Supervision Concepts and Skill-Building 8th Edition Certo Solutions Manual
1. Visit https://testbankfan.com to download the full version and
explore more testbank or solutions manual
Supervision Concepts and Skill-Building 8th
Edition Certo Solutions Manual
_____ Click the link below to download _____
https://testbankfan.com/product/supervision-concepts-and-
skill-building-8th-edition-certo-solutions-manual/
Explore and download more testbank or solutions manual at testbankfan.com
2. Here are some recommended products that we believe you will be
interested in. You can click the link to download.
Supervision Concepts and Skill-Building 8th Edition Certo
Test Bank
https://testbankfan.com/product/supervision-concepts-and-skill-
building-8th-edition-certo-test-bank/
Supervision Concepts and Skill-Building 10th Edition Certo
Solutions Manual
https://testbankfan.com/product/supervision-concepts-and-skill-
building-10th-edition-certo-solutions-manual/
Supervision Concepts and Skill-Building 9th Edition Samuel
Certo Solutions Manual
https://testbankfan.com/product/supervision-concepts-and-skill-
building-9th-edition-samuel-certo-solutions-manual/
Supervision Concepts and Skill Building 10th Edition Certo
Test Bank
https://testbankfan.com/product/supervision-concepts-and-skill-
building-10th-edition-certo-test-bank/
3. Supervision Concepts and Skill-Building 9th Edition Samuel
Certo Test Bank
https://testbankfan.com/product/supervision-concepts-and-skill-
building-9th-edition-samuel-certo-test-bank/
Modern Management Concepts and Skills 14th Edition Certo
Solutions Manual
https://testbankfan.com/product/modern-management-concepts-and-
skills-14th-edition-certo-solutions-manual/
Human Relations in Organizations Applications and Skill
Building 10th Edition Lussier Solutions Manual
https://testbankfan.com/product/human-relations-in-organizations-
applications-and-skill-building-10th-edition-lussier-solutions-manual/
Supervision Concepts and Practices of Management 12th
Edition Leonard Solutions Manual
https://testbankfan.com/product/supervision-concepts-and-practices-of-
management-12th-edition-leonard-solutions-manual/
Supervision Today 8th Edition Robbins Solutions Manual
https://testbankfan.com/product/supervision-today-8th-edition-robbins-
solutions-manual/
25. controllers of those musical instruments which are generally known as
phonographs, or music boxes, or hand organs.
Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, at the expiration of
thirty-five years from the payment of the first license fee hereinbefore
provided, the Æolian Company shall not be entitled to licenses under
the copyrights thereafter acquired by the publisher, but all licenses
existing under copyrights theretofore acquired by him shall remain in
force until the expiration of the terms of the copyrights under the
terms hereinbefore provided.
During the existence of this contract, after the payment of the license
fee hereunder, the Æolian Company obligates itself to prosecute
diligently, at its own expense and by its own counsel, in the name of
the proprietors of the copyright, all infringers of the rights granted to
it, the Æolian Company.
And the parties hereto mutually covenant and agree that all the
provisions of this agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
successors, executors, administrators, and personal representatives of
both the parties hereto.
In witness whereof the publisher has on the day and year first
hereinabove written hereunto set his hand and seal, and the Æolian
Company has caused its name and corporate seal to be hereunto
affixed by its proper officer thereunto duly authorized.
Chicago
Music
Company,
[seal.]
Platt P. Gibbs.
The Æolian
Company.
[seal.]
By E. S. Votey,
Director.
Signature of publisher witnessed by—
J. F. Bowers,
Pauline Flaherty.
26. Memorandum of agreement made and entered into this 30th day of
April, 1902, by and between Chicago Music Company, of Chicago, in
the State of Illinois, party of the first part, hereinafter called the
publisher, and the Æolian Company, a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Connecticut, and having a place of business in the
city of New York, in the State of New York, party of the second part,
hereinafter called the Æolian Company, witnesseth:
That whereas the parties hereto have, of even date herewith, entered
into an agreement whereby the Æolian Company is to have the
exclusive right for all perforated music sheets intended for use in
controlling automatic musical instruments or machines for playing
musical instruments, in and to the copyrighted musical compositions of
which the publisher is the proprietor or as to which he is the owner of
any rights, and in and to all those other musical compositions which
may hereafter be protected by copyright and the copyrights or rights in
which may be acquired by him; and
Whereas the parties hereto are desirous of entering into a further
agreement with reference to the matters and things expressed in the
above-mentioned agreement of even date herewith;
Now, therefore, the publisher, for and in consideration of the premises
and the sum of $1, lawful money of the United States, to him by the
Æolian Company in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, does hereby covenant and agree that no charge shall
be exacted from or be due from the Æolian Company for the
manufacture or sale by it, or any of its customers, of any perforated
music sheets of either of the kinds aforesaid, for playing any of the
copyrighted musical compositions which are owned or controlled, or
which shall hereafter be owned or controlled in whole or in part by the
publisher, until a decision of the court of last resort in a suit which is to
be instituted against some manufacturer or user, other than the Æolian
Company, of such perforated music sheets for the purpose of testing
the applicability of the United States copyright laws to such perforated
music sheets, and not then unless such decision shall uphold the
applicability of the United States copyright laws to perforated music
sheets of the kinds aforesaid.
And for and in consideration of the premises the Æolian Company
hereby covenants and agrees to pay all proper expenses of conducting
said suit for the purpose of testing the applicability of the United States
27. copyright laws to perforated music sheets of the kinds aforesaid, and
that if the court of last resort shall in such suit decide that the United
States copyright laws are applicable to such perforated music sheets,
then and in such case and from that time forward the Æolian Company
will keep books of account, render statements, and pay royalties, as
provided by the aforesaid agreement of even date herewith, but shall
be free from obligation to make payments for the past.
