vision of an open digital
infrastructure.
Trading Interdependence for Autonomy
Growing geopolitical competition has upended the very logic of the
international trade architecture. The post–Cold War era was one of markets
and cooperative trade multilateralism embodied by the WTO.4
Underpinned
by the dominance of the US dollar, this international trade infrastructure
served to reduce trade barriers between states, curtail state interventions
through limits on dumping and subsidies, globalize supply chains, and
foster the movement of capital. The resulting interdependencies were
considered beneficial for economic prosperity and political convergence
between disparate systems.
Leonard Schütte

77
Today, this vision of an open trade infrastructure has fewer and fewer
supporters, even if narratives of deglobalization have no basis in data so far.5
Once seen as a driver of prosperity and amity between erstwhile rivals, states
now primarily view interdependence both as a vulnerability and a conduit for
coercion.6
Russia’s weaponization of Europe’s gas and oil dependency is a case in
point. The international trade infrastructure has thus become securitized.
Protectionism incompatible with open trade infrastructure is on the rise. And
states are increasingly resorting to industrial policies, trade restrictions, export
controls, and investment screening. Figure 3.1 illustrates these trends, though
Chinese interventions tend to be underreported and likely higher in reality. We
may be at the cusp of a new geoeconomic age shaped by power, states, and
pursuits of autonomy rather than rules, markets, and interdependence.
Other
China
Brazil
India
US
EU
Discriminatory trade interventions, per year and country
Figure 3.1
Data: Global Trade Alert. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
0
1,500
1,800
900
600
300
1,200
2,100
2,400
3,900
4,200
3,300
3,000
2,700
3,600
2016 17 18 19 20 21 2022
Other
China
Brazil
India
US
EU
Figure 3.1
0
1,500
1,800
900
600
300
1,200
2,100
2,400
3,900
4,200
3,300
3,000
2,700
3,600
2016 17 18 19 20 21 2022
Other
China
Brazil
India
US
EU
Figure 3.1
0
1,500
1,800
900
600
300
1,200
2,100
2,400
3,900
4,200
3,300
3,000
2,700
3,600
2016 17 18 19 20 21 2022
“We will strengthen the
safeguards for ensuring
economic, major
infrastructure, financial,
cyber, data, biological,
resource, nuclear, space,
and maritime security.
Mechanisms for countering
foreign sanctions,
interference, and long-
arm jurisdiction will be
strengthened.”10
Xi Jinping, Chinese President,
20th Party Congress,
October 16, 2022

78
China’s “party-state capitalism”7
is a primary driver of ushering in this new
age. For years, China has been systematically violating WTO principles by
subsidizing key industries, discriminating against foreign companies, and
stealing intellectual property.8
These practices have distorted markets not
only in the West, where economic dislocation has undermined support for
globalization, but also in developing countries whose interests China
purports to defend. For instance, China has become the largest subsidizer of
agricultural products and cotton, at the expense of predominantly African
farmers.9
At the same time, China rejects WTO rulebook reforms and clings
to its status as a developing economy.
Even more consequentially, national security concerns have gradually
replaced economic prosperity as the primary driver of Chinese trade policy.11
Chinese sanctions against Lithuania for forging closer relations with
Taiwan, or against Australia for calling for an independent inquiry into the
origins of the pandemic, exemplify that China prioritizes national security
concerns over trade. The Made in China 2025 plan and the Dual Circulation
Strategy are further manifestations of these security concerns, marking a
definitive break with the long-standing focus on export- and investment-led
growth.12
To become less dependent on foreign markets and technology, the
new Chinese economic model aims to strengthen consumption and support
domestic innovation to dominate key technologies of the 21st century,
while making other countries dependent on China. In parallel, the Chinese
Communist Party seeks to elevate the role of the Chinese yuan to push back
against the hegemony of the US dollar.13
In the US, too, trade has become a matter of national security. The country
was long the guardian of the open trade infrastructure, but the Trump
administration launched a trade war against China, imposed hefty sanctions
upon its European partners, and rendered the WTO’s dispute settlement
mechanism defunct. While President Biden has suspended most tariffs
against the EU, he has kept course on other issues as trade has become
highly politicized in Congress; the US continues to block the WTO’s
dispute settlement mechanism, and pursuing free trade agreements is no
longer a priority, as the 2022 National Security Strategy testifies.
The Biden administration also uses active industrial policy, paired with
protectionist policies, to prevail in the great-power rivalry with China.
Nowhere is this more pronounced than on semiconductors. In August 2022,
US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which provides an
“America invented the
semiconductor […]
and this law brings it
back home. It’s in our
economic interest and
it’s in our national
security interest to
do so.”14
signing of the CHIPS and
Science Act, August 9, 2022

79
“We need a Buy European
Act like the Americans
[…]. You have China that
is protecting its industry,
the US that is protecting
its industry, and Europe
that is an open house.”16
Emmanuel Macron, French
President, TV interview,
October 26, 2022
“[W]e must accept this
duality, whereby we
continue to defend a
multilateral order based
on rules, but also accept
that it is essential to
do so from a stronger
position, equipping
ourselves with all
necessary instruments.”19
Sabine Weyand, Director-
General of the European
Commission’s Directorate-
General for Trade, interview,
January 31, 2022
enormous 52.7 billion US dollars to reduce dependencies on foreign producers.
In October 2022, the Biden administration doubled down and announced
a comprehensive export ban on advanced semiconductors. In the past, the
US had sanctioned individual Chinese companies including Huawei and
ZTE, but these new sanctions encompass an entire technology. US-China
decoupling, at least in technology, is well underway. And this American form
of weaponizing interdependence is not limited to chips. As the US dollar
continues to be the dominant reserve currency and primary currency for
international payments, the US enjoys substantial control over the global
financial architecture, which it regularly uses to sanction its enemies by
cutting them off from the dollar-based system.15
The landmark Inflation
Reduction Act (IRA) also contains protectionist provisions to reshore
manufacturing, which have drawn the ire of the EU, where the IRA is seen
as discriminating against European companies.
The escalation of trade relations between the US and China, pursuits of
greater self-sufficiency, and the weaponization of interdependence all pose a
fundamental challenge to the EU’s vision of an open trade infrastructure.
The founding premise of the EU is that rules-based economic interdependence –
embodied in the European single market – helps overcome historical enmity.
The EU has therefore long been among the main supporters of the WTO and
was a crucial driving force behind creating an interim dispute settlement
mechanism.17
It continues to push for wider WTO reform and pursues
multilateral trade agreements around the world. And it is much more
integrated into the global economy and more dependent on the Chinese
market than the US is.18
The beleaguered EU has thus been trying to walk the fine line of maintaining
the open trade infrastructure while becoming more autonomous. It has
grudgingly created new instruments to tackle market distortions, protect
critical infrastructure, defend itself against economic coercion, and limit the
reach of US dollar dominance.20
These instruments include a revised Trade
Enforcement Regulation to unilaterally respond to breaches of trade rules
by the EU’s trading partners; the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges to
circumvent secondary financial sanctions; investment screening regulations;
and a dual-use export regime to restrict the export of technologies used for
surveillance, for example. But some EU countries have been sending mixed
signals. While German Vice-Chancellor Robert Habeck proclaimed the
“awakening of German trade policy,”21
the social-democrat-led chancellery
overruled its coalition partners to sanction the sale of a 24.9 percent stake

80
of the port of Hamburg to the China Ocean Shipping Company, owned by
the Chinese state.
The open trade infrastructure has become the collateral of geopolitical
tensions. Visions for global trade multilateralism hardly resonate in this age
of geoeconomics. China, the US, the EU, and also India have intensified their
efforts to become less integrated with the global economy. Many new trade
initiatives – such as the US-initiated Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the
EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC), or the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership agreement that China joined – lack ambitions to
seriously increase market access, and primarily concern geoeconomic issues
like supply chain security or critical infrastructure. The securitization of
trade may usher in the end of the rules-based trade infrastructure. This
would have repercussions for prosperity everywhere, but particularly in the
EU and countries in the “Global South,” for whom (even imperfect) trade
multilateralism is preferable to unregulated power politics.23
Transatlantic
partners must therefore strike a delicate balance. In light of widespread
economic coercion by autocratic states, they need to enhance their resilience
and diversify supply chains in sensitive sectors, without bifurcating the
trade infrastructure or terminally undermining the WTO.
Building and Burning Bridges
Physical infrastructure, too, has become a site of systemic competition.
Multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, and rich countries have long
provided funds for infrastructure projects. But these have been vastly
insufficient to close the global infrastructure investment gap of around
15 trillion US dollars.24
Over the past decade, China has tried to fill this void,
becoming the central infrastructure provider in the developing world.25
Through the BRI – a framework that encompasses a sprawling panoply of
infrastructure projects such as ports, electricity grids, and train links – China’s
spending could amount to one trillion US dollars by 2027.26
However,
Chinese infrastructure investment levels have markedly declined since 2016,
as domestic economic woes and problems with debt unsustainability have
mounted, aggravated by the pandemic.27
But the BRI, as the Chinese
Communist Party’s recent National Congress affirmed, is here to stay.
Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the BRI in 2013 in a quest to create
greater connectivity across Eurasia and enable China to become the dominant
economic power in the region. Almost 170 states and international organizations
have since signed cooperation agreements. The BRI has several core aims.
“[F]ragmentation and
decoupling of the
multilateral trading
system would not just
be economically costly:
it would leave all
countries more vulnerable
to the global commons
problems that now
represent some of the
biggest threats to our
lives and livelihoods.”22
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala,
Director-General of the
WTO, 2022 Lowy Lecture
at the Lowy Institute,
November 22, 2022

81
The infrastructure program will create new export markets for Chinese
goods and outlets for its industrial surplus capacity, while also creating access
to strategic resources such as minerals and food. In addition, the BRI should
help make Chinese energy supplies more resilient. China is currently dependent
on shipments via the Strait of Malacca – 80 percent of Chinese oil imports
run through it. Given US naval dominance, constructing land routes to the
Persian Gulf should help reduce this vulnerability for China.28
But the BRI is not merely an economic project. It promotes Chinese standards
and institutions, reduces vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the US by reshifting trade
flows, draws states into Beijing’s orbit, and weaves webs of dependencies by
becoming a major creditor and creating debt traps. Almost 60 percent of
Chinese foreign loans are held by countries in financial distress.30
Chinese
investment has thus bought the Chinese Communist Party significant
influence in recipient states, many of whom vote with China in UN bodies
or veto EU positions.31
China also uses the BRI to promote its governance
model. Investments are state-led, and the absence of social, environmental,
or human rights conditionalities strengthens autocratic recipient governments
and abets corruption. Here too, China is busy creating an alternative
financial infrastructure with “Chinese characteristics” to insulate the BRI from
US financial hegemony.32
The BRI therefore furthers China’s vision of a
multipolar world order and increases China’s say over international rules, which
those outside of China (and to some extent India) disapprove of (Figure 3.2).
Transatlantic partners have been slow to respond to the BRI.33
Until recently,
infrastructural efforts had largely been disjointed. This is supposed to change
with new initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic. To counter China’s
increasingly obvious geopolitical ambitions, the EU launched its Connectivity
Strategy in 2018 to deepen networks between Europe and Asia. This was
followed by the more comprehensive Global Gateway Initiative, which pledged
60 billion euros annually. In a similar vein, the Biden administration launched
the Build Back Better World initiative, through which it intends to allocate
40 billion US dollars every year. Finally, in 2022, the G7 aggregated these
initiatives under the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
(PGII) to mobilize 600 billion US dollars through to 2027.
What unites these initiatives is their claim to offer a democratic alternative
to the BRI. The PGII aims to promote “transparency, good governance,
environmental, and climate as well as financial and debt sustainability.”35
But it is too early to say whether this lofty infrastructure vision will become
“China comes forward
with a basket of money,
aggressive proposal, and
affordable proposal. And
then we have a problem.
What to do?”29
A. K. Abdul Momen,
Bangladeshi Foreign Minister,
Munich Security Conference,
February 19, 2022
“The fate of future
generations depends
more than ever before on
the quality and quantity
of our infrastructure
investment today.”34
Ursula von der Leyen,
Commission, European
Development Days, June 21,
2022

82
reality. Questions remain around where the pledged sums will come from.
So far, the EU has not dispensed any new funds through the Global Gateway
Initiative, which lacks ownership within the European Commission.36
The
EU’s and G7’s loans also come with conditionalities, which many autocratic
governments may be disinclined to accept. Funding processes are also more
cumbersome, given the array of public and private actors involved, compared
to China’s “state-led one-stop shop.”37
But as problems with the BRI mount
and Chinese funds abate, the competition between different visions for
development infrastructure is set to intensify.
Digital Divides
Competing visions of governance are also playing out in the race to shape
the emerging digital infrastructure. Access to and control of data has become
a central ingredient for innovation, international trade, and national security.
Like with physical infrastructure, there are enormous funding gaps, especially
Nuclear Order
Neu, ungeprooft
Figure 3.2
Citizens’ views on whether China having a greater say over
the rules that govern international politics is a good thing,
Neither/don’t know Agree
Disagree
China
India
Brazil
France
Canada
Italy
US
Japan
South Africa
UK
Germany
powered by
y
Munich Securit
Index
10 26 64
39 39
40 35 26
44 9
44 25
40 16
20
36 11
47 20
41 14
44
31
22
48
44
36
52
33
45
41 39 20
Do you agree or disagree
that it is a good thing if
China has more say over
the rules that govern
international politics?

83
in the “Global South.”38
The emerging digital infrastructure has hitherto been
shaped by liberal visions. American pioneers conceived the internet as
an open, free, and global agora for ideas, governed my multiple private
stakeholders with a strictly limited role for the state.39
But China, as the
vanguard of autocratic powers, is pushing to revise the principles of the open
digital infrastructure and dominate its physical enablers. Meanwhile, the EU
aims to wrest back control from big tech companies to enhance citizens’
privacy while maintaining the internet’s open nature. Other powers, such as
India, have also become active players in the quest to shape the digital age.
The liberal digital vision contradicts the Marxist-Leninist foundation of the
Chinese Communist Party as the ultimate control organ over Chinese society.
For the “biggest of big brother,”40
an open internet that allows for freedom of
speech and anonymity poses a threat to domestic stability. China has therefore
long insulated itself from the free flow of data by erecting a Great Firewall of
technological barriers and laws. But China has recently gone on the offensive to
project its vision for the digital infrastructure abroad. First, China has promoted
its vision of a “clearly bounded national internet space”41
by trying to change the
prevailing technical internet standards. The China Standards 2035 Strategy
calls for expanding Chinese presence in bodies such as the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and deepening standardization dialogues
with BRI countries. As part of its wider effort to strategically staff UN agencies,
China managed to install Houlin Zhao, who has attracted attention for his
overt support for Huawei, as head of the ITU in 2014 (US national Doreen
Bogdan-Martin replaced him in January 2023).
The most prominent effort to introduce new digital standards is China’s 2019
proposal for a New Internet Protocol (New IP). Internet protocols enable
communications across hardware devices, and are essential for the internet
to function. The existing protocol embodies an open internet based on the
same standards worldwide. The New IP instead promotes a centralized,
controllable Chinese model, whereby each country can impose its own
restrictions and potentially require individuals to register to use the internet.42
Such a digital vision would enhance state control and surveillance while
eroding free speech and citizens’ privacy. The New IP negotiations have
stalled in the ITU, but China has found supporters in Iran, Russia, and Saudi
Arabia. China also recently turned the World Internet Conference, which it
founded and controls, into a formal organization to shift authority away
from Western-dominated institutions.43

84
Second, China is exporting its digital vision by building physical enablers
abroad, especially in developing economies. As part of its Digital Silk Road
(DSR), China has already invested 50 billion US dollars and is emerging as
a prime provider of networks, undersea cables, surveillance systems, and
satellites.44
Huawei alone has built 70 percent of the 4G networks in Africa,45
and China has become a central provider of high tech in Europe’s
neighborhood.46
Aside from reaping commercial benefits, China uses the
DSR to promote its techno-authoritarian vision of governance. Huawei’s
Smart City and Safe City projects serve as an integrated framework through
which China diffuses technologies such as facial recognition software,
surveillance cameras, and big-data analysis programs to digitize public
services while systematically surveilling citizens. According to the company’s
2021 annual report, more than 700 cities around the globe use Huawei’s
smart technology. Not surprisingly, autocratic regimes are much more likely
to sign Safe City contracts with Huawei than democratic ones are.47
The US and EU have pushed back against Chinese efforts to impose its
authoritarian vision upon the digital infrastructure, even if many EU member
states still use Huawei components in their telecommunications systems.48
Both
the US and EU agree that the New IP would undermine the foundation of the
open and inclusive internet. But the transatlantic partners have long not
seen eye to eye on digital strategy. The EU has recognized its lack of digital
sovereignty, not only because of the dearth of European tech players but also
because of diverging views on privacy and monopolies.49
The EU has pursued a
“bourgeois” vision rather than the US “commercial” vision for the internet,
where the European Commission assumes an active regulatory role to protect
citizens’ privacy, minimize hate speech, and dispel digital monopolies.50
To
these ends, the EU adopted the landmark General Data Protection Regulation to
allow citizens to decide how companies use their data,51
the EU Digital Markets
Act to prevent big tech companies from abusing their market positions, and
the Digital Services Act that obliges providers to delete disinformation and hate
speech. The European vision has created tensions with the US, whose tech
companies appear to be the primary addressees of European initiatives.
But amid the wider renaissance of the transatlantic relationship under the
Biden administration, the EU and US have begun building a common
Euro-Atlantic digital infrastructure.53
In April 2022, they spearheaded the
signing of the Declaration for the Future of the Internet by more than 60 states,
which affirms the objective of preserving an “open, free, global, interoperable,
reliable, and secure internet.” Signatories mostly included democracies but
“[The EU and US] may
not end up with the
exact same laws, but it
is becoming increasingly
clear that we share the
same basic vision when
it comes to developing
digital policy to protect
our citizens, and to keep
our markets fair and
open.”52
Margrethe Vestager, Vice
Commission, Stefan A.
Riesenfeld Symposium at
the University of California,
February 22, 2022

85
also partially free states such as Kenya and Serbia, reflecting the digital
divide between democracies and autocracies (Figure 3.3). In turn, the TTC
convened for the third time in December to spur transatlantic coordination
on technology sanctions against Russia, infrastructure programs to compete
with the DSR, and initiatives on key technologies. The two sides have also
made progress on a data privacy agreement, which has traditionally been a
divisive issue.54
Notwithstanding remaining differences on issues of privacy
and big tech regulation, the transatlantic partners are gradually converging
on a vision for digital infrastructure that should be open and global but
subject to greater regulation.
In the competition between digital visions, India is playing an increasingly
central role. Not only is it an emerging tech superpower, it has also been
busy setting digital standards and pushing back against Chinese digital
authoritarianism by banning Chinese apps, including TikTok, and Chinese
telecommunications hardware. However, amid an increase in internet
shutdowns by the Indian government during protests, India has yet to
sign the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, highlighting continued
differences with the transatlantic partners.55
It is still all to play for in the
high-stakes game of shaping the future digital infrastructure.
Signatories of the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, 2022
Figure 3.3
Signatories Non-signatories
Was machen wir hier?:
Nonsignatories (Julia Rosenfeld) vs.
Non-signatories (MSC)
Data: US State Department. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Albania
Andorra*
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cabo Verde*
Canada
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Kenya
Kosovo
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Maldives*
Malta*
Marshall Islands*
Niger
North Macedonia
Palau*
Peru
Poland
Portugal
Republic of Korea
Romania
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Taiwan
Trinidad and Tobago
United Kingdom
* Zu klein / Nicht auf der Karte
Grenze Marocco / Westsaraha
angepasst (22.12.; JS)

86
Scrambling for Structural Power
Global infrastructures have become major sites of systemic competition,
thus securitizing the erstwhile technical realm of connectivity. All major
powers are busy protecting themselves from the risks of the open trading
infrastructure by curtailing their interdependencies. A new vision for trade
infrastructure to generate mutual prosperity while limiting vulnerabilities
is not in sight. In contrast, democratic and autocratic camps openly compete
to imbue both physical and digital infrastructures with their visions of
governance. But the transatlantic partners have been slow to recognize the
gravity of the challenge posed by their autocratic rivals, and they are not
yet aligned on trade and digital issues. And when it comes to physical
infrastructure – notwithstanding lofty announcements – they are yet to put
money where their mouths are. The competition over global infrastructures
highlights that trade, security, and development policy cannot be disentangled.
Liberal democracies therefore need to adjust their political structures to
create coherence across all relevant infrastructure policies and place much
greater emphasis upon them. This will be crucial to shape the international
order in the decades to come.

