The primary function of consciousness in the nervous system
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1) The article proposes that the primary function of consciousness is to integrate competing demands from specialized systems in the nervous system that influence skeletal muscle plans. 2) These "supramodular systems" operate in parallel to control actions like breathing, pain response, elimination, but can only collectively influence action through consciousness. 3) During a "supramodular conflict", when different systems demand opposing skeletal muscle actions, consciousness is necessary to integrate the systems and determine the appropriate response.
The primary function of consciousness in the nervous system
- 1. Articl e Le ad Autho r: lVIorsella, Ezequiel Date: 2007 Article: The Primary Function of Consciousness in the Nervous System 1. Pain felt at: a. Ifthe article specifically asserts unborn children feel pain, at what post fertil ization age? b. Page: 38, Fourth Paragraph. " ...one can unconsciously emit a pain-withdrawal response." 2. Nociceptors: a. Ifthe article states nociceptors are present, at what post-fertilization age? b. Page: 3. Thalamus link: a. If t he article states nerves link nociceptors to the thalamus, at what post fertilization age? b. Page: 4. Subcorti cal plate link: a. If th e article states nerves link to the subcortical plate, at what post-fertilization age ? b. Page: 5. Noxious stimuli reaction: a. Does the article refer to reaction to noxious stimuli? At what post-fertilization age? b. Page: 6. Stress horm ones: a. Does the article refer to increase in stress hormones with noxious stimuli? At wh at post-fertilization age? b. Page: 7. long-term effects: a. Does the article describe long term harmful effects from exposure to noxious sti muli? b. Page: 8. Fetal anesthesia: a. Does the article refer to use of fetal anesthesia and its effect? At what post fertilization age? b. Page: 9. Cortex: a. Does the article relate to the asserted need for cortical involvement to experience pain? How?
- 2. ARBS Annual Review of Biomedical Sciences pdf freely available at httpilarbs .bibliotecn.llllesp.br 2007;9:37-40 The Primary Function of Consciousness in the Nervous System* Ezequiel MorseJla l , Stephen C Krieger2, Sergio Rizzo-FontanesP, John A Bargh4 IDepartment of Psychology, San Francisco State University, USA 2Department of Neurology, Mount Sinai Medical Center, New York, USA 3 Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, USA 4 Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, USA Received: 09 December 2007; accepted 12 December 2007 On line on 19 December 2007 Abstract Marsella E, Krieger SC, Rizzo-Fantanesi S, Bargh JA . The Primary Function o/Consciousness in the Nervous System. ARBSAnnu Rev Biomed Sci 2007;9: 3 7-40. The integration consensus proposes that consciousness integrates activities in the nervous system that would otherwise be independent, but it fails to specify which kinds of integration require consciousness. By contrasting the task demands of consciously-penetrable processes (e.g., pain) and consciously-impenetrable processes (e.g. , pupillary reflex and peristalsis), Supranlodular Interaction Theory proposes that consciousness is required to integrate agentic, high-level systems that are vying for (specifically) skeletomotor controL as described by the principle of parallel responses into skeletal muscle (PRISM). Thus, consciousness functions above the leve l of the traditional module to permit cross-talk among specialized, and often multi-modal, systems. @ by sao Paulo Stale University - ISSN 1806-8774 Keywords: Consciousness, function of consciousness, integration consensus, mind-body problem Consciousness (the elusive phenomenon falling under the rubrics of 'awareness', 'sentience', or 'subjective experience') is said to be possessed by an organism ifthere is something it is like to be that organism - something it is like, for example, to be human and experience pain or yellow afterimages (Nagel, 1974). We address what consciousness is by examining why one is aware of some nervous system events (e.g., pain, urge to breathe), but not others (e.g., intersensory interactions, peristalsis, pupillary reflex). Thus, we propose that consciousness serves a basic function in the nervous system that is intimately related to the actions of the skeletal muscle system . • This article is based on a theory introduced in Psychological Review (Morsella, 2005) I Correspondence Ezequiel Morsella. Department ofPsychology, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, EP 301 , San Francisco, CA, 94132, USA. Email: morsella@sfsu.edu, webpage: http ://bss .sfsu.edu/emorse lla S Krieger: stephen .krieger@mssm.edu S Rizzo-Fontanesi : srf@sfsu.edu JA Bargh: j ohn.bargh@yale.edu
