SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Mobile Phone Hacking:
A lucrative, but largely hidden history
DC4420
David Rogers
27th May 2014
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org
Car Radio Hacking – 1990s / 2000s
 PIN locks to deter and remove value of theft
 Hacking tools reset / calculate / remove security codes
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Some Phone Terms: SIMlock & IMEI
 SIMlock:
– used to secure the device to a particular network during the period of
the subsidy, can be unlocked with CK codes by calling operator
– Different variants of locks
– Recent court case in the US over legality (and lots of other previous
fights)
 IMEI :
– the International Mobile Equipment Identity number
– unique to each device
– can be blocked if device is stolen
 Other interesting information on device that would be hacked
– E.g. to change language packs, phone lock removal, text etc.
 Big battle between mobile industry and hacking groups
between c.1999 and now – has evolved to jailbreak / root
community
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
‘Unlocking’ and IMEI changing
 What is ‘unlocking?
– SIMlocks
– Most hacking used to be aimed at the SIMlock area
 The security area in the handset would protect all sensitive
data – including IMEI and SIMlock
 What is a dirty hack?
– Hacks targeted against the security area would often cause corruption
to data – including the IMEI.
– Data such as RF calibration settings would often be wiped out
 Hacking tools usually dual-use (SIMlock and IMEI)
– Causes problems in countries where IMEI changing is illegal – difficult
and costly to get direct proof
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
INTERNET
Historic Criminal
Structure
EMBEDDED
HACKER
HACKING
GROUP
INTERNET
SHOP
SHOP OR
STALL
REPAIR
CENTRE
APPLICATION
HACKER
ORGANISED
CRIME
RE-SELLER
END-USERTHIEF
DRUG
DEALER
MASS THEFT
SUBSCRIPTION
FRAUD
STREET CRIME
BLACK MARKET
EXPORTER
(UNLOCKING / IMEI CHANGING)
EBAY
COUNTERFEITING
IP THEFT
‘USER’ CRIMES
MURDER ETC.
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
INTERNET
EMBEDDED
HACKER
HACKING
GROUP
INTERNET
SHOP
SHOP OR
STALL
REPAIR
CENTRE
APPLICATION
HACKER
ORGANISED
CRIME
RE-SELLER
FREE SOFTWARE
END-USERTHIEF
DRUG
DEALER
VALUE METHOD
£10 - £30 CASH
DEBIT / CREDIT CARD
£50 - £500 WESTERN UNION
PAYPAL
POSTAL ORDER
£500 - £5000 WESTERN UNION
£5000+ WESTERN UNION
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Historic Financial
Structure
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Examples of Hacking Hardware
 Standard service repair equipment
– Fraudulent purchasing of manufacturer’s equipment
 Mass produced hardware by hacking groups
– Griffin Box
– UFS-3 (Twister)
– Blazer
– Clips
 Evolution
– New equipment was constantly developed as new models were
released
– New technologies and hardware security to ensure revenue
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Mass Manufacture of Hacking Hardware
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Examples of Hacking Hardware (2)
• Most hacks steal their solutions from already existing
hacks
— May seem to be 22 hacks available – just old hacks re-packaged.
— Different front-end to software
— Different hardware
— the ‘golden’ part of the source code is from 1 hack
• Lots of ‘ghost’ hacks that are aimed at defrauding people
— same in 2012 with jailbreaking on iOS6
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Hardware Hacking Methods
 EEPROM cloning or ‘Chipping’
– Old method
– Copied EEPROM with basic equipment
– Main aim to put EEPROM with no SIMlock on
– Result: IMEI number was cloned
 PIC’s (Programmable Integrated Circuits)
– Execute small sequences of commands
– Placed in-line to ‘snatch’ or modify data
 Flash device hot-swapping (almost impossible now)
 Exploitation of boundary scan ports
 External clips and dongles
 Note: less economical than software hacks
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
In-line PIC Between SIM and Device
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Software Hacking Methods
 Direct change
– Breaking a programming algorithm
– Finding the correct test interface protocol command
• Still used(!) serial communications / USB monitoring equipment
 Modifying binary files (software download files)
– Inserting jump code
– Hijacking other functions in the code to subvert security
– Taking advantage of software design flaws
 Abuse of boundary scan to monitor phone processes
 ‘Dumping’ to logs of data from secure areas
 Brute force cracking of algorithms
 Theft of information from Design Centres / Factories /
Service Centres
 “Voodoo Galaxy SIII SIM unlock” tool required device to be
rooted…
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Typical (Old) Software Hack Methodology
MARKETING
LAUNCH AT
TRADE SHOW
PHONE
RELEASED
TO MARKET
RESEARCH
THEFT OF
EARLY MODEL
NETWORK
OPERATOR
SAMPLES
MANUFACTURER HACKER
OPEN SOURCE INFO
AND HACKING TOOLS
TIMESCALE
0 MONTHS
6 - 12 MONTHS
HACKING
SOLUTION
DISTRIBUTE
APPLICATION
PROTECT
APPLICATION
APPLICATION
PROTECTION
TOOLS
PRODUCT
SECURITY
DETECTION
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Use of Hardware Clips – 5 Second Unlocking!
