Ontorturefirstdraft

Torture, Evil indeed
Ethics, Law and Society
Briane Chanelle Knight
12-15-2008
The tortuous actions of pulling out entrails, partial or total sensory deprivation and
repeated simulations of drowning for prolonged periods of time seem to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Nevertheless, some purport that torture is an evil necessity.1 In “What’s
Wrong with Torture?,” David Sussman suggests that while torture may not constitute an absolute
moral wrong, the act of torture is not easily justified. Sussman suggests that the very nature of
torture makes it distinctive in that the act is detrimental to the autonomy, and most importantly,
the dignity of the victim. He states that torture “bears an especially high burden of justification,
greater in degree and different in kind from even that of killing.”2 Thus, the harm to the victim’s
dignity coupled with the intentional infliction of pain, Sussman adds, is unmatched and thus
morally special.
In evaluating arguments against torture, Sussman suggests that both Utilitarian and
Kantian approaches regarding the ethics of torture are incomplete in that they fail to fully
account for all the certain distinctive aspects of torture. Without very much difficulty, one could
concede that Sussman’s claims against Utilitarianism, in regards to the importance of pain are
insufficient. Sussman, however, overstates his claim when he suggests that the Kantian approach
is incomplete because “it only provides a case against torture on the grounds that torture uses an
individual a means” (6). His argument against Kantianism is too focused on the victim’s
experience of pain. In addition, his overemphasis on the pain of the victim is not necessary to the
conclusion that torture is morally special: a distinctive civil and criminal assault against
humanity that we ought not to commit. This essay will focus on how the Kantian approach does
not fail to highlight the moral limits of torture.

Sussman’s argument is too focused on the victim’s experience of pain; this is a staple of
his argument wherein he concludes Kantian approach is incomplete. I am not considering
whether or specific types of torture or more egregious than others. Nor will I discuss whether or
not there are specific circumstances for which torture would be seen as permissible, necessary
and/or or justified. I will primarily focus on explaining what factors or elements of torture,
regardless of the circumstance, are morally special and distinctive.
Sussman’s Kantian approach to Torture
Sussman suggests that the Kantian moral theory approach is most apt to explain the moral
significance of torture wherein Kantians argue that torture is adverse to the humanity and the
autonomy of the victim. He purports that unlike Kantianism, Utilitarianism is not sufficient in
addressing the moral significance of torture. Utilitarianism, he suggests, has no particular special
focus on the badness of harm; no focus on the fact that torture “hurts.”3 For Sussman, the special
moral significance of torture stems from the distinctive structure of the torturer-victim
relationship that he suggests is intrinsically objectionable and not just bad because of its effects.
One could, however, argue that the effects of torture (harm) are sufficient to make torture
intrinsically objectionable. Given the harmful effects torture has on those who torture and also
those who are tortured (not equally), it may seem like such inhumane interpersonal relationships
are morally objectionable. Yet, his contentions are not focused on a mere moral objection to
torture. He suggests that a focus on harm are not distinctively a focus on torture; the effects of
harm are characteristic of warfare and aerial bombardment and thus is not specific to the moral
categorical condemnation of torture.4 Nevertheless, Sussman suggests that the Kantian approach
is incomplete because it only entails objecting to torture on the grounds that the act uses an
individual as a means.; he states, “For the orthodox Kantian, what is fundamentally objectionable