87
Global infrastructures have become major sites of
systemic competition because they promise to yield
structural power: the power to set the rules of the
game and create dependencies.
The global trade infrastructure based on the WTO’s
rules is eroding as China, the US, India, and even its
stalwart defender, the EU, are increasingly resorting
to protectionism. The old rules are dying but no new
vision is in sight.
Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has
engaged in massive physical infrastructure projects
in the developing world to create a Sino-centric
regional order. The G7 has only recently responded
by launching its own infrastructure funds.
Democracies and autocracies are competing to shape
both the physical enablers and the very principles of
the emerging digital infrastructure. But the US and EU
are only slowly converging on their digital vision.
Key Points
1
2
3
4

88
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

89
Strings Attached
How do increasing systemic competition and efforts
to rewrite the international rules-based order affect
development cooperation? To what extent does
China offer an alternative model for development,
and how does this play out for the provision of
vaccines, food security, and climate finance?
What are the consequences for the US and Europe?
Can countries in the “Global South” capitalize on the
increased engagement of external powers?
Development Cooperation
4

90
Strings Attached
Development cooperation has not been spared from growing systemic
competition and efforts to rewrite the international rules-based order.
Health and food security as well as climate finance have become key policy
fields where geopolitical dynamics and competing narratives are playing
out. China, in particular, is challenging US and European approaches to
development cooperation with low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).
And as the current order has hardly worked in favor of those countries, China’s
growing engagement falls on fertile ground. Based on its own development
trajectory, China aims to promote cooperation between countries in the
“Global South,” which, it claims, is guided by solidarity and produces mutual
benefits.1
However, China’s engagement comes with strings attached, which
deepen the political and economic dependencies of their partner countries.
Furthermore, the US and Europe are wary of Russia expanding its influence in
other regions of the world, especially on the African continent, often sparking
instability in already fragile contexts. As the competing powers are trying to
strengthen their commercial and strategic ties with countries in the “Global
South,” there is a risk of those countries once again being drawn into great-
power competition. But it also opens up opportunities for countries in the
“Global South” to push for a more equitable global system.
Development Cooperation: A Means to a Strategic End?
Development cooperation and foreign aid have always been used as tools to
achieve states’ foreign policy objectives. During the Cold War, the US and the
Soviet Union deployed foreign aid as a means to secure the allegiance of
other countries, including many newly independent African countries.2
Moreover, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
US used foreign aid as a means to support “friends and allies” and prevent
the spread of radicalism and terrorism through the promotion of democracy
and human rights.3
However, growing systemic competition as well as
China’s and Russia’s desire to rewrite the international rules-based order
have now elevated the strategic use of development cooperation to another
level. It is used to secure economic opportunities, forge political alliances,
and shape the rules of development.4
The US, Europe, China, and Russia are rallying political support and seeking
economic opportunities in countries in the “Global South.”6
The scramble
for winning the battle of narratives over who is to blame for Russia’s war of
aggression shows that major powers increasingly recognize that countries
“South-East Asia is a
key region and we want
to further develop
sustainable and trusted
connections with ASEAN
countries.”5
Jutta Urpilainen,
EU Commissioner for
International Partnerships,
EU-ASEAN Commemorative
Summit, December 14, 2022
Isabell Kump and
Amadée Mudie-Mantz
DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

91
“There is the will to
perpetuate systems
that have not helped
Africa.”13
Moussa Faki Mahamat,
Chairperson of the African
Union Commission, Munich
Security Conference,
February 19, 2022
“[…] Africa has come of
age and Africa has to
choose its partners and
decide what kinds of
partnership it wants.
[…] Let’s just move into
another era.”14
Louise Mushikiwabo,
Secretary General of the
Organization de la Franco-
phonie, Munich Security
Conference, February 19, 2022
in the “Global South” can become crucial “swing states.” They can tip the
balance between the systemic competitors and therefore shape the fate of
the international rules-based order.
In the near future, countries in Southeast Asia and Africa will play a much
bigger role in international trade, given their abundant natural resources,
fast demographic growth, and economic dynamism.7
Latin America also
offers vast deposits of critical raw materials, such as the world’s largest
lithium reserves, which are considered essential for the energy and electric
mobility transition (Chapter 5).8
Finally, the African continent represents
one of the largest UN voting blocks, holding three non-permanent seats on
the UN Security Council, 13 seats on the Human Rights Council, and 54 seats
in the UN General Assembly. Winning the support of African countries is
becoming increasingly decisive for breaking deadlocks, fostering collaboration,
and achieving particular outcomes in multilateral institutions.9
Winning Hearts and Minds
The US and Europe have become increasingly alarmed by China’s and
Russia’s engagement with countries in the “Global South” in recent years.10
Competition is especially strong in African countries, where particularly
China’s growing engagement falls on fertile ground, because the current
order has not yielded sufficient benefits for them.11
23 of the world’s
28 poorest countries are on the African continent.12
Moreover, many African
countries suffer from protracted conflicts, political upheavals, and
inadequate access to global public goods, including vaccines, food security,
and climate finance.
Both China and Russia frame their approaches as distinct alternatives to
what they purport to be a continuation of Western neocolonialism.15
Based
on their revisionist ambitions, both countries challenge the approaches to
development by the US and Europe, which aim to advance areas including
poverty reduction, health, and education and emphasize democracy, good
governance, free markets, accountability, and transparency.
However, China and Russia challenge the approaches of the US and Europe
in different ways. Russia, on the one hand, purposefully undermines US and
European efforts in many countries in the “Global South.” A case in point is
the African continent, where Moscow follows rather limited objectives,
mainly concentrating on arms sales, extractive industries, the expansion of
export opportunities, and security assistance.16
Its foreign aid, and its soft

92
power in general, lag significantly behind that of the US, Europe, and China.17
For the most part, Russia plays a destabilizing role in African countries,
aggravating instability and propping up authoritarian regimes through
election interference, disinformation campaigns, and the deployment of
Kremlin-linked mercenaries.18
China, on the other hand, is pursuing a long-term approach to development.19
It presents itself as a global power willing to step in where the US and Europe
have failed to support countries in their sustainable development.20
However,
in practice, China uses development cooperation to challenge the rules-based
order and foster its commercial and geopolitical interests.21
Chinese Engagement: Under the Pretext of Solidarity
Since Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013, China’s development
policy has become more assertive. Beijing offers a development model which,
it proclaims, is markedly different from the model advocated by the US and
Europe. Launched in 2021, the Global Development Initiative is the intellectual
umbrella that is supposed to create coherence across Chinese development
activities (Figure 4.1). Insisting on its status as “the world’s largest developing
country,” China has created a narrative to promote solidarity, shared values,
and “win-win” cooperation between countries in the “Global South,”22
in
contrast to the Western donor–recipient approach.23
China habitually criticizes the US and Europe for linking their foreign aid to
demands for economic and political reforms, while portraying its own
engagement as free from conditionalities. However, Chinese development
cooperation comes with very different strings attached. On the one hand,
Chinese investment imposes political strings. Recipients must respect
Beijing’s red lines, including the denial of Taiwan’s independence and its
policy toward Tibetans and Uyghurs, and vote accordingly in international
bodies. On the other hand, Chinese development cooperation creates economic
dependencies.24
Hence, Beijing presents itself as an altruistic partner, but
economic and geopolitical pursuits remain at the heart of Chinese
development policy, often at the expense of partner countries.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a case in point of China responding
to the infrastructure investment needs of LMICs while promoting its
own economic goals. While the US and Europe have mainly focused on
advancing areas such as poverty reduction, they have largely neglected
investment in infrastructure.25
In fact, the investment needs of African

93
countries have grown sharply since 2015.26
By 2030, investment needs for
infrastructure will total 253 billion US dollars, while forecasts suggest
that only 183 billion US dollars will be made available.27
Nevertheless,
infrastructure assistance by the G7 countries has been declining for years,28
leaving a void that China has sought to fill. By now, 147 countries have joined
the BRI, including 48 from Africa, 20 from Latin America and the Caribbean,
and six from Southeast Asia.29
But the BRI lacks transparency,30
aggravates the
indebtedness of partner countries, and cements their financial dependence
on China,31
while increasing China’s political clout (Chapter 3).
Although China has become a prominent development partner for African
countries, Afrobarometer polling results strikingly show that the Chinese
development model has not yet won the hearts and minds of African
Figure 4.1
The Group of Friends of the 2021 Global Development Initiative (GDI)
Development
1. Feedbackschleife MSC, geprooft,
What is the Global Development Initiative (GDI)?
Launched by Xi Jinping during his September 2021 virtual address to the
UN General Assembly, the GDI is China’s grand design for global development.
It is framed as an eﬀort to add momentum to the UN’s 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development, with poverty alleviation, food security, pandemic
response, climate change, and green development deﬁned as focal areas of
activity. However, the GDI also represents an attempt to reshape global rules and
approaches in line with Chinese interests. The initiative is based on Chinese
concepts, such as the “right to development,” which prioritizes economic
development over other human rights, and “collective rights,” which are seen
to precede individual rights.
Auf Karte nicht sichtbar:
Antigua and Barbuda
Cabo Verde
Dominica

94
citizens. Citizens from 34 African countries polled from 2019 to 2021 still
view the US model for development more positively than the Chinese one
(Figure 4.2). However, they view the European model much less favorably,
despite its similarities to the US, one which reflects the common perception
that European countries have still not sufficiently confronted their colonial
past.33
Europe’s development efforts also largely go unnoticed compared to
much more visible Chinese initiatives, even though European countries
and EU institutions invest heavily in development.34
The US remains the
largest donor country, having spent 35 billion US dollars in 2020, but it
is closely followed by Germany (29 billion US dollars), EU institutions
(21 billion US dollars), and the United Kingdom (19 billion US dollars).35
The share of China’s foreign aid, which is comparable to the official
development assistance pursued by the US and Europe, only amounted to
around 5.4 billion in the same year.36
Covid-19 Vaccines: Overpromised and Underdelivered
Since the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, China and Russia have both used
the delivery of medical and health assistance, including Covid-19 vaccines,
to portray themselves as responsible global powers. At the same time, they
were quick to highlight the failure of the US and its partners to ensure access
to Western-produced Covid-19 vaccines for LMICs, while also claiming that
these vaccines were unsafe.37
China, in particular, used the dispatch of
medical teams, donations of medical supplies, and delivery of Covid-19
vaccines to present itself as the most reliable partner for LMICs.38
Figure 4.2
African views on which country provides the best model for
development, 2019/2021, percent
Data: Afrobarometer. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
US
China
Former colonial power
My own country
None of these/there is no role model
Other 16.1
2.4
7.0
10.2
22.5
33.6
“China will always be
Africa’s partner of mutual
respect, equality, and
sincere cooperation.
We will firmly support
African countries in
pursuing [their] own
development paths
and seeking strength
through unity.”32
Wang Yi, then–Chinese
Foreign Minister,
Coordinators’ Meeting on
the Implementation of the
Follow-Up Actions of
the Eighth Ministerial
Conference of the Forum on
China-Africa Cooperation,
August 18, 2022

95
In reality, China and Russia have fallen way short of their promises to
deliver substantial amounts of vaccines to LMICs.40
China, for instance, had
only delivered 10 percent of the 850 million doses it had committed to
African and Asian countries by December 2021.41
Russia had only produced
33 million of the targeted 800 million doses of its Sputnik V vaccine by May
2021.42
In addition, there have been growing concerns about the efficacy of
Sputnik V and China’s Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines, contributing to
decreased trust and demand in the recipient countries.43
Nevertheless, on the
African continent, China initially won the battle of narratives by successfully
presenting itself as the key supporter in fighting the Covid-19 pandemic, even
though, as of May 31, 2022, the US and Europe had delivered significantly
more vaccines to African countries (Figure 4.3).44
The initial vaccine nation-
alism of the US and Europe, as well as their failure to provide the pledged
amount of vaccine doses, have not helped to counter this narrative.
China’s and Russia’s delivery of Covid-19 vaccines also largely served their
economic and geostrategic interests. Even though both China and Russia
officially advocated for vaccines to be recognized as global public goods,
they mainly delivered them on the basis of bilateral deals.45
China, for
instance, supplied most of its vaccines via bilateral deals and used COVAX,
“The deep inequity that
left Africa at the back of
the queue for vaccines
must not be repeated
with […] life-saving
treatments. Universal
access to diagnostics,
vaccines, and therapeutics
will pave the shortest
path to the end of this
pandemic.”39
Matshidiso Moeti, WHO
Africa Regional Director,
Covid-19 press conference,
January 20, 2022 Covid-19 vaccine doses supplied to the African continent by
producing economy, millions
Figure 4.3
Donations
via COVAX
Bilateral
deals
Other
Contracted
via COVAX
Direct
donations
*South Africa supplied around 23,310 vaccine doses through bilateral deals to other countries on
the African continent. The amount is too small to be visible.
Data: WTO; IMF. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
US
EU
China
South Africa*
India
Other
200 300 400 500
0 100

96

97
an initiative by the World Health Organization (WHO) to supply vaccines to
poorer countries and emerging economies, mainly as a platform to sell its
vaccines instead of donating them (Figure 4.3). These Chinese vaccines also
came with political strings, as China demanded that recipient countries cut
ties with Taiwan.46
Contrary to its self-proclaimed role as a solidary anti-
colonial power, China thus used (far fewer than promised) vaccine deliveries
to advance its geopolitical interests, deepen dependencies, and attack the
credibility of the US and Europe in Africa.
Food Insecurity: Hunger Games
Food security is another policy field in which different development models
compete. Staggering global inequality persists, with the number of people
facing acute food insecurity rising from 135 million in 2019 to 345 million in
2022.47
Sub-Saharan Africa is the most food-insecure region in the world by
far, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, Latin America, and Asia–
Pacific.48
US and European multilateral development efforts in the field of
food security have been insufficient, and Russia often acts as a spoiler,
whereas China offers an alternative – which again comes with strings of
dependency attached.
The traditional approach by Europe and the US to combatting food insecurity
focuses on providing aid through multilateral bodies, such as the UN. For
example, the US, Germany, and the European Commission are the largest
donors to the UN World Food Programme (WFP).49
European and US national
food programs abroad are closely aligned with their multilateral efforts. They
largely focus on providing emergency relief and strengthening the resilience of
recipient countries to climate change.50
However, US and European agricultural
subsidies have often undermined their own development goals, as they
depress prices on the world market, put farmers in LMICs out of business,
and render these countries dependent on volatile imports.51
Unlike China, Russia does not isolate itself from multilateral food security
efforts; indeed, it ranks 22nd as a donor to the WFP, often contributing with
in-kind donations.52
It was only through Russia’s donations, for example,
that the WFP was able to sustain its operation in Kyrgyzstan during the
Covid-19 pandemic.53
However, Russia’s war against Ukraine has exacerbated
food insecurity by inducing a spike in food prices that were already high
due to climate change and the Covid-19 pandemic,54
and also by creating
supply chain bottlenecks for grain and fertilizer exports.55
Russia has
strategically instrumentalized grain exports by blockading the main Black Sea

98
trading routes to increase pressure on the international coalition supporting
the Ukrainian government.56
The consequences of this weaponization of food
have been most felt by LMICs.
China hardly contributes to multilateral food aid at all; it donates around
the same amount to the WFP as Haiti does.58
At the same time, as part of its
South-South cooperation, China has long been making considerable agricultural
investments, especially in many African countries, which have helped
increase agricultural production and productivity.59
However, Chinese
agricultural projects often lack longevity; they regularly collapse after
flourishing initially, as they are set up for Chinese partners to eventually
withdraw – leaving locals, who do not have sufficient means and training,
to finance and run the projects without support.60
While there is concern
among African countries, for example Ghana and Tanzania, about the risk
of debt linked to Chinese agricultural investments, many countries lack
alternatives.61
China portrays itself as a partner in solidarity, while in fact
strategically creating dependencies by purchasing large areas of land and
controlling much of the necessary infrastructure on the continent. When
push comes to shove, China grabs land and resources, including by buying
up grain reserves of food-insecure countries to fill Chinese stocks, rather
than truly supporting those in need.62
Climate Finance: Blame Game
There is broad consensus that climate change is threatening developmental
progress in low-income countries (LICs), which have contributed the least
to global emissions, but suffer the most from the consequences. However,
climate finance risks becoming collateral damage of geopolitical rivalries.
Together with other rich states and regions, the US and EU pledged in 2009
to provide low-income countries with 100 billion US dollars in climate
finance annually by 2020 for mitigation and adaptation measures. However,
they are lagging behind, with payments reaching just over 83 billion
US dollars in 2020,63
which goes against their promise to assume “common
but differentiated responsibilities” based on their historical emissions.
This is in part due to growing opposition, particularly in the US, to increasing
climate finance unless China also contributes.
Both Russia and China controversially claim their status as developing
countries based on the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, while actually ranking among the
top four carbon emitting countries.65
Moscow officially acknowledges the
importance of the Paris Climate Agreement,66
but in practice often slows
“No one has the right to
weaponize food or play
starvation games.”57
Ferit Hoxha, Albanian
Ambassador to the UN,
UN Security Council,
October 31, 2022

99
“We need a coalition of
the willing to unlock
climate finance for
governments, countries,
and entire regions to
manage predictability
of the future, build
resilience capacity, and
mitigation for a future
that survives the coming
climate tsunami.”64
Sherry Rehman, Pakistani
Minister of Climate Change,
COP27, November 2022
down climate change mitigation efforts globally, as the reliance on fossil
fuels serves Russia both (geo)politically and economically.67
The country
is “at best a passive player and at worst an active saboteur of worldwide
ambition.”68
China is more vocal regarding international climate financing and claims to
support the demands of those most affected. China emphasizes that while it
is not obliged to help, it has named sustainability as one of the priority areas
of its GDI,69
and prides itself in having provided around 276 million US dollars
in climate finance through South-South cooperation.70
This amount is dwarfed
by the billions provided in multilateral efforts, which China does not join
because it sees industrial countries as bearing the sole responsibility to
compensate for their historical emissions.
The establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 in November 2022
could potentially be a turning point in multilateral climate finance. It is an
assistance mechanism for infrastructure damage caused by climate events in
LICs, paid for by the big emitters.71
The EU proposed the fund,72
and called
on the world’s leading economies, including China, Saudi Arabia, and Russia,
to contribute.73
The US is particularly insistent on Chinese contributions.74
Nonetheless, China has so far rejected giving up its developing country
status despite now producing one-quarter of the world’s carbon emissions.75
Climate finance is thus another issue area in which geostrategic competition,
especially between China and the US, is carried out on the backs of the
most vulnerable.
Fostering Cooperation on Equal Terms
The US and Europe will have to rethink their approaches to development
cooperation with countries in the “Global South.” They need to make their
development models more attractive, as China offers an alternative model
based on a narrative of solidarity and mutual benefits. The US and
European countries will have to explore the limitations and deficiencies of
their development approaches, ensure that these are tailored to the actual
needs of their partner countries, and establish real partnerships.76
However,
with regard to the African continent, the latest Afrobarometer data suggests
that particularly the US development model still enjoys high approval, which
the US can build on. The Chinese development model is not predestined to
prevail. For European countries, however, it is essential that they address
the frequent criticism of not having sufficiently confronted their colonial
pasts to recalibrate their relationships with African countries.
“The West has a credibility
problem. Compromising
its values hampers the
West’s ability to foster
stabilization, development,
and democracy elsewhere
in the world.”77
David Miliband, President
and CEO of the International
Rescue Committee, Munich
Security Conference 2022,
February 19, 2022

100
To put partnerships with countries in the “Global South” on a new footing,
Europe and the US need to live up to their promises about providing global
public goods. Moving away from the donor–recipient relationship is key to
enabling cooperation on equal terms. To compete with China, a new approach
must simultaneously focus on short-term emergency relief as well as long-term
financing that enables sustainable and resilient systems in the partner
countries. The EU Global Gateway as well as recent G7 initiatives, including
the Global Alliance for Food Security, the Pact for Pandemic Preparedness,
and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, are a
promising start.
For countries in the “Global South,” the renewed attention carries the risk
of them becoming a playing field for great-power competition once again.
In the medium term, the support of external actors in the provision of
public goods, such as healthcare, food, and climate security, will likely
continue to play an important role for many. This means dealing with the
strings that come attached. At the same time, countries in the “Global
South” can use the competition between different actors for their own
benefit and select partners whose priorities align with their own.79
This
presents an opportunity to shape the international order to better reflect
their interests.80
“China is thinking about
how to fuel its economy
over the next 25 years.
The Belt and Road is an
important part of this
larger strategy. I don’t
think we, in the West,
think about the next
25 years in the same
way because if we
did, we would have a
deeper, more strategic
relationship with
Africa.”78
Gayle Smith, President
and CEO of ONE Campaign,
October 24, 2022

101
There is renewed attention on countries in the “Global
South,” as China, Russia, the US, and Europe seek to
use development cooperation to secure economic
opportunities, forge political alliances, and shape the
rules of the international order.
Both Russia and China are actively challenging US and
European approaches to development cooperation.
While Russia’s engagement is often limited to sparking
instability, China offers an alternative model for
development, proclaiming solidarity with and mutual
benefits for countries in the “Global South.”
While China’s narrative of being a reliable partner in
tackling global challenges is often successful, economic
and geopolitical pursuits remain at the heart of its
development efforts, including on Covid-19 vaccines,
food security, and climate finance.
The US and European countries need to rethink their
cooperation with countries in the “Global South” and
reposition themselves as attractive and credible
development partners. Living up to promises and
cooperating on equal terms will help put the
relationships on a new footing.
While the increased interest of external powers in
countries in the “Global South” bears the risk of new
dependencies, it also represents an opportunity for
these countries to expand their agency and advocate
for a more equitable international order.
Key Points
1
2
3
4
5

102
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 ENERGY SECURITY
102

103
Refueled
What are the economic and geopolitical ripple effects
of Moscow’s energy warfare against Europe, and how
will the cutting of energy ties between Russia and
Europe alter global fossil fuel trade flows? Will the shift
to renewables allow liberal democracies to wean
themselves off energy dependencies from authoritarian
powers? How does the race for clean-energy
technologies play into the broader geopolitical
competition between China and the US and its partners?
Energy Security
5

