![Liane Ströbel
also function as cognitive anchorage points for a diverse range of encoding strategies.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that we use sensory-motor concepts as a model for
less specific, less differentiated, more abstract knowledge, such as emotions, needs or
temporal and spatial relations. The mere fact that even the words to understand and
to comprehend (< Latin prehendēre ‘to catch, to seize’) can be traced back to sensory-
motor concepts and that we use sensory-motor-based metaphors, such as to grasp an
idea or to handle a problem underlines the predominance of sensory-motor source
domains in the lexicon. But grammar, too, is full of morphemes which can be traced
back to sensory-motor activities. One example is the way we refer to time, e. g. French
le passé ‘the past’ (something that has gone by), maintenant ‘now’ (< Latin manu
tenendo ‘in the hand holding’) and l’avenir ‘the future’ (< Latin advenı̄re ‘still to come’)
or that we encode emotions or feeling with the help of a possessive verb related to hand
action, such as I have concerns, etc. Many light verbs and auxiliaries can also be traced
back to hand or food actions, such as to give a smile, to take a walk, or I am going
for a swim, etc. Similar the copulae in Spanish can be traced back to bodily positions
(e. g. ser [< Latin sedēre ‘to sit’] or estar [< Latin stāre ‘to stand’]) or the negation
in French to the denying of an action, such as to not take a step (ne ... pas ‘not a
step’), etc. (Ströbel, 2010, 2011). In all these examples the underlying strategy is based
on the fact that not only the same brain areas are activated whether we fulfill or just
imagine an action, but that we can also imagine a sensory-motor task, such as grasping
an object without actually grasping it (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005) and that is exactly what
makes sensory-motor concepts so suitable for rendering abstract entities less abstract
by connecting them to concrete bodily actions (Ströbel, 2014).
The linguistic perspective is covered by theories in cognitive science which support
this assumption by asserting that many concepts are grounded in sensory-motor pro-
cesses (Barsalou, 2008; Gibbs, 2005; Pezzulo et al., 2011; Wilson, 2002). Psycholinguistic
studies confirm that different sensorimotor experiences directly shape people’s use and
understanding of complex situations and metaphorical statements. Neurological studies
using neuroimaging techniques (e. g. fMRI, EEG) and also patient studies (Grossman et
al., 2008) have furthermore provided several pieces of the puzzle concerning auditory
language perception, reading and language production and deliver valuable insights
into this highly developed cognitive function.
The interdisciplinary interest in the topic is also reflected in this volume. Looking
at the subject from a number of different perspectives, the various contributions here
elaborate the fact that language and body are closely interrelated.
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![Raymond W. Gibbs
These different behaviorial studies offer support for cognitive linguistic claims about
embodied metaphor, but do so in a more systematic manner that allows for specific
hypotheses to be tested, and possible falisfied.
3 Psycholinguistics and Corpus Linguistic Studies
The experimental studies reviewed above all employed constructed examples, following
most cognitive linguistic work on embodied metaphor. But there is now more emphasis
in linguistics on corpus studies examining the use of metaphor in naturalistic discourse.
For example, read the words path and road when they are used in the two different
metaphorical contexts below, and consider whether they convey the same meaning
(Johansson-Falck & Gibbs, 2012):
1. The Spaniard lost 10–8 6–3 2–6 8–6 to Charlie Pasarell in 1967. And even if Agassi
survives his first test, his path to a second successive final is strewn with trip wire,
with former champions Boris Becker and Michael Stich top seed Pete Sampras
and powerful ninth seeded Dutchman Richard Krajicek all in his half of the draw.
[emphasis ours]
2. The learner who is well on the road to being a competent reader does bring a
number of things to the task, a set of skills and attributes many of which are still
developing. He or she brings good sight and the beginnings of visual discrimina-
tion. [emphasis ours]
The meaning of path may be appropriate in (1) because of the uneven nature of
Agassi’s journey toward winning the tennis match, while road seems apt in (2) be-
cause the journey becoming a competent reader’s is well-established, and one that
many people have metaphorically travelled. Previous corpus linguistic studies show
that metaphorical uses of path, road, as well as way, are not only structured according
to primary/conceptual metaphors such as action is motion, life/a purposeful activ-
ity is a journey, and purposes are destinations, but also appear to be influenced by
people’s embodied experiences with the specific concepts that these terms refer to in
their non-metaphorical uses (Johansson Falck, 2010). Thus, both similarities and dif-
ferences between real world paths, roads and ways are reflected by how metaphorical
paths, roads and ways are described both by the kinds and frequencies of obstacles that
people face on these journeys, and the kinds of actions people engage in, on, or near
metaphorical paths, roads or ways.
22](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/25964895-250515092508-ade913fd/85/Sensory-Motor-Concepts-In-Language-And-Cognition-Liane-Strbel-Editor-26-320.jpg)
![Raymond W. Gibbs
A second study in this series provided a detailed corpus analysis of 240 metaphorical
of path and and 47 instances of road in the British National Corpus. Most generally, the
corpus findings matched the intuitions we obtained in our first psychological study. For
instance, path was frequently used to talk of more difficult, and varied, difficulties in
travel in these contexts (23 %), but roads were never used in this way. On the other
hand, only 12 % of the path examples, but 60 % (based on only 3 of 5 instances) of the
road instances included explicit mention about where the artifact leads (i. e. to eternity,
to ruin, to stardom). The same differences are seen in the ways that path and road are
used to describe the target domain of purposeful activities/lives. Again, there were
many more mentions of the difficulties associated with travel along paths (38 %) than
roads (13 %). These difficulties may be related to obstacles in or on the path/road (e. g.,
their path to a winning was obstructed by an excellent performance from India, or the
constant traps and barriers laid by the forces that would block our path and drag us down),
or they correspond to a difficult area that someone or something is leaving or trying
to leave e. g., ([people] seek a path out of divisive ideological camps, or break though the
barriers of error to seek the road to truth).
Paths, but not roads, are connected with choices between alternative courses of ac-
tion. 21 % of the path instances with the function of describing purposeful activi-
ties/lives, but none of the road cases included words or phrases suggesting that there
may be more than one path to achieve a goal (e. g. only, best, the same, typical, a different
path to the same goal).The term road, on the other hand, is more often used in talk about
activities that people want to be efficient than paths (e. g., purposeful activity/life
and financial/political developments/processes), and paths are more often used to de-
scribe actions or developments that may have a more hesitant, aimless, or step by step,
quality than roads (e. g., courses of action/ways of living, other types of develop-
ment and paths in computer/mathematics developments/processes. Path is used in
talk about processes and road in talk about ends of processes and result. Finally, path
is more closely connected to choices between different courses of action, compared to
the much more efficient and single goal-oriented road.
The link between people’s imaginative understandings of paths and roads and the
metaphorical uses of path and road in discourse has several theoretical implications.
First, people mentally simulate different kinds of actions in journeys along paths and
roads and apply these experiences to shape their in-the-moment metaphorical under-
standings of abstract actions through the use of path and road. Second, the consistent
patterns of findings for the psychological survey and the corpus investigation suggest
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![Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm
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![Johann-Mattis List and Anselm Terhalle and Daniel Schulzek
2 Embodiment and language
The term embodiment refers to a number of partly overlapping theories whose common
denominator is the claim that cognition requires the interaction of a body with the
world (Wilson 2002, Ziemke 2003). The view we adopt in this paper is that abstract
concepts evolve on the basis of concepts which arise from perception and action. This
approach is taken by Barsalou (1999) who proposes that concepts are constructed from
perceptual symbols, i. e. subsets of modal representations which are stored in long-term
memory and reused symbolically to stand for objects in the world.
2.1 Conceptual development and language reconstruction
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) were the first of now many linguists (e. g. Gibbs 2003 and
Steen 2010) to underline the fundamental role that metaphor plays in the construction of
abstract concepts based on physical concepts. They postulate that systematic correlates
between emotions (such as happiness) and more basic sensory-motor experiences (such
as an erect body posture, which is supposed to be often concomitant with happiness)
lead to the metaphorical understanding of the more abstract concept on the basis of
the concept resulting from the perceptual experience (Lakoff 1980: 58). This conceptual
relation is reflected in language where words like up and down stand for spatial concepts
as well as for emotional states: cheer up!, I’m feeling a bit down, we’ve had our ups and
downs.
Thus, the word up preserves information regarding the sensory-motor source concept
which underlies the abstract emotional concept. The link, which allows the inference
that there is a relation between the two concepts, is the fact that they are associated
with the same sound chain [ʌp]. Moreover, the emotional concept became a meaning
of up only recently, whereas the spatial meaning is close to that of the Indo-European
etymon *upo ‹under, from under› (Pokorny 1959).
Not all cases are phonetically and morphologically as transparent as *up, which
means that more reconstruction work concerning the *formal part of the linguistic sign
is necessary to be able to draw *conclusions about the semantic side. The sound chain
of the Latin word *capacitas ‹ability› goes back to the Indo-European root *keh2p- ‹to
seize, to grasp› via Latin * capere ‹to seize› – or to the non-laryngealized * *kap-, which
cannot be excluded – (Georges 1998, Rix et al. * 2
2011), and French [Sɛf] ‹boss, * chief›
stems back from Latin [kaput] ‹head› (Gamillscheg 1997, see Figure * 1 and Figure 2),
which in turn might be derived from the root of Latin * capere as well (Vaan 2008).
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![Traces of Embodiment in Chinese Character Formation
clues than a sound chain. This makes the Chinese writing system attractive for the
study of embodiment.
3 Chinese characters
The Chinese writing system (CWS), as we know it today, is famous for its structural
properties reflected by a complicated interaction of phonetic and semantic elements.2
Since the Chinese characters can be divided into elements carrying phonetic as well as
semantic functions, it is sometimes called a ‘semanto-phonetic writing system’ (yìyı̄n
wénzì 意音文字, cf. in Zhōu 1998: 60), yet this characterization exaggerates the actual
power of Chinese characters to display phonetic information in a transparent way: Most
of the “phonetic” characteristics of the CWS are relics of the processes of character
formation which, as they took place asynchronously, were always characterized by
a complex interaction between the Chinese language spoken at different times of its
history, the sociocultural background of those people who created the characters, and
general patterns of reasoning and conceptualization.
3.1 General characteristics of the Chinese writing system
From a phonetic perspective, the CWS can be characterized as a syllabic writing system,
since every character represents a syllable of the Chinese language. From a semantic
perspective, on the other hand, it is a morphemic writing system, since the majority of all
characters represents a minimal semantically meaningful unit of the Chinese language.
In contrast to the dichotomic structure of alphabet systems, a Chinese character there-
fore has a trichotomic structure, since it can be characterized by its form, its meaning,
and its reading (List 2009). Thus, the Chinese character cǎi 采 ‹to pluck› is defined by its
written form 采, its meaning ‘to pluck’, and its reading [ʦh
ai214
] (see Figure 4). Given
this specific structure, we prefer the term morpheme-syllabic writing system (Chao 1968:
102) over the above-mentioned term semanto-phonetic writing system, since this term
more closely reflects the concrete units of the semantic and the phonetic domain that
are referred to by a Chinese character.
2
The use of the term “phonetic” follows the terminology that is used in the mainstream discussions on the
topic. Our anonymous reviewer, however, is surely right in stating that it is rather “morphonological” than
strict “phonetic identification” we are dealing with here.
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Sensory Motor Concepts In Language And Cognition Liane Strbel Editor
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- 5. Sensory Motor Concepts in Language & Cognition Liane Ströbel (ed.)
- 6. Hana Filip, Peter Indefrey, Laura Kallmeyer, Sebastian Löbner, Gerhard Schurz & Robert D. Van Valin, Jr. (eds.) Proceedings in Language and Cognition 1
- 7. Proceedings of the International Conference “Sensory Motor Concepts in Language & Cognition” Liane Ströbel (ed.)