And it is mutually understood and agreed by the parties hereto that
neither party hereto is to be obligated in any way by any of the
provisions of this agreement, or of the aforesaid agreement of even
date herewith, until the Æolian Company shall notify the publisher that
a number of copyright owners, satisfactory to the Æolian Company,
have made similar agreements with said company.
And the parties hereto mutually covenant and agree that all the
provisions of this agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
successors, executors, administrators, and personal representatives of
both the parties hereto.
In witness whereof the publisher has on the day and year first
hereinabove written hereunto set his hand and seal, and the Æolian
Company has caused its name and corporate seal to be hereunto
affixed by its proper officer thereunto duly authorized.
Chicago
Music
Company,
[seal.]
Platt P. Gibbs,
President.
The Æolian
Company.
[seal.]
By E. S. Votey,
Director.
Witnessed by—
Pauline Flaherty.
J. F. Bowers.
28. The Æolian Company,
New York, May 5, 1902.
The Chicago Music Company,
Music Publishers, Chicago, Ill.
Dear Sirs: Pursuant to the provision of the agreement granting us the
exclusive right under your United States copyrights for all perforated
music sheets intended for use in controlling automatic musical
instruments and machines for playing musical instruments, we hereby
notify you that a number of copyright owners satisfactory to us have
made with us agreements similar to our agreement with you. From this
date, therefore, our agreement goes into effect.
Looking forward to profitable and pleasant business relations, we
remain,
Yours, truly,
The Æolian Company,
E. R. Perkins,
General Manager.
Mr. Chaney. I would like to have this gentleman who has just spoken
to us (Mr. Low) submit a typewritten statement relating to the
various sections in the bill to which he objects, and setting out his
objections.
The Acting Chairman. Without objection that privilege will be accorded
to him.
Washington, D.C., June, 12, 1906.
To the Committees on Patents of the United States Senate and House
of Representatives.
Gentlemen: I file herewith in typewriting specific suggestions for the
amendment of the said bill, in pursuance of the resolution of the joint
committee, passed on the 8th day of June, 1906; these remarks or this
29. statement to follow in the record the exhibit contracts which I
presented to your committees at that time.
Very respectfully,
H. N. Low.
SUGGESTIONS AS TO THE AMENDMENT OF THE PENDING
COPYRIGHT BILL.
To the Committees on Patents of United States Senate and House of
Representatives.
Gentlemen: If the allegations which have been made before the
committee, and not denied, and which can not be successfully denied,
that there has been effected a combination in the nature of a trust to
secure practically all of the commercial business of this country in the
manufacture, sale, and use of mechanical records or controllers for the
production of music, etc., by mechanical means are true, then a very
serious situation confronts you.
The agencies relied upon to make said combination of publishers and
manufacturers successful are—
1. The contracts which have heretofore been entered into in
anticipation of this legislation, four of which contracts have been filed
in connection with the remarks of Mr. O'Connell and of Mr. Low.
2. New legislation of the character proposed by this copyright bill and
especially by paragraph (g) of section 1.
In one of the contracts referred to, dated April 30, 1902, between the
Chicago Music Company and the Æolian Company, it is provided—
"During the existence of this contract, after the payment of the license
fee thereunder, the Æolian Company obligates itself to prosecute
diligently, at its own expense and by its own counsel, in the name of
the proprietors of the copyright, all infringers of the rights granted to
it, the Æolian Company."
In the other contract of the same date and between the same parties,
a facsimile of which has been filed with your committees, it is provided
—
30. "That no charge shall be exacted from or be due from the Æolian
Company * * * until a decision of the court of last resort in a suit
which is to be instituted against some manufacturer or user other than
the Æolian Company of such perforated music sheets for the purpose
of testing the applicability of the United States copyright laws to
perforated music sheets, and not then unless such decision shall
uphold the applicability of the United States copyright laws to
perforated music sheets of the kinds aforesaid. And for and in
consideration of the premises the Æolian Company hereby covenants
and agrees to pay all proper expenses of conducting said suit," etc.
Such test suit was instituted entitled The White-Smith Music Publishing
Company v. The Apollo Company by and at the expense of the Æolian
Company, the real complainant, and decided against the Æolian
Company, the holding of the court of last resort, the United States
circuit court of appeals for the second circuit, being that such
perforated music sheets were not infringements of the copyrights of
the nominal complainant.
Although defeated so far, it is not reasonable to suppose that the
combination of the Æolian Company and its "number of copyright
owners satisfactory" to that company would rest without further effort
to make effective for profit the agreement into which they had
entered. The only remaining means was by new legislation, and I
submit that the aim and end of the pending bill is to be a substitute for
that favorable decision of a court of last resort which the Æolian
Company failed after strenuous efforts to obtain.
Certain provisions of the bill here and there—for example, the
lengthening of the copyright term—have attracted to the support of
the bill various interests who are totally indifferent one way or the
other to the question of perforated music sheets or phonographic
records, but I submit that these other provisions are more or less
unimportant, do not improve the present law, and most of them would
never have been heard of except for the desire of the special interests
above referred to to obtain new legislation as to the mechanical
producers of sound.
In the spring of 1904 attempt was made by this same combination to
obtain the legislation desired by the insertion of a specific provision in
the law to substantially this effect:
31. "Provided, That in the case of a musical composition authors or their
assigns shall have the exclusive right to use said copyright musical
compositions in the form of perforated rolls for playing attachments,
copyright on which music rolls may be obtained by said author or his
assigns in the same manner as now provided by law for copyright on
musical compositions."
I have not been able to discover that this proposed amendment of the
law was ever introduced in the form of a bill into either House of
Congress. It may have been. But I am informed that it was formulated
for the purpose of introduction as a bill in Congress in the terms above
set forth.
