The Burmese traffic-jam explored: Changing dynamics and ambiguous reforms

Cultural Dynamics
25(2) 207–227
© The Author(s) 2013
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DOI: 10.1177/0921374013498137
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The Burmese traffic-jam
explored: Changing dynamics
and ambiguous reforms
David A Feingold
Ophidian Research Institute, USA
Abstract
Burma/Myanmar has been the epicenter of human trafficking and unsafe migration in mainland
Southeast Asia. While “root causes” of trafficking are always complex, clearly, counter-productive
agricultural and tax policies, political repression, military actions, and widespread human rights
violations are heavily implicated in the underlying political ecology of trafficking/unsafe migration.
Burma has been the embodiment of an “ethnocratic state,” in that the majority ethnic group in
the country seeks to both dominate and exclude minorities. One result is that ethnic minorities
have been disproportionately represented among irregular migrants and those most at risk of
trafficking. Today, reforms are taking place in Burma. An eager international community embraces
an optimism that may be the triumph of hope over experience. Yet Aung San Suu Kyi has warned
of the dangers of “reckless optimism.” This paper examines the dynamics of trafficking in Burma
and the possible implications of the current reform process.
Keywords
Burma, ethnicity, migration, minorities, trafficking
Change and reform: the lady visits the crocodile1,2
On 31 March 2012, myself and a small group of other trafficking experts met with Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi in Bangkok, responding to her request to be briefed on a range of
issues related to human trafficking between Burma and Thailand.3 She was impressively
well-versed in the complexities of the difficulties and dangers that have plagued
migrants—both formal and informal—from Burma. She visited “refugee” camps, met
migrant laborers, and had a formal meeting with Thai Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm
Yubamrung, who oversees migrant labor issues.4 She expressed particular concern for
the plight of the many unregistered Burmese migrants facing a complex, frequently cor-
rupt nationality verification system that is supposed to regularize their status as migrant
laborers in Thailand. While the migrant registration system was originally conceived for
Corresponding author:
David A Feingold, Director, Ophidian Research Institute, Suite 80, 1530 Locust Street, Philadelphia, PA
19102, USA.
Email: ophidianfilms@hotmail.com
498137CDY25210.1177/0921374013498137Cultural DynamicsFeingold
2013
Article

208 Cultural Dynamics 25(2)
reasons of national security as well as to secure a regular supply of labor, it was also
alleged to diminish risks for trafficking and exploitation.
Aung San Suu Kyi also raised the numerous complaints of rape, extortion, sexual
exploitation and harassment, hazardous working conditions, and withholding pay that
had been brought to her during her meetings with migrants. The widespread abuse of
migrant workers in Thailand by Thai police, gangs, and employers has been extensively
documented, as has a culture of impunity that impedes any redress (see Hall, 2012;
Human Rights Watch, 2010). Over three decades, virtually every migrant from Burma
that I have met has told me of harassment, shakedowns, extortion, and greater or lesser
abuse. In addition to maltreatment and intimidation by Thai authorities, they are also at
the mercy of often corrupt transporters and labor brokers.
Young Burmese women are preferred as workers in Thai factories along the border.
They are believed to supply “nimble fingers and docile bodies” (Pearson and Kusakabe,
2012: 8); that is, they are seen as harder working, more dexterous and easier to control
than men. These young female migrant workers in Thai factories in the border town of
Mae Sot report frequent and aggressive sexual harassment by Thai managers. Many seek
boyfriends, not merely out of loneliness, romantic attachment or desire, but as a con-
scious strategy to protect themselves in the work place. There is a belief among the
women that if they have a boyfriend—whether Burmese or Thai, and no matter how
temporary—they are less likely to be “hit on” by their superiors.5 In this relatively mobile
population, this structural vulnerability and low bargaining power of female workers
lead to frequent changes of partners. There is a local saying, “a Mae Sot love affair is ten
minutes.”6 In a young population freed from many of the socio-cultural constraints of
their home communities and with limited access to culturally and linguistically appropri-
ate HIV-prevention programs, high-risk behaviors are prevalent.
Whether trafficked (either for sex or labor) or not, migrant women are at particular
risk for sexual exploitation and heterosexually transmitted infection with HIV. Migrant
men are at greater risk of infection through injecting drug use. For men from Burma,
labor exploitation in construction and the brutal fishing industry is most common.7
Ambassador Luis CDeBaca, head of the State Department Trafficking in Persons office,
gave testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
In recent years, we have learned a lot about the forced labor of migrant workers in the fishing
and seafood processing industries. In a 2006 study, the ILO found that 43 percent of Burmese
in the Thai fishing sector who have given over possession of their identity documents to their
employers cannot access these documents when they want to. In many cases, the employers
hold onto these documents purposefully to restrict their employees’ movement, even though
without them, migrants are vulnerable to arrest and deportation. (United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, 2011: 210–214 (Kindle edition))8
Aung San Suu Kyi expressed her concerns to the Deputy Prime Minister. I was told
by some Thai journalists on the day of the meeting that Chalerm told her: “Disregard the
problems, that was the past. The new government has clear policies on how to solve or
minimize those problems.”9
In reply, Aung San Suu Kyi used humor to underline the importance of Burmese labor
to Thailand. I was also told by Thai journalists that she told Chalerm: “Thai authorities

