![into it—especially Conroux’s and Daricau’s divisions, which had been
divided into separate brigades by the way in which Gazan had dealt
with them at the commencement of the action, never got into regular
divisional order again, and fought piecemeal by regiments.
The decisive point was on the ground at and above Ariñez, which
was held by Leval’s division, with one regiment of Daricau’s (103rd
Line) on their left. The village, low down on the slope, was held by
Mocquery’s brigade—Morgan’s was in support with the guns, higher
up and more to the right. Picton attacked with Power’s Portuguese on
his left, Brisbane’s brigade on his right, and Kempt’s brigade of the
Light Division in support, except that some companies of the 1/95th
had been thrown out in front of Brisbane’s line, and led the whole
attack. The Riflemen rushed at the village, penetrated into it, and
were evicted after a fierce tussle, by a French battalion charging in
mass down the street. But immediately behind came the 88th and
74th. The former, attacking to their right of the village[582]
, completely
smashed the French regiment which came down to meet them in a
close-fire combat, and drove them in disorder up the hill, while the
latter carried Ariñez itself and swept onward through it. The 45th,
farther to the right, attacked and drove off the regiment of Daricau’s
division which was flanking Leval. Power’s Portuguese would seem to
have got engaged with Morgan’s brigade, on the left of the village; it
gave way before them, when the 74th had stormed Ariñez and the
Connaught Rangers had broken the neighbouring column. Leval’s
routed troops appear to have swept to the rear rather in a southerly
direction, and to their left of the high road, so as to leave the
beginnings of a gap between them and Cassagne’s division of the
Army of the Centre, which was coming up to occupy the ridge north
of Gomecha, in the new position.
The complete breach in the French centre made by Picton’s
capture of Ariñez, and the driving of Leval out of his position above it,
had the immediate effect of compelling Darmagnac’s division to
conform to the retreat, by falling back from Margarita on to La
Hermandad and the hills behind it on the one wing, while the
confused line of Daricau’s, Conroux’s, and Maransin’s troops, on the
other hand, had to retire to the level of Gomecha, though the 4th](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-19-320.jpg)
![and 2nd Divisions were not yet far enough forward to be able to
press them. Nearly all the French guns appear to have been carried
back to the new position, which may roughly be described as
extending from Hermandad on the Zadorra by Zuazo and Gomecha to
the hills in front of Esquivel. It was quite as good as the Margarita-
Ariñez-Zumelzu line which had just been forced by Picton’s central
attack.
It took some little time for Wellington to organize his next
advance; the troops which had forced the Ariñez position had to be
re-formed, and it was necessary to allow the 4th and 2nd Divisions to
come up level with them, and to bring forward Dickson’s mass of
artillery to a more advanced line, to batter the enemy before the next
infantry assault was let loose. The only point where close fighting
seems to have continued during this interval was on the extreme left,
where Lord Dalhousie, after the French had left Margarita, was
pressing forward Grant’s brigade of his own division, supported by
Vandeleur’s brigade of the Light Division, against D’Erlon’s new
position, where Neuenstein’s brigade of five German battalions lay in
and about La Hermandad, with Chassé’s dilapidated regiments in
reserve behind. There was a very bitter struggle at this point,
rendered costly to the advancing British by the superiority of the
French artillery—D’Erlon had now at least two batteries in action—
Dalhousie only his own six divisional guns, those of Cairnes. Grant’s
brigade, after advancing some 300 yards under a very heavy fire,
came to a stand, and took cover in a deep broad ditch only 200 yards
from the French front. According to an eye-witness Dalhousie
hesitated for a moment as to whether a further advance was
possible[583]
, and had the matter settled for him by the sudden charge
of Vandeleur’s brigade, which came up at full speed, carried the 7th
Division battalions in the ditch along with it in its impetus, and
stormed La Hermandad in ten minutes. The German defenders—
Baden, Nassau, and Frankfurt battalions—reeled back in disorder, and
retreated to the crest of the heights behind, where Cassagne’s
division, hitherto not engaged, picked them up. D’Erlon succeeded in
forming some sort of a new line from Crispijana near the Zadorra to
Zuazo, where his left should have joined the right of the Army of the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-20-320.jpg)
![South. It is curious to note that while Grant’s brigade lost heavily in
this combat (330 casualties), Vandeleur’s, which carried on the attack
to success, suffered hardly at all (38 casualties). Their German
opponents were very badly punished, having lost 620 men, including
250 prisoners, in defending La Hermandad against the two British
brigades[584]
.
While Wellington, after the first breaking of the French line, was
preparing under cover of the cannonade of Dickson’s guns for the
assault on their new position in front of Zuazo and Gomecha, General
Graham was developing his attack on the Army of Portugal and the
French line of retreat, but not with the energy that might have been
expected from the victor of Barrosa.
He had, as it will be remembered, sent Oswald and the 5th
Division against the bridge of Gamarra Mayor, and Longa’s Spaniards
against that of Durana, while he himself remained with the 1st
Division, Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, and the bulk of his cavalry
on the high road, facing the bridge of Arriaga and its outlying bulwark
the village of Abechuco. We should have expected that the main
attack would be delivered at this point, but nothing of the sort took
place. When the noise of Oswald’s heavy fighting at Gamarra Mayor
had begun to grow loud, Graham directed the two Light Battalions of
the German Legion (under Colonel Halkett) to clear the French out of
Abechuco. This they did with trifling loss—1 officer and 51 men,
capturing several guns in the village[585]
. But Graham made no
subsequent attempt to improve his success by forcing the bridge
behind—as is sufficiently witnessed by the fact that of his remaining
battalions the Guards’ Brigade had no casualties that day, and the
three Line battalions of the K.G.L. one killed and one wounded.
Before drawing up in front of Arriaga he had sent Bradford’s
Portuguese, for a short time, to demonstrate to his right, toward the
bridge of Yurre; but he called them back after a space, and placed
them to the right of Abechuco, continuing the general line of the First
Division. Bradford’s battalions lost precisely 4 men killed and 9
wounded. It is clear, therefore, that Graham never attacked the
Arriaga position at all. Why he massed 4,000 British and 4,000](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-21-320.jpg)
![Portuguese infantry on this front—not to speak of two brigades of
cavalry—and then never used them, it is hard to make out.
We know, it is true, that not only Graham but Wellington himself
over-estimated the strength of Reille’s force. They did not know that
Maucune had gone away in the dark, in charge of the great convoy,
and thought that Foy’s and Taupin’s divisions were the only troops of
the Army of Portugal which had not rejoined. Arguing that he had
four infantry divisions in front of him (though they were really only
two), Graham no doubt did well to be cautious—but he was much
more than that. It was at least his duty to detain and engage as
many of the enemy’s troops as was possible—and he certainly did not
do so.
There was opposite him at Arriaga one single infantry division—
Sarrut’s, and he did so little to employ it that Reille dared—after
observing the British movements for some time—to take away
Sarrut’s second brigade (that of Fririon) for use as a central reserve,
which he posted at Betonio a mile back from the river, leaving
Menne’s brigade alone—not much over 2,000 bayonets—opposed to
the whole 1st Division, Bradford, and Pack. It is true that Menne had
heavy cavalry supports—Digeon’s dragoons and Curto’s brigade of
Mermet’s light horse—on one flank, and Boyer’s dragoons not far
away on the other. But cavalry in 1813 were not troops which could
defend a bridge or the line of a river. There was also a good deal of
French artillery present—a more important fact under the existing
circumstances. For Reille had still twenty guns ranged along the
river[586]
, beside those which were detached on the flank with
Casapalacios’ Spaniards. But Graham had almost as many—the three
batteries of Lawson, Ramsay, and Dubourdieu—and of these the two
last, ranged opposite Arriaga bridge, and pounding the village behind
it, quite held their own against the opposing guns.
It can only be supposed that Graham, in refraining from any
serious attack along the high road, was obeying in too literal a
fashion Wellington’s orders not to commit himself to close fighting in
the low ground, and to regulate his movements by those of the
columns on his right (Picton’s and Dalhousie’s divisions). When these
had worked their way up the Zadorra to his neighbourhood he did](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-22-320.jpg)
![advance. But it was then so late that the enemy in front of him was
able to get away, without any very disastrous losses.
While Graham kept quiet on the high road, Oswald was engaged
in a very different style at Gamarra Mayor, where after his first
capture of the village, he made at least three desperate attempts to
force the bridge, held most obstinately by Lamartinière’s division. The
passage was taken and retaken, but no lodgement on the southern
bank could be made. After Robinson’s brigade had exhausted itself,
Oswald put in the 3/1st from Hay’s brigade and some of his
Portuguese[587]
. But no success was obtained, though both sides
suffered heavily. The casualty rolls of the 5th Division show a loss of
38 officers and 515 men—those of their French opponents 38 officers
and 558 men. Practically all on both sides fell in the murderous
fighting up and down Gamarra bridge. The forces were so equally
balanced—each about 6,000 bayonets and one divisional battery—
that on such a narrow front decision was impossible when both
fought their best. The only way of attacking the bridge was by
pushing straight down the narrow street of the village from the
British side, and across an open field from the French. Both parties
had guns trained upon its ends, which blew to pieces any column-
head that debouched. There were no fords anywhere near, and the
banks for some distance up-stream and down-stream were lined by
the skirmishers of both sides, taking what cover they could find, and
doing their best to keep down each other’s fire. ‘It plainly appeared
this day that the enemy had formed a sort of determination not to be
beat: we never saw them stand so vigorous before,’ writes a diarist
from the ranks, in Robinson’s brigade[588]
.
There was an absolute deadlock at Gamarra Mayor till nearly five
o’clock in the afternoon. At Durana things went otherwise: Longa,
though hampered by his lack of guns, ended by pushing the Franco-
Spanish brigade across the bridge, and then for some way down the
south side of the Zadorra. The retreating party then made a stand
behind a ravine and brook some half-mile farther on, where they
were flanked by a brigade of Mermet’s light cavalry, as well as by
their own five squadrons, and supported by the French battalion of
the 3rd Line which had been in their quarter of the field from the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-23-320.jpg)
![first. Longa was unable to push them farther—probably for fear of
lending his flank to cavalry charges, and gained no further ground till
the general retreat of the French army began. But he had effectively
cut King Joseph’s communication with France by seizing Durana—and
this was the governing factor of the whole fight, since the enemy had
now only the Pampeluna road by which he could retreat. If Joseph
had owned some infantry reserves, he could (no doubt) have driven
Longa away; but he had not a man to spare in any part of the field,
and things were going so badly with the Army of the South that he
had no attention to spare for the Army of Portugal.
It must have been about four o’clock before Wellington, having
rearranged his line and brought up his artillery, determined to renew
the general attack on the French right and centre. Joseph had
brought up to the new position (extending from Crispijana on the left
by Zuazo to the heights in front of Esquivel) the whole of the infantry
of the Armies of the South and Centre, which now formed one rather
irregular line. The only infantry reserve was the six weak battalions of
the Royal Guard—perhaps 2,500 bayonets[589]
, placed on the high
road in front of Vittoria—there was also a mass of cavalry in reserve,
but this was of as little use for the defence of a hill-position as was
Wellington’s for the assault on it. There were now in line Tilly’s
division of dragoons which had been brought back from its useless
excursion on the Logroño road, and Pierre Soult’s light horse, both of
Gazan’s army, with Treillard’s dragoons, Avy’s Chasseurs, and the two
cavalry regiments of the Royal Guard, all from the Army of the Centre
—in all some 4,500 sabres.
The artillery, however, was very strong, and—deployed in a long
line on both sides of the high road—was already sweeping all the
slopes in front. There were present 46 guns of the Army of the South
(all that it owned save one piece lost at Ariñez and three absent with
Digeon’s dragoons), twelve guns of the Army of the Centre, and 18
from the reserve of the Army of Portugal—76 in all[590]
. Dickson would
appear to have brought up against them very nearly the same
number: 54 British, 18 Portuguese, and 3 Spanish guns, when the
last of the reserve batteries had got across the Zadorra and come
forward into line—a total of 75 pieces[591]
. The cannonade was the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-24-320.jpg)
![clear from the French narratives that the infantry did not support the
guns in front line as they should. The reports of the Army of the
Centre speak of being turned on their right by a column which kept
near the river and took Crispijana—obviously Colville’s brigade. As the
16th Léger in that village only suffered a loss that day of one officer
and 26 men, its resistance cannot have been very serious. But
D’Erlon’s divisions were also outflanked on their left—by clouds of
skirmishers drifting in by the wood and broken ground about
Gomecha, who turned on the line of artillery, and began shooting
down the gunners from flank and rear[592]
. Obviously there was a gap
along the high road, by which these light troops must have
penetrated, and as obviously it was caused by Leval having sheered
off to the south. For the artillery report of Gazan’s army also speaks
of being turned on its right wing—‘enveloped by skirmishers who had
got into Gomecha and were in rear of the position, which was being
also attacked frontally.’ Nor is this all, ‘the mass on the mountain
(Cameron and Morillo) descended on the left flank and rear of the
Army of the South before it had time to form again: the artillery
found itself without support.’ If so, where were the four and a half
divisions of infantry which should have been protecting it?
The only possible deduction from all our narratives is that Gazan’s
army made no real stand on the Gomecha-Esquivel position, and
retired the moment that the attack drew near. And the person mainly
responsible for the retreat was the Army-Commander himself, whose
very unconvincing account of this phase of the action is that ‘the right
flank of the line was continually being outflanked: I received no
further orders about the taking up of the position of which the King
had spoken; the enemy was getting near the gates of Vittoria (!), and
so I had to continue my movement toward that town, after having
taken up a position by Zuazo, with the intention of covering with my
right-hand division and my guns the retreat of the rest of the army,
which without this help would have been hopelessly compromised. At
this time I had only lost four guns, abandoned on the extreme left of
the line: the artillery was intact, and the army had suffered no
greater loss than it had inflicted on the enemy.’](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-26-320.jpg)
![Reading this artful narrative, we note that (1) Gazan evacuated on
his own responsibility a position that the King had definitely ordered
him to take up—because he had ‘no further orders’; (2) the continued
‘turning of his right’ could only have resulted from the defeat of his
own troops on and about the high road—which was in his sector, not
in D’Erlon’s, Leval was across it when the last phase of the battle
began; (3) D’Erlon held Zuazo and complained that there was nothing
on his left, which was completely turned on the side where Leval
ought to have been but was not; (4) Gazan retreated without any
serious loss having compelled him to do so. This is obviously the fact.
