Quasi realism science as self-organizing meta-information system a defence of fuchs views on science
- 1. Quasi realism - Science as self-organizing Meta-information system A defence of Fuchs views on science Presentation for PSGI Ganesh Bharate PhD student, IITK
- 2. Background of the problem Realism The realists claim that science describes not only observable but also the world which is hidden behind the appearances. Best of the scientific theories are at least partially true. how could scientific theories involving unobservable entities such as electrons and gravitational fields be as successful as they are if they did not correctly describe the unobservable realm at-least approximately?
- 3. Three thesis of Realism - Psillos The Metaphysical Thesis : The world has a definite and mind-independent structure. The Semantic Thesis : Scientific theories should be taken at face-value. They are truth- conditioned descriptions of their intended domain, both observable and unobservable. Hence, they are capable of being true or false. The theoretical terms featuring in theories have putative factual reference. So, if scientific theories are true, the unobservable entities they posit populate the world. The Epistemic Thesis : Mature and predictively successful scientific theories are well- confirmed and approximately true of the world. So, the entities posited by them, or, at any rate, entities very similar to those posited, inhabit the world. The most prominent and famous argument is the ‘No miracle argument’ which the realist put forth. If the scientific claims are not at least approximately true then scientific success is a miracle.
- 4. Antirealism On the other hand the anti-realists claim that the theories are mere scaffolding which are dispensable and the parts based on observation and experiment alone are retained. Questions regarding the genuine existence of point mass, frictionless plane etc can be posed to counter the realist claims regarding science. Criteria such as empirical adequacy - a theory is empirically adequate exactly if what it says about the observable things and events in the world is true exactly if it saves the phenomena (Frassen, 1980).
- 5. Quasi Realism The quasi realists on the third end, attempts to make sense of theoretical claims without making the ontological commitments of the realist. The quasi-realist without subscribing to the ontological commitment of realists retain the force of it (Jennings, 1989).
- 6. Characteristics of quasi realism The Metaphysical status that the quasi realist would assign to the theoretical entities would be that theoretical entities are projected onto the world, they are the offspring of our theories (Jennings 1989) The semantic status that quasi realist would ascribe to theoretical entities differs from the classical instrumentalist distinction between sentences accepted as true, because we can see that the world is as those sentences say it is (observable), and sentences which do not have a truth value, because they refer to no observable aspect of the world. This distinction is replaced by a distinction between sentences which can be believed and sentences which are not to be believed but are only to be accepted (as they have causal effects on the world) (Jennings, 1989) The epistemological position that quasi realist would take is an intermediate between correspondence and coherence which is “correspondence conditional”. The basis of the quasi-realist account of truth is coherence, but the judgements among which coherence is sought are the causal effects of the world (Jennings, 1989)
- 7. Where do realist - antirealist - quasi realist differ 1. The Ontological: there are in the world theoretical (i.e., unobservable) properties and entities which are independent of our theories (and thus do not change when our theories change). 2. The Epistemological: science discovers and describes the theoretical properties and entities of the world. 3. The Historical: scientific theories change radically in the course of history—they speak of different theoretical properties and entities in the world.
- 8. Claims prominently refuted ● Realists would like to refute the historical claim that scientific theories change radically in the course of history & the theories speak of different theoretical properties and entities in the world. Theoretical entities are out there. ● Antirealist systematically refuse to accept the epistemological claim that science discovers and describes the theoretical properties and entities of the world. Theoretical entities function is to save the phenomena. ● The quasi realist refutes the ontological claim that there are in the world theoretical (i.e.unobservable) properties and entities which are independent of our theories (and thus do not change when our theories change). They are projections
- 9. Quasi-realist's position regarding theoretical entities ● Quasi-realism does not offer a non-realist interpretation of belief, rather, it offers a non-realist interpretation of the object of belief. ● That is, our belief in theoretical things and properties is no different from our belief in ordinary things and properties, but for quasi-realism the theoretical things and properties are projections rather than noumena they are things in the projected world rather than in some inaccessible world with which we are utterly unacquainted (Jennings, 1989)
- 10. Science as self-organizing meta-information system (SOMIS) Background - why the need of formulating science as SOMIS ● Fuchs criticizes the one sidedness of the earlier theories as to the status ascribed by them to the empirical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. He claims that if we consider science as a self-organizing system it allows a more integrative approach. ● Any theory of science has to deal with at least four problems viz, a) epistemological, b) Causality, c) dynamics and d) Structure. ● Science as self-organizing meta-informative system is a dialectical process which bridges the subjectivist-objectivist position regarding these four problems.
- 11. Approach of dialectical process to the four problems Problem of epistemology: The question is how should the relationship of experience and theory be conceived avoiding certain perils that the subjectivists-objectivists run into ? ● The Inductivists - holding the subjective position claim that all knowledge is derived from empirical experiences. The inductivists do not take into account the theory ladenness that all observation presuppose some theory. ● While the deductivists position claim that theories are tested against data (Hoyningen). The deductivists do not take into account that theory is grounded in sense experience and is an abstraction from experience. ● The dialectical approaches like hypothetico-deductive, self-organization argue that scientific knowledge is generated by the dialectic of inductive and deductive methods jointly.