Feingold 209
are obliged to ensure Myanmar workers live happily in Thailand, or I will take all of
them back home when the situation in Myanmar is better” (Discussion with Thai journal-
ists, 31 March 2012). In fact, although Burmese migrants—particularly undocumented
migrants—are often denigrated as sources of crime, disease, and threats to security, man-
ufacturers in Mae Sot and other border areas are concerned about shortages of cheap
labor if and when people from Burma return home.
Brees, basing her calculations on figures from the Migrant Assistance Program
(MAP), points out that
It has been calculated that, if migrants are as productive
as Thai workers in each sector, their total contribution to output would be around US $11
billion, or 6.2 percent of Thailand’s GdP. If they were less productive, contributing only 75
percent of Thai workers’ output, their contribution would still be about five percent of Thai
GdP. (Brees, 2010: 41)
This is not insignificant by any measure; however, if this were disaggregated, the
contribution by specific sector—such as construction or fishing—would be considerably
greater.
However, the importance of emigrants for Burma is no less. Migrant worker remit-
tances have been essential to keeping the fragile economy afloat, particularly in the poor-
est areas (Turnell et al., 2008). Out migration has been a product of both hope and
desperation, though this should not be understood only in economic terms. People stream
across the Thai border drawn by perceived economic opportunity, but often fleeing intol-
erable political conditions at home. They use what strategies they can adapt to a broad
variety of conditions across the border (Brees, 2008).
As of August 2012, according to the Office of Foreign Workers Administration of the
Ministry of Labor of Thailand, there were 743,538 migrants working with active work
permits that have completed the nationality verification process.10 This figure includes
people from Cambodia and Laos, as well as from Burma. However, the vast majority,
623,555, comes from Burma. In contrast, of the 122,850 migrants from the three coun-
tries who are working with valid, active work permits and valid passports, only about
one-third is from Burma. There are now more than a million registered Burmese migrants
in Thailand. While no one—including the Thai Government—knows with certainty the
number of unregistered Burmese migrants in the country, I (and others) estimate the
number of unregistered migrants to be on the order of one to two million.11
As in many countries, including the United States, migrant workers in Thailand per-
form what are called the “3 D” jobs—Dirty, Dangerous, and Difficult (or, sometimes,
Demeaning). These are often jobs that Thais will not take, or certainly not take at the
wages and working conditions on offer. Migrant workers are frequently paid less than
minimum wage, forced to work extended hours without additional compensation, and
denied proper safety equipment in contravention of Thai labor law. As one report put it,
the lives of migrant workers “… almost all play out in an atmosphere circumscribed by
fear, violence, abuse, corruption, intimidation, and an acute awareness of the many dan-
gers posed by not belonging to Thai society” (Human Rights Watch, 2010: 1). Of course,
those migrants without legal status are most at risk.

As part of Aung San Suu Kyi’s first foreign trip in 24 years, it was a measure of the
importance to her of issues related to trafficking/unsafe migration and worker exploita-
tion that she devoted so much of her limited time to them. In Thailand, she was treated
by both the international and local press as a virtual head of state, and given a tumultuous
welcome by the Burmese refugees and migrant workers with whom she met. The
President of Burma, former general Thein Sein, chose not attend the same meeting of the
World Economic Forum on East Asia in Bangkok, postponing his visit to Bangkok until
after she had left. The general belief in Bangkok and among both Thai and foreign jour-
nalists was that he did not wish his visit to be overshadowed by hers. For many on the
scene, this was public proof that the surprising reform process in Burma, which had been
viewed skeptically by many, had real substance and was irreversible.
Things had hardly seemed so optimistic at the start of the transition to “civilian”
government from the repressive and corrupt military regimes that had ruled Burma in
various guises since General Ne Win seized power in 1962. The new constitution, cre-
ated by the previous military government, guaranteed 25% of the seats in parliament to
the military. The military or their families still controlled many of the levers of eco-
nomic power, and there was scant evidence of any possible independence on the part
of the judiciary. Moreover, while there had been elections, these were seen as flawed,
at best, or “rigged” (Neil, 2012). There was little in the process by which the constitu-
tion was drawn to inspire any faith that there could be anything like a transition to
democracy, and human rights violations continued to be endemic—particularly in eth-
nic minority areas.
However, Thein Sein, the 67-year-old former general and former Prime Minister who
became President, proved better than expected. Although a military man, he had a repu-
tation untainted by any accusations of corruption. Nonetheless, he was always seen as a
figurehead, a passive placeholder, unlikely to initiate any precipitous policy changes—
either positive or negative. I was told by a Burmese who knows him personally that he is
a devout Buddhist, who would prefer to be a monk than to run the government (personal
communication, October 2012). Long-time Burma observer and noted scholar, David
Steinberg expressed a view that would be echoed by many: “The reforms instituted by
President Sein, in part a result of his openness and accessibility even to his critics, have
been remarkable achievements to date” (Steinberg, 2012: 2).
Moving from years of not-so-quiet desperation to excited assurance about the possi-
bility of sustainable democratic reform in Burma, countries have fallen all over them-
selves in their rush to remove all sanctions on the country. Rather than gradual reduction
of sanctions calibrated to the pace of reform, the United States and others have discarded
sanctions wholesale, as if shedding a cumbersome coat at the first hint of spring.12
Governments, UN Agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private com-
panies are rushing into Burma like giddy school children, thrilled that parents have
finally given permission to go to the prom. They remain unsure of their balance in new
high heels but are convinced that the night is full of romantic promise just waiting to be
grasped.
Given the visit of Secretary of State Clinton to Burma, and the even more surprising
visit of President Obama, it was hardly surprising that Steinberg’s assessment was widely
shared: “At this remarkable moment, US–Burma/Myanmar relations are the best that