 Simple to use, takes it’s power from the handset
 Contains a Programmable Integrated Circuit
 Bombards the handset with commands in a repetitive sequence
 The handset eventually gives up and resets itself – unfortunately
resetting the SIMlock!
 This type of attack was used on many different makes of handsets
 Clips have now evolved and the term is usually used in reference to
dongles
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
“Logs”
 Used as a method of continually generating revenue for the
real hackers and re-sellers at the top of the food chain – a
historical issues for hackers
 Original concept by 3 Nokia hackers and dealers from Serbia:
– George, Boban (Slobodan Andrics) and Dejan (Dejan Kaljevic)
 How do logs work?
– Encrypted by hackers to avoid cracking by other hackers
– An example:
• Crack the master security locks -> generate an encrypted log of
security area information -> close the security lock on the handset
again!
 ‘Logs’ will be available only if the hacking solution is two part
– ‘Dumb’ client application to communicate with handset
– Data is sent to hacker / re-seller
– Corresponding data to unlock / change IMEI received from hacker / re-
seller
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
 Some manufacturers and ODMs used symmetric algorithms
based on the IMEI number to generate CK codes
– Broken and every possible iteration for each IMEI available
 Later versions cracked the factory / service tools because they
were leaked rather than cracking the handset
 Down to poor manufacturer security and breaking principle of no stored,
shared secrets!
CK Algorithm Breaches
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
De-capping and Focused Ion Beam Equipment
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Newer Hardware and System Level Attacks
 George Hotz – original iPhone jailbreak
– Used hardware flaw to XOR data address and insert jump code to
empty memory where he could execute his own bootloader
– Allegedly assisted by European Infineon hacking teams
 Rooting
– Various methods, exploiting vulnerabilities
– Usually used as a staging area for other attacks (e.g. malware)
– Examples:
• RageAgainstTheCage, uboot, zergRush, gingerbreak
• Other private exploits
– Some manufacturers providing it as a service in order to prevent
people hacking
 Legal battles around this area (e.g. US copyright office 2010,
2012)
– OK to remove SIMlocks and root devices
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Newer Motivations
 Main targets / motivations recently have been:
 Rooting / jailbreak device – for piracy / other apps / custom OS
/ spyware
 SIM unlocking – break out of subsidy (cheap device) / fraud /
export of stolen devices
 IMEI changing – re-enable stolen handsets in same country
 Launchpad attacks – spyware / malware / anti-theft tools / in-
app billing
 Fixing issues – e.g. old SIMlocked device, can’t contact operator
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010/11 2012
EICTA / GSMA 9 Principles
OMTP Trusted
Environment:
OMTP TR0
OMTP Advanced Trusted
Environment: OMTP TR1
TCG MPWG
Specification
GSMA Pay-Buy-Mobile
FragmentedSecurity
Handset Embedded Security Evolution (to 2012)
Google / Apple
Proprietary hardware
security features
Banking / film industry
requirements
WAC
RIM / Nokia proprietary
security features
webinos
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Evad3rs, i0n1c, geohot, RedSn0w – iOS6 & iOS7
 iOS6 hack “used more zero-days than stuxnet”*
 Millions of downloads – huge market
 Evasi0n iOS7 jailbreak rushed out due to competition (and 7.1
release), packaged with Chinese app store (Taig)
– Rumoured to be $1million
– Rumours of dirty tricks / questionable sources for some holes
– Strategic and tactical thinking, all ‘untethered’
 Some holes allegedly held back by various teams for future
cracks on iOS8
 Teams still reverse and hack each others tools (like SIMlock)
 George Hotz tried to sell to a Chinese team (via a broker) for
$350,000
– Audio clip released with negotiation discussions
* Ref:
http://www.forbes.com/sites
/andygreenberg/2013/02/05
/inside-evasi0n-the-most-
elaborate-jailbreak-to-ever-
hack-your-iphone/
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
May 2014 – Root Bounty for Verizon & AT&T
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Kill Switch / Anti-Theft Mechanism Targeting?
