Guidelines for Resilience Systems Analysis: How to analyse risk and build a roadmap to resilience

Guidelines for Resilience
Systems Analysis
How to analyse risk and build a roadmap
to resilience

This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed
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Please cite this publication as:
OECD (2014) Guidelines for resilience systems analysis, OECD Publishing.
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FOREWORD
Resilience means that states can better withstand environmental, political, economic and social shocks and
stresses. Bangladesh has become more resilient against floods as the government’s ability to warn and
evacuate people and control infectious diseases has improved. The recent peaceful democratic transitions in
El Salvador, Malawi and Indonesia are signs of stronger societies. Angola, Ghana, Mozambique and others
have set up natural resource stabilization funds and are less vulnerable to oil price shocks. Social capital, and
the fact that host families support displaced families, have shown to help protect people from shocks and
stresses in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
Resilience has been a key focus of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
since the financial crisis of 2008. The development and humanitarian communities also picked up on the
concept, prompted by a ground-breaking 2011 review of the United Kingdom’s humanitarian programme,
and later as a better way to respond to major food emergencies in the Horn of Africa, and then in the Sahel.
However, great ideas and political commitments mean little unless they have a real impact in the real world.
A major scoping study by the OECD showed that numerous obstacles were preventing the concept of
resilience from translating into better development and humanitarian programming on the ground. The
study found that field staff were cynical about the added value of resilience. Some even saw resilience as
just a term to insert into proposals to help attract new funding. People also found it difficult to understand
what resilience actually meant. Some narrowly interpreted resilience as ‘better’ food security and
livelihoods planning, or just another way to look at disaster risk reduction. Such cynicism and confusion
reinforced a feeling that resilience was just another ‘buzzword’ or ‘fad’, devoid of real meaning for
programming.
To counter this, OECD Development Assistance Committee members, together with other members of the
Experts Group on Resilience, asked for specific technical guidance – a simple “how to” guide – that would
allow people in the field to analyse what is needed to boost the resilience of specific groups, specific
systems, and specific programmes, to the risks people face every day. The results of this analysis are then
used to design new programmes to boost resilience, or to modify ongoing plans and actions.
This guidance is the end result of that work.
The guidance is aimed at professionals who are grappling with what resilience actually means, and how to
get key stakeholders to develop a shared vision of both the risks that exist in their particular context, and
what to do about them; both now, and in the longer term. We have called the outcome of the analysis a
roadmap to resilience because it is just that – a shared view of the way forward towards a more resilient
future.
The OECD will continue to support the resilience roadmap process as it is rolled out in contexts prone to
natural, climate, economic and/or geo-political shocks. Our members – major humanitarian and
development assistance providers – will use this approach to re-think their programming through a risk lens.
We will also support other organisations and states who seek to embed this approach into their programme
design processes.
I will watch this process with interest. Time has come for action and to show that resilience systems planning
can have a real positive impact, on the real lives of real people!
Erik Solheim
Chair, Development Assistance Committee

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This guidance has been prepared at the request of the OECD-led Experts Group on Risk and Resilience. The
process of developing and preparing the resilience systems analysis was led by Rachel Scott, Senior Advisor,
OECD under the overall guidance of Patti O’Neil and Brenda Killen (OECD Development Co-operation
Directorate). Andrew Mitchell and Astrid de Valon contributed significantly to the design and field testing of
the methodology, and to the documentation of the guidelines.
The methodology and the guidelines have been overseen by an Advisory Board of Experts, who have
provided invaluable comments and contributions throughout the process, including: Alexandra Vogl (Asian
Development Bank), Amanda Aspden (Australian Government Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade),
Barbara Abbentheren (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – GIZ), Dominque Albert
and Roger Bellers (European Union Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection - ECHO),
Luca Russo (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations), Marcus Oxley (Global Network of Civil
Society Organisations for Disaster Reduction), Choe Chang (International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies), Kimio Takeya (Japan International Cooperation Agency), Nadia Benani (Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation), Anita Shah (United Kingdom Department for International Development),
Daniel Maxwell (Tufts University), Maxx Dilley and Jo Scheuer (United Nations Development Programme),
Kirsten Gelsdorf, Hansjoerg Strohmeyer and Andy Thow (United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs), Marc Gordon and Gillian Holmes (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction),
and Hemang Karelia and Asbjorn Wee (World Bank). Particular thanks to Anita Shah for her thorough
reading of the final draft document.
The methodology was first applied in eastern Democratic of Congo, an exercise that provided valuable
practical insights on the use of the resilience systems analysis tool. Special thanks go to Yannick Brand, Mia
Jeong and Nona Zicherman of UNICEF, Democratic Republic of Congo, for hosting this process, and for their
excellent insights on how to improve the design of the analysis workshop and related processes. Thanks also
go to all those people working and living in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, who participated so
enthusiastically in that analysis process.
Finally, our thanks to Australia and Japan, who provided the funding for this work, and to Beth del Bourgo,
Stephanie Coïc and Raundi Halvorson-Quevedo for their invaluable editorial advice and for the preparation
of these guidelines for publication.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
WHAT IS A RESILIENCE SYSTEM ANALYSIS? ......................................................................................................... 1
Why should we do a resilience systems analysis? ........................................................................................... 1
What is the added value of resilience systems analysis, compared with risk management? ......................... 1
Who is involved in a resilience systems analysis? ............................................................................................ 2
How can we use the results of a resilience systems analysis? ......................................................................... 2
What are the limits of resilience systems analysis? ......................................................................................... 3
RESILIENCE SYSTEM ANALYSIS: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................... 4
What is a Risk? What is a Shock? ..................................................................................................................... 5
What is a System? ............................................................................................................................................ 5
What is Resilience? .......................................................................................................................................... 6
RESILIENCE SYSTEM ANALYSIS: A FOUR-STEP PROCESS ...................................................................................... 9
How long does a resilience systems analysis take? ....................................................................................... 10
STEP 1 – GOVERNANCE AND SCOPE .................................................................................................................. 11
How do we define the scope of the resilience systems analysis? .................................................................. 11
What is critical for a successful resilience systems analysis? ......................................................................... 12
How can we get the right stakeholders on board? ........................................................................................ 13
How can we ensure that people continue their support throughout the process? ...................................... 13
Who should take the lead in organising a resilience system analysis?.......................................................... 14
STEP 2 – PRE-ANALYSIS AND BRIEFING PACK .................................................................................................... 16
How do we build the briefing pack? .............................................................................................................. 17
Action 1: Determine the scoping question .................................................................................................... 17
Action 2: Understand root risks and flow on effects to secondary risks ....................................................... 18
Action 3: Evaluate the probability that the root risks will occur ................................................................... 20
Action 4: Identify the key components of the system ................................................................................... 21
Action 5: Analyse how each identified risk impacts each component of the system ................................... 23
Action 6: Determine overall severity of different risks on the system .......................................................... 24
What if we don’t have all the right data? ...................................................................................................... 24
Who should receive a copy of the briefing pack? .......................................................................................... 25
STEP 3 – THE WORKSHOP .................................................................................................................................. 26
Why a Workshop? .......................................................................................................................................... 26
Who should be invited to the workshop? ...................................................................................................... 26
How is the two-day workshop structured? .................................................................................................... 27
Who should write the workshop report? ...................................................................................................... 29
Who should get a copy of the workshop report? .......................................................................................... 29
STEP 4 – USING THE ROADMAP TO BOOST RESILIENCE .................................................................................... 30
STEP 5 - MEASURING RESILIENCE ...................................................................................................................... 33
System resilience indicators ........................................................................................................................... 33
Negative resilience indicators ........................................................................................................................ 35

Process indicators .......................................................................................................................................... 36
Output indicators ........................................................................................................................................... 36
Proxy impact indicators.................................................................................................................................. 37
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................................... i
NOTES ................................................................................................................................................................... ii
Index of tables
Table 1: Examples of actions that could strengthen the capacities of livelihoods systems (in different
contexts) .............................................................................................................................................................. 8
Table 2: Categories of actors who should be involved in a resilience systems analysis .................................... 14
Table 3: List of the ten risks analysed for the briefing pack in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo ............ 18
Table 4 : Example scales for probability of occurrence ..................................................................................... 20
Table 5: Example of a scale to assess impact ..................................................................................................... 23
Table 6 : Outputs from resilience systems analysis, and their uses................................................................... 32
Index of figures
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for the resilience systems analysis .................................................................. 4
Figure 2: Examples of key livelihoods assets for household and communities in eastern Democratic Republic
of Congo ............................................................................................................................................................... 6
Figure 3: The relationship between absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities for strengthening
resilience .............................................................................................................................................................. 7
Figure 4: Resilience System Analysis: Four Main Steps ....................................................................................... 9
Figure 5: Example of a timeline for Resilience System Analysis ........................................................................ 10
Figure 6: The four dimensions of the scoping question for a resilience systems analysis ................................. 11
Figure 7: The briefing pack for the analysis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo .................................... 16
Figure 8: Six actions to develop the briefing pack ............................................................................................. 17
Figure 9: The map of causes and effects of risks and stresses for eastern Democratic Republic of Congo ...... 19
Figure 10: Example of a risk profile in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo ................................................. 21
Figure 11: Risk heat map for eastern Democratic Republic of Congo ............................................................... 25
Figure 12: The five steps of the Resilience Systems Analysis Workshop ........................................................... 27
Figure 13: Overview of the workshop structure ................................................................................................ 28
Figure 14: Example of table to determine the indicators to measure system resilience .................................. 33
Figure 15: Example scale for % of children who are underweight .................................................................... 34
Figure 16: Example of table to determine the indicators to measure system resilience .................................. 34
Figure 17: Example of system resilience pre- and post- cholera epidemic ....................................................... 35
Figure 18: Example of severity analysis of negative resilience .......................................................................... 36