104
Refueled
Russia’s war against Ukraine and its weaponization of energy has ushered in
a global energy crisis of “unprecedented depth and complexity,”1
with Europe
at the very heart of it. Perceptions of Russia as a reliable energy partner have
been torn to shreds. And energy ties between Russia and Europe will be
permanently severed. The result is a major reshuffling of international energy
trade flows, increasingly reflecting geopolitical fault lines rather than market
logic. The securitization of energy will not stop with the hydrocarbon age, but
extend to a greener future. Since China occupies a dominant position across clean-
energy supply chains, Beijing is at the center of liberal democracies’ concerns
about new vulnerabilities emerging with the shift to renewables. And as a key
to future prosperity, green technologies are a central component of the growing
geopolitical competition between China and the US and its partners.
The Costs of Energy Reliance on Moscow: Repriced
For decades, European energy relations with Russia, heavily driven by Berlin,
were based on two fundamentals: the logic of the lowest price and the belief that
Moscow would remain a reliable energy partner even in a context of worsening
relations with the West, with energy providing a “bridge” for improving political
ties. Although decision-makers and experts in Europe and partner countries
voiced strong concerns about Russia’s energy dominance in Europe, fossil fuel
dependencies increased further. This was the case even after Moscow’s
annexation of Crimea. Between 2005 and 2010, Russia accounted for 30 percent
of European natural gas imports on average. Between 2015 and 2020, this figure
stood at 40 percent.2
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and full-scale energy warfare
against Europe brutally exposed the fallacies of an energy policy guided by
liberal market logic and destroyed beliefs in the political value of deep energy
ties with the Kremlin. The close energy relations did not “draw Russia into the
democratic fold of its Westerns neighbors,” but instead rendered liberal
democracies vulnerable to the Kremlin’s revisionist agenda.3
The risk of losing
its main export market did not prevent Moscow from using energy as a weapon
against Europe. And given the weight of Russia in international energy markets
as “the world’s largest exporter of fossil fuels,”4
Western partners have struggled
to exert pressure on Moscow by imposing sanctions on its hydrocarbons.5
In the months before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia had already prepared
the ground for its ensuing energy blackmail. Despite high demand, Russia
held back “at least one-third of the gas it could [have] sent to Europe.”7
Two
months after the invasion, Moscow then began cutting off gas deliveries to
“Our prosperity has been
based on cheap energy
coming from Russia.
Russian gas – cheap and
supposedly affordable,
secure, and stable. It has
been proved not [to be]
the case.”6
Josep Borrell, EU High
Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy,
EU Ambassadors Conference,
October 10, 2022
Julia Hammelehle
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105
“[T]his is an overt gas war
that Russia is waging
against a united Europe –
this is exactly how it
should be perceived.”9
Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
Ukrainian President,
address in Kiev, July 25, 2022
“By launching a war on
Ukraine, Putin has also
fired an ‘energy missile’
at Europe. He wants to
obliterate our economies,
weaken our societies, and
destroy our morale.”10
Charles Michel, President
of the European Council,
newsletter, October 10, 2022
Bulgaria and Poland, and progressively reduced supplies to Europe over the
summer. By November, Russian pipeline gas flows to Europe had nearly
ceased.8
Coming on top of already tight energy markets, Russia’s curtailment
of gas supplies and Western sanctions on its oil and coal exports sent
shockwaves across global energy markets, hitting Europe particularly hard.
Natural gas prices reached record levels in August, with prices about ten
times higher than their average level over the past decade.11
Electricity prices
tripled in the first half of 2022.12
Across Europe, governments massively
intervened in gas and electricity markets13
and ratcheted up support to shield
households and industries from the impact of rising prices.14
So far, concerns
that Europe’s reliance on Russian energy would dilute its response to Moscow’s
aggression have not materialized, and Western partners have remained largely
united. Yet worries about the risk of social unrest, growing friction within
the EU, and eroding support for Ukraine remain. Although prices are down
from summer highs and Europe’s gas storage has been refilled, the crisis is far
from over. Energy prices will continue to remain high, and European
competitiveness is under increasing pressure.15
As the IMF put it, “[w]inter
2022 will be challenging for Europe, but winter 2023 will likely be worse.”16
The EU is still struggling to find a joint approach, as illustrated by the
months-long negotiations over a gas price cap.17
And national responses such
as Germany’s 200 billion euro economic “defense shield” have provoked
criticism for undermining EU solidarity and distorting the internal market.18
The ripple effects of Putin’s energy warfare extend far beyond Europe. Across
low-income countries, elevated energy prices are a key factor for surging food
insecurity and extreme poverty, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 4).19
And as Europe rushed to replace Russian pipeline gas, it outbid states in Asia
for spot supplies of liquefied natural gas (LNG), leading to energy shortages
and widespread power cuts in countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh.20
Since markets will remain tight over the coming years, the “scramble for fuel”
will continue. This risks sowing discord between Europe and low-income
countries and weakening the global front against Moscow’s aggression.
Energy Trade Flows Post-Invasion: Rerouted
The severed energy ties between Russia and Europe are unlikely to be mended.
This is prompting a major reshuffling of fossil fuel trade flows, with Russia
turning to the Chinese market, and Europe increasing its imports from the
US. The post-invasion energy map will thus increasingly reflect geopolitical
fault lines, even if it will not neatly represent the democracy–autocracy
ENERGY SECURITY

106
divide: Middle Eastern countries will be key exporters to both Europe and
Asia. And for the time being, LNG shipments from Australia and the US to
China are likely to continue.
As energy trade flows between Russia and Europe will largely cease, Moscow
will shift its supplies eastwards. Yet the gains in oil and gas markets in Asia will
not be able to make up for the losses in exports to Europe (Figure 5.1). While the
soaring energy prices in the months after the invasion led to windfall revenues
for Moscow, filling its war chest with 228 billion euros by November 2022,21
in the longer term, the energy war that Russia started will leave the petro-
power in a much-diminished position in international energy. Compared to
prewar estimates, Russia’s share of global oil and gas trade is bound to halve by
2030.22
This diminished role extends beyond the fossil fuel age, as Russia’s
hydrogen ambitions are also faltering.23
With oil flows to Europe phased out, Russia is turning to Asian markets.
Profiting from heavily discounted prices, imports by China, India, and Turkey
have surged.24
Not all Russian barrels will find a new home though.25
According
to the IEA, by the mid 2020s, oil exports by North America will supersede
those of Russia, while it is Middle Eastern exporters that will fill most of the
gap left by Moscow.26
China and India will heavily drive oil demand, and Middle
Eastern countries will meet large shares of it (Figure 5.1). The Middle East
will thus gain further strategic importance for China and India, with energy
relations driving closer political and economic ties.27
This is illustrated by major
Chinese investments through the Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle
East, with Saudi Arabia as the single-largest recipient in the first half of
2022.28
Amid a declining US presence in the region, liberal democracies’
concerns about China’s rising influence are growing. The deepening ties
between China and the Middle East might evolve to include a stronger
Chinese military and security footprint, potentially undermining the
West’s security partnerships with countries in the region.29
Further strategic challenges for the US and its partners arise with regard to the
rising share of global oil production by members of the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).30
The current energy crisis shows that
even the US as a net exporter cannot insulate itself against the vagaries of
global oil markets and the steps taken by major producers.31
The September
2022 decision by OPEC+ to cut production, largely driven by Saudi Arabia,
was met with fury in Washington, DC, which feared increasing prices and
interpreted Saudi Arabia’s move as siding with Russia.32
“At best, the [OPEC]
cartel has rejected any
idea of being a helpful
actor and chosen profit
over aiding the world
economy. At worst, they’ve
made a conscious choice
to align themselves with
Putin over the US.”33
Elissa Slotkin, US
Representative, Twitter,
October 6, 2022
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107
As with oil, Russia is shifting its gas flows to Asia. Yet at least in the short
term, it will be much harder for Moscow to make up for its losses in the
European market. Building the necessary pipeline infrastructure will take
at least a decade.34
And new LNG projects in the Arctic rely on foreign
technology and financing, now sanctioned by Western partners.35
China will
be a major importer of Russian gas, but supplies are still a fraction of the
former volumes to Europe.36
While this could change with a new pipeline
project, it remains unclear whether and under what conditions China “will
make the deal.”37
Given Moscow’s increasing reliance on the Chinese market,
Beijing will set the terms while seeking to avoid overdependence on
Russia.38
For pipeline gas, China might deepen ties with Central Asia; for LNG,
it is boosting domestic production and diversifying its imports, including by
scaling up volumes from Qatar.39
Despite the geopolitical tensions, China
has also been increasing LNG imports from Australia and the US. Combined,
this accounts for around half of Chinese imports, providing Australia and
the US with potential leverage.40
Announced
Pledges
Scenario
(APS)
Stated
Policies
Scenario
(STEPS)
2021 2030 2050 2030 2050
APS
STEPS
2030 2050 2030 2050
2021
North America Other
Middle East Russia
0
50
60
30
20
10
40
70
0
50
60
30
20
10
40
70
Figure 5.1
Crude oil and natural gas imports to the EU and developing Asia,
by origin and scenario, 2021, 2030, 2050, exajoules
Data and illustration: IEA
Energiesicherheit
1. TRANCHE; geprooft; 3. Feedbackschleife MSC
EU Developing Asia
ENERGY SECURITY

108
With new LNG projects coming online in the next few years, the US will further
strengthen its position as a global LNG provider. Desperate for alternatives to
Russian gas, Europe has ramped up LNG imports from the US and is heavily
investing in new import capacity. In light of the uncertain political trajectory
of Washington, DC, the asymmetric transatlantic energy relations bring their
own challenges for Europe.41
Europe’s “dash for gas” goes beyond US LNG, with
European leaders seeking to conclude new LNG and gas pipeline agreements
with countries in the Middle East and Africa.42
Given the questionable
democratic credentials of some potential suppliers, and often high political
instability, Europe faces difficult political trade-offs and continued supply
risks. For potential exporters, Europe’s decarbonization goals make longer-
term contracts and investments unlikely; new gas infrastructure thus risks
creating stranded assets.43
Until recently, based on their climate agendas,
European leaders had advocated to stop overseas fossil fuel projects. But at
the same time, they have failed to scale up support for green energy in low-
income countries. As European leaders are now turning to fossil fuels from
developing countries, they are facing allegations of hypocrisy for having
denied these developing countries access to electricity while now using their
resources “to keep the lights on in Europe.”44
Energy Security in a Greener World: Redefined
Notwithstanding the initial rush for fossil fuels,46
in the medium to long
term, the crisis is likely to accelerate rather than slow down the path to net
zero.47
As the world weans itself off fossil fuels, green energy is gaining in
strategic importance. And while the transition to renewables allows liberal
democracies to reduce hydrocarbon dependencies, new vulnerabilities are
emerging. Given China’s position as “kingpin” of clean-energy supply chains,48
Beijing is at the center of concern for the US and its partners.
The great potential for renewable energy around the world should allow
countries to diversify. Yet green supply chains carry their own risks. This is
also the case for hydrogen. Considered as one of the keys to decarbonizing
industries and thus future economic competitiveness, momentum behind
hydrogen is growing. Since it is technically possible to produce green hydrogen
in nearly every country, there should be an increasing number of actors
joining the market over time (Figure 5.2).50
For regions such as Europe that
will not be able to produce enough hydrogen themselves, this opens up
diverse options for trade. Countries such as Chile, Namibia, and Morocco will
emerge as new export powers. Yet in some cases, old suppliers will also be
the new ones. Building on favorable resource endowments and existing
“Renewable energies
don’t just contribute
to energy security and
supply. Renewable
energies free us from
dependency. That is
why renewable energies
are freedom energies.”49
Christian Lindner, German
Minister of Finance, special
session of the Ger
man
Bundestag, Berlin,
February 27, 2022
“The whole of the West
developed on the back
of fossil fuels – even as
we speak, some Western
nations are deciding to
bring coal back into their
energy mix because of
the war. […] Is the West
saying Africa should
remain undeveloped?”45
Matthew Opoku Prempeh,
Ghanaian Minister of Energy,
Bloomberg, July 10, 2022
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109
energy infrastructure, Australia and Middle Eastern countries are pursuing
ambitious hydrogen strategies.51
Since North Africa and the Gulf region are
well placed to export hydrogen to Europe, European leaders face the question
of whether they want to yet again deepen energy ties with autocratic countries.52
While it will still take several decades until trade in hydrogen fully unfolds,
the race for leadership in hydrogen technologies is on. Electrolyzers are the
key component for the production of green hydrogen, and are thus at the
core of the competition; Europe is a leader in this space.54
But the expansion
of electrolyzer manufacturing comes with critical dependencies in raw
materials supply chains. This is most notable with regard to nickel, where
Europe imports large shares from Russia and relies on China for nickel
smelting; for platinum and iridium, Europe heavily relies on South Africa.55
And since current manufacturing capacities will not be sufficient to meet
“That [shift to green
hydrogen] is not just a
change in our energy
mix. It’s a change in
global political relations,
it will bring more
equality between states,
and it will allow us to
stand stronger in
defending our values,
because we can no
longer be blackmailed
by the producers of
hydrocarbons.”53
Frans Timmermans,
Executive Vice-President of
the European Commission
and Commissioner for the
European Green Deal, EU
Hydrogen Week, October 27,
2022
Net exports Net imports
Production
Figure 5.2
Production and trade of hydrogen and derivatives for key regions
and countries, by 2050, million tons
Data: Hydrogen Council; McKinsey Company.
China
US
Europe
Gulf region
Latin America
India
North Africa
Other African countries
Australia
Canada
Southeast Asia
Japan
Korea
50 100 150 200
-50 0
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the EU’s hydrogen ambitions, Europe might have to turn to its main
competitor, China, which is “on its way to a market takeover.”56
This twofold challenge of a high concentration of critical raw materials
(CRMs) abroad and China’s strong position in clean-energy technologies
extends beyond the hydrogen industry – it is a shared feature of green
energy markets. With growing demand for low-carbon technologies such
as electric vehicles (EVs), demand for CRMs is “set to soar.”57
Since CRMs are
highly concentrated in a small number of – often fragile – states, supply
risks are substantial.58
But for liberal democracies, the major concern relates
to China’s dominant role across CRM supply chains. China’s position in the
mining of CRMs is substantial, especially given its major acquisitions in
overseas mining projects, which Beijing has further intensified since 2021.59
But its key role in CRMs comes from the processing part of the value chain
(Figure 5.3). This dominance is particularly acute with regard to rare earth
elements (REEs).
Strategies by the US and its partners to reduce their reliance on Chinese
imports of REEs have proliferated amid growing geopolitical tensions and
Beijing’s demonstrated willingness to use its near-monopoly as political
leverage. In 2010, China halted the supply of REEs to Japan in the context of
a territorial dispute; in 2019, it threatened the US with export restrictions
amid the China–US trade conflict.60
Gaining greater independence from
China in REEs and other CRMs will require considerable investments and
international cooperation – and will still take time, leaving international
partners vulnerable to potential Chinese coercion for the years to come.61
Building on its long-term industrial strategies and prime access to CRMs,
China occupies a “key manufacturing node” in clean-energy technologies.63
By 2020, ten Chinese firms were among the top 15 wind turbine manufacturers.64
In EV batteries, China accounts for three quarters of global production.65
And China’s share in all the manufacturing stages of solar panels exceeds
80 percent, and is expected to rise further.66
In the EU, solar panel imports have
skyrocketed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; China makes up 90 percent
of them.67
Thus, to achieve their renewable energy targets and assume credible climate
leadership, liberal democracies will have to rely on Beijing.68
This reliance
raises concerns not just about geopolitical vulnerabilities and economic
competitiveness, but also human rights, as key components for EV batteries
“We cannot allow
countries to use their
market position in
key raw materials,
technologies, or products
to have the power to
disrupt our economy or
exercise unwanted
geopolitical leverage.”62
Janet L. Yellen, US Secretary
of the Treasury, Atlantic
Council, April 13, 2022
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111
and solar modules are produced in Xinjiang.69
For China, its outsized role in
green energy will reduce the country’s own energy import risks and provides
Beijing with political leverage and a head start in what is to be a “multi-trillion-
dollar” clean-technology market.”70
To reduce reliance on China and foster US competitiveness, Washington, DC
has responded by announcing significant subsidies for clean technologies as
part of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). While the IRA has been applauded
as a major push for the US climate agenda, domestic content requirements to
qualify for subsidies have raised concerns about potentially slowing down
the uptake of green technologies and provoking trade frictions with US
partners.71
Fearing it will lose out against US and Chinese industrial policies,
Critical minerals supply chains, selected minerals and indicators
Figure 5.3
Energiesicherheit
3. TRANCHE; geprooft; 2. Feedbackschleife MSC
*APS: Announced Pledges Scenario
**Figures for 2021 are projections.
Data: IEA; US Geological Survey. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Cobalt Electric vehicles
(EVs), battery
storage
DR Congo: 71
Russia: 4
Australia: 3
China: 65
Finland: 10
Belgium: 5
6.2
Copper Solar, wind, bio-
energy, electricity
networks, EVs,
battery storage
Chile: 27
Peru: 11
China: 9
China: 40
Chile: 10
Japan: 6
2.8
Lithium Australia: 55
Chile: 26
China: 14
China: 58
Chile: 29
Argentina: 10
EVs, battery
storage
24.0
Nickel Indonesia: 37
Philippines: 14
Russia: 9
China: 35
Indonesia: 15
Japan: 8
Geothermal, EVs,
battery storage,
hydrogen
12.3
7.2
Rare earth
elements
China: 60
US: 15
Myanmar: 9
China: 87
Malaysia: 12
Estonia: 1
Wind, EVs, battery
storage
Mineral Clean-energy
technology that
demands a high
input of the mineral
Rise in demand,
2050 relative
to 2021, APS*,
factor
Share of top
three countries in
mining, 2021**,
percent
Share of top
three countries in
processing, 2019,
percent
ENERGY SECURITY

112
EU plans to relax state aid rules and scale up public funding for clean
technologies are gaining traction.72
The increasing alignment of security, climate, and economic goals could
be a catalyst for the climate agenda. Yet as security and industrial policies
are increasingly driving climate and energy approaches, trends toward
protectionism are intensifying. Localizing supply chains might help reduce
dependencies, but trade has been essential in bringing down costs of
renewables and preserving flexibility in energy markets.73
Energy is
exemplary of economic relations in times of growing geopolitical tensions,
with security rather than liberal market logic increasingly shaping policy,
and government interventionism rising. But more fragmentated energy
markets come with risks not only for economic growth, but also for the path
to net zero and energy security.
ENERGY SECURITY

113
Moscow’s weaponization of energy has shattered
perceptions of Russia as a reliable energy partner and
exposed Europe’s overreliance on Russian fossil fuels.
Ripple effects extend far beyond European markets,
ushering in a global energy crisis.
As the severed energy ties between Europe and Russia
are unlikely to be mended, fossil fuel trade flows will
see a major reshuffling, increasingly reflecting geopolitical
fault lines rather than market logic.
The securitization of energy will extend to green markets.
The shift to renewables comes with new vulnerabilities,
and since China has a dominant position across clean-
energy supply chains, the dependency on Beijing is at
the center of concern for liberal democracies. Key to
future prosperity, green technologies will be a major
component in the geopolitical competition between
China and the US and its partners.
The increasing alignment of security, climate, and
economic goals may be a boon for the climate agenda.
Yet more politicized and fragmented markets carry their
own risks for energy security and the transition to net zero.
Key Points
1
2
3
4
ENERGY SECURITY

114
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 NUCLEAR ORDER

115
Atomized
What does the combination of increasingly reckless
nuclear rhetoric from Russia, accelerated expansion
of China’s nuclear arsenal, potential proliferation
by Iran, and continuing North Korean missile tests
mean for international nuclear security? What are
the prospects for reviving key nuclear arms control
treaties? And what might the nuclear order of the
future look like?
Nuclear Order
6

Atomized
For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the use of a nuclear weapon
in Europe is a plausible scenario. Since launching its full-scale invasion of
Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia has issued numerous thinly veiled
nuclear threats against its neighbor.1
That it would actually carry out such a
threat seems unlikely, but this possibility cannot be ruled out.2
In its war
against Ukraine, Russia has not only used reckless rhetoric, but reckless
actions as well: its shelling of nuclear plants and abudctions of personnel
have put both the safe operation of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, the
largest in Europe, as well as the safe storage of radioactive materials at the
former nuclear power plant Chernobyl at risk.3
With its revisionist war of aggression, Russia has upended the international
nuclear order. By threatening the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine, a
state that in 1994 gave up its own nuclear arsenal in exchange for Russia’s
commitment to respect Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity,5
Russia has undermined two key pillars of this order: the 1968 Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the nuclear taboo. The NPT,
at its core, is a grand bargain in which the five recognized nuclear-weapon
states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States –
pledged to act as responsible nuclear powers and pursue eventual nuclear
disarmament in exchange for the continued non-proliferation of the other
NPT parties.6
The nuclear taboo refers to the idea that nuclear weapons are
weapons of mass destruction so abhorrent that their use is considered
unacceptable.7
By questioning the nuclear taboo, neglecting its obligations
under the NPT, and breaking its commitment to Ukraine, Russia has lost its
credibility as a responsible nuclear-weapon state.
Russia’s nuclear threats pose a fundamental challenge to those seeking to
prevent the use of nuclear weapons now and in the future. If a Russian
nuclear strike against Ukraine were to go unpunished, it would severely
damage the existing nuclear order and make future use of nuclear weapons
more likely, as it would set a precedent of nuclear attacks being an acceptable
and possibly beneficial course of action in military conflict.8
There is also
a risk, however, of triggering a spiral of further escalation with a strong
response to a Russian nuclear attack. Therefore, the international community’s
response to such an attack would have to be measured enough to prevent
further escalation, yet strong enough to prevent the precedent of an
unpunished nuclear strike.9
“The citizens of Russia
can rest assured that
the territorial integrity
of our Motherland, our
independence and
freedom will be
defended – I repeat –
by all the systems
available to us.”4
Vladimir Putin, Russian
President, Address to the
Nation, September 21, 2022
Jintro Pauly
116
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 NUCLEAR ORDER

NUCLEAR ORDER
“The Russian invasion
and the war in Ukraine,
in many senses, has
shone a very bright light
on the cracks in the
façade of the nuclear
disarmament and non-
proliferation regime which
have started to emerge
some time ago.”10
Izumi Nakamitsu,
UN High Representative
for Disarmament Affairs,
James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies,
June 10, 2022
Alas, Russian brinkmanship is only the most immediate threat to the
international nuclear order. A wide range of other threats and challenges
stem from other revisionist actors. In an environment of rising geopolitical
tensions and eroding arms control regimes, such challenges have the potential
to fundamentally change the global nuclear security architecture.
Expiring Arms Control Treaties: Approaching the Wrong Global Zero
The international nuclear arms control regime has been eroding for some
time. Since the 2002 US withdrawal from the US–Russian Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, North Korea has left the NPT, Russia violated the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty – prompting the US to withdraw from it –, the
US pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the
Iran nuclear deal, and the US and Russia left the Open Skies Treaty.11
New
START, the last existing bilateral nuclear arms control treaty between the
US and Russia, is set to expire in 2026, and its replacement by a new
treaty is uncertain.12
Although US President Joseph Biden recently
expressed his willingness to negotiate one, he also indicated it is Russia’s
responsibility to demonstrate its commitment to resuming arms control
cooperation after its invasion of Ukraine.13
Whether Russia will take this
initiative is uncertain. With ever fewer nuclear arms control treaties in
place, the world is approaching the wrong kind of “global zero” – a world
with zero arms control treaties but an increasing number of nuclear warheads.
The five nuclear-armed permanent UN Security Council members caused a
flicker of optimism when they issued a statement in January 2022 stating that
nuclear war “cannot be won and must never be fought,” thereby seemingly
reaffirming their commitment to the nuclear taboo.14
This optimism waned,
however, as Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine and started issuing
nuclear threats. In August, the NPT Review Conference, which was held by
the parties to the NPT to review the treaty’s implementation, failed to adopt a
substantive outcome document due to Russian objections over a reference to
the safety of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. This failure dealt yet more
damage to the nuclear order and further isolated Russia on the international
stage.15
The lack of cooperation between the nuclear-weapon states party to
the NPT, a key pillar of the international nuclear order, undermines the
sustainability of this order.16
With its withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, the US has not only violated
a UN Security Council resolution,17
thereby dealing a further blow to the
UN’s authority, but also greatly reduced Iran’s nuclear breakout time.18
117