Villatte’s whole division had less than 300 casualties, Leval’s under
800, Daricau’s under 850: the only troops hard hit were Maransin’s
brigade, Rey’s brigade of Conroux’s division, and the 103rd Line in
Daricau’s. Moreover, the 4th and 2nd British Divisions, the troops
immediately opposed to Gazan’s main line, had insignificant losses in
this part of the action, Byng’s brigade under 150, Ashworth’s just 23,
Anson’s 90, Skerrett’s 22; the only appreciable loss had been that of
Stubbs’s Portuguese—about 240. For the heavy casualty lists of
O’Callaghan’s, Cadogan’s, and Brisbane’s battalions had all been
suffered in the earlier phases of the fight[593]
.
The fact is that Gazan went off without orders, and left the King
and D’Erlon in the lurch. Jourdan is telling the exact truth when he
says that ‘General Gazan, instead of conducting his divisions to the
position indicated, swerved strongly to the right, marching in retreat,
so as to link up with Villatte; he continued to draw away, following
the foot-hills of the mountain [of Puebla], leaving the high road and
Vittoria far to his left, and a vast gap between himself and Count
D’Erlon’[594]
.
No doubt the breach made in the French centre when Picton
stormed the heights behind Ariñez had been irreparable from the
first; and no doubt also the flanking movement of Morillo and
Cameron on the mountain must have dislodged the Army of the
South, if it had waited to come into frontal action with Cole and Hill.
But Gazan showed complete disregard of all interests save his own,
and went off in comparatively good condition, without orders, leaving](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-27-320.jpg)
![the King, D’Erlon, and Reille to get out of the mess as best they
might.
Some of the British narratives tend to show that many parts of
Gazan’s line had never properly settled down into the Gomecha-
Esquivel position, having reached it in such bad order that they would
have required more time than was granted them to re-form. An
officer present with the skirmishing line of the 4th Division writes in
his absolutely contemporary diary: ‘From the time when our guns
began to open, and to throw shells almost into the rear of the
enemy’s height, we saw him begin to fall back in haste from his
position. We [4th Division] marched on at a great pace in column.
From that moment the affair became a mere hunt. Our rapid advance
almost cut off four or five French battalions—they made some
resistance at first, but soon dissolved and ran pell-mell, like a swarm
of bees, up the steep hill, from which they began to fire down on us.
We disregarded their fire, and kept on advancing—in order to carry
out our main object: broken troops are easy game. When we found
the enemy in this second position there was heavy artillery fire. Since
his left wing was somewhat refused, we advanced in échelon from
the right. When we got within musketry range, we found he had
gone off out of sight. After that we drove him out of one position
after another till at last we were near the gates of Vittoria[595]
.’
Several other 4th Division and 2nd Division narratives agree in stating
that after the storming of Ariñez the French never made anything like
a solid stand on the Gomecha-Esquivel heights. But (as has been said
above) the best proof of it is the British casualty list, which shows
that the reserve line was hardly under fire, and that the front line had
very moderate losses, except at one or two points.
D’Erlon made a more creditable resistance on the French right,
but he was obviously doomed if he should linger long after Gazan
had gone off. After losing Crispijana and Zuazo he made a last stand
on the slopes a mile in front of Vittoria, between Ali and Armentia, to
which the whole of his own artillery and that of the reserve, and
perhaps also some guns of the Army of the South, retired in time to
take up a final position[596]
. For some short space they maintained a
furious fire on the 3rd Division troops which were following them up,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-28-320.jpg)
![the official reports from the Army of Portugal remarks that the
retreating cavalry joined in the ‘general pillage of the valuables of the
army,’ and other narrators mention that the treasure-fourgons had
already been broken into long before the English came upon the
scene[597]
. Be this as it may, there was no long delay before the
terrors of the stampede culminated with the arrival of several
squadrons of Grant’s hussars, who had penetrated by the gap
between D’Erlon’s and Gazan’s lines of retreat, and had made a short
cut through the suburbs of the town. Of the chaos that followed the
firing of the first pistol shots which heralded the charge of the British
light cavalry, we must not speak till we have dealt with the last fight
of the Army of Portugal, on the extreme French right.
Battle of VITTORIA
Till Grant’s and Colville’s brigades broke into Crispijana and Ali,
the line of Reille’s gallant defence along the Zadorra had remained
intact. Only artillery fire was going on opposite the bridge of Arriaga,
where the 1st Division and the two Portuguese brigades had halted](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-31-320.jpg)
![by Graham’s orders at some distance from the river, and had never
advanced. The two cavalry brigades were behind them. At Gamarra
Mayor the 5th Division had failed to force a passage, though it had
inflicted on Lamartinière’s troops as heavy a loss as it suffered. Longa
was held up half a mile beyond Durana, though he had successfully
cut the Bayonne chaussée. There was considerable cannonade and
skirmishing fire going on, upon a front of three miles, but no further
progress reported. The whole scene, however, was changed from the
moment when Grant’s and Colville’s brigades, turning the flank of
D’Erlon’s line close to the Zadorra, came sweeping over the hills by Ali
into the very rear of Reille’s line. The Army of Portugal had been
directed to hold the bridges and keep back Graham, until the rest of
the French host had got off. But the danger now came not from the
front but from the rear. In half an hour more the advancing British
columns would be level with the bridge of Arriaga and surrounding
the infantry that held it. Reille determined on instant retreat, the only
course open to him: so far as was possible it was covered by the very
ample provision of cavalry which he had in hand. Digeon, who has
left a good account of the crisis, made several desperate charges, to
hold back the advancing British while Menne’s brigade was escaping
from Arriaga. One was against infantry, which formed square and
beat off the dragoons with no difficulty[598]
—the other against
hussars, apparently two squadrons of the 15th, which had turned
northward from the suburbs of Vittoria and tried to ride in and cut off
the retreat of Menne’s battalions[599]
. They were beaten back, and the
infantry scrambled off, leaving behind them Sarrut, their divisional
general, mortally wounded as the retreat began. Moreover, all the
guns in and about Arriaga had to be abandoned in the fields, where
they could make no rapid progress. The gunners unhitched the
horses, and escaped as best they could.
Reille had drawn up in front of Betonio the small infantry reserve
(Fririon’s brigade) which he had wisely provided for himself, flanked
by Boyer’s dragoons and Curto’s brigade of light cavalry. The object
of this stand was not only to give Menne’s and Digeon’s troops a
nucleus on which they could rally, but to gain time for Lamartinière to
draw off from in front of Gamarra Mayor bridge, where he was still](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-32-320.jpg)
![hotly engaged with Oswald’s division. This infantry got away in better
order than most French troops on that day, and even brought off its
divisional battery, though that of the cavalry which had been co-
operating with it had to be left behind not far from the river-bank,
having got into a marshy bottom where it stuck fast. The Franco-
Spaniards of Casapalacios and their attendant cavalry escaped over
the hills east of Durana, pursued by Longa, who took many prisoners
from them.
When Lamartinière’s division had come in, Reille made a rapid
retreat to the woods of Zurbano, a mile and a half behind Betonio,
which promised good cover. He was now being pursued by the whole
of Graham’s corps, which had crossed the Zadorra when the bridges
were abandoned. Pack’s brigade, followed by the 1st Division and
Bradford, advanced on Arriaga; they were somewhat late owing to
slow filing over the bridge. At Gamarra Oswald sent in the pursuit of
Lamartinière two squadrons of light dragoons[600]
which had been
attached to his column; these were followed by the rest of their
brigade, which Graham sent up from the main road to join them, and
also by Bock’s German dragoons. The object of using the smaller and
more remote bridge was that cavalry crossing by it had a better
chance of getting into Reille’s rear than they would have secured by
passing at Arriaga. The much exhausted 5th Division followed the
cavalry.
Having reached the edge of the woods, Reille ordered the bulk of
his troops to push on hard, by the two parallel roads which traverse
them, keeping Fririon’s brigade in hand as a fighting rearguard. The
rather disordered columns were emerging on the east side of the
woods, and streaming into and past the village of Zurbano, when the
leading squadrons of the 12th and 16th Light Dragoons came in upon
them. These squadrons had avoided entangling themselves in the
trees till the French rearguard had passed on, but prepared to charge
the moment they got into open ground, though the main body of the
brigade had not come up. They found opposed to them a regiment of
Boyer’s dragoons, supported by another of hussars, which they
charged but did not break[601]
. But on the coming up of the rear
squadrons, the attack was renewed with success. The French cavalry](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-33-320.jpg)
![gave way, but only to clear the front of the 36th Line of Fririon’s
brigade, which was in square outside Zurbano. The British light
dragoons swept down on the square, but were completely repulsed
by its steady fire. This gained time for the rest of Reille’s troops to
make off, and the pursuit slackened. But the bulk of the French went
off in such haste that they abandoned four guns of Lamartinière’s
artillery, and took away with them only the remaining two—the sole
pieces that escaped that day of the immense train of Joseph’s three
armies. Some hundreds of stragglers were taken, but no single unit
of the retiring force was cut off or captured whole. Reille wisely kept
his army, so long as was possible, on the side-paths by Arbulo and
Oreytia, before debouching into the main Salvatierra road, which was
seething over with the wrecks of the other armies and the convoys.
Hence he succeeded in escaping the utter confusion into which the
rest fell, and, finally, when he turned into the main track, was able to
constitute himself a rearguard to the whole. Graham’s pursuit of him
seems to have been slow and cautious—no troops indeed ever came
near the retreating columns except the two light dragoon regiments,
the Caçador battalions of Pack and Bradford, and some of Longa’s
skirmishers, who (as Reille mentions) followed him along the hills on
his left, shooting down into the retreating masses, but not attempting
to break in. The 5th Division appears to have followed not much
farther than the open ground beyond the woods of Zurbano, where it
halted and encamped after eight o’clock in some bean-fields. Nor
does it seem that the 1st Division got more than a league or so
beyond the Zadorra[602]
. The Caçadores and cavalry, however, did not
halt till they reached El Burgo, four or five miles farther on.
The scene was very different on the other side of Vittoria, where
D’Erlon’s army was pushing its way, in utter disorder, through the
fields and by-paths over which the Parks and convoy were trying in
vain to get off, and Gazan’s (farther to the south) was making a dash
over ground of the most tiresome sort. For in the rugged tract east of
Esquivel and Armentia such paths as there were mostly ran in the
wrong direction—north and south instead of east and west—and it
was necessary to disregard them and to strike across country. Six
successive ravines lay in the way—marshy bottoms in which ran](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-34-320.jpg)
![trifling brooks descending toward the Zadorra—and several woods on
the ridges between the ravines. Hill’s and Cole’s skirmishers were
pressing in the rear, and above, on the heights of Puebla, Morillo’s
and Cameron’s troops could be seen hurrying along with the intention
of getting ahead of the retreating masses. The confusion growing
worse every moment—for companies and battalions each struck out
for the easiest line of retreat without regard for their neighbours—
Gazan gave orders to abandon all the artillery, which was getting
embogged, battery after battery, in the ravines, and gave leave for
every unit to shift for itself—general sauve-qui-peut. The horses were
unhitched from the guns and caissons, many of the infantry threw off
their packs, and the army went off broadcast, some in the direction
of Metauco and Arbulo, others by village paths more to the south.
The general stream finally flowed into the Salvatierra road, where it
was covered by the Army of Portugal, which was making a much
more orderly retreat[603]
. English eye-witnesses of this part of the
battle complain bitterly that no horsemen ever came up to assist the
wearied 2nd Division infantry in the pursuit, and maintain that
thousands of prisoners might have been taken by a few
squadrons[604]
. But all the cavalry seems to have been directed on
Vittoria by the high road, and save Grant’s hussar brigade none of it
came into action. This is sufficiently proved by its casualty lists—in R.
Hill’s, Ponsonby’s, Long’s, Victor Alten’s, and Fane’s brigades that day
the total losses were one man killed and eleven wounded! Only
Anson’s Light Dragoons in Graham’s corps and Grant’s regiments in
the centre got into the fighting at all. The rugged ground, it is true,
was unfavourable for cavalry action in regular order, but it was almost
as unfavourable for disordered infantry escaping over ravines and
ditches. Something was wrong here in the general direction of the
mounted arm—perhaps it suffered from the want of a responsible
cavalry leader—the brigadiers dared not act for themselves, and Bock
(the senior cavalry officer) was not only short-sighted in the extreme,
but absent from the main battle all day in Graham’s corps. One
cannot but suspect that Wellington’s thunderings in previous years,
against reckless cavalry action, were always present in the minds of
colonels and brigadiers who had a chance before them. And possibly,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-35-320.jpg)
![It only remains to speak of the chaos in the fields and roads east
of Vittoria. When the general débâcle began King Joseph and
Jourdan took their post on a low hill half a mile east of the town,
and endeavoured to organize the departure of the Park and convoys
—a hopeless task, for the roads were blocked, and no one listened
to orders. It was in vain that aides-de-camp and orderlies were sent
in all directions. Presently a flood of fugitives were driven in upon
the staff, by the approach of British cavalry in full career. These were
Grant’s 10th and 18th Hussars, who had turned the town on its left,
and galloped down on the prey before them. Joseph had only with
him the two squadrons of his Lancers of the Guard, which had been
acting as head-quarters escort all day. It would appear that the
Guard Hussars came up to join them about this time. At any rate,
these two small regiments made a valiant attempt to hold off the
hussars—they were of course beaten, being hopelessly
outnumbered[605]
. The King and staff had to fly as best they could,
and were much scattered, galloping over fields and marshy ravines,
mixed with military and civil fugitives of all sorts. Some of the British
hussars followed the throng, taking a good many prisoners by the
way: more, it is to be feared, stopped behind to gather the not too
creditable first-fruits of victory, by plundering the royal carriages,
which lay behind the scene of their charge. The French stragglers
had already shown them the way.
Wellington, on reaching Vittoria, set Robert Hill’s brigade of the
Household Cavalry to guard the town from plunder, and sent on the
rest of the horse, and the infantry as they came up, in pursuit of the
enemy. The French, however, had by now a good start, and troops in
order cannot keep up with troops in disorder, who have got rid of
their impedimenta, and scattered themselves. The country,
moreover, was unfavourable for cavalry, as has been said above, and
the infantry divisions were tired out. The chase ended five miles
beyond Vittoria—the enemy, when last seen, being still on the run,
with no formed rearguard except on the side road where the Army
of Portugal was retreating.