about torture is that the victim, and the victim’s agency, is put to use in ways to which she does
not or could not reasonably consent.”5
Sussman suggests that like Utilitarianism, what Kantian moral theory fails to include,
which is essential to the special moral wrongness of torture, is the interpersonal structure of
torture and its impact on the dignity of an individual. He claims that the Kantian approach is
incomplete in that torture unjustifiably undermines more than just one’s rational self-governance.
Moreover, he suggests that there is a significant moral difference between use of an individual as
means as compared to one being used “through one’s own distressing affects and bodily
responses.”6 He claims that the moral significance of torture is that in addition to disrespecting
one’s dignity, torture turns one’s dignity against itself. Furthermore, Sussman describes the
effects on the victim of torture as one in which the victim, even though powerless and/or
defenseless, is forced to be complicit in their own torture. Thus, pain plays a significant role in
that it is not able to be ordered or commanded, which leaves the victim passive to their own
physical pain and not constrained nor controlled by rational judgment. He describes this painful
experience as one of self-betrayal when it is the case that one’s dignity is detrimental to their
self-dignity.
Special moral significance of torture?
An essential element of torture is the felt experience of pain, fear and uncertainty-an
element that Sussman suggests is not necessarily what could potentially make torture morally
significant. He argues that torture, specifically, entails a social setting and relationship between
the torturer and the victim. This social setting is characterized by the victim’s realization of their
powerlessness, dependency and vulnerability due to their confinement; Sussman states that the

victim “must see herself as being unable to put up any real moral or legal resistance to her
tormentor.”7 His comment on a victim’s lack of inability to utilize “moral and legal resistance”
serves as a way to create an association between the moral significance of torture with the moral
significance of rape. One can give Sussman the benefit of a doubt in assuming that he means to
suggest that the victim must see herself as being unable to put up a successful resistance, morally
or legally, at the time of confinement. It would be problematic if Sussman were to suggest
otherwise since there would be no reason to believe that it is necessary for the victim to perceive
themselves as incapable, even after the fact, of putting up moral or legal resistance to their
tormentor. If Sussman is suggesting this, then maybe he is alluding to the possibility that it is not
possible for the damage done to the victim to be proportional to any damage that could be done
to the perpetrator. If my contentions are true, this begs the question of how significant the role of
autonomy, self-governance and dignity is in regards to the moral significance of torture.
Sussman’s belief that torture as an attack on agency could still hold without a particular
focus on the harm to the victim’s dignity. In regards to Sussman analogy of torture and rape,
even though it is true that the social setting and relationships between a perpetrator and a victim
are similar in both rape and torture cases, there is a relevant distinction that needs to be made. If
one is going to discuss what makes torture an absolute moral wrong, then it seems more wise to
focus intensely on the social setting. The social setting and relationship in a case of torture is
distinct primarily in the fact that the setting would definitely require some acts and behavior of
the torturer that are significantly distinct from what an act of rape would require of the rapist.
These requirements I will elaborate on later in conjunction with what is specifically required of
one who is captive and being tortured.
The politics of Pain

I will concede that pain includes, as Sussman suggests, an experience that is in and
outside of one’s self and also that pain motivates one’s agency. There is, however, no reason to
believe that pain motivates one’s agency in any declarative way, other than an initial imperative-
like call for a relief from one’s pain. Thus, it seems that Sussman overstates his claims about
what pain intrinsically motivates an agent to do when he suggests that “What the torturer does is
to take his victim’s pain, and through it his body, and make it begin to express the torturer’s
will.”8 Granted, the victim’s pain is probably consistent with what the torturer desires the victim
to feel especially in regards to interrogational torture and torture as corporal punishment.
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the will of the torturer includes more than just a desire for the
victim to feel pain. I am not claiming that there exist aims of the torturer that are more important
than inflicting pain; I am suggesting that there are other aims. These other aims, especially for
interrogational torture, include acquiring confessions or other information considered pertinent.
The torturer hopes that the deliberate infliction of pain will lead to the victim to divulge the
information that he demands regardless of whether that information is credible or not.
Specifically for interrogational torture, the accuracy or credibility of information can be difficult
to verify because the information is not entirely pertinent or is applicable only to possible future
incidents or incidents that have already passed.
The coercive power of relief
I agree with Sussman when he suggests that pain “pleads a case or provides an excuse for
giving in.”9 While pleading can be extremely coercive, as Sussman suggests, not all torture is
coercion. Moreover, it does not seem to be the case that pain internally motivates one to,
specifically, divulge pertinent information. Pain from torture does cause one to suffer from their
actions. For both the innocent torture victim and the individual who does have access to the

