IEEE 2014 DOTNET NETWORKING PROJECTS Secure data-retrieval-for-decentralized-disruption-tolerant-military-networks
- 1. GLOBALSOFT TECHNOLOGIES IEEE PROJECTS & SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENTS IEEE FINAL YEAR PROJECTS|IEEE ENGINEERING PROJECTS|IEEE STUDENTS PROJECTS|IEEE BULK PROJECTS|BE/BTECH/ME/MTECH/MS/MCA PROJECTS|CSE/IT/ECE/EEE PROJECTS CELL: +91 98495 39085, +91 99662 35788, +91 98495 57908, +91 97014 40401 Visit: www.finalyearprojects.org Mail to:ieeefinalsemprojects@gmai l.com Secure Data Retrieval for Decentralized Disruption-Tolerant Military Networks ABSTRACT: Mobile nodes in military environments such as a battlefield or a hostile region are likely to suffer from intermittent network connectivity and frequent partitions. Disruption-tolerant network (DTN) technologies are becoming successful solutions that allow wireless devices carried by soldiers to communicate with each other and access the confidential information or command reliably by exploiting external storage nodes. Some of the most challenging issues in this scenario are the enforcement of authorization policies and the policies update for secure data retrieval. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising cryptographic solution to the access control issues. However, the problem of applying CP-ABE in decentralized DTNs introduces several security and privacy challenges with regard to the attribute revocation, key escrow, and coordination of attributes issued from different authorities. In this paper, we propose a secure data retrieval scheme using CP-ABE for decentralized DTNs where multiple key authorities manage their attributes independently. We demonstrate how to apply
- 2. the proposed mechanism to securely and efficiently manage the confidential data distributed in the disruption-tolerant military network. EXISTING SYSTEM: The concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising approach that fulfills the requirements for secure data retrieval in DTNs. ABE features a mechanism that enables an access control over encrypted data using access policies and ascribed attributes among private keys and ciphertexts. Especially, ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) provides a scalable way of encrypting data such that the encryptor defines the attribute set that the decryptor needs to possess in order to decrypt the ciphertext. Thus, different users are allowed to decrypt different pieces of data per the security policy. DISADVANTAGES OF EXISTING SYSTEM: The problem of applying the ABE to DTNs introduces several security and privacy challenges. Since some users may change their associated attributes at some point (for example, moving their region), or some private keys might be compromised, key revocation (or update) for each attribute is necessary in order to make systems secure. However, this issue is even more difficult, especially in ABE systems, since each attribute is conceivably shared by multiple users (henceforth, we refer to such a collection of users as an attribute group)
- 3. Another challenge is the key escrow problem. In CP-ABE, the key authority generates private keys of users by applying the authority’s master secret keys to users’ associated set of attributes. The last challenge is the coordination of attributes issued from different authorities. When multiple authorities manage and issue attributes keys to users independently with their own master secrets, it is very hard to define fine-grained access policies over attributes issued from different authorities. PROPOSED SYSTEM: In this paper, we propose an attribute-based secure data retrieval scheme using CP-ABE for decentralized DTNs. The proposed scheme features the following achievements. First, immediate attribute revocation enhances backward/forward secrecy of confidential data by reducing the windows of vulnerability. Second, encryptors can define a fine-grained access policy using any monotone access structure under attributes issued from any chosen set of authorities. Third, the key escrow problem is resolved by an escrow-free key issuing protocol that exploits the characteristic of the decentralized DTN architecture. The key issuing protocol generates and issues user secret keys by performing a secure two-party computation (2PC) protocol among the key authorities with their own master secrets. The 2PC protocol deters the key authorities from obtaining any master secret information of each other such that none of them could generate the whole set of user keys alone. Thus, users are not required to fully trust the authorities in order to protect their data to be shared. The data confidentiality and privacy can be cryptographically enforced against any curious key authorities or data storage nodes in the proposed scheme.
- 4. ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SYSTEM: Data confidentiality: Unauthorized users who do not have enough credentials satisfying the access policy should be deterred from accessing the plain data in the storage node. In addition, unauthorized access from the storage node or key authorities should be also prevented. Collusion-resistance: If multiple users collude, they may be able to decrypt a ciphertext by combining their attributes even if each of the users cannot decrypt the ciphertext alone. Backward and forward Secrecy: In the context of ABE, backward secrecy means that any user who comes to hold an attribute (that satisfies the access policy) should be prevented from accessing the plaintext of the previous data exchanged before he holds the attribute. On the other hand, forward secrecy means that any user who drops an attribute should be prevented from accessing the plaintext of the subsequent data exchanged after he drops the attribute, unless the other valid attributes that he is holding satisfy the access policy. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE:
- 5. MODULES: 1. Key Authorities 2. Storage Nodes 3. Sender 4. User MODULES DESCRIPTION: Key Authorities: They are key generation centers that generate public/secret parameters for CP-ABE. The key authorities consist of a central authority and multiple local
- 6. authorities. We assume that there are secure and reliable communication channels between a central authority and each local authority during the initial key setup and generation phase. Each local authority manages different attributes and issues corresponding attribute keys to users. They grant differential access rights to individual users based on the users’ attributes. The key authorities are assumed to be honest-but-curious. That is, they will honestly execute the assigned tasks in the system; however they would like to learn information of encrypted contents as much as possible. Storage node: This is an entity that stores data from senders and provide corresponding access to users. It may be mobile or static. Similar to the previous schemes, we also assume the storage node to be semi-trusted that is honest-but-curious. Sender: This is an entity who owns confidential messages or data (e.g., a commander) and wishes to store them into the external data storage node for ease of sharing or for reliable delivery to users in the extreme networking environments. A sender is responsible for defining (attribute based) access policy and enforcing it on its own data by encrypting the data under the policy before storing it to the storage node. User: This is a mobile node who wants to access the data stored at the storage node (e.g., a soldier). If a user possesses a set of attributes satisfying the access policy of the encrypted data defined by the sender, and is not revoked in any of the attributes, then he will be able to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the data.
- 7. SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS: HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS: System : Pentium IV 2.4 GHz. Hard Disk : 40 GB. Floppy Drive : 1.44 Mb. Monitor : 15 VGA Colour. Mouse : Logitech. Ram : 512 Mb. SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS: Operating system : Windows XP/7. Coding Language : ASP.net, C#.net Tool : Visual Studio 2010 Database : SQL SERVER 2008 REFERENCE: Junbeom Hur and Kyungtae Kang, Member, IEEE, ACM “Secure Data Retrieval for Decentralized Disruption-Tolerant Military Networks”-IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL. 22, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2014.