If the prisoners were fewer than might have been expected, the
material captured was such as no European army had ever laid](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-37-320.jpg)
![hands on before, since Alexander’s Macedonians plundered the camp
of the Persian king after the battle of Issus. The military trophies
compared well even with those of Leipzig and Waterloo—151 guns,
415 caissons, 100 artillery waggons. Probably no other army ever
left all its artillery save two solitary pieces in the enemy’s hands[606]
.
There was but one flag captured, and that was only the standard of
a battalion of the 100th Line which had been reduced in May, and
had not been actually borne in the battle[607]
. The baton of Jourdan,
as Marshal of the Empire, was an interesting souvenir, which
delighted the Prince Regent when it arrived in London[608]
, but only
bore witness to the fact that his personal baggage, like that of his
King, had been captured. A few thousand extra prisoners—the total
taken was only about 2,000—would have been more acceptable
tokens of victory.
But non-military spoil was enormous—almost incredible. It
represented the exploitation of Spain for six long years by its
conquerors. ‘To the accumulated plunder of Andalusia were added
the collections made by the other French armies—the personal
baggage of the King—fourgons having inscribed on them in large
letters “Domaine extérieur de S.M. l’Empereur”—the military chest
containing the millions recently received from France for the
payment of the Army, and not yet distributed—jewels, pictures,
embroidery, silks, all manner of things costly and portable had been
assiduously transported thus far. Removed from their frames and
rolled up carefully, were the finest Italian pictures from the royal
collections of Madrid: they were found in the “imperials” of Joseph’s
own carriages. All this mixed with cannon, overturned coaches,
broken-down waggons, forsaken tumbrils, wounded soldiers, French
and Spanish civilians, women and children, dead horses and mules,
absolutely covered the face of the country, extending over the
surface of a flat containing many hundred acres[609]
.’ The miserable
crowd was guessed by an eye-witness to have numbered nearly
20,000 persons. Spanish and French camp-followers and military
stragglers had already started plunder—on them supervened English
and Portuguese civil and military vultures of the same sort—servants
and muleteers by the thousand, bad soldiers by the hundred: for](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-38-320.jpg)
![and then a burst of laughter, and I trotted away. I rode eight or ten
miles to the bivouack and found the officers in an ancient church—
housed à la Cromwell. On the 23rd, before we left our quarters, I
and —— went up into the belfry, and counted out the gold—the
doubloons alone made nearly £400. I remitted £250 to my father,
and purchased another horse with part of the balance[610]
.’
General Villatte, no doubt, had special facilities in Andalusia—but
every fourgon and carriage contained something that had been
worth carrying off. The amount of hard cash discovered was almost
incredible. Men and officers who had been self-respecting enough to
avoid the unseemly rush at the waggons, had wonderful bargains at
a sort of impromptu fair or auction which was held among the débris
of the convoy that night. Good mules were going for three guineas—
horses for ten. Every one wished to get rid of the heavy duros and
five-franc pieces, which constituted the greater part of the plunder;
six and eight dollars respectively were offered and taken for a gold
twenty-franc piece or a guinea. ‘The camp was turned into a fair—it
was lighted up, the cars, &c., made into stands, upon which the
things taken were exposed for sale. Many soldiers, to add to the
absurdity of the scene, dressed themselves up in uniforms found in
the chests. All the Portuguese boys belonging to some divisions are
dressed in the uniforms of French officers—many of generals[611]
.’
Wellington had hoped to secure the five million francs of the
French subsidy which had just arrived at Vittoria before the battle.
His expectations were deceived; only one-twentieth of the sum was
recovered, though an inquisitorial search was made a few days later
in suspected quarters. One regiment, which had notoriously
prospered, was made to stack its knapsacks on the 23rd, and they
were gone through in detail by an assistant provost-marshal—but
little was found: the men had stowed away their gains in belts and
secret pockets; or deposited them with quartermasters and
commissaries who were known to be honest and silent.
The only feature in this discreditable scene that gives the
historian some satisfaction is to know that there was no mishandling
of prisoners—not even of prominent Spanish traitors. The only
person recorded to have been killed in the chaos was M. Thiébault,](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-40-320.jpg)
![the King’s treasurer, who fought to defend his private strong-box
containing 100,000 dollars, and got shot[612]
. The women were
particularly well treated—the Countess Gazan, wife of the
Commander of the Army of the South, was sent by Wellington’s
orders in her own carriage to join her husband—a courtesy
acknowledged by several French diarists[613]
. The same leave was
given later to many others, and the Commander-in-Chief wrote to
the Spanish Ministry to beg that no vengeance might be taken on
the captured afrancesados, and seems to have secured his end in
the main.
The French loss in the battle, according to the definitive report
made from the head-quarters of the three armies after they had got
back into France, was 42 officers and 716 men killed, 226 officers
and 4,210 men wounded, and 23 officers and 2,825 prisoners or
missing—a total of 8,091. It is known that of the ‘missing’ some
hundreds were stragglers who rejoined later, and some other
hundreds dead men, who had not got into the list of killed. The total
number of prisoners did not really exceed 2,000. But on the other
hand the official returns are incomplete, not giving any figures for
the artillery or train of the Armies of Portugal and the Centre, or for
the Royal Guards (which lost 11 officers and therefore probably 150
to 200 men), or for the General Staff (which had 35 casualties), or
for the stray troops of the Army of the North present in the battle.
Probably the real total, therefore, was very much about the 8,000
men given by the official return.
The Allied casualties were just over 5,000—of whom 3,672 were
British, 921 Portuguese, and 552 Spaniards. A glance at the table in
the Appendix will show how unequally they were distributed. Seven-
tenths of the whole loss fell on the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, with
Grant’s brigade of the 7th, Robinson’s of the 5th, and Stubbs’s
Portuguese in the 4th. These troops furnished over 3,500 of the total
loss of 5,158. The 1st Division (54 casualties), the British brigades of
the 4th Division (125 casualties), Hay’s and Spry’s brigades of the
5th (200 casualties), Barnes’ and Lecor’s of the 7th (no
casualties[614]
), the Light Division (132 casualties), Silveira’s Division
(10 casualties), the cavalry (155 casualties) had no losses of](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-41-320.jpg)
![explains nor excuses at all his tactics after he had received, at two
o’clock, Wellington’s orders telling him to press the enemy hard, and
make his power felt. With his two British divisions, the Portuguese of
Pack and Bradford, and two cavalry brigades, he only made a
genuine attack at one point, and did not put into serious action (as
the casualty lists show) more than four battalions—those used at
Gamarra Mayor. The whole left column was contained by little more
than half of its number of French troops. Graham says in his
dispatch to Wellington that ‘in face of such force as the enemy
showed it was evidently impossible to push a column across the river
by Gamarra bridge.’ He does not explain his inactivity at other
points, except by mentioning that the enemy had ‘at least two
divisions in reserve on strong ground behind the river[615]
.’ There was
really only one brigade in reserve, and so far from being compelled
to attack at Gamarra only, Graham had besides Arriaga bridge on the
main road, two other bridges open to assault (those of Goveo and
Yurre), besides at least one and probably three fords. All these more
southern passages were watched by cavalry only, without infantry or
guns. It is clear that Graham could have got across the Zadorra
somewhere, if he had tried. Very probably his quiescence was due to
his failing eyesight, which had been noticed very clearly by those
about him during this campaign[616]
. The only part of his corps which
did really useful work was Longa’s Spanish division, which at least
cut the Bayonne road at the proper place and time.
But if Graham’s tactics cannot be praised, Lord Dalhousie was
even more responsible for the imperfect consequence of the victory.
Why Wellington put this fussy and occasionally disobedient officer in
charge of the left-centre column, instead of Picton, passes
understanding. The non-arrival of the 7th Division, which was to lead
the attack, was due to incompetent work by him or his staff. He says
in his dispatch that he was delayed by several accidents to his
artillery (Cairnes’s battery). But from his own narrative we see that
the guns got up almost as soon as his leading infantry brigade
(Grant’s), while his two rear brigades (Barnes and Le Cor) never
reached the front in time to fire a shot. What really happened was
that for want of staff guidance, for which the divisional commander](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-44-320.jpg)
![was responsible, these troops did not take the path assigned to
them, and went right over, instead of skirting, the summit of Monte
Arrato, making an apparently short (and precipitous) cut, which
turned out to be a very long one[617]
. So when Dalhousie did arrive,
with one brigade and his guns, Picton had long been waiting by Las
Guetas in a state of justifiable irritation. Finally, Dalhousie (lacking
the greater part of his division) did not attack till he got peremptory
orders to do so from the Commander-in-Chief. Hence the extreme
delay, which caused grave risk to Hill’s wing, so long engaged
without support. It is fair to add that the delay had one good effect
—since it led Jourdan to think that his right was not going to be
attacked, and therefore to send off Villatte’s and Cassagne’s divisions
to the far left. If Dalhousie had advanced an hour earlier, these
divisions would have been near enough to support Leval. But this is
no justification for the late arrival and long hesitations of the
commander of the 7th Division. Undoubtedly a part of the
responsibility devolves on Wellington himself, for putting an untried
officer in charge of a crucial part of the day’s operations, when he
had in Picton an old and experienced tactician ready to hand.
The strategical plan was so good that minor faults of execution
could not mar its general success. Yet it must be remembered that,
if all had worked out with minute accuracy, the French army would
have been destroyed, instead of merely losing its artillery and train.
And the fact that 55,000 men escaped to France, even if in sorry
condition, made the later campaign of the Pyrenees possible. There
would have been no combats of Maya and Roncesvalles, no battles
of Sorauren and St. Marcial, if the eight French divisions present at
Vittoria had been annihilated, instead of being driven in disorder on
to an eccentric line of retreat.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-45-320.jpg)
![from the brow on which it was not to be replaced[618]
.’ King Joseph
himself, pushing on ahead of the rout, reached Salvatierra, sixteen
miles from the field, before he dismounted, and shared a meagre
and melancholy supper with D’Erlon and two ministers, the Irish-
Spaniard O’Farrill and the Frenchman Miot de Melito. To them
entered later Jourdan, who had been separated from the rest of the
staff in the flight. He flung himself down to the table, saying, ‘Well,
gentlemen, they would have a battle, and it is a lost battle,’ after
which no one said anything more. This was the old marshal’s
reflection on the generals who, all through the retreat, had been
urging that it was shameful to evacuate Spain without risking a
general action. After three hours’ halt, sleep for some, but the
wakefulness of exhaustion for others, the King’s party got to horse at
dawn, and rode on toward Pampeluna, the army straggling behind
them. It was a miserable rainy day with occasional thunderstorms:
every one, from Joseph to the meanest camp-follower, was in the
same state of mental and physical exhaustion. But the one thing
which should have finished the whole game was wanting—there was
practically no pursuit.
Of Wellington’s nine brigades of cavalry only two, those of Grant
and Anson, had been seriously engaged on the 21st, and had
suffered appreciable losses. The other seven were intact, and had
not been in action. It is obvious that they could not have been used
to effect in the darkness of the night, and over rough ground and an
unknown track. But why an early pursuit at dawn was not taken in
hand it is difficult to make out. Even the same promptness which
had been shown after Salamanca, and which had been rewarded by
the lucky gleanings of Garcia Hernandez, was wanting on this
occasion. There was no excuse for the late start of the cavalry, and
in consequence it rode as far as Salvatierra without picking up more
than a few wounded stragglers and worn-out horses and mules. The
French had gone off at dawn, and were many miles ahead.
The infantry followed slowly; not only were the men tired by the
late marches and their legitimate exertions in the battle, but many
thousands had spent the hours of darkness in a surreptitious visit to
the field of the convoy, and had come back to the regimental](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-47-320.jpg)
![bivouac with plunder of all kinds bought at the cost of a sleepless
night. Many had not come back at all, but were lying drunk or
snoring among the débris of the French camps. Wellington wrote in
high wrath to Bathurst, the Minister for War: ‘We started with the
army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle nothing
could get on better. But that event has (as usual)[619]
annihilated all
discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them about a
million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000
dollars, which were got for the military chest. They are incapable of
marching in pursuit of the enemy, and are totally knocked up. Rain
has come and increased the fatigue, and I am quite sure that we
have now out of the ranks double the amount of our loss in the
battle, and that we have more stragglers in the pursuit than the
enemy have, and never in one day make more than an ordinary
march. This is the consequence of the state of discipline in the
British army. We may gain the greatest victories, but we shall do no
good till we so far alter our system as to force all ranks to do their
duty. The new regiments are as usual worst of all. The —— are a
disgrace to the name of soldier, in action as elsewhere: I shall take
their horses from them, and send the men back to England, if I
cannot get the better of them in any other manner[620]
.’