Feingold 211
they have been since the independence of the Union of Burma in 1948” (Steinberg, 2012:
2). It was also hardly surprising that when Aung San Suu Kyi was in Bangkok, she
warned against “reckless optimism” (Aung San Suu Kyi, Speech at the World Economic
Forum, Bangkok, 1 June 2012)), and, again, hardly surprising that her warning has pretty
much been ignored.
Burma: will current changes transform the dynamics of
human trafficking in Southeast Asia?
Burma has been the epicenter of human trafficking and exploitive/unsafe migration in
mainland Southeast Asia for more than 15 years (Asia Watch, 1993; Feingold, 1997,
1998, 2003, 2011; Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand (KWAT), 2005, 2008).
While Burma has also been a transit country for people—primarily ethnic minority peo-
ple—trafficked from China to Thailand and Malaysia, it is predominantly a source coun-
try for men, women, and children trafficked to all of the countries on its borders. Of
these, the largest number of migrants—trafficked and non-trafficked alike—flow into
Thailand (Feingold, 2011).
Under the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protect Act (TVPA) of 2000, passed by
the US Congress and reauthorized with some modifications since then, the State
Department is tasked to report yearly on whether or not countries comply with the “mini-
mum standards for the elimination of trafficking.” Tier 3 countries are those whose gov-
ernments are seen as not meeting minimal standards and are “not making significant
efforts to bring themselves into compliance.” Countries in Tier 3 are, after a period of
time, subject to sanctions by the United States.
Since the United States first issued the annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report
evaluating the effectiveness and commitment of the nations of the world in eliminat-
ing human trafficking, Burma has consistently been placed in Tier 3 (the lowest) in
the Trafficking in Persons Report issued each year by the US State Department. In the
2011 report, Burma was again placed in Tier 3. This yearly certification process
regarding human trafficking is similar to the older narcotics certification process that
has consistently rated Burma as “not certified/failed demonstrably” since 1989. (See
Friman, 2010, for an interesting comparison of the narcotics and the TIP certification
processes. It is also interesting to compare the annual U.S. TIP and Human Rights
reports.)
However, coordinated with President Obama’s visit to Burma, the Office of the
Spokesman of the State Department issued a Media Note (18 November 2012) detailing
an agreement on trafficking between the two governments. The preamble noted,
The Governments of the Union of Myanmar and the United States; affirming their commitment
to the global effort to combat human trafficking, a modern form of slavery that afflicts both of
our nations; recognizing the requirements and provisions of the UN Protocol to Suppress,
Punish, and Prevent Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing
the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime; acknowledging the progress
made by the Government of Myanmar in addressing sex trafficking and forced labor over the
last two years …

Six months earlier, the United States had given scant indication that it recognized
such progress. In light of the new thaw in relations between Burma and the United States,
it will be interesting to see where Burma is placed in the coming year’s TIP Report,
whether it will be ranked for encouragement or accomplishment. The communiqué went
on to state,
With the announcement of this joint plan, the Governments of the Union of Myanmar and the
United States are opening a regular anti-TIP dialogue that will be structured to have at least
annual meetings in either Myanmar or the United States, supplemented by regular ad hoc
meetings at both senior and working levels throughout the year.
In the past, while members of the Government of Burma have been credibly accused
of profiting—directly or indirectly—from the illicit drug trade, not even the severest crit-
ics of the regime have accused them of profiting from human trafficking (Feingold,
2011). In fact, even before the current reforms, the Government actively participated in
regional activities to combat trafficking. Burma was a founding signatory to the
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT) Process. In
October 2004, to the surprise of some UN officials, Burma was proud to host the initial
meeting of the COMMIT in Rangoon. Senior Government ministers from the six coun-
tries of the Mekong sub-region signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation
and joint action against trafficking in persons in the sub-region. Moreover, the
Government of Burma has been an active participant in the follow-on meetings and train-
ings that have taken place under the COMMIT auspices. Furthermore, as opposed to
many countries that have laws on the books against trafficking, but have never prose-
cuted a single case, Burma has actually conducted prosecutions.
According to Burmese officials, there were 155 trafficking cases in 2009, including
for forced marriage, forced prostitution, forced labor, and child trafficking. These cases
all involved cross-border, as opposed to domestic, trafficking. Of these, the highest
numbers (85) were for forced marriage. An official told me that the largest number of
cases (not total numbers of persons) were not on the Thai border as one might expect,
but on the border with China. This is also confirmed by the victim repatriation numbers
for 2009: 293 from China versus 132 from Thailand.13 An analysis of a total 641 traf-
ficking cases between 1 January 2006 and 31 December 2010 shows that 69.7% were
for forced marriage, and China was the destination country in 80% of cases (Union of
Myanmar, Ministry of Home Affairs, Central Body for Suppression of Trafficking in
Persons (n.d.): 45–46).
In fact, according to official figures, between January 2006 and August 2011, 731
trafficking cases were reported: of these, 585 were trafficked to China. Of those cases,
1305 people were rescued, including 780 from China (about 60% of the total). In com-
parison, there were 483 from Thailand, 16 from Indonesia, and 15 from Malaysia.Among
the trafficked persons, 85% were women, while 65% of the traffickers identified were
women as well. The concentration of official efforts on the China border helps to explain
the disproportionate representation of forced marriage in the case statistics, as that is the
most important element in trafficking from Burma into China. Again, it is most often
non-Burman ethnic minorities—and most often, Kachin—who are trafficked into China
for marriage (KWAT, 2005, 2008).14

Feingold 213
The demand for trafficked women as mates and caretakers is directly related to short-
age of available women in the poor rural areas of Northern China. There are communities
virtually devoid of women of marriageable age, where men have to live together and
cook communally, unable to raise a family. Young women have left—most often for the
cities—for greater economic and social freedom, and what they see as an easier and more
rewarding life than working the land. This leaves the men, who outnumber them in their
home communities, with little hope of a marriage partner. As a result, those who can
afford it, rely on brokers to find them wives from remote, still more impoverished com-
munities—whether within China or beyond its borders. As minorities in China are not
subject to the same “one child policy” as Han Chinese, there communities are more
likely to have available marriageable women.15
It is important to be clear, however; contrary to the frequent portrayals of all brokers
as synonymous with traffickers, marriage brokers have a recognized traditional function
that is valued by the community.16 While there are corrupt brokers, most are not in the
business of purchasing and re-selling unwilling girls and women. When things go wrong,
it is often in spite of, rather than because of, the broker. Nevertheless, regardless of the
probity of brokers (or lack thereof), the current demographics in China provide a power-
ful incentive for trafficking both from within the country and from its neighbors (for a
comparison with the situation in Colonial Indochina and present day Vietnam, see
Henriot, 2012 and Lessard, 2009).
One recent investigation in China revealed the level of demand for women as wives,
and the high price that men were willing to pay:
The crime came to light when a villager told police that he spent more than 90,000 yuan
($14,500) to “buy a wife,” but the woman left home a month later. He said he felt cheated by
the middlemen. (China Daily, 2013)
Heather Peters examined national and international policy encountering trafficking
and migration realities in Yunnan. She concludes: “… the reality is that until China
resolves the problem of the increasing sex ratio imbalance, there will be a steadily
increasing black market for women for marriage” (Peters, 2003).
However, it should be noted there is also a strong demand for children in China, and
the trade in children can be quite profitable. For example, the China Daily quoted a secu-
rity official from one of the destination provinces:
Wang Xizhang, deputy head of the criminal investigation division of the Fujian provincial
public security department, said large profits have also led to rampant child trafficking. Wang
said a healthy male infant bought with 30,000 yuan (4,810 U.S. dollars) in poverty-stricken
provinces such as Yunnan can be sold for 70,000 to 90,000 yuan in the comparatively well-off
provinces of Fujian and Guangdong. (China Daily, 2012)
Women from Burma trafficked for marriage into China, who were able to return, report
that they were under great pressure to reproduce and to produce sons. As one explained,
I ran and escaped from the Chinese man who bought me from a broker to be his wife when he
went to the toilet one day. They consider you to be a wife if you give birth to a son, but will kill

