Chris Sistrunk, PE
Tuning ICS Security Alerts:
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Remember: Threats and Risks aren’t going away, so they should guide
detection and response goals
 Detection
– Engineering the system: Philosophy and Tuning
 Security alert engineering is similar to ICS alarm engineering
 ISA 18.2 & EEMUA 191 Alarm Management Standards
 NIST SP 800-94 Guide to Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems
 Response
– Incident response playbooks
– Following the plan
Overview
2
Know your Systems
Knowledge is the most powerful tool
to operate and defend your system.
•
•
•
•
3
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 S4x19 Sarah Fluchs: Layered Blueprints for OT Security
 S4x19 Nathan Wallace:
Making Power System Cybersecurity
Part of the Engineering Process
Recap: Security Engineering
4
https://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2019
/making-ot-security-engineering-deserve-
its-name
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBjMZnoSYUs
https://www.slideshare.net/NathanWallacePhDCSS
A/s4x19-stage-2-making-power-system-
cybersecurity-part-of-the-engineering-process
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Problem:
There is little published about ICS security alert management. Asset owners have to
learn by doing things the hard way without a guide.
Theory:
 ICS Alarm management is well-defined
 IT security alert management is well-defined
 ICS security alert management must be engineered
Solution:
Create a reference that combines the key concepts from both philosophies to
empower ICS security teams and asset owners.
ICS Security Alert Management
5
https://twitter.com/_LittleBobby_/status/1211340859091947520
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
ISA 18.2-2016
7
“The primary function within
the alarm system is to notify
operators of abnormal process
conditions or equipment
malfunctions and support the
response.”
NIST SP 800-94
(Feb 2007)
“Intrusion detection is the process of
monitoring the events occurring in a
computer system or network and
analyzing them for signs of possible
incidents, which are violations or
imminent threats of violation of
computer security policies, acceptable
use policies, or standard security
practices.” ISA 18.2-2016
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
ISA 18.2-2016
8
“The primary function within
the alarm system is to notify
operators of abnormal process
conditions or equipment
malfunctions and support the
response.”
NIST SP 800-94
(Feb 2007)
“Intrusion detection is the process of
monitoring the events occurring in a
computer system or network and
analyzing them for signs of possible
incidents, which are violations or
imminent threats of violation of
computer security policies, acceptable
use policies, or standard security
practices.”
Security
Logs
SIEM /
SOC
ISA 18.2-2016
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Monitor the
network & assets
for malicious
activity, safety,
regulatory, etc
Monitor the process
& assets, KPIs,
safety, regulatory,
etc
Where/what should we collect and detect?
9
You can’t see where
you aren’t looking!
You can’t do
forensics either.
Operations
Engineering Forensics
“Root Cause Analysis”
Digital Forensics
Security
Threats and Risks define goals and ultimately drive your Security Alert Philosophy
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
ISA 18.2
“The philosophy starts with the basic definitions and extends them to operational
definitions. The criteria for alarm prioritization and the definition of alarm classes,
performance metrics, performance limits and reporting requirements are based on
the objectives and principles for alarm systems.”
Alert Philosophy
10
Create/Document ICS Security Alert Philosophy
 Define security operations for ICS
 Define ICS specific alert categories and priorities
 Define and measure metrics
 Align with existing philosophies (IT alert, ICS alarm)
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Philosophy Checklist – EEMUA 191
11
https://www.eemua.org/Products/Publications/Checklists/EEMUA-alarms-checklist.aspx FREE
alert
alert
alert
IoC, network attack, Sandworm
alert
incident
rule
Engineering
Equipment and
Materials Users
Association
UK based
51 member companies
O&G and Chem
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Security Alert Management
12
ISA 18.2-2016
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Security Alert Management
13
Security Ops
Tuning Hunting
ISA 18.2-2016
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 S4x15 Talk
Recap: Where/what will we detect?
14
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 Create and Refine reliable IDS rules
 Actively Manage your ICS network sensors
 Tuning is not a new concept to OT
Tuning
Aler
t
Is a critical alert lost in a mountain of nuisance alerts?