GLOSSARY OF RESILIENCE RELATED TERMINOLOGY
Covariate shock
Widespread infrequent events – which can be positive or negative – such as
violent conflict, volcanic eruptions or the sudden introduction of new technology,
e.g. cell phones
Critical threshold A point across which major change occurs in the system
Idiosyncratic shock Significant events that specifically affect individuals and families, such as the death
of the main breadwinner, or loss of income generating activity
Layers of society Individuals or groups of people with common characteristics. Depending on the
context, these might be households, communities, provincial groupings and
authorities or national groupings (the health system, a profession, etc.)
Resilience
The ability of households, communities and nations to absorb and recover from
shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for
living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty
Resilience boosting To manage the impact of shocks and future issues of risk, change and uncertainty,
by strengthening the capacity to absorb shocks, or adapting to reduce exposure to
shocks, or transforming so that the shock no longer has an impact on the system
Risk The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences
Risk heatmap A graphical representation of the severity of a risk
Shock A sudden event with an important and often negative impact on the vulnerability
of a system and its parts. Shocks represent significant negative (or positive)
impacts on people’s means of living and on the functioning of a state
Stress A long term trend, weakening the potential of a given system and deepening the
vulnerability of its actors
System A unit of society (e.g. individual, household, a group of people with common
characteristics, community, nation), of ecology (e.g. a forest) or a physical entity
(e.g. an urban infrastructure network).
Vulnerability An expression of susceptibility to harm, and exposure to hazard

WHAT IS A RESILIENCE SYSTEM ANALYSIS?
Everybody is talking about resilience. The idea that people, institutions and states need the right tools,
assets and skills to deal with an increasingly complex, interconnected and evolving risk landscape, while
retaining the ability to seize opportunities to increase overall well-being, is widely accepted.
In reality, however, it has not been easy to translate this sound idea into good practice, mostly because
people in the field don’t yet have the right tools to systematically analyse resilience, and then integrate
resilience aspects into their development and humanitarian programming.
This guidance aims to fix that problem.
In this document you will find a step by step approach to resilience systems analysis, a tool that helps field
practitioners to:
 prepare for, and facilitate, a successful multi-stakeholder resilience analysis workshop
 design a roadmap to boost the resilience of communities and societies
 integrate the results of the analysis into their development and humanitarian programming
Why should we do a resilience systems analysis?
We now know a great deal about different risks in developing countries. There are numerous risk analysis
tools, showing us where and when conflict is likely, which areas are exposed to natural disasters, modelling
how economic shocks and pandemics might spread, or how climate change will affect different communities
and regions.
However, we don’t yet share a vision of what to do about those risks; how to boost the resilience of
individuals, households, communities and states to the risks they face every day. Where should we invest
time, skills and funds to empower at-risk people, helping them to better absorb shocks, or adapt so that they
become less exposed to shocks, or transform so that shocks no longer occur?
A resilience systems analysis will provide key actors in the field with:
 a shared view of the risk landscape that people face
 an understanding of the broader system that people need for their all-round well-being
 an analysis of how the risk landscape affects the key components of the well-being system, which
components are resilient, which are not, and why
 a shared understanding of power dynamics, and how the use or misuse of power helps or hinders
people’s access to the assets they need to cope with shocks; and
 based on all of that, a shared vision of what needs to be done to boost resilience in the system, and
how to integrate these aspects into policies, strategies and development efforts at every layer of
society.
What is the added value of resilience systems analysis, compared with risk management?
Resilience systems analysis builds on, rather than replaces, traditional risk management approaches, by:
 adding elements that address the complexity and inter-linkages of different risks. It takes into
account, for example, how disasters can also trigger economic shocks, and how conflicts can also
leave people more exposed to disaster
 going beyond the “known knowns”, on which traditional risk management is based, to also account
for uncertainty and change, by exploring how long-term trends (stressors) such as climate change,
OECD: GUIDELINES FOR RESILIENCE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 1

governance and insecurity, economic marginalisation and volatility, environmental degradation, and
demographic changes can change the nature and impact of shocks in the future
 merging risk forecasting with critical reflection on how the system has performed in the past
 focusing on the system, not the risk, aiming to strengthen the systems that people use to support
their all-round well-being, no matter what risks they face, building on existing capacities
 understanding the importance of power relations in helping or hindering resilience
 taking into account both large scale (covariate) and small scale (idiosyncratic) shocks, given that
frequent, low impact events, like illness, can also have a devastating impact on people’s lives.
Who is involved in a resilience systems analysis?
The resilience systems analysis tool has been designed to be as light, fast and easy as possible. It does not
require “resilience experts”, but instead draws on expertise already available in different societies and their
systems. In addition, it requires minimal additional investment since it builds on existing assessments and
data.
Importantly, resilience systems analysis is also a flexible approach. Sharing data and expertise can allow
different actors to develop a solid analysis and useful roadmap within a short time-frame. Alternatively, the
methodology can also support a much more thorough process, depending on the end users’ needs and
objectives.
Finally, a resilience systems analysis also helps different types of key actors to centralise and exchange
existing information, and to reach consensus on risks and the priorities for boosting resilience. It creates an
enabling environment for shared planning and action, critical if we are to boost resilience across all aspects
of the system.
How can we use the results of a resilience systems analysis?
Many donors are requiring their partners to base their programming on a theory of change, linked to a log-frame
analysis: the resilience systems analysis facilitates both of these.
The outputs of a resilience systems analysis provide the platform for constructing a theory of change, often
used in development programming to support overall analysis, strategy and critical thinking1. A resilience
systems analysis provides information for the three key steps in constructing a theory of change:
 analysing the context
 exploring assumptions and hypotheses for changes in the future; and
 assessing evidence for future change.
The roadmap produced by the resilience systems analysis follows a theory of change logic. Using the theory
of change can help partners design programmes that are targeted at building resilience, or, even better, to
incorporate resilience boosting elements into existing programmes.
The resilience systems analysis also helps develop the logframes that are often used to document and
monitor humanitarian and development programmes. It does this by:
 providing a concrete vision of the desired programme impact, and outcomes
 showing how project outputs can contribute to these outcomes and impact; and
 providing better and more coherent risk information for the assumptions component of the
logframe.
In addition, as the resilience systems analysis is a shared process, it can also be used as the context analysis
and prioritisation exercise for joint planning exercises such as United Nations Development Assistance

Frameworks (UNDAFs), Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans (PRSPs), joint programmes such as compacts in
fragile contexts, and humanitarian Strategic Response Plans.
The process can also help design broad indicators of system resilience to guide and monitor more detailed
programme and project planning.
What are the limits of resilience systems analysis?
The quality of a resilience systems analysis is only as good as:
 the diversity and expertise of both the facilitation team, and of the participants in the workshop
 the quality and availability of relevant data
 the quality of the underlying contextual or risk analysis
In addition, the main purpose of resilience systems analysis is to provide valuable inputs into policies,
strategies and programmes, rather than to support detailed project design. Given the broad scope of the
risk landscape that is examined, a resilience systems analysis can only develop an aggregate vision of
strengths and weaknesses across the system.

RESILIENCE SYSTEM ANALYSIS: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In order to integrate resilience into programming, it is critical to understand the key concepts underpinning
resilience systems analysis. The analysis process, summarised in Figure 1:
 starts with an understanding of the risk landscape in a particular context
 looks at how those risks will affect society’s systems
 gathers information about how those systems are set up to cope with those risks, and whether this
makes them resilient
 determines what needs to be done to boost resilience; to help the different parts of the system to
either absorb those shocks, adapt so that they are less exposed to those shocks, or transform so that
the shock will no longer affect them
 the result is a resilient system, which will then change the overall context and risk landscape
Figure 1: Conceptual framework for the resilience systems analysis
Source: OECD
Boosting resilience is an iterative process: resilience programming targets specific societal systems and the
risk landscape affecting them. The outcomes of programming will, in turn, affect the context.