knowledge that the torturer desires, relief is contingent on their responses to their torturer. Pain
leads to a confession of suffering (EXPAND-whats wrong with this). But it does not lead to a
confession of anything and everything the victim may desire not to express. Thus, I don’t think it
is fair to claim that one is experiencing or perceives one’s own actions as a form of self-betrayal
by going against their body and feelings. To be more specific, while torture is definitely an attack
on one’s dignity, I don’t think that the attack of torture necessarily stems from an internal
betrayal.
Moral Significance of Torture
Sussman overstates his claim in order to advance his argument that torture is completely
detrimental to one’s dignity. He suggests that the effects of torture stem from within, wherein
there is a part of the victim that is a “surrogate of the torturer.” He further asserts that the
surrogate does more than advance a particular demand for the desired information or confession;
he purports that the surrogate demands complete submission. But one should be highly skeptical,
specifically, about Sussman’s use of universal signifiers and his statements on the effect of the
torturer-victim relationship when he states the following:
Rather, the victim’s whole perspective is given over to that surrogate, to the
extent that the only thing that matters to her is pleasing this other person, who
appears infinitely distant, important, inscrutable, powerful, and free. The will of
the torturer is thus cast as something like the source of all value in his victim’s
world, a unique object of fascination from which the victim cannot hope to free
himself. The torturer thereby makes himself into a kind of perverted God and
forces his victim into a grotesque parody of love and adoration (my emphasis). 10

Here, Sussman’s analysis is too narrow in that it presupposes that the victim’s perspective is
completely dominated by the influence of the torturer. I am not convinced that this is the case for
any and all torture cases. Moreover, I would not be convinced that what he describes is sufficient
to satisfy the moral significance that, intuitively, is ascribed to torture. I am not suggesting that
attacks on one’s dignity do not have a significant role in the perverse nature of torture. I am
solely stating that he overemphasizes the role of dignity to the detriment of his focus on the
dependency, powerlessness and vulnerability created by the interpersonal relationship of the
torturer and the victim. I highly disagree, specifically, with his following claim: “The will of
torturer is thus cast as something like the source of all value in his victim…a unique object of
fascination.” Again, I think it is false to think that the will of the torturer dominates the entire
perspective of the victim. It is the social setting between the captor and the captive that
necessarily dominates the perspective of the victim, but in a way that is slightly distinct from
what Sussman describes.
Torture not completely adverse to agency
Intuition would lead one to believe that part of the victim’s perspective is given over to
that of what Sussman’s describes as the “surrogate.” The other part of both the victim’s
perspective and the victim’s values remain focused on the will of the victim; they remain focused
on relief from pain and freedom. Why is this so? Intuitively, regardless of whether the individual
is a self-defined terrorist, possible but unconfirmed subject (innocent) or enemy combatant,
nobody is going to agree to be confined or tortured. Moreover, nobody is going to initially take
up the will of the torturer (give in) without the creation of ulterior motives or strategies of relief
and/or escape. Granted, one could argue that torture may break one’s will so that the individual is