a female child and they’ll make you a forced laborer in the fields … You will become a slave
until you give birth to a son. (Myanmar Times, 2013)
In addition, children are trafficked into China from Burma. As long ago as 2000,
Kachin children along the border were disappearing. In that year, I was interviewing a
young Kachin woman in Burma, near the China border. She explained that her mother
was heart-broken because the woman’s younger brother aged 14 years had disappeared.
He had gone outside to kick a ball around. His mother went after him a short while later
to bring him a jacket because it was getting cold. He had vanished. The family did eve-
rything they could to find him, but without success. She said that parents were afraid to
let their children out alone, as there were many stories of children and young people
disappearing. At the time, it was difficult to judge the scale of the problem. People in
different villages talked about the problem, but it was unclear if there were many inci-
dents or if the same incidents were being passed on over and over again (Interviews with
Kachin villagers outside of Laiza, Kachin State, 2000).
In interviews and discussions, Burmese officials have long claimed to be committed
to stamping out human trafficking, charged that Burma’s low rankings in the U.S. TIP
Reports reflect American belligerence toward their country, rather than a fair assessment
of the situation (see, for example, the interview with the Ambassador of Myanmar to the
UN, Feingold, 2003). In conversations at a number of international meetings, I have
talked with Burmese government representatives who seem honestly hurt and offended
that their efforts to combat human trafficking and support the COMMIT Process are not
sufficiently recognized.
Yet participation in regional anti-trafficking agreements and fora, combined with a
smattering of prosecutions, clearly does not address the underlying structural dynam-
ics of trafficking and unsafe migration from Burma. Contrary to many of the simplis-
tic frenzied journalistic and cinematic myths of trafficking—hill tribe girls in Thailand
sold in exchange for a TV, American teenage tourists kidnapped from the 16th
Arrondissement in Paris to be drugged sex slaves, and so on—human trafficking is a
process, not an event. Moreover, failure to apprehend the processual nature of traf-
ficking both results from and supports a counter-productive flight from complexity. It
promotes a valorized linear narrative that begins with kidnapping or fraudulent
recruitment, continues with movement by an organized criminal gang, moves to vio-
lent exploitation at a slave labor site—whether a brothel, factory, or fishing boat—and
ends with an heroic rescue, rehabilitation, and reintegration, with a prosecution of evil
doers along the way.
In fact, trafficking is most often migration gone terribly wrong; that is, it is the end
product of attempts by people to apply strategies available to them to negotiate among a
series of risky alternatives. While some people are literally kidnapped from their vil-
lages, the majority of trafficked adults and young people leave their homes for a variety
of reasons, migrate, and become trafficked along the way (Feingold, 2003). The
migration may or may not be undertaken with a definite destination in mind. “Unsafe
migration” may become unsafe at any point from origin point to destination. Similarly,
exploitative migration may be a post hoc judgment after journey’s end, but it can also be
a cumulative accretion of small increments.

Feingold 215
For example, many migrants and many trafficking victims in Thailand come from the
Dry Zone of Upper Burma, a considerable distance from the Thai border. This is a very
inhospitable region in which to support oneself, made more so by government policy.
Turnell, perhaps the most insightful scholar of the Burmese economy, says of the region,
The Dry Zone is one of the poorest but most densely populated regions of Burma. Water is
scarce, agricultural productivity is low and much of the natural environment is severely degraded.
Most of the population of the area is landless, and depend upon seasonal farm labour to survive.
Beyond this, employment and income opportunities are limited. (Turnell, 2005: 6–7)
To make matters worse, people from that region report an enforced in-kind taxation
that is based upon official estimates of predicted—rather than actual—yields.17 This has
had the unintended consequence of causing a degradation of seed crop, a lowering of rice
yields, and an increasing alienation of land.
Trafficking: what exactly are we “preventing, suppressing,
and punishing”?
Here, it is important to acknowledge the lack of conceptual clarity that has plagued the
trafficking discourse from its inception and that has hindered both analysis and policy.18
The standard international definition was arrived at by a contentious and conflicted pro-
cess that satisfied virtually no one. The international definition that is embodied in the
UN Trafficking Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (entry into force 2002)—commonly referred to as the
Palermo Protocol—is as follows:
“Trafficking in Persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or
receipt of persons, by the means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purposes of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of
organs.19
In the course of making Trading Women, a documentary on the trade in minority girls
and women from Yunnan, Burma, and Laos into Thailand, I had the opportunity to inter-
view many of those involved with the debates that arrived at the above definition, which
is widely seen as incomprehensible and a hindrance to effective action. Regardless of
their ideological position, among those that I interviewed, virtually all felt that the out-
come was making the best of an unsatisfactory situation.
As one legal scholar has summed it up,
The Palermo Protocol reflects a fragile international consensus, born from hard-wrought
compromise on complex and highly contested issues over legal definitions and frameworks for

