Osamas_Legacy.ppt
- 1. OSAMA’S LEGACY: A JIHADI GLOBAL FINANCIAL NETWORK Patricia Levy, PhD Fort Hays State University
- 2. Understand the Man, Understand the Vision Life experiences shape the man – a child of immigrants & wealthy family, academic background in: business & public administration, and economics Radicalized by teachers belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood - a transformation through violence for moderate Muslim regimes to Orthodox Islam (Winer 2003) – mentor Abdullah Azzam at King Abd al-Aziz University (Hamas founder & beginnings of muhajideen fighters in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union (own wealth, donors, Muslim Brotherhood a conduit to transferring of funds raised by Muslim charitable organizations in Gulf states. Until 9/11 seemed to be major part of al- Qaeda’s funding . Meanwhile construction of infrastructure, forming of Arab platoon, soldiering
- 3. Ideology & Funding The shift from traditional to non-traditional illicit funding Insurgent organization funding: Secrecy + propaganda, pose a threat to nation states , global international aim Jihad - institutional worldwide concept + internal organizational structure: e.g. Sept. 1988 – 9 of group’s 15 founders administrative specialists Shura Council – 4 components: military assistance, administrative finance unit, religious issues, media/propaganda + later field commanders for actual attack strategies & execution Budgetary costs: transport, recruitment, training, weaponry, technical equipment, counterfeit documentation, political, financial processing & influence, maintenance of members/martyrs, schools, medical clinics, safe houses, Social media/Information Committee Mentoring & seed money for foreign groups: e.g. Somalia - local members under local authority – Al Shabab
- 6. “The Business of Terror: A Multinational Corporate Model(Vittori,2005) An estimated $35 million + $5-10 million/year Bin Laden decentralizes, funding components & diversifies funding - no single revenue could destroy the organization. Businesses worldwide – some legitimate and others through money laundering, some by plane - camel, boat and courier Free from control of a state sponsored terrorist organization, maintains its own infrastructure using the international banking systems until U.S. freezing accounts and assets. Has used under-regulated regional banking systems in the Middle East (in the past Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain & Pakistan.The hawala system of alternative banking, centered in Dubai unregulated, anonymous and efficient. Fund own banks e.g. ash-Shamal bank in Sudan partly by bin Laden and Bank atTaqwa in 1988 backed by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, fraudulent loan applications
- 7. Islamic Terrorist Organizations: a Learning & Evolving Organizations Lessons from the past: Omar’s story – U.S. a target & global economic domination (Scheuer, M. , 2011) Islamic terrorist enterprises evolve & adapt to changing socioeconomic, cultural & political realities worldwide Choreographed attacks of mass violence driven by religious rationale & sanction for illicit, criminal activities “Money is a natural centrifugal force” (McCaffey & Basso, 2006) that include money laundering, assassination, extortion, human trafficking, drug running, credit card fraud, internet law- breaking ventures (e.g. gambling, video games) counterfeit cigarettes, DVDs, medications, other transnational profit- making - a blurred nexus between criminal and terrorist organizations (The House Committee Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, May 21, 2015) (Kaplan 2008; Makarenko 2004; Winer 2003) conflicts in aims, control, trust & security concerns, cyber terrorism, digital currency transfers e.g. bitcoin, paypal anonymous, low detection, no bank (Irwin, et al., 2014) terrorist organizations need in-house produced sources of revenue and business – selling antiquities
- 9. Efforts to Stem Terror Financing Post 9/11 freezing assets & “following the money” (Weiss 2005, Lormel 2002) FBITerrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS) track & stop terrorist financing, use financial information To locate terrorist groups activities. TFOS builds on FBI’s history of relationships “with the financial services sector” to carry out “criminal financial investigations…in tracking and freezing terrorists‘ assets ((http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9- 11/just-the-facts-1/counterterrorism-1) E.g. Hezbollah Lebanese Canadian Bank money laundering. Assets frozen, stopped access to criminals DEA,Treasury, State Department ,law enforcement interagency cooperation.Limited media reporting on financial information on terrorist-financing sources & self funding schemes by lone actors & small cells (Keatinge & Keen,2017)