- 8. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or re- produced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including pho- tocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without permission in writing from the publishers. © düsseldorf university press, Düsseldorf 2016 http://www.dupress.de Cover Design, Layout and Typesetting: Friedhelm Sowa, L A TEX Printed and bound in Germany by docupoint GmbH, Barleben The body type is Linux Libertine ISBN 978-3-943460-94-0 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. eISBN 978-3-11-072030-3
- 9. Contents Preface Michiel van Elk .................................................................. 7 Introduction Liane Ströbel ..................................................................... 11 Sensory-Motor Concepts and Language 1 Raymond W. Gibbs Experimental and Corpus Studies on Embodied Metaphoric Meaning .......... 19 2 Valentina Cuccio Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm .............. 27 3 Johann-Mattis List and Anselm Terhalle and Daniel Schulzek Traces of Embodiment in Chinese Character Formation A Frame Approach to the Interaction of Writing, Speaking, and Meaning ............. 45 4 Wolfgang G. Müller Motion and Emotion The application of sensory-motor concepts to the representation of emotion in literature ........................................ 63 The diversity of Sensory-Motor Concepts and its implications 5 Gerard Steen Sensory-Motor Concepts and Metaphor in Usage ................................ 85 6 Ralf Naumann Dynamics in the Brain and Dynamic Frame Theory for Action Verbs ........................................................... 109 7 Sander Lestrade The place of Place (according to spatial case) .................................... 131
- 10. 8 Andrea Bellavia Force Change Schemas and Excessive Actions: How High-Level Cognitive Operations Constrain Aspect in Idiomatic Constructions .................................... 147 Sensory-Motor Concepts and Perception 9 Lionel Brunel, Denis Brouillet and Rémy Versace The Sensory Nature of Knowledge ................................................ 163 10 Martin V. Butz and Daniel Zöllner Towards Grounding Compositional Concept Structures in Self-organizing Neural Encodings .................................. 177 11 Alex Tillas Grounding Cognition: The Role of Language in Thinking ................................................ 193 Postface Olaf Hauk ......................................................................... 219
- 11. Preface (Michiel van Elk, Universiteit van Amsterdam) Thinking back about past events often involves a vivid memory of the people, the places and the context involved. Clear pictures of conference venues and cities that seem frozen in time come to mind when thinking about past scientific meetings. The vi- sual nature of our memories may be taken as an example of the embodied view of language and cognition, which is the general topic of this volume. On this account, our knowledge about the world is grounded in sensory and motor concepts that were acquired through bodily experience. For instance, the concept ‘to grasp’ entails a mo- tor representation of the hand action that is involved in actual grasping. In line with this suggestion, it has been found that the processing of action verbs is associated with activation in similar regions in the premotor cortex that are involved in the actual exe- cution of the action that the verb refers to (Pulvermuller, 2013). Similarly, understanding a concept like ‘grasping’ when observing the action of another person has also been as- sociated with activation in motor-related brain regions, suggesting that a process of motor simulation could support action understanding (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). In the last decade, we have seen an enormous interest in embodied cognition theories among scholars from a wide range of different backgrounds. Cognitive neuroscientists have primarily investigated the when and how of activation in modality-specific brain areas in response to language and concept processing (van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2014). Psychologists have experimentally determined the bidirectional relation between bodily and cognitive processing (Fischer & Zwaan, 2008). Philosophers have focused on the question whether embodied simulation processes meet the necessary and sufficient requirements to support higher-level processes such as mind reading or false belief un- derstanding (Jacob & Jeannerod, 2005). Linguists have investigated how our everyday use of concrete and abstract language in written and spoken form is related to basic sensory and motor concepts (Gibbs, 2003). 7
- 12. Michiel van Elk I am convinced that this multidisciplinary approach is one of the major strengths of embodied cognition. In a time in which many scientific disciplines have become increas- ingly specialized, a unifying theory that spans different domains and that ranges from developmental psychology to linguistics and from philosophy to dynamical systems theory has a great potential. At the same time, the challenges faced by such a multidis- ciplinary approach are non-trivial as each field is characterized by specialist problems that are often defined by the use of a specific jargon. This theoretical challenge was faced directly at the Sensory-Motor-Concepts in Language and Cognition meeting, in which linguists, philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists participated – all with a shared interest in embodied cognition. As can be seen in the contributions to this vol- ume a wide range of topics was addressed from a variety of different perspectives and encompassing both experimental and theoretical contributions. An intriguing ques- tion is whether these different contributions are related and how they could lead to a cross-fertilization of ideas. A possible starting point for such an integrative attempt is to acknowledge that al- though the topics addressed by different disciplines may be different, they all share a similar conceptual framework. At this point, an interesting parallel can be drawn with evolutionary accounts of language. Starting from the premise that language con- ferred an adaptive advantage in the ontogeny of our species, different disciplines have focused on more proximate or ultimate causes of language development (Arbib, 2005). For instance, anthropological accounts have investigated the fossil records to determine precursors of the human vocal tract as a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of language. Developmental psychologists typically conduct experimental studies to in- vestigate how infants over the course of their first years acquire basic language abilities that often seem to go beyond the linguistic input that they received. Neuroscientists have elucidated the neural networks underlying language production and processing and have pointed out a striking overlap between the brain areas involved in the pro- duction of language and gestures, suggesting that gestural communication could be a precursor of a prototype of language. Thus, although differing in their topic of in- vestigation and their experimental approach, these findings converge on the idea that language should be understood in terms of its adaptive function and its relation to other more basic forms of action and communication. Similarly, within the framework of embodied cognition the different approaches con- verge on the notion that language and cognition involve the use of sensory motor con- cepts. This may be reflected in the use of metaphors referring to concrete sensory 8
- 13. Preface motor domains, effects of concrete experiences on word reading and the activation of sensory motor brain areas in response to reading action verbs. Furthermore, each of the different domains can be characterized by similar discussions regarding the question whether an embodied cognition explanation is the only and most viable account of the extant data. For instance, embodied theories of conceptual content are often contrasted with amodal theories, according to which our thinking is based on an internal and sym- bolic ‘language of thought’ that is abstracted away from concrete experience (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). One important argument that is often used in the debate between embodied and amodal theories of cognition is the grounding problem: it remains un- clear how concepts derive meaning if they are unrelated to concrete experiences (Barsa- lou, 2008). The embodied account proposes an intuitive and plausible solution to this problem: the meaning of concepts is derived from the fact that concepts are by defi- nition sensorimotor in nature. More recently, several authors have proposed a hybrid model according to which semantic processing involves both multimodal and modality- specific processing (Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010; Ralph, Sage, Jones, & Mayberry, 2010). These ideas may lead to a conceptual refinement of the current theoretical ideas and it would be interesting to see whether eventually theoretical integration is possible, not only within specific research domains such as neuroscience or psychology, but across different domains as well. The collection of papers in this volume provides an excellent first attempt for such an endeavor. Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge Liane Ströbel without whom this project would not have been possible. She organized a stimulating conference and took the effort of making the proceedings of this meeting available in the form of this special issue of Düsseldorf University Press. It is my sincere hope that the discussions that were started throughout this project will be continued in the future and will lead to a further exchange of people and ideas. 9
- 15. Introduction: Sensory Motor Concepts – at the Crossroad between Language & Cognition (Liane Ströbel) This book presents selected papers from the conference “Sensory Motor Concepts in Language and Cognition” organized by the DFG Collaborative Research Center 991: “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science” and held from December 01–03 at the University of Düsseldorf, Germany. It brings together re- searchers working in the fields of computer linguistics, linguistics, literary, neuro- science, philosophy and psychology, whose work contributes to the interdisciplinary study of cognitive phenomena, specifically in the exploration of the role of sensory motor concepts for language and cognition in general. The aim of this book is to un- cover hidden potentials and available prospects of inter and trans-disciplinary research in the field of sensory motor concepts by defining common interests and objectives, and sketching paths for a fruitful interdisciplinary cross-fertilization, cooperative projects, and research transfer. What is so fascinating about sensory-motor concepts? According to Barsalou, mental representations used in cognitive tasks are grounded in the sensory-motor system. Therefore it is assumed that the human system of concepts cannot be regarded as either abstract or amodal, but as immediately anchored in the perception, experience and simulation of sensory-motor actions (Barsalou, 2008). This assumption is supported by the following facts: a) sensory-motor knowledge is the most specific and best-differentiated concrete human experience we possess, and b) sensory- motor concepts are not only conceptually simple and easy to encode given the fact that they are part of our everyday life, but due to their semantic complexity they can 11
- 16. Liane Ströbel also function as cognitive anchorage points for a diverse range of encoding strategies. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that we use sensory-motor concepts as a model for less specific, less differentiated, more abstract knowledge, such as emotions, needs or temporal and spatial relations. The mere fact that even the words to understand and to comprehend (< Latin prehendēre ‘to catch, to seize’) can be traced back to sensory- motor concepts and that we use sensory-motor-based metaphors, such as to grasp an idea or to handle a problem underlines the predominance of sensory-motor source domains in the lexicon. But grammar, too, is full of morphemes which can be traced back to sensory-motor activities. One example is the way we refer to time, e. g. French le passé ‘the past’ (something that has gone by), maintenant ‘now’ (< Latin manu tenendo ‘in the hand holding’) and l’avenir ‘the future’ (< Latin advenı̄re ‘still to come’) or that we encode emotions or feeling with the help of a possessive verb related to hand action, such as I have concerns, etc. Many light verbs and auxiliaries can also be traced back to hand or food actions, such as to give a smile, to take a walk, or I am going for a swim, etc. Similar the copulae in Spanish can be traced back to bodily positions (e. g. ser [< Latin sedēre ‘to sit’] or estar [< Latin stāre ‘to stand’]) or the negation in French to the denying of an action, such as to not take a step (ne ... pas ‘not a step’), etc. (Ströbel, 2010, 2011). In all these examples the underlying strategy is based on the fact that not only the same brain areas are activated whether we fulfill or just imagine an action, but that we can also imagine a sensory-motor task, such as grasping an object without actually grasping it (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005) and that is exactly what makes sensory-motor concepts so suitable for rendering abstract entities less abstract by connecting them to concrete bodily actions (Ströbel, 2014). The linguistic perspective is covered by theories in cognitive science which support this assumption by asserting that many concepts are grounded in sensory-motor pro- cesses (Barsalou, 2008; Gibbs, 2005; Pezzulo et al., 2011; Wilson, 2002). Psycholinguistic studies confirm that different sensorimotor experiences directly shape people’s use and understanding of complex situations and metaphorical statements. Neurological studies using neuroimaging techniques (e. g. fMRI, EEG) and also patient studies (Grossman et al., 2008) have furthermore provided several pieces of the puzzle concerning auditory language perception, reading and language production and deliver valuable insights into this highly developed cognitive function. The interdisciplinary interest in the topic is also reflected in this volume. Looking at the subject from a number of different perspectives, the various contributions here elaborate the fact that language and body are closely interrelated. 12
- 17. Introduction Sensory-Motor Concepts and Language The close connection between sensory-motor concepts and language is illustrated in the first part of this volume: Raymond Gibbs points out that much of everyday cognition and language has its roots in ongoing bodily experience. In his article, he describes a number of studies from the fields of experimental psychology and corpus linguistics and illustrates how metaphoric ideas and talk emerge from embodied simulation pro- cesses. Valentina Cuccio purposes a usage-based model of language. Taking the idea that speaking is acting as a starting point, she uses studies on action understanding in order to clarify language production and comprehension and to explain how inferential meaning is deduced from literal sentences. The close connection between sensory- motor concepts and metaphor is discussed by Johann-Mattis List, Anselm Terhalle and Daniel Schulzek. Analyzing traces of embodiment in Chinese character forma- tion, they underline the complex interactions between speaking, writing, and meaning. Wolfgang Müller’s approach starts from the assumption that – much like emotions in actual life – emotions in literature are also grounded in the kinesthetic experience of the body. In his contribution, he illustrates that literature is a productive field for experimentation in matters of embodied cognition. The diversity of Sensory-Motor Concepts and its implications The diversity of sensory-motor concepts and its implications is highlighted in the sec- ond part of this volume: Gerard Steen divides the group of sensory-motor concepts into five subgroups, namely motor concepts, sensory concepts, sight concepts, sound concepts, location and direction concepts. Furthermore, he also points out that the dif- ferent groups of sensory-motor concepts are preferred in different registers and that a complete study of sensory-motor concepts would involve a four-way interaction be- tween sensory-motor concepts, metaphor, word class, and register. Ralf Naumann outlines a theory of action verbs that combines an abstract, modality-independent com- ponent with a modality-specific component located in certain regions of the premotor cortex. His proposal is based on the observation that a verb like kick can be used to express diverse types of actions that differ with respect to parameters (e. g. telic vs. atelic, result vs. no result or atomic vs. iteration). Sander Lestrade addresses the ques- tion whether we should analyze “place”, a generalized location, expressing the absence of a change of location, on a par with mode expressions specifying the type of such a 13
- 18. Liane Ströbel change, i. e. “source” and “goal”. In his paper, he discusses the status of place markers in a cross-linguistic sample of spatial-case inventories. Andrea Bellavia focuses on the connection between aspectuality and embodiment by analyzing a specific class of idiomatic constructions which systematically denote a change of location undergone by a body part at the source domain and which is metaphorically projected into the target domain denoting an event carried out in an intensive fashion. He is advancing a two- level integration model in order to display the semantic compositional representation of such idiomatic constructions. Sensory-Motor Concepts and Perception The close connection between sensory-motor concepts and perception is the focus of the last part of this volume: Lionel Brunel, Denis Brouillet and Rémy Versace’s approach is based on the close link between memory and perception and analyzes the influence of an auditory memory component upon the sensory processing of a sound by demonstrating the strong linkage between the access to our memory and the reac- tivation of the relevant sensory components, as part of the function of the respective context or the task. Martin Butz and Daniel Zöllner argue that progressively com- plex concepts and compositional structures can be developed starting from very basic perceptual and motor control mechanisms. They propose that the innateness of con- cepts may not be directly genetically imprinted, but concepts and compositional concept structures may be indirectly predetermined to develop due to the ontogenetic path laid out in the genes of the organism, the morphological constraints given by the body of the organism, and the environmental reality with which the organism interacts. Alex Tillas investigates the relationship between natural language and thinking. He takes as his starting point the assumption that thinking is imagistic, to the extent that con- ceptual thoughts are built out of concepts which, in turn, are built out of perceptual representations; and that concepts – the building blocks of thoughts – are association- istic in their causal patterns. His claim is supported by independent empirical evidence obtained from work done with aphasic subjects. 14