Boosting resilience involves:
 actively understanding the risk landscape and how it impacts on systems – how society functions in
each context
 determining at which layer of society those risks are best managed
 applying a set of resilience principles to strengthen the system’s capacity to absorb shocks or adapt
and transform so that they are less exposed to shocks.
The following questions explore selective aspects of this conceptual framework.
What is a Risk? What is a Shock?
A risk is the probability of a negative event and its negative consequences. A shock occurs when this risk
becomes reality. For example, a country may be at risk of earthquakes because it lies on a fault line. When
an earthquake actually hits, this is called a shock.
Resilience systems analysis considers different types of risks, shocks and stresses:
1. infrequent events with an impact on almost everyone in the target group, such as violent conflict,
volcanic eruptions or currency devaluations - covariate shocks
2. significant events that specifically affect individuals and families, such as the death of the main
breadwinner or the loss of income-generating activity - idiosyncratic shocks
3. seasonal shocks, such as annual flooding linked to the rainy season, food market price changes, or
recurring shocks such as frequent displacement or endemic cholera in particular communities
4. long term trends, weakening the potential of a system and deepening the vulnerability of its actors,
like increased pollution, deforestation, exchange rate fluctuations and electoral cycles - stresses.
Resilience systems analysis considers that:
 Specific shocks that affect families, and the cumulative impacts of seasonality and frequent low
impact events, are as important to analyse as headline-grabbing, major shocks. These idiosyncratic
shocks create recurring high costs for parts of society, and can, in some situations, be more of a
threat for households than covariate shocks2.
 It is critical to understand the cause and effect of stresses and shocks in the past, if we are to
properly understand and prioritise future risks.
 The risk landscape brings both risks and opportunities: both should be considered when looking at
how shocks and stresses affect systems and people.
What is a System?
Resilience systems analysis uses a systems approach. This is because the impact of a future shock – the risk –
is dependent on how society’s systems are set up to respond to shocks and change.
A system could be many things, including a unit of society (for example an individual or household, a
community, or a state), of the natural environment (for example a forest) or a physical entity (for example
an urban infrastructure network)3.
The system used as an example in these guidelines comes from the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach.
A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A
livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and
maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not
undermining the natural resource base (DFID, 1999)

The Sustainable Livelihoods system is a good basis for analysing the resilience of individuals, households, and
communities. Other systems can also be analysed using the resilience systems analysis methodology, for
example, an infrastructure network, or a hospital system or the different aspects of national institutions. In
these cases, the examples in these guidelines will need to be adapted.
Under the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach, the well-being of a community depends on a system with six
different categories of assets or “capitals” – financial, human, natural, physical, political, and social capital.
The assets that make up each of these categories of capital will differ from context to context. Figure 2
shows examples of the assets that make up the different categories of capital in eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo.
Figure 2: Examples of key livelihoods assets for household and communities in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Source: OECD and UNICEF (2014)
What is Resilience?
Resilience is the ability of households, communities and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst
positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses,
change and uncertainty (Mitchell, 2013).
Resilience can be boosted by strengthening three different types of capacities:
 Absorptive capacity: The ability of a system to prepare for, mitigate or prevent negative impacts,
using predetermined coping responses in order to preserve and restore essential basic structures
and functions. This includes coping mechanisms used during periods of shock. Examples of
absorptive capacity include early harvest, taking children out of school, and delaying debt
repayments.
 Adaptive capacity: The ability of a system to adjust, modify or change its characteristics and actions
to moderate potential future damage and to take advantage of opportunities, so that it can continue
to function without major qualitative changes in function or structural identity. Examples of adaptive
capacity include diversification of livelihoods, involvement of the private sector in delivering basic
services, and introducing drought resistant seed.

 Transformative capacity: The ability to create a fundamentally new system so that the shock will no
longer have any impact. This can be necessary when ecological, economic or social structures make
the existing system untenable. Examples of transformative capacity include the introduction of
conflict resolution mechanisms, urban planning measures, and actions to stamp out corruption.
Figure 3: The relationship between absorptive, adaptive and transformative capacities for strengthening resilience
Source: Béné et al (2012)
Often, these three capacities are used at the same time. For example, a coastal community in Bangladesh
may use its absorptive capacity to build barriers that will protect their resources against annual flooding; use
adaptive skills to alter how they cultivate crops and collect drinking water in new ways that guard against
the increasing salinity of groundwater associated with climate change, and transform the way they manage
natural resources by changing basic attitudes about the role and partnership of different community groups,
and the role of women.
Table 1 provides some examples of the three types of capacities, for different categories of capital within the
livelihood system.

Table 1: Examples of actions that could strengthen the capacities of livelihoods systems (in different contexts)
Absorptive capacity Adaptive capacity Transformative capacity
Financial
Capital
Support access to markets to increase the sale
of agricultural/livestock products
Setting up and linking savings groups, pooling
of community goods, mutual solidarity banks
Better access to micro-credit and revolving funds, to
encourage risk taking for new incoming generating activities
Introduction of e-banking mechanisms
Open a formal insurance market
Social protection systems.
Simplify and explain the tax law to limit corruption
Human
Capital
Integration of displaced children into new
schools in host communities
Use of traditional medicine
Social support groups to help families pay for
health care
Increase understanding of the rights of the child (including
education)
Establish formal health insurance schemes
Provide free education
Decentralise the healthcare system
Natural
Capital
Sale or slaughter of livestock
Moving to a more secure area
Vaccination
Reforestation
Setting and securing national park boundaries
Diversification of livestock holdings
Animal vaccination
Support to the REDD+ process
Reform of Land tenure Law: assuring proper planning and
synergies with different land users
Physical
Capital
 Strengthen committees in charge of
infrastructure maintenance
 Ensure community participation in planning
processes for community infrastructure
 Introduce new technologies: efficient combustion
fireplaces, recycling and improved management of waste,
alternative energy sources
Promote civic education in schools, including a component
on energy, environmental protection and climate change
Advocate for greater decentralisation of national budgets
and systems
Political
Capital
Better transparency and accountability in
community decision-making
 Support and strengthen local initiatives for
community meetings, and for land conflict
resolution
Support community organizations to participate in local
power structures, including greater inclusion of women and
different ethnic groups
Educate voters, strengthen democratic culture, and
increase dialogue between political parties
Advocate to improve election transparency
Educate citizens about democratic principles
Advocate for the respect and the reform of land-related
legislation
Social
Capital
Use of mediation and peace committees
Community networks for the protection of
children, youth patrols to prevent theft and
rape
Training of peace committees and other groups
Promotion of shared community spaces and natural
resources
Strengthen the role of women in community governance
Support the restoration of formal justice systems and
promote trust in these mechanisms
Reinforce women in leadership positions
Remove the stigmatisation of those suffering from rape and
other critical protection incidents

RESILIENCE SYSTEM ANALYSIS: A FOUR-STEP PROCESS
There are four main steps to a resilience system analysis.
Figure 4: Resilience System Analysis: Four Main Steps
Step 2: Pre-analysis
and
briefing pack
Step 3:
Workshop
Five steps of the workshop
Step 1: Governance
and scope
Step 4: Using
the roadmap to
boost resilience
Module 1
•Risks, stresses
and their
impact on
systems
Module 2
•Analysis of the
characteristics of
the system and
its components
Module 3
•Analysis of
stakeholders
and processes
influencing
the system
Module 4
•Identifying
gaps in the
system's
resilience
Module 5
•Developing a
roadmap to
strengthen
resilience

How long does a resilience systems analysis take?
The process is designed to be as light, fast and easy as possible.
For most people, this will mean providing access to their data and information during the preparation
phase, actively participating in a two day workshop, and using the results to inform their current and future
policies and programmes.
However, there is more work involved for the team who is leading and facilitating the analysis.
The timeline in Figure 5 gives an example of the time that was needed for each stage of the resilience
systems analysis undertaken in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Steps one and two, and the
preparation for step three, can be performed in parallel.
Figure 5: Example of a timeline for Resilience System Analysis
Step 1: Governance
and scope
Two months of discussions with
key stakeholders
and
briefing pack
2 weeks
Step 3:
Workshop
Workshop: 2 days
Preparation: 4 weeks
Report/roadmap: 1
week
Step 4: Using
the roadmap to
boost resilience
Ongoing process

STEP 1 – GOVERNANCE AND SCOPE
Step 1:
Governance and scope
Step 2:
Pre-analysis and
briefing pack
Step 3:
Workshop
Step 4:
Using the
roadmap to boost
resilience
Good governance of the resilience systems analysis process is critical. This step ensures that the right
stakeholders are involved in the analysis; helps set the stage for consensus around the main issues; and
allows a diverse group of people to develop a shared vision of risks, resilience, and priorities for the future.
This consensus and shared vision ensures that the resilience roadmap will be used to develop better policies
and programmes.
How do we define the scope of the resilience systems analysis?
There are four dimensions to setting the scope for the resilience systems analysis, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: The four dimensions of the scoping question for a resilience systems analysis
Source: OECD
It is important to get the scope of the analysis right. The scope should be narrow enough to ensure that it is
realistic, and it should also closely correlate to the scope of the participants’ policies and programmes, so
that the resulting roadmap can be applied without any further changes.