completely complicit in their own torture; that would be an ordeal, as Sussman suggests, which I
will address in a later passage. But for those who posses any desire to be free from torture of free
from pain, the torturer’s will is valuable in that it provides potential ways to escape for the
victim. Nevertheless, regardless of who the person is, no rational being wants to be tortured.
Individuals may desire pain, but that is not to be confused with a desire for torture. Nor would
any rational being acknowledge that the intensity of pain inflicted on their body is warranted or
justified. I will concede that some individuals who are in the military or members of terrorist
organizations have been trained to resist and endure torture. Nevertheless, even a terrorist of the
“ticking-bomb scenario” will desire to escape because, like Sussman suggests, the imperative
force of pain is characteristic of the human form.
Subjective Tick….Tock… bomb Scenario
Imagine this: I am an avid participant in a high-profile terrorist organization. Let’s say,
because of my high-ranking, I anticipate that if I am caught, I will be tortured for information
regarding a potential attack in London. How could I even begin to comprehend the pain that will
be inflicted on me? I am definitely ready to resist by any means necessary; I might be committed
to killing myself over giving up any information to my captors. I have even attempted to prepare
myself, mentally, for the torture. But nevertheless, intuition tells me that even that preparation
will not be sufficient to counteract the actual torture that I will be put through. Everybody can
guess what torture could entail. The aim of torture is the deliberate and boundless infliction of
pain. The only assumed limitation on interrogational torture would be murder. Every other action
that would not directly result in my death is available to my torturer, who has been trained. For
example, while being tortured, if I seem to be unaffected or even just enduring the pain that my

torturer is intending to inflict on me (especially if I have yet to confess), one can assume that my
torturer will either increase the intensity of harm or try a different and probably more intense
form of harm. For example, let’s say that initially I am forced to stand, handcuffed and with my
feet shackled to an eye bolt in the floor for more than 40 hours and I am exhausted and sleep
deprived. My actions seem to convey a message to my torture. Signs of resistance include
silence, a refusal to confess any information or a refusal to say the “right” information. More
forms of resistance include claiming that I am innocent, claiming that I should not be tortured or
claiming that my pain is unjustified and wrong. I am not divulging anything thus, I am still
resistant. It would be logical, according to the perverse aims of torture, for those holding me
captive to lower my cell temperature to near 50 degrees and routinely douse my cold, exhausted,
sleep deprived, naked body with cold water, as long as this type or treatment was suspected to
not typically result in death (according to my captive’s torture manual. I am not insinuating that
an actual book exists). Let’s say that the pain was becoming too excruciating to bear. I did not
see how anyone could have prepared themselves for this. I started saying that I didn’t know
anything and that I just wanted to go home to my family. Those keeping me captive might bind
me to an inclined board with my feet raised and my head slightly below my feet and then wrap
cellophane over my face and pour water over me. Or my captives might try to use the fact that I
miss my family as a way to coerce me into a confession and then move on to the cellophane and
the water if I still resisted. Why would either of these be acts of the torture? (WHAT) Especially
for interrogational torture, the goal is to get the pertinent information by any means necessary, as
long as it does not directly lead to death. Waterboarding would be an obvious and desirable
option for the torturer who wants to inflict pain, wherein my inevitable gag reflex to simulated
drowning, if anything, would always lead to a plea. 11

My life, in the torturer’s hands
There is no reason to believe that my plea consist of a confession of something other
than pain. But even for those victims who would rather give up their life than give in, water
boarding demands a response; it demands a plea for air, and a sincere plea for one’s life. The
plea for one’s life is characteristic of the coercive influence pain has over the body. However,
pain does not lead one to give their entire perspective up for the torturer. The social setting of
torture and the relationship give substantial reason for the victim to want to please the torturer.
This is consistent with Sussman’s description of the relationship as a “grotesque parody of love
and adoration.” What torture does is put an individual into a setting wherein their entire
environment is capable of being distorted and contorted by another. One would go too far in
assuming that one who is captive and being tortured has no desire or ability to control their
environment. (If given any object or material, a torture victim would attempt to use this object to
the best of their ability in an attempt to sustain, entertain or free themselves). Furthermore, as
Sussman suggests, the victim is knowledgeable that any act they can or try to do will almost
never be of their own (private). The social setting creates dependency. I think what is necessary
to include is that the social setting is highly conducive of expressions of trust. The idea of trust in
torture may seem perverse. It is. But the perverseness of trust in this situation, where trust is
unfortunately unwarranted and inevitably detrimental to the victim because of what torture
entails, is sufficient enough to concede the distinctive nature of torture as an absolute moral
wrong.
The perverse intra/interpersonal structure of Torture
The torture victim is always forced into a situation of optimism and trust. Whether or not
they actually genuinely trust their captive or are just mimicking trust is irrelevant because their

