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Birgitte Snabe
The Usage of System Dynamics
in Organizational Interventions

Birgitte Snabe
The Usage of
System Dynamics
in Organizational
Interventions
A Participative Modeling Approach
Supporting Change Management Efforts
With a foreword by Prof. Dr. Peter Milling
Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag

Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der
Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über
<http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.
Dissertation Universität Mannheim, 2006
D 17
flage Dezember 1997
1. Auflage März 2007
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© Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2007
Lektorat: Brigitte Siegel / Anita Wilke
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Printed in Germany
ISBN 978-3-8350-0711-6

Foreword
Internationalization and globalization are major forces for companies to
change their organizational structures and processes fundamentally. To
master the associated problems, profound and well planned procedures are
indispensable, a task which is referred to as change management, and which
has to take into account both structural and dynamic aspects. Especially
interventions in the area of human resource management lead to manifold
repercussions—intended and unintended, enhancing or interfering with the
original intentions. Birgitte Snabe investigates in her dissertation if and to
what extent System Dynamics can be helpful to design organizational
interventions and to examine and evaluate in a next step which particular
actions offer adequate problem solutions.
In a distinction from the permanent organizational adaptation to a
changing environment, the author understands organizational interventions
as discrete and fundamental changes to the company’s structures and
processes. The management of organizational interventions consists of two
interdependent cycles: Problem formulation, analysis and solution (what to
do) on the one hand, and the resulting actions to make the change happen
(how to do it) on the other. It is a central hypothesis of the investigation that
the implementation of solutions to strategic problems often presents larger
challenges than the development of the solution itself. The methodological
support for effective implementation processes is the core topic of the
dissertation.
Following an ‘action research’ approach, a delicate and far reaching
personnel decision in a large corporation was investigated and is discussed.
System Dynamics uses participative model building since about 1990 and
offers the prerequisites for mapping contexts which are difficult to quantify.
The author presents the development of a complex system model and the
implementation of its recommendations both in the practical steps of the
concrete case under investigation and in the abstract form necessary for
scientific analysis. She demonstrates the power of the selected modelling
approach and points out how group dynamics lead to the integration of

Foreword
VIII
initially individual objectives and strategies into a generally accepted
process model – i.e. into a “shared mental model”.
Mrs. Snabe’s work skillfully combines theoretical considerations and
aspects of the practical implementation. The propositions about organi-
zational interventions developed in the conceptual parts of the study are
tested in a rigorous – even though not extensive and representative –
practical setting. Their viability is shown in the context of top-management
decision making.
Peter Milling

Preface
The managers below the top executives in large corporate organizations are
often placed in the challenging situation of implementing other people’s
ideas. Top executives will frequently launch strategic initiatives, and expect
the managers at lower levels to act as change leaders even though they have
often played only a small or no part at all in the groping strategy forming
process where the strategic initiative has its origin. Consequently, there is a
need for learning processes that focus on the transfer of the insights and
reasoning behind the decision, as well as supporting the refining of
implementation plans. Furthermore, the processes should allow iterations
with top executives, with the dual objective of adjusting the strategic
initiative according to implementation issues and giving the managers
responsible for implementation true influence on the entire process. To a
great extent, this dissertation addresses the process of transfer of insights
and ownership as well as the operationalization of strategic initiatives and
other change projects. The main topic is the usage of system dynamics
modeling in organizational interventions in general, and specifically the use
of system dynamics modeling for the purposes of change management. The
first two chapters mainly discuss organizational interventions and the use of
modeling in decision-making and policy forming processes, which is the
predominant application of system dynamics. The last three chapters
concentrate on a rather specific application of system dynamics: modeling in
a change management context. Change management dedicated application of
system dynamics builds upon the theories and methods of system dynamics
in a decision-making and policy-forming context, but aims at the transfer of
insights and ownership from decision-makers to implementers, as well as
refining and aligning cross-organizational implementation plans.
Writing this doctoral dissertation has been an interesting journey for
me. I have enjoyed the opportunity to take the time to go into depth with the
literature especially from the disciplines of system dynamics and
organizational psychology. Coming directly from 10 years of management
consulting, the academic experience has been of great personal and

Preface
X
educational value to me. I would therefore like to sincerely thank first of all
Professor Dr. Peter Milling for supporting me on my journey. He and
assistant Professor Dr. Andreas Größler have guided me with great patience
through the learning process – helping me to adjust my normative and
solution-oriented worldview from the consulting world to also embrace
scientific and academic viewpoints. I would also like to thank all my
doctoral colleagues at ‘Industrieseminars’ for the weekly discussions at the
doctoral seminars, and Markus Salge and Dr. Nadine Schieritz especially for
always volunteering to finding literature and discussing modeling issues.
Furthermore, I want to thank my good friend since early childhood, Kirstine
Munk, who has been struggling with her own dissertation at the same time as
me. Although our subjects are very different, we have had many and
interesting discussions on a wide variety of issues including theories of
science, social constructivism, aesthetic in consultations and workshops, and
using cognitive frameworks (being both models and horoscopes!) to reduce
personal barriers for involvement and honesty in discussions. Last but not
least, I want to thank my husband, Jim Hagemann Snabe. As well as
receiving personal support in many ways, I have also been very privileged to
be able to draw on his extensive business experience and conceptual
capabilities.
Birgitte Snabe

List of Contents
Foreword ..............................................................................................VII
Preface .................................................................................................. IX
List of Figures ......................................................................................XV
List of Tables..................................................................................... XVII
A. Organizational Intervention Skills as Corporate Competence........ 1
I. The Need for and the Challenges of
Organizational Interventions ......................................................... 1
II. Foundation and Strategies for Planned Change Interventions....... 10
III.The Usage of System Dynamics Modeling
in Organizational Interventions ................................................... 15
B. Conceptual Foundation for the Usage of System Dynamics ......... 27
I. The Usage and Utility of Modeling in Decision-Making.............. 27
II. Cognitive and Behavioral Rationale for the
Usage of System Dynamics ......................................................... 35
1. Individual Learning and Change of Behavior in a
Complex and Dynamic Environment ...................................... 35
2. Establishing Group Consensus by Sharing Mental Models...... 46
3. Enhancing Organizational Learning through System
Thinking Experience and Double-Loop Learning ................... 51

List of Contents
XII
III.The Development Process of System Dynamics Models
in Corporations ........................................................................... 56
1. Decompositions and Iterations in Model Development ........... 58
a. Problem Definition and System Conceptualization............. 58
b. Model Formulation and Testing......................................... 62
c. Policy Formulation and Implementation ............................ 66
2. Designing System Dynamics Modeling-Based Interventions... 68
a. Experimentation-Based Learning Cycles ........................... 68
b. Knowledge Acquisition in Modeling Projects .................... 71
c. Designing Participative Modeling Interventions ................ 73
d. Facilitation of Participative Modeling Interventions .......... 77
C. A Case Study Using Participative System Dynamics Modeling
in the Implementation of a Sensitive Change Project.................... 83
I. Research Considerations for the Case Study Application............. 83
II. Case Study: Refining and Implementing a Location Strategy....... 89
1. The Problem and its Context .................................................. 89
2. Intervention Process............................................................... 93
3. The Model and Selected Simulations...................................... 98
III.Evaluation of the Case Study .....................................................108
1. A Framework for Evaluating the Effectiveness and
Efficiency of the Case Study .................................................108
2. Conclusions on Case Study Effectiveness and Efficiency.......116

List of Contents XIII
D. The Usage and Utility of Participative Modeling
in Change Management.................................................................119
I. Context Factors Relevant for Deciding on
Usage of Modeling in Change Management ...............................120
II. Process Considerations ..............................................................128
1. Business Objectives and Targets Directing and
Framing the Intervention.......................................................131
2. Structured Development of Change Leaders..........................135
3. Designing the Change Process...............................................140
4. Facilitation of modeling and simulation sessions ...................148
III.Outcomes of Participative Modeling Efforts in the
Implementation of Change Programs..........................................155
1. Modeling and simulation as a tool for transfering insights
and ownership from decision-makers to implementers...........155
2. Refining and Aligning Implementation Plans
Through Scenario Simulation................................................157
3. Organizational Learning in Change Management
Oriented Modeling................................................................158
E. Targeted Participative Modeling in Change Management...........161
Appendices...........................................................................................165
Bibliography.........................................................................................201

List of Figures
Figure A-1: The Basic Model of Corporations ...................................... 2
Figure A-2: Model of stages of problem solving ................................... 5
Figure A-3a: Diagnostics and decision-making (cycle I) ......................... 6
Figure A-3b: Change management (cycle II)........................................... 6
Figure A-4: Goal-seeking system ........................................................ 16
Figure B-1: Accumulative levels of models in the usage of system
dynamics ......................................................................... 30
Figure B-2: Limited linear perception of system ................................. 36
Figure B-3: Theory of planned behavior ............................................. 43
Figure B-4: Different limited linear perceptions of a system ............... 47
Figure B-5: Mental models as instruments between actual systems
and formal models ........................................................... 51
Figure B-6: The basic structure of organizational learning .................. 54
Figure B-7: Formal models supporting organizational learning ........... 56
Figure B-8: The learning cycle for learning labs ................................. 70
Figure B-9: Mental database and decreasing content
of written and numerical databases................................... 71
Figure B-10: Maps, frameworks and microworlds................................. 74
Figure B-11: A model of communication .............................................. 79
Figure B-12: The Wallow Curve at work .............................................. 81