 Obvious this would happen
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Car Radio Hacking - 2014
Questions?
david.rogers {@} copperhorse.co.uk
@drogersuk
Mobile Systems Security course:
http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/softeng/subjects/MSS.html
Mobile Security: A Guide for Users:
http://www.lulu.com/gb/en/shop/david-rogers/mobile-security-a-
guide-for-users/paperback/product-21197551.html
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org

More Related Content

PPT
Module 3 Scanning
PPTX
Mobile security part 1(Android Apps Pentesting)- Romansh yadav
PDF
Android application penetration testing
PPTX
Android Application Penetration Testing - Mohammed Adam
PPTX
Android Hacking + Pentesting
PDF
Introduction to Cyber Security
PPT
Port Scanning
Module 3 Scanning
Mobile security part 1(Android Apps Pentesting)- Romansh yadav
Android application penetration testing
Android Application Penetration Testing - Mohammed Adam
Android Hacking + Pentesting
Introduction to Cyber Security
Port Scanning

What's hot (20)

PPTX
Recon with Nmap
PPTX
Mobile security
PPTX
Introduction to Malware Analysis
PPTX
PPTX
Ethical hacking : Its methodologies and tools
PDF
SSL Pinning and Bypasses: Android and iOS
PPT
Secure code practices
PPTX
API Security Fundamentals
PPTX
Mobile security
PPTX
Firebase integration with Flutter
PPTX
Mobile Application Security
PPTX
PPTX
Owasp mobile top 10
PPTX
Secure coding practices
PPTX
Vulnerabilities in modern web applications
PPT
Cross Site Request Forgery Vulnerabilities
PDF
Hacking With Nmap - Scanning Techniques
PPTX
Offensive Payment Security
PPTX
Understanding Cross-site Request Forgery
Recon with Nmap
Mobile security
Introduction to Malware Analysis
Ethical hacking : Its methodologies and tools
SSL Pinning and Bypasses: Android and iOS
Secure code practices
API Security Fundamentals
Mobile security
Firebase integration with Flutter
Mobile Application Security
Owasp mobile top 10
Secure coding practices
Vulnerabilities in modern web applications
Cross Site Request Forgery Vulnerabilities
Hacking With Nmap - Scanning Techniques
Offensive Payment Security
Understanding Cross-site Request Forgery

Similar to Phone Hacking: A lucrative, but largely hidden history (20)

PDF
UplinQ - the future of mobile security
PDF
The Future Mobile Security
PPTX
Protect your IPPBX against VOIP attacks
PDF
Shmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
PDF
ISACA CACS 2012 - Mobile Device Security and Privacy
ODP
Confraria Security & IT - Mobile Security
PPTX
Dark Clouds and Rainy Days, the Bad Side of Cloud Computing
PPTX
Sniffer for detecting lost mobiles
PDF
The Big Hairy Edge Device Security Problem
PDF
Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...
PPTX
Android phone identifiers and eavesdropping audio
PDF
Threat Modeling for the Internet of Things
PPT
Adaptive Trust for Strong Network Security
PPTX
EHEv1 Module 09 Mobile Attacks and Countermeasures.pptx
PDF
Security & Identity for the Internet of Things Webinar
PPT
The Consumerisation of Corporate IT
PDF
Extracting and Decoding Smartphone and Tablet Evidence with the UFED Series: ...
