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A Survey on Security in Network
Functions Virtualization Prepared by:
Sandra Rotaru (101053527)
Nisarg Shah (101060103)
 Introduction
 NFV vs SDN vs Traditional Network
 NFV Architecture
 Security attributes
 Threats
| Network function-specific threats
| Generic virtualization threats
 References
Outline
Introduction
 NFV is a bundle of opportunities with some core challenges.
 NFV completely disassociates the functions of the network from
its equipment.
 VNF is a software version of various network functions.
Advantages
 Operation at the requirement of the user.
 No installation of expensive hardware.
 Create and discontinue on demand
NFV vs Traditional Network
 Reduced equipment costs.
 Improved operating performance and operational
efficiency.
 Optimized network configuration and resource
allocation.
 Flexible network function deployment and dynamic
operation.
 Reduced energy consumption
NFV vs SDN
 Highly Complementary for scalable, agile, and
innovative networks.
 Positioned strategically with the aid of a active
virtual/physical Infrastructure to allocate a network
service.
 NFV is applicable to both data and control planes
 SDN is a product which separates control plane and
the data plane.
 Productively transport of data and fine-grained control
of network management and services.
NFV Architecture
Figure : NFV Architectural Frame work[2]
Security attributes
 Security of network is inversely proportional to the
value of network.
 Adding more layers to the network means more
chances of attack.
 Single point of failure.
 Make exploitation expensive so only reasonable risk
remains.
 CIAAA acronym should be fulfilled
Threat categories
 network-function specific threats (spoofing, sniffing and denial of service)
 virtualization targeted theats
| infrastructure
| VNF specific
| user targeted
Figure 1:- VNF Threat Classification[1]
Network function-specific threats
Private NFV Model
Network Provider owns the NFS, service portal, cloud.
No external user except the various subsidiary of the carrier
unit.
Challenges
Majority of threat from the insider
Configuration error can lead network function open to public
internet.
Exploits caused by flaws in virtualization software and
vulnerabilities of image files
Solution
Role-based access control[5]
Application of the principles of the “least privilege” and
“separation of duties”
Network function-specific threats
Hybrid NFV deployment model
Each model add security threats to those in the previous
model.
Network function like CDN , VNFs can be accessed via a portal
by third party so lead to additional vector of threat on carrier
network.
Challenges
Bargain of a public-facing network function, result into
escalate the threat.
Key escrow
Solution
Employing security zoning, hypervisor introspection and
analytics.
Hardware security modules (HSM).
Virtualization threats
Figure : General virtualization threats [1]
Infrastructure threats
 Operational interface
| NICs with programmable cards - Virtual
switch implemented partly in the
hypervisor
| Allows attacker to trap the packets of a
victim host or generate the packets
which lead to network congestion or
packet retransmission
| Solution: A secure packet processing
system that monitors the instruction
level operations of the packet processor
Figure : virtualized switch [6]
Infrastructure threats
 Malicious provider
| NaaS (Network as a Service) – DoS and
extract secret information
| Example: a live video streaming service
that can be eavesdropped, reproduced
and redirected to a set of unauthorized
users.
| Solution: Hypervisor detects excessive
resource consumption and restartins
malicious virtual network
Figure : virtualized switch [6]
 Misuse of resources
| Resource Freeing Attacks (RFA) and Resource consumption attacks
| Example: a live video streaming service that can be eavesdropped, reproduced and
redirected to a set of unauthorized users.
| Solution: Hypervisor detects excessive resource consumption and restrains malicious
virtual network
Infrastructure threats
Table 1:- NFV infrastructure – security challenges and solutions[4]
Security management framework
 NFV Security Manager - security policy
planning, enforcement and validation
 Virtualized Security Functions
| Coupled and decoupled security for
VNFs
| Service centric deployment
 Security Element Manager – manages
VSFs
 NFVI Security Function – hypervisor
based security management
VNF threats
 Outsourcing workload to a third party
| Issue: attacker gets control of the service and may compromise confidentiality.
Each of the three entities may pose this risk.
| Example: cloud security services for mobile devices – opportunity for malware
injection
| Solution: control the malicious entry to avoid malware spreading
 Live migration – relocating VNFs without service interruption
| Issue: attacker gets control of the service it is being migrated between
hypervisors
| Example: Initiating unauthorized migration of a large group of VMs to the victim’s
machine or migration of a VM from the victim, taking control of it.
| Solution: virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) can use TLS protocol to provide
confidentiality and authentication
 Noisy neighbor
| Issue: A VN F instance trying to exhaust all the resources
| Solution: Logical isolation - improves the control and manageability of a shared
infrastructure system
VNF Threats
 Side-channel
| Issue: attacker gets control of the service and may compromise confidentiality. Each
of the three entities may pose this risk.