List of Figures
XVI
Figure C-1: The reinforcing growth loop underlying the
intervention ..................................................................... 91
Figure C-2: Intervention process as communicated in the project........ 94
Figure C-3: The location strategy model............................................. 99
Figure C-4: Fraction of employees in low-cost countries compared
to total number of employees in the division ................. 104
Figure C-5: Development in cost-index for an average productive
unit (e.g. cost for one employee for a fixed period) ....... 105
Figure C-6: Development of productivity index for an average unit
(e.g. output/month/unit) ................................................. 105
Figure D-1: Conceptual modeling steps in the case study .................. 128
Figure D-2: Four antecedent processes in organizational
interventions.................................................................. 144
Appendix D, Figure 1: The preliminary model in the case study....……. 185
Appendix E, Figure 1: Simulation run of adjusted model
(avoiding rate-on-rate modeling)………….……..187
Appendix E, Figure 2: Model without rate-on-rate modeling……...…… 188

List of Tables
Table C-1: Roles and responsibilities as defined in the project........…. 95
Table C-2a: Main sources for evaluation of outcomes on
Individual level…………………………………….………... 111
Table C-2b: Main sources for evaluation of outcomes on group level…… 112
Table C-2c: Main sources for evaluation of outcomes
on organization level………………………………………… 113
Table C-2d: Main sources for evaluation of system dynamics
compared to other approaches……...……………………….. 114
Table C-2e: Main sources for evaluation of the usage of system dynamics
in a change management context……………………………. 115
Table C-3: Questionnaire results……..………………………….……. 118
Table D-1: Political characteristics of situations in terms of the
issues of interest, conflict, and power………………..…... 123
Table D-2: Generic symptoms of change resistance..………………… 142
Appendix A, Table 1: Parameters relevant to high-cost locations……… 167
Appendix A, Table 2: Parameters relevant to low-cost locations………. 168
Appendix A, Table 3: Parameters mainly relevant for transfer of tasks
and build-up of employees in low-cost locations………… 169
.
Appendix B, Table 1: Main equations influencing stock levels…………171
Appendix B, Table 2: Main equations influencing production/month…..172

A. Organizational Intervention Skills as Corporate
Competence
I. The Need for and the Challenges of Organizational
Interventions
Finding ways to lead and develop organizations is a constant quest seeking to
ensure competitiveness in a changing and dynamic world, which is well
illustrated by Forrester’s words calling change “the essence of the manager’s
environment.”1
Furthermore, industries are typically facing shorter changes
cycles in new technologies, competition, value chain, environmental factors, and
customer demands, resulting in an increased need for effectiveness and efficiency
in organizational change processes.2
The changes constitute challenges
representing both threats and new opportunities for the individual business
organization, putting pressure on its ability to learn and transform.3
Organizations
change in various ways: in organic, incremental processes of adapting to
changing environments or in more abrupt organizational interventions.4
The latter
way is the focus of this dissertation.
1
Forrester, Jay W.: Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 1.
2
See Kotter, John P: Leading Change, Boston, 1996, p. 18; Fine, Charles H.:
“Clockspeed-based strategies for Supply Chain Design”, Production and
Operation Management, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000, p. 213; Brown, John Seely:
“Research That Reinvents the Corporation”, Harvard Business Review, August
2002, p. 105.
3
In de Geus, Arie P.: “Planning as Learning”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 66,
No. 2, March-April 1988, p. 71, it is proposed that ”the ability to learn faster
than competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage.“
4
The Japanese concept of Kaizen is an example of a continued process
improvement focus, whereas the western world typically is more oriented
towards innovation- and result-oriented thinking, see Imai, Masaaki: Kaizen:
Der Schlüssel zum Erfolg der Japaner im Wettbewerb, German translation,
München, 1992, p. 15.

A. Organizational Intervention Skills as Corporate Competence
2
Discussions of the concepts of ‘organizations’ and ‘interventions’ cover a
wide range of literature from the sciences of management, the social sciences and
system sciences. Taking a departure from the field of cybernetics, Takahara
offers a rather generic definition of an organization as “a complex system of
interconnected human and nonliving machines; and it is formed for a purpose, to
achieve a certain goal.”5
In line with this definition, Milling has described the
basic model of corporations as a goal-seeking input-output feedback system:
Figure A-1: The Basic Model of Corporations6
In this basic model of corporations, two different, but interrelated, conceptual
processes form the basic structure: the causal stratum, which is the operative
5
Takahara, Yasuhiko: “A Formal Model of Organization”, in Takahashi, Singo,
Kyoichi Kijima and Ryo Sato (eds.): Applied General Systems Research on
Organizations, Tokyo, 2004, p. 3.
6
Own translation of figure in Milling, Peter: Systemtheoretische Grundlagen zur
Plannung der Unternehmenspolitik, Berlin, 1981, p. 17. It should be noted that
the original figure uses the German term “Führungsstratum” (translated to
Managing Stratum) which is a broader term also encompassing the meaning of
leading, steering, controlling. This model is chosen due to its abstraction level
suitable to illustrate the concept of interventions. Takahara offers a more
detailed basic model of organizations decomposing the operational level (the
causal stratum), which inherent has a stronger focus on internal structures and
coordination challenges; see Takahara, Yasuhiko: A Formal Model of
Organization, in Takahashi, Singo, Kyoichi Kijima and Ryo Sato (eds.): Applied
General Systems Research on Organizations, Tokyo, 2004, pp. 10—13.
Managing Stratum
Causal Stratum
Goals
Resource
input
Achieved
output
Interventions Feedback

A. Organizational Intervention Skills as Corporate Competence 3
domain producing the output, and the higher-level managing stratum, which
includes information processing to goal compliant forming and controlling of the
causal stratum.7
In the social-psychological field of science, Argyris describes
organizational interventions from a task point of view stating: “the
interventionist’s primary tasks are to generate valid information, to help the client
system make informed and responsible choices, and to develop internal
commitment to these choices”.8
The terms ‘the interventionist’ and ‘the client’
are often used in intervention literature.9
Although disagreement exists with
regards to the importance of independence of the system and the intervener, the
contemporary literature focusing on organizational development typically sees
organizational interventions as embracing both change processes with and
without the use of external interventionists.10
The client system can, in the social-
psychological field of science, be an individual, a group of people or an
organization. At these three levels, behavioral changes are largely explained with
7
Milling, Peter: Systemtheoretische Grundlagen zur Plannung der Unternehmens-
politik, Berlin, 1981, p. 18. Milling later decomposes the managing stratum into
four levels: the normative level (formulation of long-term goals), the structuring
level (determination of the basic structures), the adaptive level (specification of
change programs) and the operative level (selection of actions), p. 20.
8
Argyris, Chris: Interventions Theory and Method – A Behavioural Science
View, Reading, Massachusetts, 1970, p. 21.
9
Cummings, Thomas G. and Christopher G. Worley: Organizational Development
and Change, Ohio, 2001, p. 142, describe the term intervention as “sequenced
planned actions or events intended to help an organization increase its
effectiveness. Interventions purposely disrupt the status quo; they are
deliberately attempts to change an organization or sub-unit towards a different
and more effective state.” Linguistic, the term ‘intervention’ indicates, that a
party is proactively doing something to change the system. This is also seen in
fields like economy (state interventions) and foreign affairs (armed conflicts).
10
In Argyris, Chris: Interventions Theory and Method – A behavioural Science
View, Reading, Massachusetts, 1970, p. 15, the importance of independency
between the client and the interventionist is stressed, whereas in Schein, Edgar
H.: Process Consultation, Boston, 2000, part II, p. 35, (collection of work first
published in the 1960’s), it is argued that both external consultants as well as
managers from within the company can serve the role of the interventionist.
Recent textbooks generally support the latter view.

