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Hirschmann Technology Paper
Overview of WLAN security functions
Hirschmann. Symply a good Connection
The increasingly widespread use of
WLAN technology has led to higher
demands on security mechanisms to
protect the transmitted data from inter-
ception by unauthorised persons. Data in
a WLAN are transmitted through the air
which makes the control and limitation of
access to the data far more difficult that
with cabled LAN.
Advancements have been made since the early days of the
IEEE 802.11 and recent years have seen the development
of new functions and standards for the protection of
modern WLANs.
WLAN security mechanisms generally aim to fulfill the fol-
lowing functions:
࡯ Authentication
Only authorized users should have access to the
WLAN and should connect only to their desig-
nated access points.
࡯ Integrity
The transmitted data should arrive at the recei-
ver in their original form; manipulated data
must be recognized as such and rejected.
࡯ Confidentiality
Unauthorized third parties should not be able to
intercept the data traffic.
This techpaper provides an overview of the security func-
tions provided by the Hirschmann BAT54-Rail. Further
information about the underlying technology is available
from other techpapers; concrete details about configuring
the functions in the Hirschmann BAT54-Rail are available
in the reference manual for the respective version of
LCOS.
Hirschmann recommends that you utilise all of the avai-
lable security mechanisms for the protection of your wire-
less networks. You should regularly update the firmware of
your Hirschmann BAT54-Rail so that you can use all of the
available security functions.
WEP64/128/152
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is the function incorpora-
ted in the original WLAN standard for the encryption of
transmitted data. The primary aim of WEP is the protection
of the data from unauthorized interception.
This made use of symmetrical keys of various lengths.
Embedded in the standard are the basic encryption
methods WEP64 and WEP128 which ensure compatibility
to all standard client adapters available on the market.
Hirschmann BAT54-Rail devices also support encryption
with WEP152 which makes use of an even longer key. All
AirLancer client adapters support this feature.
WEP can provide a basic level of encryption that protects
the network from unauthorised snoopers. Hackers are at
least presented with a slight hurdle that complicates the
interception of data.
WLANs protected only by WEP are easily "cracked" by
experts, so this method can only be recommended for
home use whereby the WEP key needs to be changed
regularly.
More information about WEP is available in the
Hirschmann techpaper "WPA and IEEE 802.11i".
Instructions for setting up WEP encryption is
available in the reference manual and in the user
manual for the Hirschmann BAT54-Rail.
MAC filter list (ACL)
A simple yet effective method for authentication is the use
of a MAC address filter. The MAC addresses of authorised
client adapters are entered into a list (ACL — Access Con-
trol List) in the access point which then only permits WLAN
access to authorised users. For larger installations, the
ACL can be centrally administered by a RADIUS server.
Since an experienced hacker can get around the limitati-
ons set by an ACL, this method should not be used as the
sole security mechanism.
Instructions for setting the ACL are to be found
in the reference manual.
Hirschmann. Symply a good Connection
2/4
Hirschmann Technology Paper
Overview of WLAN security functions
Closed Network
Each cell in a wireless network is identified by a network
name, the SSID (Service Set Identifier). A client adapter
can only connect to a wireless network if it is programmed
with the SSID.
The factory settings for many wireless networks use the
SSID "any", the continued use of which would relieve a
potential intruder of the need to find out the wireless LANs
SSID. This can be prevented with the Closed Network
function. This excludes the option of registering with the
SSID "any", each user must know the SSID exactly to be
able to log onto the WLAN.
Instructions for setting up the Closed Network
function are available in the reference manual.
SSID broadcast
Access points announce the presence of the available
wireless networks by transmitting the SSID. Potential
intruders benefit from this public announcement that
offers a first step towards entering a WLAN; they can
search at random for wireless networks by "scanning" the
environment.
The SSID broadcast can be suppressed to prevent unau-
thorised users from finding a network by scanning. The
name of the WLAN network will no longer appear in the
scanner software's results list. Sophisticated scanning
tools are still able to find out the SSID, however. Since
these tools do not belong to the standard equipment for
WLAN clients, the suppression of the SSID broadcast does
present an additional hurdle to intrusion in to the WLAN
network.