| Example: 1. an attacker VM can extract a private ElGamal decryption key
from a co-resident victim VM running Gnu Privacy Guard
(GnuPG) [7]
2. a process in a side-channel attacks can threaten other
processes running on the same processor, despite partitioning
methods such as memory protection, sandboxing and
virtualization [8]
| Solution: hiding access management from VNFs
Figure : Diagram of the main streps in proposed side channel attack [7]
MANO – Management and Orchestration
Mano Security
 Attacks
| Attacker gets access to the
orchestrator and instantiates a
modified VNF. This can break
access privileges and VNF isolation.
| VNFs are dynamic - managing
modified ones is challenging
| Scaling and elasticity of VNF, pose
security threats
 Solution
| User authentication, user privilege
control, and network configuration
can be predefined
| Security monitoring system – detect
and separate defective VNF
| Storage protection
Security MANO
 Automation of security management,
similarly to VNF MANO
 Enforces security policies for network
services
 May provide security for VNF and for
the physical network
References
[1] Alcatel, “Providing security in NFV, challenges and opportunities”, strategic white paper, May 2014
[2] W. Yang, C. Fung, “A Survey on Security in Network Functions Virtualization”, IEEE NetSoft Conference and
Workshops (NetSoft), pp. 15-19, 2016.
[3] “ETSI Group Specification: Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) Management and Orchestration,” Dec. 2014.
[4] D. Cotroneo, L. De Simone, A. K. Iannillo, A. Lanzaro, R. Natella, F. Jiang, and P. Wang, “Network Function
Virtualization: Challenges and Directions for Reliability Assurance,” in ISSREW, Nov. 2014.
[5] I. Faynberg, H. Lu, and H. Ristock. “On dynamic access control in Web 2.0 and beyond: Trends and technologies,”
Bell Labs Technical Journal, vol. 16, no. 2 (2011), 199-218.
[6] Y. Luo, E. Murray, T.L. Ficarra, Accelerated virtual switching with programmable
NICs for scalable data center networking, in: Proceedings of the
Second ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Virtualized Infrastructure Systems and
Architectures, 2010, pp. 65–72.
[7] Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M.K. Reiter, T. Ristenpart, Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys, in:
2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS’12, 2012, pp. 305–316.
[8] D.A. Osvik, A. Shamir, E. Tromer, Cache attacks and countermeasures: The case of AES, in: Proceedings of the
Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology, CT-RSA’06, 2006, pp. 1–20.

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NFV Security PPT

  • 1. A Survey on Security in Network Functions Virtualization Prepared by: Sandra Rotaru (101053527) Nisarg Shah (101060103)
  • 2.  Introduction  NFV vs SDN vs Traditional Network  NFV Architecture  Security attributes  Threats | Network function-specific threats | Generic virtualization threats  References Outline
  • 3. Introduction  NFV is a bundle of opportunities with some core challenges.  NFV completely disassociates the functions of the network from its equipment.  VNF is a software version of various network functions. Advantages  Operation at the requirement of the user.  No installation of expensive hardware.  Create and discontinue on demand
  • 4. NFV vs Traditional Network  Reduced equipment costs.  Improved operating performance and operational efficiency.  Optimized network configuration and resource allocation.  Flexible network function deployment and dynamic operation.  Reduced energy consumption
  • 5. NFV vs SDN  Highly Complementary for scalable, agile, and innovative networks.  Positioned strategically with the aid of a active virtual/physical Infrastructure to allocate a network service.  NFV is applicable to both data and control planes  SDN is a product which separates control plane and the data plane.  Productively transport of data and fine-grained control of network management and services.
  • 6. NFV Architecture Figure : NFV Architectural Frame work[2]
  • 7. Security attributes  Security of network is inversely proportional to the value of network.  Adding more layers to the network means more chances of attack.  Single point of failure.  Make exploitation expensive so only reasonable risk remains.  CIAAA acronym should be fulfilled
  • 8. Threat categories  network-function specific threats (spoofing, sniffing and denial of service)  virtualization targeted theats | infrastructure | VNF specific | user targeted Figure 1:- VNF Threat Classification[1]
  • 9. Network function-specific threats Private NFV Model Network Provider owns the NFS, service portal, cloud. No external user except the various subsidiary of the carrier unit. Challenges Majority of threat from the insider Configuration error can lead network function open to public internet. Exploits caused by flaws in virtualization software and vulnerabilities of image files Solution Role-based access control[5] Application of the principles of the “least privilege” and “separation of duties”
  • 10. Network function-specific threats Hybrid NFV deployment model Each model add security threats to those in the previous model. Network function like CDN , VNFs can be accessed via a portal by third party so lead to additional vector of threat on carrier network. Challenges Bargain of a public-facing network function, result into escalate the threat. Key escrow Solution Employing security zoning, hypervisor introspection and analytics. Hardware security modules (HSM).