To set the scope for the analysis we need to answer this question: what are we looking to do? Boost the
resilience:
Of what system? The livelihoods system, with its six different categories of capital, is used for this analysis.
Of who? This depends on the target layer of society. Are we looking to boost the resilience of individuals,
communities, specific groups, or of a state and its institutions?
To what risk? We recommend taking a multi-hazard approach, and thus including geo-political, economic
and natural and environmental risks, and including both covariate (wide-ranging) and idiosyncratic (specific
to individuals) shocks. However, the analysis can also focus on a narrower set of risks.
Over what timeframe? The timeframe should normally correspond to the programming cycle. If programmes
are being planned out three years, then the analysis should also be for three years. Remember that the
longer the timeframe, the more likely it is that shocks will occur, but the more uncertain we will be about
how the system can cope with those shocks, and thus what we should do to support these capacities.
What is critical for a successful resilience systems analysis?
The success of the resilience systems analysis depends on three main factors:
 the rigour of the analysis
 access to multi-sectoral expertise and people who are knowledgeable about risks
 the quality and scope of the resilience roadmap
 ownership and use of the results to inform better policies and programming.
Getting this right means thinking very carefully about the governance of the process.
Here are some of aspects that are critical for success:
Timing: Timing is critical to motivating key people to participate in, and use, a resilience systems analysis.
Messages about resilience will probably be easier to pass during (or just after) a crisis, and in the run-up to
national and local elections. An analysis is more likely to be used if it is timed to coincide with key points in
donor and partner country planning and budgeting cycles – in the run-up to the annual state budget, for
example, or at the initial phases of country strategy development cycles, as input to individual agency
planning processes, and/or linked to the humanitarian planning cycle.
Political support: The support of respected leaders will help ensure that the right people are motivated to
participate in the analysis process, and that the results of the analysis are translated into policies and
programmes. Building this political support may require significant investment at the beginning of the
process, built on a clear understanding of the interests of the key decision-makers.
Money: In many contexts, the hint of potential new funding can provide a powerful incentive for changing
attitudes about risks and resilience, and motivating people to engage with a resilience systems analysis
process. Building resilience actually comes from working smarter and more coherently, rather than a raft of
new projects and new money. However, some seed funding will be necessary, especially to ensure that the
resilience systems analysis is properly resourced; donors should communicate their willingness to provide
these funds.
Clarity about the process: Everyone involved in the analysis must be clear about what they are doing, and
why, and they must understand what the words they are using mean. A clear scoping question will help key
people understand, and focus on, what they are analysing. Individual discussions with key actors prior to the
analysis can be a good investment, by ensuring that the process is clear. Terms like resilience need to be
clarified early in the workshop process.
Approach to transparency and accountability:
The following principles should be followed:
 Make the results easy to understand

 Record methods used, and levels of uncertainty
 Justify choices about including or excluding certain risks
 Identify sources of data
 Agree a protocol for using expert opinion to avoid bias and conflict of interest
 Clarify limitations on the accuracy or completeness of the data
 Consider independent evaluation of results
Where possible, it would be good to provide open access to risk data and models. However there are also
other things to consider, such as the cost of providing data, privacy, confidentiality and security. Partial
access to data, for example providing access to data on natural disaster hazards, but not to data on other
risks, may be one intermediate option.
How can we get the right stakeholders on board?
Ensuring that the right people are involved in the analysis is critical to its success. Here’s why:
Creating opportunities for building on existing relationships: Different donors, different parts of
government and different operational actors work in different ways, and address developmental challenges
at different layers of society. Bringing people together for a shared resilience systems analysis will help
exploit relationships among actors, increase access to potential development solutions, and uncover new
ways of working together. The analysis can also promote shared learning; understanding what works, and
what doesn’t, in a particular context.
A shared risk landscape and coherent plan: Analysing risks together will allow different actors to share
information (and thus increase access to new information) about risks, trends, and programming intentions.
A shared analysis will also increase ownership and buy-in for building resilience, and lead to more objective
discussions about how to strengthen resilience. A common picture of the risk landscape could also lead to
greater synergies between different development, climate change and humanitarian actors, perhaps leading
to joint programmes. Finally, a shared and more complete analysis of the risk landscape will decrease the
potential for unintended consequences.
Leveraging new funding mechanisms: A coherent, shared understanding of the risk landscape, and what
needs to be done about it, will open up opportunities for donors to seek additional funds from their head
offices. The analysis could also help raise the profile of high risk countries on the international stage –
potentially attracting new donors.
How can we ensure that people continue their support throughout the process?
Three main sets of actors should be involved in a resilience systems analysis – experts in risks, experts in
systems, and key decision-makers. Table 2 shows some examples of the types of people who can fill these
different categories – although who exactly to invite to the resilience systems analysis will differ from
context to context.
Some of the key stakeholders may be reluctant – at first – to commit to a shared resilience systems analysis.
Therefore, it is important to send the right messages, targeting the interests, and concerns, of the different
target groups.
Humanitarian actors will be more likely to participate in shared risk analyses if they understand that these
discussions will not adversely impact on humanitarian principles, nor require humanitarians to engage in
future joint programming. For humanitarians, the benefits of resilience systems analysis include the
potential to prioritise programming that addresses the root causes of crises, and to reduce dependency on
humanitarian funds for crisis mitigation efforts.

Development and climate change actors, including scientists and academics, will be more likely to come
together if the benefits of sharing information are made clear, including the possibility to ensure that issues
important for them, for example the environment, are taken into account in future programming.
Table 2: Categories of actors who should be involved in a resilience systems analysis
•Natural and climate risk: scientists and academics from local universities, environmental advocates
•Geo-political risk: local or international think-tanks, security/military analysts, and political
scientists
•Economic risk: central bank, economists, market traders, agriculture price analysts
Experts in Risk
•Human: education specialists, teachers, hygiene promotion actors
•Financial: commercial banks/credit institutions, mobile phone company, chamber of commerce,
traditional lending systems, social safety net actors, insurance industry
•Natural: park rangers, agriculture and forestry agencies, extractive industries
•Physical: water/electricity company, basic servicesproviders, transport/infrastructure actors,
engineers
•Political: lawyers, electoral commission staff, lobbysts, parliamentarians, military
•Social: religious leaders, community leaders, women's groups, protection actors, conflict prevention
actors, media
Experts in
Systems
•Local authorities, sectoral ministries, Ministry of Finance, parliamentarians, community leaders
•Senior donor officials
•Senior programming staff - heads of UN agencies, development banks, major NGOs, Red Cross/Red
Crescent movement, other operational actors
Key Decision-makers
Local communities and civil society actors will be more likely to participate in shared analyses if they know
that the results will be acted on by local and national authorities, and by donors.
Donors and the private sector will be interested in joining these processes if doing so is presented as
information-sharing, rather than binding them to joint actions.
Government actors, parliamentarians and Ministries of Finance can be persuaded to join resilience
analyses if they see that the process will give them greater clarity, and influence, over the range of
international operations in-country.
Risk analysts: Risk analysts are motivated by the idea that their analyses will actually be used in
programming. For example, in a context dominated by geo-political risk, scientists working on seismic or
flood risk, and economists concerned about exchange rate shocks, will be interested in joining a shared
analysis if it means that post-conflict actors will also include responses to “their” risks in new programming.
Local private sector: Typically, private sector actors have little access to the international aid community.
The analysis can therefore be highlighted as a networking opportunity. There is also the possibility for new
public-private partnerships, and for stubborn issues affecting the business climate, to be stressed to
policymakers.
Who should take the lead in organising a resilience system analysis?
Choosing who should lead the resilience systems analysis is important – but it will also vary from context to
context. Whoever is chosen must have sufficient political authority to ensure that the resulting roadmap is
effectively translated into policy and programming to build resilience.
For community and household resilience systems analyses, the lead should be a person who is perceived to
represent the range of interests of the community. In exceptional circumstances, the leadership role could
also be played by a prominent actor in the international community.
Technical expertise will also be required in two areas: risk analysis, and workshop facilitation.

In the analysis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the initial data analysis took two people three
weeks to complete – collecting the data, analyzing it, and presenting the results in the briefing pack (see
Step 2).
We found that it was important to have a neutral third party undertake the initial analysis – in this case the
OECD – so that there were no accusations of bias or conflict of interest in the results.
We also found that it was critical to have professional facilitation for the workshop, to ensure that the
process ran smoothly, that participants were kept interested and engaged over the two days, and to enable
the production of a professional report documenting the process and the roadmap.
Investing in these two areas – risk analysis and workshop facilitation – was a critical success factor.

STEP 2 – PRE-ANALYSIS AND BRIEFING PACK
Step 1: Governance
and scope
and
briefing pack
Step 3:
Workshop
Step 4: Using
the roadmap to
boost resilience
It is important that participants arrive at the workshop well prepared, with a common understanding of key
concepts, and a shared initial analysis of the risk landscape. This will allow the workshop to focus on
structured discussions, sharing of ideas, and the development of the resilience roadmap. The best way to do
this is to develop a briefing pack, based on a preliminary analysis of data and reports from a wide range of
trusted sources.
The analysis for the briefing pack is not scientific research, but rather a process to capture and synthesise
existing data and information in a way that participants will easily understand, whether or not they are
experts in risks or livelihoods systems. The aim is to produce an executive summary, to help participants to
reflect on what is known about risk and resilience, and thus ensure more informed discussions as they build
the resilience roadmap.
Ideally, the briefing pack is prepared by a neutral third party, to avoid accusations of bias in the analysis and
synthesis process. The third party should have an understanding of the context, to ensure that the briefing
pack products are a “good enough” description of the risk landscape and its impact on the livelihood
systems of the target groups.
Figure 7: The briefing pack for the analysis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
The briefing pack for the April 2014 resilience systems
analysis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
(seen here) included information on the main
concepts linked with risk and resilience, and outlined
how systems had been defined in line with the
Sustainable Livelihoods Approach.
The briefing pack also included a preliminary analysis
of specific information and analysis relevant to the
DRC context. This information was based on a review
of data and documents provided by many different
stakeholders. Sharing this information was very useful
to help facilitate discussions and exercises during the
workshop itself.
The briefing pack was sent to participants one week
before the workshop.
The full briefing pack (in French) can be accessed at:
www.oecd.org/fr/cad/gouvernance-developpement/
Briefing%20Dossier.pdf

How do we build the briefing pack?
Figure 8 summarizes the six actions that help develop the various products required for the briefing pack.
For each action, we highlight the types of input required and the potential sources of this data and
information.
Figure 8: Six actions to develop the briefing pack
Action 1: Determine the scoping question
The scope of the resilience systems analysis needs to be documented at the start of the briefing pack. The
scoping question was determined in Step 1 of the analysis, through consultations with key stakeholders. It
must be realistic, i.e. not overly broad, and relevant, i.e. linked to future policy and programming processes.