It is not possible to suppress SSID broadcasting in wireless
networks that operate with the IEEE 802.11a standard.
Instructions for suppressing the SSID broadcast
are to be found in the reference manual.
WPA & IEEE 802.11i
The WEP data encryption implemented in the IEEE 802.11
standard has been demonstrated as insufficient for pro-
tecting wireless LANs from professional attacks. WPA and
IEEE 802.11i are significantly improved encryption
methods that are now available that address these known
security loopholes and offer reliable protection from attack
for your wireless networks.
More information about WPA and IEEE 802.11i
is available in the Hirschmann techpaper "WPA
and IEEE 802.11i". Instructions for setting up
this encryption is available in the reference
manual and in the user manuals for the
Hirschmann BAT54-RAil.
WPA
WPA uses an improved, software-based encryption
method to close the security loopholes in WEP. In particu-
lar, the dynamic key portion (initial vector) is no longer
transmitted unencrypted and, with its 48 bits, is twice as
long as with WEP. Further, WPA changes the key regularly
so that true session keys are available even without a
RADIUS server.
WPA in combination with IEEE 802.1x also offers the
option of authentication in corporate networks.
IEEE 802.11i
When the hardware-accelerated AES-CCK encryption
algorithm is used in combination with IEEE 802.11i, an
even higher level of encryption than WPA can be achieved
which is comparable with VPN. This comes with no loss in
performance thanks to the hardware acceleration. The
maximum bandwidth (e. g. up to 108 Mbps in turbo mode)
can be used to the full.
IEEE 802.11i with passphrase
A simple way of encrypting a WLAN connection with IEEE
802.11i in a small network is to set up a "passphrase" for
each wireless network. This is entered directly into the
access point and client adapter. This passphrase serves as
a basis for the calculation of the encryption key per con-
nection and time space for a WLAN connection.
Ideally, the passphrases should be as long and as complex
as possible, available only to the relevant persons, and
should be changed regularly.
3/4
Hirschmann Technology Paper
Overview of WLAN security functions
Hirschmann. Symply a good Connection
The weak link is the 'human' factor in the distribution and
management of the passphrase. Regular changes in the
passphrase and as complex a structure as possible are
recommended to address this weakness.
Encryption with passphrase according to IEEE
802.11i is available with version 3.50 and hig-
her.
IEEE 802.11i for point-to-point connec-
tions
The introduction of IEEE 802.11i means that, for the first
time, point-to-point (P2P) connections can be directly
encrypted; additional protection from VPN is no longer
necessary. The hardware acceleration in the Hirschmann
BAT54-RAil carries out this encryption without loss of per-
formance.
IPSec over WLAN
When using a VPN gateway in the access point, an alter-
native to IEEE 802.11i for encrypting WLAN connections is
IPSec. This method is also suitable for making point-to-
point connections absolutely secure from attack.
Mastering this complex technology is made easy with
BAT54-Rail devices. Wizards and management tools help
with fast configuration.
The BSI (the German Federal Office for Informa-
tion Security) still recommends IPSec via WLAN
as the most secure method of WLAN protection.
IEEE 802.1x
The protocol IEEE 802.1x in combination with IEEE
802.11i in large networks offers the possibility to carry out
an authentication of every single WLAN connection. The
exchange of keys or passphrases is unnecessary for this.
Advanced knowledge of networking is a requirement for
establishing IEEE 802.11x infrastructure, as is a CA server
and an IEEE 802.1x server. This makes this application
most realistic for larger company networks.
Further information about IEEE 802.1x can be
found in the Hirschmann techpaper "IEEE
802.1x".
LEPS
With LEPS (LANCOM Enhanced Passphrase Security) in
the BAT54-Rail an efficient method that makes use of the
simple configuration of IEEE 802.11i with passphrase, but
that avoids the potential error sources in passphrase dis-
tribution is used.
LEPS uses an additional column in the ACL to assign an
individual passphrase consisting of any 4 to 64 ASCII cha-
racters to each MAC address.
The connection to the access point and the subsequent
encryption with IEEE 802.11i or WPA is only possible with
the right combination of passphrase and MAC address.