  • 11. Virtualization threats Figure : General virtualization threats [1]
  • 12. Infrastructure threats  Operational interface | NICs with programmable cards - Virtual switch implemented partly in the hypervisor | Allows attacker to trap the packets of a victim host or generate the packets which lead to network congestion or packet retransmission | Solution: A secure packet processing system that monitors the instruction level operations of the packet processor Figure : virtualized switch [6]
  • 13. Infrastructure threats  Malicious provider | NaaS (Network as a Service) – DoS and extract secret information | Example: a live video streaming service that can be eavesdropped, reproduced and redirected to a set of unauthorized users. | Solution: Hypervisor detects excessive resource consumption and restartins malicious virtual network Figure : virtualized switch [6]  Misuse of resources | Resource Freeing Attacks (RFA) and Resource consumption attacks | Example: a live video streaming service that can be eavesdropped, reproduced and redirected to a set of unauthorized users. | Solution: Hypervisor detects excessive resource consumption and restrains malicious virtual network
  • 14. Infrastructure threats Table 1:- NFV infrastructure – security challenges and solutions[4]
  • 15. Security management framework  NFV Security Manager - security policy planning, enforcement and validation  Virtualized Security Functions | Coupled and decoupled security for VNFs | Service centric deployment  Security Element Manager – manages VSFs  NFVI Security Function – hypervisor based security management
  • 16. VNF threats  Outsourcing workload to a third party | Issue: attacker gets control of the service and may compromise confidentiality. Each of the three entities may pose this risk. | Example: cloud security services for mobile devices – opportunity for malware injection | Solution: control the malicious entry to avoid malware spreading  Live migration – relocating VNFs without service interruption | Issue: attacker gets control of the service it is being migrated between hypervisors | Example: Initiating unauthorized migration of a large group of VMs to the victim’s machine or migration of a VM from the victim, taking control of it. | Solution: virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) can use TLS protocol to provide confidentiality and authentication  Noisy neighbor | Issue: A VN F instance trying to exhaust all the resources | Solution: Logical isolation - improves the control and manageability of a shared infrastructure system
  • 17. VNF Threats  Side-channel | Issue: attacker gets control of the service and may compromise confidentiality. Each of the three entities may pose this risk. | Example: 1. an attacker VM can extract a private ElGamal decryption key from a co-resident victim VM running Gnu Privacy Guard (GnuPG) [7] 2. a process in a side-channel attacks can threaten other processes running on the same processor, despite partitioning methods such as memory protection, sandboxing and virtualization [8] | Solution: hiding access management from VNFs Figure : Diagram of the main streps in proposed side channel attack [7]
  • 18. MANO – Management and Orchestration Mano Security  Attacks | Attacker gets access to the orchestrator and instantiates a modified VNF. This can break access privileges and VNF isolation. | VNFs are dynamic - managing modified ones is challenging | Scaling and elasticity of VNF, pose security threats  Solution | User authentication, user privilege control, and network configuration can be predefined | Security monitoring system – detect and separate defective VNF | Storage protection Security MANO  Automation of security management, similarly to VNF MANO  Enforces security policies for network services  May provide security for VNF and for the physical network
  • 19. References [1] Alcatel, “Providing security in NFV, challenges and opportunities”, strategic white paper, May 2014 [2] W. Yang, C. Fung, “A Survey on Security in Network Functions Virtualization”, IEEE NetSoft Conference and Workshops (NetSoft), pp. 15-19, 2016. [3] “ETSI Group Specification: Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) Management and Orchestration,” Dec. 2014. [4] D. Cotroneo, L. De Simone, A. K. Iannillo, A. Lanzaro, R. Natella, F. Jiang, and P. Wang, “Network Function Virtualization: Challenges and Directions for Reliability Assurance,” in ISSREW, Nov. 2014. [5] I. Faynberg, H. Lu, and H. Ristock. “On dynamic access control in Web 2.0 and beyond: Trends and technologies,” Bell Labs Technical Journal, vol. 16, no. 2 (2011), 199-218. [6] Y. Luo, E. Murray, T.L. Ficarra, Accelerated virtual switching with programmable NICs for scalable data center networking, in: Proceedings of the Second ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Virtualized Infrastructure Systems and Architectures, 2010, pp. 65–72. [7] Y. Zhang, A. Juels, M.K. Reiter, T. Ristenpart, Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys, in: 2012 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS’12, 2012, pp. 305–316. [8] D.A. Osvik, A. Shamir, E. Tromer, Cache attacks and countermeasures: The case of AES, in: Proceedings of the Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology, CT-RSA’06, 2006, pp. 1–20.