- 3. The integration consensus proposes that consciousness somehow integrates neural activities and inform ation-processing structures that would otherwise be independent. Thus, consciousness allows diverse kinds of information to be gathered in some sort of global workspace (see reviews in Baars, 2002; Merker, 2007; Morsella, 2005). However, it is illlcear which kinds of information must be distributed and integrat d in a conscious manner and which kinds can be distributed and integrated unconsciously. Obviously not all kinds of information are capable of being distributed globally (e.g., neural activity related to reflexes, vegetative functions, illlconscious motor programs, and low-level perceptual analyses) and many kinds can be disseminated and combined with other kinds without conscious mediation, as in the many cases of intersensory processing. For example, the McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976) involves interactions between visual and auditory processes: an observer views a speaker mouthing 'ba' while pTesented with the sound ' ga' . Surprisingly, the observer is unaware of any intersensory interaction, perceiving only 'da'. Consistent with the view that consciousness is associated with only a subset ofall brain regions and processes (Merker, 2007), these phenomena demonstrate that consciousness is unnecessary to integrate information from different modalities. Hence, which kinds of integration require consciousness? Sup ramodular Interaction Theory (SIT; Morsella, 2005) addresses this issue by contrasting the task demands of consciouslY-impenetrable processes (e.g., pupillary reflex, peristalsis, intersensory conflicts, and 'vegetative' actions) and consCiously-penetrable processes (e. g., pain, urge to breathe). SpecificaJly, SIT contrasts interactions that are consciously impenetrable with conscious conflicts, a dramatic class of conscious interactions between different information-processing systems. Conscious conflicts are basic part of the hillDan experience. For example, when one experiences the common event of holding one's breath underwater, withstanding pain, or suppressing elimination behaviors, one is simultaneously conscious of the inclinations to perfornl certain actions and ofthe inclinations to not do so. SIT builds on the integration consensus by proposing that consciousness is required to integrate information, but only certain kinds of information. Specifically, it is required to integrate information from specialized, high-level (and often multi-modal) systems that are unique in that they may conflict with skeletal muscle plans, as described by the principle of Parallel Responses into Skeletal Muscle (PRlSM). These supramodu/ar systems are defined in terms of their 'concerns' (e.g., bodily needs) rather than in terms of their sensory afference (e.g., visual, auditory). Operat ing in parallel, supramodular systems may have different operating principles, concerns, and phylogenetic histories (Morsella, 2005). For example, an air-intake system has the skeletomotor tendencies of inhaling; a tissue-damage system has those of pain withdrawal; an elimination system has those of micturating and defecating; a food-intake system has those of licking, chewing, and swallowing. Thus, each system can influence action directly and unconsciously, but it is only through consciousness that they can influence action collectively, as during a conscious conflict (e.g., when carrying a scorching plate or holding one 's breath). Supramodular Conflict Supramodular systems are inflexible in the sense that, without consciousness, they are incapable oftaking information generated by other systems into account. For example, the tissue-damage system is 'encapsu lated' in the sense that it will protest damage even when the action engendering the damage is lifesaving. According to SIT, one can breathe unconsc ioLisly, but consciousness is required to suppress breath ing. Sim ilarly, one can unconsciously emit a pain-withdrawal response, but one cannot over-ride such a response for food or water concerns without consciousness. Similar classes of conflict involve air-intake, food-intake, water-intake, sleep onset, and the various elimination behaviors. PRISM Figuratively, there are multiple systems trying to control the same 'steering wheel' (i .e., the skeletal muscle system) in the nervous system. For example, expressing (or suppressing) inhaling, blinking, pain withdrawa l, micturating, and defecating all involve, specifically, skeletal muscle plans. Accordingly, regarding processes such as digestion, one is conscious of only those phases requiring coordination with skeletomotor plans (e.g., chewing, defecating) and none ofthose that do not (e.g., peristalsis). Conversely, no skeletal muscle plans are directly involved in unconscious processes such as the pupillary reflex, peristalsis, bronchial dilation, and vasoconstriction (all involving smooth muscle); and heart rate regulation (involving cardiac muscle). Regarding a process such as digestion, one is conscious of only those phases requiring coordination with skeletal muscle plans (e.g., chewing). The PRlSM acronym is conceptually 38 http://arbs. biblioleca .unesp.br ARBS Annu Re. Biamed Sci 2007;9 :37-40 .