This combination makes the spoofing of the MAC addres-
ses futile—and LEPS thus shuts out a potential attack on
the ACL. If WPA or IEEE 802.11i are used for encryption,
the MAC address can indeed be intercepted—but this
method never transmits the passphrase over wireless.
This greatly increases the difficulty of attacking the WLAN
as the combination of MAC address and passphrase
requires both to be known before an encryption can be
negotiated.
LEPS can be used both locally in the device and centrally
managed with a RADIUS server.
LEPS works with all WLAN client adapters available on the
market without any modification. Full compatibility to third-
party products is assured as LEPS only involves configura-
tion in the access point.
An additional security aspect: LEPS can also be used to
secure single point-to-point (P2P) connections with an
individual passphrase. Even if an access point in a P2P
installation is stolen and the passphrase and MAC address
become known, all other WLAN connections secured by
LEPS remain secure, particularly when the ACL is stored
on a RADIUS server.
Hirschmann Technology Paper
Overview of WLAN security functions
Hirschmann Automation and Control GmbH I Stuttgarter Str. 45-51 I 72654 Neckartenzlingen I Deutschland I hac-support@hirschmann.de I www.hirschmann-ac.com
©2007HirschmannAutomationandControlGmbHandLANCOMSystemsGmbH.Allrightsreserved.LANCOM,LANCOMSystems,LCOSandLANvantageareregisteredtrademarks.Allothernamesordescriptionsusedmay
betrademarksorregisteredtrademarksoftheirowners.Subjecttochangewithoutnotice.Noliabilityfortechnicalerrorsand/oromissions.Version1.0
Hirschmann. Symply a good Connection
MultiSSID
MultiSSID enables up to eight logical WLAN networks to
operate on just one physical WLAN interface—each with
its own SSID. This method allows one single access point
to support multiple WLAN networks, each with different
security settings. This means that a single access point
can simultaneously support one WLAN that is completely
open and another that is protected with IEEE 802.11i, for
example.
Further information about MultiSSID can be
found in the Hirschmann techpaper "MultiSSID".
VLAN
Virtual networks (VLANs) enable the security measures for
logical WLANs to be "extended" into the cabled network.
This involves the assignment of each logical wireless net-
work to a certain virtual network. Data traffic from particu-
larly security sensitive wireless networks can be protected
from eavesdroppers within the normal LAN as well.

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Overview of WLAN security functions (ENG)

  • 1. 1/4 Hirschmann Technology Paper Overview of WLAN security functions Hirschmann. Symply a good Connection The increasingly widespread use of WLAN technology has led to higher demands on security mechanisms to protect the transmitted data from inter- ception by unauthorised persons. Data in a WLAN are transmitted through the air which makes the control and limitation of access to the data far more difficult that with cabled LAN. Advancements have been made since the early days of the IEEE 802.11 and recent years have seen the development of new functions and standards for the protection of modern WLANs. WLAN security mechanisms generally aim to fulfill the fol- lowing functions: ࡯ Authentication Only authorized users should have access to the WLAN and should connect only to their desig- nated access points. ࡯ Integrity The transmitted data should arrive at the recei- ver in their original form; manipulated data must be recognized as such and rejected. ࡯ Confidentiality Unauthorized third parties should not be able to intercept the data traffic. This techpaper provides an overview of the security func- tions provided by the Hirschmann BAT54-Rail. Further information about the underlying technology is available from other techpapers; concrete details about configuring the functions in the Hirschmann BAT54-Rail are available in the reference manual for the respective version of LCOS. Hirschmann recommends that you utilise all of the avai- lable security mechanisms for the protection of your wire- less networks. You should regularly update the firmware of your Hirschmann BAT54-Rail so that you can use all of the available security functions. WEP64/128/152 WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is the function incorpora- ted in the original WLAN standard for the encryption of transmitted data. The primary aim of WEP is the protection of the data from unauthorized interception. This made use of symmetrical keys of various lengths. Embedded in the standard are the basic encryption methods WEP64 and WEP128 which ensure compatibility to all standard client adapters available on the market. Hirschmann BAT54-Rail devices also support encryption with WEP152 which makes use of an even longer key. All AirLancer client adapters support this feature. WEP can provide a basic level of encryption that protects the network from unauthorised snoopers. Hackers are at least presented with a slight hurdle that complicates the interception of data. WLANs protected only by WEP are easily "cracked" by experts, so this method can only be recommended for home use whereby the WEP key needs to be changed regularly. More information about WEP is available in the Hirschmann techpaper "WPA and IEEE 802.11i". Instructions for setting up WEP encryption is available in the reference manual and in the user manual for the Hirschmann BAT54-Rail. MAC filter list (ACL) A simple yet effective method for authentication is the use of a MAC address filter. The MAC addresses of authorised client adapters are entered into a list (ACL — Access Con- trol List) in the access point which then only permits WLAN access to authorised users. For larger installations, the ACL can be centrally administered by a RADIUS server. Since an experienced hacker can get around the limitati- ons set by an ACL, this method should not be used as the sole security mechanism. Instructions for setting the ACL are to be found in the reference manual.