torturer will be the only one to decide whether their captive’s trust is genuine or not. Regardless
of who the captive is (could be the innocent victim or the terrorist who refuses to talk, or even
the individual--terrorist or non-terrorist--who is committed to killing themselves over divulging
information), humans believe that the other person is competent in some way; we believe that
another competent human being will have some boundaries, some restraint or at least some
attribute, characteristic, disposition or virtue that will assist the victim in evading the torturous
situation they have been forced into. Sussman addresses the lack of assurance of life and safety
when he states that the victim’s “only grounds for such beliefs about her tormentors’ ends and
intentions come from how these tormentors choose to present themselves to her.”12 It would not
be wrong to assume that the initial presentation of one’s tormentors, while in captivity, is purely
pejorative. Thus, there is an initial desire to attempt and escape the deliberate pain that the
torturer will inflict. Skeptical? Consider the situation described earlier: the individual who would
rather die than be tortured. Trust in the individual who wants to die, while captive, lies in the fact
that they hope the torturer will go too far. This individual hopes that the torturer will become
reckless in their torture methods as a result of the individual’s resistance. This individual will
have the optimistic view that the torturer would be capable of murdering the captive. This
individual hopes that the torturer will not attempt to save or alleviate the wounds and pains of the
victim. This individual hopes that the torturer will let him/her die. But this will not happen. The
act of letting a torture victim die is adverse to the aims of torture, especially interrogational
torture. Any torturer who wants a confession from such individual will attempt to sustain the life
of this individual even if that person is committed to dying (think of the many cases where
individual’s torture victims are force-fed or where the suicide attempts of captives are
sabotaged). The main goal of torture is not to kill. Granted, it may seem like corporal torture

intends to kill. But, if the aim is to kill through torture methods, then that is objectionable on the
grounds that it is blatant murder: wrongful killing. Or think of the captive who continues to
assert that they are innocent. Or consider the individual who falsely confesses. These captives
hope that the torture will cease when the torturer either gets what information is desired (even if
it is a false confession) or has no more incentive to continue their acts torture (if they are
torturing an individual who does not have the information the torturer desires). Thus, torture
gives no reason not to attempt and mimic expressions of hope and trust because the captive is
entirely vulnerable and open to any possibility that will lead to their freedom13 (unless that
possibility entails divulging information they desire to keep private).
ticking…ticking…ticking….Ticking Bomb
Even if there is information that a captive desires to keep private, this may or may not be
the information desired by the captor. Thus, it is not necessarily the case that attempts at freedom
will involve self-betrayal. Without trust or hope, or ingenuous trust or hope, there is no rational
justification for the victim who is being tortured to believe that divulging even the correct
information will inevitably lead to freedom. This might seem contradictory to what I previously
stated about trust. It is not. Trust in the torturer serves as a mechanism for self-preservation.
There is reason for the victim to trust that the conduct of the torturer can be influenced by
expressions of submission and trust. But, especially for interrogational torture, one hopes that
they are set free. One would, however, not be wrong in assuming that the victim’s freedom is
contingent on the weight of their confession. (It is possible that one may be free from acts of
torture but still held captive wherein there is no reason to believe that one will not be subjected
to, in the future, more forms of torture.) Consider the “ticking-bomb scenario”: a high-profile
terrorist suspected of a potential bombing is captured a month (even days) before the planned