4
the same mechanisms, having the change of attitudes and intentions of
individuals as a central element.11
Offering an additional perspective from the social-psychological field of
science, Schein identifies three basic models of organizational interventions as
being (1) The Purchase of Expertise Model, (2) The Doctor-Patient Model, and
(3) The Process Consultation Model.12
In the Purchase of Expertise Model, the
role of the interventionist is to provide recommendations based on expert
information and services, whereas the Doctor-Patient Model starts with an
investigation of ‘symptoms’ followed by analyses and recommendations made by
the interventionist. In both The Purchase of Expertise Model and The Doctor-
Patient Model, the primary objective is the identification of ‘the solution.’ The
third intervention model, The Process Consultation Model, focuses rather on
strengthening the organization’s own ability to identify the core problem in
general, as well as finding a suitable solution in the specific situation.
Furthermore, the Process Consultation Model focuses strongly on stakeholder
involvement in the search for sustainable change, as was also seen in Argyris’
discussion of establishment of internal commitment.
Theories of organizational interventions are closely linked with those of
decision-making and problem solving. The processes of decision-making and
problem solving from individual, group and organizational perspectives are
extensively discussed in the literature.13
11
See Chin, Robert and Kenneth D. Benne: “General Strategies for Effecting
Changes in Human Systems”, in Bennis, Warren G., Kenneth D. Benne and
Robert Chin: The Planning of Change, 4th
edition, New York, 1985, p. 24; and
Bungard, Walter and Catrin Niethammer: “Psychologische Aspekte des Change
Management im interorganisationalen Kontext”, in Walter Bungard, Jürgen
Fleischer, Holger Nohr, Dieter Spath and Erich Zahn (eds.), Customer
Knowledge Management, Stuttgart, 2003, p. 109.
12
Schein, Edgar H.: Process Consultation, Boston, 2000, part I, pp. 9—12, and
part II, pp. 29—35. It should be noted, that this book mainly consists of reprints
from his work in the late 1960’s. Schein’s work in general addresses the last
intervention model type, the Process Consultation Model.
13
In Akkermanns, Henk: Modelling With Managers, Breda, The Netherlands,
1995, pp. 7—12, a literature overview of decision-making and problem solving
is found, covering Operation Management, System Dynamics, Strategic
Management, Operations Research/“Soft OR”, Group Decision Support Systems
and Organizational Psychology.

Figure A-2: Model of stages of problem solving14
Figure A-2 illustrates a problem-solving process of iterative stages with
two conceptual cycles succeeding the problem identification (the “felt need” in
the center of the figure). Cycle I (figure A-3a) includes the problem formulation,
producing proposals for solutions and forecasting consequences and testing
proposals. Cycle II (figure A-3b) includes action planning, taking action steps
and evaluating outcomes.
14
See Schein, Edgar H.: Process Consultation, Boston, 2000, part I, p. 61. The
model is an elaboration of a model originally developed by Richard Wallen for
use in sensitivity training programs. The model has strong similarities with
Dörner’s “Steps in Planning and Action”, although Dörners model less sharp
separate in a planning and an implementation part, see Dörner, Dietrich: The
Logic of Failure, New York, 1996, p. 43. Also, the model has similarities with
the PDCA-cycle (Plan-Do-Check-Act) as seen in TQM. The PDCA-cycle is a
generic version of the Deming Cycle, see Imai, Masaaki: Kaizen: Der Schlüssel
zum Erfolg der Japaner im Wettbewerb, german translation, München, 1992,
p. 87.
6
Evaluating
outcomes
4
Action planning
1
Problem
formulation
2
Producing
proposals
for solutions
3
Forecasting
consequences,
testing proposals
Felt
need
5
Taking
action steps

6
Figure A-3a: Diagnostics and decision-making (cycle I)
Figure A-3b: Change management (cycle II)
For organizational interventions addressing the strategic problems of
larger organizations, the two cycles of problem solving are typically discussed in
6
Evaluating
outcomes
4
Action planning
1
Problem
formulation
2
Producing
proposals
for solutions
3
Forecasting
consequences,
testing
proposals
Felt
need
5
Taking
action steps
6
Evaluating
outcomes
4
Action planning
1
Problem
formulation
2
Producing
proposals
for solutions
3
Forecasting
consequences,
testing
proposals
Felt
need
5
Taking
action steps
6
Evaluating
outcomes
4
Action planning
1
Problem
formulation
2
Producing
proposals
for solutions
3
Forecasting
consequences,
testing
proposals
Felt
need
5
Taking
action steps
6
Evaluating
outcomes
4
Action planning
1
Problem
formulation
2
Producing
proposals
for solutions
3
Forecasting
consequences,
testing
proposals
Felt
need
5
Taking
action steps

two distinct areas: the area of strategy forming and the area of strategy
implementation.15
The latter is described in the change management focused
literature from the disciplines of organizational psychology and organizational
development (OD). Cycle I of interventions have their primary focus on
diagnostics and decision-making, which for strategic organizational interventions
can be understood as strategy forming. In the field of organizational psychology,
cycle I activities are normally labeled ‘organizational diagnostics’ which is
leading to the initiation of the planned change process.16
Cycle II interventions,
focusing on planning, carrying out and following up on implementation, comprise
what in the fields of organizational psychology and OD are typically categorized
as ‘planned change’ interventions.
The iterative and recursive nature of the entire problem solving process
(both cycle I and cycle II) should not be underestimated, as also discussed in the
problem solving system described by Flood, “Total System Intervention”.17
Total
System Intervention focuses on creative problem investigation and deliberate
selection of methods to solve problems, through an iterative and recursive
process of three phases, (1) creativity, (2) choice, (3) implementation. In this
context, strategy forming is influenced by implementation considerations and
experiences, and the strategy implementation constitutes in itself a new cycle
with the need for creative ideas on how best to implement the strategy and the
choice of the best methods to achieve the implementation.
Research within the area of strategy forming proposes that the way
corporations address strategic problems should be considered as groping,
interactive processes emphasizing learning, creativity, synthesis, and sharing of
mental models among decision-makers.18
In this regard, the understanding of
15
Huff, Anne S. and Rhonda Kay Reger: “A Review of Strategic Process
Research”, Journal of Management, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1987, p. 212. It should be
noted, that Huff and Reger use the term strategy formulation rather than strategy
forming.
16
The term ‘diagnostics’ is often used as heading for activities leading to the
planned change interventions, e.g. see the list of contents in Bennis, Warren G.,
Kenneth D. Benne and Robert Chin: The Planning of Change, 4th
edition, New
York, 1985 as well as in Cummings, Thomas G. and Christopher G. Worley:
Organizational Development and Change, Ohio, 2001.
17
Flood, Robert L.: Solving Problem Solving, Chichester, 1995, p. 32.
18
See Mintzberg, Henry: The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, New York,
1994, p. 77; de Geus, Arie P.: “Planning as Learning”, Harvard Business

8
mental models offers some interesting perspectives on the challenges in the
process. The interpretation of mental models varies significantly in the literature
from understanding mental models as “pre-compiled” limited conceptual
representations to seeing them as implicit, foggy, intuitive system perceptions
also involving the subconscious.19
Despite difficulties in the literature to agree on
a definition on mental models, it seems that general agreement exists in the
understanding, that mental models influence behavior and decisions significantly,
and that in information selection and interpretation, people subconsciously seek
confirmation of their existing mental models, which can also result in them
rejecting or ignoring information that contradicts their beliefs.20
Due to the
complexity of social systems, the strategy forming processes must encourage
strategies and assumptions to be challenged from inside or outside the problem-
solving environment to challenge improper beliefs people may have about causal
relations in their mental models.21
Review, March-April 1988, p. 71; Davenport, Thomas H.: Process Innovation,
Boston, 1993, pp. 278—279. In Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.: “Strategy as Strategic
Decision Making”, Sloan Management Review, Spring 1999, p. 66, this process
is described as “building collective intuition.”
19
For a discussion on mental models and literature on mental models, see among
others Senge, Peter M.: The Fifth Discipline, New York, 1994, pp. 174—204;
Doyle, James K. and David N. Ford: “Mental models concepts for system
dynamics research”, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 1998,
pp. 3—29, Doyle, James K. and David N. Ford: “Mental models concepts
revisited: some clarifications and a reply to Lane”, System Dynamics Review,
Vol. 14, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 3—12. The word ‘subconscious’ is used in this
dissertation as “existing or operating in the mind beneath or beyond
consciousness”, see Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the
English Language, New York, 1989, p. 1414.
20
See Vennix, Jac A. M.: Group Model Building, Chichester, 1996, p. 21; Senge,
Peter M.: The Fifth Discipline, New York, 1994, p. 175; Kampmann, Christian
P. E.: Feedback complexity and market adjustment – An experimental approach,
Boston, 1992, p. 29; Bakken, Bent E.: Learning and Transfer of Understanding
in Dynamics Decision Environments, Boston, 1993, p. 30; Hogarth, Robin:
Judgment and Choice – The Psychology of Decision, 2nd
edition, Chicago, 1987,
p. 130.
21
See Bakken, Bent E.: Learning and Transfer of Understanding in Dynamics
Decision Environments, Boston, 1993, p. 30; Argyris, Chris: Reasoning,
Learning, and Action – Individual and Organizational, San Francisco, 1982,
p. 39.