This, of course, is one of Wellington’s periodical explosions of
general indiscriminating rage against the army which, as he
confessed on other occasions, had brought him out of many a
dangerous scrape by its sheer hard fighting. He went on a few days
later with language that can hardly be forgiven: ‘We have in the
Service the scum of the earth as common soldiers, and of late years
have been doing everything in our power, both by law and by
publication, to relax the discipline by which alone such men can be
kept in order. The officers of the lower ranks will not perform the
duty required from them to keep the soldiers in order. The non-
commissioned officers are (as I have repeatedly stated) as bad as
the men. It is really a disgrace to have anything to say to such men
as some of our soldiers are[621]
.’ The Commander-in-Chief’s own
panacea was more shooting, and much more flogging. All this
language is comprehensible in a moment of irritation, but was](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/1539-250214085400-6e7abe70/85/Solution-Manual-for-COMP-3-3rd-Edition-all-chapter-instant-download-48-320.jpg)
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- 5. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 2 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning End of Tutorial Material 12 Glossary of Key Terms 13 Tutorial Objectives Students will have mastered the material in Tutorial Two when they can: Session 2.1 ⚫ Review the principles of data validation ⚫ Create a DOCTYPE ⚫ Declare XML elements and define their content ⚫ Define the structure of child elements Session 2.2 ⚫ Declare attributes ⚫ Set rules for attribute content ⚫ Define optional and required attributes ⚫ Validate an XML document Session 2.3 ⚫ Place internal and external content in an entity ⚫ Create entity references ⚫ Understand how to store code in parameter entities ⚫ Create comments in a DTD ⚫ Understand how to create conditional sections ⚫ Understand how to create entities for non- character data ⚫ Understand how to validate standard vocabularies XML 68: Creating a Valid Document LECTURE NOTES Explain what a DTD can do when used in conjunction with an XML parser that supports data validation Discuss what a DOCTYPE is and its purpose Review the two parts a DOCTYPE can be divided into Explain the reason for creating a public identifier for a DTD Illustrate the differences between external and internal subsets used in a DOCTYPE BOXES TIP: The root value in the DOCTYPE must match the name of the XML document’s root element; otherwise,parsers will reject the document as invalid.(XML 71) InSight: Understanding URIs (XML 72) ProSkills: Written Communication: Interpreting Public Identifiers (XML 73) Reference: Declaring a DTD (XML 74) FIGURES Figure 2-1, Figure 2-2, Figure 2-3, Figure 2-4, Figure 2-5 TEACHER TIP Provide students with a table like the one in Figure 2-1, marking which fields, if any, are optional, and ask them to devise the corresponding structure for the data in the document, like the one shown in Figure 2-3. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: Present students with scenarios and ask them to determine the kind of DOCTYPE statement the scenario would require. For example, if a company is using a standard XML vocabulary like MathML, what kind of statement is required? (Answer: A public identifier) If a company has
- 6. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 3 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning developed a customized XML parser to read its XML documents, what is required? (Answer: An external file with a system identifier) 2. Quick Quiz: A DTD can be used to . a. ensure that all required elements are present in a document b. prevent undefined elements from being used in a document c. define default values for attributes d. All of these are correct. (Answer: D) A(n) subset is a set of declarations placed within the XML document. (Answer: internal) True/False: An internal DTD can be easily used as a common DTD among many documents, forcing them to use the same elements, attributes, and document structure. (Answer: False) XML 75: Declaring Document Elements LECTURE NOTES Explain the meaning of an element type declaration Illustrate the differences between elements that can contain any data, empty elements, and parsed character data BOXES TIP: Element declarations must begin with <!ELEMENT in all uppercase letters and not <!Element or <!element. (XML 75) Reference: Specifying Types of Element Content (XML 77) FIGURES Figure 2-6 TEACHER TIP Ask students to brainstorm examples of elements that would fall under each of the five types of content models. The more examples that you can go over with them, the more it will help students understand the various types of elements. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: Present students with examples of elements that have been declared to be of a particular type and then are invalid, and ask students to explain how to correct the element so it complies with its assigned type. 2. Quick Quiz: An element declaration can specify all of the following except . a. the reserved symbols that the element name can contain b. the element’s name c. what kind of content the element can contain d. the order in which elements appear in the document (Answer: A) An element declared as cannot store any content. (Answer: empty)
- 7. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 4 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning True/False: Generally, elements are declared as being of type ANY or #PCDATA. (Answer: False) XML 78: Working with Child Elements LECTURE NOTES Explain how to declare an element that contains child elements Discuss the two ways to declare an element that has multiple child elements Define a modifying symbol and describe its uses BOXES Reference: Specifying Child Elements (XML 80) TIP: You can specify that an element contains a minimum number of a child element by entering duplicate elements equal to the minimum number and adding a + to the last one. (XML 80) Reference: Applying Modifying Symbols (XML 81) InSight: DTDs and Mixed Content (XML 83) Review:Session 2.1 Quick Check (XML 83) FIGURES Figure 2-7 TEACHER TIP Present students with examples of elements that have been declared to be of a particular type and then are invalid, and ask students to explain how to correct the elements so they comply with their assigned type. This will help them to understand child elements better. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: Describe in words the child elements a parent element must contain (for example,“a citizen must have a state or a province code, but not both”) and ask students to write the element declarations that correspond to the examples presented. Another exercise would be to present a list of child elements (e.g., name, company) and ask what element declaration allows the given list of child elements, making sure to remind students that modifying symbols add extra possible solutions. 2. Quick Quiz: True/False: For content that involves multiple child elements, you can specify the elements in either a sequence or a choice of elements. (Answer: True) A is a list of elements that follow a defined order. a. choice b. source c. sequence d. series (Answer: C)
- 8. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 5 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning A(n) symbol specifies the number of occurrences of each child element. (Answer: modifying) LAB ACTIVITY Have students begin to construct a DTD for the following situation: Students who have student ID, first name, last name, email, phone Courses which have course ID, description, and number of credits Grade records which have record ID, student ID, course ID, and grade They should create the main elements and then specify the children. Students may have more than one phone number and email address. XML 86: Declaring Attributes LECTURE NOTES Review the various purposes of an attribute list declaration Discuss the different ways to declare elements with multiple attributes BOXES Reference: Declaring Attributes in a DTD (XML 87) FIGURES Figure 2-8, Figure 2-9 TEACHER TIP Stress that right now the attribute declarations would be rejected since the attribute types are not specified. As with the other sections, go through several examples to help students understand the process. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. Class Discussion: Ask students to come up with attributes for a course element. What attributes would they have? How would they be specified in a DTD? 2. Quick Quiz: True/False: If a parser encounters more than one declaration for the same attribute, it only recognizes the second statement and ignores the first. (Answer: False) Which of the following is true of attribute-list declarations? a. They must be located at the beginning of the DTD. b. They must be located at the end of the DTD. c. They must be located adjacent to the declaration for the element with which they are associated. d. They can be located anywhere within the DTD. (Answer: D) To enforce attribution properties on a document, you must add a(n) to the document’s DTD. (Answer: attribute-list declaration) XML 89 Working with Attribute Types LECTURE NOTES Discuss different data types that DTDs support for attribute values Explain the differences in character data and enumerated types of attribute values
- 9. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 6 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning Discuss the four types of tokens that DTDs support BOXES TIP: You’ll learn more about default attribute values later in this tutorial. (XML 90) TIP: Because an ID must be valid XML names, it cannot begin with a number. Commonly used identifiers, such as Social Security numbers, must be prefaced with one or more alphabetical characters, such as SS123-45-6789. (XML 93) FIGURES Figure 2-10, Figure 2-11, Figure 2-12, Figure 2-13 TEACHER TIP Point out the fact that quantities, to which students would expect to assign a data type of “integer” or “number,” are expressed as being of type “CDATA.” If they have programmed at all before, they may be confused about this. Caution students that the use of the IDREF token requires that there be a matching attribute to be cross-referenced, or the document will be rejected as invalid. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: Ask students to brainstorm scenarios in which enumerated-type attributes would be useful because the values must be limited to a known, bounded set. 2. Quick Quiz: The simplest form for attribute text is . a. CDATA b. ID c. enumerated list d. NMTOKEN (Answer: A) Attributes that are limited to a set of possible values are known as types. (Answer: enumerated) True/False: Tokens are used when an attribute value refers to a file containing nontextual data, like a graphic image or a video clip. (Answer: False) XML 95: Working with Attribute Defaults LECTURE NOTES Review the four types of attribute defaults and explain their uses Demonstrate how to declare each of the four types BOXES TIP: If you specify a default value for an attribute, omit #REQUIRED and #IMPLIED from the attribute declaration so parsersdon’t reject the DTD. (XML 95) Reference: Specifying the Attribute Default (XML 96) FIGURES Figure 2-14, Figure 2-15 TEACHER TIP
- 10. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 7 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning In studying XML, students often worry that there are too many options to remember. Provide more examples and ask students to contribute a few; thiswill help students to remember the various options. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. Class Discussion: Ask students to break into teams. Have them devise scenarios that allow them to provide examples of the uses of each of the attribute defaults in Figure 2-14. Have them discuss their results with each other. 2. Quick Quiz: You can indicate that a given element must always have a particular attribute by adding the value to the attribute declaration. a. #FIXED b. #REQUIRED c. #IMPLIED d. #MANDATED (Answer: B) The value for an attribute indicates that the use of this attribute is optional. (Answer: #implied) XML 97: Validating an XML Document LECTURE NOTES Discuss the process of validating an XML document Explain how to correct common errors BOXES TIP: You can also press F7 (Windows) of fn+F7(Mac) to validate a document in Exchanger XMLEditor. (XML 98) ProSkills: Problem Solving: ReconcilingDTDs and Namespaces (XML 102) Review:Session 2.2 Quick Check (XML 103) FIGURES Figure 2-16, Figure 2-17, Figure 2-18, Figure 2-19, Figure 2-20 TEACHER TIP As the text example shows, go through a document with errors and let students see how to correct them. This really helps them prepare for when they are on their own and validating their work. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: If you have a computer with a projection device, use it to open valid XML code and make changes to it, creating some errors on purpose, in order to illustrate the kinds of errors students will become familiar with as they do more coding in XML. 2. Quick Quiz: True/False: You can use Internet Explorer’s MSXML parser to validate your XML document yourself. (Answer: False)
- 11. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 8 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning LAB ACTIVITY Students should now add attributes to their DTD. For “phone,” they should add a phoneType attribute that identifies the phone as home, work, or cell. For “email,” there should be an emailType attribute that identifies the email address as home, work, or school. For “first name,” they can add an attribute of title. Also, the record “no” for grade should include semester and year attributes, which will be used to indicate which semester and year the grade was given for a course. The grade record attributes are required. Have the students specify default values where appropriate. Students should create an XML file to go along with this (or you can provide one if you like), and then they should validate their work. XML 106: Introducing Entities LECTURE NOTES Identify the five built-in entities supported by XML Discuss the usefulness of creating customized entities FIGURES Figure 2-21 TEACHER TIP Stress that entities can be used to avoid data entry errors. An analogy from outside programming is macros, such as Microsoft Word’s AutoText feature, which allows a few keystrokes to represent a longer character string. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. Class Discussion: Can students think of scenarios when they might use a customized entity? 2. Quick Quiz: Which of the following is not a built-in XML entity? a. < b. & c. " d. &posit; (Answer: D) True/False: Using entities can help you to avoid data errors. (Answer: True) XML 106: Working with General Entities LECTURE NOTES Identify the differences between general, external, and internal entities Explain that the content referenced by an entity can be either parsed or unparsed Explain how to create a parsed entity Illustrate how to reference a general entity BOXES TIP: For a long text string that will be repeated throughout an XML document, avoid data entry errors by placing the text string in its own entity.(XML 106)
- 12. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 9 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning TIP: Including markup tags in an entity value lets you create a section of XML code and content, and insert it once or multiple times into a document. (XML 107) Reference: Declaring and ReferencingParsed Entities (XML 108) FIGURES Figure 2-22, Figure 2-23,Figure 2-24,Figure 2-25,Figure 2-26,Figure 2-27 TEACHER TIP Caution students that if they use an external file, it must contain well-formed XML content and no XML declaration. Emphasize that students must handle the & and % symbols with careful consideration. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: Present students with a series of types of content and ask them to characterize what type of entity could be used to reference them (e.g., a paragraph of text inside the DTD would be an internal parsed entity; a video file would be an unparsed external entity). 2. Quick Quiz: True/False: You cannot use the hyphen character in an entity’s value because this is the symbol used for inserting parameter entities. (Answer: False) Which of the following entity types would reference a video file? a. unparsed internal b. parsed internal c. unparsed external d. parsed external (Answer: C) A(n) entity is an entity that references content to be used within an XML document. (Answer: general) XML 113: Working with Parameter Entities LECTURE NOTES Explain that a parameter entity is used to insert content into the DTD because it can be used to break it into modules Demonstrate how to declare parameter entities and then reference them BOXES TIP: Note that when declaring a parameter entity, you include a space after the %; but when referencing a parameter entity, there is no space between the % and the entity name. (XML 114) Reference: Declaring and ReferencingParameter Entities (XML 115) FIGURES Figure 2-28 TEACHER TIP Make sure to point out that not all browsers support external entities in combination with DTDs.