118
Although negotiations to revive the agreement started in 2021, revival efforts
are complicated by domestic opposition to the agreement in both Iran and
the US, Iran’s recent deliveries of weaponry to Russia for use against
Ukraine, and Iran’s brutal repression of domestic protests.19
If Iran were to
produce nuclear warheads, this could trigger a nuclear arms race in the
Middle East. Proliferation cascades have been wrongly predicted before,
and other would-be Middle Eastern nuclear powers would face obstacles on
their way to the bomb, but Saudi Arabia would feel pressured to seek nuclear
weapons in such a scenario. Meanwhile, Iranian proliferation might cause
Israel – already a nuclear power – to consider a preemptive strike against
Iran, given the long history of Iranian threats to annihilate the country
and its people.20
These new developments that further hollow out the nuclear arms control
regime come on top of already existing challenges to this regime. Already,
four states outside of the NPT framework possess nuclear weapons. Three of
these, India, Israel, and Pakistan, never signed the NPT.22
The fourth, North
Korea, withdrew from the NPT in 2003, although it is disputed whether this
withdrawal is valid under international law.23
Political developments in some
of these states also pose risks to international nuclear security. Enduring
political instability in Pakistan raises questions on how responsibly the
country will be able to handle its nuclear arsenal in the future.24
North Korea,
meanwhile, conducted 86 missile tests in 2022 alone, a record number for the
country.25
There are also indications that it is preparing for a new nuclear
test. In September, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un announced a more
assertive nuclear posture, which allows for nuclear first-use under certain
circumstances.26
These “extra-NPT” nuclear activities are examples of a revisionist challenge
by the non-NPT nuclear-weapon states and Iran vis-à-vis the NPT-based
nuclear order, which seeks to classify them as non-nuclear-weapon states.
With its aggressive behavior, North Korea takes this challenge even further
than the other states, thereby threatening the security of states in East Asia
and beyond.
Meanwhile, the circumstances for reinvigorating nuclear arms control
regimes are suboptimal: great-power competition is becoming ever more
intense, trust among nuclear and would-be nuclear adversaries is low, and few
are willing to risk losing geopolitical competitive advantages by pursuing
arms control measures. Nonetheless, the international community must
“If Iran gets an operational
nuclear weapon, all bets
are off. [...] Regional
states will certainly look
towards how they can
ensure their own
security.”21
Prince Faisal bin Farhan
Al Saud, Saudi Foreign
Minister, World Policy
Conference, December 11,
2022
NUCLEAR ORDER

119
recommit to arms control. The further erosion of the international nuclear
arms control regime has removed important safeguards against further nuclear
proliferation, arms races between existing nuclear powers, unintended
nuclear escalations, and all the risks that come with those. But the Cold War
has shown that even in times of great-power competition, arms control
cooperation may be possible.
Trinity Test: China as the Third Nuclear Superpower?
A new nuclear arms race may already be underway: there are strong signs
that China is on track to massively expand its nuclear arsenal in the coming
decade.27
Compared to Russia and the US, with 4,477 and 3,708 nuclear
warheads, respectively, China maintains a modest arsenal of 350 warheads.28
This arsenal has, however, grown steadily in recent years and might grow
even faster in the coming decade (Figure 6.1).29
In 2021, the US Department
of Defense estimated that China might possess as many as 1,000 warheads
by 2030,30
given that China is currently constructing approximately 280 new
nuclear missile silos, more than ten times as many as it operates today
(Figure 6.2).31
There are some caveats to these predictions. Massive Chinese nuclear
expansion has been predicted before, but it never manifested.32
It is also
uncertain whether China will fill all silos with missiles, or how many warheads
it plans to equip each missile with. It is possible that the US Department of
Defense overestimated these unknown factors when making its 2030 forecast.
Figure 6.1
Growth of China’s nuclear arsenal, 2010–2022, number of warheads
Data: Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris; Hans M. Kristensen
and Matt Korda. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2022
200
150
0
50
100
300
250
350
NUCLEAR ORDER

120
If China were to immensely expand its nuclear arsenal or possibly even seek
nuclear parity with Russia and the US, this would create a nuclear order
fundamentally different from the bipolar nuclear order of the Cold War.
Nuclear stability would then have to be achieved between at least three
competing nuclear superpowers and the US would need to deter two nuclear
near-peers.33
This would vastly complicate arms control efforts, as the
dynamics of negotiations and verification mechanisms would inevitably be
more complex with three parties.34
Such complications are manifesting
themselves already, as China does not show any intention of engaging in
trilateral arms control with the US and Russia, thereby undermining US
10 suspected nuclear missile silos discovered since 2019
Figure 6.2
Nuclear missile silos in China, 2022
Data: Hans M. Kristensen; Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda; Scott LaFoy and Decker Eveleth; Rod Lee;
Joby Warrick. Illustration: Munich Security Conference
Hami missile silo field
110 suspected silos,
first discovered July 2021
PLA Rocket
Force Base 63
Approximately
10 existing silos
PLA Rocket
Force Base 66
Approximately
10 existing silos and
4 suspected new silos,
first discovered
February 2020
Jilantai training area
16 suspected silos,
first discovered
September 2019
10 nuclear missile silos in existence before 2019
Yumen missile silo field
119 suspected silos,
first discovered June 2021
Ordos missile silo field
29 suspected silos,
first discovered August 2021
NUCLEAR ORDER

121
“China is conducting
an unprecedented,
concerning nuclear
buildup without any
transparency.”36
UN General Assembly,
September 21, 2022
and Russian appetite to engage in mutual bilateral arms control from which
China might gain strategic advantages.
China’s nuclear expansion also constitutes a revisionist challenge to the
nuclear order in which the US and Russia are the two nuclear superpowers.
By expanding its nuclear arsenal without being transparent about it and
refusing to engage in arms control talks, China seeks to either join the ranks
as a nuclear superpower, or at least strengthen its strategic position relative
to Russia and the US. This expansion could, for example, provide China with
additional leverage in a confrontation with the US over Taiwan.35
Separation Anxiety: Proliferation Risks Among US Allies
Ever since former US President Donald Trump sowed doubt about the US’s
commitment to defending its allies, the credibility of US extended nuclear
deterrence has become the subject of debate.37
Trump may no longer be
president, but a return to the White House of someone without a strong
commitment to the US’s alliances remains a possibility. Furthermore, the
possibility that the US nuclear arsenal may soon have to deter two nuclear
peer-competitors raises questions regarding the long-term ability of the US
to live up to its extended nuclear deterrence commitments.38
Some experts
have warned that a further loss of credibility in this area could trigger a new
form of nuclear revisionism: if US allies no longer trust in the US security
guarantees that they received in exchange for their commitment to non-
proliferation, some of them may seek to become nuclear-weapon states
themselves.39
US allies in Asia, for example, face both an expanding Chinese nuclear arsenal
and continuing nuclear threats by North Korea. In South Korea, popular
support for the acquisition of a national nuclear arsenal is increasing, with one
2022 poll putting it as high as 71 percent.40
In Japan, on the contrary, several
polls in recent years showed broad popular support for joining the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).41
At the same time, Japan’s 2022
national security strategy, although not announcing nuclear proliferation in
any way, does seem to signal a pivot to much more assertive foreign policy and
security policy in response to the increasing threats posed by China and North
Korea.42
This, together with the fact that Japan is a nuclear-threshold state,
meaning it possesses the technological capabilities to develop nuclear weapons
if it decided to do so, would make Japan a potential proliferation risk if it were
to ever lose faith in the US-provided nuclear umbrella.43
NUCLEAR ORDER

122
Speaking Firmly, but Not Carrying a Big Stick: The Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
The TPNW, which has 68 state parties and 91 signatory states, poses a different
kind of revisionist challenge to the existing nuclear order.44
As frustration over
the lack of progress on arms control by NPT nuclear-weapon states grew,
several civil society organizations initiated a campaign for a treaty banning
nuclear weapons altogether.45
In 2017, this led several non-nuclear-weapon
NPT states to launch the TPNW in an effort to promote the implementation of
NPT Article VI, which outlines the obligation of nuclear-weapon states to work
toward complete nuclear disarmament.46
The TPNW thus seeks to change the
nuclear order by eliminating all nuclear weapon arsenals, including those of
the states permitted to have them under the NPT. It mainly draws support
from smaller states from the “Global South” that neither have nuclear weapons
nor enjoy the benefits of a nuclear umbrella (Figures 6.3 and 6.4).47
Global nuclear order, 2022
Figure 6.3
Data and illustration: Center for International Security at the Hertie School
Nuclear-weapon state outside of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*
Nuclear-weapon host state
State part of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or a signatory
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear-weapon state recognized by the NPT
State under or soon to be under a nuclear umbrella
Neither category
*Israel has never officially confirmed or denied the existence of its
nuclear weapons. It is assumed that Israel developed a nuclear
weapons capability in the 1960s.
“We must recognize
that this treaty is the
democratic wish of the
overwhelming majority
of UN member states
and the people of the
world. No longer should
the world’s people’s be
held hostage to the
unspeakable terror of
these weapons.”48
Alvin Botes, South African
Deputy Minister of
International Relations and
Cooperation, first meeting
of state parties to the TPNW,
June 21, 2022
NUCLEAR ORDER

123
Faced with deteriorating geopolitical conditions, the TPNW has been unable
to make significant inroads among states who enjoy the benefits of nuclear
deterrence, either through their own nuclear arsenal or an ally’s extended
nuclear deterrence. In its 2022 Strategic Concept, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) reaffirmed it will remain a nuclear alliance as long as
nuclear weapons exist.49
The US also reiterated its rejection of the TPNW in
its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.50
And in Europe, Russia’s attack on Ukraine
has decreased enthusiasm for the TPNW. A 2022 public opinion poll showed
that support for nuclear deterrence has significantly increased in Germany,
a country traditionally very skeptical of it. Now, a plurality of 38 percent of
the population supports Germany’s participation in NATO’s nuclear sharing
arrangement, whereas 31 percent reject it.51
The 2022 decision to buy dual-capable
F-35 aircraft signaled that the German government remains committed to
NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement.52
Finland’s and Sweden’s applications
to join NATO have probably ended any hopes of these states, both TPNW
observers, actually joining the treaty.53
These issues add to the already existing
problems for the TPNW, such as criticism of its proposed non-proliferation
Nuclear status, 2022
Figure 6.4
Data and Illustration: Center for International Security at the Hertie School
123
32
32
9
47%
9%
35%
8%
... lives in a nuclear-weapon state*
... lives in an NWFZ or a TPNW
signatory state**
... lives under a nuclear umbrella
... lives in neither category
... have nuclear weapons*
... have signed the TPNW or
are part of an NWFZ**
... are in neither category
... are under a nuclear umbrella
Share of the global population that ... Number of states that ...
*Israel has never officially confirmed or denied the existence of its
nuclear weapons. It is assumed that Israel developed a nuclear
weapons capability in the 1960s.
**NWFZ: nuclear-weapon-free zone; TPNW: Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons
NUCLEAR ORDER

124
verification mechanisms and the fact that its strategy of relying on societal
pressure to motivate nuclear-weapon states to join is ineffective in autocracies
and thus selectively targets democracies.54
Although the TPNW may face difficulties convincing more states to join,
its broad support in the “Global South” is a signal to be taken seriously. It shows
the widespread frustration among non-nuclear-weapon states in this part of
the world with the lack of progress on implementing Article VI of the NPT
and with the inequality of the nuclear order. If this discontent is not addressed,
the NPT risks losing credibility.
The Nuclear Order Is Dead – Long Live the Nuclear Order?
The existing nuclear order faces various challenges: nuclear brinkmanship by
Russia and North Korea, nuclear expansion by China, and various horizontal
proliferation risks. The safeguards provided by arms control treaties are
steadily eroding. Meanwhile, an alternative and more radical arms control
regime in the form of the TPNW challenges the existing regime built around
the NPT.
The nuclear order needs revision to again enjoy the broad support among the
international community that is needed to ensure nuclear stability and arms
control. With great-power competition on the rise, this is difficult. Nevertheless,
world leaders must make an effort, wherever possible, to reestablish a nuclear
order that halts further proliferation and promotes arms control. This requires
cooperation on these issues between the NPT nuclear-weapon states. It is
especially critical here to build an incentive structure to convince China to
create transparency regarding its nuclear arsenal expansion and engage in
arms control discussions. If substantial reductions of nuclear arsenals are to
prove unobtainable in the current geopolitical environment, nuclear powers
should at least try and expand transparency and nuclear risk-reduction
measures. Such measures could include a satellite non-interference treaty,
ensuring parties’ capabilities to observe each other’s nuclear capabilities,
as well as more active use of the Washington–Beijing military hotline.55
Reinvigorating arms control regimes may be difficult, but nuclear powers
must nonetheless try. The likely alternative is unregulated arms races and
further nuclear proliferation, with all the associated risks.
“We are here to
defend the rules-based
international order. The
NPT is not just a piece of
paper. It embodies some
of the most fundamental
commitments of
humankind.”56
Annalena Baerbock, German
Foreign Minister, 10th NPT
Review Conference, August 1,
2022

125
The nuclear order is under increasing pressure.
As nuclear arms control regimes keep eroding, ever
fewer safeguards are in place to prevent arms races
and further nuclear proliferation.
Russia’s continuous nuclear threats and reckless attacks
on nuclear power facilities in Ukraine pose a grave
threat to the nuclear order. Not since the Cold War has
a nuclear attack in Europe been such a realistic scenario
as it is today.
As its nuclear arsenal continues to grow, China may
soon become the third nuclear superpower, joining the
United States and Russia. The nuclear arms control
regime therefore needs to be extended, but China has
thus far refused to accept restrictions.
With intensifying great-power competition, rising
geopolitical tensions, and increasing discontent with
the NPT-based order in the “Global South,” reinventing
a nuclear order that ensures nuclear stability, fosters
transparency and arms control, and enjoys broad global
support is challenging. Nonetheless, the international
community must do the maximum to achieve this
objective.
Key Points
1
2
3
4
NUCLEAR ORDER

FOOD FOR THOUGHT
126

128
Food for Thought
Books
Lawrence Freedman, Command: The Politics of Military Operation
From Korea to Ukraine
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.
Freedman, the British éminence grise of war studies, details the intricate dynam‑
ics between commanders and politicians in modern wars. Covering wars from
across the globe since 1945, his account underlines the often neglected impor‑
tance of effective decision-making. Not least in the context of Russia’s military
blundersinUkraine,thisbookiskeytounderstandinghowmodernwarsarefought.
Bill Gates, How to Prevent the Next Pandemic
New York: Knopf Publishing, 2022.
In his characteristic techno-optimism, Gates sets out a series of practical steps
for preventing the next pandemic. Drawing on his experience with the Bill
Melinda Gates Foundation, he proposes creating a force of global pandemic
experts to respond immediately to new outbreaks, improving vaccine manufac-
turing (even envisioning a universal vaccine against all sorts of viruses), holding
regular pandemic drills, and enhancing pandemic surveillance and diagnostics.
Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of
Tyranny in the 21st Century
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2022.
“Spin dictators” have largely replaced “fear dictators,” so the argument by
Guriev and Treisman goes. Instead of resorting to large-scale violence, modern
dictators aptly manipulate information to control society and weaken opposi-
tion, all under the guise of democracy. But the current struggles of authoritarian
strongmen highlight the fragility of ideologically bankrupt regimes.
Chris Miller, Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology
New York: Simon Schuster, 2022.
Miller recounts history since the 1960s through the prism of the battle over
semiconductors, the key technology of our times. In his accessible and
gripping account, Miller weaves together the roles of key individuals from
Silicon Valley to Taiwan with a broader analysis of the centrality of semi‑
conductors to the world economy and balance of power. As tensions over
technology between the US and China heat up, this book is essential reading.
FOOD FOR THOUGHT

129
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 FOOD FOR THOUGHT
Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict
Between the US and Xi Jinping’s China
New York: Public Affairs, 2022.
War between China and the US is not inevitable, argues Rudd, providing an
antidote to deterministic doom. The former Australian Prime Minister and
Mandarin speaker sketches ten future scenarios and suggests guardrails to
manage the strategic competition. Above all, US and Chinese leaders must
overcome their “mutually assured non-comprehension” of each other.
Helen Thompson, Disorder: Hard Times in the 21st Century
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.
Fossil fuels might literally be relics of the past, but they continue to dominate
global politics. Thompson, a Cambridge professor, tells the meta story of how
energy is inextricably linked to the geopolitical, economic, and democratic
disorders of the present day. The green energy transition, too, will be marked
by geopolitical struggles as Europe and the US depend on China, which
dominates the production and processing of critical minerals.
Natalie Tocci, A Green and Global Europe
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2022.
The European Green Deal could be the new raison d’être for the EU, according
to Tocci. After a decade of manifold crises, the EU is in dire need of a new
vision to regain both the support of European citizens and credibility abroad.
But the green transition is deeply political. The leading scholar-practitioner
argues that the EU therefore needs to deal with the socio-economic and
geopolitical concomitants to make it a success.
Gaia Vince, Nomad Century: How to Survive the Climate Upheaval
London: Allen Lane, 2022.
Set against the escalating climate crisis, Vince explains that global warming
will render large swathes of the world uninhabitable. Rather than escaping
from this reality, the environmental journalist and writer appeals, we must
plan for the inevitable consequence: mass movements of people toward the
North. She makes an optimistic case for devising a humane migration system,
which seems daring given widespread nativism.

130
Reports
Richard Black et al., “Environment of Peace: Security in a New Era of Risk”
Stockholm: SIPRI, May 2022, https://doi.org/10.55163/LCLS7037.
This report analyses the mutually reinforcing relationship between global
warming and insecurity. Events such as droughts are multipliers of existing
tensions in many parts of the world, while armed conflict damages the
environment and renders environmental governance more difficult. We
must fundamentally rethink the tenets of security policy, the authors argue,
and include environmental resilience in fragile societies as a major security
objective.
Rosa Balfour, Lizza Bomassi, and Marta Martinelli, “The Southern Mirror:
Reflections on Europe From the Global South”
Brussels: Carnegie Europe, June 2022, https://perma.cc/27B2-SXMQ.
The ambiguous responses by many countries in the “Global South” toward
Russia’s war on Ukraine caught many Europeans by surprise. This report helps
understand Europe’s lack of followership by surveying the views on Europe in
seven countries in the “Global South.” Highlighting the chasm between Europe’s
self-perception and reputation elsewhere, the report makes the case for a better
understanding of other perspectives to strengthen Europe’s soft power.
Chris Bradley et al., “On the Cusp of a New Era?”
New York: McKinsey Global Institute, October 2022, https://perma.cc/6LCC-34J4.
This report captures the sense that the old order is dying, but the new one
cannot yet be born. Following the “era of markets,” the confluence of
geopolitical tensions, rampaging inflation, and an energy crisis may mark a
new era. Drawing on a wealth of data, this report imagines what this new era
may look like in terms of the world order, technology, demography, energy,
and macroeconomics, offering some cause for optimism.
Anthony Dworking and Mats Engström, “We’ll Always Have Paris:
How to Adapt Multilateral Climate Cooperation to New Realities”
Berlin: ECFR, October 2022, https://perma.cc/8WGY-K9QH.
Multilateral climate negotiations are beset by a lack of trust, geopolitical
tensions, and economic crises that hinder ambitious cooperation. The
underwhelming results of COP27 are a case in point, raising the question of
whether the multilateral approach based on the Paris Agreement is ill-fated.
This report recommends that the EU persist with collective approaches
while pushing ambitious initiatives among smaller groups of states.
FOOD FOR THOUGHT

131
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 FOOD FOR THOUGHT
Ronja Ganster et al., “Designing Ukraine’s Recovery in the Spirit of
the Marshall Plan”
Washington, DC: GMF, September 2022, https://perma.cc/BKF6-7VBQ.
75 years after the original Marshall Plan for Europe, this report proposes
a new Marshall Plan for Ukraine. Ravaged by Russia’s indiscriminate attacks,
Ukraine desperately needs help with rebuilding the country. The authors
recommend that Europe and the US provide immediate relief, help reconstruct
basic infrastructure, modernize the economy, and encourage EU accession.
Jacob Gunter and Helena Legarda, eds., “Beyond Blocks: Global Views
on China and US-China Relations”
Berlin: MERICS, August 2022, https://perma.cc/4TYC-NX49.
While views on China as a systemic rival appear to be converging among the
transatlantic allies, perspectives elsewhere in the world differ. Analyzing the
positions of seven diverse countries, this report demonstrates that most do not
want to choose sides. But China is intensifying its efforts to bring more
countries into its fold, the authors warn, and Europe needs to take action to be
a more attractive partner to countries in the “Global South.”
Benjamin Larsen, “The Geopolitics of AI and the Rise of Digital Sovereignty”
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, https://perma.cc/RJ5B-JS4Z.
Once seen as a global agora, the digital ecosystem is splintering along
ideological lines. Larsen shows that governance of artificial intelligence is
emblematic of the technological decoupling between democracies and
autocracies. While China and others use AI to surveil and control their
populations, the EU and US, after initial disagreements, are starting to
converge on a human-rights-centered approach.
Leslie Vinjamuri et al., “Building Global Prosperity: Proposals for
Sustainable Growth”
London: Chatham House, December 2022,
https://doi.org/10.55317/9781784135508.
The combined fallouts from the pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine have
caused a perfect storm in many developing economies. Covering sectors such
as digital infrastructure, climate, and health, this report examines how to
build back better and rejuvenate global development. Above all, the authors
argue, stakeholders need to rebuild trust, which is the foundation of effective
development cooperation.
Principles, Architecture,
Financing, Accountability:
Recommendations for
Donor Countries
Ronja Ganster, Jacob Kirkegaard,
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff,
and Bruce Stokes
Working Paper
September
2022
No 11 | August 2022
MERICS
PAPERS
ON CHINA
BEYOND BLOCS
Global views on China and US-China relations
Edited by Jacob Gunter and Helena Legarda
Report
The Geopolitics of AI and the Rise of Digital Sovereignty
Benjamin Cedric Larsen
Thursday, December 8, 2022