It was found impracticable to obtain the new legislation in such specific
and undisguised form, and resort is now had to a pretended revision or
codification of the entire copyright law, for which there is not the
slightest necessity and which will inevitably give rise to a great amount
of litigation before the meaning and effect of the words used in the
new law can be legally understood, for the sole purpose that the
Æolian Company may have with its contracting publishers and
copyright owners "pleasant and profitable business relations," as
expressed in the notice from the Æolian Company to the contracting
publishers, dated May 5, 1902 (a facsimile of which I have filed with
your committees). This notice states "a number a copyright owners
satisfactory to us have made with us agreements similar to our
agreement with you."
Although the matters above referred to have been opened up before
your committee in the remarks of Mr. O'Connell, I have felt it my duty
to give my view of the matter in brief form, both in confirmation of
what Mr. O'Connell has said, and for the purpose of indicating that the
bill itself and proposed amendments thereto must be scrutinized by
your committees with the greatest care before it is reported.
As to amendments of the bill, I see no alternative to the striking out of
paragraph (g) of section 1. If the combine exists as is alleged it is
obvious that the patents, inventions, machinery, and plants of all those
manufacturers of mechanical records who are not inside of the
combine, that is to say, of all the manufacturers of perforated music
rolls excepting the Æolian Company, and all the manufacturers of
talking machines and records excepting the two companies who are
alleged to be members of another combination or trust for the
32. exclusive manufacture of such machines, and of all without exception
of the manufacturers and users and sellers of pianos and organs which
are operated by perforated music sheets, will be rendered practically
useless, the owners of such manufactories will be put out of business,
and their workmen will have their field of labor and bread taken away.
If this will be the result of the bill, and especially of the paragraph
section 1 (g), the bill is most unjust and class legislation of the worst
type. And that is just what the bill is intended to be, but I am thankful
that its object can not be concealed.
It is no answer to the above objection to say that the bill provides only
for the future. So do the contracts between the Æolian Company and
its "satisfactory number" of copyright owners. The said contracts are
unlimited as to time, having been signed by the great bulk of the trade
(meaning thereby almost all of the great music publishers of the
country), they leave outside of the combination only small publishers,
and the contracts provide as follows:
"Now, therefore, the publisher, for and in consideration of the
premises, and of the sum of one dollar, lawful money of the United
States, to him paid by the Æolian Company, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, and for and in consideration of the true and faithful
performance by the Æolian Company of its covenants hereinafter
made, does hereby sell, assign, transfer, and set over unto the Æolian
Company the exclusive right for all perforated music sheets of the
kinds aforesaid in and to all the copyrighted compositions of which the
publisher is the proprietor, or in the case in which he is the owner of
any less rights, to the extent of said rights, and does hereby covenant
and agree with the Æolian Company to give and secure to it the
exclusive right in like manner for all perforated music sheets of the
kinds aforesaid in and to all those other musical compositions which
may hereafter be protected by copyright, and the copyrights or rights
in which may be acquired by the publisher, except that if the Æolian
Company do not accept any piece offered them within three months
after said offer then the publisher may be at liberty to dispose of the
same otherwise."
From the foregoing we arrive at this conclusion, and there is no escape
from it, that there is in existence a combination whose design and
effect upon very important business and laboring interests of this
country will be injurious and unlawful if the bill should be passed as
33. proposed, which combination is of unlimited duration as to time, and
which combination will control, for the purpose of producing perforated
music sheets, all the copyrights or rights of production hereafter for
such unlimited duration of time which may be acquired by the great
bulk of the trade (music publishers) of this country. Your committees
will see, therefore, that the bill provides for the profitable future of the
members of the combination without limit as to time.
The result of this will be threefold:
1. The Æolian Company will secure for itself practically the entire
business of the United States in the manufacture of perforated music
sheets, and will be in a position to dictate the prices for such sheets to
the trade, including the manufacturers and sellers of pianos and
organs operated by said sheets as well as the sellers of the sheets
alone, and to raise the price to the public generally for such sheets.
2. The publishers who have contracted with the Æolian Company to
give the latter all the rights which the publishers have or may have in
copyrighted music will receive from the Æolian Company certain
royalties, which royalties will either be clear profit to the publishers or
will be less than any extra royalties which the publishers will pay to the
composers. It is practically certain that in the long run the composers
will get no more royalties than they now receive, for the composer, for
his own advantage in obtaining a large sale of his works, must go to
one of the large publishers of music, and will be compelled by such
publisher to accept in full payment of his copyright just such a royalty
as he now gets under existing law, and all the extra profits which can
be mulcted from the public under section 1 (g) of the bill will be
divided between the members of the combination.
3. The public will foot all the bills without any more advantage to
themselves than they have under existing law.
The assertion made in support of the bill, that it relates only to the
future, is completely met with the reply that the bill does not provide
for the future of anyone who is outside of the combination.
If the existing copyright law is bad or insufficient and anything like a
revision of or a codification of the copyright statutes in a new law must
be made in the interests of justice, let it be done. But let care be taken
that you do not do injustice. If a new copyright law is to be enacted,
and the pending bill is to be the foundation of such a law, the practical
34. question is, how is it to be amended in order that it may not cause the
evils above referred to.
Mr. Putnam in his introductory remarks indicated that your committees
would find evidences of "selfishness" in the bill. He is undoubtedly
right. It is, however, much more far reaching in this respect than Mr.
Putnam had any idea of. It is extraordinary that the conference which
advised Mr. Putnam adopted such radical legislation as is proposed in
section 1 (g) without inviting the attendance at the conference of a
single person interested adversely to this legislation. In fact it would
appear that such persons were purposely kept in ignorance of what the
conference was doing.
But I do not think that the selfishness of the interests which are
opposed to the said new legislation, and who are now fully aware that
it is proposed, extends beyond a rightful effort to prevent their own
extinction.