15
https://www.automation.com/library/articles-white-papers/alarm-monitoring-
management/keeping-the-peace-and-quiet
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Reducing Nuisance Alerts
16
Alerts
http://www.mc.uky.edu/kiprc/fire/Residential%20Smoke%20Ala
rm%20Installation.ppt
https://www.chemicalprocessing.com/articles/2018/optimi
ze-alarm-management/
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 [insert favorite IDS or ICS NSM sensor here]
 You installed it, it is collecting data, but soon…
Examples when you don’t tune
17
 There are 800,000 active security alerts and
baselining feature wasn’t used
– Mesh radios like to change IP addresses: could have
added their MAC’s to the asset list to prevent alerts
 Bro/Zeek by default alerts on every function
code for each ICS protocol
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Collect them all???
18
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sorry-collectors-nobody-
wants-your-beanie-babies-anymore-1519234039
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3191379/false-positives-still-cause-
alert-fatigue.html
https://www.reuters.com/article/target-breach/target-missed-early-
alert-of-credit-card-data-breach-report-idUSL2N0MA0KF20140313
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
True Positive (TP):
• Reality: A wolf threatened.
• Shepherd said: "Wolf."
• Outcome: Shepherd is a hero.
False Positive (FP):
• Reality: No wolf threatened.
• Shepherd said: "Wolf."
• Outcome: Villagers are angry at shepherd
waking them up.
False Negative (FN):
• Reality: A wolf threatened.
• Shepherd said: "No wolf."
• Outcome: The wolf ate all the sheep.
True Negative (TN):
• Reality: No wolf threatened.
• Shepherd said: "No wolf."
• Outcome: Everyone is fine.
Confusion Matrix
19
Hat tip to @mubix: https://twitter.com/mubix/status/1201923641979654146
Google: https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/classification/true-false-positive-negative
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 S4x19 On-ramp Talk
 Detection is a continuum > use capability you have until you need more
 Don’t overwhelm yourself right off the bat
 Measure your success
Recap: Where do we start?
20
Start small
Use what and who
you already have
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 SOC analysts > buy donuts for the ICS Engineers & SMEs
– Work together to define the ICS Alert Philosophy
– Use your existing ICS alarm and SOC alert standards as the reference
 If you don’t have them, use ISA 18.2, EEMUA 191, and NIST SP 800-94
 Start with the ICS DMZ firewall or other ingress/egress points
 Choose from existing firewall logs, Windows logs, switch logs – not all
 Tune IDS or ICS NSM sensors (leverage your vendors during install)
 DON’T put ICS Security Alerts on the HMI
 Operators don’t need extra burden > leave it to the SOC analysts
Focus on the Basics
21
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye22
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
1. Commodity Malware
– Conficker, Ramnit
2. Credential Compromise
– Ukraine Power Grid, ladder logic change (Aurora)
3. Destructive Attack
– KillDisk, overwriting firmware (Ukraine)
4. “Stop the bleeding” if it’s a serious situation
– Wiper malware (NotPetya) or ransomware spreading
Remediation for each play:
– Restore backups, reset passwords, etc
“RUN IT!”Playbooks and Use Cases
23
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 Design plays for each phase
 Practice those drills
 Use your players’ strengths
 Exploit their weaknesses
 Finish strong!
Run it!
24
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
Knowledge
is the most powerful tool
Know and harden the network
 Review what you already have (tighten rules, accounts, backups, etc)
 Identify critical assets and ingress/egress points
Know and tune the network visibility
 Review your existing alarm/alert standards
 Philosophy > implementation > monitoring > metrics
Know what to do when an incident occurs
 Review your disaster recovery and incident response plans
 Run it! > Practice your playbooks
25
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 ISA18.2-2016 Alarm Management Standard > aka IEC 62682
 https://www.isa.org/intech/201606standards/
 ISA-TR18.2.2-2016 Alarm Identification and Rationalization
 https://www.isa.org/intech-plus/2017/november/beyond-alarm-management/
 https://www.rockwellautomation.com/resources/downloads/rockwellautomation/pdf/events/a
utomation-fair/2011/psug/afpsug11_ed16.pdf - excellent
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alarm_management
 https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-publications/intech-magazine/white-
papers/pas-understanding-and-applying-ansi-isa-18-2-alarm-management-standard/
 https://www.automation.com/library/articles-white-papers/alarm-monitoring-
management/keeping-the-peace-and-quiet
 EEMUA Publication 191 Alarm systems - a guide to design, management and procurement
 https://www.eemua.org/Products/Publications/Print/EEMUA-Publication-191.aspx
 The Alarm Management Handbook, 2nd Ed., Hollifield and Habibi, PAS Inc. 2010.