  • 2. Hirschmann. Symply a good Connection 2/4 Hirschmann Technology Paper Overview of WLAN security functions Closed Network Each cell in a wireless network is identified by a network name, the SSID (Service Set Identifier). A client adapter can only connect to a wireless network if it is programmed with the SSID. The factory settings for many wireless networks use the SSID "any", the continued use of which would relieve a potential intruder of the need to find out the wireless LANs SSID. This can be prevented with the Closed Network function. This excludes the option of registering with the SSID "any", each user must know the SSID exactly to be able to log onto the WLAN. Instructions for setting up the Closed Network function are available in the reference manual. SSID broadcast Access points announce the presence of the available wireless networks by transmitting the SSID. Potential intruders benefit from this public announcement that offers a first step towards entering a WLAN; they can search at random for wireless networks by "scanning" the environment. The SSID broadcast can be suppressed to prevent unau- thorised users from finding a network by scanning. The name of the WLAN network will no longer appear in the scanner software's results list. Sophisticated scanning tools are still able to find out the SSID, however. Since these tools do not belong to the standard equipment for WLAN clients, the suppression of the SSID broadcast does present an additional hurdle to intrusion in to the WLAN network. It is not possible to suppress SSID broadcasting in wireless networks that operate with the IEEE 802.11a standard. Instructions for suppressing the SSID broadcast are to be found in the reference manual. WPA & IEEE 802.11i The WEP data encryption implemented in the IEEE 802.11 standard has been demonstrated as insufficient for pro- tecting wireless LANs from professional attacks. WPA and IEEE 802.11i are significantly improved encryption methods that are now available that address these known security loopholes and offer reliable protection from attack for your wireless networks. More information about WPA and IEEE 802.11i is available in the Hirschmann techpaper "WPA and IEEE 802.11i". Instructions for setting up this encryption is available in the reference manual and in the user manuals for the Hirschmann BAT54-RAil. WPA WPA uses an improved, software-based encryption method to close the security loopholes in WEP. In particu- lar, the dynamic key portion (initial vector) is no longer transmitted unencrypted and, with its 48 bits, is twice as long as with WEP. Further, WPA changes the key regularly so that true session keys are available even without a RADIUS server. WPA in combination with IEEE 802.1x also offers the option of authentication in corporate networks. IEEE 802.11i When the hardware-accelerated AES-CCK encryption algorithm is used in combination with IEEE 802.11i, an even higher level of encryption than WPA can be achieved which is comparable with VPN. This comes with no loss in performance thanks to the hardware acceleration. The maximum bandwidth (e. g. up to 108 Mbps in turbo mode) can be used to the full. IEEE 802.11i with passphrase A simple way of encrypting a WLAN connection with IEEE 802.11i in a small network is to set up a "passphrase" for each wireless network. This is entered directly into the access point and client adapter. This passphrase serves as a basis for the calculation of the encryption key per con- nection and time space for a WLAN connection. Ideally, the passphrases should be as long and as complex as possible, available only to the relevant persons, and should be changed regularly.