Action 2: Understand root risks and flow on effects to secondary risks
This helps highlight the cause and effect relationship between primary and secondary risks in the current
context. To do this, the analyst, supported by the lead agency, will need to review all major authoritative
reports on the context, triangulating where possible with quality primary and secondary data sources. It
helps if the analyst has a good understanding of the context, as this will help them validate the information
being processed.
Using an analytical approach similar to problem tree analysis, the analyst will then develop a one-page
overview of the relationships between primary and secondary risks, and related stresses, in this specific
context. One example is shown in Figure 9. It is important to differentiate covariate and idiosyncratic risks
and stresses, as well as colour-code them according to the categories of risk that are being assessed in this
analysis, using different colours for natural/environmental, geo-political and economic risks.
This graphical representation will help workshop participants understand how different stresses make the
system more exposed to certain risks, and how one risk may then lead to another. Understanding
weaknesses and risks in the context, and how they affect each other, allows policy makers and operational
programmers to target the most critical weaknesses of the system, and therefore also block or limit any
possible secondary effects.
For example, the risk of displacement in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is not a root risk, but actually
a consequence of other risks, including the risk of conflict or of volcanic eruption. Some risks are also
heightened by the presence of stresses: the risk of price volatility in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is
compounded by the dual stresses of a high dependency on exports, and an unfavourable business
environment.
Based on the results of this analysis, the analyst, together with the hosting organisation, will then identify a
list of the (up to) 15 major root risks, which will be analysed further.
Table 3 highlights the ten risks selected for the resilience systems analysis in eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo.
Table 3: List of the ten risks analysed for the briefing pack in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Covariate risks Idiosyncratic risks
Natural Climate hazard (erosion, landslides, rock slides,
floods)
Volcanic, seismic events and gas eruptions
Epizooties and plant diseases
Endemic diseases and epidemics*
Geopolitical Troubles linked with the 2014 Democratic
Republic Of Congo elections and the 2015
Burundi elections
Land-related conflict
Conflict related to war-time economy
Protection incidents
Economic Price volatility and exchange rate fluctuation Loss of income generating activities
* Note that in certain circumstances, endemic diseases and epidemics could be classified as covariate risks

Figure 9: The map of causes and effects of risks and stresses for eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

Action 3: Evaluate the probability that the root risks will occur
The next step is to analyse secondary data or interview experts in relation to each of the root risks identified in
Action 2. This will allow the analyst to complete the first half of the risk profiles (example in Figure 10). The
following information is required to fill out the risk profile:
 Type of risk (idiosyncratic or covariate)
 Hazard type (natural, geopolitical, economic, etc.)
 Related stresses (long term trends, aggravating factors)
 Risk description (summary of what is known about the characteristics of this risk)
 Past shocks and scenarios (examples of historical occurrences of the shock, and their impacts)
 Possible impacts (description of possible impact on different system components derived from past
impacts and scenario exercises)
 Main sources of information (reference to the documents reviewed)
To evaluate the probability that each root risk will occur, the analyst can refer, for example, to existing
contingency plans, national risk assessments, expert analyses and/or statistics from insurance companies.
The data will often be incomplete, especially as far as geo-political risks are concerned. In these cases, the
analyst will need to subjectively assess the probability, based on research undertaken. It is important that these
assessments are verified by a control group of experts, before the briefing pack is distributed.
The scale for the probability should be simple so that the workshop participants can understand it easily, even if
this means that the scale may be slightly arbitrary.
Table 4 shows some example tables.
Table 4 : Example scales for probability of occurrence
Scale Likelihood of occurrence Probability of occurrence per year
4 Frequent or very likely >33%
3 Moderate or likely 10%-33%
2 Occasional 3%-10%
1 Unlikely 1%-3%
0 Not applicable
Scale Meaning Probability in %
4 Very likely Almost sure that this risk will create a shock within a year
3 Likely Between 10% and 100% probability in one year
2 Possible Between 1% and 10% probability in one year
1 Unlikely Less than 1% probability in one year
0 Not applicable

Figure 10: Example of a risk profile in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Action 4: Identify the key components of the system
The aim of this step is to determine the key components of the system that the resilience systems analysis is
looking at. To demonstrate this we will use the sustainable livelihoods approach, which analyses the system in
terms of impacts on different types of “capital” (Figure 2).
The analyst’s job is to list the assets that make up each of these six types of capital in the current context.
Classification is not an exact science, as some assets can be classified in different ways. For example, a cow can
be considered as natural capital (for its milk), as physical capital (to plow the fields) or as social capital (for
dowry).

The following table provides examples of assets for each group of capital. This could serve as a starting point;
the analyst will then add or remove the assets depending on the context.
Capital Asset
Financial Additional production for sale
Banking facilities
Credit/ savings group
Formal employment
Gifts / Donations
Income to cover basic needs
Informal employment
Savings
Transfer of funds
Human Competencies, knowledge, habits
Education
Health
Vocational skills
Natural Biodiversity of the environment
Forest
Land for agriculture / livestock
Livestock
Minerals
Rivers and waterholes
Source of drinking water
Physical Commodities
Drinking Water
Energy
Essential Household items
Means of Transportation, Livestock
Productive Land/Productive capital
Sanitation
Shelter
Social Infrastructure
Political Access to those in authority
Knowledge of rights and duties
Membership in political parties
Participation in community meetings
Participation in community organizations influencing local power structures
Participation in democratic processes (elections, decentralization)
Social Community committees
Formal/informal conflict management mechanisms
Informal social interaction
Measures to protect girls and boys
Membership in formal community groups
Mutual support
Participation of women in community life

Action 5: Analyse how each identified risk impacts each component of the system
Here the analyst determines how each of the risks identified in Action 2 will impact on each of the system
components identified in Action 4. In this way, we get an overall picture of:
 how individual risks will likely affect different parts of the system; and
 where the system is most exposed to risks, and where it is not.
In an ideal world, the analyst would refer to quantitative data measuring the state of a system component both
before and after a shock, to determine the magnitude of the impact of different shocks. However, data is more
likely to be available for some assets – for example assets in the physical capital group – than for others.
Indeed, it may be difficult to find data on how social and political assets have reacted to different shocks in the
past. In this case, the analyst will need to refer to secondary data, reports and perhaps even expert interviews,
to determine the likely impacts.
To document the analysis, the analyst would prepare a table showing the list of assets from Action 4, the
assessed impact of each risk on each asset, and a justification of the assessment.
The example below shows an excerpt of the analysis of the likely impact of epizooties (animal diseases) and
plant diseases on the different system assets in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. For the social assets,
“community committees” might not be affected but “trust in institutions” might be slightly affected if the state
institution is not able to control the animal or plant disease.
Example of Analysis for the risk “Epizooties and Plant Disease” on two assets in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Capital Detailed list of Asset Estimated impact of
the specific risk on
the specific asset
Justification
Social Community Committee 0
Social Trust in institutions 2 Institution unable to provide warnings or introduce control measures
… …
Table 5 shows an example of a scale that could be used to document the impact.
Table 5: Example of a scale to assess impact
Scale of Impact
0 Not applicable The shock does not affect this system component
1 Negligible The shock only minimally affects this system component
2 Limited The shock affects this system component in a limited and temporary manner
3 Substantial The shock substantially affects this system component into the medium to long
term
4 Critical The shock profoundly and permanently affects this system component
After having filled out the table, the analyst will calculate:
 the average impact of the risk on each group of assets (each capital) in the system – for example the
average impact of plant and animal diseases on social capital assets. This is done by taking a
mathematical average of all the impact scores for that group of assets.
 in some settings, the average may not give a realistic score of the severity of the impact. This may
happen when one key asset (one aspect of social capital) is assessed as severely impacted by a
particular shock, but the other assets (other aspects of social capital) are not impacted at all. In this