132
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 NOTES

134
Quotations originally in British English
have been adapted to American English.
Endnotes
1 Introduction: Re:vision
1. Moscow’s war is “among the most – if not the most –
significant shocks to the global order since World War
II.” See Ingrid Brunk and Monica Hakimi, “Russia,
Ukraine, and the Future World Order,” American
Journal of International Law 116:4 (2022), 687–697,
https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2022.69, 688.
2. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “We Stand, We Fight and We
Will Win. Because We Are United. Ukraine, America and
the Entire Free World: Address by Volodymyr Zelenskyy
in a Joint Meeting of the US Congress,” Washington, DC,
December 22, 2022, https://perma.cc/4F6R-2DEG.
3. Maryam Zakir-Hussain, “The Human Cost of Putin’s
War: 200,000 Soldiers and 40,000 Civilians Killed in
Ukraine,” The Independent, November 10, 2022,
https://perma.cc/LVB5-SD9V; UNHCR, “Ukraine Refugee
Situation,” Geneva: UNHCR, January 3, 2023,
https://perma.cc/Z8HX-T3B8; Dan Bilefsky and Nick
Cumming-Bruce, “Ukraine’s Prime Minister Says
Rebuilding Will Cost $750 Billion,” The New York Times,
July 5, 2022, https://perma.cc/TMQ9-JAFN. At the end of
November 2022, European Commission President Ursula
von der Leyen said that the damage suffered by Ukraine
was estimated at 600 billion euros. See Ursula von der
Leyen, “Statement by President von der Leyen on Russian
Accountability and the Use of Russian Frozen Assets,”
Brussels, November 30, 2022, https://perma.cc/77EP-37R7.
4. Sofia Sereda, “War Crimes Are Part of Russia’s War
Culture, Says Ukrainian Nobel Peace Prize Winner,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 24, 2022,
https://perma.cc/6PVH-K585; Julia Friedrich and Niklas
Masuhr, “Why Is Russia Being so Brutal in Ukraine?,”
Political Violence at a Glance, May 23, 2022,
https://perma.cc/8ZBT-DVP6; AP, Frontline, and PBS,
“War Crimes Watch Ukraine,” https://perma.cc/XBL4
-N5ZR; Emma Bubola, “Using Adoptions, Russia Turns
Ukrainian Children Into Spoils of War,” The New York
Times, October 22, 2022, https://perma.cc/TPH5-Y4KY.
5. Simon Childs, “‘A Circus Show’: Why Russian State
TV Keeps Threatening to Nuke Everything,” Vice World
News, May 10, 2022, https://perma.cc/QUG9-GQMS;
Justin Ling, “Russia Is Ramping Up Nuclear War
Propaganda,” Wired, November 4, 2022, https://perma
.cc/AZ8H-D99Q.
6. On the lack of compassion see the interview with
Lev Gudkov, the director of the Levada Center, who says
that “just 1.5 to 2 percent of respondents” in his polls
show compassion: “And only an average of 10 percent of
the population feels guilt and shows empathy – Russian
society is amoral.” Christina Hebel, “Interview With
Opinion Researcher Lev Gudkov: ‘Russians Have Little
Compassion for the Ukrainians’,” Spiegel International,
January 5, 2023, https://perma.cc/2VDD-7679.
7. Olaf Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz,
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member
of the German Bundestag,” Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag,
February 27, 2022, https://perma.cc/4KE6-H6E6.
8. The White House, “National Security Strategy,”
Washington, DC: The White House, 2022,
https://perma.cc/7UGM-BTMG, 2.
9. In his often-quoted speech at the Munich Security
Conference in 2007, Putin already noted that “we have
reached a decisive moment when we must seriously
think about the architecture of global security.” See
Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion
at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Munich:
Munich Security Conference, February 10, 2007,
https://perma.cc/3DNL-FUYW.
10. Vladimir Putin, “Meeting with State Duma Leaders
and Party Faction Heads,” Moscow: Kremlin, July 7, 2022,
https://perma.cc/7D8Y-7WFT.
11. Jeremy Cliffe, “The War That Changed the World,”
The New Statesman, August 17, 2022, https://perma.cc/
WA85-FD74.
12. Sergey Lavrov, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s
Remarks and Answers to Questions at a Meeting
with Students and Faculty of the MGIMO University,”
Moscow: MGIMO University, March 23, 2022,
https://perma.cc/JHH2-X6DV.
ENDNOTES

135
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 ENDNOTES
13. Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China,
“Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s
Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a
New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,” Beijing:
Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China,
February 4, 2022, https://perma.cc/M4G7-NK62.
14. The Press and Information Office of the Federal
Government, “G7 Leaders’ Statement,” Berlin: The Press
and Information Office of the Federal Government,
May 8, 2022, https://perma.cc/TU6B-T99H.
15. Kate Connolly, “China and Germany Condemn Russian
Threat to Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine,” The Guardian,
November 4, 2022, https://perma.cc/LG6H-W3LB.
16. Josep Borrell, “Unmute Yourself: European Foreign
and Security Policy and the Language of Power,”
Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 20, 2022,
https://perma.cc/E48F-K6FQ.
17. Rana Mitter, “China: Revolutionary or Revisionist?,”
The Washington Quarterly 45:3 (2022), 7–21,
https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124017.
18. Olaf Scholz, “The Global Zeitenwende,” Foreign
Affairs 102:1 (2023), 22–38 , https://perma.cc/8EES-ZFWG.
19. Xi Jinping, “Full Text of the Report to the 20th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China,”
Beijing: Communist Party of China, October 22, 2022,
https://perma.cc/W5J3-KU7T.
20. For an analysis of the legislation see Brendan Clift,
“Hong Kong’s Made-in-China National Security Law:
Upending the Legal Order for the Sake of Law and
Order,” Australian Journal of Asian Law 21:1 (2020), 1–23
21. Elizabeth Economy, “Xi Jinping’s New World Order:
Can China Remake the International System?,” Foreign
Affairs 101:1 (2022), 52–67, https://perma.cc/8REQ-35G6, 54.
22. On the PRC’s expansive claims and their limited
consistency with international law see United States
Department of State Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, “People’s Republic
of China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,”
Washington, DC: United States Department of State
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, Limits in the Seas 150, January 2022,
https://perma.cc/SY3W-YC3L.
23. In August 2022, the Chinese government issued a
new White Paper, “The Taiwan Question and China’s
Reunification in the New Era,” which underscores the
importance of reunification, calling it “indispensable for
the realization of China’s rejuvenation” and “a historic
mission” of the Communist Party. See “The Taiwan
Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era,”
Beijing: Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and
State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic
of China, August 2022, https://perma.cc/5YKJ-GLPS.
For an assessment see Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s New White
Paper Lays Out Vision for Post Reunification’ Taiwan,” The
Diplomat, August 11, 2022, https://perma.cc/MD4C-CZYV.
24. Xi Jinping, “Full Text of the Report to the 20th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China.”
25. Bonny Lin and Joel Wuthnow, “Pushing Back
Against China’s New Normal in the Taiwan Strait,” War on
the Rocks, August 16, 2022, https://perma.cc/ER94-2WQT.
26. Since March 2021, this sentiment has increased in all
countries surveyed for the Munich Security Index. For
instance, while only 22 percent of respondents in Germany
believed China invading Taiwan posed a great risk to the
world in March 2021, this number increased to 45 percent
in October and November 2022. In Japan, numbers rose
from 49 percent to 60 percent.
27. Katja Drinhausen and Helena Legarda,
“‘Comprehensive National Security’ Unleashed: How
Xi’s Approach Shapes China’s Policies at Home and
Abroad,” Berlin: MERICS, MERICS China Monitor,
September 15, 2022, https://perma.cc/977H-QTWD.
28. Jeffrey Mankoff, “The War in Ukraine and Eurasia’s
New Imperial Moment,” The Washington Quarterly 45:2
(2022), 127–147, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022
.2090761, 128.
29. Fumio Kishida, “Keynote Address by Prime Minister
Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue,”
Singapore: IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, June 10, 2022,
https://perma.cc/6G5F-JX8S.
30. Antony J. Blinken, “The Administration’s Approach
to the People’s Republic of China,” Washington, DC:
The George Washington University, May 26, 2022,
https://perma.cc/3A54-WEU8.
31. Luke Patey, How China Loses: The Pushback Against
Chinese Global Ambitions, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2021.
32. Larry Diamond, “All Democracy Is Global: Why
America Can’t Shrink From the Fight for Freedom,”
Foreign Affairs 101:5 (2022), 182–197.

136
33. John Avlon, “The Tide Is Turning Against Autocracy,”
CNN, December 1, 2022, https://perma.cc/TF85-8L43;
Fareed Zakaria, “Enough About Democracy’s Weaknesses.
Let’s Talk About Its Strengths,” The Washington Post,
December 1, 2022, https://perma.cc/M23J-7M9J.
34. Bruce Jones, “A Strategy for the Fence Sitters:
Learning to Live With Countries That Refus to Take
Sides on Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, June 15, 2022, https://
perma.cc/Q678-NQK3; Angela Stent, “The West vs. the
Rest,” Foreign Policy, May 2, 2022, https://perma.cc
/VLL3-A88P; Michael J. Mazarr, “How to Save the
Postwar Order: The United States Should Rethink Its
Defense of the System,” Foreign Affairs, May 6, 2022,
https://perma.cc/X7LZ-LEFT.
35. “General Assembly Resolution Demands End to
Russian Offensive in Ukraine,” UN News, March 2, 2022,
https://perma.cc/5MNU-HGKC; Jones, “A Strategy for
the Fence Sitters.”
36. Annalena Baerbock, “Speech by Foreign Minister
Annalena Baerbock at the Emergency Special Session
of the UN General Assembly on Ukraine,”
New York: UN General Assembly, March 1, 2022,
https://perma.cc/PY3A-PFB8.
37. David L. Sloss and Laura A. Dickinson, “The Russia-
Ukraine War and the Seeds of a New Liberal Plurilateral
Order,” American Journal of International Law 116:4
(2022), 798–809, https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2022.55, 801.
38. Mazarr, “How to Save the Postwar Order.”
39. Shannon Tiezzi, “How Did Asian Countries Vote on
the UN’s Ukraine Resolution?,” The Diplomat, March 3,
2022, https://perma.cc/YQ63-WTQZ.
40. Tiezzi, “How Did Asian Countries Vote on the UN’s
Ukraine Resolution?”
41. “EAM S Jaishankar Goes Viral for Savage Reply to
Question About India’s Stance on Ukraine,” News 18,
June 3, 2022, https://perma.cc/Y86Y-8SUZ.
42. Jones, “A Strategy for the Fence Sitters.”
43. Shivshankar Menon, “The Fantasy of the Free World:
Are Democracies Really United Against Russia?,” Foreign
Affairs, April 4, 2022, https://perma.cc/GY42-8KB5.
44. Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Zeitenwende
for the G7: Insights From the Munich Security Index
Special G7 Edition,” Munich: Munich Security
Conference, Munich Security Brief 3, June 2022,
https://doi.org/10.47342/JDIE4364, 28–44.
45. Ivan Krastev, “Middle Powers are Reshaping
Geopolitics,” Financial Times, November 18, 2022,
https://perma.cc/4HE2-P3EL
46. Nicholas Mulder, “Don’t Expect Sanctions to Win the
Ukraine War,” The Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2022,
https://perma.cc/38JD-B6ZY.
47. “EAM S Jaishankar Goes Viral for Savage Reply to
Question About India’s Stance on Ukraine.”
48. Shivshankar Menon, “Nobody Wants the Current
World Order: How All the Major Powers—Even the
United States—Became Revisionists,” Foreign Affairs,
August 3, 2022, https://perma.cc/62ZR-5SX2, News 18.
49. Michael Zürn, “Eine außenpolitische Doppelstrategie
für Zeiten des Systemkonflikts,” Berlin: Global Public Policy
Institute and Auswärtiges Amt, 49security, October 5, 2022,
https://perma.cc/QD5K-NQZF; Amrita Narlikar, “Must the
Weak Suffer What They Must? The Global South in a World
of Weaponized Interdependence,” in: Daniel Drezner/
Henry Farrell/Abraham Newman (eds.), The Uses and
Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence, Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2021, 289–304.
50. Trita Parsi, “Why Non-Western Countries Tend to
See Russia’s War Very, Very Differently,” New York:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, April 11, 2022,
https://perma.cc/H3RY-97NE.
51. This has been a core theme of previous Munich
Security Reports. See Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich
Security Report 2020: Westlessness,” Munich: Munich
Security Conference, February 2020, https://doi.org/10
.47342/IAQX5691
52. Nancy Pelosi, “Pelosi Floor Speech on S. 3522, the
Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022,”
Washington, DC: US House of Representatives, April 28,
2022, https://perma.cc/F486-7NLL.
53. Hans van Leeuwen, “How Vladimir Putin and Xi
Jinping Could Ruin 2023,” Financial Review, December 28,
2022, https://perma.cc/RDU7-EQ67.
54. Andrzej Duda, “Speech by the President of Poland at
the 77th Session of the UN General Assembly,” Warsaw:
President of the Republic of Poland, September 20, 2022,
https://perma.cc/KN67-4K7V.
55. Tobias Bunde, “Overcoming Westlessness,” in: Tobias
Bunde/Benedikt Franke (eds.), The Art of Diplomacy:
75+ Views Behind the Scenes of World Politics, Berlin: Econ,
2022, 151–6; van Leeuwen, “How Vladimir Putin and Xi
ENDNOTES

137
Jinping Could Ruin 2023”; Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich
Security Report 2022: Turning the Tide – Unlearning
Helplessness,” Munich: Munich Security Conference,
February 2022, https://doi.org/10.47342/QAWU4724.
56. Joseph Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on the
United Efforts of the Free World to Support the People of
Ukraine,” Warsaw, March 26, 2022, https://perma.cc/
G72N-N3TG.
57. Annalena Baerbock, “Seizing the Transatlantic
Moment: Our Common Responsibility in a New World,”
New York: The New School, August 2, 2022,
https://perma.cc/ST6J-FA2U. The transatlantic to-do
list can be found n the MSC website at https://
securityconference.org/en/transatlantic-to-do-list/.
Among others, it contains section relations with Russia,
China, and the “Global South.”
58. Gideon Rachman, “Xi Jinping’s China and the Rise
of the ‘Global West’,” Financial Times, October 24, 2022,
https://perma.cc/L5X5-HTHG. On efforts to revive
cooperation among the world’s liberal democracies
see Tobias Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2021:
Between States of Matter – Competition and
Cooperation,” Munich: Munich Security Conference,
June 2021, https://doi.org/10.47342/CYPE1056, 24–27.
59. European Council, “European Council Conclusions
on Ukraine, the Membership Applications of Ukraine,
the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, Western Balkans
and External Relations,” Brussels: European Council,
June 23, 2022, https://perma.cc/UE9L-TDG4.
60. Jens Stoltenberg, “Speech by NATO Secretary
General Jens Stoltenberg at the 68th Annual Session of
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly,” Madrid: NATO
Parliamentary Assembly, November 21, 2022,
https://perma.cc/XL34-2S74.
61. See in detail Bunde and Eisentraut, “Zeitenwende for
the G7.”
62. NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” Madrid:
NATO, June 29, 2022, https://perma.cc/PV6W-UBUY, §8.
63. Jens Stoltenberg, “Pre-Summit Press Conference,”
Madrid, June 27, 2022, https://perma.cc/89MJ-T2KS.
64. Matilde Stronell, “Poland Unveils Record 2023
Defence Budget,” Janes, September 1, 2022,
https://perma.cc/E5TL-CYQT.
65. Andreas Kluth, “This Is the Dawning of the Age of
Zeitenwende,” Bloomberg, December 23, 2022, https://
perma.cc/ZZX7-CSDX; Tobias Bunde, “Lessons (to Be)
Learned? Germany’s Zeitenwende and European
Security After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,”
Contemporary Security Policy 43:3 (2022), 516–530,
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2092820.
66. Mirna Galic, “What You Need to Know About Japan’s
New National Security Strategy,” Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace, December 19, 2022,
https://perma.cc/8U79-BZ84.
67. See in detail Wolfgang Ischinger and Joseph S. Nye,
Jr. (eds.), “Mind the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic
China Policy – Report of the Distinguished Reflection
Group on Transatlantic China Policy,” Munich/Berlin/
Washington, DC: Munich Security Conference, Mercator
Institute for China Studies, Aspen Strategy Group,
July 2021, https://doi.org/10.47342/GXWK1490; Mikko
Huotari, Anja Manuel, and Boris Ruge, (eds.), “Bridging
the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic China Policy,”
Berlin/Munich/Washington, DC: MERICS, Munich
Security Conference, Aspen Strategy Group, forthcoming.
68. Liana Fix and Thorsten Benner, “Germany’s
Unlearned Lessons: Berlin Must Reduce Its Dependence
Not Just on Russia but on China, Too,” Foreign Affairs,
December 15, 2022, https://perma.cc/WH2G-7L6C.
69. Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the
German Bundestag”; Kishida, “Keynote Address by
Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue”; Vladimir Putin, “Valdai International
Discussion Club Meeting,” Moscow: Valdai International
Discussion Club, October 27, 2022, https://perma.cc/
6CYH-4U9J; Joseph Biden, “Remarks by President Biden
at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference,”
Munich/Washington, DC: Munich Security Conference,
February 19, 2021, https://perma.cc/84Z9-W7TE.
70. Putin, “Valdai International Discussion Club Meeting.”
71. Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor
of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the
German Bundestag.”
72. Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2021,” 24–27.
See recently The White House, “National Security
Strategy”; Ursula von der Leyen, “2022 State of the
Union Address by President von der Leyen,” Strasbourg,
September 14, 2022, https://perma.cc/3AE5-M8Y5.
73. The White House, “National Security Strategy,” 8.

138
74. Emmanuel Macron, “Speech by the President of the
French Republic at the United Nations General
Assembly,” New York, September 20, 2022, https://perma
.cc/7CAB-4GHQ.
75. Matthew Duss, “The War in Ukraine Calls for a Reset
of Biden’s Foreign Policy: America Can’t Support
Democracy Only When It’s Convenient,” Foreign Affairs,
May 4, 2022, https://perma.cc/3UKV-QN4V.
76. For another dynamic not covered in this report
see Martin Binder and Autumn Lockwood Payton,
“With Frenemies Like These: Rising Power Voting
Behavior in the UN General Assembly,” British Journal
of Political Science 52:1 (2022), 381–398,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000538.
77. Bunde et al., “Munich Security Report 2021.”
78. The White House, “National Security Strategy,” 16.
79. Christoph Heusgen, “The War in Ukraine Will Be a
Historic Turning Point,” Foreign Affairs, May 12, 2022,
https://perma.cc/GYS3-THMX.
80. Michito Tsuruoka, “Why the War in Ukraine Is Not
About Democracy Versus Authoritarianism,” London:
The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and
Security Studies, RUSI Commentary, June 27, 2022,
https://perma.cc/3HGK-TL4G.
81. Sergey Lavrov, “On Law, Rights and Rules,” Russia
in Global Affairs 19:3 (2021), 228–240, 229.
82. Tom O’Connor, “China, Russia, Iran, North Korea
and More Join Forces ‘in Defense’ of U.N.,” Newsweek,
March 12, 2021, https://perma.cc/79DM-7Q2H.
83. Leyen, “2022 State of the Union Address by President
von der Leyen.”
84. Marjo Koivisto and Tim Dunne, “Crisis, What Crisis?
Liberal Order Building and World Order Conventions,”
Millennium 38:3 (2010), 615–640,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829810363509.
85. Hal Brands and Charles Edel, “A Grand Strategy of
Democratic Solidarity,” The Washington Quarterly
44:1 (2021), 29–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X
.2021.1893003.
86. The argument that democracy is in constant need of
renewal, as made by Sebastian Enskat et al., “Die
wehrhafte(re) Demokratie: Russland und zehn weitere
Gefahren für unsere Freiheit,” Berlin: Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung, https://perma.cc/H557-YPCE, 67–73., also
applies to the international order.
87. Joseph Biden, “Remarks by President Biden
Before the 77th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly,” New York: UN, September 21, 2022,
https://perma.cc/9VML-PYPF.
1. It is important to note that many countries had not
yet achieved independence from colonial rule at that
time and the constituent republics of the Soviet Union
did not become sovereign before the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in 1991.
2. United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: History of the Declaration,” United Nations,
https://perma.cc/X696-B5F2; United Nations, “Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,” Paris: United Nations,
December 10, 1948, https://perma.cc/GEQ3-7HHL.
3. Hurst Hannum, “The Status of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International
Law,” Georgia Journal of International and Comparative
Law 25:1–2 (1995/1996), 287−397, https://perma.cc/FSH4-
4966; while there are also important differences between
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the
UDHR, the former was clearly inspired by the latter. See
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and
International Bar Association, “Human Rights in the
Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for
Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers,” New York/Geneva:
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and
International Bar Association, 2003, https://perma.cc
/K4QQ-H52Y, 72. Eight nations abstained from the vote. See
United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”
4. Munich Security Conference, “#MSC2023 YouTube
Studio: Talk With Kenneth Roth Jaafar Abdul Karim,”
YouTube, February 19, 2022, https://perma.cc/83PJ
-SWW2.
5. Sarah Repucci and Amy Slipowitz, “Freedom in
the World 2022: The Global Expansion of Authoritarian
Rule,” Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2022,
https://perma.cc/B5CX-AUX4.
6. Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights,
Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2013;
Christopher Sabatini, Reclaiming Human Rights in a
Changing World Order, Blue Ridge Summit: Brookings
ENDNOTES

139
Institution Press, 2022. The V-Dem Institute also describes
significant deterioration in freedom of expression and
worsening repression of civil society in the countries it
covers. See V-Dem Institute, “Democracy Report 2022:
Autocratization Changing Nature?,” Gothenburg: V-Dem
Institute, March 2022, https://perma.cc/LXM2-AVC8.
7. David Miliband, “It’s Time to End the Age of
Impunity,” Foreign Policy, June 3, 2022,
https://perma.cc/8LDD-72LT.
8. David Miliband, “Ukraine Must Be the Last War
of the Age of Impunity,” Time, March 11, 2022,
https://perma.cc/Z3ZD-KFXK.
9. Tanner Larkin, “How China Is Rewriting the Norms
of Human Rights,” Lawfare, May 9, 2022, https://perma
.cc/S7ZH-SJ2X.
10. Tom Ginsburg, “Authoritarian International Law?,”
American Journal of International Law 114:2 (2020),
221–260, https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2020.3.
11. Larkin, “How China Is Rewriting the Norms of Human
Rights”; Ted Piccone, “China’s Long Game on Human
Rights at the United Nations,” Washington, DC: Brookings,
September 2018, https://perma.cc/WW4J-KZLU.
12. Dag Hammarskjöld Library, “Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948), Drafting History,” New York:
Dag Hammarskjöld Library, July 11, 2022, https://perma
.cc/FD9D-N4Z2; this was before the People’s Republic of
China was formally established in 1949; Peng-Chun
Chang represented the Republic of China at the United
Nations and helped draft the UDHR.
13. Kaja Kallas, “No Peace on Putin’s Terms: Why Russia
Must Be Pushed Out of Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs,
December 8, 2022, https://perma.cc/R88S-RHFJ.
14. See Nadège Rolland, “China’s Southern Strategy:
Beijing Is Using the Global South to Constrain America,”
Foreign Affairs, June 9, 2022, https://perma.cc/EUX9
-MBTY.
15. Larkin, “How China Is Rewriting the Norms of
Human Rights.”
16. Alice Su and David Rennie, “Drum Tower: Back to
the Future,” The Economist Podcasts, November 14, 2022,
https://perma.cc/2FPK-8T6E; Ahmed Shaheed and Rose
Parris Richter, “Is ‘Human Rights’ a Western Concept?,”
New York: IPI Global Observatory, October 17, 2018,
https://perma.cc/ES96-ULQC.
17. Emmanuel Macron, “Speech by the President of the
French Republic at the Conference of Ambassadors,” Paris:
Elysée, September 1, 2022, https://perma.cc/S2M6-PPFH.
18. Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan, “China and the
Global Reach of Human Rights,” The China Quarterly 241
(2020), 169–190, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741019000833,
176; Jacqueline Hale, “FPC Briefing: Competing Norms –
Why Defence of Human Rights Is Strategically Important
in a Multipolar Era,” London: The Foreign Policy Centre,
December 14, 2017, https://fpc.org.uk/competing-norms/.
19. David Rennie, “China Wants to Change, or Break, a
World Order Set by Others,” The Economist, October 10,
2022, https://perma.cc/9XFT-XA9X.
20. Rolland, “China’s Southern Strategy.”
21. Congressional-Executive Commission on China,
“How China Uses Economic Coercion to Silence Critics
and Achieve its Political Aims Globally: A Testimony by
Bonnie S. Glaser,” Washington, DC: Congressional-
Executive Commission on China, December 7, 2021,
https://perma.cc/N5RJ-GZM4.
22. Piccone, “China’s Long Game on Human Rights at
the United Nations,” 9–10.
23. James McMurray, “The UN’s Report on the Uyghurs
Nearly Didn’t See the Light of Day, Thanks to China,” The
Guardian, September 1, 2022, https://perma.cc/T6HY-8W5J.
24. Ginsburg, “Authoritarian International Law?,” 255.
25. To date, it is mostly courts in EU member states that
invoke this principle. See Jamil Balga-Koch and Teresa
Quadt, “Nirgendwo auf der Welt straffrei,” Germany:
Amnesty International, May 14, 2021, https://perma.cc/
665R-5TNX.
26. Tobias Bunde, “Beyond Westlessness: A Readout
From the MSC Special Edition 2021,” Munich: Munich
Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, February
2021, https://doi.org/10.47342/NLUJ4791.
27. Kenneth Roth, “World Report 2020: China’s Global
Threat to Human Rights,” New York: Human Rights
Watch, 2020, https://perma.cc/NA5P-EHBQ.
28. Zack Stanton, “How the ‘Culture War’ Could Break
Democracy,” Politico, May 20, 2021, https://perma.cc/
WHA9-VZPT.
29. Roth, “World Report 2020.”
30. Kurt Mills and Rodger A. Payne, “America First and
the Human Rights Regime,” Journal of Human Rights 19:4
(2020), 399–424, https://doi.org/10.1080/14754835.2020.
1809362.