- 13. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 10 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: Have students come up with scenarios when parameters may be used, and then have themcreate declarations for the scenarios. 2. Quick Quiz: You use a(n) to insert content into a DTD. (Answer: parameter entity) True/False: Firefox browsers allow external entities in combination with DTDs. (Answer: False) XML115: Inserting Comments into a DTD LECTURE NOTES Explain how to put comments into a DTD Give examples of how documenting code in comments is beneficial BOXES ProSkills: Teamwork: Documenting Shared Code with Comments (XML 115) FIGURES Figure 2-29 TEACHER TIP Let students know that comments can also be useful to explain the browser compatibility issues. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. Class Discussion: Have students brainstorm ways to use comments in their DTDs. XML 116: Creating Conditional Sections LECTURE NOTES Explain how to create a conditional section in an external DTD to either include or ignore sections of the declaration Discuss the best ways to use conditional sections TEACHER TIP Remind students thatconditional sections cannot be applied to internal DTDs. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. Class Discussion: If you have a computer with a projection device, show a couple of examples of conditional sections. Can students think of other uses? 2. Quick Quiz: True/False: One effective way of creating IGNORE sections is to create a parameter entity that defines when the section should be included or not. (Answer: True) XML 117: Working with Unparsed Data LECTURE NOTES Discuss the steps involved when working with unparsed data Demonstrate how to declare a notation to identify the data type of the unparsed data Explain how to create an unparsed entity that references specific items that use a notation
- 14. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 11 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning BOXES TIP: As an alternative to notations, you can place a URL that lists a resource for nontextual content in an element or attribute, and then allow your application to work with that element or attribute value directly. (XML 118) Reference: Declaring an Unparsed Entity (XML 119) TEACHER TIP Stress that the notation will not necessarily enable an application to open. Current Web browsers may not support notation mechanisms to display files from helper applications. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: Ask students to brainstorm scenarios in which unparsed data would be useful to an XML document. 2. Quick Quiz: 1. True/False: Current Web browsers support mechanisms for validating and rendering unparsed data declared in the DTDs of XML documents. (Answer: False) 2. True/False: An alternate to notations is to place a URL in an element or attribute. (Answer: True) XML 119: Validating Standard Vocabularies LECTURE NOTES Discuss how to validate a standard XML vocabulary by specifying an external DTD Review the different DOCTYPEs for standard vocabularies BOXES InSight: Advantages and Disadvantages of DTDs (XML 121) Review:Session 2.3 Quick Check (XML 121) FIGURES Figure 2-30, Figure 2-31 TEACHER TIP The online validator by W3C is a great tool. Show how to use it to validate and fix errors so that students can become familiar with common errors. CLASSROOM ACTIVITIES 1. GroupActivity: If you have a computer with a projection device, use it to show a portion of the XHTML 1.0 strict DTD from W3C.org for another element or elements. 2. Quick Quiz: True/False: Most standard vocabularies make their DTDs available online for inspection. (Answer: True) True/False:The W3C does not provide an online validator.(Answer: False)
- 15. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 12 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning LAB ACTIVITY Students are going to modify the grades section of their XML document to include a reference to the professor. They should modify their DTD to add the professor element. They should create elements for five professors called prof1, prof2, prof3, prof4, and prof5. The elements should contain the professor’s name and title (i.e., John Smith, Associate Professor). Then, in the XML, they should just reference the entity when referring to the professor. They should then add appropriate comments to their work. Finally, have the students validate their work again to make sure it is correct. End of Tutorial Material SAM Assessment, Training, and Projects: This text is available with SAM Assessment, Training, and Projects that map directly to the learning objectives covered in each chapter. SAM's active, hands- on training and skill-based assessment help you master Microsoft Office skills. SAM Projects let you apply skills in real-world scenarios using the actual Microsoft Office applications. Immediate feedback and comprehensive study guides give you the practice and support you need to succeed. To obtain a SAM account, visit www.cengagebrain.com or contact your instructor or bookstore for additional information. Review Assignments: Review Assignments provide students with additional practice of the skills they learned in the tutorial using the same tutorial case, with which they are already familiar. These assignments are designed as straight practice only and should not include anything of an exploratory nature. Case Problems:A typical NP tutorial has four Case Problems following the Review Assignments. Short tutorials can have fewer Case Problems (or none at all); other tutorials may have five Case Problems. The Case Problems provide further hands-on assessment of the skills and topics presented in the tutorial, but with new case scenarios. There are four types of Case Problems: Apply. In this type of Case Problem, students apply the skills that they have learned in the tutorial to solve a problem. “Apply” Case Problems can include “Explore” steps, which go a bit beyond what was presented in the tutorial, but should include only 1 or 2 Explore steps if any at all. Create. In a “Create” Case Problem, students are either shown the end result, such as a finished Word document, and asked to create the document based on the figure provided; or, students are asked to create something from scratch in a more free-form manner. Challenge.A “Challenge” Case problem involves 3 or more Explore steps. These steps challenge students by having them go beyond what was covered in the tutorial, either with guidance in the step or by using online Help as directed. Research.In this type of Case Problem, students need to go to the Web to find information that they will incorporate somehow in their work for the Case Problem. A tutorial does not have to include each of the four types of Case Problems; rather, the tutorial’s content should dictate the types of exercises written. It’s possible, therefore, that some tutorials might have three Case Problems of one type and only one Case Problem of a different type. To the extent possible, the first Case Problem in a tutorial should be an “Apply,” so that the Case Problems progress in degree of difficulty. ProSkills Exercises:ProSkills exercises integrate the technology skills students learn with one or more of the following soft skills: decision making, problem solving, teamwork, verbal communication, and written communication. The goal of these exercises is to enhance students’
- 16. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 13 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning understanding of the soft skills and how to apply them appropriately in real-world, professional situations that also involve software application skills. ProSkills exercises are offered at various points throughout a text, encompassing the concepts and skills presented in a standalone tutorial or a group of related tutorials. Glossary of Key Terms #IMPLIED (XML 85) mixed content (XML 83) #PCDATA (XML 67) modifying symbol (XML 67) #REQUIRED (XML 85) module (XML 113) attribute declaration (XML 84) NMTOKEN (XML94) attribute-list declaration (XML 84) NMTOKENS (XML95) CDATA data type (XML85) notation (XML 92) (XML 117) conditional section (XML 116) parameter entity (XML106) (XML 113) DOCTYPE (XML71) parsed entity (XML 104) document type declaration (XML71) public identifier (XML 72) element declaration (XML66) sequence (XML 67) element type declaration (XML66) system identifier (XML 71) enumerated type (XML 85) tokenized type (XML 92) external entity (XML106) token (XML 92) external subset (XML 71) unparsed entity (XML106) formal public identifier (XML 72) general entity (XML 104) ID token (XML 92) ID token type (XML 85) IDREF token (XML 93) IDREF token type (XML 85) internal entity (XML 104) internal subset (XML 71)
- 17. New Perspectives on XML Comprehensive, 3rd Edition, Instructors Manual 14 of 14 © 2015 Cengage Learning Top of Document
- 18. Discovering Diverse Content Through Random Scribd Documents
- 19. into it—especially Conroux’s and Daricau’s divisions, which had been divided into separate brigades by the way in which Gazan had dealt with them at the commencement of the action, never got into regular divisional order again, and fought piecemeal by regiments. The decisive point was on the ground at and above Ariñez, which was held by Leval’s division, with one regiment of Daricau’s (103rd Line) on their left. The village, low down on the slope, was held by Mocquery’s brigade—Morgan’s was in support with the guns, higher up and more to the right. Picton attacked with Power’s Portuguese on his left, Brisbane’s brigade on his right, and Kempt’s brigade of the Light Division in support, except that some companies of the 1/95th had been thrown out in front of Brisbane’s line, and led the whole attack. The Riflemen rushed at the village, penetrated into it, and were evicted after a fierce tussle, by a French battalion charging in mass down the street. But immediately behind came the 88th and 74th. The former, attacking to their right of the village[582] , completely smashed the French regiment which came down to meet them in a close-fire combat, and drove them in disorder up the hill, while the latter carried Ariñez itself and swept onward through it. The 45th, farther to the right, attacked and drove off the regiment of Daricau’s division which was flanking Leval. Power’s Portuguese would seem to have got engaged with Morgan’s brigade, on the left of the village; it gave way before them, when the 74th had stormed Ariñez and the Connaught Rangers had broken the neighbouring column. Leval’s routed troops appear to have swept to the rear rather in a southerly direction, and to their left of the high road, so as to leave the beginnings of a gap between them and Cassagne’s division of the Army of the Centre, which was coming up to occupy the ridge north of Gomecha, in the new position. The complete breach in the French centre made by Picton’s capture of Ariñez, and the driving of Leval out of his position above it, had the immediate effect of compelling Darmagnac’s division to conform to the retreat, by falling back from Margarita on to La Hermandad and the hills behind it on the one wing, while the confused line of Daricau’s, Conroux’s, and Maransin’s troops, on the other hand, had to retire to the level of Gomecha, though the 4th
- 20. and 2nd Divisions were not yet far enough forward to be able to press them. Nearly all the French guns appear to have been carried back to the new position, which may roughly be described as extending from Hermandad on the Zadorra by Zuazo and Gomecha to the hills in front of Esquivel. It was quite as good as the Margarita- Ariñez-Zumelzu line which had just been forced by Picton’s central attack. It took some little time for Wellington to organize his next advance; the troops which had forced the Ariñez position had to be re-formed, and it was necessary to allow the 4th and 2nd Divisions to come up level with them, and to bring forward Dickson’s mass of artillery to a more advanced line, to batter the enemy before the next infantry assault was let loose. The only point where close fighting seems to have continued during this interval was on the extreme left, where Lord Dalhousie, after the French had left Margarita, was pressing forward Grant’s brigade of his own division, supported by Vandeleur’s brigade of the Light Division, against D’Erlon’s new position, where Neuenstein’s brigade of five German battalions lay in and about La Hermandad, with Chassé’s dilapidated regiments in reserve behind. There was a very bitter struggle at this point, rendered costly to the advancing British by the superiority of the French artillery—D’Erlon had now at least two batteries in action— Dalhousie only his own six divisional guns, those of Cairnes. Grant’s brigade, after advancing some 300 yards under a very heavy fire, came to a stand, and took cover in a deep broad ditch only 200 yards from the French front. According to an eye-witness Dalhousie hesitated for a moment as to whether a further advance was possible[583] , and had the matter settled for him by the sudden charge of Vandeleur’s brigade, which came up at full speed, carried the 7th Division battalions in the ditch along with it in its impetus, and stormed La Hermandad in ten minutes. The German defenders— Baden, Nassau, and Frankfurt battalions—reeled back in disorder, and retreated to the crest of the heights behind, where Cassagne’s division, hitherto not engaged, picked them up. D’Erlon succeeded in forming some sort of a new line from Crispijana near the Zadorra to Zuazo, where his left should have joined the right of the Army of the
- 21. South. It is curious to note that while Grant’s brigade lost heavily in this combat (330 casualties), Vandeleur’s, which carried on the attack to success, suffered hardly at all (38 casualties). Their German opponents were very badly punished, having lost 620 men, including 250 prisoners, in defending La Hermandad against the two British brigades[584] . While Wellington, after the first breaking of the French line, was preparing under cover of the cannonade of Dickson’s guns for the assault on their new position in front of Zuazo and Gomecha, General Graham was developing his attack on the Army of Portugal and the French line of retreat, but not with the energy that might have been expected from the victor of Barrosa. He had, as it will be remembered, sent Oswald and the 5th Division against the bridge of Gamarra Mayor, and Longa’s Spaniards against that of Durana, while he himself remained with the 1st Division, Pack’s and Bradford’s Portuguese, and the bulk of his cavalry on the high road, facing the bridge of Arriaga and its outlying bulwark the village of Abechuco. We should have expected that the main attack would be delivered at this point, but nothing of the sort took place. When the noise of Oswald’s heavy fighting at Gamarra Mayor had begun to grow loud, Graham directed the two Light Battalions of the German Legion (under Colonel Halkett) to clear the French out of Abechuco. This they did with trifling loss—1 officer and 51 men, capturing several guns in the village[585] . But Graham made no subsequent attempt to improve his success by forcing the bridge behind—as is sufficiently witnessed by the fact that of his remaining battalions the Guards’ Brigade had no casualties that day, and the three Line battalions of the K.G.L. one killed and one wounded. Before drawing up in front of Arriaga he had sent Bradford’s Portuguese, for a short time, to demonstrate to his right, toward the bridge of Yurre; but he called them back after a space, and placed them to the right of Abechuco, continuing the general line of the First Division. Bradford’s battalions lost precisely 4 men killed and 9 wounded. It is clear, therefore, that Graham never attacked the Arriaga position at all. Why he massed 4,000 British and 4,000
- 22. Portuguese infantry on this front—not to speak of two brigades of cavalry—and then never used them, it is hard to make out. We know, it is true, that not only Graham but Wellington himself over-estimated the strength of Reille’s force. They did not know that Maucune had gone away in the dark, in charge of the great convoy, and thought that Foy’s and Taupin’s divisions were the only troops of the Army of Portugal which had not rejoined. Arguing that he had four infantry divisions in front of him (though they were really only two), Graham no doubt did well to be cautious—but he was much more than that. It was at least his duty to detain and engage as many of the enemy’s troops as was possible—and he certainly did not do so. There was opposite him at Arriaga one single infantry division— Sarrut’s, and he did so little to employ it that Reille dared—after observing the British movements for some time—to take away Sarrut’s second brigade (that of Fririon) for use as a central reserve, which he posted at Betonio a mile back from the river, leaving Menne’s brigade alone—not much over 2,000 bayonets—opposed to the whole 1st Division, Bradford, and Pack. It is true that Menne had heavy cavalry supports—Digeon’s dragoons and Curto’s brigade of Mermet’s light horse—on one flank, and Boyer’s dragoons not far away on the other. But cavalry in 1813 were not troops which could defend a bridge or the line of a river. There was also a good deal of French artillery present—a more important fact under the existing circumstances. For Reille had still twenty guns ranged along the river[586] , beside those which were detached on the flank with Casapalacios’ Spaniards. But Graham had almost as many—the three batteries of Lawson, Ramsay, and Dubourdieu—and of these the two last, ranged opposite Arriaga bridge, and pounding the village behind it, quite held their own against the opposing guns. It can only be supposed that Graham, in refraining from any serious attack along the high road, was obeying in too literal a fashion Wellington’s orders not to commit himself to close fighting in the low ground, and to regulate his movements by those of the columns on his right (Picton’s and Dalhousie’s divisions). When these had worked their way up the Zadorra to his neighbourhood he did