- 4. related to the principle, for just as a prism com bines di ffe rent colors to yield a single hue, consciousness culls simultaneously activated tendencies to yield adaptive skeletomotor action . Why Skeletal Muscles are 'Voluntary' Muscles: since the nineteenth century it has been known that, though often functioning unconsciously (as in blinking and breathing), skeletal muscle is the only effec tor that can be consciously controlled, but why this is so has never been explained . SIT introduces a reinterpretation of this age-old fact: skeletomotor actions are at times 'consciously mediated' because they are directed by multiple, encapsulated systems that, when in conflict, require consciousness 10 yield adaptive action. Accordingly, incompatible skeletomotor intentions (e.g. , to point right and left, to eat and not eat, to inhale and not inhale) produce strong, systematic changes in consciousness. For example, in a paradigm in which participants are trained to introspect conflict-related aspects of cognition during an interference task and then introspect the same 'thing' while sustaining compatible intentions (e.g.• pointing left with a given finger and vibrating that fmger) and incompatible intentions (e.g., to point left and right with the same finger), participants reported stronger systematic changes in subjective experience when sustaining incompatible than compatible skeletomotor intentions, even though participants w ere always in a motionless state (Morsella et al., 2006). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that, of the traditional forms of flanker interference in variants of the classic Eriksen flanker task (e.g., stimulus interference and response interference; Eriksen & Schultz, 1979), response interference produces the strongest subjective effects (Morsella et al., 2007). This is consistent with the observation that conflicts occurring at perceptual levels of processing (e.g., intersensory conflicts as in ventriloquism) are not as subj ctively taxing as those occurring at response selection levels of processing, whether in interference tasks, approach-avoidance conflicts (Livnat & Pippenger, 2006), or the delay of gratification (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Figuratively speaking, people tend not to experience any mental strife while watching a ventriloquist or being subjected to the McGurk effect, but such is apparently not the case while they perform interference tasks or exert self-control. PRJSM also correctly predicts that certain aspects ofthe expression (or suppression) of emotions (e. g. , aggression, affection), reproductive behaviors, parental care, and addiction-related behaviors should be coupled with consciousness, for the action tendencies of such processes may compromise skeletal muscle plans. Conversely, one will never be conscious of activities such as peristalsis, for they do not require communication across systems in order to yield adaptive action. Consistent with this approach, automatic actions (e.g., reflexive swallowing) involve substantially fewer brain regions than their intentional counterparts (e.g. , volitional swallowing; Kern et al., 200 I). In summary, SIT explains why some processes are con cious while others are not, and why skeletal muscle is the only muscle that is controlled 'voluntarily' . Bu ilding on the integration consensus, SIT allows one to appreciate that not all kinds of integration involve consciousness and that conscious and unconscious processes may be distinguished by the nature of the effectors involved. Given these developments, the time has come for neuroscience to isolate the neuroanatomical regions that embody supramodular cross-talk and to illuminate the physical events that render it conscious. References Baars BJ. The conscious access hypothesis: origins 311d recent evidence. Trends Cogn Sci 2002;6:47-52. Eriksen, CW, Schultz, DW. Information processing in visual search: a continuous flow conception and experimental results . Percept Psychophys 1979;25 :249-63 . Kern MK, Safwan J, Amdorfer RC, Shaker R. Cerebral cortical representation of reflexive and volitional swallowing in humans. Am J Physiol: Gastr L 2001 ;280:G3 54-G360 . Li vnatA, Pippenger N. An optimal brain can be composed of conflicting agents. Proc Nat Acad Sci USA 2006; I03 :3198-202. McGurk H, MacDonald 1. Hearing lips and seeing voices . Nature 1976;264 :746-8 . Merker B . Consciousness without a cerebral cortex : a challenge for neuroscience and medicine. Behav Brain Sci 2007;30:63-134. Metcalfe J, Mischel W. A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification : dynamics of willpower. Psycho! Rev 1999;106:3-19. Morse lla E. The functi on of phenomenal states : supramodular interaction theory . Psycho! Rev 2005; Il2: 1000-2l. Morsella E, Gray JR, Levine LR, Bargh JA. On the function of consciousness : the subjective experience of incompatible intentions. Poster presented at the 18,h Annual Convention of the American Morsella E e/ a/. • Funclion or Con sciou sness 39
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