Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and Exploitation
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This document discusses common vulnerabilities found in mobile applications. It begins by outlining the types of sensitive data stored on mobile devices and used by mobile apps. It then covers tools for analyzing the file system, application layer, and transport layer of mobile apps. Specific vulnerabilities are highlighted from the OWASP Mobile Top 10 list, including insecure data storage, weak server-side controls, and insufficient transport layer protection. Examples of vulnerabilities found in popular apps like Facebook, Evernote, MyFitnessPal, and LinkedIn are provided. The document concludes by emphasizing that mobile security issues go beyond just application vulnerabilities.
Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and Exploitation
- 1. Smart Bombs: Mobile Vulnerability and Exploitation Tom Eston
- 3. Windows Mobile Wins! 3
- 4. Tom Eston • Manager, SecureState Profiling & Penetration Team • Blogger – SpyLogic.net • Infrequent Podcaster – Security Justice/Social Media Security • Zombie aficionado • I like to break new technology 4
- 5. What are we talking about today? • What’s at risk? • Tools, Testing and Exploitation • Common vulnerabilities found in popular apps (this is the fun part) • Special thanks to Kevin Johnson and John Sawyer who helped with this research! 5
- 6. What are Smart Bombs? • We’ve got powerful technology in the palm of our hands! • We store and transmit sensitive data • Mobile devices are being used by: – Major Businesses (PII) – Energy Companies (The Grid) – The Government(s) – Hospitals (PHI) – Your Mom (Scary) 6
- 8. Testing Mobile Apps • What are the three major areas for testing? – File System What are apps writing to the file system? How is data stored? – Application Layer How are apps communicating via HTTP and Web Services? SSL? – Transport Layer How are apps communicating over the network? TCP and Third-party APIs 8
- 9. OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks 1. Insecure Data Storage 2. Weak Server Side Controls 3. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection 4. Client Side Injection 5. Poor Authorization and Authentication 9
- 10. OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks 6. Improper Session Handling 7. Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs 8. Side Channel Data Leakage 9. Broken Cryptography 10. Sensitive Information Disclosure 10
- 11. OWASP Mobile Security Project • You should get involved! • https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project 11
- 12. Other Issues • Privacy of your data! – Mobile apps talk to many third party APIs (ads) – What’s collected by Google/Apple/Microsoft? 12
- 13. Common Tools • SSH • VNC server • A compiler (gcc / agcc) • Android SDK (adb!) • Xcode • iExplorer (iOS GUI file explorer) • Jailbroken iDevice • Rooted Android Device 13
- 14. File System Analysis • Forensic approach – File system artifacts – Timeline analysis – Log analysis – Temp files 14
- 15. Forensic Tools • Mobile Forensic Tools – EnCase, FTK, Cellebrite • Free and/or Open Source – file, strings, less, dd, md5sum – The Sleuthkit (mactime, mac-robber) 15
- 16. Timelines • Timelines are awesome – Anyone know log2timeline? • Filesystem – mac-robber – mactime • Logs – Application- & OS-specific 16
- 17. Temp Files 17
- 18. Viewing & Searching Files • cat, less, vi, strings, grep • SQLite files – GUI browser, API (Ruby, Python, etc) • Android apps – ashell, aSQLiteManager, aLogViewer 18
- 19. Application Layer - HTTP • Tools Used: – Burp Suite – Burp Suite – oh yeah Burp Suite! 19
- 20. Why Look at the App Layer? • Very common in mobile platforms • Many errors are found within the application – And how it talks to the back end service • Able to use many existing tools 20
- 21. Misunderstanding Encryption 21
- 22. Base64 Encoding is NOT Encryption! • Really. It’s 2012. Base64: TXkgc3VwZXIgc2VjcmV0IGtleSE= Plaintext: My super secret key! 22
- 23. Want Credentials? Note: This is actually a hardcoded password in the UPS app… 23
- 24. Transport Layer - TCP • Tools Used: – Wireshark – Tcpdump – NetworkMiner 24
- 25. Why look at the transport layer? • Check to see how network protocols are handled in the app • Easily look for SSL certificate or other communication issues 25
- 26. NetworkMiner • Extracts files/images and more • Can pull out clear txt credentials • Quickly view parameters 26
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- 28. TCP Lab Setup • Run tcpdump directly on the device • Run Wireshark by sniffing traffic over wireless AP or network hub setup (lots of ways to do this) • Import PCAPs into NetworkMiner 28
- 29. App Vulnerabilities • Several examples that we’ve found • Many from the Top 25 downloaded apps 29
- 30. Facebook • OAuth Tokens Stored in PLIST file • Simply copy the PLIST file to another device, you’re logged in as them! • I’m finding OAuth tokens in lots of PLIST files…Dropbox and apps that use Dropbox like password managers… 30
- 31. Evernote • Notebooks are stored in the cloud • But…caches some files on the device… • OWASP M1: Insecure Data Storage 31
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- 33. MyFitnessPal • Android app stores sensitive data on the device (too much data) 33
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- 35. Password Keeper “Lite” • PIN and passwords stored in clear-text SQLite database • So much for the security of your passwords… 35
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- 39. Draw Something • Word list stored on the device • Modify to mess with your friends 39
- 40. LinkedIn • SSL only for authentication • Session tokens and data sent over HTTP • Lots of apps do this • M3: Insufficient Transport Layer Protection • Note: This was fixed with the latest version of the app (for iOS at least) 40
- 41. Auth over SSL Data sent over HTTP 41
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- 43. Pandora • Registration over HTTP • User name/Password and Registration info sent over clear text • Unfortunately…lots of apps do this 43
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- 45. Hard Coded Passwords/Keys • Major Grocery Chain “Rewards” Android app • Simple to view the source, extract private key • OWASP M9: Broken Cryptography • Do developers really do this? 45
- 46. Why yes, they do! 46
- 47. Privacy Issues • Example: Draw Something App (Top 25) • UDID and more sent to the following third-party ad providers: – appads.com – mydas.mobi – greystripe.com – tapjoyads.com 47
- 48. What is UDID? • Alphanumeric string that uniquely identifies an Apple device 48
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- 50. Pinterest and Flurry.com 50
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- 52. Conclusions • Mobile devices are critically common • Most people use them without thinking of security • Developers seem to be repeating the past • Lots of issues besides Mobile Application Security – BYOD – The device itself (Jailbreaking/Rooting) – MDM and Enterprise Management – The list goes on… 52