- 19. Introduction References (Preface & Introduction) Arbib, M. A. (2005). From monkey-like action recognition to human language: An evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(2), 105–167. Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounding symbolic operations in the brain’s modal systems. In G. R. Semin, & E. R. Smith (Eds.), Embodied grounding: Social, cognitive, affective, and neuroscientific approaches (pp. 9–42). New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press. Fischer, M. H., & Zwaan, R. A. (2008). Embodied language: A review of the role of the motor system in language comprehension. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61(6), 825–850. Gallese & Lakoff (2005).The Brain’s Concepts: The Role of the Sensory-Motor System in Reason and Language. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2005, 22:455–479. Gibbs, R. W. (2003). Embodied experience and linguistic meaning. Brain and Language, 84(1), 1–15. Gibbs, R. W. J. (2005). The psychological status of image schemas. In B. Hampe (Ed.), From perception to meaning (pp. 113–135). Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2002). Grounding language in action. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 558–565. Grossman, M., Anderson, C., Khan, A., Avants, B., Elman, L., & McCluskey, L. (2008). Impaired action knowledge in amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. Neurology, 71(18), 1396–1401. Jacob, P., & Jeannerod, M. (2005). The motor theory of social cognition: a critique. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(1), 21–25. Louwerse, M. M., & Jeuniaux, P. (2010). The linguistic and embodied nature of concep- tual processing. Cognition, 114(1), 96–104. Mahon, B. Z., & Caramazza, A. (2008). A critical look at the embodied cognition hypoth- esis and a new proposal for grounding conceptual content. Journal of Physiology - Paris, 102(1–3), 59–70. Pezzulo, G., Barsalou, L.W., Cangelosi, A., Fischer, M.A., McRae, K., Spivey, M. (2011). The mechanics of embodiment: A dialogue on embodiment and computational mod- eling. Frontiers in Cognition, 2(5), 1–21. Pulvermuller, F. (2013). Semantic embodiment, disembodiment or misembodiment? In search of meaning in modules and neuron circuits. Brain and Language, 127(1), 86–103. 15
- 20. Liane Ströbel Ralph, M. A. L., Sage, K., Jones, R. W., & Mayberry, E. J. (2010). Coherent concepts are computed in the anterior temporal lobes. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(6), 2717–2722. Ströbel, L. (2010). Die Entstehung einer neuen Kategorie – Leerverben als paralleler Kop- ulastrang. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. Ströbel, L. (2011). Invisible, visible, grammaticalization. In Callies, M. Lohöfer, A. Keller, W. (Eds.), Bi-Directionality in the Cognitive Sciences: Avenues, challenges, and limitations. viii, 313 pp. (pp. 211–234), New York/Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Ströbel, L. (2014). Sensomotorische Strategien & Sprachwandel, In E. Pustka & S. Gold- schmitt (eds.), Emotionen, Expressivität, Emphase. Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag. van Elk, M., van Schie, H. T., & Bekkering, H. (2014). Action Semantics: A unifying conceptual framework. Physics of Life Reviews. Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9, 625–636. 16
- 21. Sensory-Motor Concepts and Language
- 23. Raymond W. Gibbs Experimental and Corpus Studies on Embodied Metaphoric Meaning Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. University of California, Santa Cruz Department of Psychology Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA gibbs@ucsc.edu Abstract An important claim in cognitive science is that much of everyday cognition and lan- guage has its roots in ongoing bodily experience. One place where embodiment is critical is in the creation and use of metaphoric talk. This article describes some of the studies from experimental psychology and corpus linguistics demonstrating how metaphoric ideas and talk emerge from embodied simulation processes where people imagine themselves engaging in the actions mentioned in the language (e. g., “grasp the concept”). Some of this newer work demonstrates how experimental studies can test ideas from linguistics, but that corpus studies can also be used to examine falsifiable hypotheses first seen in psychology, on the embodied nature of metaphoric meaning. 1 Introduction Embodied metaphor refers to the idea that many metaphoric concepts are grounded in recurring patterns of bodily experience (Gibbs, 2006; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). For example, both “I am struggling to get a good start in my career” and “My marriage is on the rock” refers to the concept that LIFE IS A JOURNEY. People’s journey experiences, where they start at some source point, follow a path, and end up at some goal or destination, are used to better structured more abstract concepts like life or career or relationship. Much research in cognitive linguistics shows the importance of embodied source domains in metaphoric ideas and talk. To a significant extent, the experimental research on embodied metaphor is seen as verification for cognitive linguistic theories of embodied metaphor. But the rise of new work in corpus linguistics now sets the stage for a different kind of interdisciplinary collaboration between linguists and psychologists. This paper presents one example of this interaction between experimental psychology and corpus linguistics on the topic of embodied metaphor. My aim is to demonstrate some of the ways these two fields can be integrated; especially in regard to testing specific potentially falsifiable hypotheses. 19
- 24. Raymond W. Gibbs 2 Experimental Studies on Embodied Metaphor Many psycholinguistic studies have been conducted over the last 25 years to explore the ways that embodied metaphors may be recruited during people’s use and understanding of metaphoric language (Gibbs & Colston, 2012). These varied psychological findings, collected using a variety of experimental methods, indicate that the metaphorical map- pings between embodied source domains and abstract target domains partly motivate people’s understanding of the specific figurative meanings of many conventional and novel metaphors. For example, some experiments examined how immediate bodily experience influ- ence metaphor interpretations. In one series of studies on metaphorical talk about time, students waiting in line at a café were given the statement “Next Wednesday’s meeting has been moved forward two days” and then asked “What day is the meeting that has been rescheduled?” (Borodistky & Ramscar, 2002). Students who were farther along in the line (i. e., who had thus very recently experienced more forward spatial motion) were more likely to say that the meeting had been moved to Friday, rather than to Mon- day. Similarly, people riding a train were presented the same ambiguous statement and question about the rescheduled meeting. Passengers who were at the end of their jour- neys reported that the meeting was moved to Friday significantly more than did people in the middle of their journeys. Although both groups of passengers were experienc- ing the same physical experience of sitting in a moving train, they thought differently about their journey and consequently responded differently to the rescheduled meeting question. These results suggest how ongoing sensorimotor experience has an influence on people’s comprehension of metaphorical statements about time. One idea that has attracted a good deal of attention in cognitive science is the pos- siblity that much cognition and language is organized around embodied simulation pro- cesses (Gibbs, 2006). Several different behavioral studies provide support for the view that embodied simulations play some role in people’s immediate processing of verbal metaphors (Gibbs, 2006). People may create partial embodied simulations of speak- ers’ metaphorical messages that involve moment-by-moment “what must it be like” processes that make use of ongoing tactile-kinesthetic experiences (Gibbs, 2006). Un- derstanding abstract, metaphorical events, such as “grasping the concept,” for example, is constrained by aspects of people’s embodied experience as if they are immersed in the discourse situation, even when these events can only be metaphorically and not 20
- 25. Experimental and Corpus Studies on Embodied Metaphoric Meaning physically realized (i. e., it is not physically possible to grasp an abstract entity such as a “concept”). For instance, people’s speeded comprehension of metaphorical phrases, like “grasp the concept” are facilitated when they first make, or imagine making, a relevant bod- ily action, such as a grasping motion (Wilson & Gibbs, 2007). One unique study re- vealed that people walked further toward a target when thinking about a metaphorical statement “Your relationship was moving along in a good direction” when the con- text ultimately suggested a positive relationship than when the scenario alluded to a negative, unsuccessful relationship (Gibbs, 2012). This same difference, however, was not obtained when people read the nonmetaphorical statement “Your relationship was very important” in the same two scenarios. People appear to partly understand the metaphorical statement from building an embodied simulation relevant to LOVE RE- LATIONSHIPS ARE JOURNEYS, such that they bodily imagine taking a longer journey with the successful relationship than with the unsuccessful one. A different set of experiments examined people’s understanding of the embodied metaphor TIME IS MOTION by first asking people to read fictive motion sentences, as in “The tattoo runs along his spine” (Matlock, Ramscar, & Boroditsky, 2005). Participants read each fictive motion statement or a sentence that did not imply fictive motion (e. g., “The tattoo is next to the spine”), and then answered the “move forward” question (e. g., “The meeting originally scheduled for next Wednesday has been moved forward two days.”). People gave significantly more Friday than Monday responses after reading the fictive motion expressions, but not the non-fictive motion statements. These results implies that people inferred TIME IS MOTION conceptual metaphor when reading the fictive motion expressions which primed their interpretation of the ambiguous “move forward” question. A follow-up group of studies had people engage in abstract motion to see if it in- fluenced their responses to the “move forward” questions (Matlock et al., 2011). Par- ticipants first filled in the missing numbers in an array that either went in ascending (e. g., between 5 and 17) or descending (e. g., between 17 and 5) order. When the partici- pants then answered the “move forward” question, they gave far more Friday responses after filling in the numbers for the ascending condition and gave more Monday answers having just filled in the numbers for the descending order condition. People appear to understand the meaning of time metaphors through a mental simulation of the implied motion, findings that are congruent with the claim that conceptual metaphors are active parts of verbal metaphor processing. 21
- 26. Raymond W. Gibbs These different behaviorial studies offer support for cognitive linguistic claims about embodied metaphor, but do so in a more systematic manner that allows for specific hypotheses to be tested, and possible falisfied. 3 Psycholinguistics and Corpus Linguistic Studies The experimental studies reviewed above all employed constructed examples, following most cognitive linguistic work on embodied metaphor. But there is now more emphasis in linguistics on corpus studies examining the use of metaphor in naturalistic discourse. For example, read the words path and road when they are used in the two different metaphorical contexts below, and consider whether they convey the same meaning (Johansson-Falck & Gibbs, 2012): 1. The Spaniard lost 10–8 6–3 2–6 8–6 to Charlie Pasarell in 1967. And even if Agassi survives his first test, his path to a second successive final is strewn with trip wire, with former champions Boris Becker and Michael Stich top seed Pete Sampras and powerful ninth seeded Dutchman Richard Krajicek all in his half of the draw. [emphasis ours] 2. The learner who is well on the road to being a competent reader does bring a number of things to the task, a set of skills and attributes many of which are still developing. He or she brings good sight and the beginnings of visual discrimina- tion. [emphasis ours] The meaning of path may be appropriate in (1) because of the uneven nature of Agassi’s journey toward winning the tennis match, while road seems apt in (2) be- cause the journey becoming a competent reader’s is well-established, and one that many people have metaphorically travelled. Previous corpus linguistic studies show that metaphorical uses of path, road, as well as way, are not only structured according to primary/conceptual metaphors such as action is motion, life/a purposeful activ- ity is a journey, and purposes are destinations, but also appear to be influenced by people’s embodied experiences with the specific concepts that these terms refer to in their non-metaphorical uses (Johansson Falck, 2010). Thus, both similarities and dif- ferences between real world paths, roads and ways are reflected by how metaphorical paths, roads and ways are described both by the kinds and frequencies of obstacles that people face on these journeys, and the kinds of actions people engage in, on, or near metaphorical paths, roads or ways. 22
- 27. Experimental and Corpus Studies on Embodied Metaphoric Meaning Johansson-Falck and Gibbs (2012) conducted two studies, one a psychological ques- tionnaire and the second a corpus linguistic investigation to see if embodied simulation processes are also prominent in people’s use and understanding of expressions like his path to a second successive final is strewn with trip wire in reference to Agassi’ metaphor- ical journey to a tennis tournament championship as seen in (1) above. Thus, people’s embodied simulation in regard to their imaginative understandings of traveling along different paths and roads provides a major constraint on what gets mapped in various metaphorical instances of path and road. A first study investigated people’s experiences with paths and roads. Participants were given a booklet that first asked them to create a mental image of “being on a path” and then, on the next page, to form a mental image of “being on a road.” Following this, the participants turned the page and saw a series of questions, each of which could be answered by circling either the word path or road. Analysis of participants’ responses revealed the following qualities that people strongly felt they experienced along paths and roads. Paths Something you travel on by foot More up and down More aimless in their direction Something you stop on more often More problematic to travel on Roads Straighter Wider Paved Lead to a specific destination Something you drive on Overall, the results of this first study employing human participants demonstrated that people’s imaginative perceptions of paths and roads focus on the more central rather than peripheral aspects of their bodily actions relevant to these real-world arti- facts (e. g. on driving, but not walking, on roads, and on walking, but not driving, on paths etc.). Traveling along paths is clearly different in important ways from that of roads. 23
- 28. Raymond W. Gibbs A second study in this series provided a detailed corpus analysis of 240 metaphorical of path and and 47 instances of road in the British National Corpus. Most generally, the corpus findings matched the intuitions we obtained in our first psychological study. For instance, path was frequently used to talk of more difficult, and varied, difficulties in travel in these contexts (23 %), but roads were never used in this way. On the other hand, only 12 % of the path examples, but 60 % (based on only 3 of 5 instances) of the road instances included explicit mention about where the artifact leads (i. e. to eternity, to ruin, to stardom). The same differences are seen in the ways that path and road are used to describe the target domain of purposeful activities/lives. Again, there were many more mentions of the difficulties associated with travel along paths (38 %) than roads (13 %). These difficulties may be related to obstacles in or on the path/road (e. g., their path to a winning was obstructed by an excellent performance from India, or the constant traps and barriers laid by the forces that would block our path and drag us down), or they correspond to a difficult area that someone or something is leaving or trying to leave e. g., ([people] seek a path out of divisive ideological camps, or break though the barriers of error to seek the road to truth). Paths, but not roads, are connected with choices between alternative courses of ac- tion. 21 % of the path instances with the function of describing purposeful activi- ties/lives, but none of the road cases included words or phrases suggesting that there may be more than one path to achieve a goal (e. g. only, best, the same, typical, a different path to the same goal).The term road, on the other hand, is more often used in talk about activities that people want to be efficient than paths (e. g., purposeful activity/life and financial/political developments/processes), and paths are more often used to de- scribe actions or developments that may have a more hesitant, aimless, or step by step, quality than roads (e. g., courses of action/ways of living, other types of develop- ment and paths in computer/mathematics developments/processes. Path is used in talk about processes and road in talk about ends of processes and result. Finally, path is more closely connected to choices between different courses of action, compared to the much more efficient and single goal-oriented road. The link between people’s imaginative understandings of paths and roads and the metaphorical uses of path and road in discourse has several theoretical implications. First, people mentally simulate different kinds of actions in journeys along paths and roads and apply these experiences to shape their in-the-moment metaphorical under- standings of abstract actions through the use of path and road. Second, the consistent patterns of findings for the psychological survey and the corpus investigation suggest 24