ReferencesICS Alarm Management
26
©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye
 NIST SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)
 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-94.pdf
– Tuning, 2-3, 3-3, 3-4, 4-11, 5-10, 6-5, 7-6
 https://securityonion.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tuning.html
 https://securityonion.readthedocs.io/en/latest/alerts.html
 https://www.zeek.org/current/slides/2016_educause_configuration_and_tuning.pdf
 https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/classification/true-false-
positive-negative
 Applied Network Security Monitoring: Collection, Detection, and Analysis. Sanders and Smith.
Syngress, 2013.
Security Engineering
 https://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2019/making-ot-security-engineering-deserve-its-
name
ReferencesSecurity Alert Management
27
Thank you!
chris.sistrunk@mandiant.com

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S4x20 - Tuning ICS Security Alerts: An Alarm Management Approach

  • 1. Chris Sistrunk, PE Tuning ICS Security Alerts:
  • 2. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Remember: Threats and Risks aren’t going away, so they should guide detection and response goals  Detection – Engineering the system: Philosophy and Tuning  Security alert engineering is similar to ICS alarm engineering  ISA 18.2 & EEMUA 191 Alarm Management Standards  NIST SP 800-94 Guide to Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems  Response – Incident response playbooks – Following the plan Overview 2
  • 3. Know your Systems Knowledge is the most powerful tool to operate and defend your system. • • • • 3
  • 4. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  S4x19 Sarah Fluchs: Layered Blueprints for OT Security  S4x19 Nathan Wallace: Making Power System Cybersecurity Part of the Engineering Process Recap: Security Engineering 4 https://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2019 /making-ot-security-engineering-deserve- its-name https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bBjMZnoSYUs https://www.slideshare.net/NathanWallacePhDCSS A/s4x19-stage-2-making-power-system- cybersecurity-part-of-the-engineering-process
  • 5. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Problem: There is little published about ICS security alert management. Asset owners have to learn by doing things the hard way without a guide. Theory:  ICS Alarm management is well-defined  IT security alert management is well-defined  ICS security alert management must be engineered Solution: Create a reference that combines the key concepts from both philosophies to empower ICS security teams and asset owners. ICS Security Alert Management 5
  • 7. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye ISA 18.2-2016 7 “The primary function within the alarm system is to notify operators of abnormal process conditions or equipment malfunctions and support the response.” NIST SP 800-94 (Feb 2007) “Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.” ISA 18.2-2016
  • 8. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye ISA 18.2-2016 8 “The primary function within the alarm system is to notify operators of abnormal process conditions or equipment malfunctions and support the response.” NIST SP 800-94 (Feb 2007) “Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of possible incidents, which are violations or imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard security practices.” Security Logs SIEM / SOC ISA 18.2-2016
  • 9. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Monitor the network & assets for malicious activity, safety, regulatory, etc Monitor the process & assets, KPIs, safety, regulatory, etc Where/what should we collect and detect? 9 You can’t see where you aren’t looking! You can’t do forensics either. Operations Engineering Forensics “Root Cause Analysis” Digital Forensics Security Threats and Risks define goals and ultimately drive your Security Alert Philosophy
  • 10. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye ISA 18.2 “The philosophy starts with the basic definitions and extends them to operational definitions. The criteria for alarm prioritization and the definition of alarm classes, performance metrics, performance limits and reporting requirements are based on the objectives and principles for alarm systems.” Alert Philosophy 10 Create/Document ICS Security Alert Philosophy  Define security operations for ICS  Define ICS specific alert categories and priorities  Define and measure metrics  Align with existing philosophies (IT alert, ICS alarm)
  • 11. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Philosophy Checklist – EEMUA 191 11 https://www.eemua.org/Products/Publications/Checklists/EEMUA-alarms-checklist.aspx FREE alert alert alert IoC, network attack, Sandworm alert incident rule Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association UK based 51 member companies O&G and Chem
  • 12. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Security Alert Management 12 ISA 18.2-2016