- 23. advance. But it was then so late that the enemy in front of him was able to get away, without any very disastrous losses. While Graham kept quiet on the high road, Oswald was engaged in a very different style at Gamarra Mayor, where after his first capture of the village, he made at least three desperate attempts to force the bridge, held most obstinately by Lamartinière’s division. The passage was taken and retaken, but no lodgement on the southern bank could be made. After Robinson’s brigade had exhausted itself, Oswald put in the 3/1st from Hay’s brigade and some of his Portuguese[587] . But no success was obtained, though both sides suffered heavily. The casualty rolls of the 5th Division show a loss of 38 officers and 515 men—those of their French opponents 38 officers and 558 men. Practically all on both sides fell in the murderous fighting up and down Gamarra bridge. The forces were so equally balanced—each about 6,000 bayonets and one divisional battery— that on such a narrow front decision was impossible when both fought their best. The only way of attacking the bridge was by pushing straight down the narrow street of the village from the British side, and across an open field from the French. Both parties had guns trained upon its ends, which blew to pieces any column- head that debouched. There were no fords anywhere near, and the banks for some distance up-stream and down-stream were lined by the skirmishers of both sides, taking what cover they could find, and doing their best to keep down each other’s fire. ‘It plainly appeared this day that the enemy had formed a sort of determination not to be beat: we never saw them stand so vigorous before,’ writes a diarist from the ranks, in Robinson’s brigade[588] . There was an absolute deadlock at Gamarra Mayor till nearly five o’clock in the afternoon. At Durana things went otherwise: Longa, though hampered by his lack of guns, ended by pushing the Franco- Spanish brigade across the bridge, and then for some way down the south side of the Zadorra. The retreating party then made a stand behind a ravine and brook some half-mile farther on, where they were flanked by a brigade of Mermet’s light cavalry, as well as by their own five squadrons, and supported by the French battalion of the 3rd Line which had been in their quarter of the field from the
- 24. first. Longa was unable to push them farther—probably for fear of lending his flank to cavalry charges, and gained no further ground till the general retreat of the French army began. But he had effectively cut King Joseph’s communication with France by seizing Durana—and this was the governing factor of the whole fight, since the enemy had now only the Pampeluna road by which he could retreat. If Joseph had owned some infantry reserves, he could (no doubt) have driven Longa away; but he had not a man to spare in any part of the field, and things were going so badly with the Army of the South that he had no attention to spare for the Army of Portugal. It must have been about four o’clock before Wellington, having rearranged his line and brought up his artillery, determined to renew the general attack on the French right and centre. Joseph had brought up to the new position (extending from Crispijana on the left by Zuazo to the heights in front of Esquivel) the whole of the infantry of the Armies of the South and Centre, which now formed one rather irregular line. The only infantry reserve was the six weak battalions of the Royal Guard—perhaps 2,500 bayonets[589] , placed on the high road in front of Vittoria—there was also a mass of cavalry in reserve, but this was of as little use for the defence of a hill-position as was Wellington’s for the assault on it. There were now in line Tilly’s division of dragoons which had been brought back from its useless excursion on the Logroño road, and Pierre Soult’s light horse, both of Gazan’s army, with Treillard’s dragoons, Avy’s Chasseurs, and the two cavalry regiments of the Royal Guard, all from the Army of the Centre —in all some 4,500 sabres. The artillery, however, was very strong, and—deployed in a long line on both sides of the high road—was already sweeping all the slopes in front. There were present 46 guns of the Army of the South (all that it owned save one piece lost at Ariñez and three absent with Digeon’s dragoons), twelve guns of the Army of the Centre, and 18 from the reserve of the Army of Portugal—76 in all[590] . Dickson would appear to have brought up against them very nearly the same number: 54 British, 18 Portuguese, and 3 Spanish guns, when the last of the reserve batteries had got across the Zadorra and come forward into line—a total of 75 pieces[591] . The cannonade was the
- 25. fiercest ever known in the Peninsula—each side was mainly trying to pound the enemy’s infantry—a task more easy for the French than the Allied gunners, since the assailant had to come up the open hillside, and the assailed was partly screened by woods (especially in front of Gomecha) and dips in the rough ground which he was holding. The French line was now formed by Cassagne’s division on the extreme right, with one regiment (the 16th Léger) in Crispijana, and the others extending to meet Darmagnac’s much depleted battalions which were in and about Zuazo. Leval ought to have been in touch with Darmagnac, but obviously was not, the ground on each side of the high road being held by guns only, with cavalry in support some way behind. For after losing Ariñez Leval’s infantry had inclined much to their left. But on the other flank Villatte had, as it seems, inclined somewhat to the right, for having lost the heights of La Puebla, he could not prevent Cameron and Morillo from pressing along their crest and getting behind his new position: they were edging past his flank all through this period of the action. The long front of the British advance started with Colville’s brigade—now once more in front line—opposite Crispijana, and was continued southward by those of Grant, Power, Brisbane, Stubbs, Byng, and O’Callaghan, while Vandeleur, Kempt, W. Anson, Skerrett, and Ashworth were formed in support, with Silveira’s division and the cavalry in third line. The missing brigades of the 7th Division were not yet on the field, possibly not even across the Zadorra, for neither of them lost a man that day. The advance of the line was a splendid spectacle, recorded with notes of admiration by many who witnessed it from the hill of Ariñez or the heights of La Puebla. The French artillery fire was heavy, and in some sections of the line very murderous—Power’s and Stubbs’s Portuguese brigades were special sufferers. But the infantry defence was not resolute: on many parts of the front it was obviously very weak. The enemy was already a beaten army, he had been turned out of two positions, the news had got round that the road to France had been cut, and that Reille’s small force was in grave danger of losing the line of the Zadorra—in which case the whole army would find itself attacked in the rear. It is
- 26. clear from the French narratives that the infantry did not support the guns in front line as they should. The reports of the Army of the Centre speak of being turned on their right by a column which kept near the river and took Crispijana—obviously Colville’s brigade. As the 16th Léger in that village only suffered a loss that day of one officer and 26 men, its resistance cannot have been very serious. But D’Erlon’s divisions were also outflanked on their left—by clouds of skirmishers drifting in by the wood and broken ground about Gomecha, who turned on the line of artillery, and began shooting down the gunners from flank and rear[592] . Obviously there was a gap along the high road, by which these light troops must have penetrated, and as obviously it was caused by Leval having sheered off to the south. For the artillery report of Gazan’s army also speaks of being turned on its right wing—‘enveloped by skirmishers who had got into Gomecha and were in rear of the position, which was being also attacked frontally.’ Nor is this all, ‘the mass on the mountain (Cameron and Morillo) descended on the left flank and rear of the Army of the South before it had time to form again: the artillery found itself without support.’ If so, where were the four and a half divisions of infantry which should have been protecting it? The only possible deduction from all our narratives is that Gazan’s army made no real stand on the Gomecha-Esquivel position, and retired the moment that the attack drew near. And the person mainly responsible for the retreat was the Army-Commander himself, whose very unconvincing account of this phase of the action is that ‘the right flank of the line was continually being outflanked: I received no further orders about the taking up of the position of which the King had spoken; the enemy was getting near the gates of Vittoria (!), and so I had to continue my movement toward that town, after having taken up a position by Zuazo, with the intention of covering with my right-hand division and my guns the retreat of the rest of the army, which without this help would have been hopelessly compromised. At this time I had only lost four guns, abandoned on the extreme left of the line: the artillery was intact, and the army had suffered no greater loss than it had inflicted on the enemy.’
- 27. Reading this artful narrative, we note that (1) Gazan evacuated on his own responsibility a position that the King had definitely ordered him to take up—because he had ‘no further orders’; (2) the continued ‘turning of his right’ could only have resulted from the defeat of his own troops on and about the high road—which was in his sector, not in D’Erlon’s, Leval was across it when the last phase of the battle began; (3) D’Erlon held Zuazo and complained that there was nothing on his left, which was completely turned on the side where Leval ought to have been but was not; (4) Gazan retreated without any serious loss having compelled him to do so. This is obviously the fact. Villatte’s whole division had less than 300 casualties, Leval’s under 800, Daricau’s under 850: the only troops hard hit were Maransin’s brigade, Rey’s brigade of Conroux’s division, and the 103rd Line in Daricau’s. Moreover, the 4th and 2nd British Divisions, the troops immediately opposed to Gazan’s main line, had insignificant losses in this part of the action, Byng’s brigade under 150, Ashworth’s just 23, Anson’s 90, Skerrett’s 22; the only appreciable loss had been that of Stubbs’s Portuguese—about 240. For the heavy casualty lists of O’Callaghan’s, Cadogan’s, and Brisbane’s battalions had all been suffered in the earlier phases of the fight[593] . The fact is that Gazan went off without orders, and left the King and D’Erlon in the lurch. Jourdan is telling the exact truth when he says that ‘General Gazan, instead of conducting his divisions to the position indicated, swerved strongly to the right, marching in retreat, so as to link up with Villatte; he continued to draw away, following the foot-hills of the mountain [of Puebla], leaving the high road and Vittoria far to his left, and a vast gap between himself and Count D’Erlon’[594] . No doubt the breach made in the French centre when Picton stormed the heights behind Ariñez had been irreparable from the first; and no doubt also the flanking movement of Morillo and Cameron on the mountain must have dislodged the Army of the South, if it had waited to come into frontal action with Cole and Hill. But Gazan showed complete disregard of all interests save his own, and went off in comparatively good condition, without orders, leaving
- 28. the King, D’Erlon, and Reille to get out of the mess as best they might. Some of the British narratives tend to show that many parts of Gazan’s line had never properly settled down into the Gomecha- Esquivel position, having reached it in such bad order that they would have required more time than was granted them to re-form. An officer present with the skirmishing line of the 4th Division writes in his absolutely contemporary diary: ‘From the time when our guns began to open, and to throw shells almost into the rear of the enemy’s height, we saw him begin to fall back in haste from his position. We [4th Division] marched on at a great pace in column. From that moment the affair became a mere hunt. Our rapid advance almost cut off four or five French battalions—they made some resistance at first, but soon dissolved and ran pell-mell, like a swarm of bees, up the steep hill, from which they began to fire down on us. We disregarded their fire, and kept on advancing—in order to carry out our main object: broken troops are easy game. When we found the enemy in this second position there was heavy artillery fire. Since his left wing was somewhat refused, we advanced in échelon from the right. When we got within musketry range, we found he had gone off out of sight. After that we drove him out of one position after another till at last we were near the gates of Vittoria[595] .’ Several other 4th Division and 2nd Division narratives agree in stating that after the storming of Ariñez the French never made anything like a solid stand on the Gomecha-Esquivel heights. But (as has been said above) the best proof of it is the British casualty list, which shows that the reserve line was hardly under fire, and that the front line had very moderate losses, except at one or two points. D’Erlon made a more creditable resistance on the French right, but he was obviously doomed if he should linger long after Gazan had gone off. After losing Crispijana and Zuazo he made a last stand on the slopes a mile in front of Vittoria, between Ali and Armentia, to which the whole of his own artillery and that of the reserve, and perhaps also some guns of the Army of the South, retired in time to take up a final position[596] . For some short space they maintained a furious fire on the 3rd Division troops which were following them up,
- 29. so as to allow their infantry to re-form. But it was but for a few minutes—the column near the Zadorra (Grant, Colville, and Vandeleur) got round the flank of the village of Ali, and the line of guns was obviously in danger if it remained any longer in action. Just at this moment D’Erlon received the King’s orders for a general retreat by the route of Salvatierra. The high road to France had ceased to be available since Longa got across it in the earlier afternoon. Any attempt to force it open would obviously have taken much time, and might well have failed, since the French were everywhere closely pressed by the pursuing British. Jourdan judged the idea of reopening the passage to be hopelessly impracticable, and ordered the retreat on Pampeluna as the only possible policy, though (as his report owns) he was aware of the badness of the Salvatierra road, and doubted his power to carry off his guns, transport, and convoy of refugees by such a second-rate track. But it was the only one open, and there was no choice. The orders issued were that the Train and Park should get off at once, that the Army of the South should retreat by the country paths south of Vittoria, the Army of the Centre by those north of it. The Army of Portugal was to hang on to its position till D’Erlon’s troops had passed its rear, and then follow them as best it could. All the cross-tracks indicated to the three armies ended by converging on the Salvatierra road east of Vittoria, so that a hopeless confusion was assured for the moment when three separate streams of retreating troops should meet, and struggle for the use of one narrow and inadequate thoroughfare. But as a matter of fact the chaos began long before that time was reached, for the road was blocked or ever the three armies got near it. The order for the retreat of the Park and convoys had been issued far too late—Gazan says that he had advised Jourdan to give it two hours before, when the first positions had been abandoned. But the Marshal had apparently high confidence in his power to hold the Hermandad-Gomecha-Esquivel line; at any rate, he had given no such command. The noise of battle rolling ever closer to Vittoria had warned the mixed multitude of civil and military hangers-on of the army who were waiting by their carriages, carts, pack-mules, and fourgons, in the open fields east of
- 30. Vittoria, that the French army was being driven in. Many of those who were not under military discipline had begun to push ahead on the Salvatierra road, the moment that the alarming news flew around that the great chaussée leading to France had been blocked. The Park, however—which all day long had been sending up reserve ammunition to the front, and even one or two improvised sections of guns—had naturally remained waiting for orders. So had the immense accumulation of divisional and regimental baggage, the convoy of treasure which had arrived from Bayonne on the 19th, and the heavy carriages of the King’s personal caravan, stuffed with the plate and pictures of the palace at Madrid. And of the miscellaneous French and Spanish hangers-on of the Court—ministers, courtiers, clerks, commissaries, contractors, and the ladies who in legitimate or illegitimate capacities followed them—few had dared to go off unescorted on an early start. There was a vast accumulation of distracted womenfolk—nous étions un bordel ambulant, said one French eye-witness—some crammed together in travelling coaches with children and servants, others riding the spare horses or mules of the men to whom they belonged. When the orders for general retreat were shouted around, among the fields where the multitude had been waiting, three thousand vehicles of one sort and another tried simultaneously to get into one or another of the five field-paths which go east from Vittoria, all of which ultimately debouch into the single narrow Salvatierra road. A dozen blocks and upsets had occurred before the first ten minutes were over, and chaos supervened. Many carriages and waggons never got off on a road at all. Into the rear of this confusion there came charging, a few minutes later, batteries of artillery going at high speed, and strings of caissons, which had been horsed up and had started away early from the Park. Of course they could not get through—but the thrust which they delivered, before they came to an enforced stop, jammed the crowd of vehicles in front of them into a still more hopeless block. Dozens of carriages broke down—whereupon light-fingered fugitives began to help themselves to all that was spilt. Of course camp followers began the game, but Jourdan says that a large proportion of the French prisoners that day were soldiers who s’amusaient à piller in and about Vittoria; one of