addressing this transnational problem. The drafting sessions quickly became a forum for heated
debates over global anti-trafficking policy, including whether the international legal definition
of trafficking should encompass “voluntary” prostitution, and how to balance states’ concerns
over irregular migration and criminal activity against their obligations to protect trafficked
persons’ human rights. (Chuang, 2006: 438)
In my view, a more useful definition is one such as that put forward by GAATW, the
Global Alliance against Trafficking of Women, an NGO based in Thailand that works
throughout Asia. GAATW defines “trafficking in women” as
all acts involved in the recruitment and/or transportation of women within and across national
borders for work or services by means of violence or threat of violence, abuse of authority or
dominant position, debt bondage, deception or other forms of coercion. (GAATW, 2000)
Although this definition was initially formulated to apply only to women, it is easily
expanded to include men.
In this regard, it should be noted that the initial formulations of many trafficking defi-
nitions and trafficking laws were framed with only women and children in mind. This
was due, in part, to the frequent conflation of trafficking with prostitution—equivalence
pushed by the US Government during the Bush years, and still promoted by various
“abolitionist” NGOs and the Swedish Government today.20 While in some cases, this
exclusion of men was a function of ideology (Weitzer, 2007), in others, it was an expres-
sion of a cultural belief in the unique vulnerability of women and children, with the result
of often equating the two at law. Until 2009, when the law was finally changed in
Thailand, only women and children could be recognized as potential trafficking victims.
Adult males were excluded under the law.
Migrants from Burma often come across the border as families. Prior to the change in
law, if a husband and wife crossed the border illegally, worked in the same seafood fac-
tory under oppressive conditions, were kept prisoner and subjected to the same abuses,
rescue by the police would lead to very different results. If judged to be a trafficking
victim, the wife would be sent to shelter. The husband, on the other hand, despite suffer-
ing identical exploitation, would be judged to be an illegal migrant and sent to the immi-
gration detention center. This discrepancy was corrected by the new law.
To unpack the concept of “trafficking” still further, its elements can be understood as
“movement” plus “force,” “fraud,” “coercion” or “deception” leading to “exploitation.”
Even here, none of these terms are clear and uncontested. In early discussions of traffick-
ing, “movement” was an essential element. Therefore, many countries—Burma among
them—attempted to curtail trafficking by curtailing movement, particularly by women
(Feingold, 2003). Now, at discussions of human trafficking, the questions become, “How
much ‘movement’ is necessary to trafficking? Across a border, across a province, across
a street?” Is movement a necessary element of trafficking at all?
Even the other terms are not always as clear as they might seem. While beatings,
rapes, threats against families, and so on are quite clear cut, coercion is often much more
subtle. Moreover, while some organizations are advocating a focus on end-point exploi-
tation as the most effective way to address trafficking, and hence an almost exclusively
prosecutorial approach, “exploitation” may be more problematic than appears at first

Feingold 217
sight. Again, if you are locked in a shrimp processing factory (as a number of Burmese
were), never allowed to leave, and kept for a year without pay, you clearly have suffered
a level of exploitation that would meet any criteria to be defined as a trafficking victim.
However, to consider the other end of the spectrum, many graduate teaching assistants
consider themselves exploited, and some, no doubt, are, by many definitions. However,
it is unlikely that many would consider them to be victims of human trafficking.
Minorities in Burma: repression, structural vulnerability,
and exploitation
The modern history of Burma has been a history of the inability to integrate ethnic
nationalities into a nation.21 In a statement issued on 19 November 2012, the United
Nationalities Alliance22 summed up the aims of the politically organized minority groups
in Burma:
We always want and have been fighting for genuine federal union in which rule of law, equality,
self-determination, and human rights are restored and prevailed for all ethnic nationalities of
Burma.
Minorities make up just over one-third of the population of Burma; however, the last
official census was in 1983. Depending on how one counts, there are 100–135 ethnic
groups in Burma, speaking a variety of different languages. Many of these groups are
part of cross-border populations, living both within and outside of the current national
boundaries of the Union of Myanmar. Their concepts of social space developed with lit-
tle regard to these boundaries, and to this day, their networks of kinship, marriage, lan-
guage, trade, belief, and identity are often more closely integrated with people living
hundreds of miles apart than with those living a short distance away23 (see Feingold,
1976, 1981, 2000, 2010; Leach, 1954, 1960). This is of particular strategic anxiety to
Burma’s neighbors and has implications for human trafficking patterns in the region. As
noted Shan scholar Harn Yawnghwe has observed,
[an issue] … of great concern to China, India and Thailand, is the ethnic issue. Myanmar’s
ethnic communities straddle the country’s borders with Bangladesh, India, China, Laos and
Thailand. Altogether they make up at least 35 per cent of Myanmar’s population and their
homelands 60 percent of the territory. (Yawnghwe, 2010: 431)
The results of this census were questioned by a number of minority groups at the time,
claiming that the central government purposely under-counted in minority areas to
diminish their numbers, and thereby, undermine the legitimacy of their political aspira-
tions.24 Whether the under-count was the result of a deliberate policy decision, technical
capacity limitations, practical barriers to carrying out enumeration in remote and inse-
cure areas, or the reluctance of the population to cooperate with the government, there is
little doubt that the count was inaccurate. However, the scale of the inaccuracy is far
from clear. Obviously, demographic projections made by various agencies since then are
open to question and politically fraught.