In my opinion the manufacturers of mechanical music controllers or
records are willing to pay a fair and reasonable royalty to composers of
music which they use, or to other owners of copyrights for musical
compositions, but this must be provided for otherwise than by an
enactment which will give rise to the evils attending the said
paragraph, section 1 (g) of the bill. That paragraph should be
eliminated and other parts of the bill corresponding with this
paragraph, and there should be substituted for it, probably at some
other more appropriate part of the bill, a provision like the following:
"Any person, firm, or corporation who shall make, use, or sell, or let
for hire, any device, contrivance, or appliance especially adapted in any
manner whatsoever to reproduce to the ear the whole or any material
part of any work published and copyrighted after this act shall have
gone into effect, shall pay to the author or composer of such work a
fair and reasonable royalty to be determined according to the market
price for such or similar royalties.
"And the author or composer of the work so used shall have the same
remedies for the recovery from such person, firm, or corporation of
such royalty or royalties as is provided in this act for the recovery of
damages for the infringement of copyright.
"And after the amount of such royalty or royalties shall have been
ascertained and become due by express contract between the parties,
35. or shall have been ascertained and adjudged to be due by any circuit
court of the United States, and is not paid, then the author or
composer shall have the same remedy by injunction against such
person, firm, or corporation, as is provided in this act in cases of the
infringement of a copyright."
It is believed that such an enactment would give to the composers
who have appeared before your committees all the rights and
remuneration which is due them, and at the same time will defeat the
unlawful combination which exists and is hereinbefore referred to.
I believe that it will not be at all difficult to arrive at the just value of
such royalties, and in almost every instance they would be settled by
contract between the owner of the copyright and the maker of the
mechanical appliance for producing the music. In the case of a
composition of any value the composer will dispose of it for an agreed-
upon royalty to some music publisher in the usual way. He will then
dispose of his right to the composition for reproduction by mechanical
means to some manufacturer of such mechanical means for a royalty
agreed upon. If any other such manufacturer, not in contractual
relations with the owner of the copyright thereafter makes use of the
composition, the amount of the royalty for which the owner of the
copyright has contracted will aid in determining what royalty is fair and
reasonable and is to be paid by such other manufacturer. I suppose
that in some cases litigation may be necessary to arrive at the amount
of the royalty, but not more than is inevitable in human affairs. It is not
to be supposed that a manufacturer will resist the payment of the
royalty for a musical composition which he has utilized and pay to the
complainant the cost of litigation rather than make a fair settlement
upon terms which are well settled, or will soon become well settled
under this act, in the trade.
A provision like that above suggested is analogous to, and appears to
be quite similar in its effect to, the compulsory-license provision of
some of the foreign statutes. For instance, in the law of the Dominion
of Canada, lately enacted, in 1903, we have the following:
"7. (a) Any person, at any time while a patent continues in force, may
apply to the commissioner, by petition, for a license to make,
construct, use, and sell the patented invention, and the commissioner
shall, subject to general rules to be made for carrying out this section,
hear the person applying and the owner of the patent, and if he is
36. satisfied that the reasonable requirements of the public in reference to
the invention have not been satisfied by reason of the neglect or
refusal of the patentee or his legal representatives to make, construct,
use, or sell the invention, or to grant licenses to others on reasonable
terms to make, construct, use, or sell the same, may make an order
under his hand and seal of the patent office requiring the owner of the
patent to grant a license to the person applying therefor, in such form
and upon such terms as to the duration of the license, the amount of
the royalties, security for payment, and otherwise, as the
commissioner, having regard to the nature of the invention and the
circumstances of the case, deems just."
I instance this foreign law to show that under a system of
jurisprudence exactly like our own it has been found best to limit rights
heretofore granted in the most exclusive form, and provide for
compelling the owners of such rights to deal reasonably and fairly with
the public. This Canadian law relates to exclusive rights to inventions
under letters patent, where the ascertainment of what is a just license
fee or royalty is always more or less complicated and difficult. In the
case of copyrights much simpler conditions prevail, the value of
musical compositions are more easily measurable and there would be
far less difficulty in arriving at a fair royalty by a contract between the
parties or by arbitration, or, in the last resort, by the judgment of a
circuit court. I have mentioned a circuit court merely for purpose of
illustration. It would probably be more convenient to confer this
jurisdiction on a United States district court.
It seems to me that under the conditions which confront your
committees, there being on the one hand a desire to recompense
musical composers, and on the other hand the necessity of defeating
the unlawful combination which will have entrenched itself most
securely if the bill should become a law including the objectionable
paragraph which I have discussed, an amendment of the bill in some
such way as above indicated is inevitable.
SPECIFIC AMENDMENT OF THE BILL.
I submit that in the interest of the public it is far better to correct any
evil in the existing copyright law, which was pretty thoroughly revised
not very many years ago, than to pass a revision of the law which uses
so many new terms and words which have not received judicial
37. interpretation, and which bill evidently requires itself revision and
amendment in almost every section. It requires such amendment in
detail in the first place to eliminate those matters which have been
embodied in the bill for the purpose of most thoroughly carrying out
the provisions of section 1 (g), upon which I have already commented.
If it is necessary to eliminate the paragraph specified, it is also
necessary to revise the bill in many other sections where
corresponding matter appears.
In the second place, the bill requires amendment as to the term of
copyright proposed, as to the damages for infringement, as to the
effect which the certificate of the filing of the entry shall have, as to
the way in which and the terms in which the notice of copyright shall
be given, and as to broad and uncertain expressions which are found
in many sections, which can have no good effect and which will only
be productive of uncertainty, confusion, and litigation.
I am informed that a substitute bill will be submitted to your
committees in the nature of specific amendments to the existing law to
cure any evils which may exist therein and, among other things, to
give reasonable compensation to authors or composers for the use of
their works by the manufacturers of automatic mechanical reproducing
devices. I believe that it will be preferable to thus amend existing law,
leaving the great bulk of the law in those words and terms and
provisions which there is no necessity of changing and which have
become well understood by years of judicial interpretation.