PDF
Make Mobilization Work - Properly Implementing Mobile Security
PPT
Cell phone cloning
PPTX
Investigation and Analysis of Digital Evidence
UplinQ - the future of mobile security
The Future Mobile Security
Protect your IPPBX against VOIP attacks
Shmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
ISACA CACS 2012 - Mobile Device Security and Privacy
Confraria Security & IT - Mobile Security
Dark Clouds and Rainy Days, the Bad Side of Cloud Computing
Sniffer for detecting lost mobiles
The Big Hairy Edge Device Security Problem
Why mobile-should-stop-worrying-learn-love-root-andrew-hoog-viaforensics-rsa-...
Android phone identifiers and eavesdropping audio
Threat Modeling for the Internet of Things
Adaptive Trust for Strong Network Security
EHEv1 Module 09 Mobile Attacks and Countermeasures.pptx
Security & Identity for the Internet of Things Webinar
The Consumerisation of Corporate IT
Extracting and Decoding Smartphone and Tablet Evidence with the UFED Series: ...
Make Mobilization Work - Properly Implementing Mobile Security
Cell phone cloning
Investigation and Analysis of Digital Evidence

Recently uploaded (20)

PDF
-DIGITAL-INDIA.pdf one of the most prominent
PPTX
Syllabus Computer Six class curriculum s
PDF
Core Components of IoT, The elements need for IOT
PPTX
executive branch_no record.pptxsvvsgsggs
PPTX
02fdgfhfhfhghghhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.pptx
PPTX
making presentation that do no stick.pptx
DOCX
A PROPOSAL ON IoT climate sensor 2.docx
PPTX
kvjhvhjvhjhjhjghjghjgjhgjhgjhgjhgjhgjhgjhgjh
PDF
Dynamic Checkweighers and Automatic Weighing Machine Solutions
PPTX
figurative-languagepowerpoint-150309132252-conversion-gate01.pptx
PPTX
了解新西兰毕业证(Wintec毕业证书)怀卡托理工学院毕业证存档可查的
PPT
Hypersensitivity Namisha1111111111-WPS.ppt
PDF
PPT Determiners.pdf.......................
PPT
Lines and angles cbse class 9 math chemistry
PPTX
Fundamentals of Computer.pptx Computer BSC
PPTX
ATL_Arduino_Complete_Presentation_AI_Visuals.pptx
PPTX
Embedded for Artificial Intelligence 1.pptx
PPTX
PROGRAMMING-QUARTER-2-PYTHON.pptxnsnsndn
PPTX
KVL KCL ppt electrical electronics eee tiet
PPTX
Nanokeyer nano keyekr kano ketkker nano keyer
-DIGITAL-INDIA.pdf one of the most prominent
Syllabus Computer Six class curriculum s
Core Components of IoT, The elements need for IOT
executive branch_no record.pptxsvvsgsggs
02fdgfhfhfhghghhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh.pptx
making presentation that do no stick.pptx
A PROPOSAL ON IoT climate sensor 2.docx
kvjhvhjvhjhjhjghjghjgjhgjhgjhgjhgjhgjhgjhgjh
Dynamic Checkweighers and Automatic Weighing Machine Solutions
figurative-languagepowerpoint-150309132252-conversion-gate01.pptx
了解新西兰毕业证(Wintec毕业证书)怀卡托理工学院毕业证存档可查的
Hypersensitivity Namisha1111111111-WPS.ppt
PPT Determiners.pdf.......................
