Sensor Networks or Smart Artifacts? - Ubicomp 2007
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This document discusses the role of ubiquitous computing in industrial health and safety monitoring systems, emphasizing the importance of designing technology that aligns with organizational culture and needs. It highlights challenges in the technology design process, lessons learned regarding risk perception and behavior-based safety, and the impacts of different system models on health and safety solutions. The document also suggests that an industrial workplace presents opportunities for implementation, stressing the significance of context in the design process.
Sensor Networks or Smart Artifacts? - Ubicomp 2007
- 1. Sensor Networks or Smart Artifacts? An Exploration of Organizational Issues of an Industrial Health and Safety Monitoring System Gerd Kortuem David Alford Linden Ball Jerry Busby Computing Department Nigel Davies Psychology Department Christos Efstratiou Management School Joe Finney Marian Iszatt White Katharina Kinder Lancaster University
- 2. What role can Ubiquitous Computing play? Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 3. Designing for People and Organizations The NEMO Project Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 4. Shareholders / Legal & Government Agencies Society Clients Health & Safety Health & Safety Business Social Regulations Compliance pressure pressure Organization Health and Safety System Actors Policies & Assessment Rules Procedures Management Training Surveilance Data Equipment Records Operative Supervisor Designing for People and Organizations The NEMO Project Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 5. Shareholders / Legal & Government Agencies Society Clients Health & Safety Health & Safety Business Social Regulations Compliance pressure pressure Organization Health and Safety System Actors Policies & Assessment Rules Procedures Management Training Surveilance Data Equipment Records Operative Supervisor Designing for People and Organizations The NEMO Project Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 6. Technology Design process Challenges & lessons Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 7. NEMO Drill NEMO Dosimeter Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 8. all daily trigger tim short-term exposu Duration of use exposure action). (measured) average daily expo Vibration characteristics (known for each equipment, measured by manufacturer) • Daily exposu Soil condition (assumed) •Exposure exposu Actual Daily ? A(8) is defined as Maximum Legal Exposure Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk ahv = actual
- 9. Drill-Dosimeter pairing determined by proximity Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 10. Network node Sensor component Actuator component ( including displays) Enterprise System In-Vehicle Intermittent System communication Figure 2: HAV monitoring system Figur Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - the NEMO system is to A key issue for kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk ensure that vibra- on user input makes
- 11. Technology ‣ Design process Challenges & lessons Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 12. Design process Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 13. Design process Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 14. Design process Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 15. Design process Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 16. Technology Design process ‣ Challenges & lessons Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 17. Invisible Risks Risk perception is poor Lesson 1: Shift from H&S compliance to increasing awareness Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 18. Self-Image and Social Pressure Safety equipment often not used Lesson 2: Personal and social “invisibility” becomes key design goal Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 19. Past Experiences & Narratives GPS had been experienced as surveillance technology Lesson 3: Technology narrative should be part of the design Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 20. Developers’ Blind-spot (a) Wider organizational aspects are perceived to be of low importance (organizational culture, re-distribution of power, organizational disruption, societal issues, privacy and security concerns) (b) Even organizational issues that are considered to be of importance often do not actually influence the design process Günter, H., Grote, G. & Boos, D. (2006): Organizational issues in ubiquitous computing, Paper presented at 22nd EGOS Colloquium, Bergen, July 06-08. Boos, D., Günter., H., & Grote, G. (2007): Organizational issues, technological frames and the development of a new ubiquitous computing prototype, Paper presented at 23nd EGOS Colloquium, Vienna, Austria, July 05-07. Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 21. Technology Archetypes Developers view problem in light of well-known system models Sensor network Smart artifacts (sensing + data) (interaction) Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 22. Technology Archetypes Different system models imply different H&S solutions Enterprise Management System Personal Exception Health & reports Safety Record Health & Safety Rules Data logs Feedback Operative's Context-sensitive Automatic behavior notices data capture Operatives' behavior Operatives Sensor-network Smart-artifact inspired H&S system inspired H&S system (top-down) (bottom-up) Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 23. Sensor Network Smart Artifact Risk perception unchanged increased Trust in rules unchanged increased Intelligibility low high (information awareness) Surveillance increased unchanged Provable compliance supported not supported Well intentioned rule more difficult unchanged violations Rule formulation more rigid more rigid Behavior-based safety not supported supported Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 24. Display Matters Unit w/o display was perceived as surveillance technology Sensor-network Smart-artifact inspired H&S system inspired H&S system Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 25. Behavior-based Safety Operatives as source of expertise and behavioral change Personal Personal Health & Health & Safety Safety Record Record Operative's Context-sensitive Operative's Context-sensitive behavior notices behavior notices Collaborative safety Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 26. Points to Take Home • Industrial workplace is opportunity for ubicomp • Design process must investigate organizational context • Architecture is not neutral Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 27. Thank You Gerd Kortuem kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/nemo Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk
- 28. • James Brown, Joe Finney, Christos Efstratiou, Ben Green, Nigel Davies, Mark Lowton and Gerd Kortuem. Network Interrupts: Supporting Delay Sensitive Applications in Low Power Wireless Control Networks. CHANTS 2007. • Efstratiou, C., Davies, N., Kortuem, G. Finney, J., Hooper, R., and Lowton, M. Experiences of Designing and Deploying Intellignent Sensor Nodes to Monitor Hand-Arm Vibrations in the Field. Proceedings of MobiSys 2007, San Juan, Puerto Rico, June, 2007 • Iszatt White, M. Catching Them At It? An Ethnography of Rule Violation. Symposium on Current Developments in Ethnographic Research in the Social and Management Sciences. 13th-14th September 2006. Liverpool, UK. • Busby, J. and Iszatt-White, M. Pushing the Boundaries of HRO. Thinking: Non-complex and Uncoupled but still Deadly. SRA Annual Meeting - Risk Analysis in a Dynamic World: Making a Difference, 3rd-4th December 2006. Baltimore, Maryland • Davies, N., Efstratiou, C., Finney, J., Hooper, R., Kortuem G., Lowton, M. Sensing Danger – Challenges in Supporting Compliance in the Field. 8th IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (HotMobile 2007), Tucson, Arizona, February, 2007 • Lowton M. and Finney, J. Finding NEMO: On the Accuracy of Inferring Location in IEEE 802.15.4 Networks. Proceedings Workshop on Real-World Wireless Sensor Networks (RealWSN 2006), Uppsala, Sweden June 2006. Gerd Kortuem - Lancaster University - 2007 - kortuem@comp.lancs.ac.uk