Minority populations see their rights to self-determination embodied in the Panlong
Agreement, by which they agreed to join the Union of Burma at its founding. It was
overseen and agreed to by Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, who is revered as the
father of independent Burma. A detailed discussion of the meaning and implications of
the rights laid out in this agreement is well beyond the scope of this article, but suffice it
to say that it has been and remains highly contested (Aung-Thwin, 2001; Charney, 2009;
Matthew, 2008; Taylor, 2008). Burma has been described as an “ethnocratic state,” in
that the majority ethnic group in the country seeks to both dominate and exclude minori-
ties. David Brown (1994) describes a
situation where the state acts as the agency of the dominant ethnic community … in which
recruitment to the state elite … and government is disproportionately and overwhelmingly
from the majority ethnic group … The ethnocratic state is one which employs the cultural
attributes and values of the dominant ethnic segment as the core elements for the elaboration of
the national ideology … and its political structures serve to maintain and reinforce the
monopolization of power by the ethnic segment. (pp. 36–37)
This impacts the minority groups in a variety of subtle ways that exacerbates vulner-
ability to trafficking. Lack of legal status is a key risk factor for trafficking. Aye (2009)
points out how the mere question of honorifics has an impact on the recognition of
citizenship:
The honorific title for a man in Shan is “Sai” and in Karen is “Saw.” The Shan and Karen must
adopt the Burmese “Maung” to get a citizenship identification card at the immigration
department. The Shan and the Karen have to choose between “getting a card” or “keeping the
ethnic identity.” (p. 20)
In fact, lack of legal status—citizenship and birth registration—is such an important
factor in vulnerability to trafficking that the TVPA included it in the criteria for assigning
countries to tiers. What the study by the KWAT (2008) found for the Kachins could just
as easily been applied to other ethnic groups:
While the factors pushing people to migrate intensify, the state’s failure to issue ID cards to
many ethnic peoples, including Kachin, is continuing to make women and girls vulnerable to
trafficking. Earlier this year, people’s hopes were raised when temporary ID cards were issued
to many Kachin to enable them to vote in the May 2008 constitutional referendum. However,
not only was the referendum a sham, but so were the ID cards, which were withdrawn
afterwards. Once again, the regime showed its unwillingness to seriously address the root
causes of trafficking in Burma. (p. 2)
The Shan have been in armed revolt against the central government of the Union of
Burma (later the Union of Myanmar) since General Ne Win seized power in a military
coup 1962.25 In the early days, Shan leaders diverged in regard to their ultimate political
objective. Some wanted complete independence, pointing out that a Shan State would be
larger than several countries in the UN and would be economically viable. Others wanted
autonomy within the Union of Burma, provided that their rights could be protected. A
third, smaller group wanted union with Thailand in some sort of pan-Tai entity.26 This

Feingold 219
last opinion soon dissipated, though the Shan cause has always received support from a
number of important families in Northern Thailand. Now, despite the romantic appeal of
an independent state, most Shan favor autonomy, with strong guarantees of protection of
their rights.
The Kachin, Karen, Mon, Wa, and numerous smaller groups have at various times
also felt the need to take up arms. The reasons are complex, and many battles over the
years were fought as much for control of drug trading routes as for “independence.”
Similarly, the Burmese army and its allies often fought as much to secure the drug trade
as to preserve the unity of the nation (Feingold, 1981). For half a century, groups battled
over opium, rubies, and jade; for the past two decades, they battled over amphetamines
as well. Although there were frequent attempts by outsiders to distinguish noble “free-
dom fighters” from evil “narco-traffickers,” the reality on the ground was quite a bit
more complex. For example, see Kramer’s (2007) study on the most formidable current
ethnic army, the United Wa State Army, which has been heavily involved in the ampheta-
mine trade.
Here, it should be noted that despite frequent mention of organized crime’s involve-
ment in human trafficking, none of the major figures in the opium trade—such as Khun
Sa and Lo Hsin Han—ever dealt in people. In addition to narcotics, both dealt exten-
sively and profitably in jade, but never engaged in human trafficking.
Decades of warfare has extracted a high toll on the minority areas. Mines are still
being laid in Kachin State, and despite a call for a ceasefire by the President of the coun-
try, the Burmese Army continues to attack Kachins, including the shelling of civilians
(Human Rights Watch, 2012; KWAT, 2011; Partners Relief & Development, 2011).
Since at least 1964, the Burmese Army has been using rape as a weapon of war. That this
has been a policy and not merely the act of some undisciplined soldiers has been exten-
sively documented (Apple, 1997; Apple and Martin, 2003; Karen Women’s Organization
(KWO), 2007; Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) and Shan Women’s Action
Network (SWAN), 2002). Fear of sexual violence has been a major factor pushing migra-
tion by Shan and Karen women and exposing them to trafficking. Shan women in the sex
industry in Thailand often see their choices as staying home and getting raped for free by
the army, or coming to Thailand to do whatever they have to. Hardly a choice that anyone
should be forced to make (see also Beyrer, 2001).
As I have noted elsewhere, political insecurity has raised liquidity preferences, and,
hence, favored the production of drug crops over food crops. This has placed local popu-
lations into a condition of “defined cultural criminality,” whereby, traditional practices
become justification for external repression (Feingold, 1981, 2000). Furthermore, despite
living in areas with some of the most valuable and abundant natural resources, ethnic
minorities suffer from low agricultural productivity, food insecurity, lack of health ser-
vices, and inadequate schooling (Dapice et al., 2009; Food andAgricultural Organization
(FAO)/World Food Programme (WFP), 2009; Stover et al., 2007; The Lancet, 2012). In
an assessment of food production and consumption in Burma in 2009, the FAO and WFP
concluded,
There are more than 5 million people below the food poverty line in Myanmar. States/divisions
which the Mission found to be a priority for emergency food assistance are: cyclone-affected