The challenge of improper beliefs and the improvement and realignment
of mental models is not only relevant among the executive decision-makers, but
is often critical in larger circles. In many organizations, decentralization and
empowerment have resulted in business decisions being made also at the lower
levels of the organizational hierarchy. Therefore, new strategies can seldom be
implemented only by introducing new guidelines or policies, as it is required that
a larger number of employees understand why the organization must change as
well as understand the reasoning behind the new strategy. Consequently, the
transfer of insights gained by the decision-makers in the strategy forming process
is of great importance. In terms of the previously introduced problem solving
cycles, this means that the insights gained in Cycle I need to be transferred to the
people responsible for the implementation (cycle II). A further argument for this
transfer of insights to take place in the intervention process is the trend among
business organizations to motivate employees using non-monetary instruments
such as involvement and influence, which requires the employees to have in-
depth understanding of the relevant strategic issues.22
Some researchers, however,
are questioning the importance of this value substitution at times of high
unemployment rates and strong focus on cost rationalizations.23
A number of major researchers within the field of strategic planning
devote much attention to the discussion of problems in the implementation of
strategies and policies, as implementations far too often remain unsuccessful.24
A
parallel can also be drawn with Repenning and Sterman’s view on improvement
programs, which argue that successful implementation of new methods represents
a bigger challenge than identifying or learning new improvement methods.25
22
See Schein, Edgar H.: Organisationspsykologi, Danish translation, Herning,
1990, p. 53; Kieser, Alfred: “Human Relations-Bewegung und Organisations-
psychologie”, in Kieser, Alfred (ed.): Organisationstheorien, 3rd
edition,
Stuttgart, 1999, pp. 101—131.
23
This viewpoint is discussed in Jöns, Ingela: Managementstrategien und
Organisationswandel, Mannheim, 1995, p. 156.
24
See Preface, Warren, Kim: Competitive Strategy Dynamics, Chichester, 2002.
For a theoretical discussion of the implementation problem, see also McPherson
III, L. Fillmore: “Organizational Change: An Industrial Dynamics Approach”, in
Edward B. Roberts (ed.): Managerial Applications of System Dynamics,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978, pp. 447—449.
25
See Repenning, Nelson P. and John D. Sterman: “Nobody Ever Gets Credit for
Fixing Problems that Never Happened: Creating and Sustaining Process

10
Senge furthermore lists a number of studies documenting significant failure rates
in achieving sustainable change in top management-driven change initiatives.26
In
other words, the implementation of a solution to a strategic problem can even
constitute a bigger challenge than finding the solution.27
II. Foundation and Strategies for Planned Change Interventions
Lewin is often accredited as being the intellectual founder of ‘planned change’
organizational interventions, and he is still one of the most frequently quoted
authors in the social sciences.28
Planned change refers to attempts where change
is “conscious, deliberate, and intended, at least on the part of one or more agents
related to the change attempt”.29
The theories of planned change are concerned
with the complex processes of learning and change necessary to overcome the
normal resistance most humans have towards change, even when the goals are
apparently highly beneficial.30
Planned change in Lewin’s perspective is also
known as the “unfreezing-movement-freezing” process. Social systems seem to
have some sort of “inner resistance” to change, indicating that in spite of the
Improvement”, California Management Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, Summer 2001,
p. 65.
26
Senge, Peter M.: The Dance of Change, New York, 1999, pp. 5—6.
27
This does not imply that strategy making is easy. Rethinking strategies and entire
business concepts is both a difficult and crucial task in given situations; see
Hamel, Gary: Leading the Revolution, Boston, 2000, p. 28; Fine, Charles H.:
“Clockspeed-based strategies for Supply Chain Design”, Production and
Operation Management, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000, pp. 213—221.
28
See preface in Gold, Martin: The Complete Social Scientist: A Kurt Lewin
Reader, Washington, 1999; Schein, Edgar H.: Organisationspsykologi, Danish
translation, Herning, 1990, p. 249.
29
See Chin, Robert and Kenneth D. Benne: “General Strategies for Effecting
Changes in Human Systems”, in Bennis, Warren G., Kenneth D. Benne and
Robert Chin: The Planning of Change, 4th
edition, New York, 1985, p. 22.
30
The intervention process described by Argyris concerning moving an individual,
a group or an organization towards Model II theory-in-use and double-loop
learning is an example of an extensive and detailed planned change intervention
in action research tradition, see Argyris, Chris: Reasoning, Learning, and Action
– Individual and Organizational, San Francisco, 1982, especially pp. 162—162
and pp. 468—474.

application of a force, the social process will not change without an additional
force to break the habit, to unfreeze existing customs.31
Unfreezing existing
behavior or attitudes can take place through the mechanisms of weakening
existing behavior or attitudes, then the establishment of feelings of dislike
regarding the present situation, and also establishment of psychological feeling of
safeness in the change process.32
The second phase in the planned change process
is the actual change part with development of new attitudes and behavior based
on new information and cognitive and affective redefinitions. The last phase in
the planned change process (freeze) is concerned with how to change behavior in
a sustainable way, avoiding it sliding back to its old level in a short time.33
To
strive for sustainable and continuous benefit of new attitudes and behavior, useful
mechanisms could be testing the congruence between the change and the
individual’s own situation, team-building efforts and continuous support, or
recognition from both formal and informal leaders in the organization.34
Lewin’s
theories of planned change originally focus on cognitive and behavioral change
aspects related to a specific change situation, but researchers often also
emphasize the broader term organizational learning. Argyris and Schein both
place interventions as part of the continuous learning and forming of the
organization and its change readiness, Senge emphasizes the importance of
improving system thinking skills, and Sterman emphasizes the importance of
helping organizations to improve the critical thinking skills necessary to
challenge future mental models and biases, opposed to only helping to solve a
specific problem.35
31
Lewin, Kurt: “Group Decision and Social Change” (first published in Newcomb
and Hartley’s Readings in social psychology, 1948, pp. 330—341), in Gold,
Martin: The Complete Social Scientist – A Kurt Lewin Reader, Washington,
1999, p. 281.
32
See Schein, Edgar H.: Organisations Psykologi, Herning, 1990, pp. 254—255.
33
Lewin, Kurt: “Group Decision and Social Change”, in Gold, Martin: The
Complete Social Scientist – A Kurt Lewin Reader, Washington, 1999, p. 265.
The arguments include, that behavior observed in a training program is often not
continued when the person goes back to his normal routines.
34
See Schein, Edgar H.: Organisationspsykologi, Herning, 1990, pp. 256—257;
and Change, Ohio, 2001, pp. 22—30.
35
Argyris, Chris: Interventions Theory and Method – A Behavioural Science
View, Reading, Ma., 1970, chapters 1 & 2; Schein, Edgar H.: Organisations-

12
The planning of organizational interventions always, more or less
deliberately, reflects underlying change strategies.36
Chin and Benne have
developed a taxonomy of strategies for effecting changes in human systems,
consisting of three types of general strategies:37
• Empirical-Rational Strategies assume changes to be adopted
if they are rationally justified. Examples in business
organizations include allocation of funding, personnel
replacement and scientific management projects.38
• Normative-Re-educative Strategies focus the change process
on attitudes, values and skills, inspired from the fields of
sociology and psychology. These strategies are often less
concerned with solving specific problems but rather focus on
organizational development and improving the problem-
solving capabilities of the organization.
• Power-Coercive Strategies emphasize political and
economical sanctions in the exercise of power, or even
playing upon sentiments of guilt and shame. Top-down
implementation of new strategies or policies often has
implicit elements of use of power.
psykologi, 1990, p. 40; Senge, Peter M.: The Fifth Discipline, New York, 1994,
pp. 57—67; Sterman, John D.: “All models are wrong: reflections on becoming a
systems scientist”, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winther 2002,
p. 526.
36
Borum, Finn: Strategier for organisationsændringer, Copenhagen, 1995, p. 15.
37
Chin, Robert and Kenneth D. Benne: “General Strategies for Effecting Changes
in Human Systems”, in Bennis, Warren G., Kenneth D. Benne and Robert Chin:
The Planning of Change, 4th
edition, New York, 1985, pp. 22—45.
38
The school of scientific management dates back to the early 20th century with
Taylor’s work on rational optimization of work processes. The most well known
mechanism element might be the detailed time studies of work procedures,
although this should be seen in context with the underlying principles, including
focus on science development, scientific basis for selection and development of
workmen, and friendly cooperation between the management and the men, see
Taylor, Frederick W.: The Principles of Scientific Management, New York,
1967, (first published in 1911), pp. 129—130.