I will however proceed to discuss the pending bill and point out the
specific amendments which appear to be necessary in the interest of
the public, both as to clearness and certainty of expression and as to
the relative just claims of the author and of the public.
Section 1, paragraph (f), should be amended by striking out the words
"or for purpose" and the remainder of line 10 and to the end of line
13, and by inserting the words "or to make any variation, adaptation,
or arrangement thereof."
It will be seen that to retain this paragraph in the present form would
be equivalent to retaining paragraph (g), because it was the intent in
framing paragraph (f) to have the word "performance" cover the
operation of an automatic mechanical device; and the words
"arrangement or setting" were intended to include the production of a
perforated music sheet.
38. Paragraph (g) should be eliminated for the reasons already given.
Paragraph (h) should be amended by inserting at the end thereof the
words "amounting to a copy thereof."
It is obvious that this paragraph is altogether too broad and uncertain.
The paragraph should only protect against infringements which are
copies, and it must be left to judicial determination in the future as it
has been in the past to say whether or not any particular abridgment,
adaptation, or arrangement is a copy within the meaning of the law.
Section 2 appears to be substantially similar to section 36, and one of
the two sections should be eliminated or they should be consolidated.
Section 3 should be amended by striking out "the copyrightable" and
the rest of line 4, and to the end of line 8, and substituting "matters
copyrighted after this act goes into effect."
So amended the section does not appear to be necessary in the bill,
but on the other hand in its present form it will be seen at once that it
is retroactive and very injurious, making in effect certain matters
infringements of the copyright granted under existing law which are
not infringements now and are within the public domain.
Section 4 is absurdly broad and indefinite and covers pastry or other
works of a cook. It should be amended by inserting the word "literary"
before the word "works," or by substituting the word "writings," which
is used in the Constitution and is the preferable word to employ, or by
inserting after the word "works" the words "mentioned in section 5
hereof."
In section 5 paragraph (h) should be eliminated. This paragraph was
intended to cover perforated music sheets or talking-machine records
which are to be otherwise provided for. As to other matters it may be
said that if the reproductions referred to are copies of things already
copyrighted, they are infringements; if not copies, they are works of
art in themselves under paragraph (g) of section 5.
On page 4 "The above specifications shall," in line 8 and line 9 and line
10, to and including the words "nor shall," should be canceled, and in
line 11, after "classification," insert the words "shall not."
It is obvious that an unlimited subject-matter of copyright is highly
undesirable from the standpoint of the public.
39. In section 6, line 15, after "compilations," insert "or," and in the same
line strike out "or other versions." These words are plainly unnecessary
and are intended to have a capability of elastic interpretation unduly
favorable to the author and prejudicial to the public.
In section 7, paragraph (b), the words "of a work" and the rest of line
6 and lines 7, 8, and 9, to and including the word "text," should be
canceled. If a work has fallen into the public domain, even though
subsequent to 1891, it would be retroactive to now bring it within the
copyright law and deprive the public of its use.
Section 8, paragraph (a), in the interest of clearness should be
amended by striking out the words "or cotemporaneously" in line 21,
and by inserting after line 22 "shall publish his work within the limits of
the United States cotemporaneously with its first publication
elsewhere; or."
Section 9 should be amended by inserting after the word "Act," line 14,
the words "and by the performance of the other conditions precedent
mentioned in the act, and by entry of the title of the work as
hereinafter provided." It is plain that a person does not "secure"
copyright by the publication with notice, which is all that is mentioned
in this section.
Section 10, line 24, the words "and such registration shall be prima
facie evidence to ownership" should be struck out. There does not
appear to be sufficient reason for giving a mere assertion of claim the
prima facie standing of absolute ownership.
It would put upon the true author, whose production had been entered
for copyright by another person, the burden of proof, and this section
if not amended would be very susceptible of fraudulent use. I am
inclined to think that it is advisable, certainly if the copyright entry is to
be prima facie evidence of ownership, to require that the claim be
verified before it is presented to the Librarian, and that false swearing
to such a claim shall subject the affiant to the penalty for perjury.
Section 13, page 9, line 19, "and all his rights and privileges under said
copyright shall thereafter be forfeited" should be canceled. These
words might lead to the unjust forfeiture of a copyright if the false
affidavit were made by the agent or printer without the knowledge of
the author or owner. Also the words seem superfluous. If a condition
precedent has not been performed, the right is lost by operation of law
40. without these words. To insert them implies that the provisions of
section 13 are not conditions precedent to obtaining a valid copyright.
In line 24 the word "and" should be substituted for "or;" and at the
end of line 25 the words "if it has been published" should be inserted.
It is very desirable that all the facts upon which the copyright depends
should be clearly stated when possible.
Section 14, line 2, the words "or the," and the following matter down
to, but not including the word "accompanied," in lines 5 and 6, should
be canceled, and the words "with the date of entry of the copyright"
should be inserted.
The notice of copyright must be clear and in such usual words, not
signs which hardly anyone will understand, as are intelligible to the
public. I consider it highly important that the date of copyright,
including the year, month, and day, should appear in the notice, and
also the name of the person by whom the original entry is made in the
copyright office. The indexes will be kept by these names, and any
subsequent entry or transfer should always be indexed under such
original names. These remarks apply also to sections 44 and 45
hereafter considered.
In line 10, after "some," the words "uncovered and" should be
inserted.
In line 13, after "name," the words "as in the original entry of
copyright" should be inserted.
Line 19, the word "its" should be changed to "the," and in line 20,
after "following," the words "of each separate volume" should be
inserted; and in line 24, after "accessible," the word "uncovered"
should be inserted.