areas of Ayeyarwady Division (85 000 tonnes); Chin State (23 000 tonnes), particularly those
areas affected by the rat infestation; Rakhine State (15 000 tonnes), particularly the north of the
State; Kachin State (8 300 tonnes); north Shan State (20 200 tonnes); east Shan State (7 000
tonnes); and Magwe Division (27 500 tonnes).
With the exception of one division that suffered from Cyclone Nargis and Magwe
Division, all of the others with major food shortfalls are ethnic minority areas. Moreover,
while lack of access to agricultural credit is a major problem for farmers throughout
Burma, it is most acute in minority regions (Turnell, 2009). It is a sad commentary on an
historically fertile country that today most farmers cannot support themselves farming
(Bissinger, 2012). Again, while this problem is widespread in Burma, it is exacerbated in
the ethnic minority areas. The lack of economic opportunities, combined with political
and military repression, has acted to push the population to seek prospects elsewhere,
despite the widespread awareness of the dangers and difficulties involved. Consequently,
minorities are disproportionately represented among those trafficked across Burma’s
borders, whether Kachin trafficked for marriage into China or Shan, Akha or Lahu traf-
ficked for sex or labor into Thailand.
I interviewed two groups of some 42 young people in two villages in Shan State in
Burma. All were Shan, and had traveled to Thailand and returned their home villages.
With the exception of two young men in unique circumstances—one was a skilled furni-
ture carver; the other had been a Buddhist monk—all had bad experiences. Some had
very bad experiences, involving robbery and abuse. When I asked, “What would you tell
a friend about going to Thailand?” All said that they would tell him or her not to go; that
it was difficult, dangerous, and “no one there cared about you.” However, further discus-
sion revealed that if a “good” opportunity arose, many would risk migrating again. They
believed that they were smarter and more knowledgeable now, and, besides, “there was
nothing for them at home.”27
Conclusion
There is no doubt that changes are taking place in Burma: real estate is booming in
Rangoon as aid agencies, NGOs, and investors flock in; there is significantly greater—
but still limited—media freedom; and journalists entry into the country is considerably
eased. There is a weak, but legitimized, political opposition. The Government is making
many of the right noises, whether on trafficking or other issues. Yet the reform process
remains ambiguous. Demonstrations are now possible but can also be ruthlessly sup-
pressed. The army is still conducting operations in the Kachin region—with or without
the approval of the President. Massive human rights violations are taking place against
the Rohingya people in the Rakhine, expanding on a long-standing pattern (Feingold,
2011; Irish Centre for Human Rights, 2010). Aung San Suu Kyi and her party have main-
tained a studied distance from minority issues, or if addressing them at all, doing so with
an evenhandedness hardly justified by the circumstances. While her supporters tend to
present this as a tactical necessity (it may well be), it is undermining her standing with
the ethnic groups. Land is being seized with little compensation, often by force. While
this is happening in many areas, it has been most frequent in minority areas that are rich

Feingold 221
in natural resources. Despite change, people are still pushed to migrate to support them-
selves and their families and to flee fighting.
There can be no addressing human trafficking effectively without addressing the
underlying political ecology (Feingold, 1997). It is as yet unclear whether changes now
taking place in Burma can ameliorate the dynamics of trafficking and exploitive migra-
tion in the future. If the issues in Burma cannot be solved, counter-trafficking efforts in
mainland Southeast Asia will remain pretty much what the Thais call, phak chee—the
Chinese parsley sprinkled on the top of curries—decorative, but without substance.
Declaration of conflicting interests
The author wishes to acknowledge the generous support of the funding organizations. It must be
noted, however, that the ideas presented in this article do not purport to represent the views of any
of these institutions. A note on sources: some of the information in this article came to author’s
attention through meetings and informal conversations with Burmese and Thai government offi-
cials. In keeping with the author’s view of his ethical responsibilities as both a researcher and
former UNESCO project coordinator, they will remain unnamed.
Funding
Research for this project has been conducted under grants from the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation, the Else Sackler Foundation (two grants), and the Spunk Fund Inc (multi-
ple grants). The project has received additional ongoing support from the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Ophidian Research Institute.
The UNESCO Trafficking & HIV/AIDS Project, which I founded and directed has received sup-
port from the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), UNAIDS, the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
through the SEARCH Project, the US CDC, and the UK Embassy, Bangkok. Earlier research on
opium production, trade, and use was conducted under grants from the US National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH), the National Institute on DrugAbuse (NIDA), and the National Endowment
for the Humanities (NEH).
Notes
1. This article is part of ongoing research into the trade in minority girls and women from
Yunnan, Burma (Myanmar), and Laos into Thailand.
2. In Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi is frequently referred to as “The Lady.” Because of the wide-
spread abuses suffered by migrant workers in Thailand, it is said that they ran from the tiger
(Burma) into the crocodile (Thailand) (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Versions of the tiger/
crocodile metaphor are widespread; a Khmer expression was that Cambodia was caught
between “the tiger of Thailand and the crocodile of Vietnam.”
3. Every book or article on Burma/Myanmar begins with a note explaining and/or justifying
the author’s choice of which name to use based on linguistics, culture, or politics. This is an
issue that has divided scholars, governments, and news organizations since the name of the
country was changed by the military government from the Union of Burma to the Union of
Myanmar. Japan, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United Nations
have adopted “Myanmar.” The United States and United Kingdom continue to use “Burma,”
while the European Union uses “Burma/Myanmar.” (For one discussion of this issue, see
Dittmer, 2008; for a survey of the field of Burma studies, see Selth, 2010; for a choice similar
to my own, see Kramer, 2007: XI.) Many people from the country are not always consistent