  • 13. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Security Alert Management 13 Security Ops Tuning Hunting ISA 18.2-2016
  • 14. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  S4x15 Talk Recap: Where/what will we detect? 14
  • 15. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  Create and Refine reliable IDS rules  Actively Manage your ICS network sensors  Tuning is not a new concept to OT Tuning Aler t Is a critical alert lost in a mountain of nuisance alerts? 15 https://www.automation.com/library/articles-white-papers/alarm-monitoring- management/keeping-the-peace-and-quiet
  • 16. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Reducing Nuisance Alerts 16 Alerts http://www.mc.uky.edu/kiprc/fire/Residential%20Smoke%20Ala rm%20Installation.ppt https://www.chemicalprocessing.com/articles/2018/optimi ze-alarm-management/
  • 17. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  [insert favorite IDS or ICS NSM sensor here]  You installed it, it is collecting data, but soon… Examples when you don’t tune 17  There are 800,000 active security alerts and baselining feature wasn’t used – Mesh radios like to change IP addresses: could have added their MAC’s to the asset list to prevent alerts  Bro/Zeek by default alerts on every function code for each ICS protocol
  • 18. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Collect them all??? 18 https://www.wsj.com/articles/sorry-collectors-nobody- wants-your-beanie-babies-anymore-1519234039 https://www.csoonline.com/article/3191379/false-positives-still-cause- alert-fatigue.html https://www.reuters.com/article/target-breach/target-missed-early- alert-of-credit-card-data-breach-report-idUSL2N0MA0KF20140313
  • 19. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye True Positive (TP): • Reality: A wolf threatened. • Shepherd said: "Wolf." • Outcome: Shepherd is a hero. False Positive (FP): • Reality: No wolf threatened. • Shepherd said: "Wolf." • Outcome: Villagers are angry at shepherd waking them up. False Negative (FN): • Reality: A wolf threatened. • Shepherd said: "No wolf." • Outcome: The wolf ate all the sheep. True Negative (TN): • Reality: No wolf threatened. • Shepherd said: "No wolf." • Outcome: Everyone is fine. Confusion Matrix 19 Hat tip to @mubix: https://twitter.com/mubix/status/1201923641979654146 Google: https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/classification/true-false-positive-negative
  • 20. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  S4x19 On-ramp Talk  Detection is a continuum > use capability you have until you need more  Don’t overwhelm yourself right off the bat  Measure your success Recap: Where do we start? 20 Start small Use what and who you already have
  • 21. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  SOC analysts > buy donuts for the ICS Engineers & SMEs – Work together to define the ICS Alert Philosophy – Use your existing ICS alarm and SOC alert standards as the reference  If you don’t have them, use ISA 18.2, EEMUA 191, and NIST SP 800-94  Start with the ICS DMZ firewall or other ingress/egress points  Choose from existing firewall logs, Windows logs, switch logs – not all  Tune IDS or ICS NSM sensors (leverage your vendors during install)  DON’T put ICS Security Alerts on the HMI  Operators don’t need extra burden > leave it to the SOC analysts Focus on the Basics 21
  • 23. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye 1. Commodity Malware – Conficker, Ramnit 2. Credential Compromise – Ukraine Power Grid, ladder logic change (Aurora) 3. Destructive Attack – KillDisk, overwriting firmware (Ukraine) 4. “Stop the bleeding” if it’s a serious situation – Wiper malware (NotPetya) or ransomware spreading Remediation for each play: – Restore backups, reset passwords, etc “RUN IT!”Playbooks and Use Cases 23
  • 24. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  Design plays for each phase  Practice those drills  Use your players’ strengths  Exploit their weaknesses  Finish strong! Run it! 24
  • 25. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye Knowledge is the most powerful tool Know and harden the network  Review what you already have (tighten rules, accounts, backups, etc)  Identify critical assets and ingress/egress points Know and tune the network visibility  Review your existing alarm/alert standards  Philosophy > implementation > monitoring > metrics Know what to do when an incident occurs  Review your disaster recovery and incident response plans  Run it! > Practice your playbooks 25