- 31. the official reports from the Army of Portugal remarks that the retreating cavalry joined in the ‘general pillage of the valuables of the army,’ and other narrators mention that the treasure-fourgons had already been broken into long before the English came upon the scene[597] . Be this as it may, there was no long delay before the terrors of the stampede culminated with the arrival of several squadrons of Grant’s hussars, who had penetrated by the gap between D’Erlon’s and Gazan’s lines of retreat, and had made a short cut through the suburbs of the town. Of the chaos that followed the firing of the first pistol shots which heralded the charge of the British light cavalry, we must not speak till we have dealt with the last fight of the Army of Portugal, on the extreme French right. Battle of VITTORIA Till Grant’s and Colville’s brigades broke into Crispijana and Ali, the line of Reille’s gallant defence along the Zadorra had remained intact. Only artillery fire was going on opposite the bridge of Arriaga, where the 1st Division and the two Portuguese brigades had halted
- 32. by Graham’s orders at some distance from the river, and had never advanced. The two cavalry brigades were behind them. At Gamarra Mayor the 5th Division had failed to force a passage, though it had inflicted on Lamartinière’s troops as heavy a loss as it suffered. Longa was held up half a mile beyond Durana, though he had successfully cut the Bayonne chaussée. There was considerable cannonade and skirmishing fire going on, upon a front of three miles, but no further progress reported. The whole scene, however, was changed from the moment when Grant’s and Colville’s brigades, turning the flank of D’Erlon’s line close to the Zadorra, came sweeping over the hills by Ali into the very rear of Reille’s line. The Army of Portugal had been directed to hold the bridges and keep back Graham, until the rest of the French host had got off. But the danger now came not from the front but from the rear. In half an hour more the advancing British columns would be level with the bridge of Arriaga and surrounding the infantry that held it. Reille determined on instant retreat, the only course open to him: so far as was possible it was covered by the very ample provision of cavalry which he had in hand. Digeon, who has left a good account of the crisis, made several desperate charges, to hold back the advancing British while Menne’s brigade was escaping from Arriaga. One was against infantry, which formed square and beat off the dragoons with no difficulty[598] —the other against hussars, apparently two squadrons of the 15th, which had turned northward from the suburbs of Vittoria and tried to ride in and cut off the retreat of Menne’s battalions[599] . They were beaten back, and the infantry scrambled off, leaving behind them Sarrut, their divisional general, mortally wounded as the retreat began. Moreover, all the guns in and about Arriaga had to be abandoned in the fields, where they could make no rapid progress. The gunners unhitched the horses, and escaped as best they could. Reille had drawn up in front of Betonio the small infantry reserve (Fririon’s brigade) which he had wisely provided for himself, flanked by Boyer’s dragoons and Curto’s brigade of light cavalry. The object of this stand was not only to give Menne’s and Digeon’s troops a nucleus on which they could rally, but to gain time for Lamartinière to draw off from in front of Gamarra Mayor bridge, where he was still
- 33. hotly engaged with Oswald’s division. This infantry got away in better order than most French troops on that day, and even brought off its divisional battery, though that of the cavalry which had been co- operating with it had to be left behind not far from the river-bank, having got into a marshy bottom where it stuck fast. The Franco- Spaniards of Casapalacios and their attendant cavalry escaped over the hills east of Durana, pursued by Longa, who took many prisoners from them. When Lamartinière’s division had come in, Reille made a rapid retreat to the woods of Zurbano, a mile and a half behind Betonio, which promised good cover. He was now being pursued by the whole of Graham’s corps, which had crossed the Zadorra when the bridges were abandoned. Pack’s brigade, followed by the 1st Division and Bradford, advanced on Arriaga; they were somewhat late owing to slow filing over the bridge. At Gamarra Oswald sent in the pursuit of Lamartinière two squadrons of light dragoons[600] which had been attached to his column; these were followed by the rest of their brigade, which Graham sent up from the main road to join them, and also by Bock’s German dragoons. The object of using the smaller and more remote bridge was that cavalry crossing by it had a better chance of getting into Reille’s rear than they would have secured by passing at Arriaga. The much exhausted 5th Division followed the cavalry. Having reached the edge of the woods, Reille ordered the bulk of his troops to push on hard, by the two parallel roads which traverse them, keeping Fririon’s brigade in hand as a fighting rearguard. The rather disordered columns were emerging on the east side of the woods, and streaming into and past the village of Zurbano, when the leading squadrons of the 12th and 16th Light Dragoons came in upon them. These squadrons had avoided entangling themselves in the trees till the French rearguard had passed on, but prepared to charge the moment they got into open ground, though the main body of the brigade had not come up. They found opposed to them a regiment of Boyer’s dragoons, supported by another of hussars, which they charged but did not break[601] . But on the coming up of the rear squadrons, the attack was renewed with success. The French cavalry
- 34. gave way, but only to clear the front of the 36th Line of Fririon’s brigade, which was in square outside Zurbano. The British light dragoons swept down on the square, but were completely repulsed by its steady fire. This gained time for the rest of Reille’s troops to make off, and the pursuit slackened. But the bulk of the French went off in such haste that they abandoned four guns of Lamartinière’s artillery, and took away with them only the remaining two—the sole pieces that escaped that day of the immense train of Joseph’s three armies. Some hundreds of stragglers were taken, but no single unit of the retiring force was cut off or captured whole. Reille wisely kept his army, so long as was possible, on the side-paths by Arbulo and Oreytia, before debouching into the main Salvatierra road, which was seething over with the wrecks of the other armies and the convoys. Hence he succeeded in escaping the utter confusion into which the rest fell, and, finally, when he turned into the main track, was able to constitute himself a rearguard to the whole. Graham’s pursuit of him seems to have been slow and cautious—no troops indeed ever came near the retreating columns except the two light dragoon regiments, the Caçador battalions of Pack and Bradford, and some of Longa’s skirmishers, who (as Reille mentions) followed him along the hills on his left, shooting down into the retreating masses, but not attempting to break in. The 5th Division appears to have followed not much farther than the open ground beyond the woods of Zurbano, where it halted and encamped after eight o’clock in some bean-fields. Nor does it seem that the 1st Division got more than a league or so beyond the Zadorra[602] . The Caçadores and cavalry, however, did not halt till they reached El Burgo, four or five miles farther on. The scene was very different on the other side of Vittoria, where D’Erlon’s army was pushing its way, in utter disorder, through the fields and by-paths over which the Parks and convoy were trying in vain to get off, and Gazan’s (farther to the south) was making a dash over ground of the most tiresome sort. For in the rugged tract east of Esquivel and Armentia such paths as there were mostly ran in the wrong direction—north and south instead of east and west—and it was necessary to disregard them and to strike across country. Six successive ravines lay in the way—marshy bottoms in which ran
- 35. trifling brooks descending toward the Zadorra—and several woods on the ridges between the ravines. Hill’s and Cole’s skirmishers were pressing in the rear, and above, on the heights of Puebla, Morillo’s and Cameron’s troops could be seen hurrying along with the intention of getting ahead of the retreating masses. The confusion growing worse every moment—for companies and battalions each struck out for the easiest line of retreat without regard for their neighbours— Gazan gave orders to abandon all the artillery, which was getting embogged, battery after battery, in the ravines, and gave leave for every unit to shift for itself—general sauve-qui-peut. The horses were unhitched from the guns and caissons, many of the infantry threw off their packs, and the army went off broadcast, some in the direction of Metauco and Arbulo, others by village paths more to the south. The general stream finally flowed into the Salvatierra road, where it was covered by the Army of Portugal, which was making a much more orderly retreat[603] . English eye-witnesses of this part of the battle complain bitterly that no horsemen ever came up to assist the wearied 2nd Division infantry in the pursuit, and maintain that thousands of prisoners might have been taken by a few squadrons[604] . But all the cavalry seems to have been directed on Vittoria by the high road, and save Grant’s hussar brigade none of it came into action. This is sufficiently proved by its casualty lists—in R. Hill’s, Ponsonby’s, Long’s, Victor Alten’s, and Fane’s brigades that day the total losses were one man killed and eleven wounded! Only Anson’s Light Dragoons in Graham’s corps and Grant’s regiments in the centre got into the fighting at all. The rugged ground, it is true, was unfavourable for cavalry action in regular order, but it was almost as unfavourable for disordered infantry escaping over ravines and ditches. Something was wrong here in the general direction of the mounted arm—perhaps it suffered from the want of a responsible cavalry leader—the brigadiers dared not act for themselves, and Bock (the senior cavalry officer) was not only short-sighted in the extreme, but absent from the main battle all day in Graham’s corps. One cannot but suspect that Wellington’s thunderings in previous years, against reckless cavalry action, were always present in the minds of colonels and brigadiers who had a chance before them. And possibly,
- 36. in the end, there was more gained by the avoidance of mistakes of rashness than lost by the missing of opportunities, if we take the war as a whole. But at Vittoria it would most certainly appear that the great mass of British cavalry might as well have been on the other side of the Ebro for all the good that it accomplished.
- 37. It only remains to speak of the chaos in the fields and roads east of Vittoria. When the general débâcle began King Joseph and Jourdan took their post on a low hill half a mile east of the town, and endeavoured to organize the departure of the Park and convoys —a hopeless task, for the roads were blocked, and no one listened to orders. It was in vain that aides-de-camp and orderlies were sent in all directions. Presently a flood of fugitives were driven in upon the staff, by the approach of British cavalry in full career. These were Grant’s 10th and 18th Hussars, who had turned the town on its left, and galloped down on the prey before them. Joseph had only with him the two squadrons of his Lancers of the Guard, which had been acting as head-quarters escort all day. It would appear that the Guard Hussars came up to join them about this time. At any rate, these two small regiments made a valiant attempt to hold off the hussars—they were of course beaten, being hopelessly outnumbered[605] . The King and staff had to fly as best they could, and were much scattered, galloping over fields and marshy ravines, mixed with military and civil fugitives of all sorts. Some of the British hussars followed the throng, taking a good many prisoners by the way: more, it is to be feared, stopped behind to gather the not too creditable first-fruits of victory, by plundering the royal carriages, which lay behind the scene of their charge. The French stragglers had already shown them the way. Wellington, on reaching Vittoria, set Robert Hill’s brigade of the Household Cavalry to guard the town from plunder, and sent on the rest of the horse, and the infantry as they came up, in pursuit of the enemy. The French, however, had by now a good start, and troops in order cannot keep up with troops in disorder, who have got rid of their impedimenta, and scattered themselves. The country, moreover, was unfavourable for cavalry, as has been said above, and the infantry divisions were tired out. The chase ended five miles beyond Vittoria—the enemy, when last seen, being still on the run, with no formed rearguard except on the side road where the Army of Portugal was retreating. If the prisoners were fewer than might have been expected, the material captured was such as no European army had ever laid
- 38. hands on before, since Alexander’s Macedonians plundered the camp of the Persian king after the battle of Issus. The military trophies compared well even with those of Leipzig and Waterloo—151 guns, 415 caissons, 100 artillery waggons. Probably no other army ever left all its artillery save two solitary pieces in the enemy’s hands[606] . There was but one flag captured, and that was only the standard of a battalion of the 100th Line which had been reduced in May, and had not been actually borne in the battle[607] . The baton of Jourdan, as Marshal of the Empire, was an interesting souvenir, which delighted the Prince Regent when it arrived in London[608] , but only bore witness to the fact that his personal baggage, like that of his King, had been captured. A few thousand extra prisoners—the total taken was only about 2,000—would have been more acceptable tokens of victory. But non-military spoil was enormous—almost incredible. It represented the exploitation of Spain for six long years by its conquerors. ‘To the accumulated plunder of Andalusia were added the collections made by the other French armies—the personal baggage of the King—fourgons having inscribed on them in large letters “Domaine extérieur de S.M. l’Empereur”—the military chest containing the millions recently received from France for the payment of the Army, and not yet distributed—jewels, pictures, embroidery, silks, all manner of things costly and portable had been assiduously transported thus far. Removed from their frames and rolled up carefully, were the finest Italian pictures from the royal collections of Madrid: they were found in the “imperials” of Joseph’s own carriages. All this mixed with cannon, overturned coaches, broken-down waggons, forsaken tumbrils, wounded soldiers, French and Spanish civilians, women and children, dead horses and mules, absolutely covered the face of the country, extending over the surface of a flat containing many hundred acres[609] .’ The miserable crowd was guessed by an eye-witness to have numbered nearly 20,000 persons. Spanish and French camp-followers and military stragglers had already started plunder—on them supervened English and Portuguese civil and military vultures of the same sort—servants and muleteers by the thousand, bad soldiers by the hundred: for
- 39. while the good men marched on, the bad ones melted out of the ranks and flew to the spoil, evading the officers who tried to urge them on. In such a chaos evasion was easy. Nor were the commissioned ranks altogether without their unobtrusive seekers after gain—as witness the subjoined narrative by one whom a companion in a contemporary letter describes as a ‘graceless youth.’ ‘As L. and I rode out of Vittoria, we came to the camp in less than a mile. On the left-hand side of the road was a heap of ransacked waggons already broken up and dismantled. There arose a shout from a number of persons among the waggons, and we found that they had discovered one yet unopened. We cantered up and found some men using all possible force to break open three iron clasps secured with padlocks. On the side of the fourgon was painted “Le Lieutenant-Général Villatte.” The hasps gave way, and a shout followed. The whole surface of the waggon was packed with church plate, mixed with bags of dollars. A man who thrust his arm down said that the bottom was full of loose dollars and boxes. L. and I were the only ones on horseback, and pushed close to the waggon. He swung out a large chalice, and buckling it to his holster- strap cantered off. As the people were crowding to lay hold of the plate, I noted a mahogany box about eighteen inches by two feet, with brass clasps. I picked out four men, told them that the box was the real thing, and if they would fetch it out we would see what it held. They caught the idea: the box was very heavy. I led the way through the standing corn, six or seven feet high, to a small shed, where we put it down and tried to get it open. After several devices had failed, two men found a large stone, and, lifting it as high as they could, dropped it on the box. It withstood several blows, but at length gave way. Gold doubloons and smaller pieces filled the whole box, in which were mixed some bags with trinkets. Just then an Ordnance store-keeper came up, and said there was no time to count shares: he would go round and give a handfull in turn to each. He first poured a double handfull into my holster. The second round was a smaller handfull. By this time I was reflecting that I was the only officer present, and in rather an awkward position. I said they might have the rest of my share,—there was first a look of surprise,