in English, sometimes using one or the other usage. Since Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from
house arrest and election to parliament, the issue seems to be somewhat less fraught; she,
herself, has tended to use “Burma.”
4. The camps in Thailand that house some (but not all) of those who have fled Burma to seek
refuge are commonly—not surprisingly—referred to as refugee camps. In fact, Thailand
designates them as “temporary shelters” for “displaced persons.” Thailand is not a signa-
tory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol, and therefore does not recognize
refugee status. This has always made the work of the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR)—the UN Refugee Agency—particularly sensitive in Thailand.
5. It is unclear if this is empirically correct.
6. I was first told about this expression by anthropologist Chris Lyttleton, who has been conduct-
ing research in this area. Others are also familiar with it.
7. I have recently begun a project to investigate the dynamics of trafficking in the Thai fishing
industry and its relation to the demise of coastal fishing over the past three decades.
8. In the early days of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protect Act (TVPA), the interna-
tional focus of the US anti-trafficking efforts and rhetoric was almost exclusively limited to
sex trafficking and the repression of prostitution (Feingold, 2003, 2005; Weitzer, 2007). In
fact, sex trafficking and prostitution were often seen as synonymous, denying the possibil-
ity of any sort of agency to women in the sex industry. Very late in the Bush administration,
and much more strongly in the Obama administration, labor trafficking came to figure more
prominently in the yearly Trafficking in Persons Report. The relative significance of “sex traf-
ficking” and “labor trafficking” in the public discourse on trafficking is still highly contested
in the United States and parts of Europe. It is much less so in Thailand.
9. A number of the journalists also joked about Chalerm’s less than savory reputation. Among
other issues, his son Duang had been accused of shooting a police officer during an alterca-
tion in a crowded night club. The son fled the country and was widely believed to have had
the assistance of his father. Despite the many people reportedly being present in the night
club, Duang was later acquitted on the grounds of insufficient evidence and witnesses giving
conflicting testimony. Through an additional ironic twist, Duang is now a police officer (see
“Chalerm’s son now a police officer,” Bangkok Post (27 July 2012)). Most recently, Chalerm
was reported in the Bangkok Post (12 February 2013) as saying that policemen could ask for
money during Chinese New Year because it was not a bribe:
It is not unusual for police to ask for tae-ear (a red envelope filled with money as a Chinese
New Year gift from working age adults). This has been a practice since before I served in the
police. I don’t think a change of regulations is needed because of this.
Some journalists also quipped that after having been under house arrest for 24 years, it was
cruel that Aung San Suu Kyi’s first meeting abroad was with Chalerm.
10. Monthly update figures can be found on the Ministry of Labor website: http://wp.doe.go.th/
monthly-statistics (accessed on Aug. 2012).
11. See, for example, Pearson and Kusakabe (2012: 81). Obviously, this is a very broad range.
It derives from my discussions with Thai officials, labor and migrant nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), International Labour
Organisation (ILO), and other UN agencies, as well as attempts to extrapolate from older
UNESCO mapped registration data. However, even taking the lower end of the estimate, it is
clear that migrants from Burma are, by far, the largest source of migration into Thailand, and
that irregular migration from Burma is equal to or exceeds regular migration.
12. There remain sanctions in place on gems from Burma. There is now a heated debate on

Feingold 223
whether economic sanctions and political isolation hastened or impeded the present changes
in the country. These echo the former debates that raged for more than a decade over a policy
of sanctions versus one of “constructive engagement”—sometimes derided as “destructive
derangement.”
13. These figures were compiled from the Anti-Trafficking Unit, Ministry of Home Affairs,
Union of Myanmar (compiled in 2010).
14. In addition to forced marriage, many Kachin girls are lured by promises of marriage that they
willingly except, only to find themselves in Northern China forced to be unpaid caretakers for
elderly or infirmed people or forced into prostitution. This is true for Jingpo (Kachin) girls on
the China side of the border as well as those that come from Burma.
15. The foregoing analysis has been informed by discussions over the last 25 years, including
those with Dr Heather Peters; Prof. Wang Ningsheng; Prof. Shi Junchao; Prof. Du Juan; my
colleagues at the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, the Yunnan Nationalities University,
andYunnan University; the Kachin Women’sAssociation of Thailand (KWAT), Dr Sara Davis;
as well as discussions with colleagues from UNESCO, the United Nations Inter-Agency
Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), Asian Development Bank (ADB), UNAIDS, Health
Unlimited, ILO, IOM, and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). Under the UNESCO
HIV/AIDS and Trafficking project, which I directed from 1997 to 2012, research in China
was conducted among Jingpo, Dai Lue, Dai Nuea, Naxi, Yi (Nosou), and Wa in order to pre-
pare culturally and linguistically appropriate mother-tongue prevention materials. See also,
for example, Poston et al. (2006), Jin et al. (2007), and Li et al. (2011).
16. I have attended numerous international meetings where discussions equate all marriage bro-
kers with traffickers.
17. It has not clear whether, as a matter of policy or practice, this system is still in place at the
present time.
18. For what is perhaps the best summary work on the international law of trafficking, see
Gallagher (2011).
19. United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (Palermo, Italy: United Nations, 2000).
20. This was not the case with Global Alliance against Traffic in Women (GAATW), an organiza-
tion dedicated to combating the trafficking of women, but also committed to protecting the
rights of voluntary sex workers and diminishing the “collateral damage” of counter-trafficking
actions. (See GAATW, 2007, for an excellent discussion of collateral damage and unintended
consequences of counter-trafficking programs.) Self-described abolitionist organizations,
such as the Coalition against Trafficking in Women (CATW), equate prostitution with traf-
ficking, reject the term “sex work” and deny that it can ever be voluntary (see Weitzer, 2007).
21. There is an extensive literature on this issue; however, for useful discussions and background,
see Smith (2007) and South (2008).
22. The United NationalitiesAlliance is made up of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
(SNLD), the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD), the Mon Democracy Party (MDP), the
Zomi Congress for Democracy (ZCD), the Shan State Kokang Democratic Party (SSKDP),
the Kachin State National Congress for Democracy (KNCD), and the Kayin National
Congress for Democracy (KNCD).
23. The concept of social space was developed and elaborated by Condominas (1980).
24. This came up numerous times in discussions with Shan, Kachin, and Karen activists both
before and since the census.
25. I first became acquainted with many of the Shan resistance leaders in 1964, while doing
research among the Akha on the Thai–Burma border.

26. Shans are most often referred to in Thai as Tai Yai (“great” or “big Tai”). Shans speak a num-
ber of Tai languages.
27. The original interviews were conducted in Shan villages in Kengtung, close to the Thai border
in 2001. I arranged to have similar interviews carried out in 2009, with substantially the same
results.
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Feingold 227
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Author biography
David A Feingold, PhD, is a research anthropologist and filmmaker. Trained in anthropology and
Southeast Asian Studies at Dartmouth, Yale, and Columbia, he has conducted extensive field
research in Southeast Asia over three decades, particularly among the Akha and Shan people. He
is one of the founders and directors of the Institute for the Study of Human Issues (ISHI), the first
research cooperative in the United States and is the director of Trading Women (2003), a documen-
tary about sex trafficking in Southeast Asia. He is currently investigating the trade in minority girls
and women from Burma, Yunnan, and Laos to Thailand under two grants from the Else Sackler
Foundation and a research and writing grant for that project from the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation.

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