  • 3. 3/4 Hirschmann Technology Paper Overview of WLAN security functions Hirschmann. Symply a good Connection The weak link is the 'human' factor in the distribution and management of the passphrase. Regular changes in the passphrase and as complex a structure as possible are recommended to address this weakness. Encryption with passphrase according to IEEE 802.11i is available with version 3.50 and hig- her. IEEE 802.11i for point-to-point connec- tions The introduction of IEEE 802.11i means that, for the first time, point-to-point (P2P) connections can be directly encrypted; additional protection from VPN is no longer necessary. The hardware acceleration in the Hirschmann BAT54-RAil carries out this encryption without loss of per- formance. IPSec over WLAN When using a VPN gateway in the access point, an alter- native to IEEE 802.11i for encrypting WLAN connections is IPSec. This method is also suitable for making point-to- point connections absolutely secure from attack. Mastering this complex technology is made easy with BAT54-Rail devices. Wizards and management tools help with fast configuration. The BSI (the German Federal Office for Informa- tion Security) still recommends IPSec via WLAN as the most secure method of WLAN protection. IEEE 802.1x The protocol IEEE 802.1x in combination with IEEE 802.11i in large networks offers the possibility to carry out an authentication of every single WLAN connection. The exchange of keys or passphrases is unnecessary for this. Advanced knowledge of networking is a requirement for establishing IEEE 802.11x infrastructure, as is a CA server and an IEEE 802.1x server. This makes this application most realistic for larger company networks. Further information about IEEE 802.1x can be found in the Hirschmann techpaper "IEEE 802.1x". LEPS With LEPS (LANCOM Enhanced Passphrase Security) in the BAT54-Rail an efficient method that makes use of the simple configuration of IEEE 802.11i with passphrase, but that avoids the potential error sources in passphrase dis- tribution is used. LEPS uses an additional column in the ACL to assign an individual passphrase consisting of any 4 to 64 ASCII cha- racters to each MAC address. The connection to the access point and the subsequent encryption with IEEE 802.11i or WPA is only possible with the right combination of passphrase and MAC address. This combination makes the spoofing of the MAC addres- ses futile—and LEPS thus shuts out a potential attack on the ACL. If WPA or IEEE 802.11i are used for encryption, the MAC address can indeed be intercepted—but this method never transmits the passphrase over wireless. This greatly increases the difficulty of attacking the WLAN as the combination of MAC address and passphrase requires both to be known before an encryption can be negotiated. LEPS can be used both locally in the device and centrally managed with a RADIUS server. LEPS works with all WLAN client adapters available on the market without any modification. Full compatibility to third- party products is assured as LEPS only involves configura- tion in the access point. An additional security aspect: LEPS can also be used to secure single point-to-point (P2P) connections with an individual passphrase. Even if an access point in a P2P installation is stolen and the passphrase and MAC address become known, all other WLAN connections secured by LEPS remain secure, particularly when the ACL is stored on a RADIUS server.
  • 4. Hirschmann Technology Paper Overview of WLAN security functions Hirschmann Automation and Control GmbH I Stuttgarter Str. 45-51 I 72654 Neckartenzlingen I Deutschland I hac-support@hirschmann.de I www.hirschmann-ac.com ©2007HirschmannAutomationandControlGmbHandLANCOMSystemsGmbH.Allrightsreserved.LANCOM,LANCOMSystems,LCOSandLANvantageareregisteredtrademarks.Allothernamesordescriptionsusedmay betrademarksorregisteredtrademarksoftheirowners.Subjecttochangewithoutnotice.Noliabilityfortechnicalerrorsand/oromissions.Version1.0 Hirschmann. Symply a good Connection MultiSSID MultiSSID enables up to eight logical WLAN networks to operate on just one physical WLAN interface—each with its own SSID. This method allows one single access point to support multiple WLAN networks, each with different security settings. This means that a single access point can simultaneously support one WLAN that is completely open and another that is protected with IEEE 802.11i, for example. Further information about MultiSSID can be found in the Hirschmann techpaper "MultiSSID". VLAN Virtual networks (VLANs) enable the security measures for logical WLANs to be "extended" into the cabled network. This involves the assignment of each logical wireless net- work to a certain virtual network. Data traffic from particu- larly security sensitive wireless networks can be protected from eavesdroppers within the normal LAN as well.