  • 26. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  ISA18.2-2016 Alarm Management Standard > aka IEC 62682  https://www.isa.org/intech/201606standards/  ISA-TR18.2.2-2016 Alarm Identification and Rationalization  https://www.isa.org/intech-plus/2017/november/beyond-alarm-management/  https://www.rockwellautomation.com/resources/downloads/rockwellautomation/pdf/events/a utomation-fair/2011/psug/afpsug11_ed16.pdf - excellent  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alarm_management  https://www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-publications/intech-magazine/white- papers/pas-understanding-and-applying-ansi-isa-18-2-alarm-management-standard/  https://www.automation.com/library/articles-white-papers/alarm-monitoring- management/keeping-the-peace-and-quiet  EEMUA Publication 191 Alarm systems - a guide to design, management and procurement  https://www.eemua.org/Products/Publications/Print/EEMUA-Publication-191.aspx  The Alarm Management Handbook, 2nd Ed., Hollifield and Habibi, PAS Inc. 2010. ReferencesICS Alarm Management 26
  • 27. ©2019 FireEye©2019 FireEye  NIST SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)  https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-94.pdf – Tuning, 2-3, 3-3, 3-4, 4-11, 5-10, 6-5, 7-6  https://securityonion.readthedocs.io/en/latest/tuning.html  https://securityonion.readthedocs.io/en/latest/alerts.html  https://www.zeek.org/current/slides/2016_educause_configuration_and_tuning.pdf  https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/crash-course/classification/true-false- positive-negative  Applied Network Security Monitoring: Collection, Detection, and Analysis. Sanders and Smith. Syngress, 2013. Security Engineering  https://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2019/making-ot-security-engineering-deserve-its- name ReferencesSecurity Alert Management 27

Editor's Notes

  • #3: The main focus of this talk is to cover ICS Security Alert Tuning I won’t get into the details about ICS threats as they should be ICS Security 101 by now…and the latest threats have been talked about in other S4x20 talks Main point: Nothing is new under the sun! No need to reinvent the wheel here… But this is important to document because there are not a lot of talks or articles about how to tune ICS NSM tools and alerts. There are articles and standards for engineering ICS alarms (ISA 18.2 standard, EEMUA 191) and for tuning traditional IT NSM systems (NIST SP 800-94), BUT not something that blends both concepts I will show you the similarities from ISA 18.2 and 800-94 and flesh out an OT NSM Security Alert Engineering method Lastly, I will cover the importance of using Security Alert Engineering with your OT Incident Response
  • #4: Continuously ask yourself these questions
  • #5: Security Engineering is a relatively new and fast-growing segment of ICS Engineering. These referenced talks cover some of these concepts…and my talk on security alert engineering expands this research.
  • #7: What are these Goals that little bobby is talking about? ICS visibility to ICS Security visibility end goals + response playbooks / use cases = Security Alert Engineering What drives that whole process? The philosophy!
  • #10: Operations and Security have different and overlapping goals for monitoring Where you get visibility depends on your network, what the critical assets are, and the ingress/egress points are You should also study past ICS attacks and how they map to the attack lifecycle
  • #12: Can we modify existing engineering alarm philosophies to dovetail with our SOC analysts alert philosophies for ICS? EEMUA 191 standard is not free but the philosophy checklist is free to download
  • #13: Philosophy drives the whole process…whether adding a new alert or revising an existing alert.
  • #14: Philosophy drives the whole process…whether adding a new alert or revising an existing alert.
  • #15: With regards to OT Security NSM, these are some of the basic things to collect from different parts of the OT network Detection goals may be different for each system, which is why detection needs to be engineered. Each OT system is engineered No network is the same Thus detections must be engineered too
  • #16: Tuning a network sensor has challenges that are similar to any ICS or SCADA system It has to be managed Alerts have to be tuned Nuisance logs/alerts are no use (write a rule to where it will fire only on specific instances) https://www.automation.com/library/articles-white-papers/alarm-monitoring-management/keeping-the-peace-and-quiet
  • #18: Talk about several real use cases that we’ve seen regarding real-world tuning situations
  • #21: Given the “insecure by design” problem with ICS protocols, apps and devices, protection is difficult if the attacker is past the cyber security perimeter. Detection is key to identify attacks early and response is necessary to prevent or limit the consequences. This is a fast-moving area in ICSsec. you can start small with detection. For example, even monitoring your endpoint protection for alerts. Or monitoring your firewall log for blocked egress attempts. The idea that detection is a continuum and you can, and maybe should, start small rather than be overloaded with data no one looks at. The equivalent of operator alarm fatigue. Rather it is here is how you should gather and consider attack and threat information as part of your ICS risk management program.
  • #24: Design and engineer these playbooks to match your ICS alert philosophy and ICS incident response plan