140
31. Stephen Wertheim, “The Crisis in Progressive Foreign
Policy: How the Left Can Adapt to an Age of Great-Power
Rivalry,” August 24, 2022, https://perma.cc/QHZ4-V8Z5.
32. Michael Brenes and Van Jackson, “Great-Power
Competition Is Bad for Democracy,” Foreign Affairs,
July 14, 2022, https://perma.cc/72B3-MFLZ.
33. Richard Gowan and Franziska Brantner, “A Global
Force for Human Rights? An Audit of European Power at
the UN,” London: ECFR, Policy Paper, September 2008,
https://perma.cc/Z2LP-ZDWK.
34. Martin Binder and Sophie Eisentraut, “Negotiating
the UN Human Rights Council,” in: Matthew D. Stephen/
Michael Zürn (eds.), Contested World Orders: Rising
Powers, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the
Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-State, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, First Edition, 2019, 245–271,
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198843047.003.0007,
265; Susi Dennison and Anthony Dworkin, “Towards an
EU Human Rights Strategy for a Post-Western World,”
London: ECFR, Policy Brief, September 2010,
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35. Dennison and Dworkin, “Towards an EU Human
Rights Strategy for a Post-Western World.”
36. Seth D. Kaplan, Human Rights in Thick and Thin
Societies: Universality Without Uniformity, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018, 12, 67.
37. Philip Cunliffe, Cosmopolitan Dystopia: International
Intervention and the Failure of the West, Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2020.
38. Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, “The Power Atlas:
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39. Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in
Georgia, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin’s
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40. Larkin, “How China Is Rewriting the Norms of
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41. “How Russia Is Trying to Win Over the Global South,”
The Economist, September 22, 2022, https://perma.cc/
GBM2-YJXB; Rolland, “China’s Southern Strategy.”
42. Tom Ginsburg, “How Authoritarians Use
International Law,” Journal of Democracy 31:4 (2020),
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43. Kaplan, Human Rights in Thick and Thin Societies,
102, 188.
44. Francis Fukuyama, “More Proof That This Really Is
the End of History,” The Atlantic, October 17, 2022,
https://perma.cc/LMG7-LWCY.
45. Amrita Narlikar, “Scripting a Third Way: The
Importance of EU-India Partnership,” Observer Research
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V8YV-MRST; World Values Survey, “World Values Survey
Wave 7 (2017–2022),” Vienna: World Values Survey, 2022,
https://perma.cc/DZS5-TN86
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ENDNOTES

141
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142
32. Johannes Petry, “Beyond ports, roads and railways:
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34. Ursula von der Leyen, “Opening speech by President
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1. Jingdong Yuan, Fei Su, and Xuwan Ouyang,
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ENDNOTES

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2. “The New Scramble for Africa,” The Economist, March
7, 2019, https://perma.cc/WZ9S-23P6; Stephan Klingebiel,
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4. Mathias Kamp, “Das Engagement autoritärer
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42. Kier and Stronski, “Russia’s Vaccine Diplomacy Is
Mostly Smoke and Mirrors,” 3.
43. Taylor, “Beijing and Moscow Are Losing the Vaccine
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44. Denis Tull, Benedikt Erforth, and Dominik
Schottner, “Megatrends Afrika: Afrika als geopolitisches
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45. Kier and Stronski, “Russia’s Vaccine Diplomacy Is
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ENDNOTES

145
46. Gisela Grieger, “Towards a Joint Western Alternative
to the Belt and Road Initiative?,” Brussels: European
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2021, https://perma.cc/36E4-CWM3, 2; Doherty, Hurst,
and Lyons, “Coercion or Altruism: Is China Using Its
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47. WFP, “A Global Food Crisis,” Rome: WFP, 2022,
https://perma.cc/U2PY-UX5Y.
48. Economist Impact, “Global Food Security Index
2022: Exploring Challenges and Developing Solutions for
Food Security Across 113 Countries,” London: Economist
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49. WFP, “Contributions to WFP in 2021,” Rome: WFP,
2022, https://perma.cc/8SFR-PGVK.
50. Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development, “Eradicating Hunger – Ensuring Food
Security,” Bonn: Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development, 2022, https://perma.cc/42LZ-5J9H.
51. Richard Mshomba, “How Northern Subsidies Hurt
Africa,” Africa Renewal, September 2002, https://perma
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52. WFP, “Contributions to WFP in 2021.”
53. WFP, “Russian Federation Helps World Food
Programme to Support Poor Families in Kyrgyzstan,”
Press Release, July 1, 2021, https://perma.cc/3FFK-NERS.
54. FAO, “World Food Situation,” Rome: FAO, 2022,
https://perma.cc/XR3P-L543.
55. Christopher B. Barrett, “The Global Food Crisis
Shouldn’t Have Come as a Surprise: How to Finally Fix
the Broken System for Alleviating Hunger,” Foreign
Affairs, July 25, 2022, https://perma.cc/X9E4-3F4S.
56. Eddy Wax, “Brussels Playbook: Russia Inflicts Grain
Pain - Denmark Gets Mette - Coffee Tips,” Politico,
November 2, 2022, https://perma.cc/55NQ-XC9U.
57. UN Security Council, “Russian Federation’s
Suspension of Participation in Black Sea Grain Initiative
Risks Impacting Global Food Prices, Top Officials Tells
Security Council,” New York: UN Security Council,
October 31, 2022, https://perma.cc/PJ4X-2JRL.
58. WFP, “Contributions to WFP in 2021.”
59. Eric Olander, “Rethinking China’s Participation in
African Agricultural Development in the Post-COVID-19
Era,” China Global South Project, September 11, 2020,
https://perma.cc/G9DX-RRNF.
60. Ndoricimpa Siméon, Xiaoyang Li, and Sangmeng
Xiao, “China’s Agricultural Assistance Efficiency to
Africa: Two Decades of Forum for China-Africa
Cooperation Creation,” Journal of Agriculture and
Food Research 9:100329 (2022), 1–10,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jafr.2022.100329, 8.
61. Julian May, “Strengthening African Food Systems:
What Role Can China Play?,” Milan: Italian Institute for
International Political Studies, July 29, 2021, https://
perma.cc/Y888-RZ8G.
62. “China Seeks a World Order That Defers to States and
Their Rulers,” The Economist, October 10, 2022, https://
perma.cc/3CBM-U7MZ.
63. OECD, “Aggregate Trends of Climate Finance Provided
and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2013-2020,”
Paris: OECD, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1787/d28f963c-en.
64. “COP27 Must Help Unlock Financing for Climate
Adaptation: Sherry,” Dawn, November 12, 2022, https://
perma.cc/2TP3-JYDF.
65. World Population Review, “Carbon Footprint by
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https://perma.cc/7QGT-TQZF.
66. Katja Doose, Alexander Vorbrugg, and Angelina
Davydova, “Russian Climate Action and Research is
Collateral Damage in Putin’s War on Ukraine,” Climate
Home News, May 26, 2022, https://perma.cc/77XT-YFUL.
67. Ian Hill, “Is Russia Finally Getting Serious on
Climate Change?,” The Interpreter, November 1, 2021,
https://perma.cc/NFB5-PQE2.
68. Doose, Vorbrugg, and Davydova, “Russian Climate
Action and Research is Collateral Damage in Putin’s War
on Ukraine.”
69. Jie Yu, “Climate Justice with Chinese
Characteristics?,” Project Syndicate, September 12, 2022,
https://perma.cc/YMK4-8DWC.
70. The State Council Information Office of The People’s
Republic of China, “Envoy: China Supports Developing
Countries’ Demand on Climate Finance,” Beijing: The State
Council Information Office of The People’s Republic of
China, November 11, 2022, https://perma.cc/94B6-7NY8.
71. UNFCCC, “COP27 Reaches Breakthrough Agreement
on New ‘Loss and Damage’ Fund for Vulnerable
Countries,” Press Release, November 22, 2022, https://
perma.cc/XZ47-E4AN.

146
72. Sara Schonhardt and Karl Mathiesen, “EU Climate
Finance Proposal Upends COP27 Talks,” Politico,
November 18, 2022, https://perma.cc/3X23-PGUQ.
73. Fiona Harvey, “EU Reversal of Stance on Loss and
Damage Turns Tables on China at COP27,” The Guardian,
November 18, 2022, https://perma.cc/LPV5-3LAR.
74. Zack Colman and Karl Mathiesen, “New U.S.
Message on Climate Change: Make China Pay,” Politico,
November 5, 2022, https://perma.cc/ZL63-YA8W.
75. Kate Bartlett, “COP27: How China and Africa Fit in
Debate Over ‘Loss and Damage’ Fund,” Voice of America,
November 18, 2022, https://perma.cc/3WR8-TKVQ.
76. Leslie Vinjamuri et al., “Building Global Prosperity:
Proposals for Sustainable Growth,” London: Chatham
House, December 9, 2022, https://perma.cc/7FLU-VSKH, 31.
77. David Miliband, “Remarks by David Miliband at the
2022 Munich Security Conference,” Munich: Munich
Security Conference, February 19, 2022, https://perma.cc/
T92R-P52N.
78. Ramona Bloj and Mario Pezzini, “A Conversation
with Gayle Smith,” Paris: Groupe géopolitiques, October
24, 2022, https://perma.cc/EMN5-RC2M.
79. Kamp, “Das Engagement autoritärer Geberstaaten in
Afrika,” 60.
80. Tull, Erforth, and Schottner, SWP Podcast,
November 10, 2022.
1. IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022,” Paris: IEA,
October 2022, https://perma.cc/6T2W-28SZ, 33.
2. IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022,” 35. Note that for
some European states, this figure has been considerably
higher. For an overview on the share of gas imports from
Russia by EU member states, see IEA, “World Energy
Outlook 2022,” 387.
3. Olga Khakova, “Lesson for the Energy Sector:
Decades of Energy Diplomacy Can Disappear With One
Brutal Invasion,” in: Six Months, Twenty-Three Lessons:
What the World Has Learned From Russia’s War in
Ukraine, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2022,
https://perma.cc/GUS7-K8NT.
4. IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022,” 19.
5. This is illustrated, for example, by the pitfalls of
the G7 oil price cap. To ease pressure in global energy
markets and bring down prices, Western partners have
been searching for ways that keep Russian fuels in the
markets but limit Moscow’s revenues. After months of
negotiations, agreement on a G7 oil price cap has been
found, but questions concerning its implementation
remain. See, for example, Ben McWilliams, Simone
Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann, “Will the European
Union Price Cap on Russian Oil Work?,” Brussels: Bruegel,
Blog, December 7, 2022, https://perma.cc/53X6-SKE7.
6. Josep Borrell, “EU Ambassadors Annual Conference
2022: Opening Speech by High Representative Josep
Borrell,” russels, October 10, 2022, https://
perma.cc/FKF4-RZAN.
7. Fatih Birol, quoted in David Sheppard, James Politi,
and Max Seddon, “IEA Chief Accuses Russia of
Worsening Europe’s Gas Crisis,” Financial Times,
January 12, 2022, https://perma.cc/GGY4-CKJ7.
8. Anna Cooban and Uliana Pavlova, “Russia Threatens
to Cut Supply of Gas Through Ukraine,” CNN Business,
November 23, 2022, https://perma.cc/86C9-LB6N. Note
that Russian LNG exports to Europe, however, have been
increasing. See Javier Blas, “Let’s Talk about Russia’s
Other Gas Export Bonanza,” Bloomberg, October 13,
2022, https://perma.cc/V596-WWVS. See also Anne-
Sophie Corbeau and Diego Rivera Rivota, “QA: Why
Under-the-Radar Russian LNG Exports Matter,” New
York: Columbia University School of International and
Public Affairs, Center on Global Energy Policy,
September 27, 2022, https://perma.cc/3PUT-E5FK.
9. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, “The Gas War That Russia Is
Waging Against Europe Is a Form of Terror, so It Is
Necessary to Hit Back: Address by the President of
Ukraine,” Kiev: President of Ukraine, July 25, 2022,
https://perma.cc/88NS-CVGT.
10. Charles Michel, “The Time Is Now: The EU Needs a
Genuine Energy Union,” Brussels: European Council,
October 10, 2022, https://perma.cc/W2U7-8LAX.
11. Christina Lu, “You Have No Idea How Bad Europe’s
Energy Crisis Is,” Foreign Policy, August 26, 2022, https://
perma.cc/8H2D-3RK4.
13. Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter, “Whither the
Liberal European Union Energy Model? The Public
ENDNOTES

147
Policy Consequences of Russia’s Weaponization of
Energy,” EconPol Forum 23:6 (2022), 4–7,
https://perma.cc/PQ3E-KJKB, 5.
14. Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg
Zachmann, “National Fiscal Policy Responses to the
Energy Crisis,” Brussels: Bruegel, November 29, 2022,
https://perma.cc/JT7T-M29L.
15. “Europe Faces an Enduring Crisis of Energy and
Geopolitics,” The Economist, November 24, 2022,
https://perma.cc/N73E-5PLW.
16. IMF, “World Economic Outlook: Countering the Cost-
of-Living-Crisis,” Washington, DC: IMF, October 2022,
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2022/
10/11/world-economic-outlook-october-2022, xiv.
17. Charlie Cooper, America Hernandez, and Victor
Jack, “EU Agrees on Gas Price Cap, Skeptics Denounce
It As an ‘Illusion’,” Politico, December 19, 2022,
https://perma.cc/4TLX-CBY8.
18. See, for example, Thierry Breton and Paolo Gentolini,
“Germany’s Latest Response to Energy Crisis Raises
Questions,” Irish Times, October 3, 2022, https://perma.cc
/DN6Z-XGZL.
19. IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022,” 259. Also note
that around 75 million people who recently gained access
to electricity are likely to lose the ability to pay for it.
See IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022,” 29.
20. IEA, “Gas Market Report, Q4-2022,” Paris: IEA,
October 2022, https://perma.cc/AJ6K-Z9H6, 23–26.
21. Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air,
“Payments to Russia for Fossil Fuels Since 24 February
2022,” Helsinki: Centre for Research on Energy and Clean
Air, November 28, 2022, https://perma.cc/4SS8-M7XK.
22. IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022: Launch
Presentation,” Paris: IEA, October 27, 2022. On Russia’s
costs for its energy war, see also, for example, Agathe
Demarais, “Russia Will Lose the Energy War Putin
Started,” Politico, November 11, 2022, https://perma.cc/
28GM-Z7ML.
23. Aliaksei Patonia, “How Its War on Ukraine Killed
Russia’s Hydrogen Ambitions,” n.a.: GMF, Policy Paper,
October 2022, https://perma.cc/ZDU5-HU9G.
24. Derek Brower and David Sheppard, “The Week That
Could Unravel the Global Oil Market,” Financial Times,
November 28, 2022, https://perma.cc/4P32-5B3K.
25. For first observations about the effects of the oil
price cap, see, for example, Ben Cahill, “Progress Report
on EU Embargo and Russian Oil Price Cap,” Washington,
DC: CSIS, Critical Questions, January 10, 2023,
https://perma.cc/7L7U-JRL4.
27. On China–Gulf relations, see, for example, Inbar
Pe’er, Niels Graham, and Mrugank Bhusari,
“Strengthening Ties: China and the GCC,” Washington,
DC: Atlantic Council, January 31, 2022, https://perma.cc/
26GE-4NUP. On India, see, for example, Ariel Cohen,
“India, the Rising Power, Is Seeking Oil From the
Middle East and Russia,” Forbes, August 19, 2022,
https://perma.cc/47HB-SYYG.
28. John Calabrese, “China-Middle East Engagement
Amid Slow Growth,” Washington, DC: Middle East
Institute, October 31, 2022, https://perma.cc/3XCL-7Y66.
29. Grant Rumley, “China’s Security Presence in the
Middle East: Redlines and Guidelines for the United
States,” Washington, DC: The Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, Policy Notes 123, October 2022,
https://perma.cc/ZE8G-4DNV.
30. According to the IEA, the OPEC share of oil production
should rise from 35 percent in 2021 to 43 percent in 2050.
See IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022,” 329.
31. Robinson Meyer, “America Is the World’s Largest Oil
Producer. So Why Is Losing Russia’s Oil Such a Big Deal?,”
The Atlantic, March 8, 2022, https://perma.cc/XXD5
-567D.
32. On Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy rationale and the
implications for its oil policies, see, for example, Javier
Blas, “What the New ‘Saudi First’ Policy Means for Oil
and Power,” Bloomberg, October 28, 2022,
https://perma.cc/9PC3-9KGZ.
33. Elissa Slotkin, Tweet, Twitter, October 6, 2022,
6:18 PM, https://perma.cc/5Y7G-WTCT.
34. Angela Picciariello et al., “Navigating Energy
Transitions: Mapping the Road to 1.5°C,” Winnipeg:
International Institute for Sustainable Development,
October 2022, https://perma.cc/M7ZP-YGDV, 32–34.
35. On Russian attempts to realize Arctic LNG projects
despite Western sanctions by cooperating with a company
in the United Arab Emirates, see Malte Humpert,
“Russia’s Novatek to Use Closer Ties With UAE to Secure

148
Key Technology for Arctic LNG Project,” High North
News, October 17, 2022, https://perma.cc/SV38-Q9Q5.
36. For an overview of Russian supplies to Asia in
comparison to former volumes to Europe, see
Picciariello et al., “Navigating Energy Transitions,” 34.
37. Nikos Tsafos, “Can Russia Execute a Gas Pivot to
Asia?,” Washington, DC: CSIS, Commentary, May 4,
2022, https://perma.cc/FMS3-QV22.
38. On Russia’s junior role vis-à-vis China, reinforced by
their energy relations, see Alexander Gabuev, “China’s
New Vassal: How the War in Ukraine Turned Moscow
Into Beijing’s Junior Partner,” Foreign Affairs, August 9,
2022, https://perma.cc/9TDL-9XLQ.
39. For an analysis of recent Chinese LNG policies and
gas diversification strategies, see Anne-Sophie Corbeau
and Sheng Yan, “Implications of China’s Unprecedented
LNG-Contracting Activity,” New York: Columbia
University School of International and Public Affairs,
Center on Global Energy Policy, October 2022,
https://perma.cc/LV93-MKHX. Note that recently a
27-year LNG agreement between China and Qatar
made headlines. See Andrew Mills and Maha El Dahan,
“Qatar Seals 27-year LNG Deal With China as Competition
Heats Up,” Reuters, November 21, 2022, https://
perma.cc/R557-YE92.
40. On US–China LNG relations, see Corbeau and Yan,
“Implications of China’s Unprecedented LNG-
Contracting Activity.” See also Nikos Tsafos, “A New
Chapter in U.S.-China LNG Relations,” Washington, DC:
CSIS, December 6, 2021, https://perma.cc/CRC9-KSJ4.
Note that there are some voices in Washington, DC,
calling to curb LNG exports to China and increase trade
volumes with US allies instead. See Gavin Bade, “China
Wants America’s Natural Gas. Some Lawmakers Are
Worried,” Politico, October 26, 2022, https://perma.cc/
8VGY-LALV.
41. Susi Dennison and Pawel Zerka, “Tracking Europe’s
Energy Security: Four Lessons From the EU’s New
Energy Deals,” n.a.: ECFR, Commentary, November 24,
2022, https://perma.cc/YL9J-9QBU.
42. Picciariello et al., “Navigating Energy Transitions,”
34–37.
43. Picciariello et al., “Navigating Energy Transitions,” ix.
On the uncertain longer-term gas export prospects for
countries in Africa, see Mostefa Ouki, “African Gas Supplies
to Europe: Between Hopes and Hard Realities,” Oxford: The
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford Energy
Comment, July 2022, https://perma.cc/G7GL-FUEN.
44. Neil Munshi, Paul Burkhardt, and Paul Clowes,
“Europe’s Rush to Buy Africa’s Natural Gas Draws Cries
of Hypocrisy,” Bloomberg News, July 10, 2022, https://
perma.cc/7B59-V9RU.
45. Quoted in Munshi, Burkhardt, and Clowes, “Europe’s
Rush to Buy Africa’s Natural Gas Draws Cries of
Hypocrisy.”
46. Note that in addition to Europe’s scramble for
alternative gas supplies, there has been an uptick in
demand for coal and oil as substitutes for natural gas
around the world. See IEA, “World Energy Outlook
2022,” 29.
47. IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022,” 29–30.
48. IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy
Transitions,” Paris: IEA, May 2021, https://perma.cc/
6W4R-SQRE, 162.
49. Christian Lindner in Deutscher Bundestag,
“Deutscher Bundestag: Stenografischer Bericht –
19. Sitzung,” Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, February 27,
2022, https://perma.cc/MRR7-GNDN, 1362. Own
translation.
50. For a detailed assessment of the unfolding hydrogen
market and the countries involved, see IRENA,
“Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation: The
Hydrogen Factor,” Abu Dhabi: IRENA, January 2022,
https://perma.cc/22WM-K4RX, 45–53.
51. On the hydrogen strategies of the Gulf states, see
Dawud Ansari, “The Hydrogen Ambitions of the Gulf
States: Achieving Economic Diversification While
Maintaining Power,” Berlin: SWP, Comment 44, July 2022,
https://doi.org/10.18449/2022C44.
52. On the Gulf States, see Ansari, “The Hydrogen
Ambitions of the Gulf States,” 7. For Europe’s relations
with Algeria, see Andrew Farrand, “Against the Flow:
Europe’s Role in Kickstarting Algeria’s Green
Transition,” n.a.: ECFR, Policy Brief, October 2022,
https://perma.cc/3J8K-QEHM.
53. Frans Timmermans, “Keynote Speech EVP
Timmermans at EU Hydrogen Week 2022,” Brussels,
October 25, 2022, https://perma.cc/4MM6-2NDW.
54. Dawud Ansari, Julian Grinschgl, and Jacopo Maria
Pepe, “Electrolysers for the Hydrogen Revolution:
ENDNOTES