- 29. Experimental and Corpus Studies on Embodied Metaphoric Meaning that metaphorical language including terms that refer to artifacts is to some significant extent predictable. Most importantly, our combination of a psychological investiga- tion of people’s experiences of paths and roads with an extensive corpus analysis of metaphorical path and road shows that neither a conceptual metaphor theory explana- tion in terms of mappings at the levels of primary or complex metaphor, nor a purely social theory in which the use of path and road are negotiated between speakers, suf- ficiently account for the link between metaphorical meaning, mind and world. Instead, people’s imaginative perceptions of paths or roads are influenced by their understand- ings of these artifacts through embodied experience, which can then be simulated in the context of metaphoric thinking and speaking. 4 Conclusion There is a large body of both experimental and corpus linguistic work on the embod- ied nature of many metaphoric concepts. The studies described in this article show how experimental and corpus research can nicely feed one another to create hypotheses that can be tested using either experimental or corpus linguistic methods. More specifically, cognitive linguistic studies strongly suggest that people’s recurring bodily experiences critically motivate aspects of their metaphoric talk. Psycholinguistic studies confirm that different sensorimotor experiences directly shape people’s use and understanding of various metaphorical statements. But the psycholinguistic work is limited in testing people’s immediate understanding of individual metaphors and does not explore the role of embodiment in larger discourse contexts. However, recent corpus linguistic re- search has demonstrated how specific hypotheses can be tested by examining detailed patterns of metaphoric language use within naturalistic speech and text (also see Ste- fanowitsch, 2011). This work shows that the metaphorical uses of certain words is not simply a social process or accomplished via the direct activation of encoded primary or conceptual metaphors. Instead, similar to the experimental research, corpus linguistic methods are capable of revealing the constraining presences of embodied simulation processes in the ways people think and speak of different abstract, and in this case metaphorical, concepts. In this way, then, corpus linguistic analyses do not simply offer ideas for possible testing using behavioral methods, but can be the site of testing explicit hypotheses themselves. Embodied experience seems critical to people’s use and understanding of metaphoric idea and language, a conclusion that vastly differs from traditional disembodied theo- 25
- 30. Raymond W. Gibbs ries of metaphorical meaning and language use. Of course, many other factors, ranging from purely linguistic, social and cultural processes also shape the creation and inter- pretation of metaphoric discourse. But it is unlikely that any of these forces can act alone, apart from the influence of bodily activity. The studies described in this article provide additional evidence that the embodied nature of metaphoric concepts is best characterized in terms of embodied simulation hypotheses in which people imagine themselves engaged in the actual events mentioned in the language, even when these involves actions that are physically impossible to perform in the real world. 5 References Boroditsky, L., & Ramscar, M. (2002). The roles of body and mind in abstract thought. Psychological Science, 13, 185–189. Gibbs, R. (2006). Embodiment and cognitive science. New York: Cambridge University Press. Gibbs, R. (2011). Evaluating conceptual metaphor theory. Discourse Processes, 48, 529– 562. Gibbs, R. (2012). Walking the walk while thinking about the talk: Embodied interpre- tation of metaphorical narratives. Psycholinguistic Research. Gibbs, R., & Colston, H. (2012). Interpreting figurative meaning. New York: Cambridge University Press. Johansson Falck, M. (2010). Are metaphorical paths and roads ever paved? Corpus analysis of real and imagined journeys. Review of Cognitive Linguistics, 8, 93–122. Johansson-Falck, M., & Gibbs, R. (2012). Embodied motivations for metaphoric mean- ing. Cognitive Linguistics, 23, 251–272. Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1999). Philsopphy in the flesh. New York: Basic Books. Matlock, T., Ramscar, M., & Boroditsky, L. (2005). On the experiential link between spatial and temporal language. Cognitive Science, 29, 655–664 Matlock, T., Holmes, K., Srinivasan, M., & Ramscar, M. (2011). Even abstract motion influences the understanding of time. Metaphor and Symbol, 26, 260–271. Stefanowitsch, A. (2011). Cognitive linguistics as cognitive science. In M. Callies, W. Keller, & A. Lohofer (Eds.), Bi-directionality in the cognitive sciences (pp. 295–310). Amstersdam: Benjamins. Wilson, N., & Gibbs, R. (2007). Real and imagined body movement primes metaphor comprehension. Cognitive Science, 31, 721–731. 26
- 31. Valentina Cuccio Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm Valentina Cuccio Humboldt University Berlin School of Mind and Brain University of Palermo Department of Humanities valentina.cuccio@unipa.it Abstract The aim of this paper is to focus on a problem that has not been sufficiently attended to by researchers in the embodied language paradigm. This problem concerns the inferen- tial level of communication. In real-life conversations implicit and inferential meaning is often the most important part of dialogues. However, embodied language researches, up to now, have not sufficiently considered this aspect of human communication. Simu- lation of the propositional content is not sufficient in order to explain real-life linguistic activity. In addition, we need to explain how we get from propositional contents to in- ferential meanings. A usage-based model of language, focused on the idea that speaking is acting, will be presented. On this basis, the processes of language production and comprehension will be analyzed in the light of the recent findings on action compre- hension. Keywords: Inferential Communication, Embodied Language, Motor Simulation 1 Some remarks on the Embodied Language Paradigm According to many authors (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Pul- vermüller, 1999, 2002) linguistic meaning is embodied. This means that the compre- hension of an action-related word or sentence activates the same neural structures that enable the execution of that action. Gallese (2008) presented this hypothesis as the “neural exploitation hypothesis”. Language exploits the same brain circuits as action does. According to this hypothesis, our linguistic and social abilities are grounded in our sensory-motor system. The Mirror Neuron System (MNS) is the neural structure that supports both our motor abilities and our social skills, language included. Thus, in this account, actions and language comprehension are mediated by motor simulation. We understand actions such as John taking a bottle from the refrigerator and drinking some milk, at least in part, by simulating the same actions in the Mirror Neuron System; and we understand a sentence such as “John took the bottle from the refrigerator and 27
- 32. Valentina Cuccio drank some milk”, at least in part, by simulating the corresponding actions in the same neural network that executes those actions. This seems to hold true even for the understanding of abstract linguistic meanings. Indeed, in that case, metaphorical thought allows us to map from a sensory-motor do- main to an abstract domain. This mechanism, according to Gallese and Lakoff (2005), is the basis for the construction and comprehension of abstract meanings and concepts. Now, imagine entering a bar, you look at the barman and say: “Water”. Or imagine being a firefighter, you are in front of a building on fire and you scream out loud to your co-worker: “Water!”. Imagine getting lost in the desert. At some point you see an oasis and say aloud to your exhausted friend: “Water”. In each of these cases, the word ‘water’ by itself expresses a full proposition, and it is a different proposition in each case (Wittgenstein, 1953; Lo Piparo, 2007). It is also vey likely that, in all of these examples, linguistic comprehension implies a mental simulation by the interlocutor. And it is also very likely that in these three different contexts the very same word will enables three completely different mental simulations. In the first case the simulation will probably concern the actions of putting water in a glass and giving the glass to a customer. In the second case, the simulation will concern the action of pumping water on the building using a fire hydrant. And finally, in the last example the interlocutor will comprehend that very same word as an information, “there is water over there”, and as an invitation, “let’s go to drink some water”. His mental simulations will most likely concern these linguistic contents. The very same word, then, can express full propositions with entirely different mean- ings. None of these possible meanings is literally present in the speech act. Indeed, propositions produced and comprehended in these examples are implicit and inferen- tial. Considering that, in the simulative account, language comprehension is realized by means of an embodied simulation of the propositional content, how can we explain, in this account, the simulation of a full proposition starting only from the uttering of a single word? Imagine now a boy that returns home. His father sees him and asks: “So?” and the boy answers with a smile: “It was fine”. This conversation can only be understood by someone who shares the same background knowledge as the participants. For example, the boy could have returned from an exam, a job interview, or from a date with a girl he really likes, and the father is asking about this. Thus, it is likely that in this case both the father and the son are performing a mental simulation. But is the mental simulation pertinent to the words “So” and “That’s fine” or to the implicit meanings that can be 28
- 33. Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm inferred from those words? The latter is more likely. Consider that these very same words uttered in a different context by different people would have a very different meaning. The aim of this paper is to focus on a problem that only very recently has started to be addressed by researchers working in the embodied language paradigm. This problem concerns the inferential level of communication. In real-life conversations, implicit and inferential meaning is often the most important part of a dialogue. However, up to now embodied language researches have not sufficiently considered this aspect of human communication. Indeed the most influential model of language at work in embodied language re- searches is mainly based on the idea that we have semantic circuits in our brain where our linguistic knowledge, in terms of words meanings, is stored in a pretty stable way (Pulvermüller 2002). Language comprehension, thus, implies the activation of our se- mantic knowledge that is often coded in terms of action, perception or emotion knowl- edge, according to the wittgensteinen idea that different word kinds impliy different form of knowledge (Pulvermüller 2012). However, a semantic-based model of language understanding, that basically relies on a fixed and conventional repertoire of meanings, is not sufficiently explicative of what really happens when people speak. A simulation of propositional content does not sufficiently explain real-life linguistic activity. Indeed, the question that must be addressed is: what does it mean for the two utterances in the above dialogue to be subjected to a simulation of their propositional content. In ad- dition, we need to explain how we get from the propositional content to the implicit content and inferential meaning. Simulative understanding is “immediate, automatic and almost reflex-like” (Gallese 2007). Pulvermüller (2012, 442) describes the brain pro- cesses that reflect comprehension as immediate, automatic and functionally relevant as well. However, can this definition of comprehension processes explain how we get from literal meaning to inferential meaning? This question should push us to reflect on the nature of automatic processes and to deepen out understanding of such processes. It could be that even automatic and subpersonal processes are sensible to the context. Findings from recent empirical studies support this hypothesis. Contextual effects on motor simulation during linguistic processing have been assessed in behavioural (e. g. van Dam, Rueschemeyer, Lindemann, & Bekkering 2010) and functional magnetic reso- nancge imaging (fMRI) studies (e. g. Papeo, Rumiati, Cecchetto & Tomasino 2012; van Ackeren, Casasanto, Bekkering, Hagoort, & Rueschemeyer, 2012). These findings sug- gest that contextual information prevails over semantics. However, how precisely this 29
- 34. Valentina Cuccio happens is still an open question. Anyhow, these data raise an issue that all semantic- based account of language understanding should address. Also, not trivial philosophical implications on our understanding of what semantics really is and how it works and on the notion of automaticity should be drawn from these data. It is worth noting that in this paper it is not questioned the fact that language is em- bodied. Instead, the aim of the paper is to highlight the limitations that studies mainly focused on descriptive and action related usages of language inevitably have. These limitations have been mainly undervalued by researchers working in the embodied lan- guage paradigm. Even in those studies that addressed non-literal usages of language, experimental sets seem to miss a realistic pragmatic context that can trigger a process of inferential communication. They rarely take into account more pragmatically com- plex dialogues such as, for example, the one between the father and son previously discussed. Thus, if these kinds of stimuli, by far much closer to real-life linguistic ac- tivity, were taken into consideration, we would probably see that language production and comprehension imply the activation of the Mirror Neuron System in a peculiar, pragmatically-based, way. In other words, as some studies already suggest (Papeo et al. 2012; van Ackeren et al. 2012; van Dam et al. 2010), motor simulation occurring during linguistic comprehension is very likely contextually determined and not fixedly linked to the literal meaning of words. Consequentially, there is a second related problem that it is worth noting here. It concerns the definition of meaning and semantics adopted, sometimes implicitly some- times explicitly, in the embodied language paradigm. The language model adopted in this paradigm seems to be that of the dictionary. In the dictionary model of language, there is a fixed repertoire of words and each word is associated to a meaning. Of course, language seems to also show some imperfections such as polysemy and homonymy, but even these facts can be explained by the model of the dictionary. Indeed, each acceptation of a polysemic or homonym word works as if it were a different word with its own related meaning that we can eventually find in the dictionary. The word’s context allows the activation of the right meaning in any sentence. However, sometimes the context is too ambiguous, and this leads to misunderstandings. This appears to be the only room left for pragmatics in embodied language research (even when contextual effects are taken into consideration, these are considered as something outside the speaker that, in some way, interacts with fixed meanings stored in the speaker “heads”). 30
- 35. Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm In contrast, the pragmatic dimension of language is more extensive than the problem of polysemy and homonymy even though they are more complex than what has been sketched-out here. A more comprehensive account of language should be provided in order to address issues concerning the pragmatic dimension of language. 1.1 A Usage-Based Model of Language Since the first half of the nineteenth century, researchers in the fields of the Philosophy of Language, Pragmatics, Linguistics, Discourse Psychology and even Anthropology have been outlining a usage-based model of language. The vast and very rich literature on this topic numbers among its contributors philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Austin and Grice, linguists such as Levinson and Horn, discourse psychologists as Barlow and Kemmer and anthropologists such as Sperber. Although partially different currents of thought can be identified among these researchers, their accounts present some com- mon features. Hence, the next question to address is: what are the defining features of the usage-based model of language? A good starting point is an examination of semantics and its role in the construction of linguistic meaning. The key to understanding the role of semantics is the distinction between what is literally said and what is intended by the utterance of a sentence (the sentence’s meaning and the speaker’s meaning, in Grice’s words). This distinction in itself suggests that the semantic level only, with compositionality rules, is not sufficient in order to understand linguistic activity. A second, pragmatic, step of language com- prehension seems to be necessary. However, the problem is to determine to what extent the first semantic level can be considered autonomous from the pragmatic level of lan- guage. In other words, is there a residual literal meaning that we can call semantics or, should meaning be always considered as contextually determined at every level? In the latter option holds true, language understanding does not procede from a minimal, literal, proposition to the indended meaning. Pragmatic processes operate extensively at every level of language comprehension. Currently, in the pragmatic debate these two different accounts of the semantic/prag- matic distinction are known as Minimalism and Contextualism. However, indepen- dently of this debate, neither Minimalism nor Contextualism accepts the idea that a consideration of semantics as a fixed repertoire of meanings, can sufficiently explain the process of language production and comprehension. Semantics does not seem to be enough. In fact, if we look at what usually happens in real-life conversations again, 31