Another taxonomy proposed by Borum includes The Technical-Rational
Change Strategy, The Humanistic Change Strategy and The Political Change
Strategy.39
The first two types in each of the taxonomies are rather similar,
whereas Borum’s political change strategy has less focus on coercive elements
and more focus on interpersonal negotiations, handling of personal interests,
personal power-bases and interpersonal conflicts. Although using the terminology
‘change mindsets’ rather than ‘change strategies’, Anderson and Anderson
compare the ‘industrial mindset’, including power and control, predictability,
discrete events, with the ‘emerging mindset’, including participation, uncertainty
and self-organization.40
The study of change strategy taxonomies contributes to
enabling change agents to deliberately construct intervention strategies based on
scientific research, and intervention strategies of large and complex corporate
change programs are likely to combine elements from two or more of the general
change strategies. A central element in such intervention strategies is the
overcoming of human resistance to change.41
Literature discussions on change
resistance mostly center on attitudes and intentions towards change, with attitudes
being influenced by cognitive, affective and conative elements. Ajzen offers a
widely used framework for the study of change of behavior based on the change
39
In Borum, Finn: Strategier for organisationsændringer, Copenhagen, 1995, the
change strategies are discussed thoroughly, and at p. 117, a schematic overview
can be found. Furthermore a fourth change strategy regarding network
organizations/communities is discussed.
40
Anderson, Linda A. and Dean Anderson: “Awake at the Wheel: Moving beyond
Change Management to Conscious Change Leadership”, OD Practitioner,
Vol. 33, No. 3, 2001, p. 44. The two mindsets seem to a high extend to
correspond with the traditional two views on Man-in-Organization: The Human
View vs. The Resource View, see Leavitt, Harold J., William R. Dill, and Henry
B. Eyring: The Organizational World – A systematic view of managers and
management, New York, 1973, pp. 122—123.
41
Overcoming human resistance to change is among the most discussed topics the
literature of strategy implementation and change management, see Cummings,
Thomas G. and Christopher G. Worley: Organizational Development and
Change, Ohio, 2001, pp. 154—173; Argyris, Chris: Interventions Theory and
Method – A behavioral Science View, Reading, Ma., 1970, p. 70.

14
of intentions leveraging on attitudes, norms and perceived behavioral control.42
This framework will be discussed further in chapter B.
The intervention context, primarily understood as organizational and
problem characteristics, is the main factor influencing the intervention strategy
and the decisions on intervention mechanisms.43
Context elements include the
organization’s management traditions such as authoritarian or democratic
decision processes.44
According to Jöns, when strategy implementation also
encompasses changes in the organization’s philosophies, it is insufficient that the
implementation process addresses qualifications and acceptance; the
implementation process must also address the underlying values of the
organization and to a higher degree includes employee development, information
and participation.45
Different science schools exist in regards to using theory or the real world
as the starting point for an academic research approach.46
In the field of planned
change, action research belongs to the most recognized approaches. Action
research takes the theoretical point of departure, that dynamic systems such as
organizations can be examined through carefully planned, theory-based
interventions.47
Action research is formative as well as summative, as the
42
Ajzen, Icek: Attitudes, Personality and Behavior, Chicago, 1988, pp. 20—131.
See also Rouwette, Etiënne: Group model building as mutual persuasion,
Nijmegen, 2003, pp. 104—111, for a discussion on Ajzen’s framework.
43
See Rouwette, Etiënne: Group model building as mutual persuasion, Nijmegen,
2003, p. 103.
44
See Schein, Edgar H.: Organisationspsykologi, Herning, 1990, p. 142 for a
literature overview of management traditions in regards to involvement of
subordinates in decisions.
45
Jöns, Ingela: Managementstrategien und Organisationswandel, Mannheim, 1995,
p. 157.
46
An extensive literature-based discussion of the relationship between practice and
theory in organizations theories in general (not specific related to action
research) can be found in Scherer, Andreas G.: “Kritik der Organisation oder
Organisation der Kritik? Wissenschaftstheoretische Bemerkungen zum Umgang
mit Organisationstheorien”, in Kieser, Alfred (ed.): Organisationstheorien,
3rd
edition, Stuttgart, 1999, pp. 1—37.
47
See Schein, Edgar H.: Organisationspsykologi, Herning, 1990, pp. 249—259;
and Change, Ohio, 2001, pp. 22—30. Action research has some parallels to the
field of cybernetics, where focus is on behavior of systems (what does it do)

interventions are altered if resultant data or changing conditions suggest the
appropriateness.48
Action research projects do not involve traditional science
evaluation models, e.g. the use of control groups, as the complex social
environment is not controllable to a degree that allows isolation of the true
variables. Furthermore, action research projects and practical use is supposed to
coexist with mutual benefit, also in regards to evaluation. Evaluation of human
systems will influence the system, for example as a Hawthorne effect or as
expectation settings.49
Consequently, interventions in action research tradition
must be designed in a way where the academic evaluation is not counter-
productive with regards to the desired results of the intervention.
III. The Usage of System Dynamics Modeling in Organizational
Interventions
On an abstract, conceptual level, modeling takes place in organizations all the
time. Every time a decision is made, the decision maker’s cognitive model of the
situation will influence the decision.
Figure A-4 is a model of decision maker (D) and the process (P), which is
the target for goal-seeking decision making. Ideally, rational decision-making
should be a function of P, input and output of P, as well as system goals (G) and
decision principles (DP).50
rather than on a detailed understanding of the system elements (what is this
thing), see Ashby, W. Ross: An Introduction to Cybernetics, paperback version,
London, 1964, p. 1.
48
See Gold, Martin: The Complete Social Scientist – A Kurt Lewin Reader,
Washington, 1999, p. 253.
49
The Hawthorne effect is widely discussed in various literatures and typically
refers to performance improvements among workers participating in
experiments, although no theoretical basis exists for the effects. According to
Wikipedia, accessed April 2006, Mayo Elton has interpreted the performance
improvement among workers (the Hawthorne effect) as: “it was the feeling they
were being closely attended to that caused the improvement in performance.”
50
Only external information input (ue) is made explicit, as resource input is viewed
as controllable in P. M, Ue, Y, represent the sets of values of the manipulating
value, the external input and the outcomes. The decision problem is to find the
decision variable (m) in M such that G(m,ue,P(m,ue)) is maximized. For further

16
Figure A-4: Goal-seeking system51
However, in social-economic systems, due to uncertainty and complexity, only a
limited cognitive model of P will be available (Pm
) for the decision-making.
Furthermore, D will be characterized by perceptions, motivation, and personal
values.
Figure A-4 illustrates the often-implicit use of modeling in decision-
making, whereas system dynamics offers an explicit, deliberate use of modeling.52
description see Takahara, Yasuhiko: “A Formal Model of Organization”, in
Takahashi, Singo, Kyoichi Kijima and Ryo Sato (eds.): Applied General Systems
Research on Organizations, Tokyo, 2004, pp. 15—21.
51
Takahara, Yasuhiko: “A Formal Model of Organization”, Tokyo, 2004, p. 16.
52
It should be noted, that a model is always only a limited reflection of a real
system, representing a given viewpoint on a problem or a system, based on
human decisions on parameters and structures to be included in the model. In
Sterman, John D.: “All models are wrong: reflections on becoming a systems
scientist”, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 2002, p. 525, a
model is called “a simplification, an abstraction, a selection“ and “inevitably
incomplete, incorrect – wrong.” Nevertheless, modeling offers an opportunity to
overcome a number of the problems in unsupported decision-making, as
discussed later in this chapter.
G, DP
D, P
P
m
u y
e

The system dynamics field has its origin as a primarily analytical and rational
oriented problem-investigating and policy-forming discipline.53
Forrester states
that the purpose of system dynamics in corporate environments is to aid in the
design of improved industrial and economical systems, and system dynamics has
over the years contributed significantly to create insight being used in strategic
planning and policy design.54
System dynamics offers a complementary
opportunity to analyze complex and dynamic problems, as most of the traditional
tools offered by the strategic planning field, are largely static, and thereby often
insufficient in our present-day environment of complexity and dynamics,
consequently resulting in actions often being made based on intuition and
experience.55
System dynamics addresses the need for decision makers to learn and
understand complex problems and situations. Since Descartes, cognitive science
has been interested in how humans learn.56
Human brain processes are event-
orientated, which – without long experience or effective learning - makes it
53
In Forrester, Jay W.: Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 56, objectives in
using mathematical models are described as follows: “A mathematical model of
an industrial enterprise should aid in understanding that enterprise. It should be
a useful guide to judgment and intuitive decisions. It should help establish
desirable policies.” Milling, Peter: “Leitmotive des System-Dynamics-
Ansatzes”, Wirtshaftswissenschaftliches Studium, Vol. 10, 1984, p. 508, also
supports this understanding of system dynamics: “System Dynamics verwendet
formale Modelle, um zu einem verbesserten Verständnis des zu studierende
Phänomens zu gelangen und um Eingriffe in das System auf ihre Konsequenzen
hin zu untersuchen.”
54
See Forrester, Jay W.: Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 115. For
examples of the practical usage of system dynamics, see the numerous cases
published in System Dynamics Review over the years.
55
See Lyneis, James M.: Corporate Planning and Policy Design: A System
Dynamics Approach, Massachusetts, 1980, p. 3; and Warren, Kim: Competitive
Strategy Dynamics, Chichester, 2002, preface; Mintzberg, Henry: The Rise and
Fall of Strategic Planning, New York, 1994, p. 319.
56
In René Descartes first major contribution, 1628, “Regulae ad directionem
ingenii,” regarding rules for the use of the human’s cognitive means, a method
for acquiring scientific or any other type of rational founded insight is described,
see Lübcke, Poul (ed.): Politikens filosofi leksikon, Copenhagen, 2001,
pp. 82—87. Wikipedia (accessed April 2006) describes the work as a method for
scientific and philosophical thinking and translates the title of the book into
“Rules for the Direction of the Mind.”