Page 11, line 3 should be stricken out or amended to cure its
indefiniteness as to the meaning of the word "composite."
In line 4, the word "musical" should be changed to "musical-dramatic."
It has never been intended by the copyright law to use the word
"performance," excepting of such works as are only useful when
represented or "performed" in a dramatic sense. The word "dramatic"
has not always seemed sufficiently broad, and the words "musical
composition" have often been added to include operas, oratorios, and
41. musical works that are not purely dramatic, and yet are partially so. It
is submitted that it has never been the intention of the law to make
the mere singing of a song from copyrighted notes that have been paid
for, or the playing of music, infringements of copyright, and it is
believed that this section will carry out the full intent of the law if the
word "dramatic" be coupled with the word "musical," as above
indicated.
In view of the use of the word "performance" in other parts of this bill
for the purpose of including the use of automatic mechanical devices,
it should be made clear that the word "performance," in line 5, has
nothing beyond its ordinary significance. I suggest that this can best
be attained by striking out the word "performance," in line 5, and
inserting the word "representation."
Section 15 should be amended by striking out the words "if, by reason"
and the rest of line 11 and lines 12 and 13.
It is plain that these words in the bill leave an open door for free
publication which brings a work within the public domain, and
subsequent monopoly of the work upon a mere allegation of error. The
Librarian has not the facilities or legal machinery to try such question
of error, and it should be left to the courts to determine whether there
has been an error or omission, and whether by reason thereof any
condition precedent for a valid copyright has been left unperformed.
Page 12, line 13, the words "bulk of the" should be stricken out. These
words are uncertain and would allow the proprietor to omit the notice
from 49 per cent of the edition. This would clearly amount to
insufficient notice to the public and could be made the instrument of
fraud. Line 14 and the remainder of the section are entirely sufficient
for the purpose without the words "bulk of the."
Section 17, line 22, the words "be extended to" should be canceled,
and at the end of line 24 the words "such term beginning with the date
of filing the request for the reservation of the copyright," should be
inserted.
There appears to be no reason for granting more than the specific
term, which the law will provide, in the case which section 17 is
intended to cover.
Section 18 relates to the term of copyright.
42. The whole system provided in the Constitution is for the benefit of the
public, the intent is to accumulate for the use of the public, matters of
literature, art, and invention. The stimulus in the way of a reward
given by the public in return for these matters is subsidiary to the main
object. The reward consists in "securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries." The objection to the term provided in the bill is that it is
unconscionably long. It may easily amount to a hundred years or
more, during which time the public will have paid tribute to the author
for something which will be so old fashioned as to be useless to the
public when the copyright has expired.
The word "limited" in the Constitution shows that the framers of that
instrument had in mind to secure for the public certain benefits after
the time had expired. To provide such a long copyright term as the
authors seek to obtain in this bill would practically defeat the object of
the said clause of the Constitution and the intention of its framers. I
submit that it could only be considered for a moment on the ground
that it is a matter of indifference to the public because the works so to
be protected are entirely useless in themselves. I do not think there is
any sufficient reason for lengthening the term—twenty-eight years with
an extension of fourteen years—provided by existing law.
In another respect this section is bad in making the length of the term
dependent upon an event which is uncertain in advance, and of which
no public accessible record may be made when it occurs; that is to say,
the death of the author. I see no reason why a young author should
have longer protection than an old author, and the provision would
leave open to publishers a door of fraud by securing copyrights for the
productions of old authors in the name of some younger person.
The objection to a long term especially applies to music which depends
almost entirely upon fashion and taste, and these soon change and the
music becomes useless to the public. In my opinion, purely musical
productions should have a relatively short term of copyright, but I have
not considered the subject sufficiently to be justified in fixing any
precise number of years.
But as to all copyrights it is my conviction that the interest of the
public unquestionably requires that they be granted for a definite term
of years, and that, if an extension is provided, the extension should be
for a fixed and definite time. It is only this which enables the public to
43. know, upon reading a notice of the copyright, when the monopoly will
terminate.
If for any reason it should seem wiser to make the term dependent in
its length upon the death of an author, then the continuance of the
copyright should depend upon definite evidence being filed in the
copyright office showing positively the date of death.
At the end of section 18, page 15, line 8, after "name," the words
"Provided, That in such published work the notice of copyright be
given as required in this act" should be inserted.
Section 19 should, in my opinion, be canceled. It is retroactive in its
character. Definite contracts have been entered into between authors
and the public with respect to matters already copyrighted, and it
would impair the obligations of those contracts to provide any renewal
or extension of such copyrights. It has already been agreed between
such authors and the public at what time their copyrighted works shall
pass into the public domain.
Recurring to lines 3 and 4 of page 15, I submit that they should be
canceled, so that the copyright shall extend for a definite number of
years after the date of original entry. There seems to be no sound
reason for giving an author a longer copyright, longer by a year, if he
makes his entry on the 2d of January, than another author will have
who enters his copyright on the 30th of December preceding.
Section 21 should be canceled, as it gives, in effect, copyright
privileges where the conditions precedent required by this act have not
been performed.
Section 22, line 14, is too broadly worded for the benefit of the authors
of this bill, and the word "reproduction" should be canceled and the
words "copy or representation" should be inserted.
In lines 22 and 23 the words "such fraudulent" and the rest of the
section should be canceled, and the words "copies which are
infringements is hereby prohibited."
Section 23, paragraph (b), should be canceled and made to read:
"(b) To pay to the copyright proprietor damages for the infringement."
44. As the paragraph now reads, it gives double damages. The proprietor
should receive damages which will be judicially ascertained in the
ordinary way, either by estimating the profits which the infringer has
made, or by estimating the damages or loss which the proprietor has
suffered. If there is no actual damage it should not be provided that
$250 should be recovered, and if the damages are greater than $5,000
there is no sound reason for limiting them to the latter sum.