case, the analyst may choose to take an average of only those assets that are affected by the particular
shock, by excluding all the assets that have scored zero. In this case, the analyst can state that the score
is an average of the impact on all assets affected by that shock.
 the average impact of that risk on the system as a whole. This is calculated as the average impact on
each of the six capitals.
This analysis results in the following graph:
This graph, and the calculation of overall impact of this risk on the system, is then integrated into the risk profile
(Figure 10).
Action 6: Determine overall severity of different risks on the system
Severity is calculated by multiplying the probability of occurrence of a risk, calculated in Action 3, with the
overall impact of the risk on the system, calculated in Action 5.
The severity value can be entered in the final line of the risk profile.
This information then lets the analyst create the risk heatmap. The heatmap plots the probability of a risk
occurring on one axis, and the impact of the risk on the system, on the other axis.
An example is shown in Figure 11.
Other risk maps could also be developed if there is sufficient data, using a geographic information system (GIS).
For example, a physical map of the analysis area, showing layers of risk, can help people visualise and analyse
risks, and also help them to understand relationships between different types of risks.
What if we don’t have all the right data?
The role of the lead agency organising the workshop is critical for the data collection process. The lead agency
can:
 provide a list of relevant databases and facilitate access to information
 prepare a desk review of key information and reports
 circulate a message to key stakeholders to ask them to share key documents and datasets that could be
useful for the briefing pack.
In an ideal situation, the briefing pack should be compiled from existing risk analyses and reports. However, in
many countries data and analyses might be out-of-date, patchy or not available. In this case the briefing pack
will need to be developed using a more qualitative approach.
For example, the analysis of the severity of the impact of different risks in the eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo was derived from qualitative interpretations of different data and reports. In this case, the triangulation
(cross-checking) of different products before circulating the briefing pack and during the workshop was key to
ensuring the credibility of the analysis.

Figure 11: Risk heat map for eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Key
Risks:
Yellow:
economic
Green:
natural/
environmental
Blue:
geopolitical
Pink:
specific to
Goma and Lake
Kivu area.
Triangles:
idiosyncratic
risks.
Circles:
covariate risks.
It is important to mention areas where there the analyst has found no, or insufficient, data, as this can help
trigger reflection about how to overcome these data gaps in the future. For example, participants may prioritise
research to provide in-depth scientific risk assessments about those hazards that have been assessed as high
risk, but where there is currently limited information.
Who should receive a copy of the briefing pack?
The briefing pack should be sent to workshop participants at least one week before the start of the workshop. It
should be accompanied with a message explaining its purpose, and encouraging participants to read the
contents before the workshop starts.
The message that accompanies the briefing pack should acknowledge all the stakeholders who contributed to
the briefing pack, including those who have provided access to databases, secondary data and expert reports. It
should also clarify that the analysis in the briefing pack is a preliminary analysis, it is not a scientific publication,
and its primary purpose is to serve as an initial foundation for discussions during the workshop.

STEP 3 – THE WORKSHOP
Step 1: Governance
and scope
and
briefing pack
Step 3:
Workshop
Step 4: Using
the roadmap to
boost resilience
Why a Workshop?
The resilience systems analysis is a participatory, multi-stakeholder process.
Although the preliminary analysis of risk data can be done by a neutral third party and summarized in a briefing
pack, the analysis itself, and the prioritization of actions to boost resilience for any particular context, can only
be done by those key stakeholders who will actually implement the roadmap to resilience.
The workshop structure, and the design of participatory exercises, are intended to guide discussions and
activities to reach this objective. The workshop takes 2 days.
The workshop will help:
 Reach a common understanding about risk and resilience in the current context, including:
o the principles of risk and resilience
o how a society’s systems are structured
o how risks impact different parts of the system; and
o where the system is resilient, and where it is weak.
 Demonstrate the relevance of risk and resilience to the work of participants
 Set the tone for consensus-building, enabling participants to design a roadmap to boost resilience.
Who should be invited to the workshop?
Experience has shown that a resilience systems analysis workshop is very popular, and that many people will
want to participate. However, for the best results, both for a rigorous analysis, and for the resulting roadmap to
actually drive better programming, it is important to involve only the right people.
In Step 1, we discussed the three main sets of actors that should be involved in a resilience systems analysis –
experts in risks, experts in systems, and key decision-makers. To ensure that these people actually attend the
workshop, the organisers should market the workshop as an exclusive event, addressed to specific invitees
only. Risk and systems specialists are more likely to want to attend an event where they will have access to real
decision-makers. Decision-makers are more likely to attend if they know they will have access to real experts, as
well as new and interesting information.
Limiting the total participants to about 40 people is helpful, to ensure genuine participation and productive
debate.
In most cases, this will mean that only one person from each organization should attend, and that others who
would like to participate will have to be turned away. This message can be softened by ensuring that all data
and information – including from people who must be turned away from the workshop – is included in the
initial risk mapping process, and by sharing the results of the workshop with these wider groups, both in the
form of a written report, and, where possible, through a general presentation soon after the workshop has
taken place.

How is the two-day workshop structured?
The workshop spans two days and is organised into five modules. The structure is shown in Figure 12 and Figure
13. By the end of the workshop, participants will be able to:
 Describe concepts linked to resilience such as risks, shocks, stresses, vulnerabilities and capacities
 Share a vision of current and future risks and their impact on the system
 Develop a roadmap to boost the system’s resilience.
Figure 12: The five steps of the Resilience Systems Analysis Workshop

Figure 13: Overview of the workshop structure
Module Module Aim By the end of the module participants will be able to :
Day 1
Introduction
What is
resilience?
Provide an overview of
definitions and concepts
related to resilience
 Define key words including: idiosyncratic and covariate
shocks, risk and stresses.
 Describe the added value of resilience compared for risk
management.
 Explain the three types of capacities which contribute to
strengthening resilience.
Module 1 :
Risks, stresses
and their impact
on systems
Share a vision of the risks
affecting the system under
analysis, including the
covariate, idiosyncratic and
low-impact recurring shocks,
as well as stresses and their
roles
 Identify the key events and stresses that have impacted
on, and will impact on, the system
 Describe the cause and effect relationships between
these shocks and stresses
 Plot the likelihood and probable impact of shocks on the
system
 Prioritise the most severe risks, both now and within the
agreed timeframe
Module 2
Analysis of
system parts
Explain how different risks
affect the various parts of the
system, and understand
where the system is resilient
and where it is weak
 Explain why some parts of the system are less affected,
and some more affected, by potential shocks
 List how priority system components are absorbing
shocks, or adapting to make them less exposed to
shocks (their current capacities for resilience)
Day 2
Module 3
Power analysis
of stakeholders
and processes
influencing the
system
Analyse how stakeholders
and processes influence the
level, quality and access to
different parts of the system
 Identify key stakeholders influencing the system
 List the processes through which they are influencing
different parts of the system, in term of level, quality
and access
 Map stakeholders’ current and future influence on the
system
Module 4
Identifying gaps
in the system’s
resilience
Share a vision of the priority
gaps in system resilience,
both now and in the future
 For each part of the system, document current policies
and programmes that help boost the capacity of the
system to absorb shocks, or adapt or transform to
become less exposed to the shock
 Analyse what we know so far; the risk landscape and
how this affects the system, power dynamics, and
policies and programmes that support different parts of
the system
 Determine the priority gaps in resilience
Module 5
Constructing a
roadmap to
boost resilience
Construct a roadmap to
boost resilience in the short,
medium and long term
 Decide on measures to fill the priority resilience gaps
and boost system resilience
 Identify which stakeholders to engage
 Prioritize and sequence actions to build resilience
 Brainstorm on a results measurement framework
The detailed Facilitator’s Guide, published alongside this guidance, is designed to support the organisation of
the workshop.

It includes:
 Detailed section plans
 PowerPoint slides you can adapt to your own context and workshop
 Facilitator’s preparation and facilitation notes to accompany each slide
 Logistical and administrative arrangements, and a list of handouts
Who should write the workshop report?
The host organisation and facilitation team are in charge of capturing the information from the group work
exercises in the workshop. The main facilitator can lead the write-up of the report, a process that generally
takes around one week.
The structure of the workshop report can be based on the report prepared after the resilience systems analysis
in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. You can download the original version in French, or an English
translation, from:
www.oecd.org/dac/governance-development/
aresilienceroadmapforeasterndemocraticrepublicofthecongo.htm
Who should get a copy of the workshop report?
The workshop report should be sent to different stakeholders, for different purposes:
Who Purpose
All workshop participants To recognise the commitment and contributions of participants, and to
demonstrate the value of their ideas and discussions.
To encourage participants to continue their collaboration, and to use the
results of the analysis to inform policymaking, planning and programme
implementation
Contributors to the Briefing Pack To acknowledge their contributions and show how the data they provided
has been used, and to encourage further collaboration, for example to
establish measurement indicators
In-country experts in risk,
systems and resilience
To show how their speciality areas have been taken into consideration and
to encourage shared planning exercises in the future
Key decision-makers To advocate for their support to this holistic vision, as a basis for future
programming
Donors To use the shared understanding of the current and future risk landscape,
and the roadmap, as tools to orientate funding decisions, and leverage new
sources of funds
Resilience experts worldwide To share the latest lessons from resilience systems analysis, to strengthen
material on lessons learned from various contexts.
Additional communications could accompany the release of the report, such as blog posts and social media, an
executive summary for high level decision-makers, a ready made presentation for advocacy purposes and other
communications tools and efforts, as appropriate.