18
difficult to comprehend feedback-loops of even relatively simple and small
dynamic structures, resulting in problem-solving in the area of strategic, complex,
and dynamic problems often not taking unwanted side-effects, delayed reactions
and policy resistance into consideration.57
Although companies deal with these
types of complex problems every day, they have often not been solved using
analytical tools, but have in many respects been managed based on past
experiences on what works and what does not – with respect to the existing
production facilities, portfolios of customers, products, etc. This experience-
based decision-making is regularly implemented as heuristics, rules of thumb,
organizational routines or the use of simplifications and traditions.58
No explicit,
formal models underlie this type of decision-making, but the experience-based
decision-making is building on mental models of individuals.
While intuitive, implicit knowledge such as simple heuristics and
experience proves to be helpful in many situations (particularly when dynamics
are rather low), it is insufficient in innovative and rapidly changing situations.59
This dependence on erroneous intuitive solutions is, in the view of Forrester, the
cause of most misbehavior in corporate systems.60
System dynamics can help decision-makers cope with and understand
situations and problems, that would have taken years to understand based on
empirical experiences. The accelerated learning is partly due to the structured
emphasis on understanding and exploring how behavior is influenced by
corporate structures and policies, partly due to the aid of computer modeling to
design improved policies and resource allocation and the utilization of the
computers’ ability to calculate thousands of iterations, and partly due to the
57
See Sterman, John D.: Business Dynamics – Systems Thinking and Modeling for
a Complex World, Boston, 2000, pp. 10—11; Kampmann, Christian P. E.:
Feedback complexity and market adjustment – An experimental approach,
Boston, 1992, p. 31; Bakken, Bent E.: Learning and Transfer of Understanding
in Dynamics Decision Environments, Boston, 1993, pp. 29—30; Dörner,
Dietrich: The Logic of Failure, New York, 1996, pp. 38—42.
58
Größler, Andreas: “A Content and Process View on Bounded Rationality in
System Dynamics”, Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Vol. 21, No. 4,
July/August, 2004, p. 320.
59
Bonabeau, Eric: “Don’t Trust Your Guts”, Harvard Business Review, May 2003,
pp. 118—119.
60
Forrester, Jay W.: “System Dynamics, System Thinking, and Soft OR”, System
Dynamics Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1994, p. 249.

creation of improved and shared mental models among the decision-makers
across multiple organizational units.61
De Geus gives three main reasons for going through the trouble of making
and simulating computer models.62
These main reasons are: (1) that most people
only are able to deal with a few variables at a time, and this only in one or two
time iterations, (2) the need for separation of cause and effect in time and space,
and (3) computer models help to identify what information is most relevant. The
first reason in particular, is also supported in Miller’s work on limitations on the
amount of information humans are able to receive, process and remember.63
De
Geus’ arguments further include statements on computer models, often revealing
counter-intuitive behavior, which is a view also supported by Lane.64
Milling
furthermore emphasizes the synergy of combining human creativity with the
capabilities and the power of high-speed computing.65
The system dynamics
literature often points out promising results from the transfer research regarding
computer simulations, which according to Bakken “may be attributed to
motivational side-effects of the interactive pedagogy”.66
Lastly, the data acquiring
process in quantitative modeling processes is in itself valuable for understanding
61
Lyneis, James M.: Corporate Planning and Policy Design – A System Dynamics
Approach, Massachusetts, 1980, p. 9 and p. 15; Lane, David C.: “Should System
Dynamics be Described as a ‘Hard’ or ‘Deterministic’ System Approach?”
Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Vol. 17, 2000, p. 4.
62
de Geus, Arie P.: “Planning as Learning”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 66,
No. 2, March-April 1988, pp. 70—74.
63
Miller, George A.: “The Magical Number Seven, Plus Minus Two: Some Limits
on Our Capacity for Processing Information”, The Psychological Review,
Vol. 63, No. 2, March 1956, p. 95.
64
Lane, David C.: “Should System Dynamics be Described as a ‘Hard’ or
‘Deterministic’ System Approach?”, Systems Research and Behavioral Science,
Vol. 17, 2000, p. 4.
65
Milling, Peter: “Modeling Innovation Processes for Decision Support and
Management Simulation”, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1996,
p. 227.
66
Bakken, Bent E.: Learning and Transfer of Understanding in Dynamics Decision
Environments, Boston, 1993, p. 31.

20
the problem parameters, and stimulates best practice discussions and brings to
surface misperceptions among key individuals.67
In the 1990’s a school within the field of system dynamics, oriented
towards participative modeling approaches, emerged with increased embracing of
softer aspects such as organizational learning, group processes, and the
importance of consensus and commitment.68
This development might follow from
the change in organizational structures in many organizations. Modern
organizations with a high degree of employee empowerment typically have a
need for a large number of people to have an understanding for the whole of the
organization and its strategy, including the dynamics and the interdependencies,
to be able to make the right decisions in their daily work as well as for
motivational factors. This to some degree substitutes the “old way” with a few
executives directing strategies and policies to be implemented downwards in the
organization. The challenge of interventions nowadays is therefore not only to
find good solutions to problems or new situations. The solution must also be
understood and find acceptance among the many stakeholders, and efforts of
establishing internal commitment in organizational interventions are often
centered on the creation of awareness, consensus, and confidence regarding the
goals and the change process.69
Although system dynamics projects (participative modeling, in particular)
are concerned with both cognitive and behavioral aspects relevant for
implementation, system dynamics modeling efforts are typically elements in
organizations’ strategy forming, with less focus on strategy implementation.
However, the value creation of a corporate modeling study is seldom “a new
67
See Warren, Kim: Competitive Strategy Dynamics, Chichester, 2002, p. 30;
Snabe, Birgitte and Andreas Größler: “Targeted Participative Modelling as
Organisational Intervention: Concept and Case Study”, Journal of Systems
Research and Behavioral Science, Vol. 23, No. 4, in print, 2006, p. 20.
68
Through the introduction of participative model-building methodologies and
“planning as learning”, focus has been put on creating conceptual insights,
changing mental models of decision-makers and creating consensus and
commitment; see Vennix, Jac A. M.: Group Model Building, Chichester, 1996,
p. 97; de Geus, Arie P.: “Planning as Learning”, Harvard Business Review,
March-April 1988, p. 70; Lane, David C.: “Modelling as Learning: A
consultancy methodology for enhancing learning in management teams”,
European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 59, No.1, 1992, pp. 64—84.
69
See Akkermans, Henk: Modelling With Managers, Breda, p. 20.

policy” to be implemented subsequently, but rather the learning that appears
among modeling participants through the exploratory process examining the
problem and the system behavior.70
New improved mental models among
decision-makers will constitute a part of the solution, as the new insight and new
decided policies will influence future operational decisions. In many cases, no
formal implementation is needed, as the learning among decision-makers is all
that was required to solve the problem.71
Some projects, nevertheless, are taking
place in a context, where more formal implementation is needed, and for this
reason most of the system dynamics literature and textbooks calls for the
implementation challenge to be considered throughout the intervention process,
and also considers the iterative nature of the process.72
The purpose of a system dynamics modeling study is likely be articulated
as an exploratory exercise addressing a problem and possible solutions, and only
seldom to be stated as strategy forming or strategy implementation. Although
seen from a strategic organizational intervention viewpoint, addressing the
context of the modeling studies, such a modeling study has conceptual orientation
towards strategy forming due to the strong Cycle I focus. As explicit support of
the change management phase (Cycle II), in the implementation efforts when a
strategic decision is already made, almost no tradition exists for using system
dynamics in a modeling-oriented way, as most implementation-oriented SD
70
See Lane, David C.: “Modelling as Learning: A consultancy methodology for
enhancing learning in management teams”, European Journal of Operational
Research, Vol. 59, No.1, 1992, p. 64; Vennix, Jac A. M.: Group Model
Building, Chichester, 1996, pp. 98—99.
71
See Akkermanns, Henk: Modelling With Managers, Breda, 1995, p. 17.
72
Sterman, John D.: Business Dynamics, Boston, 2000, p. 80 and p. 88; Roberts,
Edward B.: “Strategies for Effective Implementation of Complex Corporate
Models”, in Edward B. Roberts (ed.): Managerial Applications of System
Dynamics, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 79—84. A more critical view on system
dynamics efforts in organizational interventions can be found in Zock,
Alexander: “A critical review of the use of System Dynamics for organizational
consulting projects”, at CD-ROM of Proceedings, System Dynamics Conference,
System Dynamics Society, 2004, p. 7, where it is argued that not even the
participative modeling approaches are sufficient attentive to the overall
challenges of change processes.