149
Challenges, Dependencies, and Solutions,” Berlin:
SWP, SWP Comment 57, September 2022,
https://doi.org/10.18449/2022C57, 5. See also IEA,
“Electrolysers: More Efforts Needed,” Paris: IEA,
September 2022, https://perma.cc/5MYR-T9BD.
55. Ansari, Grinschgl, and Pepe, “Electrolysers for the
Hydrogen Revolution,” 2–4.
56. Ansari, Grinschgl, and Pepe, “Electrolysers for
the Hydrogen Revolution,” 5–6. For China’s hydrogen
strategy, see Jane Nakano, “China Unveils Its First
Long-Term Hydrogen Plan,” Washington, DC: CSIS,
Commentary, March 28, 2022, https://perma.cc/77MJ
-28CQ. See also Alexander Brown and Nis Grünberg,
“China’s Nascent Green Hydrogen Sector: How Policy,
Research, and Business Are Forging a New Industry,”
Berlin: MERICS, MERICS China Monitor 77, June 28,
2022, https://perma.cc/UVS3-2L6X.
58. On the share of CRMs located in countries affected
by instability, see Julia Hammelehle, Juliane Kabus, and
Sophie Eisentraut, “Power Shifts,” in Tobias Bunde et al.,
Munich Security Report 2021: Between States of Matter –
Competition and Cooperation. Munich: Munich Security
Conference, June 2021, 100–111, 106. On CRM supply
risks, see IEA, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean
Energy Transitions,” 11–12.
59. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, “2022 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission,”
Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, November 2022, https://perma.cc/
RXP3-Y3DF, 270. For China’s stakes in foreign mining
projects, see also Luc Leruth et al., “Green Energy
Depends on Critical Minerals. Who Controls the Supply
Chains?,” Washington, DC: PIIE, Working Paper 12,
August 2022, https://perma.cc/QC4U-RTAT.
60. Hammelehle, Kabus, and Eisentraut, “Power Shifts,”
107–109.
61. Hung Tran, “Our Guide to Friend-Shoring: Sectors to
Watch,” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Issue Brief,
October 27, 2022, https://perma.cc/ZF23-PKUB. For an
overview of the strategies of the US and its partners to
reduce reliance on China, see Jane Nakano, “The
Geopolitics of Critical Minerals Supply Chains,”
Washington, DC: CSIS, March 2021, https://perma.cc/
PUT9-TFHH. A new database by the IEA tracks the flurry
of new CRM policies: IEA, “Critical Minerals Policy
Tracker,” Paris: IEA, November 2022, https://perma.cc/
74EZ-4XRE.
62. Janet L. Yellen, “Transcript: US Treasury Secretary
Janet Yellen on the Next Steps for Russia Sanctions and
‘Friend-shoring’ Supply Chains,” Washington, DC: Atlantic
Council, April 13, 2022, https://perma.cc/77BV-HNZU.
Economic and Security Review Commission,” 268.
65. Note that percentages are even higher for specific
components, with China accounting for 90 percent of
anode and electrolyte production. See “China’s Battery
Supply Chain Tops BNEF Ranking for Third Consecutive
Time, With Canada a Close Second,” BloombergNEF,
November 12, 2022, https://perma.cc/QY68-ME7Q.
66. IEA, “Special Report on Solar PV Global Supply Chains,”
Paris: IEA, 2022, https://perma.cc/YMN9-X3LR, 7–9.
67. Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and
Cecilia Trasi, “National Energy Policy Responses to the
Energy Crisis,” Brussels: Bruegel, November 11, 2022,
https://perma.cc/5C6B-6ZWA.
Economic and Security Review Commission,” 271–272.
On the way that clean technologies play into broader
China–US competition, see Helen Thompson, Disorder:
Hard Times in the 21st Century, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2022, 91, 271–272.
69. Anna Swanson and Chris Buckley, “Red Flags for
Forced Labor Found in China’s Car Battery Supply
Chain,” The New York Times, June 20, 2022, https://
perma.cc/TJ8T-SSTR. Note that Xinjiang accounts for
40 percent of global polysilicon manufacturing, which is
needed for solar panels. See IEA, “Special Report on
Solar PV Global Supply Chains,” 9.
71. William Alan Reinsch, “Electric Vehicle Reshoring:
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150
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72. See, for example, the four-point plan presented by
EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in
December 2022 in response to the IRA. European
Commission, “Opening Remarks by President von der
Leyen at the Joint Press Conference With President
Michel and Prime Minister Fiala Following the Meeting
of the European Council of 15 December 2022,” Brussels:
European Commission, December 15, 2022,
https://perma.cc/Y22C-9DBA. Note that EU Commission
and the heads of state and government of the EU
countries will further discuss the EU’s response to
the IRA in early February 2023.
73. Nikos Tsafos, “How the Energy Transition Will
Rewire the World,” Washington, DC: CSIS, Commentary,
May 12, 2022, https://perma.cc/778Z-T4UY. On the risks
of less-integrated markets, see Jason Bordoff and
Meghan L. O’Sullivan, “The New Energy Order: How
Governments Will Transform Energy Markets,” Foreign
Affairs 101:4 (2022), https://perma.cc/A8DZ-4XHP.
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see also Kali Robinson, “What Is the Iran Nuclear Deal?,”
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ENDNOTES

151
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24, 2021, https://perma.cc/NP9D-NWXT.
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152
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33. Hal Brands, “The Art of the Arms Race: To Avoid
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the Fold,” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council Scowcroft
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ENDNOTES

153
49. NATO, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,” Madrid:
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X4GE; see also International Campaign to Abolish
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54. Schneider, “Kernwaffenverbotsvertrag: Das
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55. David Brunnstrom and Michael Martina, “Strategic
Clarity on Taiwan Policy Carries ‘Significant Downsides’ -
U.S.,” Reuters, May 4, 2021, https://perma.cc/manage
/create?folder=87251; see also Michael Markey, Jonathan
Pearl, and Benjamin Bahney, “How Satellites Can Save
Arms Control: A Global Noninterference Treaty Would
Reduce Nuclear Risks,” Foreign Affairs, August 5, 2020,
https://perma.cc/F5Z8-6B35.
56. Annalena Baerbock, “Statement by Foreign Minister
Annalena Baerbock at the 10th Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,” New York City: UN, August 1, 2022,
https://perma.cc/BF24-WBFG.

154
List of Figures
Possible deviations from a total of 100 percent in visualized data result from rounding.
1 Introduction: Re:vision
1.1 Examples of Russian war crimes in Ukraine, 2022
Illustration adapted by the Munich Security Conference based on data collected by the
Victor Pinchuk Foundation and an illustration provided by the Pinchuk Art Center.
According to Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, 79,415 crimes related to the aggression
of the Russian Federation have been registered, among them: 62,095 crimes against
the peace and security of mankind, and the international legal order (including
60,366 war crimes); 17,320 crimes against the national security fundamentals of
Ukraine. Concerning war crimes against children, 2,405 criminal proceedings have
been registered. Moreover, 71,308 objects of civil infrastructure have been destroyed
or damaged. The armed forces of the Russian Federation carried out 179 strikes on
93 objects of the electric power industry of Ukraine. There were 69 attacks (38.6 percent)
on 51 objects in October 2022. There were 31 attacks (17,3 percent) on 28 objects in
November 2022. There were 45 attacks (25,1 percent) on 35 objects in December 2022.
916 cases of the use of prohibited means of warfare have been established.
1.2 Citizens’ views on the invasion of Ukraine as a turning point in world politics, October–
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Kekst CNC.
In answer to the question “Do you agree or disagree with the following in light of Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine? – This is a turning point in world politics” respondents were given
the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,”
“slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine
the net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest.
1.3 Escalating military intimidation of Taiwan by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), September 2020–December 2022
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by MERICS.
MERICS research is based on reports of the Taiwanese Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Data on the number of PLA aircraft entering Taiwan’s air defense identification
zone (ADIZ) and on the number of days with PLA aircraft entering Taiwan’s ADIZ
covers the period since the Taiwanese MoD has released regular reports. Data on
the number of PLA aircraft crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait covers
the period since the first noticeable uptick in PLA activity in this space since 1999.
According to MERICS research, before September 2020, there have been two aircraft
crossing the median line in March 2019, three crossing in February 2020, and two
crossing in August 2020.
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MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 LIST OF FIGURES
1.4 Voting summary, United Nations General resolution on “The territorial integrity of Ukraine:
Defending the principles of the Charter of the United Nations,” October 12, 2022
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on the voting summary for
resolution ES-11/4, adopted by the UN General Assembly on October 12, 2022,
https://perma.cc/W6CM-LA9G. For the full text of the resolution see “Territorial Integrity
of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations,” A/RES/ES-11/4,
October 12, 2022, https://perma.cc/A2RQ-V79J. Further note that the borders shown
on this map are not intended to be exhaustive and do not imply official endorsement.
Only UN member states are colored.
1.5 Evaluation of the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by citizens of different countries,
share saying the country or organization has “done well” minus share saying it has “done badly,”
In answer to the question “Thinking about the response to Russia invading Ukraine how
do you think the following countries and organizations have done in their response
to Russia?” respondents were given the following options: “very well,” “quite well,”
“neither well nor badly,” “quite badly,” “very badly,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown
are the net of the total percentage for “well” minus the total percentage for “badly.”
1.6 Citizens’ views on whose rules they would prefer to live by, October–November 2022, percent
In answer to the question “Would you rather live in a world with international rules
shaped mostly by…?” respondents were given the following options: “Europe,” “US,”
“economically developing countries, such as countries in Africa (often known as the
‘Global South’),” “China,” “Russia,” and “don’t know.”
1.7. Citizens’ preferences for their country’s response to Russia, share saying that their
country should oppose Russia minus share saying that their country should cooperate with Russia,
In answer to the question “What do you think your country should do in response to the
Russia as a military and economic power?” respondents were given the following options:
“fully cooperate with Russia,” “somewhat cooperate with Russia,” “stay neutral,”
“somewhat oppose Russia,” “fully oppose Russia,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown are
the net of the total percentage for “oppose” minus the total percentage for “cooperate.”
1.8 Citizens’ preferences for their country’s response to the rise of China, share saying that their
country should oppose China minus share saying that their country should cooperate with China,
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by Kekst CNC.
In answer to the question “What do you think your country should do in response to the
rise of China as a military and economic power?” respondents were given the following
options: “fully cooperate with China,” “somewhat cooperate with China,” “stay neutral,”

156
“somewhat oppose China,” “fully oppose China,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown are
the net of the total percentage for “oppose” minus the total percentage for “cooperate.”
1.9 Citizens’ views on the main fault line in global politics, October–November 2022, percent
In answer to the question “What is the main fault line/division in global politics today?”
respondents were given the options “democracies versus dictators,” “countries that
support a rules-based order and countries who don’t,” rich versus poor countries,” “the
West versus all other countries,” “China versus the rest of the world,” and “don’t know.”
1.10 Recent votes in the UN General Assembly, by regime type, percent
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on David L. Sloss and Laura A.
Dickinson, “The Russia-Ukraine War and the Seeds of a New Liberal Plurilateral Order,”
American Journal of International Law 116:4 (2022), 798–809, https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil
.2022.55.
1.11 Citizens’ views on whether a country or group of countries has a vision for the global
order, self-perception compared to the perception of others, October–November 2022, percent
In answer to the question “Do the following have a vision for how they would like the
international order to be run, or not?” respondents were given the following options:
“a very clear vision,” “a somewhat clear vision,” “no vision,” and “don’t know.” For
the “US,” “EU,” “China,” and “developing countries”, the first figure shows the self-
perception, and the second figure shows the averaged perception of all other countries
polled. For “Russia,” the figure only shows the perceptions of others. The countries
included in the category “developing country” are Brazil, India, and South Africa.
All illustrations and data in this section are based on the survey conducted by Kekst
CNC. For the detailed method underpinning the index, see pages 40-41.
Explaining the Index
1. “Energy supply disruption” was not yet included in previous editions of the index. The
Munich Security Index 2021 and the Munich Security Index 2022 thus covered 31 risks.
2. The answer scale is reversed to account for the natural direction of time. More
imminent being sooner is closer on our answer scale and less imminent being later is
further away on our answer scale, but we in fact want to give a higher score to risks
that are more imminent – hence we reverse.
3. The answer scale is reversed because higher answer scores for each of the five inputs
should be associated with more serious risk. Without rescaling, it is exactly the reverse:
high answer scores are associated with high risk preparedness and thus with less
serious risk.
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1.14 Citizens’ perceptions of other countries, share saying country is an ally minus share
saying country is a threat, October–November 2022, percent
In answer to the question “For each country/jurisdiction below, please say whether
you think they pose a threat or are an ally to your country or neither [0-10, where
0 is ‘threat,’ 5 is neither and 10 is ‘ally’].” The scores run from a potential -100
(if 100 percent of a population said that x was a threat) to +100 (if 100 percent of a
population said that x was an ally).
1.15 Perceptions of other countries as threats or allies, change between November 2021 and
October–November 2022, group average
In answer to the question “For each country/jurisdiction below, please say whether
you think they pose a threat or are an ally to your country or neither [0-10, where 0 is
‘threat,’ 5 is neither and 10 is ‘ally’].” “Global” comprises all 12 countries surveyed,
except Ukraine, which was not polled in the last round of the index. “G7” comprises
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US. “BICS” comprises Brazil,
India, China, and South Africa. Fieldwork for the previous Munich Security Index,
published in the Munich Security Report 2022 and used as a reference point here, took
place in November 2021.
Spotlight Ukraine
1.16 Ukrainian citizens’ views on whose rules they would prefer to live by, November 2022,
percent
In answer to the question “Would you rather live in a world with international rules
shaped mostly by…?” respondents were given the following options: “Europe,” “US,”
“economically developing countries, such as countries in Africa (often known as the
‘Global South’),” “China,” “Russia,” and “don’t know.”
1.17 Ukrainians evaluating whether they should carry on fighting or surrender in different
scenarios, November 2022, percent
In answer to the question “In the following circumstances, do you think Ukraine
should carry on fighting or surrender?” respondents were given the following options:
“carry on fighting,” “surrender,” and “don’t know.”
1.18 Ukrainian citizens’ views on acceptable ceasefire terms, November 2022, percent
In answer to the question “How acceptable would the following terms be for a ceasefire
between Ukraine and Russia?” respondents were given the following options:
“completely acceptable,” “somewhat acceptable,” “neither acceptable nor unacceptable,”
“somewhat unacceptable,” “completely unacceptable,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown
here combine the net responses for acceptable and unacceptable, with the gray area
representing the rest.
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158
1.19 Ukrainian citizens’ views on security arrangements after the war, November 2022,
percent
In answer to the question “Do you agree or disagree with the following ...?” respondents
were given the following options: “strongly agree,” “tend to agree,” “neither agree nor
disagree,” “tend to disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here
combinethenetresponsesagreeinganddisagreeing,withthegrayarearepresentingtherest.
1.20 Ukrainian evaluation of the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine of different
countries and organizations, share saying the country or organization has “done well”
minus share saying it has “done badly,” November 2022, percent
In answer to the question “Thinking about the response to Russia invading Ukraine how
do you think the following countries and organizations have done in their response
to Russia?” respondents were given the options “very well,” “quite well,” “neither well
nor badly,” “quite badly,” “very badly,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown are the net of
the total percentage for “well” minus the total percentage for “badly.”
2.1 The growing impunity crisis, various indicators
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by the
International Rescue Committee (IRC). The data on people in humanitarian need is
based on acaps, “Humanitarian Access Overview,” Geneva: acaps, July 2022,
https://perma.cc/GJ74-8KV2. The data on civilian casualties is based on Monty G. Marshall
and Benjamin R. Cole, “Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility,”
Vienna: Center For Systemic Peace, July 23, 2014, https://perma.cc/5VJP-U8W6. The
data on aid workers is based on Abby Stoddard et al., “Aid Worker Security Report 2022:
Collateral Violence,” n.a.: Humanitarian Outcomes, August 2022, https://perma.cc/4R9R
-FB6G. The data on attacks against health facilities is based on Safeguarding Health
in Conflict Coalition and Insecurity Insight, “Unrelenting Violence: Violence Against
Health Care in Conflict 2021,” Baltimore: Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition
and Insecurity Insight, 2021, https://perma.cc/XJ3B-3WVQ.
2.2 Chinese efforts to redefine international human rights standards, selected concepts
promoted by Beijing
MERICS research relies on the analysis of policy documents and statements of the Chinese
Communist Party as well as on the Decoding China project developed with support of the
China Media Project, Heidelberg University, and the Swedish Center for China Studies.
2.3 Voting coincidence with the EU on human rights votes in the UN General Assembly,
2021–2022, percent
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by the European
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), updating data in Richard Gowan and Franziska
Brantner, “A Global Force for Human Rights? An Audit of European Power at the
LIST OF FIGURES