- 36. Valentina Cuccio we will see that linguistic meaning is tightly linked to the context of speech, to the background knowledge of the speakers, to their shared knowledge and to their aims in that context (Carapezza & Biancini in press). To know the dictionary definition of each word plus the rules of their composition is not sufficient in order to receive the speaker’s meaning. We all perfectly know the corresponding definition of the words ‘so’, ‘that’, ‘is’ and ‘fine’ in the dictionary. However, this knowledge is not sufficient in order to understand what the father and son in our example are talking about. Hence, to understand lan- guage we need to understand how, when, where, by who and why words are used. This idea leads to a definition of meaning that is very different from the one presented in the dictionary model of language. In this account, meaning is defined by the use of a word in a specific context. We can now turn to another point. Linguistic meaning is the product of a mutual identification of communicative intentions. Without the possibility of understanding other people mental states, and in particular their communicative intentions, language would be a mere code. Indeed, it is the ability to understand other people’s mental states and in particular their communicative intentions that makes irony, figurative language, jokes or even misunderstandings possible. If we only simulate the propositional content of an ironic utterance, how can we understand its ironic meaning? And how can we get the ironic meaning if we do not understand the presuppositions and implicatures of that sentence? And how can we understand the presuppositions and implicatures of a proposition if we do not understand other people mental states? In other words, how can we get the meaning of this sentence without implying a complex mindreading ability? This last point allows us to make a leap forward. Indeed, the key to understanding inferential communication is exactly a complex mindreading ability. The automatic, immediate and reflex-like form of mindreading realized by embodied simulation is not sufficient in order to explain inferential communication. Questions concerning the identification of the functional mechanisms of mindread- ing involved in real-life conversations and their neural implementation are still open. These issues will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 32
- 37. Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm 2 Becoming Ironic. How Do Children Develop an Understanding of Irony? Irony is a very clear example to highlight the role of mindreading in language compre- hension. Moreover, studies on the development of the ability to understand irony can help us to identify those steps of socio-cognitive development that we need to achieve in order to become ironic. Irony has been a widely addressed topic of study for more than two millennia. In the 1st century AD, the Roman rhetorician Quintilian defined irony as a figure of speech consisting in intending the opposite of what is literally said – contrarium quod dicitur intelligendum est. This definition is still very popular along with many others different theories of irony nowadays available. As Colston and Gibbs (2007) noted in their introduction to the edited volume “Irony in Thought and Language”, a host of different theories of irony have been presented and are currently discussed. And each of them seems to be able to explain only a part of this very complex phenomenon. For some researchers (Wilson and Sperber, 1992), irony implies an echoic reference to a desired or expected event while an undesired event is taking place. For others (Clark and Gerrig, 1984), irony is the realization of a pretence. The speaker is acting out the beliefs or behaviours of others and in doing so he is taking distance from them. These two accounts are just examples, though influential, but by no means represen- tative of the huge quantity of theories of irony that are presently discussed (see Colston and Gibbs, 2007 for a review of contemporary theories of irony). However, despite the number of different definitions, irony is, beyond all doubt, a very good example of inferential communication. This is true for many reasons. In order to receive the ironic meaning of an utterance, we need to understand the presuppositions and implicatures of that utterance. Indeed, the use of irony implies, at least, a form of violation. Irony can express the violation of expectations (Colston, 2000; Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksberg, & Brown, 1995; Wilson and Sperber, 1992), the violation of relevance, appropriateness and manner (Attardo, 2000), or the violation of the Gricean Maxim of quality (Kumon-Nakamura et al., 1995). In any case, each of these forms of violation entails a presupposed shared knowledge. Indeed, in order to feel that something is the expression of a violation, we need to know, implicitly or explicitly, that something different should have been the case in that context. Speaker and addressee need to share this knowledge and they need to reciprocally know that 33
- 38. Valentina Cuccio they share this kind of knowledge. If not, irony will not succeed. Moreover, if irony succeeds, we understand the meaning of the speaker’s intentional violation. And this meaning is not explicitly expressed, the speaker and addressee need to implicate it. Thus, the processing of irony entails the ability to manage with presuppositions (the shared knowledge) and implicatures (meanings inferred from violations). Furthermore, the addressee needs to comprehend the goal of the speaker in order to understand his ironic meaning and to make reference to context (both the physical context of speech and the background knowledge of the speaker and the addressee). These issues hold true for many other language usages, but in irony comprehension they are particularly evident. How can we explain the process of inferential understanding in an embodied ac- count? That is, how can we explain the comprehension of something that is not literally present in the sentence but only presupposed and implicated by it? Can we hypothe- size that it is a chain of simulations that leads to the inferential, ironic meaning? Does this chain of simulation need to start with the simulation of the propositional content or not? Does the process of inferential understanding need to be implicit or explicit? These are empirical open questions that are waiting for experimental studies. A look at the development of irony-understanding might help to clarify these exper- imental questions. Indeed, developmental studies can help us to identify the cognitive mechanisms necessary for irony-understanding and this could make the task of looking for their neural implementation easier. Why do developmental studies of irony matter? Developmental studies on irony tell us something about the step of cognitive development that is necessary in order to produce and understand irony. These studies are focused on the identification of the social-cognitive mechanisms needed in the production and understanding of irony. On the other hand, studies on the production and comprehension of irony in adults seem to be more focused on the pragmatic description of the phenomenon. Adults studies seem to be interested in the social functions of irony, in its communicative effects, in the role played by the context in the construction of ironic utterances and so on and so forth. They do not seem to be strictly focused on the identification of the social-cognitive mechanism underlining the use of irony as developmental studies would (Filippova and Astington, 2010). As Filippova and Astington (2010) have recently claimed, much of the research that has been carried out in the developmental line of study (e. g., Happé, 1993, 1995; Sulli- van, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995; Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, & Pincus, 1998; Winner 34
- 39. Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm & Leekam, 1991) has highlighted the fact that the ability to make second-order mental state attributions is required in order to be able to produce and comprehend irony. This claim is so strong in developmental studies that the production and comprehension of irony is often used as a test for evaluating the possession of a sophisticated mindreading ability, i. e. a full Theory of Mind. Indeed, Theory of Mind, the ability to attribute mental states to other people and to understand them shows a gradual development. It is possi- ble to identify different levels of Theory of Mind. The first entails the ability to implicitly attribute intentions, mainly motor intentions, to others. The second level implies the capacity to explicitly reason about other people mental states (desires, beliefs, inten- tions, etc.). A third level implies the ability to reason about other people mental states concerning, in their turn, other people’s mental states (e. g. “I know/believe/predict that John knows that Mary knows”). Accordingly, different kinds of Theory of Mind tests, such as the false-belief test, are usually run. Clements and Perner (1994), using an anticipatory looking paradigm, showed false belief understanding in 2 years and 11 month-old children; in Southgate et al. (2007), the age of false belief understanding was lowered to 25 months using the same experimental paradigm. Recently Buttelman, Carpenter and Tomasello (2009) carried out a study using an active helping paradigm. This study showed false belief understanding in 18 month-old infants. In these stud- ies, children are not requested to explicitly and verbally reason about other people’s intentions. Their helping behaviours and their eye gaze directions seem to suggest false belief understanding. A false-belief task can also be explicit and verbal and it can test first and second or- der mental representations. Indeed, in the “Anne and Sally” test (Wimmer and Perner, 1983) the experimenter asks children about Anne’s (false) belief or asks about what Sally knows that Anne knows. The former is a first-order mental representation test, it is passed by children around the age of 4 years; the latter is a second-order mental representation test and children are usually able to pass the test only after their 4th birthday. The use of irony is considered as a proof of a full Theory of Mind ability. In fact, many studies carried out with both typically and atypically developing chil- dren seem to suggest that the understanding of second-order mental representations is needed in order to acquire irony (Happé, 1993, 1995; Sullivan, Winner, & Hopfield, 1995; Winner, Brownell, Happé, Blum, & Pincus, 1998; Winner & Leekam, 1991). Al- though there is not a general agreement on the exact age at which children start to use irony, this is, beyond all doubt, a later achievement in language acquisition. According to some researchers (Demorest et al. 1983, 1984) children become competent ironists 35
- 40. Valentina Cuccio at about 13 years of age. According to others (e. g., Harris & Pexman, 2003; Sullivan et al., 1995; Winner & Leekam, 1991; see Filippova and Astington 2010 for a review) children of 6 years of age can already comprehend some form of irony. As Filippova and Astington argue, this difference may be due to the fact that those studies looked for different aspects of irony understanding. Moreover, they might show evidence of a gradual development of irony comprehension. In any case, even the results attesting irony competence at six years of age are fully compatible with the claim that irony en- tails second-order mental states understanding. Indeed, results by Perner and Winner (1985) attest understanding of second-order mental states at around the age of six or seven years. Very briefly, we can say that irony entails the ability to go beyond the propositional meaning of an utterance, which sometimes can be literally true and sometimes can be literally false, and to grasp a speaker’s intended meaning through the recognition of a form of violation. In order to carry out this inferential process, a complex mindreading ability seems to be necessary. Indeed, psycholinguistic studies carried out in typically and atypically developing children verify the necessity of a second-order mindreading ability in order to produce and comprehend irony. Irony is then a paradigmatic example of inferential communication. Studies on the development of irony understanding offer us some hints about the socio-cognitive mechanisms that are necessarily involved in the development of inferencial abilities in language production and comprehension. Most of the studies on embodied language seem to still disregard the question of how this inferential process works during lin- guistic activity and where and how in the brain it is implemented. 2.1 Speaking is Acting In a recent article by Friedmann Pulvermüller (2012), the sketch of a neurobiological model of language is preceded by an introduction about semantic theories. Importantly, Pulvermüller introduces pragmatic concepts in the embodied language research. In- deed, the ideas of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein are given plenty of room in this introduction. In particular, Wittgenstein’s notions of “meaning as usage” and “word kinds” are presented. There are different kinds of meaning that lead to different kinds of words and, Pulvermüller says, each kind leads to the activation of a different area of the brain. So, for example, we have object-words, action-words or emotional words. 36
- 41. Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm Semantic knowledge, in these word kinds, is coded in our brain respectively in terms of perception knowledge, action knowledge or emotional knowledge. However, despite the interesting discussion of these wittgensteinian notions, the account of semantics that Pulvermüller proposes is complety describable according to the dictionary model of language. In fact, his account is grounded on the idea that semantics is made up of the binding of a word form and a kind of meaning knowledge. And that language comprehension is the act of connecting the word form to the right knowledge, i. e. to a pattern of neural activation. Pulvermüller does not really look at usages of words in speech act contexts, that was one of Wittgenstein main concerns and one of the most interesting aspects of his philosophical legacy. The problem of how intentions, background knowledge, context, etc. ..., come together to construct meaning is not addressed by Pulvermüller nor by most of the other reserchers working in the embodied paradigm. Boulenger, Hauk and Pulvermüller (2009) carried out a fMRI study on idiom com- prehension, considered as examples of non-literal meaning. This study compared the comprehension of literal and non-literal sentences (idiomatic) containing action-related words. The authors found that the comprehension of both literal and idiomatic sen- tences containing action-related words led to somatotopic activation along the motor strip. These findings were further confirmed in a later study carried out by Boulenger, Shtyrov and Pulvermüller (2012) using a different technique (MEG – MagnetoEncephalo- Graphy) that affords more temporal information about brain processes. Data from this second study revealed somatotopic activation of precentral motor systems during the processing of both literal and idiomatic sentences containing action-related words. However, despite the fact that these studies take into consideration forms of non- literal meaning, they seem to be very far away from the goal of understanding infer- ential communication in real-life linguistic activity. Indeed, participants of both studies read sentences (e. g. “Pablo kicked the habit” and “Pablo kicked the ball”) on a computer screen, without any contextual information. This means that participants did not have to face any pragmatic task that could have triggered inferential understanding and, con- sequently, for example, a different modality of recruitment of the motor system. If we utter the sentence “Pablo kicked the habit” in a real-life conversation in order to talk, for example, about a friend that has stopped smoking, would the pattern of neural acti- vation be exactly the same? We can hypothesize that, on the basis of our background knowledge, the idiom is interpreted as “Pablo stopped smoking” and the somatotopic 37
- 42. Valentina Cuccio activation in the motor system could, thus, pertain to the action of smoking and not the action of kicking. It is now possible to turn to another issue of pragmatics studies that seems to be undervalued in the embodied language researches when it might be very important in order to understand how language works. This issue concerns the definition of language as action. To speak is never just a mere neutral description of states of affairs. Speaking always implies the carrying out of both a physical and a social action. By using irony, we can ridicule or praise someone; with a declaration we can start a war, a love affair, or a hearing in the court; with words we can apologize, we can get married, we can name children or boats. And the list could go on infinitely because the social actions carried out by language are potentially countless. It is important to note that speaking is also an action in the physical sense. Indeed, speaking implies the movement of the oro-facial muscles and often of the hands, which can be involved in co-speech gesturing (or hands and co-sign mouthing in the case of sign languages). Therefore, this should lead researchers to look at language as the performance of physical and social actions. Speaking is acting in a broader sense than just naming objects, actions or abstract concepts. By speaking, we always want to do something. In fact, many of the actions that make us human can only be carried out in language. Speaking implies some kind of background knowledge, goals and intentions; it im- plies physical movements and it has social effects. On the whole, non-linguistic in- tentional actions seem to share these very same features. And besides, linguistic ac- tivity entails communicative intentions, mainly not present in non-linguistic and non- communicative actions. However, often linguistic actions are undervalued and what is taken into account is only the process that links a sign, i. e. a word form, to a meaning. The definition of language as action has been widely discussed by philosophers of language like Austin and Wittgenstein. However, researches working in the embodied language paradigm, despite the fact they were greatly responsible for the discovery of empirical evidence in support of the claim that language is deeply grounded in the brain systems for action and perception, seem not to consider speaking as being an action itself. When I say “Pablo kicked the ball” or “Pablo kicked the habit” I have an intention and I expect my action to have an effect in the real world. And I presuppose that you share the knowledge with me that will allow you to understand what I am saying. 38