22
studies and approaches are concerned with gaming-oriented simulations such as
flight simulators and planning games.73
Taking the view of change management versus decision-making or
strategy forming, two conceptually different usages of system dynamics modeling
in organizational interventions appear:74
• Exploratory modeling supporting diagnosing, learning and decision-
making75
• Transfer-oriented modeling usage supporting change management
The focal point in this differentiation is the purpose of the usage of system
dynamics: exploring a problem versus to transferring existing insights. Modeling
used in supporting diagnosing, learning and decision-making is driven by the
desire to explore and understand system behavior and to identify and simulate
possible new policies addressing a complex problem. Such interventions do not
have the same degree of control characteristics as typical implementation
projects, for example detailed project plans or thorough stakeholder analyses and
73
The use of modeling-oriented simulations vs. gaming-oriented simulations
comes from the taxonomy proposed by Maier, Frank und Andreas Größler:
“What are we talking about? A taxonomy of Computer Simulations to Support
Learning”, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 16, No 2, 2000, p. 143. The term
‘modeling-oriented simulations’ does not refer to the context of the project in
regards to decision-making or implementation.
74
In this dissertation, strategic formulation is understood to include both strategic
planning and policy formulation. In the system dynamics society, the term
“policy formulation“ is often used as the aim of modeling projects with policies
being rules stating how the day-by-day operating decisions are made, see
Forrester, Jay W.: Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge, 1961, p. 93. Strategies are
constituted by both corporate goals and corporate policies, and strategic
planning is defined as the process of transforming corporate goals into policies,
see Lyneis, James M.: Corporate Planning and Policy Design: A System
Dynamics Approach, Boston, 1980, p. 19 and p. 3.
75
‘Exploratory modeling’ should not be mistaken with ‘exploratory models’ as
described in Homer, Jack B.: “Why we iterate: scientific modeling in theory and
practice”, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring 1996, p. 1. Homer
defines exploratory models as a kind of easy-made, draft models less occupied
with validation. In this dissertation ‘exploratory modeling’ refers to the purpose
of the project: to explore and understand a given problem, no matter if the model
used is less detailed or if it is highly developed and refined with scientific rigor.

communication plans. This is due to the fact, that for exploratory modeling
interventions, the organizational change process cannot be defined before the
outcome of the modeling process is (at least to some extent) clear.76
Often, a
strategy forming modeling intervention will result in changed mental models
among decision-makers; frequently, implementation will not take place in an
explicit, planned change manner.77
Exploratory modeling can take place as
‘participative modeling’ or as ‘expert modeling’, the difference primarily being
the way people are involved. In expert modeling, people – apart from the main
decision-makers and a few modelers - are primarily involved for information
collection purposes.78
In participative modeling, such as Group Model Building
and Modeling for Learning, people representing an extensive array of viewpoints
are involved in the modeling process itself, with strong focus on mental model
alignment and refinement.79
Transfer-oriented usage of system dynamics modeling belongs to the
planned change type of organizational interventions and has some common
characteristics with the field of action research, with its parallel focus on the
implementation of planned change as well as on continued knowledge
development.
80
The modeling project supports implementation processes where a
76
In Vennix, Jac A. M.: Group Model Building, Chichester, 1996, p. 99, it is
argued that learning cannot be predicted in the outset of a project.
77
In Vennix, Jac A. M.: Group Model Building, Chichester, 1996, p. 97, it is
argued that insights are conceptual rather than instrumental, and although
stressing that the purpose of system dynamics is performance improvement, he
also states (p. 99) that “implementation becomes evasive.” Richardson, George
P. and Alexander L. Pugh: Introduction to System Dynamics Modeling with
DYNAMO, Cambridge, 1981, p. 355, write that “a modeling study usually
focuses on what policies will help, not on how those policies ought to be
introduced into the system.”
78
See Forrester, Jay W.: “Policies, decisions and information sources for
modeling”, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1992,
pp. 59—60, and Forrester, Jay W.: Industrial Dynamics, Cambridge, 1961,
p. 364, where it is recommended to use industrial dynamics in a business
company by initiating in a small, exclusive group of people with the right
qualities to go in-depth with the dynamics of the company including the
“innermost secrets and hopes of the organization.”
79
Vennix, Jac A. M.: Group Model Building, Chichester, 1996, p. 112.
80
For definitions of action research, see Cummings, Thomas G. and Christopher G.
Worley: Organizational Development and Change, Ohio, 2001, p. 23.

24
strategy forming process has outlined business objectives and targets, but where
the optimization of the strategy or policy is left as a part of the implementation.
Therefore a balance is needed between the initial detail level of the objectives
and the degree of freedom to make decisions in the implementation process.
81
This could be called “framing the intervention”, giving participants
empowerment to explore, decide and act within a given ‘frame’ (how to do), but
not to explore, decide and act outside the given ‘frame’ (what to do). Transfer-
oriented usage of modeling could be called instrumental usage of modeling for
change management purposes. In respect to transfer of existing learning from one
group of people to another group of people, this type of modeling has similarities
with gaming-oriented simulations, such as flight simulators or educational games.
Gaming-oriented simulations make use of fixed models, with the purpose being
to transfer the understanding of the causal relations and the behavior of the
system. Compared with gaming-oriented simulations, transfer-oriented modeling
to a higher extends aims to transfer commitment in the search for sustainable
change. Through involvement and participation in modeling sessions,
implementers take part in the refining of the change program and the
operationalization of the implementation. In his description of the system
dynamics process, Forrester proposes a phase called “Educate and Debate”, in
which consensus for implementation is aimed for.82
The phase is placed after the
actual exploratory modeling, but is expected to raise questions resulting in
repeated analysis in the previous phases. If modeling were to be used in the
Educate and Debate phase, it would be an example of change management
oriented modeling. Although for transfer-oriented usage of modeling, it may or
may not be the case that a model has been developed in an earlier strategy
formulation phase.83
The modeling can also be based on a model especially
81
Borum, Finn: Strategier for organisationsændringer, Copenhagen, 1995, p. 58,
discuss the problem of “a free, informed choice as a condition for establishment
of commitment” in a change process planned and controlled by consultants.
82
Dynamics Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1994, p. 247.
83
An interesting case, where a modeling project was continued into instrumental
implementation activities is the well-known “Maintenance Game” described in
Repenning, Nelson P. and John D. Sterman: “Nobody Ever Gets Credit for
Fixing Problems that Never Happened: Creating and Sustaining Process
Improvement”, California Management Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, Summer 2001,
pp. 64—88.

drafted for the project. Using such a preliminary model of the problem-system,
the process should allow for interactive refining and evaluation of the model
itself, and through both model adjustments, model enhancements and model
simulations, the modeling approach has the threefold aim of change program
refining, transfer of system understanding, and establishment of commitment.
The design of participative modeling interventions supporting change
management can draw from the normative, prescriptive management literature of
planned change with regards to activities such as intervention planning,
stakeholder management and implementation planning and review. Intervention
planning includes the definition of business objectives and targets, the framing of
the intervention, the identification of consultation relationships, roles and
responsibilities in the project organization, and time and budget planning.
Stakeholder management involves a thorough analysis of all the major interest
groups and individuals who have significant influence - directly or indirectly - on
the success of the intervention. Focus is on interests and power, importance for
solution design and implementation, and relevant means of involvement and
communication.
84
Stakeholder analysis is a major input to intervention planning,
both to secure relevant parameters to be included in the process, and to secure
appropriate involvement and communication with stakeholders and other
employees.
85
Implementation planning and review deals with the planning of the
implementation, including a communication plan and a clear assignment of
responsibilities. The communication plan develops over the course of the
intervention and includes elements such as motivating change and the
communication of visions, results, implementation plan and successes. Planning
activities for implementation should to be understood as something to be done
84
See Flood, Robert L. and Michael C. Jackson: Creative Problem Solving – Total
Systems Intervention, Chichester, 1991, p. 12; Argyris, Chris: Interventions
Theory and Method – A Behavioural Science View, Reading, Massachusetts,
1970, p. 81; and Borum, Finn: Strategier for organisationsændringer,
Copenhagen, 1995, pp. 77—89.
85
For discussions on “Employee Involvement”, see both Cummings, Thomas G.
and Christopher G. Worley: Organizational Development and Change, Ohio,
2001, p. 317; and Thun, Jörn-Henrik, Peter M. Milling, and Uwe Schwellbach:
“The Impact of Total Employee Involvement on Time-based Manufacturing”, in
Blackmon, Kate, Steve Brown, Paul Cousins, Andrew Graves, Christine
Harland, Richard Lamming, and Harvey Maylor (eds.): “What Really Matters in
Operations Management”, Bath, 2001, pp. 133—135.

