SET 4: QUIZ OF ZERO-SUM
GAMES
Erwin Widodo
GAME 1
When do we state that above payoff matrix is a
representation of a zero-sum game without equilibrium
point?
Please elaborate your reason.
Player II
One Two
Player
I
One a b
Two d c
GAME 2
What is the best strategy if you were the convict in this case? Give the
reasons.
What is the type of this game?
Sheriff
Highway Forest
Convic
t
Highw
ay 0 1
Forest 1 1-1/n
GAME 3
Players I and II simultaneously call out one of the numbers: “one” or
“two”.
Player I wins if the sum of the numbers is odd.
Player II wins if the sum of the numbers is even.
The amount paid to the winner by the loser is always the sum of the
numbers in dollars.
The payoff matrix is as follows.
GAME 3
Problems:
Is there any equilibrium point? Give your reason.
Suppose Player I play to call “one” 60% and to call “two”
40% of the time, what is the average value?
Is that the minimax value? If it isn’t please give your
suggested value.
Player II’s call
One Two
Player I’s
call
One -2 3
Two 3 -4
GAME 4
Player 1 maximize its payoff, while Player 2 is the
opposite. Unfortunately some payoffs are missing.
Does this game have its equilibrium point (EP)?
Explain your reasoning to determine this EP.
Player 2
I II III IV
Player
1
A 2 ? ? ?
B 3 ? ? ?
C 4 ? ? ?
D 5 6 7 8
GAME 5
From a set of 3 cards, numbered as 1, 2, 3, Player 1 select a card at
will.
Player 2 tries to guess this selected card.
After each guess, Player 1 signals High, Low, of Correct depending on
Player 2’s guess.
The game is over when the card is successfully guessed by Player 2.
Player 2 pays Player 1 an amount equals to the number of trials Player
2 made.
Problems:
 What payoff matrix should be constructed?
 What type of game is it? Please give your reason
SOLUTION 1
Assume there is no EP and let’s start from p11.
If a ≥ b, then b < c, as otherwise b is an EP.
Since b < c, we must have c > d, as otherwise c is an EP. Continuing
thus, we see that d < a.
In other words, if a ≥ b, then a > b < c > d < a.
By symmetry, if a ≤ b, then a < b > c < d> a.
20 points
SOLUTION 2
As the convict, let’s say choose “highway” at p
(p)(0)+(1-p)(1)=(p)(1)+(1-p)(1-1/n)
p =1/(n+1) and
choose “forest” at (1-p)= n/(n+1)
The expected value to escape= n/(n+1)
Two-person zero-sum game without equilibrium point
15 points
5 points
SOLUTION 3
Maximin=-2; minimax=3  no EP
P1 calls “one” 60% & calls “two” 40%:
 If P2 calls “one”: 60%(-2)+40%(3)=0
 If P2 calls “two”: 60%(3)+40%(-4)=0.2
 Hence the “at least value” of P1 in this case = 0
VN Minimax value  P1 calls “one” at “p”
p(-2)+(1-p)(3)=p(3)+(1-p)(-4)
p=7/12 VN Minimax=1/12
8 points
8 points
4 points
SOLUTION 4
Player 1 viewpoint: no matter “?”
 In each row of ? > p11,p21,p31,p41  player 1 will choose p11,p21,p31,p41 as
minima and p41 as maximin value
Player 2 viewpoint:
 In each row of ? < p11,p21,p31,p41  player 2 will choose p41 and may choose ?s
or p42,p43,p44 as maxima but for sure will choose p41 as minimax value
Hence the EP is p41
2 points
9 points
9 points
SOLUTION 5
Maximin=1;Minimax=2Two-person zero-sum game
without equilibrium point
Player 2
123 132 21/2
3
312 321
Player
1
1 1 1 2 2 3
2 2 3 1 3 2
3 3 2 2 1 1
The payoffs represent the amount Player
1 gets
15 points
5 points

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Set 4 quiz of zero-sum games

  • 1. SET 4: QUIZ OF ZERO-SUM GAMES Erwin Widodo
  • 2. GAME 1 When do we state that above payoff matrix is a representation of a zero-sum game without equilibrium point? Please elaborate your reason. Player II One Two Player I One a b Two d c
  • 3. GAME 2 What is the best strategy if you were the convict in this case? Give the reasons. What is the type of this game? Sheriff Highway Forest Convic t Highw ay 0 1 Forest 1 1-1/n
  • 4. GAME 3 Players I and II simultaneously call out one of the numbers: “one” or “two”. Player I wins if the sum of the numbers is odd. Player II wins if the sum of the numbers is even. The amount paid to the winner by the loser is always the sum of the numbers in dollars. The payoff matrix is as follows.
  • 5. GAME 3 Problems: Is there any equilibrium point? Give your reason. Suppose Player I play to call “one” 60% and to call “two” 40% of the time, what is the average value? Is that the minimax value? If it isn’t please give your suggested value. Player II’s call One Two Player I’s call One -2 3 Two 3 -4
  • 6. GAME 4 Player 1 maximize its payoff, while Player 2 is the opposite. Unfortunately some payoffs are missing. Does this game have its equilibrium point (EP)? Explain your reasoning to determine this EP. Player 2 I II III IV Player 1 A 2 ? ? ? B 3 ? ? ? C 4 ? ? ? D 5 6 7 8
  • 7. GAME 5 From a set of 3 cards, numbered as 1, 2, 3, Player 1 select a card at will. Player 2 tries to guess this selected card. After each guess, Player 1 signals High, Low, of Correct depending on Player 2’s guess. The game is over when the card is successfully guessed by Player 2. Player 2 pays Player 1 an amount equals to the number of trials Player 2 made. Problems:  What payoff matrix should be constructed?  What type of game is it? Please give your reason
  • 8. SOLUTION 1 Assume there is no EP and let’s start from p11. If a ≥ b, then b < c, as otherwise b is an EP. Since b < c, we must have c > d, as otherwise c is an EP. Continuing thus, we see that d < a. In other words, if a ≥ b, then a > b < c > d < a. By symmetry, if a ≤ b, then a < b > c < d> a. 20 points
  • 9. SOLUTION 2 As the convict, let’s say choose “highway” at p (p)(0)+(1-p)(1)=(p)(1)+(1-p)(1-1/n) p =1/(n+1) and choose “forest” at (1-p)= n/(n+1) The expected value to escape= n/(n+1) Two-person zero-sum game without equilibrium point 15 points 5 points
  • 10. SOLUTION 3 Maximin=-2; minimax=3  no EP P1 calls “one” 60% & calls “two” 40%:  If P2 calls “one”: 60%(-2)+40%(3)=0  If P2 calls “two”: 60%(3)+40%(-4)=0.2  Hence the “at least value” of P1 in this case = 0 VN Minimax value  P1 calls “one” at “p” p(-2)+(1-p)(3)=p(3)+(1-p)(-4) p=7/12 VN Minimax=1/12 8 points 8 points 4 points
  • 11. SOLUTION 4 Player 1 viewpoint: no matter “?”  In each row of ? > p11,p21,p31,p41  player 1 will choose p11,p21,p31,p41 as minima and p41 as maximin value Player 2 viewpoint:  In each row of ? < p11,p21,p31,p41  player 2 will choose p41 and may choose ?s or p42,p43,p44 as maxima but for sure will choose p41 as minimax value Hence the EP is p41 2 points 9 points 9 points
  • 12. SOLUTION 5 Maximin=1;Minimax=2Two-person zero-sum game without equilibrium point Player 2 123 132 21/2 3 312 321 Player 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 The payoffs represent the amount Player 1 gets 15 points 5 points