Lines and angles cbse class 9 math chemistry
Fundamentals of Computer.pptx Computer BSC
ATL_Arduino_Complete_Presentation_AI_Visuals.pptx
Embedded for Artificial Intelligence 1.pptx
PROGRAMMING-QUARTER-2-PYTHON.pptxnsnsndn
KVL KCL ppt electrical electronics eee tiet
Nanokeyer nano keyekr kano ketkker nano keyer

Phone Hacking: A lucrative, but largely hidden history

  • 1. Mobile Phone Hacking: A lucrative, but largely hidden history DC4420 David Rogers 27th May 2014 Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved. http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org
  • 2. Car Radio Hacking – 1990s / 2000s  PIN locks to deter and remove value of theft  Hacking tools reset / calculate / remove security codes Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 3. Some Phone Terms: SIMlock & IMEI  SIMlock: – used to secure the device to a particular network during the period of the subsidy, can be unlocked with CK codes by calling operator – Different variants of locks – Recent court case in the US over legality (and lots of other previous fights)  IMEI : – the International Mobile Equipment Identity number – unique to each device – can be blocked if device is stolen  Other interesting information on device that would be hacked – E.g. to change language packs, phone lock removal, text etc.  Big battle between mobile industry and hacking groups between c.1999 and now – has evolved to jailbreak / root community Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 4. ‘Unlocking’ and IMEI changing  What is ‘unlocking? – SIMlocks – Most hacking used to be aimed at the SIMlock area  The security area in the handset would protect all sensitive data – including IMEI and SIMlock  What is a dirty hack? – Hacks targeted against the security area would often cause corruption to data – including the IMEI. – Data such as RF calibration settings would often be wiped out  Hacking tools usually dual-use (SIMlock and IMEI) – Causes problems in countries where IMEI changing is illegal – difficult and costly to get direct proof Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 5. INTERNET Historic Criminal Structure EMBEDDED HACKER HACKING GROUP INTERNET SHOP SHOP OR STALL REPAIR CENTRE APPLICATION HACKER ORGANISED CRIME RE-SELLER END-USERTHIEF DRUG DEALER MASS THEFT SUBSCRIPTION FRAUD STREET CRIME BLACK MARKET EXPORTER (UNLOCKING / IMEI CHANGING) EBAY COUNTERFEITING IP THEFT ‘USER’ CRIMES MURDER ETC. Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 6. INTERNET EMBEDDED HACKER HACKING GROUP INTERNET SHOP SHOP OR STALL REPAIR CENTRE APPLICATION HACKER ORGANISED CRIME RE-SELLER FREE SOFTWARE END-USERTHIEF DRUG DEALER VALUE METHOD £10 - £30 CASH DEBIT / CREDIT CARD £50 - £500 WESTERN UNION PAYPAL POSTAL ORDER £500 - £5000 WESTERN UNION £5000+ WESTERN UNION Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Historic Financial Structure Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 7. Examples of Hacking Hardware  Standard service repair equipment – Fraudulent purchasing of manufacturer’s equipment  Mass produced hardware by hacking groups – Griffin Box – UFS-3 (Twister) – Blazer – Clips  Evolution – New equipment was constantly developed as new models were released – New technologies and hardware security to ensure revenue Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 8. Mass Manufacture of Hacking Hardware Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 9. Examples of Hacking Hardware (2) • Most hacks steal their solutions from already existing hacks — May seem to be 22 hacks available – just old hacks re-packaged. — Different front-end to software — Different hardware — the ‘golden’ part of the source code is from 1 hack • Lots of ‘ghost’ hacks that are aimed at defrauding people — same in 2012 with jailbreaking on iOS6 Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 10. Hardware Hacking Methods  EEPROM cloning or ‘Chipping’ – Old method – Copied EEPROM with basic equipment – Main aim to put EEPROM with no SIMlock on – Result: IMEI number was cloned  PIC’s (Programmable Integrated Circuits) – Execute small sequences of commands – Placed in-line to ‘snatch’ or modify data  Flash device hot-swapping (almost impossible now)  Exploitation of boundary scan ports  External clips and dongles  Note: less economical than software hacks Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 11. In-line PIC Between SIM and Device Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 12. Software Hacking Methods  Direct change – Breaking a programming algorithm – Finding the correct test interface protocol command • Still used(!) serial communications / USB monitoring equipment  Modifying binary files (software download files) – Inserting jump code – Hijacking other functions in the code to subvert security – Taking advantage of software design flaws  Abuse of boundary scan to monitor phone processes  ‘Dumping’ to logs of data from secure areas  Brute force cracking of algorithms  Theft of information from Design Centres / Factories / Service Centres  “Voodoo Galaxy SIII SIM unlock” tool required device to be rooted… Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 13. Typical (Old) Software Hack Methodology MARKETING LAUNCH AT TRADE SHOW PHONE RELEASED TO MARKET RESEARCH THEFT OF EARLY MODEL NETWORK OPERATOR SAMPLES MANUFACTURER HACKER OPEN SOURCE INFO AND HACKING TOOLS TIMESCALE 0 MONTHS 6 - 12 MONTHS HACKING SOLUTION DISTRIBUTE APPLICATION PROTECT APPLICATION APPLICATION PROTECTION TOOLS PRODUCT SECURITY DETECTION Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 14. Use of Hardware Clips – 5 Second Unlocking!  