STEP 4 – USING THE ROADMAP TO BOOST RESILIENCE
Step 1: Governance
and scope
and
briefing pack
Step 3:
Workshop
Step 4: Using
the roadmap to
boost resilience
The resilience systems analysis gathers together the main stakeholders across different layers of society, from
different sectors, and with different programming and risk management expertise; this helps to break down
silos. The resulting roadmap to resilience shows what policy and programming changes are needed to boost
resilience in a particular context, prioritised in terms of i) urgent actions, ii) medium-term actions and iii) actions
that can be started much later.
In most contexts, individual organisations and actors will choose which of the actions on the roadmap to
implement, based on their specific mandates, expertise, programming timeframes, and resources. Different
actors can “do” certain things, through policy change and programming, other actors can use their power to
“influence” change, and in other areas, a shared advocacy strategy could be useful. All of the actions prioritised
by the roadmap should be picked up by at least one actor.
In other settings, the workshop outputs can serve as a platform for a more detailed collective planning and
division of labour. For example, they could be useful to provide the overall analysis that guides New Deal4
compacts, Humanitarian Strategic Response Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans, and United Nations
Development Assistance Frameworks.
Below is a guide to how the various products developed during the resilience systems analysis can be used by
different stakeholders:
Country-based senior management of aid organisations:
The major synthesis products, including the risk heat map, power map and the roadmap for boosting resilience
can be used to inform country strategies, as inputs to programme planning exercises (as a theory of change), to
inform the review of progress on existing programming, and as a basis for evaluation frameworks. For donors,
synthesis outputs can also inform funding allocations, ensuring that risk and resilience aspects are properly
integrated into the partner’s planning.
Field technical experts:
The outputs that summarise the strengths and weaknesses in the system, particularly how different actions
contribute to boosting the capacities of resilience, can inform technical policy and best practice, both in the
context that has been analysed, and also to inform good practice in other, similar, settings. Discussions in the
workshop also allow for a cross-fertilisation of expertise and ideas between technical experts working on
diverse subjects and themes. This process can provide technical experts with a more holistic analysis of the
context, on which to build better policies and programmes.
Field project management staff:
The detailed sheets on how risks, and the various capacities for resilience, affect the livelihoods system, and the
final roadmap for boosting resilience, provide a solid platform for informing a theory of change. They can also
be used as the basis of programme/project log frame analyses, in that they clearly show how inputs and
activities can produce long-term impacts.

Headquarters staff:
Major synthesis products, including the risk heat map, power map, and the roadmap for boosting resilience, can
be used to:
 inform country policies and provide information used to analyse strategy, programme or project
demands; and
 export best practices to other country teams, and to inform global technical policy.
Using individual products from the workshop
The workshop structure and methodology also enables participants to produce different resilience analysis
products.
Table 6 highlights examples of these outputs, and provides suggestions about how each of them can be used to
boost resilience.

Table 6 : Outputs from resilience systems analysis, and their uses
Resilience
systems
analysis
output
Summary of output Use
Risk profiles
Detailed information on the
characteristics of each major risk
and potential impact on
livelihood assets
Helps decide which risks to prioritise for programming, and to
better understand the characteristics of those risks, and where
and how they impact on the system.
Impact of
risks on
system
components
(part of the
risk profile)
Allocates the combined impact
of major shocks on a series of
key livelihood assets, and ranks
these from most to least
impacted
Can help prioritise programming towards the most risk-prone
parts of the system, and help sequencing of programming from
reinforcing most risk-prone to least risk-prone assets. The
ranking helps actors understand what parts of livelihood
systems are more prone (weakness in the system) and less
prone (strengths in the system) to the impact of shocks. This
gives an indication of how future shocks are likely to impact on
the system, even where the nature and timing of these shocks
is uncertain.
Shock and
stress map
Provides an overall picture of the
risk landscape, including cause
and effect linkages between
long-term stresses, and covariate
and idiosyncratic shocks.
Helps with strategic decision making, ensuring that policies and
programmes target the root causes of risks, as well as the main
stresses (those that increase the severity of the risk)
Risk heat
map
Compares the relative risk of
different events
Helps to prioritise which risks to address with policies and
programmes, by focusing on the highest likelihood, highest
impact shocks
Risk
landscape per
vulnerable
group
Demonstrates how different
vulnerable groups are impacted
by the risk landscape
Used to ensure that solutions for managing risk and boosting
resilience address the specific risks for each vulnerable group
Livelihood
capital
sheets: risk,
weaknesses,
strengths
Explains why each system asset
is more or less prone to shocks
and how that asset is resilient (or
not) to those potential shocks.
Helps target weaknesses in the system, and shows how to
reinforce and exploit lessons from strengths in the system.
Used to map and explain why parts of the livelihood system
are relatively weak or strong.
Power map
Maps the main stakeholders
influencing livelihoods, showing
their relative power (strong to
weak), influence (positive or
negative), and the layers of
society they operate at.
Used to ensure that programming also targets the key actors
that control access to household livelihood assets, and that
actions are taken to empower people to make optimal
decisions about how they use their assets.
Roadmap for
the short-,
medium- and
long-term
Prioritises and sequences the
different actions that should be
be taken to reinforce the
absorptive, adaptive and
transformative capacities of
people and their livelihoods
systems.
Used as an overall vision for what policy and programming
changes are needed to boost resilience in a particular context.
Prioritises these into urgent actions, medium term actions, and
actions that can be started much later.
Individual organisations can choose which of the actions on the
roadmap to implement, based on their specific mandates,
expertise, timeframes and resources
Databases
per capital,
per layer
Provides an initial overview of
what databases exist and at what
layer(s) of society they target.
Used to gain an initial understanding of how existing data and
information could be used to track the levels and quality of
assets; a key dimension to measurement of the impact of
policies and programmes to boost resilience.

STEP 5 - MEASURING RESILIENCE
The results of the resilience systems analysis can help monitor and measure resilience in a particular context.
Different types of indicators can be used to deepen our understanding of system resilience, and thereby help
refine and modify plans, policies and programmes to boost resilience. These indicators can be categorized as:
 System resilience indicators (outcome indicators) look at the resilience of the main components of the
system over time, including how the overall well-being of people and the system is affected when
shocks actually occur, for example how political capital is affected by an actual earthquake, or how
social capital is affected by new or escalating conflict. These indicators should be complemented by
negative resilience indicators.
 Negative resilience indicators look at whether people are using strategies to boost resilience that may
have negative impacts on other areas of the system, for example turning to crime to deal with
unemployment; or negative impacts on certain vulnerable people, for example by reducing the number
of meals eaten a day, or taking children out of school
 Process indicators ensure that the resilience roadmap is being used in policy making and programming
 Output indicators show the results of implementing different parts of the resilience roadmap
 Proxy impact indicators help show the results of resilience programming. These must be used with
caution, but can be necessary when other more nuanced measures (such as system resilience
indicators) are difficult to create, or difficult to communicate to a specific target audience.
System resilience indicators
During the workshop we collected two important sets of information that will help us monitor system resilience
and well-being:
 A list of the key system components
 A matrix showing all the indicators and datasets that currently exist in this particular context
The first step towards developing the basket of indicators that will help us monitor system resilience is to map
out a table that matches the list of key system components, with the indicators that are currently being used to
monitor those components (Figure 14).
Figure 14: Example of table to determine the indicators to measure system resilience
Capital Asset Indicator Source
Human Formal Education Proportion of girls, and boys, attending school UNICEF
Proportion of classes with less than 55 students UNICEF
Vocational Education No indicator
Physical and mental
health
Mortality rate per 10,000 people per day
# of confirmed cholera cases per week
# of new disease cases per 1000 people per month
% of births that were facilitated by a midwife
Health of babies and
children
Mortality rate per 10,000 children under 5 per day
Incidences of diarrhea in children under 5 every 2 weeks
% of children under 1 vaccinated for childhood diseases
% of children who are underweight
Physical Etc….
Note that, in some contexts, there may be many different indicators linked to some system components. For
other components, perhaps no indicators are being collected at the moment.