- 12. The problem of structure: The second problem of structure is the question that whether the development of science is determined by scientific structures (academic institutions, theories, publication etc) or by human practices ? ● Action based accounts like Kuhn, Ladyman claim that science develops by intersubjective actions of dissent and consensus. Action theory overlooks the actions are conditioned and objective factors delimit the agents (scientists). ● Structuralists claim that it is due to objective structures that the development of science takes place, eg, Merton - science is institutionalization of objective values. The structuralist overlook that human agents are creative, active and do change the structures. ● A dialectical approach tries to bridge this lacuna overlooked by action theory and structuralists where agents and structures change each other in the process of generating knowledge.
- 13. Problem of causality: The third problem is the question as to how the development of science is caused ? ● The Internalists claim that science is autonomous and has its own laws of development and is independent of external factors (Kuhn, Luhman). ● The externalists claim that science is dependent on external factors and determined by them (Marx). ● The dialectical approach claims that science prospers by the interplay of both the internal and external factors.
- 14. Problem of dynamics: The fourth problem is the problem of dynamics which problematizes how changes are to be incorporated into science ? According to the synchronous view, science changes slowly, continuously in a cumulative fashion (traditional). While the diachronic view, change as discontinuous, spontaneous revolutions (Kuhn - incommensurability thesis). ‘The synchronous accounts overlook radical changes while the diachronic are blind to permanent changes in the lower level of sciences’ (Fuchs). The dialectical approach claims that dynamics of science is a process where new innovations occur in stable phases and fundamental changes occur in the phase of instability.
- 15. What is the status of theoretical knowledge in SOMIS Realist side of SOMIS - A theory is a system of logically interconnected and related hypotheses. ● A hypothesis is a statement about the lawful character of a certain aspect of the world, it explains certain real phenomena. ● Theory is always nonlinear in the sense that there are numerous ways of representing parts of outside reality creatively in a theory. ● Theoretical knowledge is an informational relationship between a reflected reality and a symbolic reality.
- 16. The scientific totality of theories is a whole that can be described as a large hypertext. “A hypertext is a matrix of potential texts, only some of which will be realized through interaction with a user” (Lévy 1998) A hypertext is a self-referential system in the sense that when a new link is created the system refers to itself by actualizing its content The metaphor of science as a grand hypertext refers to the self-referential character of scientific texts. A scientific text by the way of citation refers to other scientific texts, it incorporates part of the history of science, and methodologically discusses other texts. Theories are structural aspects of science, they are produced and reproduced through human creative activities and enable and constrain further scientific practices (hence quasi realist as creativity in hypotheses is similar to projection) Two moments structures and actors who create…..
- 17. Two moments of science Scientific structures Scientific actors Theories Innovation related activities Research institutions Dissemination and interchange Technologies Funding related activities Journals Teaching Publications Public discourse Science funds Science policy Norms, values of scientific conduct Economic practices
- 18. Self organization process of scientific knowledge
- 19. Self-organization process of social systems
- 20. Cycle of science as self-organization ● In self-organization cycle there is bottom-up emergence of theoretical knowledge. ● On the contrary side of the cycle is the top-down emergence of experience and materiel effects ● Research progresses through a cyclical process, it neither consists solely of bottom-up induction or abstraction, nor solely by top-down deduction or concretization. It is a complex, cyclical, dialectical process.
- 21. Full cycle of self-organization of scientific knowledge (Fuchs)
- 22. Practical Truth Scientific truths are not absolute truths, they are truths-in-question, truths-in- discourse, and truths-in-conflict, and truths-in-development. Science is not value free it is connected through structures with production, power and ideology. Practical truth is connected to human conflicts and power relationships. Practical truth doesn’t simply explain how things are but how they can be changed for the better. It takes into account being-in-possibility and not-yet-being.
- 23. Conclusion ● Science as self-organizing meta-informative system is a dialectical process which bridges the subjectivist-objectivist position regarding the four problems (epistemology, structure, causality, dynamics) ● The theoretical entities and properties are projections rather than noumena they are things in the projected world rather than in some inaccessible world with which we are utterly unacquainted. ● Scientific truths are not absolute truths, they are truths-in- question, truths-in-discourse, and truths-in-conflict, and truths- in-development.
- 24. Works Cited C., Van Fraassen Bas. The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon, 1980. Print. Chalmers, A. F. What Is This Thing Called Science? Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1999. Print. Jennings, Richard. "Scientific Quasi-Realism." Mind XCVIII.390 (1989): 225-45. Print. Psillos, Stathis. "The Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate." Knowing the Structure of Nature (2009): 3-33. Print. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/1621/1/science.pdf
- 25. Glossary Meta-information - Science is a knowledge / information system in the sense that it produces knowledge about nature and society that is objectified in theories, it is a meta- information system in the sense that in its self-organization it produces information about information. Self-organization - it is a process where some form of overall order or coordination, arises out of the local interactions between smaller component parts of an initially disordered system. (the two moments actors and structures are the components)