Simple to use, takes it’s power from the handset  Contains a Programmable Integrated Circuit  Bombards the handset with commands in a repetitive sequence  The handset eventually gives up and resets itself – unfortunately resetting the SIMlock!  This type of attack was used on many different makes of handsets  Clips have now evolved and the term is usually used in reference to dongles Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 15. “Logs”  Used as a method of continually generating revenue for the real hackers and re-sellers at the top of the food chain – a historical issues for hackers  Original concept by 3 Nokia hackers and dealers from Serbia: – George, Boban (Slobodan Andrics) and Dejan (Dejan Kaljevic)  How do logs work? – Encrypted by hackers to avoid cracking by other hackers – An example: • Crack the master security locks -> generate an encrypted log of security area information -> close the security lock on the handset again!  ‘Logs’ will be available only if the hacking solution is two part – ‘Dumb’ client application to communicate with handset – Data is sent to hacker / re-seller – Corresponding data to unlock / change IMEI received from hacker / re- seller Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 16.  Some manufacturers and ODMs used symmetric algorithms based on the IMEI number to generate CK codes – Broken and every possible iteration for each IMEI available  Later versions cracked the factory / service tools because they were leaked rather than cracking the handset  Down to poor manufacturer security and breaking principle of no stored, shared secrets! CK Algorithm Breaches Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 17. De-capping and Focused Ion Beam Equipment Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 18. Newer Hardware and System Level Attacks  George Hotz – original iPhone jailbreak – Used hardware flaw to XOR data address and insert jump code to empty memory where he could execute his own bootloader – Allegedly assisted by European Infineon hacking teams  Rooting – Various methods, exploiting vulnerabilities – Usually used as a staging area for other attacks (e.g. malware) – Examples: • RageAgainstTheCage, uboot, zergRush, gingerbreak • Other private exploits – Some manufacturers providing it as a service in order to prevent people hacking  Legal battles around this area (e.g. US copyright office 2010, 2012) – OK to remove SIMlocks and root devices Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 19. Newer Motivations  Main targets / motivations recently have been:  Rooting / jailbreak device – for piracy / other apps / custom OS / spyware  SIM unlocking – break out of subsidy (cheap device) / fraud / export of stolen devices  IMEI changing – re-enable stolen handsets in same country  Launchpad attacks – spyware / malware / anti-theft tools / in- app billing  Fixing issues – e.g. old SIMlocked device, can’t contact operator Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 20. 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010/11 2012 EICTA / GSMA 9 Principles OMTP Trusted Environment: OMTP TR0 OMTP Advanced Trusted Environment: OMTP TR1 TCG MPWG Specification GSMA Pay-Buy-Mobile FragmentedSecurity Handset Embedded Security Evolution (to 2012) Google / Apple Proprietary hardware security features Banking / film industry requirements WAC RIM / Nokia proprietary security features webinos Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 21. Evad3rs, i0n1c, geohot, RedSn0w – iOS6 & iOS7  iOS6 hack “used more zero-days than stuxnet”*  Millions of downloads – huge market  Evasi0n iOS7 jailbreak rushed out due to competition (and 7.1 release), packaged with Chinese app store (Taig) – Rumoured to be $1million – Rumours of dirty tricks / questionable sources for some holes – Strategic and tactical thinking, all ‘untethered’  Some holes allegedly held back by various teams for future cracks on iOS8  Teams still reverse and hack each others tools (like SIMlock)  George Hotz tried to sell to a Chinese team (via a broker) for $350,000 – Audio clip released with negotiation discussions * Ref: http://www.forbes.com/sites /andygreenberg/2013/02/05 /inside-evasi0n-the-most- elaborate-jailbreak-to-ever- hack-your-iphone/ Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 22. May 2014 – Root Bounty for Verizon & AT&T Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 23. Kill Switch / Anti-Theft Mechanism Targeting?  Obvious this would happen Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
  • 24. Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved. Car Radio Hacking - 2014
  • 25. Questions? david.rogers {@} copperhorse.co.uk @drogersuk Mobile Systems Security course: http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/softeng/subjects/MSS.html Mobile Security: A Guide for Users: http://www.lulu.com/gb/en/shop/david-rogers/mobile-security-a- guide-for-users/paperback/product-21197551.html Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved. http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org