- 40. and then a burst of laughter, and I trotted away. I rode eight or ten miles to the bivouack and found the officers in an ancient church— housed à la Cromwell. On the 23rd, before we left our quarters, I and —— went up into the belfry, and counted out the gold—the doubloons alone made nearly £400. I remitted £250 to my father, and purchased another horse with part of the balance[610] .’ General Villatte, no doubt, had special facilities in Andalusia—but every fourgon and carriage contained something that had been worth carrying off. The amount of hard cash discovered was almost incredible. Men and officers who had been self-respecting enough to avoid the unseemly rush at the waggons, had wonderful bargains at a sort of impromptu fair or auction which was held among the débris of the convoy that night. Good mules were going for three guineas— horses for ten. Every one wished to get rid of the heavy duros and five-franc pieces, which constituted the greater part of the plunder; six and eight dollars respectively were offered and taken for a gold twenty-franc piece or a guinea. ‘The camp was turned into a fair—it was lighted up, the cars, &c., made into stands, upon which the things taken were exposed for sale. Many soldiers, to add to the absurdity of the scene, dressed themselves up in uniforms found in the chests. All the Portuguese boys belonging to some divisions are dressed in the uniforms of French officers—many of generals[611] .’ Wellington had hoped to secure the five million francs of the French subsidy which had just arrived at Vittoria before the battle. His expectations were deceived; only one-twentieth of the sum was recovered, though an inquisitorial search was made a few days later in suspected quarters. One regiment, which had notoriously prospered, was made to stack its knapsacks on the 23rd, and they were gone through in detail by an assistant provost-marshal—but little was found: the men had stowed away their gains in belts and secret pockets; or deposited them with quartermasters and commissaries who were known to be honest and silent. The only feature in this discreditable scene that gives the historian some satisfaction is to know that there was no mishandling of prisoners—not even of prominent Spanish traitors. The only person recorded to have been killed in the chaos was M. Thiébault,
- 41. the King’s treasurer, who fought to defend his private strong-box containing 100,000 dollars, and got shot[612] . The women were particularly well treated—the Countess Gazan, wife of the Commander of the Army of the South, was sent by Wellington’s orders in her own carriage to join her husband—a courtesy acknowledged by several French diarists[613] . The same leave was given later to many others, and the Commander-in-Chief wrote to the Spanish Ministry to beg that no vengeance might be taken on the captured afrancesados, and seems to have secured his end in the main. The French loss in the battle, according to the definitive report made from the head-quarters of the three armies after they had got back into France, was 42 officers and 716 men killed, 226 officers and 4,210 men wounded, and 23 officers and 2,825 prisoners or missing—a total of 8,091. It is known that of the ‘missing’ some hundreds were stragglers who rejoined later, and some other hundreds dead men, who had not got into the list of killed. The total number of prisoners did not really exceed 2,000. But on the other hand the official returns are incomplete, not giving any figures for the artillery or train of the Armies of Portugal and the Centre, or for the Royal Guards (which lost 11 officers and therefore probably 150 to 200 men), or for the General Staff (which had 35 casualties), or for the stray troops of the Army of the North present in the battle. Probably the real total, therefore, was very much about the 8,000 men given by the official return. The Allied casualties were just over 5,000—of whom 3,672 were British, 921 Portuguese, and 552 Spaniards. A glance at the table in the Appendix will show how unequally they were distributed. Seven- tenths of the whole loss fell on the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, with Grant’s brigade of the 7th, Robinson’s of the 5th, and Stubbs’s Portuguese in the 4th. These troops furnished over 3,500 of the total loss of 5,158. The 1st Division (54 casualties), the British brigades of the 4th Division (125 casualties), Hay’s and Spry’s brigades of the 5th (200 casualties), Barnes’ and Lecor’s of the 7th (no casualties[614] ), the Light Division (132 casualties), Silveira’s Division (10 casualties), the cavalry (155 casualties) had no losses of
- 42. importance. The 266 men marked as missing were all either dead or absent marauding, save 40 of the 71st whom the French took prisoners to Pampeluna. The Spanish loss of 14 officers and 524 men was entirely in Morillo’s and Longa’s Divisions, and much heavier among the Estremadurans, who fought so well on the heights of La Puebla, than among the Cantabrians who skirmished all day at Durana. Giron’s Galicians were never engaged, having only arrived in the rear of Graham’s column just as the fighting north of the Zadorra was over. They encamped round Arriaga at the end of the day. That the battle of Vittoria was the crowning-point of a very brilliant strategic campaign is obvious. That in tactical detail it was not by any means so brilliant an example of what Wellington and his army could accomplish, is equally obvious. Was the General’s plan to blame? or was a well-framed scheme wrecked by the faults of subordinates? It is always a dangerous matter to criticize Wellington’s arrangements—so much seems clear to the historian that could not possibly have been known to the soldier on the morning of June 21st. It is obvious to us now that there was a fair chance not only of beating the French army, and of cutting off its retreat on Bayonne, but of surrounding and destroying at least a considerable portion of it. Wellington’s orders are always extremely reticent in stating his final aims, and give a list of things to be done by each division, rather than a general appreciation of what he intends the army to accomplish. But reading his directions to Graham, Hill, and Dalhousie, and looking at the way on which they work out on the map, and the allocation of forces in each column, it would seem that in view of the distribution of the French troops on the afternoon of June 20th, he planned a complete encircling scheme, which should not only accomplish what he actually did accomplish, but much more. Graham, with his 20,000 men, must have been intended not only to force the line of the Zadorra and cut the Royal Road, but to fall upon the rear of the whole French army, which on the afternoon of the 20th had been seen to have a most inadequate flank-guard towards the north-east. Hill’s 20,000 men were not, as Jourdan thought, the only main attack, nor as Gazan
- 43. (equally in error) thought, a mere demonstration. They were intended to make an encircling movement to the south, as strong as Graham’s similar movement to the north. But obviously both the flanking columns, Hill’s far more than Graham’s, were in danger of being repulsed, if the French could turn large unemployed reserves upon them. Wherefore the central attacks, by the 4th and Light Divisions on the Nanclares side, and by the 3rd and 7th Divisions on the Mendoza side, were necessary in order to contain any troops which Jourdan might have sent off to overwhelm Hill or Graham. And here comes the weak point of the whole scheme—all the movements had to be made through defiles and over rough country: Hill had to debouch from the narrow pass of Puebla, Graham had a long mountain road from Murguia, and, worst of all, Dalhousie, with the 3rd and 7th Divisions, had to cross the watershed of a very considerable mountain by mere peasants’ tracks. Only the column which marched from the Bayas to Nanclares had decent going on a second-rate road. There was, therefore, a considerable danger that some part of the complicated scheme might miscarry. And any failure at one point imperilled the whole, since the Nanclares column was not to act till Hill was well forward, and the Mendoza column was ordered to get into touch with the troops to its right, and regulate its movements by them; while Graham, still farther off, was also to guide himself by what was going on upon his right, to correct himself with the Mendoza column, and only to attack on the Bilbao road when it should be seen that an attack would be obviously useful to the main advance. Hill discharged his part of the scheme to admiration, as he always did anything committed to him, and took up the attention of the main part of the Army of the South. But the central and left attacks did not proceed as Wellington had desired. Graham got to his destined position within the time allotted to him, but when he had reached it, was slow and unenterprising in his action. He was seeking for Dalhousie’s column, with which he had been directed to co-ordinate his operations: he sent out cavalry scouts and Bradford’s Portuguese to his right, but could find nothing. This, I think, explains but does not wholly excuse his caution at noon. But it neither
- 44. explains nor excuses at all his tactics after he had received, at two o’clock, Wellington’s orders telling him to press the enemy hard, and make his power felt. With his two British divisions, the Portuguese of Pack and Bradford, and two cavalry brigades, he only made a genuine attack at one point, and did not put into serious action (as the casualty lists show) more than four battalions—those used at Gamarra Mayor. The whole left column was contained by little more than half of its number of French troops. Graham says in his dispatch to Wellington that ‘in face of such force as the enemy showed it was evidently impossible to push a column across the river by Gamarra bridge.’ He does not explain his inactivity at other points, except by mentioning that the enemy had ‘at least two divisions in reserve on strong ground behind the river[615] .’ There was really only one brigade in reserve, and so far from being compelled to attack at Gamarra only, Graham had besides Arriaga bridge on the main road, two other bridges open to assault (those of Goveo and Yurre), besides at least one and probably three fords. All these more southern passages were watched by cavalry only, without infantry or guns. It is clear that Graham could have got across the Zadorra somewhere, if he had tried. Very probably his quiescence was due to his failing eyesight, which had been noticed very clearly by those about him during this campaign[616] . The only part of his corps which did really useful work was Longa’s Spanish division, which at least cut the Bayonne road at the proper place and time. But if Graham’s tactics cannot be praised, Lord Dalhousie was even more responsible for the imperfect consequence of the victory. Why Wellington put this fussy and occasionally disobedient officer in charge of the left-centre column, instead of Picton, passes understanding. The non-arrival of the 7th Division, which was to lead the attack, was due to incompetent work by him or his staff. He says in his dispatch that he was delayed by several accidents to his artillery (Cairnes’s battery). But from his own narrative we see that the guns got up almost as soon as his leading infantry brigade (Grant’s), while his two rear brigades (Barnes and Le Cor) never reached the front in time to fire a shot. What really happened was that for want of staff guidance, for which the divisional commander
- 45. was responsible, these troops did not take the path assigned to them, and went right over, instead of skirting, the summit of Monte Arrato, making an apparently short (and precipitous) cut, which turned out to be a very long one[617] . So when Dalhousie did arrive, with one brigade and his guns, Picton had long been waiting by Las Guetas in a state of justifiable irritation. Finally, Dalhousie (lacking the greater part of his division) did not attack till he got peremptory orders to do so from the Commander-in-Chief. Hence the extreme delay, which caused grave risk to Hill’s wing, so long engaged without support. It is fair to add that the delay had one good effect —since it led Jourdan to think that his right was not going to be attacked, and therefore to send off Villatte’s and Cassagne’s divisions to the far left. If Dalhousie had advanced an hour earlier, these divisions would have been near enough to support Leval. But this is no justification for the late arrival and long hesitations of the commander of the 7th Division. Undoubtedly a part of the responsibility devolves on Wellington himself, for putting an untried officer in charge of a crucial part of the day’s operations, when he had in Picton an old and experienced tactician ready to hand. The strategical plan was so good that minor faults of execution could not mar its general success. Yet it must be remembered that, if all had worked out with minute accuracy, the French army would have been destroyed, instead of merely losing its artillery and train. And the fact that 55,000 men escaped to France, even if in sorry condition, made the later campaign of the Pyrenees possible. There would have been no combats of Maya and Roncesvalles, no battles of Sorauren and St. Marcial, if the eight French divisions present at Vittoria had been annihilated, instead of being driven in disorder on to an eccentric line of retreat.
- 46. SECTION XXXVII EXPULSION OF THE FRENCH FROM SPAIN CHAPTER I THE PURSUIT OF CLAUSEL At ten o’clock on the morning of June 22nd Wellington moved out from Vittoria in pursuit of the French. Touch with them had been lost on the preceding night, as the divisions which had fought the battle had ceased to move on after dark, and had settled into bivouacs four or five miles beyond the city. The enemy, on the other hand, had continued his flight in the darkness, till sheer exhaustion compelled each man to throw himself down where he was, all order having been lost in most units, and only Reille’s rearguard of the Army of Portugal having kept its ranks. About midnight the majority had run to a standstill, and the hills along the Salvatierra road began to be covered with thousands of little fires, round which small groups were cooking the scanty rations that they had saved in their haversacks. ‘The impromptu illumination had a very pretty effect: if the enemy had seen it he might have thought that we had rallied and were in order. But it was only next morning that the regiments began to coalesce, and reorganization was not complete till we got back to France. Generals were seeking their divisions, colonels their regiments, officers their companies. They found them later—but one thing was never found again—the crown of Spain, fallen for ever
- 47. from the brow on which it was not to be replaced[618] .’ King Joseph himself, pushing on ahead of the rout, reached Salvatierra, sixteen miles from the field, before he dismounted, and shared a meagre and melancholy supper with D’Erlon and two ministers, the Irish- Spaniard O’Farrill and the Frenchman Miot de Melito. To them entered later Jourdan, who had been separated from the rest of the staff in the flight. He flung himself down to the table, saying, ‘Well, gentlemen, they would have a battle, and it is a lost battle,’ after which no one said anything more. This was the old marshal’s reflection on the generals who, all through the retreat, had been urging that it was shameful to evacuate Spain without risking a general action. After three hours’ halt, sleep for some, but the wakefulness of exhaustion for others, the King’s party got to horse at dawn, and rode on toward Pampeluna, the army straggling behind them. It was a miserable rainy day with occasional thunderstorms: every one, from Joseph to the meanest camp-follower, was in the same state of mental and physical exhaustion. But the one thing which should have finished the whole game was wanting—there was practically no pursuit. Of Wellington’s nine brigades of cavalry only two, those of Grant and Anson, had been seriously engaged on the 21st, and had suffered appreciable losses. The other seven were intact, and had not been in action. It is obvious that they could not have been used to effect in the darkness of the night, and over rough ground and an unknown track. But why an early pursuit at dawn was not taken in hand it is difficult to make out. Even the same promptness which had been shown after Salamanca, and which had been rewarded by the lucky gleanings of Garcia Hernandez, was wanting on this occasion. There was no excuse for the late start of the cavalry, and in consequence it rode as far as Salvatierra without picking up more than a few wounded stragglers and worn-out horses and mules. The French had gone off at dawn, and were many miles ahead. The infantry followed slowly; not only were the men tired by the late marches and their legitimate exertions in the battle, but many thousands had spent the hours of darkness in a surreptitious visit to the field of the convoy, and had come back to the regimental
- 48. bivouac with plunder of all kinds bought at the cost of a sleepless night. Many had not come back at all, but were lying drunk or snoring among the débris of the French camps. Wellington wrote in high wrath to Bathurst, the Minister for War: ‘We started with the army in the highest order, and up to the day of the battle nothing could get on better. But that event has (as usual)[619] annihilated all discipline. The soldiers of the army have got among them about a million sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars, which were got for the military chest. They are incapable of marching in pursuit of the enemy, and are totally knocked up. Rain has come and increased the fatigue, and I am quite sure that we have now out of the ranks double the amount of our loss in the battle, and that we have more stragglers in the pursuit than the enemy have, and never in one day make more than an ordinary march. This is the consequence of the state of discipline in the British army. We may gain the greatest victories, but we shall do no good till we so far alter our system as to force all ranks to do their duty. The new regiments are as usual worst of all. The —— are a disgrace to the name of soldier, in action as elsewhere: I shall take their horses from them, and send the men back to England, if I cannot get the better of them in any other manner[620] .’ This, of course, is one of Wellington’s periodical explosions of general indiscriminating rage against the army which, as he confessed on other occasions, had brought him out of many a dangerous scrape by its sheer hard fighting. He went on a few days later with language that can hardly be forgiven: ‘We have in the Service the scum of the earth as common soldiers, and of late years have been doing everything in our power, both by law and by publication, to relax the discipline by which alone such men can be kept in order. The officers of the lower ranks will not perform the duty required from them to keep the soldiers in order. The non- commissioned officers are (as I have repeatedly stated) as bad as the men. It is really a disgrace to have anything to say to such men as some of our soldiers are[621] .’ The Commander-in-Chief’s own panacea was more shooting, and much more flogging. All this language is comprehensible in a moment of irritation, but was
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