- 10. Efforts to Stem the Tide (Examples) “U.S.’s legal & regulatory enforcement framework for counter threat finance has not kept up with scale, scope, & sophistication of terrorism financing”? … Not enough. (Asher, 2015 – testimony to House CommitteeTask Force to InvestigateTerrorism Financing) Need better coordination between all American agencies to combat terrorist financing” . own policies & priorities Designation of metrics for measuring checking domestic charities – need a more unified strategy International partners non-enforcement of anti-terror financing laws to stop Saudi donors ($40 million 2013- 2014 ) – e.g. to ISIS (Stopping the Money Flow:TheWar onTerror Finance, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, andTrade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs & Subcommittee on EmergingThreats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, June 9, 2016) Money laundering: Placement (most vulnerable to detection), Layering & Integration – a synergistic collaboration in “real-time” - law enforcement , financial institutions, intelligence, regulators (Irwin, Kim-Kwang, & Choos, 2012)
- 12. Al-Qaeda’s Multigenerational Jihad Bin Laden – passing on the torch for decades to come with insurgencies worldwide Next generation more educated, more from middle and upper classes & technologically adept at using modern weapons –e.g. improvised explosive devices, car bombs, etc. communication tools, internet streaming propaganda Bin Laden their present day inspirational figure rejectingWestern culture – more devout , youthful idealistic suicide bombers Bin Laden’s legacy: reignited a Muslim culture that served as a reminder of the underlying resentment against memories of the colonial & ethnocentric imperialistic West
- 13. Bibliography Asher, D. (May 21, 2015). CongressionalTestimony, A Dangerous Nexus: Terrorism, Crime, and Corruption. The House Committee on Financial Services:Task Force to InvestigateTerrorism Financing.Washington, DC Irwin,A.S., Kim-Kwang, R., & Choo, Liu. (2012). Modeling of money laundering and terrorism financing typologies. Journal of Money Laundering Control; London, 15.3, 316-335. Irwin,A.S., Kim-Kwang, R., & Choo, Liu. (2014). Money laundering and terrorism financing in virtual environments: a feasibility study. Journal of Money Laundering Control; London, 17.1, 50-75. Kaplan, D.E. (2008/2009) Paying for terror: How jihadist groups are using organized-crime tactics – and profits – to finance attacks around the globe. InT.J. Badey (Ed.), Annual Editions (11th ed), pp. 28-33. Dubuque, IA: Mc- Graw Hill Higher Education. Keating,T. & Keen, F. (2017, January). Lone-Actor and small cell terrorist attacks: A new front in counter-terrorist finance? The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI); London. Lormel, D.M. (2002, February 12). CongressionalTestimony – Financing patterns associated with Al Qaeda & global terrorist networks, Federal Bureau of Investigation at www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/lormel021202.htm
- 14. Bibliography continued Makarenko,T. (2004, February).The Crime-Terror Continuum:Tracing the interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism. Global Crime, 6, No. 1, pp. 129-145. McCaffrey, B.R., & Basso, J.A. (2006). Narcotics, terrorism, and international crime:The convergence phenomenon. In R.D. Howard, & R.L. Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and counterterrorism: Understanding the new security environment, pp. 322-336. Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill Contemporary Learning Series. Scheuer, M. (2011). Osama Bin Laden. NewYork:Oxford University Press. Vittori, J.M. (2005) Analysis-the business of terror. Financially al-Qaeda operates like a multinational corporation. IP Global/Published by the German Council on Foreign Relations – www.ip- global.or/archiv/volumes/2005/summer2005/the-bus... Weiss, M.A. (2005, February 25).Terrorist financing:The 9/11 Commission Recommendation Winer, J. (2003, July).Testimony: Origins, organization, and prevention of Terrorist Finance. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs at www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2003_h/030