Typically, in a country in crisis, you will find many indicators to measure physical capital (indicators that look at
water, shelter etc.) and human capital (health, education, etc.) but fewer indicators that show the state of
social, political, natural and financial capital. However, this will vary from context to context.
Next, you will need to look at the table and ask:
Are there system components that are really critical for overall resilience, that we are not currently measuring,
i.e. they do not currently have an indicator? Often, there are no indicators measuring the state of the key
political assets, for example. In these cases you might decide to develop and collect a new indicator.
The third step is to decide which indicators will make up the baskets that measure each of the types of capital
underpinning local systems (human, social, physical, etc.). In Figure 14, the indicators that the participants have
chosen not to use for the human capital basket have been barred out.
Finally, you will need to ensure that the scale is comparable across all the indicators. This will help you add the
score from, for example, the proportion of girls and boys attending school, to the mortality rate per 10,000
people per day.
A scale like this could be used for each indicator, or it could be adapted to your context. An example of a scale
for % of children who are underweight is shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15: Example scale for % of children who are underweight
Score Meaning Relating to this indictor
0 No impact on this system component (in this case health
of babies and children)
MUAC over 135mm
1 Minimal impact MUAC between 125mm and
135mm
2 Significant impact, effects are limited and temporary MUAC between 115mm and
125mm without oedema
3 Significant impact, effects will be felt into the medium or
long-term, and/or irreversible
MUAC between 115mm and
125mm with oedema
4 Major impact, the system component has been
profoundly and permanently affected
MUAC less than 115mm
Finally, you need to set up a spreadsheet to calculate the basket score for each capital, as shown in Figure 16.
Figure 16: Example of table to determine the indicators to measure system resilience
Capital Asset Indicator Score based on
scale
Human Formal Education Proportion of girls, and boys, attending school 2
Proportion of classes with less than 55 students
Vocational
Education
New indicator required 3
Physical and mental
health
Mortality rate per 10,000 people per day 3
# of confirmed cholera cases per week
# of new disease cases per 1000 people per month
% of births that were facilitated by a midwife 2
Health of babies and
children
Mortality rate per 10,000 children under 5 per day 3
Incidences of diarrhea in children under 5 every 2
weeks
% of children under 1 vaccinated for childhood
diseases
1
% of children who are underweight 2
AVERAGE (BASKET) SCORE FOR HUMAN CAPITAL 2.29

The well-being of different parts of the system (the different capitals) can then be shown graphically, helping to
analyse trends over time, or to look at the impact of various shocks on the system, as in Figure 17.
Figure 17: Example of system resilience pre- and post- cholera epidemic
Human
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Social
Political
Natural
Financial
Physical
June, post cholera epidemic
January
Looking at the chart in Figure 17, we see that the cholera epidemic has not affected natural or political capital,
and has affected physical capital only slightly. However, human, social and financial capitals have been badly
affected by this shock – obviously key assets in those parts of the system are not at all resilient. This
information will help target further analysis, and help modify existing policymaking and programming, and be
very useful for future resilient systems analyses.
Negative resilience indicators
Monitoring negative coping strategies is also important for understanding resilience better. It is important that
the strategies that people or assets use to absorb shocks, or adapt or transform so that they are less exposed to
shocks, do not – intentionally or unintentionally – have a negative impact on other areas of the system or on
certain vulnerable groups.
One way to monitor the severity of negative coping strategies is to use a method developed by FAO and
available here: www.fao.org/crisisandhunger/root/pdf/cop_strat.pdf
Using this method, you would monitor the severity of negative coping strategies for different groups
(households or communities, or state institutions, for example).
An example is shown in Figure 18. The negative absorption capacities are those that were listed during the
resilience systems analysis in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The rates of occurrence (in this case, just
examples) are based on discussions with community members after a shock. The severity rating is based on
perceptions – how severe is this behaviour, how much does it impact negatively on other components of the
system, or on vulnerable groups? To determine severity, a scale such as that shown in Figure 15 may be useful.
In general, a behaviour that was only likely to have temporary, minor effects would have a lower score, and one
that has permanent, severe effects should have a higher score.

Figure 18: Example of severity analysis of negative resilience
RATE OF OCCURRENCE SEVERITY RATE x
SEVERITY
In the past 30 days, how often have community
members had to:
All the
time/every day
Pretty often/ 3-
6x a week
Once in a while/
1-2x a week
Hardly at all <1x
week
Never
Raw Score
Severity rating
Relative score
Relative frequency score 7 4.5 1.5 0.5 0
Shifting to traditional medicine 7 7 2 14
Taking out new loans 1.5 1.5 3 4.5
Selling productive assets 4.5 4.5 2 9
Sending children out to work 1.5 1.5 2 3
Enrolling in armed groups 1.5 1.5 4 6
Prostitution 0.5 0.5 2 1
Sale of household assets 1.5 1.5 2 3
Reduction in daily food rations 0.5 0.5 2 1
Crime 1.5 1.5 3 4.5
Deforestation 4.5 4.5 3 13.5
Illegal use of land 0.5 0.5 1 1
Early harvest 4.5 4.5 3 13.5
TOTAL FOR THIS COMMUNITY 74
The aim of this analysis is to monitor trends in negative resilience. If the level of negative resilience actions
increases, actors may want to change the targeting and prioritization of their actions to boost resilience, and
adapt their policies and programmes.
The analysis can also help to develop new actions to deter certain critical negative resilience behaviours –
helping those at risk to adopt better strategies to deal with shocks.
Process indicators
Process indicators can be useful to ensure that the results of the resilience systems analysis – the specific
actions on the resilience roadmap – have been translated into policy and programming. Some suggested
indicators include:
 # (and budget size/share) of development (and related) programmes that integrate actions from the
resilience roadmap
 # (or %) of actions from the resilience roadmap that have been integrated into policy, or are being
implemented through programming, (perhaps breaking this down into short-term, medium-term and
long-term priorities)
 # of Government ministries/authorities and development/humanitarian organisations that are involved
in implementing actions from the resilience roadmap
Output indicators
Output indicators measure the quantity, quality, and timeliness of the products — products, goods or services
— that are the result of an activity, project, or programme. These measures will be required to determine
whether the individual actions on the resilience roadmap have been completed.
The output indicators will need to be tailored to the particular activities on your resilience roadmap. For
example, using two actions from the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo roadmap:

Roadmap Action: Build additional communal buildings to prevent schools from being used by internally
displaced people, and during disasters
Example output indicator: # of buildings constructed in host villages, occupancy rate of these buildings by
internally displaced people and others post-disaster
Or:
Roadmap Action: Raise awareness about rights and duties
Example output indicator: % of men and women who understand their rights and duties
Proxy impact indicators
It is not possible, after the resilience systems analysis, to develop one ‘magic’ impact indicator that will show
the definitive status of resilience at any one point in time. This is because resilience spans the entire
programming cycle, at multiple layers of society, involving multiple sectors, and in relation to multiple types of
shocks. In addition, it is often very difficult to measure resilience if no shock has occurred. Finally, impact
indicators often focus only on losses – how many people died, or what level of economic losses occurred
because of a shock. They don’t tell you anything about the people who survived, or were resilient to, the shock,
and what happened to their overall well-being.
However, proxy impact indicators may be required in certain cases, for example when one measure is needed
for communication or advocacy purposes. It is important, however, that the limits of reducing resilience to one
‘magic’ indicator are well understood.
Some examples of measures that could be used as proxy indicators:
 # of dead per # exposed to the shock
 # of dead in specified public infrastructure
 % reduction in household and economic losses (perhaps as a % of GDP) due to shocks
 % of target population that slip back into poverty
 $ spent on humanitarian relief
 $ of development investments that were affected by a shock (or are exposed to a shock)
 % of exposed population that feel ‘safer’ or ‘able to deal with a shock’ (perception data/survey)
disaggregated by gender and age, and perhaps by type of shock

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Barrett and Costas (2013) Resilience to avoid and escape chronic poverty: Theoretical Foundations and
Measurement Principles, Paper presented at IFPRI, August 2013
Béné et al. (2012): Resilience: New Utopia or New Tyranny? Reflection about the Potentials and Limits of the
Concept of Resilience in Relation to Vulnerability-Reduction Programmes, Institute for Development Studies
Working Paper 405
British Colombia government (2004), Hazard, risk and vulnerability analysis tool kit, Provincial Emergency
Program, Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, Canada.
Department for International Development (1999) Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets, DFID
Global Network of Civil Society for Disaster Reduction (2013) Views from the frontline 2013: beyond 2015,
available at www.globalnetwork-dr.org/views-from-the-frontline/vfl-2013.html
GTZ (2004) Risk Analysis – a Basis for Disaster Risk Management, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische
Zusammenarbeit(GTZ) GmbH. Eschborn, Germany;
Mitchell (2013) Risk and Resilience: From Good Idea to Good Practice, OECD Development Assistance
Committee Working Paper 13/2013, OECD Publishing
OECD and UNICEF (2014) Final Report: Resilience Systems Analysis, eastern Democratic Republic of Congo,
available at:
www.oecd.org/dac/governance-development/
aresilienceroadmapforeasterndemocraticrepublicofthecongo.htm
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2009) Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk
Reduction (2009), UNISDR
Vogel (2012) Review of the use of ‘Theory of Change’ in international development, DFID
World Bank (2013) World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity—Managing Risk for Development,
Washington, DC: World Bank.
OECD: GUIDELINES FOR RESILIENCE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS i

NOTES
1 For a detailed review of the Theory of Change concept, see Vogel (2012).
2 For further discussion on this topic, see for example World Bank (2013) and Barrett and Costas (2013). In
addition the 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction documented that between 30-
90% of economic losses for different sectors of critical infrastructure due to frequent, low-intensity
events (UNISDR, 2009). Similarly, the Global Network for Disaster Reduction documented that ‘recurrent
small-scale “everyday” disasters are the most common risk profile facing poor vulnerable people,
impacting on their housing, household assets and livelihoods as well as damaging and disrupting local
infrastructure and public services’ (GNDR, 2013).
3 OECD (2013). Risk and resilience: from good idea to good practice. Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, Paris, France; World Bank (2013) World Development Report 2014: Risk
and Opportunity—Managing Risk for Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
4 For more on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, see www.newdeal4peace.org
OECD: GUIDELINES FOR RESILIENCE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ii

Guidelines for Resilience Systems Analysis: How to analyse risk and build a roadmap to resilience

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