attack. To continue the earlier story, let’s say that I am this terrorist who is tortured on the
whereabouts of the bomb and any other preparations for the attack. I confess. I tell them where
it’s going to be planted, when, where and what my group is about. Authorities prepare to first try
to prevent the planting of the bomb and if they can’t, they will at least know who is attempting to
plant the bomb, where it is and when the attack is supposed to happen. Let’s say, in response to
the fact that I, the terrorist with information regarding the bomb, am in custody or even just
missing, (i.e. my fellow terrorists cannot get in contact with me) the preparations of the attack
are changed. Let’s say the terrorist group even changes the location of the attack (for example,
from an embassy in Britain to one in France). What happens to me? What is to be done with the
terrorist who is held captive? One could conclude that I will be let go since I have already
confessed. Nevertheless, it would be obvious to see why this situation would lead to torture as
corporal punishment wherein I am confined on the grounds that I am a terrorist who may have
knowledge of the identities of other terrorists and other potential acts of terrorism.
Final thoughts: the significance of occupying the position of the tormentor
To conclude: In her article, “Training Torturers: A Critique of The ‘Ticking Bomb’
Argument,” Jessica Wolfendale poses the question of whether the effects of training required to
administer torture are morally wrong; she states that “serious and widespread consequences of
training tortures can be justified by the off-chance that a case fitting highly implausible
requirements of the ticking bomb scenario will in fact arise.” 14 Those who are soldiers trained to
torture are desensitized in order to reduce their empathetic responses to physical suffering. Thus,
they have to be able to withstand the pain and brutality they inflict on others. In addition the
dehumanizing effect torture has on victims serves to the detriment of a sense of responsibility for
the torture. 15 A Chilean ex-torturer described this process as hard; he states the following:

You hide yourself and cry, so nobody can see you. Later on, you don’t cry, you
only feel sad…And after…not wanting to…but wanting to, you start getting used
to it. Yes, definitely, there comes a moment when you feel noting about what you
are doing6
My contention is that torture is boundless; it is entirely perverse. Torture is a situation where the
shift from interrogational torture to corporal torture is expected as a result of what torture
excessively demands from anyone’s agency. The social setting demand excessive inhumane pain
of the victim and also may strategically demands excessive, forms of brutality and inhumane acts
from the torturer. Even though harm to both parties is neither equal nor proportionate, both the
victim and the torture experience a form of pain that is adverse to one’s agency; this is what is
needed to establish torture as an absolute moral wrong.
Endnotes
1Miller, Seumas. 2005. “Is Torture Ever Morally Justifiable?” International Journal of
Philosophy 19.2: p. 186.
2 Sussman, David. “What’s Wrong with Torture?” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2005 (Vol. 33.
No.1) p. 4
3 Sussman, David. “What’s Wrong with Torture?” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2005 (Vol. 33.
No.1) p. 15
4 Sussman is not referring to torture as a separate category in itself but as morally significant and
distinct from
other categories like cruelty.
5 Sussman. p. 14
6 Sussman. p. 19
7 Sussman. p. 7
8.Sussman. p. 26
9 Sussman. p. 21
10 Sussman. p. 24. Italics; my emphasis
11 Pogge, Thomas. March 2008. “Making War on Terrorists Reflections on Harming the
Innocent.” Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1. p. 20-21
12 Sussman. p. 7
13 Becker, L.C. 1996. “Trust as noncognitive security about motives.” Ethics. 107:p 45-46
14 Wolfendale, Jessica. 2006 “Turning torturers: a critique of the ‘ticking bomb” argument.
Social Theory and Practice. 32.2. p. 270
15 Wolfendale. p. 277

16 Wolfendale. p. 288
Bibliography
Becker, L.C. 1996. “Trust as noncognitive security about motives.” Ethics. 107:43-61
Pogge, Thomas. March 2008. “Making War on Terrorists Reflections on Harming the Innocent.”
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1. 1-25
Sussman, David, 2005, “What's Wrong with Torture?”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 33,
1-33.
Wolfendale, Jessica. "Training torturers: a critique of the 'ticking bomb' argument." Social
Theory and Practice 32.2 (April 2006): 269(19). Expanded Academic ASAP. Gale. Tufts
University Library. 12 Dec. 2008

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