For the same reasons lines 18 to 24 on page 17, and lines 1 to 7 on
page 18, should be canceled.
Paragraph (c) on page 18 should be amended by striking out the word
"alleged", in line 10, and inserting "shown to the satisfaction of the
court."
Section 25 should be amended by inserting at the end of line 23 "and
with intent to deprive the owner of the copyright of lawful profit."
The word "willfully" does not appear to make the section sufficiently
clear, and it is submitted that an infringer should not be held guilty of a
misdemeanor unless he have the intent specified in the suggested
amendment.
After line 6 on page 19 the following words should be inserted:
"Provided, That any person who performs the alleged infringing acts
under a mistake of fact or law shall not be deemed to be a willful
infringer."
The alleged infringer may have good reason to think that conditions
precedent have not been performed and that no valid copyright exists;
he may be under a mistake as to when the term expires; he may be of
the opinion that what he has produced is not a copy, and he may
perform his alleged infringing acts under advice of counsel. It does not
seem proper under such circumstances to hold him to be a willful
infringer and guilty of a misdemeanor.
In line 14 of page 19, after "knowingly," the following words should be
inserted: "and with fraudulent intent."
Page 20, line 9, before "publish," the following words should be
inserted: "send notice of such seizure by registered mail to the person
to whom the article seized is consigned or directed, and shall."
45. Section 27, line 24, after "first," there should be inserted the words
"mailing or".
Section 29, lines 6 and 7, the words "supposed to contain" should be
canceled, and the words "which contains" should be inserted. It is
unreasonable to permit a postmaster to detain a package upon a mere
supposition.
In line 9, before "mail," there should be inserted the word "registered."
Page 24, lines 16 and 17, the words "not more than one copy at one
time" should be canceled, and in line 17 the word "or" changed to
"and."
At the end of section 32 the following should be inserted:
"Provided, That the owner of the right to perform any copyrighted
work by means of any automatic mechanical device shall not have the
remedy by injunction herein provided until the amount of fair and
reasonable royalty for such use shall have been ascertained by express
contract between the parties, or by judgment of a court, and shall be
due and not paid."
Section 35, line 8, the word "full" should be canceled; and in line 9,
after "allowed," there should be inserted "according to the practice of
law and equity."
In many cases it might be inequitable to allow costs, and the court
should be left free to exercise its legal discretion.
Section 36, line 11, the word "common" should be inserted before the
word "law." This section should be compared with section 2, and they
should be consolidated, or preferably they should both be omitted as
unnecessary and as being outside of the purview of this act.
Section 38, line 23, there should be inserted after the word "musical"
the word "-dramatic."
Line 25, the word "make" should be canceled and there should be
inserted the words "produce by."
It is evident that the right to make belongs to the patentee of the
device.
46. Page 30, line 1, the words "ninety days" should be changed to "three
months" as more convenient and as excluding any contention whether
or not Sundays and holidays are included in the ninety days. The
similar provision of the patent law reads "three months."
Section 44 should be amended by inserting after "assignment", in line
12, the words: "and index the same under the name of the person by
whom the original entry of copyright was made."
Section 45 should be amended so that lines 21 to 23 shall read as
follows: "signee shall in all cases give in the statutory notice of
copyright prescribed by this act the name of the person by whom the
original entry of the copyright was made."
Without this provision the public will be put to great inconvenience in
finding the original entry on which the copyright depends. The
copyright notice should be of a clear and specific character so as to
cause the public as little inconvenience and uncertainty as possible.
Paragraph 52 should be amended by striking out "provided" and all
thereafter to the end of the paragraph in lines 2 and 3 of page 33. This
provision is altogether too broad and the courts should be left free to
determine what are conditions precedent to a valid copyright and
whether there has been any breach of them.
Section 54 should be amended by striking out the words "the date of
the" and inserting "that the affidavit states the dates of;" and in line 20
cancel the words "as stated in the said affidavit," and insert the words
"which dates shall be given in the certificate."
Section 55 provides for the destruction of card catalogues. The wisdom
of this provision is very doubtful. A single card catalogue for each class
of copyright work would save an immense amount of time and error to
the public, and to the Librarian in making searches. Instead of
periodically destroying card catalogues, they should be added to and
preserved. As soon as they are destroyed, instead of being able to
make one examination of one part of the card catalogue, the public
will be compelled to examine a great number of periodically made
printed indexes. I therefore suggest that the words "and thereupon",
to and including the word "intervals," lines 9 to 12 of page 34, be
canceled.
47. As to the destruction of articles provided for in section 59, I suggest
that the section be amended by inserting in line 10 of page 36, after
the word "provided," the words "and with the authorization of the
Committees on Patents of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives."
Section 63 should be amended by striking out the words "sold or
placed on" in line 7, and by inserting "made public, or sold publicly or
privately, or placed on public."
As to section 64, I have to suggest that the present bill is supposed to
be what may be termed a codification of the copyright law; if so,
section 4966 of the Revised Statutes has no proper place outside of
this bill. If there is anything desirable in the section it should be
embodied in the bill at the proper place, and in doing so it should be
made plain that the word "musical" where it first occurs in section
4966 means "musical-dramatic," meaning thereby a composition which
is dependent upon representation or performance in the dramatic
sense.
I do not believe that the people of this country are aware of what the
musical composers and publishers are attempting to do in the way of
securing monopolies.
If the public were aware that these persons, after having secured
copyrights giving them the exclusive right of copying and publishing
music for sale, and after having sold the copies of such music are
attempting to secure laws by which they may impose further taxes
upon the public for the use of such music by singing or playing, and
are seeking to provide fines and terms of imprisonment for those
members of the public who do not pay the additional tax, there will be
such a storm of protests before your committees as could not be
disregarded.