- 43. Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm Imagine that I want you to hire Pablo in your company, but you do not agree with me because Pablo has been having trouble with alcohol. I come to your office and say: “Pablo kicked the habit”. This utterance is sufficient to let you understand my request. Without a sophisticated and mutual recognition of intentions and beliefs, this linguistic exchange could not work. Furthermore, how could I perform this action of requesting without language? Humans, then, have a very complicated kind of action, linguistic actions. Hence, we should look at language from the same perspective we use to understand action. This leads us again to the problem of the mindreading systems needed in order to understand action/language. 3 Comprehending Others’ People Actions If speaking is acting (the speaker is performing an action and the addressee has to interpret the speaker’s action), studies on action understanding can help us to clarify language production and comprehension. In particular, these studies could help us in the task of understanding how the mindreading ability is involved in the construction of meaning. How do we get inferential meaning out of literal sentences and what is the role of mindreading in the construction of inferential meaning? Recently, many works have been devoted to the task of identifying the neural mech- anisms that support our ability to understand other people mental states. This ability seems to be necessary for action understanding (see Frith and Frith 2006 for a review). In fact, as Frith and Frith argue (2006, 531), mental states determine actions. Very often the inferential process of mentalizing is carried out automatically. This means that it does not entail conscious thought or deliberation. Often, when we are involved in the task of understanding other people actions, im- plicit and automatic inferences are carried out in the Mirror Neuron System. However, simulations carried out in the Mirror Neuron System cannot always explain the full process of understanding others’ goals and intensions (Frith and Frith, 2006; Mitchel, Macrae and Banaji, 2006). For example, as Mitchel, Macrae and Banaji argue (2006), motor simulation cannot explain long-term attitude. The question is still under debate. Despite the fact that mindreading seems to be a very important function, its neural im- plementation seems to be still controversial. In particular, while the role of the Mirror Neuron System is less controversial in order to understand motor intentions of familiar actions, the possibility of a different neural implementation is under consideration for 39
- 44. Valentina Cuccio a more sophisticated form of mindreading that would allow for the understanding of non-familiar actions. Following Brass et al. (2007), it is possible to say that we have two different ac- counts of the systems that allow us to interpret other’s behaviours. According to one of them, based on the process of motor simulation, we understand others’ actions by simulating them through the activation of the mirror neuron system. According to a second account, action understanding is realised by means of inferential processes im- plemented in non-mirror circuits of the brain (Brass et al., 2007). The findings of Brass and colleagues (2007) support the idea that action understanding in novel and implau- sible situations is primarily mediated by an inferential interpretive system rather than the mirror system. Following the authors, an action is implausible if its goal is not obvious but required context-based inferencing. According to the authors, implausible action understanding activates a brain network involved in inferential interpretative processes that lack mirror properties (Brass et al. 2007). No differential activation was found in the mirror neuron system in relation to the contextual plausibility of observed actions. Then, in this model the comprehension of implausible action is the result of a context-sensitive inferential process of mentalizing. Turning again to the problem of language production and comprehension, what kind of mindreading mechanism is at work when we produce and comprehend linguistic actions? And in particular, what kind of mindreading mechanism is at work in the un- derstanding of inferential communication (e. g. irony, jokes or the daily conversations such as the one previously discussed)? In light of the findings of Brass et al. (2007), it is reasonable to hypothesize that in the understanding of inferential meaning in daily communication we also need a more complex and inferential form of mindreading that should be involved, being an integral part of it, in the dynamic process of the construction of meaning. It is plausible that this mechanism interacts with other mechanisms also involved in linguistic compre- hension, such as the mechanism of motor simulation. These considerations push us to deepen our understanding of the role of contextual effects on language and action understanding. Furthermore, these considerations push us to reflect more on the role of these contextual effects on automatic mechanisms such as the mechanism of motor simulation. Only further empirical studies can help to clarify these issues. 40
- 45. Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm 4 References Attardo, S. (2000). Irony as relevant inappropriateness. [Article]. Pragmatics, 32(6), 793–826. Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and Brain Science, 22(4), 577–609; discussion 610–560. Boulenger, V., Hauk, O., & Pulvermüller, F. (2009). Grasping ideas with the motor system: semantic somatotopy in idiom comprehension. Cerebral Cortex, 19(8), 1905– 1914. Boulenger, V., Shtyrov, Y., & Pulvermüller, F. (2012). When do you grasp the idea? MEG evidence for instantaneous idiom understanding. Neuroimage, 59(4), 3502–3513. Brass, M., Schmitt, R. M., Spengler, S., & Gergely, G. (2007). Investigating action un- derstanding: inferential processes versus action simulation. Current Biology, 17(24), 2117–2121. Buttelmann, D., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2009). Eighteen-month-old infants show false belief understanding in an active helping paradigm. Cognition, 112(2), 337–342. Carapezza, M., & Biancini, P. (in press). Language-game: calculus or pragmatic act?. In A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo, M. Carapezza (eds.), Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, Springer. Choi, S. (1988). The semantic development of negation: a cross-linguistic longitudinal study. Child Langiage, 15(3), 517–531. Clark, H. H., & Gerrig, R. J. (1984). On the pretense theory of irony. Experimental Psychology General, 113(1), 121–126. Clements, W., & Perner, J. (1994). Implicit understanding of belief. Cognitive Develop- ment, 9(4), 377–395. Colston, H. (2000). On necessary conditions for verbal irony comprehension. Pragmatics and Cognition, 8, 277–324. Demorest, A., Meyer, C., Phelps, E., Gardner, H., & Winner, E. (1984). Words speak louder than actions: Understanding deliberately false remarks. Child Development, 55, 1527–1534. Demorest, A., Silberstein, L., Gardner, H., & Winner, E. (1983). Telling it as it isn”t: Children”s understanding of figurative language. British Journal of Developmental Psy- chology, 1, 121–134. Filippova, E., & Astington, J. W. (2010). Children’s understanding of social-cognitive and social-communicative aspects of discourse irony. Child Development, 81(3), 913–928. 41
- 46. Valentina Cuccio Frith, C. D., & Frith, U. (2006). The neural basis of mentalizing. Neuron, 50(4), 531–534. Gallese, V. (2008). Mirror neurons and the social nature of language: the neural ex- ploitation hypothesis. Social Neuroscience, 3(3–4), 317–333. Gallese, V., & Lakoff, G. (2005). The Brain’s concepts: the role of the Sensory-motor system in conceptual knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3), 455–479. Gibbs, R. W., & Colston, H. L. (2007). Irony in language and thought : a cognitive science reader. New York; London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Happé, F. G. (1993). Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism: a test of relevance theory. Cognition, 48(2), 101–119. Happé, F. G. (1995). The role of age and verbal ability in the theory of mind task performance of subjects with autism. Child Development, 66(3), 843–855. Harris, M., & Pexman, P. (2003). Children’s perceptions of the social functions of verbal irony. [Article|Proceedings Paper]. Discourse Processes, 36(3), 147–165. Kumon-Nakamura, S., Glucksberg, S., & Brown, M. (1995). How about another piece of pie: the allusional pretense theory of discourse irony. Experimental Psychology General, 124(1), 3–21. Mitchell, J. P., Macrae, C. N., & Banaji, M. R. (2006). Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others. Neuron, 50(4), 655–663. Papeo, L., Rumiati, R. I., Cecchetto, C., & Tomasino, B. (2012). On-line Changing of Thinking about Words: The Effect of Cognitive Context on Neural Responses to Verb Reading. Cognitiv Neuroscience, 24(12), 2348–2362. Pulvermüller, F. (1999). Words in the brain’s language. Behavioral Brain Science, 22(2), 253–279; discussion 280–336. Pulvermüller, F. (2002). The neuroscience of language: on brain circuits of words and serial order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pulvermüller F. (2010). Brain-Language Research: Where is the Progress?. Biolinguistics, 4, 2–3:255–288. Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms under- lying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2(9), 661–670. Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. Psychology Science, 18(7), 587–592. Sullivan, K., Winner, E., & Hopfield, N. (1995). How children tell a lie from a joke – The role of 2nd-order mental state attributions. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 13, 191–204. 42
- 47. Inferential Communication in the Embodied Language Paradigm Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. van Ackeren, M. J., Casasanto, D., Bekkering, H., Hagoort, P., & Rueschemeyer, S. A. (2012). Pragmatics in action: indirect requests engage theory of mind areas and the cortical motor network. Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(11), 2237–2247. van Dam, W. O., Rueschemeyer, S. A., Lindemann, O., & Bekkering, H. (2010). Context effects in embodied lexical-semantic processing. Front Psychol, 1–150. Wilson, D., & Sperber, D. (1992). On verbal irony. Lingua, 87(1–2), 53–76. Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cogni- tion, 13(1), 103–128. Winner, E., Brownell, H., Happé, F., Blum, A., & Pincus, D. (1998). Distinguishing lies from jokes: theory of mind deficits and discourse interpretation in right hemisphere brain-damaged patients. Brain Language, 62(1), 89–106. Winner, E., & Leekam, S. (1991). Distinguishing irony from deception – Understanding the speaker 2nd-order intention. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 257–270. Wittgenstein, L., & Anscombe, G. E. M. (1953). Philosophical investigations = Philosophi- sche Untersuchungen. Oxford: Blackwell. 43
- 49. Traces of Embodiment in Chinese Character Formation A Frame Approach to the Interaction of Writing, Speaking, and Meaning Johann-Mattis List École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales Paris Centre de recherches linguistiques sur l’Asie Orientale mattis.list@lingpy.org Anselm Terhalle Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf Institute for Romance Languages and Literature terhalle@phil.hhu.de Daniel Schulzek Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf Institute for Language and Information schulzek@phil.hhu.de Abstract In this paper, we develop a frame approach for modelling and investigating certain pat- terns of concept evolution in the history of Chinese as they are reflected in the Chinese writing system. Our method uses known processes of character formation to infer dif- ferent states of concept evolution. By decomposing these states into frames, we show how the complex interaction between speaking, writing, and meaning throughout the history of the Chinese language can be made transparent. 1 Introduction In this paper, we discuss the complex interaction of the written form, spoken form and meaning in Chinese. We show that conceptual processes such as metonymy or metaphor and the sensory-motor grounding of human conceptualization are reflected in Chinese character development. Our analysis is based on the modelling of conceptual processes by means of a frame-based approach to character formation. After introducing the notion of embodiment and its role for language development and linguistic analysis, we point out some general properties of the Chinese writing system, i. e. Chinese character forms, their place in traditional sign models and prin- ciples of character formation. We then give a short introduction on how concepts can be modelled as recursive attribute-value structures called frames. The main section con- sists of a frame-based analysis of selected character formation processes which illustrate the different ways phonemic, graphemic, and semantic components interact. 45
- 50. Johann-Mattis List and Anselm Terhalle and Daniel Schulzek 2 Embodiment and language The term embodiment refers to a number of partly overlapping theories whose common denominator is the claim that cognition requires the interaction of a body with the world (Wilson 2002, Ziemke 2003). The view we adopt in this paper is that abstract concepts evolve on the basis of concepts which arise from perception and action. This approach is taken by Barsalou (1999) who proposes that concepts are constructed from perceptual symbols, i. e. subsets of modal representations which are stored in long-term memory and reused symbolically to stand for objects in the world. 2.1 Conceptual development and language reconstruction Lakoff and Johnson (1980) were the first of now many linguists (e. g. Gibbs 2003 and Steen 2010) to underline the fundamental role that metaphor plays in the construction of abstract concepts based on physical concepts. They postulate that systematic correlates between emotions (such as happiness) and more basic sensory-motor experiences (such as an erect body posture, which is supposed to be often concomitant with happiness) lead to the metaphorical understanding of the more abstract concept on the basis of the concept resulting from the perceptual experience (Lakoff 1980: 58). This conceptual relation is reflected in language where words like up and down stand for spatial concepts as well as for emotional states: cheer up!, I’m feeling a bit down, we’ve had our ups and downs. Thus, the word up preserves information regarding the sensory-motor source concept which underlies the abstract emotional concept. The link, which allows the inference that there is a relation between the two concepts, is the fact that they are associated with the same sound chain [ʌp]. Moreover, the emotional concept became a meaning of up only recently, whereas the spatial meaning is close to that of the Indo-European etymon *upo ‹under, from under› (Pokorny 1959). Not all cases are phonetically and morphologically as transparent as *up, which means that more reconstruction work concerning the *formal part of the linguistic sign is necessary to be able to draw *conclusions about the semantic side. The sound chain of the Latin word *capacitas ‹ability› goes back to the Indo-European root *keh2p- ‹to seize, to grasp› via Latin * capere ‹to seize› – or to the non-laryngealized * *kap-, which cannot be excluded – (Georges 1998, Rix et al. * 2 2011), and French [Sɛf] ‹boss, * chief› stems back from Latin [kaput] ‹head› (Gamillscheg 1997, see Figure * 1 and Figure 2), which in turn might be derived from the root of Latin * capere as well (Vaan 2008). 46
- 51. Traces of Embodiment in Chinese Character Formation : : : Indo-European Latin Latin Latin Fig. 1: Etymology of Latin capacitas. : : : Latin Gallo-Romance Old French Modern French Fig. 2: Etymology of French chef Independently of the morphological * transparency, the genetic relation (or identity as in the case of * up) between the sound chains can thus be seen as a trace of the * sensory-motor grounding of the more abstract concepts ‹ability› and ‹boss› * on the basic concepts ‹grasp› and ‹head›. This information about * conceptual development is of interest for historical semanticists and * cognitive scientists in search of linguistic evidence for embodiment. However, reconstructing the history of a word, i. e. regressing its sound chain back to earlier forms, leads to a sound chain which is no less arbitrary with respect to the concept it designates than the word itself. Tracing back the evolution of French chef, we obtain the Latin word caput. Its sound chain does not tell us anything about its meaning which is something we have to investigate at the same time.1 2.2 Traces of embodiment in Chinese character forms As we have seen, reconstructing the form of a linguistic sign does not automatically provide knowledge about its meaning. This is different with the Chinese writing system. 1 Our anonymous reviewer points out that the -ut ending does contain information about gender, declension or number, and thus provides semantic content. However, this does not alter our argument because -ut, as a linguistic sign, is as arbitrarily linked to its meaning as cap-. 47
- 52. Johann-Mattis List and Anselm Terhalle and Daniel Schulzek Chinese characters consist of 1) the character meaning, 2) the character reading, i. e. a sound chain, and 3) the (written) character form. Reconstructing the evolution of the character form does not lead us to a collection of brush strokes related arbitrarily to any kind of concept, but to an iconic image character, to a representation of the concept originally designated by the form. Fig. 3: Development of the Chinese character forms for ‹chief, first› and ‹fish›. Consider the Chinese character forms for the concepts ‹chief, first› and ‹fish› (shǒu 首 and yú 魚, see Figure 3). Tracing back their evolution, we obtain less abstract images and end up with the source concept of ‹chief› which is ‹head› and for ‹fish› which is, not surprisingly, ‹fish›. The abstract concept ‹chief, first› is grounded on the physical, bodily concept ‹head› whereas ‹fish› is not grounded on another basic concept as it is, in itself, a concept with physical, visible and touchable instantiations which are directly perceivable by sensory-motor means. Thus, the successful reconstruction of the Chinese character form directly provides the concept associated with it. Of course, we do not deny that even the interpretation of the underlying image is subject to a certain arbitrariness. In the case of Chinese shǒu 首, for example, it cannot be completely ruled out that the underlying image depicts something else than a head; and even if we admit that it shows a head the question arises as to what kind of head it is. However, because of their form representing character, these signs are less open to interpretation than are non-onomatopoeic sound-based signs: assuming that we do not have any additional information, an icon provides more 48