159
UN,” London: ECFR, Policy Paper, September 2008, https://perma.cc/Z2LP-ZDWK. The
data covers the 76th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). “Human rights votes”
refers to resolutions from the Third Committee of the UNGA, which deals with “Social,
Humanitarian and Cultural” affairs. They include all votes on draft resolutions adopted
by the Assembly in which the EU’s members voted “in favour,” “against,” or abstained
together. Resolutions on which the EU did not take a united position (of which there
were six) were excluded from the analysis. The voting coincidence of non-EU members
was calculated by dividing the number of votes cast by non-EU countries coinciding
with the EU’s positions by the overall number of votes, abstentions and no-shows of all
non-EU countries on these resolutions. The evaluation of countries as free, partly free,
and not free is based on Freedom House’s country evaluations as documented in
Freedom in the World 2022. The UN regional group “Western Europe and others” also
includes Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and Turkey. The “not free” country
in the “Western Europe and others” group is Turkey. Richard Gowan thanks Raquel
Alberto De la Fuente for updating the figures.
3 Global Infrastructures: My Way or No Highway
3.1 Discriminatory trade interventions, per year and country
Illustration by Munich Security Conference based on “Global Dynamics: Total Number
of Implemented Interventions since November 2008,” St. Gallen: St. Gallen Endowment
for Prosperity through Trade, December 2022, https://perma.cc/FM8Z-ZG86. When
comparing current year activity to that of previous ones, the GTA recommends using
snapshots of the GTA database taken on the same date within each year. The GTA
dataset is a growing dataset as the GTA analysts continue reporting on years past.
In this case, the cut-off date for this data is December 12th. That is, the dataset used
here comprises the number of interventions recorded by December 12 of the respective
year to ensure comparability.
3.2 Citizens’ views on China having a greater say over the rules that govern international
politics, October–November 2022, percent
In answer to the question “Thinking about world politics. Do you agree or disagree
with the following? It is a good thing if China has more say over the rules that govern
international politics” respondents were given the following options: “strongly agree,”
“slightly agree,” “neither agree or disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,”
and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses agreeing and
disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest.
3.3 Signatories of the Declaration for the Future of the Internet, April 2022
Illustration by Munich Security Conference based on “Declaration for the Future of
the Internet,” Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 2022, https://perma.cc
/3GDE-XV56. The following signatories are geographically too small to display on the
map: Andorra, Cabo Verde, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and
Palau. Further note that the borders shown on this map are not intended to be exhaustive
and do not imply official endorsement.
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160
4.1 The Group of Friends of the 2021 Global Development Initiative (GDI)
The list of the Group of Friends includes all countries that have been verified to have
taken part in one or more of the following meetings: virtual launch meeting of the
Group of Friends of the GDI on January 20, 2022; high-level virtual meeting of the
group on May 9, 2022; ministerial meeting of the group on September 20, 2022.
Further note that the borders shown on this map are not intended to be exhaustive
and do not imply official endorsement.
4.2 African views on which country provides the best model for development, 2019/2021, percent
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on Afrobarometer, “Analyse
Online,” n.a.: Afrobarometer, 2022, https://perma.cc/4B5R-CJFP. The data reflects
the results of the 8th round of surveys (2019/2021), which covered 34 countries,
including Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Senegal, Nigeria, Côte
d’Ivoire, Togo, Botswana, Guinea, Niger, Gabon, Sudan, Kenya, Cameroon, Zambia,
Uganda, Mozambique, Malawi, Lesotho, South Africa, Tunisia, Ghana, Mauritius,
Morocco, Gambia, Cabo Verde, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Liberia,
and Eswatini. The category “former colonial powers” includes the United Kingdom,
France, Portugal, and Germany. Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in
the language of the respondent’s choice.
4.3 Covid-19 vaccine doses supplied to the African continent by producing economy, millions
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on WTO and IMF, “WTO-IMF
Covid-19 Vaccine Tracker,” Geneva/Washington, DC: WTO/IMF, May 31, 2022, https://
perma.cc/Y37Q-K4HE. The database was last updated on May 31, 2022. South Africa’s
“other supply” to the African continent comprises domestic supply and supply via
the African Vaccine Acquisition Trust (AVAT). AVAT aims to secure vaccine doses to
complement initiatives such as COVAX.
5.1 Crude oil and natural gas imports to the EU and developing Asia, by origin and scenario,
2021, 2030, 2050, exajoules
Data and illustration based on “World Energy Outlook 2022,” Paris: IEA, October 2022,
https://perma.cc/6T2W-28SZ, figure 1.14, 54. The figures for 2050 were provided by
Tae-Yoon Kim, Energy Analyst at the IEA. The Stated Policies Scenario (STEPS)
describes how the energy system evolves when current policy settings are retained.
The Announced Pledges Scenario (APS) illustrates how the energy system evolves
when governments achieve all transition targets on time and in full. Developing Asia
covers the Asia-Pacific regional grouping excluding Australia, Japan, Korea, and New
Zealand. The Asia-Pacific regional grouping includes Southeast Asia (with Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
and Viet Nam) as well as Australia, Bangladesh, North Korea, India, Japan, Korea,
Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and other
Asia-Pacific countries and territories. The Middle East includes Bahrain, Iran, Iraq,
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161
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen. North America covers Canada, Mexico, and the US.
5.2 Production and trade of hydrogen and derivatives for key regions and countries, by 2050,
million tons
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data provided by McKinsey
Company and based on the report “Global Hydrogen Flows: Hydrogen Trade As a Key
Enabler For Efficient Decarbonization,” Hydrogen Council and McKinsey Company,
October 2022, https://perma.cc/7NXQ-DA9U. The estimates are based on a net zero
scenario (global temperature rise to 1.5 to 1.6 degrees above pre-industrial levels) and refer
to hydrogen, ammonia, methanol, synthetic kerosene, and hydrogen used in green
steel. Europe covers the EU, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland. The Gulf
region includes Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Latin America
covers the Americas excluding the US, Canada, and Mexico. Chile accounts for most of
Latin America’s hydrogen exports. North Africa includes Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Alge-
ria, and Tunisia. “Other African countries” covers all African countries not included
in the category North Africa. Namibia and South Africa account for the net exports.
Southeast Asia includes Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Viet Nam.
5.3 Critical minerals supply chains, selected minerals and indicators
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data from the IEA and the
US Geological Survey. Data on the critical minerals needs for clean-energy technologies
are based on “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions,” Paris: IEA,
May 2021, https://perma.cc/6W4R-SQRE, 45. The figures for the rise in demand were
provided by Tae-Yoon Kim, Energy Analyst at the IEA, and have been updated by the
IEA in the context of the report “World Energy Outlook 2022,” Paris: IEA, October 2022,
https://perma.cc/6T2W-28SZ. Note that the rise in demand is calculated by weight.
The data on the top three countries in mining is based on “Mineral Commodity
Summaries 2022,” Reston, US Geological Survey, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2022.
The data on the top three countries in processing is based on “Share of Top Three Pro-
ducing Countries in Total Processing of Selected Minerals and Fossil Fuels, 2019,”
Paris: IEA, 2019, https://perma.cc/S3TM-L86F.
6.1 Growth of China’s nuclear arsenal, 2010-2021, number of warheads
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on data published by Hans M.
Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Matt Korda in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
and SIPRI Yearbook. For the data on 2010, see Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen,
“Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66:6 (2010), 134–141,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340210387046, 139. For the data on 2011, see Hans M.
Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 67:6 (2011), 81–87, https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340211426630, 85. For the data on
2012, see Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Pursuits, 2012,” Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists 68:1 (2012), 94–98, https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340211433025, 96.
For the data on 2013, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces,
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162
2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69:6 (2013), 79–85, https://doi.org/10.1177/
0096340213508632, 80. For the data on 2014, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S.
Norris, “Worldwide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 70:5 (2014), 96–108, https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340214547619, 97. For the data on
2015, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2015,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 71:4 (2015), 77–84, https://doi.org/10.1177/0096340215591247, 78.
For the data on 2016, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear
Forces, 2016,” BulletinoftheAtomicScientists 72:4 (2016), 205–211, https://doi.org/10.1080
/00963402.2016.1194054, 206. For the data on 2017, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert
S. Norris, “Worldwide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2017,” Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 73:5 (2017), 289–297, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995, 294. For the
data on 2018, see Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2018,”
BulletinoftheAtomicScientists 74:4 (2018), 289–295, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018
.1486620, 290. For the data on 2019, see Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese
Nuclear Forces, 2019,” BulletinoftheAtomicScientists 75:4 (2019), 171–178, https://doi.org/10
.1080/00963402.2019.1628511, 172. For the data on 2020, see Hans M. Kristensen and
Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76:6
(2020), 443–457, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432, 444. For the data on
2021, see Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2021,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 77:6 (2021), 318–336, https://doi.org/10.1080
/00963402.2021.1989208, 320. For the data on 2022, see Hans M. Kristensen and
Matt Korda, “World Nuclear Forces,” in: Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (ed.), SIPRI Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmament and International
Security. Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022, 341–
432, https://perma.cc/4L53-L2SF, 342.
6.2 Nuclear missile silos in China, 2022
Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on articles published by Hans M.
Kristensen, Matt Korda, Scott Lafoy, Decker Eveleth, Rod Lee, and Joby Warrick. For the
data on the pre-2019 silos at PLARF Bases 63 and 66 see Hans M. Kristensen and Matt
Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 76:6 (2020), 443–
457, https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432, 448-450. For the data on the
newly discovered suspected missile silos at PLARF Base 66 see Scott Lafoy and Decker
Eveleth, “Possible ICBM Modernization Underway at Sundian,” n.a.: Arms Control
Wonk, February 5, 2020, https://perma.cc/8H57-HK3Z. For the data on the suspected
silos at the Jilantai training area, see Hans M. Kristensen, “New Missile Silo and DF-41
Launchers Seen in Chinese Nuclear Missile Training Area,” n.a.: Federation of American
Scientists, September 3, 2019, https://perma.cc/BD6E-WAAN; Hans M. Kristensen,
“China’s Expanding Missile Training Area: More Silos, Tunnels, and Support Facilities,”
n.a.: Federation of American Scientists, February 24, 2021, https://perma.cc/E7FY-QJGH.
A suspected silo was first discovered at the Jilantai training area by Hans M. Kristensen
in September 2019. In February 2021, he discovered 15 more in the same area. For the
data on the suspected silos at the Yumen missile silo field see Joby Warrick, “China
Is Building More Than 100 New Missile Silos in its Western Desert, Analysts Say,”
The Washington Post, June 30, 2021, https://perma.cc/BDA2-2EXJ. For the data on the
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163
suspected silos at the Hami missile field see Matt Korda and Hans M. Kristensen,
“China Is Building a Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field,” n.a.: Federation of American
Scientists, July 26, 2021, https://perma.cc/P65T-WG7Y. For the data on the suspected
silos at the Ordos missile silo field see Rod Lee, “PLA Likely Begins Construction of
an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Silo Site Near Hanggin Banner,” n.a.: China
Aerospace Studies Institute, August 12, 2021, https://perma.cc/4HKF-RSSQ. Please
note that the boundaries shown on this map are not intended to be exhaustive and
do not imply official endorsement.
6.3 Global nuclear order, 2022
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Felix Lemmer
from the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School. For data on which
states possess nuclear weapons see Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “World
Nuclear Forces,” in: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (ed.), SIPRI
Yearbook 2022: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Stockholm:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022, 341–432, https://perma.cc
/4L53-L2SF, 342. For data on which nuclear weapon states are party to the NPT see UN
Office for Disarmament, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” UN
Office for Disarmament Affairs, July 1, 1968, https://perma.cc/VU5Z-ZH4A. For data on
nuclear weapon host states see Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States
Nuclear Weapons, 2022,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 78:3 (2022), 162-184, https://
doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2062943, 176. For data on which states are under or
soon to be under a nuclear umbrella see NATO, “NATO Member Countries,” NATO, Au-
gust 31, 2020, https://perma.cc/C76T-WPU8; NATO, “Accession Talks and Signature of
the Accession Protocols of Finland and Sweden,” Press Release, July 4, 2022, https://
perma.cc/N6ES-QKZD; National Museum Australia, “ANZUS Treaty,” Australia National
Museum, September 19, 2022, https://perma.cc/J5Y5-B4US; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Japan, “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United
States of America,” Washington, DC: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 19,
1960, https://perma.cc/9VYV-RFGT; U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation With Korea,” U.S. Department of State, January 20,
2021, https://perma.cc/TQ4N-XHCR. For data on which states are part of a Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone or are party to the TPNW, see UN Office for Disarmament Affairs,
“Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” New York: UN Office for Disarmament
Affairs, July 7, 2017, https://perma.cc/F75D-FMJK; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs,
“Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,”
New York: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, February 14, 1967, https://perma.cc/P83Z-
UF2G; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,”
New York: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, August 6, 1985, https://perma.cc/42R3-
4QRW; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone,” New York: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, December 15, 1995,
https://perma.cc/94N2-8S9K; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “African Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Treaty,” New York: UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, April 11, 1996,
https://perma.cc/CGE6-VJBQ; UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Treaty on a
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia,” New York: UN Office for Disarmament
LIST OF FIGURES

164
Affairs, September 8, 2006, https://perma.cc/ASR6-FLRH. Please note that the
boundaries shown on this map are not intended to be exhaustive and do not imply
official endorsement.
6.4 Nuclear status, 2022
Data and illustration provided to the Munich Security Conference by Felix Lemmer
from the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School. In addition to the
sources used for Figure 6.3, the graphics rely on data from the R package Rnaturalearth
that stems from the year 2017 to calculate the population of the states in each category.
LIST OF FIGURES

165
Image Sources
Alan Santos/PR/ Palácio do Planalto
P. 17 (Xi), 77
Bloomberg via Getty Images
P. 22 (Lee), 108 (Prempeh),
108 (Lindner)
Dimitris Papamitsos/GR
Premierminister
P. 29, 116
Florian Gaertner via Getty Images
P. 99 (Rehman)
Kevin Dietsch via Getty Images
P. 110
Michailidis/Shutterstock
P. 90
MSC/Balk
P. 27, 80, 88
MSC/Barth
P. 19 (Blinken)
MSC/Hildenbrand
P. 23 (Jaishankar), 81 (Momen),
91 (Mushikiwabo), 99 (Miliband)
MSC/Kaller
P. 95
MSC/Koerner
P. 109
MSC/Kleinschmidt
P. 19 (Kishida)
MSC/Kopatsch
P. 118
MSC/Oellermann
P. 79 (Weyand)
MSC/Preiss
P. 64
MSC/Rehle
P. 91 (Mahamat)
MSC/Schulze
P. 94
MSC/Simon
P. 106
Thomas Trutschel via Getty Images
P. 100
“Wang Wenbin” by 中国新闻网/
licensed under Creative Commons
Attribution 3.0 Unported.
P. 71
“Alvin Botes 077A7226” by US Embassy
South Africa under CC BY 2.0
P. 122
All other images: MSC/Kuhlmann
Book and report covers
Allen Lane; Brookings Institution;
Carnegie Europe; Chatham House;
ECFR; GMF; Knopf Publishing;
McKinsey Global Institute; MERICS;
Oxford University Press; Polity
Press; Princeton University Press;
Public Affairs; Simon Schuster;
SIPRI
IMAGE SOURCES

166
List of Abbreviations
Announced Pledges Scenario
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Belt and Road Initiative
Chinese Communist Party
carbon dioxide
27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access
critical raw materials
Digital Silk Road
European Union
electric vehicles
Group of Seven of the world’s advanced economies
Global Development Initiative
The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
International Energy Agency
International Monetary Fund
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
Inflation Reduction Act
International Telecommunications Union
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran nuclear deal)
low-income countries
low- and middle-income countries
liquefied natural gas
Munich Security Conference
Munich Security Index
Munich Security Report
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New Internet Protocol
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty)
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
Official Development Assistance
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
group of 23 oil-producing countries, consisting of OPEC and non-OPEC members
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment
People’s Liberation Army
rare earth elements
Stated Policies Scenario
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
EU-US Trade and Technology Council
APS
ASEAN
BRI
CCP
CO2
COP27
COVAX
CRMs
DSR
EU
EVs
G7
GDI
FOCAC
IEA
IMF
INF Treaty
IRA
ITU
JCPOA
LICs
LMICs
LNG
MSC
MSI
MSR
NATO
New IP
New START
NPT
NWFZ
ODA
OPEC
OPEC+
PGII
PLA
REEs
STEPS
TPNW
TTC
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

167
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
United Nations
United Nations Human Rights Council
United States
UN World Food Programme
World Health Organization
World Trade Organization
UDHR
UN
UNHRC
US
WFP
WHO
WTO

168
Dr. Tobias Bunde
is Director of Research
Policy at the Munich
Security Conference and a
Postdoctoral Researcher at
the Centre for International
Security at the Hertie
School in Berlin.
Editorial Team
Team
Natalie Knapp
is a Publications Manager
at the Munich Security
Conference.
Dr. Leonard Schütte
is a Senior Researcher
Conference.
Dr. Sophie Eisentraut
is Head of Research
Publications at the Munich
Security Conference.
Report Team
Isabell Kump
is a Policy Advisor at the
Munich Security Conference.
Felix Kirner
is a Graphic Designer at the
Amadée Mudie-Mantz
is a Special Assistant to
the Chairman and a Policy
Advisor at the Munich
Julia Hammelehle
is a Policy Advisor at the
Johannes Deregowski
is a Working Student at the
Jintro Pauly
is a Junior Policy Advisor
Conference.
TEAM

169
169
TEAM
Ambassador
Dr. Christoph Heusgen is
Chairman of the Munich
Editorial Board
Kekst CNC (Munich Security Index)
Bernhard Meising is Co-Chief Executive Officer and Partner at Kekst CNC.
Kevin Soady is a Partner at Kekst CNC.
Dr. Tom Lubbock is a Senior Advisor at Kekst CNC.
James Johnson is a Senior Advisor at Kekst CNC.
Joe Alder is a Research Associate at J.L. Partners.
McKinsey Company (Institutional Partner, Graphic Design, and Production Support)
Nadine Grießmann is a Senior Practice Manager at McKinsey Company.
Katharina Wagner is an Associate Partner at McKinsey Company.
Hannes Fischer is a Fellow Senior Associate at McKinsey Company.
Daniel Abraham is a Fellow Senior Associate at McKinsey Company.
Tanja Barrall is a Creative Associate at McKinsey Company.
Juliane Schäfer is a Senior Media Designer at McKinsey Company.
Julia Rosenfeld is a Client Copy Editor at McKinsey Company.
Dr. Benedikt Franke is
Vice-Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the
Ambassador Boris Ruge
is Vice-Chairman of the
Munich Security
Conference.
The report team would like to thank the entire team at the Munich Security Conference
for their indispensable support in completing this Munich Security Report, especially
Konstantin Griep, Paula Köhler, and Dr. Nicole Koenig.

170
Acknowledgments
This report was made possible by the generous support from many
organizations and their teams. The Munich Security Conference would
like to thank the following organizations for their cooperation:
Centre for International Security at the Hertie School, International
Energy Agency (IEA), International Rescue Committee (IRC), European
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Mercator Institute for China Studies
(MERICS), Global Trade Alert.
We would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their
considerable support:
Nicholas Browne (McKinsey Company), Doris Duschek (Freelance Media
Designer), Fernando Martín Espejo (Global Trade Alert), Richard Gowan
(International Crisis Group), Tae-Yoon Kim (IEA), Felix Lemmer (Centre
for International Security at the Hertie School), David Miliband (IRC),
Amrita Narlikar (GIGA), Sibusiso Nkomo (Afrobarometer), Ken Sofer (IRC),
Thomas Speckmann (Westenergie AG), Jan Weidenfeld (MERICS).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

171
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Disclaimer
The information and data in the Munich Security Report has been obtained
from sources that the authors believe to be reliable, accurate, and trustworthy.
However, we cannot guarantee their accuracy or completeness.
Should you wish to reproduce parts of this Munich Security Report, please
ensure that you acknowledge the original source and consult with the
contributing organization or institution.
This report went to print on January 16, 2023.
Suggested Citation
Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Leonard Schütte,
Julia Hammelehle, Isabell Kump, Amadée Mudie-Mantz, and Jintro Pauly,
“Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision,” Munich: Munich Security
Conference, February 2023, https://doi.org/10.47342/ZBJA9198.

172
No. 4/2022
A Readout From the Munich Leaders Meeting in Bucharest
in November 2022
Munich Security Brief
December 2022
Dark Clouds Over
the Black Sea
No. 3/2022
Insights From the Munich Security Index Special G7 Edition
June 2022
Zeitenwende
for the G7
Latest MSC Publications
Isabell Kump and Leonard Schütte, “Dark Clouds Over the Black Sea:
A Readout From the Munich Leaders Meeting in Bucharest in
November 2022”
Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 4, December 2022,
https://doi.org/10.47342/VJZB9052.
In late November 2022, the MSC held its first formal meeting in Southeastern
Europe – the region most affected by Russia’s war on Ukraine. This Munich
Security Brief summarizes the discussions centering on support for Ukraine,
the Black Sea region, and the implications of the war for the European
security architecture. It includes an updated edition of the “Transatlantic
To-Do List.”
Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Zeitenwende for the G7:
Insights From the Munich Security Index Special G7 Edition”
Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 3, June 2022,
https://doi.org/10.47342/JDIE4364.
As survey data collected for a special edition of the Munich Security Index
shows, Germany is not the only country where people perceive the Russian
invasion of Ukraine as a Zeitenwende – a turning point. This Munich
Security Brief discusses the momentous changes in public opinion in the G7
countries and provides an overview of the challenges facing the G7 in a security
environment shaped by both traditional and nontraditional security risks.
Randolf Carr and Julia Hammelehle, “Building a Transatlantic To-Do
List: A Readout From the Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC,
in May 2022”
Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 2, May 2022,
https://doi.org/10.47342/TGHT8654.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the transatlantic partners showed
remarkable unity. Building on this transatlantic momentum, the discussions
at the Munich Leaders Meeting in Washington, DC, highlighted the need to
develop joint responses to the Zeitenwende. This includes a multitude of
challenges beyond Russia. Maintaining unity, investing in the strength of
democracies, and deepening global partnerships will be vital. This Munich
Security Brief summarizes the discussions at the Munich Leaders Meeting
and the ambitious “Transatlantic To-Do List” that emerged from them.
LATEST MSC PUBLICATIONS

173
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 LATEST PUBLICATIONS
No. 1/2022
A Readout From the Munich Security Conference 2022
February 2022
Unity in a Time
of Upheaval
Turning the Tide
Unlearning Helplessness
February 2022
Sophie Eisentraut, “Unity in a Time of Upheaval: A Readout From the
Munich Security Conference 2022”
Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, February 2022,
https://doi.org/10.47342/JMVD4331.
Overshadowed by the growing threat of a major military conflict in Eastern
Europe, last year’s Munich Security Conference occurred at a particularly
critical moment for European security and international peace. Nonetheless,
as the Munich Security Report 2022 had hoped for, the political leaders
present in Munich actively fought the impression of collective helplessness in
the face of the “Russia crisis” and many other overlapping conflicts. This
Munich Security Brief summarizes the conference’s key takeaways.
Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Randolf Carr,
Julia Hammelehle, Isabell Kump, Luca Miehe, and Amadée Mudie-Mantz,
“Munich Security Report 2022: Turning the Tide – Unlearning
Helplessness”
Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2022,
https://doi.org/10.47342/QAWU4724.
A mounting tide of crises that reinforce each other is threatening to overwhelm
our societies and political systems. The Munich Security Report 2022 explores
the emergence of a sense of “collective helplessness” in the face of a plethora of
global challenges, and stimulates the debate on how it can best be overcome.
Tobias Bunde and Benedikt Franke (eds.), The Art of Diplomacy:
75+ Views Behind the Scenes of World Politics
Berlin: Econ, 2022, ISBN 978-3-430-21077-5.
In this book, renowned companions of Wolfgang Ischinger – including
several current and former heads of state and government – reflect on basic
questions of diplomacy on the occasion of his 75th birthday. Taking the
reader behind the scenes of diplomacy, they reveal their most astonishing
experiences, successes, and failures on the diplomatic stage, and outline
their ideas for the diplomatic handling of unresolved challenges.

174
About
About the Munich Security Conference (MSC)
The Munich Security Conference is the world’s leading forum for debating
international security policy. In addition to its annual flagship conference,
the MSC regularly convenes high-profile events around the world. The MSC
publishes the annual Munich Security Report and other publications on
specific security issues.
About the Munich Security Report (MSR)
Since its first edition in 2015, the Munich Security Report (MSR) has compiled
data, analyses, and maps to illustrate current security policy issues. The
annual flagship report serves as a discussion starter for the Munich Security
Conference in February and is targeted at an expert audience as well as the
interested public. Special editions of the MSR offer deeper analyses of key
actors, regions, or issues.
ABOUT

175
MUNICH SECURITY REPORT 2023 ABOUT
Editorial Board
Ambassador Dr. Christoph Heusgen, Ambassador Boris Ruge,
Dr. Benedikt Franke
Design Concept
MetaDesign
Cover/MSI Design and Layout
Juliane Schäfer and Felix Kirner
Printed by
Königsdruck
Stiftung Münchner Sicherheitskonferenz gGmbH
Karolinenplatz 3
80333 Munich
www.securityconference.org
research@securityconference.org
Visit our app and social media channels:
www.linktr.ee/MunSecConf
Bibliographical Information
Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Leonard Schütte,
Julia Hammelehle, Isabell Kump, Amadée Mudie-Mantz, and Jintro Pauly,
“Munich Security Report 2023: Re:vision,” Munich: Munich Security
Conference, February 2023, https://doi.org/10.47342/ZBJA9198.
DOI: 10.47342/ZBJA9198
ISSN (Print): 2365-2179
ISSN (Online): 2365-2187

Debates about different visions for the future international order are often
abstract and theoretical. By invading Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir
Putin has made the clash of competing visions a brutal and deathly reality.
The world’s liberal democracies are awakening to the challenges posed by
autocratic revisionists, and have taken the first important steps to pushing
back. But for liberal-democratic principles to prevail over the autocratic
variants, democracies must revamp their vision of a desirable international
order. A re-envisioned liberal, rules-based international order is needed to
strengthen democratic resilience in an era of fierce systemic competition
with autocratic regimes. But to make this vision more attractive among the
wider international community and help it win the contest for the future
international order, democracies must also take into account legitimate
criticism and concerns among the wider international community.
Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Leonard Schütte, Julia Hammelehle,
Isabell Kump, Amadée Mudie-Mantz, and Jintro Pauly, “Munich Security Report 2023:
Re:vision,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2023,
https://doi.org/10.47342/ZBJA9198.
securityconference.org

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