Section 4966 of the Revised Statutes should be repealed altogether,
and so far as its provisions appear in this bill they should be limited to
musical-dramatic compositions, and the provisions for damages other
than actual damages and for imprisonment should be absolutely
eliminated.
Very respectfully,
H. N. Low.
48. The Acting Chairman. Now we will hear the gentleman who represents
the talking machines.
STATEMENT OF S. T. CAMERON, ESQ., REPRESENTING THE
AMERICAN GRAPHOPHONE COMPANY, OF NEW YORK CITY.
Mr. Cameron. Gentlemen, the first objection we have to the bill is, in
our mind, the most serious one, and one which has been several
times touched upon heretofore, so that I shall not attempt to go into
any very great detail in discussing it here, but shall simply call
attention to the fact that we object to it, and point out to you why,
in connection with our particular business, it is especially important.
If you will turn to section 4 you will find that it reads:
That the works for which copyright may be secured under this act shall
include all the works of an author.
Our position is that this is in direct contravention of the Constitution.
If you will substitute in that clause the word used by the
Constitution, and say that the works for which copyright may be
secured under this act shall include all the "writings" of an author,
then we do not object to that section.
Now, if you will take certain other sections of this bill, with that
change made in section 4, and attempt to read them, particularly
where the word "reproduce" occurs, or the word "reproductions"
occurs, you will see the importance of it to us.
Take, for example, section 3, immediately above:
That the copyright provided by this act shall extend to and protect all
the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted, any and
all reproductions or copies thereof.
49. If you read that word "reproductions" with the word "works" in
section 4 changed to "writings," reproduction means a very different
thing.
If you will turn to section 18, on page 14, subclause b, you will find
this language:
Any arrangement or reproduction in some new form of a musical
composition.
Mr. Chaney. What do you understand the word "works" to mean in
section 4?
Mr. Cameron. It may mean anything that is reduced to writing, or that
is not reduced to writing. It may be an oral speech that is absolutely
wafted upon the winds of the air and never gets into permanent
form. In proof of that we go to section 5, line 20: "Oral lectures,
sermons, addresses."
The talking-machine art stands in a somewhat different position
from that of the perforated music roll. You take a sheet of music and
you have Sousa's or any other band play that music into the horn of
an instrument, a patented apparatus. That machine engraves lines
corresponding to what? To the sound waves produced by the band
or the voice of the performer on the wax or other tablet.
Now, if you make that word "works" read "writings," as I
understand, as the Supreme Court has interpreted the word
"writings," it means this, in its broadest signification: That the idea
of the author has been recorded in some tangible form, in such a
way that another, through the eye, may have the idea of the author
impressed upon his brain. That may be a painting; it may be the
work of an artist. I think the Supreme Court has included a painting
under that term because of that very fact, that the idea of the artist
was recorded in some tangible form and, through the eye of the
beholder, the idea of the artist was conveyed to the brain of the
50. beholder. That is what a writing is, as I understand it, within the
meaning of the Constitution.
Mr. Chaney. The effect of your argument is, then, to limit the word to
something that can be read by anybody?
Mr. Cameron. Not necessarily by anybody.
Mr. Currier. But by somebody?
Mr. Cameron. Yes. I can not read Sanskrit.
Mr. Chaney. I mean to say, that can be read by persons
understanding the same language?
Mr. Cameron. Yes; something that is capable of conveying to the
reader, if you may call him such, the idea of the author.
Mr. Chaney. And in that respect it would cut out the music-roll
proposition altogether?
Mr. Cameron. As my predecessor has told you, there is a dispute in
regard to that, and I am not qualified to state. As far as I have been
able to analyze the evidence, the preponderance is against the idea
that the music roll can be read. But I do know this: There is a
graphophone record of the disk form [exhibiting record to the
committee]. There is a graphophone record of the cylinder form
[exhibiting record]. I defy anyone—I defy Mr. Sousa to read that and
tell whether it is one of his marches or whether it is a speech of a
Member of Congress. [Laughter.]
Mr. Chaney. They are often very much alike. [Laughter.]
Mr. Cameron. They are both musical. [Laughter.]
Mr. McGavin. They are alike in volume of sound. [Laughter.]
51. Mr. Cameron. I am not making this statement theoretically nor as a
lawyer. I make it as an expert in this particular art. I have spent
months and months of time with the microscope myself striving to
do that very thing, and I know it can not be done.
Now, let us go one step further. What is it that makes that
graphophonic record valuable? I can take Mr. Sousa's score and I
can select some person, some alleged musician in this audience, and
I can hand him a graphophone and tell him to make that record, and
it would not be worth one cent upon the market. It takes the genius
of a Sousa to play into the horn. It takes the voice of the
magnificent singer to sing into the horn; and it takes the skill of the
mechanician who is operating the graphophone to make a fine
record that has a marketable value.
You ask me if I would use Sousa's march, make that record and sell
it, and not pay him any royalty. I answer, "Yes; I would;" because I
have paid him royalty. Whenever Mr. Sousa publishes one of his
pieces of music and puts it out upon the market and I pay the price
of that music, that sheet of music passes from under the monopoly,
just as when I patent a cornet and sell the cornet to Mr. Sousa, and
he pays the price for it, it passes out from under the patent
monopoly, and he has a right to use it. Suppose I should come here
and say to you that every time one of Mr. Sousa's cornet players
played the cornet that I had sold to him that he should pay me
royalty for having played it! That is what he is asking of you. That is
not all.
Mr. Sousa himself does not scorn, as he pretended to the other day,
these "infernal talking machines." The day has been when Mr. Sousa
himself came with advance scores and begged to have them put
upon the machines, in order that they might popularize his own
music. Nor is that all. He to-day is under contract, and he plays into
these "infernal machines" with his band, and he is contributing, as
he told you a few days ago, to stifle these "beautiful young voices