- 53. Traces of Embodiment in Chinese Character Formation clues than a sound chain. This makes the Chinese writing system attractive for the study of embodiment. 3 Chinese characters The Chinese writing system (CWS), as we know it today, is famous for its structural properties reflected by a complicated interaction of phonetic and semantic elements.2 Since the Chinese characters can be divided into elements carrying phonetic as well as semantic functions, it is sometimes called a ‘semanto-phonetic writing system’ (yìyı̄n wénzì 意音文字, cf. in Zhōu 1998: 60), yet this characterization exaggerates the actual power of Chinese characters to display phonetic information in a transparent way: Most of the “phonetic” characteristics of the CWS are relics of the processes of character formation which, as they took place asynchronously, were always characterized by a complex interaction between the Chinese language spoken at different times of its history, the sociocultural background of those people who created the characters, and general patterns of reasoning and conceptualization. 3.1 General characteristics of the Chinese writing system From a phonetic perspective, the CWS can be characterized as a syllabic writing system, since every character represents a syllable of the Chinese language. From a semantic perspective, on the other hand, it is a morphemic writing system, since the majority of all characters represents a minimal semantically meaningful unit of the Chinese language. In contrast to the dichotomic structure of alphabet systems, a Chinese character there- fore has a trichotomic structure, since it can be characterized by its form, its meaning, and its reading (List 2009). Thus, the Chinese character cǎi 采 ‹to pluck› is defined by its written form 采, its meaning ‘to pluck’, and its reading [ʦh ai214 ] (see Figure 4). Given this specific structure, we prefer the term morpheme-syllabic writing system (Chao 1968: 102) over the above-mentioned term semanto-phonetic writing system, since this term more closely reflects the concrete units of the semantic and the phonetic domain that are referred to by a Chinese character. 2 The use of the term “phonetic” follows the terminology that is used in the mainstream discussions on the topic. Our anonymous reviewer, however, is surely right in stating that it is rather “morphonological” than strict “phonetic identification” we are dealing with here. 49
- 54. Johann-Mattis List and Anselm Terhalle and Daniel Schulzek Fig. 4: The trichotomic structure of Chinese characters. 3.2 External and internal structure of Chinese characters An important aspect of Chinese character forms is their two-fold structure: Character forms can be analysed with respect to their external and their internal structure (List 2008: 45 f.). Here, external structure refers to the formal aspects of the way the forms are built, i. e. the number, the order, and the direction of strokes. Internal structure refers to the motivation underlying the creation of the forms. While an analysis with respect to the external structure is strictly synchronic, an analysis of the internal structure is always done with respect to the diachronic dimension of a character. As an example, consider again the character cǎi 采 ‹to pluck› (see Figure 5, middle). Based on its external structure one can divide the form into a sequence of eight different strokes (see Figure 5, left). The internal structure, on the other hand, can only be understood when going back in time and looking at the oracle bone version of the form, which dates back to around 1000 BC (see Figure 5, right). Here, one can see a hand which plucks some kind of fruit from a plant.3 Judging from the old version of the character form alone, the pictographic motivation might not be too obvious. But both the picture for ‹hand› and the picture for ‹fruits on a plant› are reflected in other old character forms as well, so there can be little doubt that the original motivation for the creation of the character form was to depict the process of grasping. 3.3 Basic types of Chinese character formation By now, it should have become clear that – in contrast to many alphabetic systems – the formation of the Chinese character forms was not accomplished ad hoc, but instead took a certain amount of time, whereby many character forms were created during 3 This is, of course, an overstatement, since we cannot see an action on a static picture, but have to infer the action from what we see. 50
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- 56. "Do you know who has come to-night to stay with us for a month? Dicky—Dicky Browne. He met auntie and me last season in town. And auntie asked him to run down to us for a bit. He's a nuisance, certainly," shrugging her shoulders. "We all know that, in spite of everything; but I do love Dicky more than any one else, I think." "I wish I could believe that," said Agatha, in a low tone. Lord Ambert was standing near, waiting for Elfrida. "Better love him than—-" "Pouf! What a suggestion! Why should I love any one?" Elfrida's piquant face was now alight with mischief. "Do you think I am such a one as thyself? I tell you, Agatha, that I, for one, have no heart! I can't afford one." "I should think you could afford anything," said Agatha. "You could, at all events, afford to marry the man who loved you." "And where does he live?" asked Elfrida, laughing. "You know," said Agatha slowly, earnestly. "You're lovely; you're a perfect delight!" said Miss Firs-Robinson, her amusement now growing more apparent; "but really I don't. I know only that I—want to be—-" "Happy?" said Agatha, answering. "No; a countess," said the pretty little fairy, with a gay grimace. She looked over Agatha's shoulder and beckoned to Lord Ambert, who was still "in waiting," to come to her. He came. A middle-sized, well-set-up man of about forty, with a rather supercilious mouth and small eyes. He looked quite a gentleman, however; which a great many earls do not, and, of course, there he scored. He was a poor man for his rank in life, and was desirous of impounding the numerous thousands in which Miss Firs-Robinson lay, as it were, enwrapped. He never forgot his dignity,
- 57. however, when with her. He gave her quite to understand that she was by birth many degrees below zero, and that he was a star in her firmament. In the meantime Elfrida, who had a very acute mind of her own, saw straight through him. In a sense he amused her, and, after all, she knew very well who would be mistress and master after her marriage with him. Not Ambert, anyway. Her money should be securely settled on herself; she was quite decided about that. She was quite decided also about her marriage with him. She had lived some little time in America, as has been said, and had learned the value of our English lords; so she had arranged with herself very early in life never to die until she could have a title carved upon her tombstone. Ambert had come in quite handy. He was the only unmarried earl within a radius of a tremendous number of miles, so, of course, he would have to do. It was a pity he was so old—that he was a little bald—that his expression was so unpleasant. But he was an earl. She would be Lady Ambert; and if he thought he would have it all his own way afterwards—why, she would show him. She hadn't the least doubt about his proposing to her. She gave herself no trouble on that head; and, indeed, she used to know great mirth sometimes, when he had been specially laborious over his efforts to prove to her that he had twenty or forty heiresses in his eye, who would all be ready at a moment's notice to accept his title, his debts, and his bald head. For all that, she was determined to marry him. This, however, did not prevent her indulging in small flirtations here and there. There were several young officers in the barracks in the next town who were literally at her feet, and there was the curate, Tom Blount, who every one knew was a very slave to her every caprice. "Ah, Mr. Blount," said she, as she passed him now on her way to the conservatory. "Here? And you haven't asked me for a single dance."
- 58. "I don't dance," said Tom Blount. "The bishop doesn't like it, you know, and to ask you to sit out a dance with me would be more than I dare venture." He smiled at her out of two honest blue eyes. And she smiled back at him out of two very dishonest ones, though all four were much of the same colour. "'If thy heart fail thee,'" quoted she daringly. "Well, I shan't let it fail me," said the curate suddenly. His smile was somewhat forced, however. "Will you sit out one with me?" "You don't deserve it," said she. "But—-" Here Lord Ambert bent and whispered something into her ear. He was evidently urging her to refuse the insolent request of this nobody, this curate of a small country parish. But his words took no effect. Elfrida listened to them, nodded and smiled as if acquiescing, and then—- "The fourteenth is a quadrille, for the sake of appeasing old Lady Saunders, I believe," said she, looking at the curate. "Will you have that dance—to sit it out with me?" "Won't I!" said the curate enthusiastically, who had not long left Oxford, and who was wonderfully young in many ways. "You promised that quadrille to me," said Ambert, frowning. "Yes, I know. But as I never dance quadrilles—-" She paused and looked up at Ambert. "You see?" "No, I don't," said he. "Well I am sure Mr. Blount does," said Elfrida audaciously. "Now, remember, Mr. Blount, the fourteenth is ours."
- 59. Lord Ambert looked at him. Really the audacity of this contemptible curate passed comprehension. To speak so to her, his—Ambert's—future wife. He frowned and bit his lip. That was the worst of marrying into the middle classes; they never know how to keep those beneath them in order. Lord Ambert, holding her hand during her descent from the steps to the garden beneath, ventured a cold remonstrance. "Is it wise of you—you will pardon, I hope, my interference— but is it wise of you to be so kind to a person of that sort?" "A person? Is he a person?" asked Miss Firs-Robinson with much airy astonishment. "I quite understood he was a man of good family. Whereas a 'person' must be of no family whatever." "If without money," put in Lord Ambert quickly, "quite so. There are, of course, grades." "Grades?" "Yes. A man of no birth with money is not the same as a man of no birth without it. For money educates, refines, elevates." This he pointed with little emphases, as a small hint to her. "And a man of birth without money?" "Sinks." Here Lord Ambert's voice took even a lower tone. "Sinks until he meets the extreme—that is, the lowest of all classes—with which he unites. I am afraid that young man you have just been talking to will come to that end. His people, I believe, were in a decent set at one time; but there is no money there now, and probably he will marry his landlady's daughter, or the young woman who manages the school in the village, and— repent it soon after."
- 60. "Repentance is good for the soul," said Elfrida; she laughed. "But as you show it, money is everything. Even the 'person' can be raised by it." "It is sad of course, but I am afraid that is really the case. In these days money is of great importance—of nearly as great importance as birth or position. It lifts the 'person,' as you call it—-" "Has it, then, lifted me?" "Dear Miss Firs-Robinson! What a question! Surely you do not consider yourself part of this discussion?" He, however, had considered her so, and had taken pleasure in the argument that had laid her low. This was part of what he called his "training" of her! "You—who are a thing apart, a thing most precious—-" "I don't want to be a 'thing,' however precious," said Miss Firs- Robinson, with decision. "I should much rather be a 'person,' for choice, however criminal it sounds. It only wants 'age' put to it to be magnificent. And so you call Mr. Blount 'a person'?" "Perhaps I was wrong," said Ambert contemptuously; "a 'beggar' would be nearer the mark."
- 61. CHAPTER V Meanwhile Agatha was left standing near the doorway, whilst her chaperon was explaining the reason of her late arrival to old Miss Firs-Robinson, Elfrida's aunt. The girl's eyes were directed towards the dancers, and so absorbed was her gaze that she started visibly when a voice sounded at her elbow—that hated voice! "May I have the pleasure of this waltz, Miss Nesbitt?" Agatha looked up. Dr. Darkham, tall, handsome, almost young, was standing beside her. "I am sorry—but the dance is promised," said Agatha, gently but coldly. "I am unfortunate." He looked keenly at her, with open question in his eyes. He had educated himself very carefully on the lines of social etiquette; but education of that sort, unless it comes by nature, is often defective and sometimes he forgot. It did not now suggest itself to him that to question Agatha's word, whether that word were true or false, was a bêtise. Some men had come up to ask, Agatha for a dance, and when they were gone he spoke. "It is promised, then?" he said. "And yet you have only just come?" Agatha looked at him for a moment as if surprised. "It is promised," she said again.
- 62. She made no attempt to explain herself. Her manner, however, was very quiet, although her face was set and her tone frozen. Suddenly, however, her expression changed. It lit up with a happy fervour, and her eyes shone. They were looking past Dr. Darkham's towards something beyond, and the latter, as though unable to control his longing to learn the cause of this sweet change in the lovely face before him, turned to follow her glance, and saw over there, making anxious efforts to reach her, a young man rather above middle height, with a face that, if not strictly handsome, was at all events extremely good to look at. It was Dillwyn, the young doctor who had lately come into the neighbourhood, and who was beginning to do pretty well with a certain class of patients. Not the better classes; those belonged almost exclusively to Darkham. Dillwyn was still a long way off, hemmed in by a crowd of skirts that now, being a little stiffened at the tail, took up a considerable amount of room and were not easily passed. There was still a moment or two before he could reach Agatha. Darkham caught his opportunity and turned hurriedly to her. "I hope you will give me a dance later on?" he said, with a dogged sort of determination. He saw that she did not wish to dance with him, but the knowledge only served to strengthen his desire to dance with her; yet he did not ask her for the next dance. An almost mad longing to waltz with her, to hold her in his arms for even a few minutes, to feel her hand in his, took possession of him. He would risk it. "If the first supper dance is not engaged, may I hope for that?" he said, his voice quite even, his heart beating wildly. "I am afraid I have promised that, too," said Agatha, who had not promised it, but she felt driven to desperation. Her voice was low
- 63. and tremulous. What was it about him that repelled her so? She could not, she would not dance with him, whatever came of it. Darkham bowed and drew back, leaning against the wall just behind her. She felt miserable, and yet thankful, that she could no longer see him. Yet she knew he was behind her, watching her; and she had been rude—certainly, very rude. At that moment Mrs. Poynter joined her. "Not a partner yet? I suppose you must wait for this dance to be over? Ah! here I see Dr. Dillwyn coming towards us. You know, Agatha dearest, that he is a cousin of mine, and quite good family and all that." Agatha laughed. "Yes, yes; you ought to take it that way. It really should not be serious," said Mrs. Poynter, who was a young woman and fond of Agatha, and thought the girl with her charming face ought to make a good match. "I am so glad you are not going to be serious over it, because, really, it would be a terrible throwing away of yourself." "But Mrs. Poynter—-" "Yes, of course. He hasn't proposed, you mean; but—I really wish he had not been placed here through the influence of old Mrs. Greatorex, Reginald Greatorex. The old gentleman might just as well have sent him anywhere else, and he does run after you a good deal, Agatha, doesn't he now?" "I never saw him run in my life," said Agatha demurely. "Ah, there! I see you are evading the subject. And here he comes. Now Agatha, be careful; you know—-"
- 64. "Yes; I know, I know," said Agatha, smiling at her. Yet she hardly heard her; her eyes and thoughts were for the young man who was standing before her. Neither of them saw the face behind them—the face of the man leaning against the wall!
- 65. CHAPTER VI "At last!" said John Dillwyn. "You have not given it away? You have remembered?" "The dance?" "Yes. You know you said you would give me the first on your arrival." "But this! I am so late! I could not have expected you to wait—-" "I have waited, however. And it is mine?" He was now looking at her anxiously. What did her manner, her hesitation, mean? "Yes, of course, but have you no partner?" "I have, indeed"—laughing. "One I would not readily change. I have you." "But," looking up at him a little shyly after this plain speech, "how did you arrange it?" "Very simply. This will be my first waltz as well a yours." "Oh, that is too bad of you," said the girl, colouring softly. She meant to be angry with him, perhaps; but if so, the effort was a dead failure. The corners of her lips were smiling, and a happy light had crept into her eyes. "To wait so long, and—-" "It was long. I admit that," interrupted he, smiling. "I thought you would never come."
- 66. "It was all Mrs. Poynter's fault," said Agatha. "And really, but for me I am sure she would not be here even now." "Well, come on, now; let us get even a turn or two," said Dillwyn. "By the bye, the next—is that free?" "Yes," said Agatha. She felt a little frightened. She hoped he would not know she had kept it free purposely. Four or five men had asked her for dances whilst she stood near the door on her arrival with Mrs. Poynter, and when giving them a dance here and there she had steadily refused to part with the next one. She did not tell herself why at the moment, but she knew all the same. "May I have it?" asked Dillwyn, with such a delightful anxiety that all at once her mind was set at rest. He suspected nothing, thought of nothing but his fear that the dance might have been given away before he could ask her for it. Oh, how dear he was! Was there ever any one so good, so perfect? He passed his arm round her waist, and together they joined the dancers. Agatha waltzed delightfully. Her lovely svelte figure swayed and sympathised with the music, just as though it had caught her and was moving with her. Dillwyn waltzed well too. The dance was too soon at an end. "The night is lovely," said he, "will you come out?" He felt that he wanted to be more alone with her; the presence of the people round checked him, destroyed the keenness of the joy he always knew when with her. "I should like it," said she.
- 67. They went towards the conservatory, from which there were steps to the garden outside. The door of the conservatory opened off the dancing-room, and was close to where Agatha had been standing on her entrance. Darkham was still there. He had not stirred since Agatha had floated away with Dillwyn's arm around her. He had watched her persistently. He watched her now as she went through the conservatory door down to the gardens, that glad, sweet light upon her face. Were his wife's words true then, after all? Was there something between her and that fellow—that interloper, who had come from no one knew where, to dispute his right in all the parish ailments? His eyes followed them as though they could not tear themselves away, as Dillwyn and Agatha, happy, laughing, went out of the door beyond into the mild and starlit night. A laugh roused him; it was his wife's. A terrible vision in scarlet satin, trimmed with black velvet bows, met his gaze as he turned. Mrs. Darkham was distinctly en fête to-night. "Well, what d'ye think now? That's her young man. What did I say? Don't you wish you were young, eh? Why, she looks upon you as a Methusaler!" Darkham drew his breath sharply. He looked quickly round him. Had any one heard? The woman's hideous vulgarity made him sick. Try as he would, how could he raise himself with this incubus hanging round his neck? He moved away, tired at heart, half mad with misery. Agatha and Dillwyn had reached the garden by this time—a garden lit by heaven's own lamps, and sweet with the breath of sleeping flowers. A few other couples were strolling up and down the paths—but over there was a garden-chair untenanted. They moved towards it in a
- 68. leisurely fashion. Whether they stood or walked or sat, they were together—that was the principal thing. "The next is mine, too," said he, in a glad voice, as if dwelling on some joy that nothing could spoil. "Yes. We must take care not to lose it." "And yet it is so lovely out here. Are you sure you are warm enough? And, at all events, it is a good thing to know we need not hurry— that there is no other partner waiting for either of us." He seemed to dwell upon the "we" and "us" as if they conveyed great sweetness to him. His heart seemed full. All at once it seemed to him as though he must speak to her—must tell her of the love that filled his heart. The hour, the loneliness, the silence, all tempted him, and yet he feared! She had known him so short a time—and what was there in her manner to him that should give him courage? Could he dare to put it to the touch to win—or lose it all? To lose! That was what held him back. Agatha was speaking. "I am so sorry you waited for me," said she, lying unconsciously. Had not her heart beaten with delight because he had waited? "And you, too, who are so fond of dancing." "Ah! fond! That is a strong expression. I am not a slave to it, you know." "No." She paused. She seemed to study him for a moment. His face, young, strong, with a sort of defiance in it, as though he could and would conquer his world, fascinated her. It had always fascinated her from the first moment she saw it, now three months ago. It was not so much the kindliness of it as its strength that attracted her.
- 69. She, too, could be strong. She felt in harmony with him from the very first. He was, as has been said, not strictly handsome, but his eyes were dark and expressive, and his mouth firm. The pose of his head was charming and his figure well-built and athletic. He was always in splendid spirits, and the milk of human kindness ran swiftly within his veins. Already the poor in his district began to adore him, for kind were his words and encouraging his smiles, and these counted with the sickly ones even more than the shillings that so often came out of a pocket where but few shilling lay. He had begun his fight with life unaided, save by the influence of old Reginald Greatorex, who had property in Rickton, and had got him appointed there, but he felt no fears. A natural buoyancy upheld him. "Well," said he, smiling at her. He was wondering at the depth of her regard. "I was thinking," said she, starting slightly, "that you could never be a slave to anything." Dillwyn looked at her now. "There you wrong me," said he. "I could be—I am—a slave!" "It is difficult to believe," said she calmly. "Why should it be difficult?" "I don't know. But you don't lend yourself readily to the idea. You look as if you could never be easily swayed or governed." "Not easily, perhaps. But—-" He put out his hand as if to clasp hers. At this moment a sudden movement in the bushes behind her struck upon Agatha's ears. She sprang to her feet.
- 71. CHAPTER VII A sense of faintness crept over her. By some strange prescience, she knew who stood behind there in the darkness, concealed, listening. A great horror took possession of her. Why should he haunt her so? What was she to him? He who had a living wife! She turned to Dillwyn, who had risen too. "Come back to the house," said she. Her voice was nervous, but very low. She moved away from the seat, on which she had been resting, with a haste that was almost feverish. Dillwyn followed her, his mind disturbed. Had she fathomed his determination to speak to her, and had she purposely prevented his speaking? He went at once to the point, as he always did when uncertain or perplexed. "Have I offended you?" asked he. "No! Oh, no! You must not think that. How could you have offended me? But I thought I heard some one—there—behind the shrubs." "But even so, there are people all over the place to-night." "Yes, I know." Her tone now was almost heartbroken. She stopped suddenly and held out her hand to him. "You are still my friend?" said she. "I shall be your friend to the last day of my life," said Dillwyn. But his tone was heavy; the elasticity that always distinguished it had gone out of it for the first time.
- 72. In silence they reached the house. Not another word was said about the dance impending. Agatha seeing a couch surrounded by fragrant shrubs, went towards it. "The dance has begun," said Dillwyn, but so coldly that she shrank from him. "I am tired," she said. "Then you had better rest here. Shall I bring you an ice?" "Thank you." He went away. Agatha dropped on to the lounge and gave her misery full play. She had put an end to it all—all that might have made her dull life a very spring of joy. And yet to tell the man who loved her that another man—a married man—pursued her with his hateful attentions was more than she could do. Now, left alone, her spirit failed her, and her eyes filled with tears. She would have given all she possessed to be at home, in her own room, alone, so that her grief might have full sway. She almost hoped he would not come back with the ice. She dreaded the coldness of his regard more than his absence. She—- "Can I do anything for you, Miss Nesbitt?" Dr. Darkham stood beside her. It was to Agatha as though he had risen from the dead. She had supposed him still outside in the garden. But he had followed her apparently. "No, thank you," she said, in a voice well kept in order. "You are not dancing, then?" "Not for the moment." "Your partner is Dr. Dillwyn?"
- 73. "Yes." "He was your partner for the last two, I think?" Agatha roused herself. She looked full at him; there was a smile upon her beautiful lips. "Ah, Dr. Darkham, I have already a chaperon!" said she. "A most inefficient one," said Darkham steadily. "Why should you be allowed to listen to the solicitations of a mere beggar? Were your aunt to hear of this—-" "My aunt!" Agatha looked up at him, but after that one swift glance drew back. What was there in his eyes? Oh, horrible! Surely, surely now she knew that she was not wrong when lately she told herself in shrinking whispers that this man was in love with her. There had been something so strange in the expression of his eyes when looking at her—something so empressé in his manner— something so downright hateful in the inflection of his voice. "My aunt is quite capable of looking after me without the interference of any one," said Agatha slowly. "You have been very kind to Mrs. Greatorex, but you must not extend your kindness to me. I want no other guardian but my aunt." She rose and looked him straight in the face. "Pray do not trouble yourself about my welfare for the future." She passed him and went on; she saw Dillwyn coming towards her with the ice; she had believed she would rather not have seen him return, but now she went to him gladly. Darkham fell slowly into the chair she had just left. That girl —her face, her form—they haunted him. And side by side with hers always grew another face, another form—that of his wife! What vile fiend
- 74. had arranged his marriage? A mere mockery of marriage, where hatred alone was the link that bound the two. Gold that had given a false brilliancy to the faded yellow of her hair, and thrown a gleaming into her light, lustreless eyes. Had he but waited, had he but relied upon himself and given his undoubted genius a chance, he might have risen, unaided, to the highest point, and been now free to marry the woman he loved. With wild, increasing exultation he remembered how she had risen to-night out there in the shrubberies as Dillwyn was on the point of proposing to her. She had cast him off in a sense. Gently, though. She was always kind and gentle. But she certainly put him off; she did not care for him, then. Darkham's face glowed as he sat there in the conservatory. If this woman to whom he was tied was gone—dead! Then his chance might come. If she did not care for Dillwyn—why, she might care for him. At present how could she? "Why don't you come out and look at her?" said the coarse voice he dreaded at his ear; "she's dancing with Dillwyn. She dances lovely —'specially with Dillwyn."
- 75. CHAPTER VIII Mrs. Greatorex was, in a ladylike sort of way, a confirmed gossip. To have told her so personally would have been to make her your enemy for life. The way she looked at it was far more Christian—she said "she took a kindly interest in her neighbours." To-day her interest was particularly strong, if not very kindly; and she was now, from the depths of her low lounging chair, catechising Agatha about the dance last night. She was always very keen about any news that concerned the Firs-Robinsons, who were really nobodies, whilst she—- Her grandfather had been an earl—out-at-elbows, it was true, but yet an earl. She laid great store by this, and periodically reminded her acquaintances of it. Her mother, Lady Winifred, had married (badly from a moneyed point of view) a young and reckless guardsman, who died three years after her marriage, leaving her all his debts and an infant daughter. But then he was one of the Engletons of Derbyshire, and would have come into a baronetcy if three uncles and five cousins had been removed. Unfortunately, her husband predeceased his father! And when the old man (who detested her) followed him to the family vault three months later, it was found that she was not as much as mentioned in his will. There had been no settlements. As there were no children, all the property went to the second son, Reginald Greatorex.
- 76. The sorest subject with Agatha's aunt was this brother-in-law. She had treated him very cavalierly during her short reign at Medlands, as wife of the elder son; and when Reginald came in for the property he remembered it. He portioned her off with as small a dowry as decency would allow. He was testy, self-contained old bachelor—and the last of his race— though with a good point here and there. He had a been good, at all events, to John Dillwyn, whose father was the rector of his parish, and whose mother, some said, had been the one love of old Reginald's life. Both father and mother were dead now, and the young man, after a fierce struggle for existence in town, had passed all his exams, and was free to kill or cure, anywhere. It was when he stood triumphant, but friendless, that Mr. Greatorex had come forward, and got him his post at Rickton, where the former had a good deal of property, though Medlands itself lay in an adjoining county. Mrs. Greatorex had received the young man coldly. Any one connected with Reginald must be distasteful to her. To do her justice, she had never truckled to her brother-in-law in any way, and had contented herself with undisguised hatred of him. Agatha had nothing to do with him, she thanked Heaven—otherwise she could not have supported existence with her. She came from her side of the house, where people had been officers and—- "Mrs Darkham looked frightful," said Agatha. "She really did, poor woman! Fancy, such a gown—red satin and black velvet— and her face—-" "As red as the satin, no doubt. But is it possible, Agatha, what you tell me—that Richard Browne is staying with those people?" "Those people" were always the Firs-Robinsons with Mrs. Greatorex. The fact that they could have bought her up a thousand times over at any moment rankled in her mind. She could not forgive them that.
- 77. Still in some queer way she hankered after the Robinsons— desiring to know this and that about them, and being, as has been hinted, of a parsimonious turn of mind, did not refrain from accepting from them fruits and flowers and vegetables. Indeed, face to face with them she was delightful. She justified herself over this hypocritical turn, and explained herself to Agatha, by quoting St. Paul. "All things to all men" was a motto of his. "Richard?" questioned Agatha, as if surprised. Indeed, Mrs. Greatorex was perhaps the only person of his acquaintance who called Mr. Browne "Richard." "Dicky, you mean?" "Yes, of course. He was christened Richard, Agatha. That ought to count. His father's name is Richard." "It is so funny to think of Dicky's having a father," said Agatha, laughing. "What kind is he, auntie?" "A mummy! A modern mummy," said Mrs. Greatorex, laying down her sock. "A dandified mummy. All paint and wig and teeth—-" "But a mummy! It wouldn't have—-" "Yes, I know. But there's nothing in him! Nothing that is his own. He is padded and stuffed and perfumed! He"—indignantly— "ought to have died ten years ago, and yet now he goes about the world rejuvenated yearly. Only last month I had a letter from a friend of mine, saying Richard's father had come back from the German spas describing himself as 'a giant refreshed.' Just fancy that, at seventy- eight!" "I always feel I could love old Mr. Browne," said Agatha, laughing still. "You must have precious little to love," said her aunt, knitting vigorously. She had known old Mr. Browne in her youth.
- 78. Agatha's laughter came to a sudden end. She sprang to her feet. "Here is Edwy Darkham," said Agatha, moving to the window—"and looking so wild! Aunt Hilda, do come here! Oh!"—anxiously— "surely there is something wrong with him." Across the lawn, running uncouthly, hideously—rolling from side to side—yet with astonishing speed, the idiot came. His huge head was thrown up, and the beauty that was in his face when it was in repose was now all gone. He was mouthing horribly, and inarticulate cries seemed to be bursting from his lips. Agatha struck by the great terror that so evidently possessed him, conquered all fear, and springing out of the low French window, ran to meet him. At times she shrank from him—not always. Deep pity for him lay within her heart, because he was so docile, and because he clung to her so, poor thing! and seemed to find such comfort in her presence. She had been specially kind in her manner to his mother often because of him, and perhaps that kindness to her—the mother— whom the poor, handsome, ill-shapen idiot adored, had been the first cause of his affection for Agatha. She had always been good to Edwy, in spite of her detestation of his father, and now, when the unhappy creature was in such evident trouble—a trouble that rendered him a thousand times more repulsive than usual—she lost her fear of him, and ran down the balcony steps to meet him. He was unhappy—this poor boy, whose soul was but an empty shell! What ailed him? All her young, strong, gentle heart went out to him. "Edwy! Edwy!" cried she, as eloquently as though he could hear her. He rushed to her, and caught her arm, and sank on his knees before her. "Sho! Sho! Sho!" he yelled.
- 79. It was his one word. To him it meant "mother." Agatha understood him. She pressed his poor head against her arm. "What is it? What is it, Edwy?" asked she. There was quick anxiety in her tone. Her voice was unheard by him, but his eyes followed hers and the movement of her lips. Some thread in his weak brain caught at the meaning of her words. His fingers clutched her and closed upon both her arms. The pain was excessive, almost beyond bearing, and Agatha tried to shake herself free. But after a first effort she checked herself. The agony in the poor boy's face, usually so expressionless, moved her so powerfully that she stood still, bearing the pain courageously. She managed to lay her hand, however, on the large bony one (so singularly muscular) that was grasping her right arm, and after a moment or two Edwy relaxed his hold. "Aunt Hilda," cried Agatha, turning to the window. "What can be the matter?" But Mrs. Greatorex, who had carefully taken refuge behind the window curtains, from which safety point she could see without being seen, declined to leave her shelter to solve the problem offered her. "Send him away! send him away!" she screamed dramatically, safe in the knowledge that the idiot could not hear her. "He is going mad. I can see it in his eyes. He'll murder you if you encourage him any further. Get rid of him, Agatha, I implore you, before he does any mischief." "Oh no, it isn't that. It is only that he is in terrible distress about something." At this moment Edwy rose to his feet, and, approaching her, began to gesticulate violently and make loud guttural sounds. In vain
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