26
only after a strategy or policy has been designed. Involving the right people in the
right way early in the process might be one of the most important criteria for
successful implementation later, together with communication strategies
including timely information and dialogues. Also, the iterative process continues
after implementation activities, as follow-up activities will create learning to be
used for further corrective actions.
The main differentiator of modeling supporting change management
compared to other approaches within the field of system dynamics, is the usage
and utility of participative modeling in a new context, namely in strategy
implementation rather than strategy formation. The main research objective is to
investigate whether change management-oriented participative modeling seems
to be an effective approach seeking sustainable change through:
• Transfer of insight from decision-makers to implementers in such a way
that not only the decisions but also the underlying arguments are
effectively transferred,
• Allow true involvement of implementers through participative strategy
refinement within a given decision ‘frame’ and strategic direction.
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: chapter B is a
theoretical discussion of the conceptual foundation for the usage of system
dynamics in organizational interventions. The discussion is not limited to usage
of system dynamics in change management, but rather it aim to investigate the
general purposes and methods for using system dynamics, which is traditionally
placed in decision-making and strategy and policy forming contexts. Focus on
usage of system dynamics in a change management context, begins in chapter C,
which describes a field study and an underlying research approach. In Chapter D
the insights from the field study are discussed in terms of both the theory basis
from chapter B and the normative, prescriptive management literature from the
field of organization development and planned change. Chapter E concludes with
the discussions from the previous chapters and proposes areas for further
research.

B. Conceptual Foundation for the Usage of
System Dynamics
The description of the conceptual foundation for the usage of system dynamics
involves a journey through a variety of disciplines: although it is based in
mathematics, physics and engineering, system dynamics also draws on cognitive
and social psychology, economics and other social sciences.86
According to
Martinez and Richardson, conceptual differences in research designs can be
discussed in terms of theory, method and procedure elements.87
The theories
underlying the usage of system dynamics (why use system dynamics) are
discussed in chapter B.II: Cognitive and Behavioral Rationale for the Usage of
System Dynamics. The methods and procedures for the usage of system
dynamics in organizational interventions (how system dynamics is used) are
described in chapter B.III: The Development Process of System Dynamics
Models in Corporations. Before the theory, method and procedure discussions,
however, chapter B.I seeks to place the usage of system dynamics within the
overall context of decision-making.
I. The Usage and Utility of Modeling in Decision-Making
In the field of decision-making Baron discusses utility theory as a normative
model concerned with elements of (1) the trade-off between the probability of an
outcome and its utility, (2) the trade-offs among different goals, (3) maximizing
utility over all relevant people as a normative model for moral decisions, and (4)
86
Sterman, John D.: Business Dynamics – Systems Thinking and Modeling for a
Complex World, Boston, 2000, pp. 4—5.
87
Martinez, Ignacio J and George P. Richardson: “An Expert View on the System
Dynamics Modeling Process: Concurrences and Divergences Searching for Best
Practices in System Dynamics Modeling”, at CD-ROM of Proceedings, System
Dynamics Conference, System Dynamics Society, 2002, p. 25.

B. Conceptual Foundation for the Usage of System Dynamics
28
handling conflicts among outcomes that occur at different times.88
The rationality
based expected-utility decision-making is often seen analyzed in the traditions of
operations research, decision trees, game theories, etc. 89
Whereas principles of rational choice are considered as reasonable in
abstract form, their implications are often violated in actual choices. In socio-
economic systems it is an illusion to assume perfect rational decision-making due
to complexity, uncertainty and human factors. The topic of complexity and
complex systems has been of great interest to scientists using terms such as
theories of holism, cybernetics, general system theory, chaos theories etc. since
World War I.90
Although not undertaking a formal definition of complexity,
Simon explains a complex system as “one made up of a large number of parts
that have many interactions.”91
In system theory traditions, Senge and Sterman
describe complexity as consisting of detail complexity and dynamic complexity.92
Milling further divides detail complexity into three sub-dimensions: number of
relevant elements (variety), number of connections between elements
(connectivity), and functional relationship between elements (functionality).93
88
Baron, Jonathan: Thinking and Deciding, 3rd
edition, Cambridge, UK, 2000,
pp. 223—243.
89
See Baron, Jonathan: Thinking and Deciding, Cambridge, UK, 2000, p. 227, for
a discussion on using game theory to examine expected-utility decision-making.
Expected-utility is also a cornerstone in the expected-monetary-value method;
see e.g. Tversky, Amos: “Additivity, utility and subjective probability”,
in Edwards, Ward and Amos Tversky (eds.): Decision Making, 1967,
pp. 208—238.
90
In Simon, Herbert A.: The Science of the Artificial, 3rd
edition, Cambridge,
1996, pp. 169—181, an overall discussion is offered on the major scientific
trends in this field.
91
Simon, Herbert A.: The Science of the Artificial, Cambridge, 1996,
pp. 183—184.
92
Senge, Peter M.: The Fifth Discipline, New York, 1994, p. 71; Sterman, John
D.: Business Dynamics – Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World,
Boston, 2000, p. 21.
93
Milling, Peter: “Kybernetische Überlegungen beim Entscheiden in komplexen
Systemen”, in Entscheiden in komplexen Systemen, Wirtschaftskybernetik und
Systemanalyse, Band 20, Berlin, 2002, p. 12.

B. Conceptual Foundation for the Usage of System Dynamics 29
Simon’s view on rationality is, that whereas human decision-making is not
rational from an economic standpoint, it is still purposeful.94
Simon argues that in
real-world context even rational expectationists are retreating from rational utility
maximizing to a more realistic scheme of adaptive expectations.95
Decisions are
constrained not only by human process capabilities, but also by an incomplete
search for information. This only continues until a satisfactory solution is found
(contrary to seeking an optimal solution).96
History is full of grave examples of
people seeking to solve a problem and actually managing to worsen the situation
despite the best intentions. This is often due to what Forrester calls
“counterintuitive behavior of social systems”, or “policy resistance” in Sterman’s
terminology, where unintended side effects and neglected feedback loops make a
system behave differently from the intentions of the intervener.97
The literature
offers extensive discussion on these phenomena: the descriptive literature
identifies the deficiencies of traditional, unsupported decision making, whereas
the prescriptive tradition offers a number of methods and techniques to overcome
these limitations.98
When seeking to improve the organizational decision-making,
organizations make different types of analyses and models. For problems
characterized by feedback loops and delays, organizations can make use of
94
Herbert Simons view was expressed in the 1950’s, and discussed in Hogarth,
Robin: Judgement and Choice – The Psychology of Decision, 2nd
edition,
Chicago, 1987, p. 63.
95
Simon, Herbert A.: The Science of the Artificial, 3rd
edition, Cambridge, 1996,
p. 39.
96
Vol. 63, No. 2, March 1956, p. 95; Vennix, Jac A. M.: Group Model Building,
Chichester, 1996, p. 27.
97
Forrester, Jay W.: “Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems”, in Collected
Papers of Jay W. Forrester, Cambridge, 1975, p. 216. In Sterman, John D.:
Business Dynamics – Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World,
Boston, 2000, pp. 5—9, a larger number of examples of policy resistance are
described. In Dörner, Dietrich: The Logic of Failure, New York, 1996, a few,
but more detailed examples are discussed throughout the book; including
failures in Third World efforts and the Chernobyl disaster.
98
See Rouweette, Etiënne: Group model building as mutual persuasion, Nijmegen,
2003, pp. 19—29, for a description of descriptive and prescriptive view-points
in decision-making.

30
explicit conceptual feedback models (system thinking). Examples of such system
thinking efforts are soft operations research, cognitive mapping, structured
system discussions etc. A particular category of explicit, conceptual feedback
models is taking advantage of mathematical computer models and simulation.
These are the system dynamics models.
Figure B-1 tries to graphically depict the accumulative use of models in system
dynamics.
Figure B-1: Accumulative levels of models in the usage of system dynamics
The three levels in figure B-1 are accumulative; i.e. in addition to the use
of formal mathematical models, system dynamics also comprises explicit,
conceptual feedback models as well as intuitive and experience-based models.
This is in accordance with Kampmann, who stresses that intuitive assumptions
underlie any type of model.99
The usage of qualitative and quantitative models
serve the purpose of changing the mental models of the decision makers, as
mental models are seen as a vehicle to change decisions and organizational
action.100
The difference between system thinking and system dynamics cannot be
99
Kampmann, Christian P. E.: Feedback complexity and market adjustment,
Boston, 1992, p. 28.
100
Keough, Mark and Andrew Doman: “The CEO as organization designer – An
interview with Professor Jay W. Forrester, the founder of system dynamics”, The
Use of Implicit, Experience-based Models (Mental Models)
Use of Explicit, Conceptual Feed-back Models
(e.g. CLD or Soft OR)
Use of Formal,
Mathematical Models
(Simulation Models)
Intuition &
Experience
System
Thinking
System
Dynamics

seen as reflecting the differences between hard and soft modeling approaches, as
system dynamics is located somewhere between the two extremes.101
Hard
modeling is a term used for single objective optimization, typically without
taking people and organization into account.102
Although system dynamics uses
mathematical formulas and relatively rigid model structures, it also encompasses
soft modeling fundamentals like focus on generating debate and new insights
about the problem at hand.103
The field of system dynamics often has vital debates concerning the
advantages of qualitative modeling as seen in the system thinking area vs. the
advantages of quantitative modeling as seen in system dynamics. The opinions
differ from the one extreme, that only if a model is quantified and simulated, a
study can be said to be complete, to the other extreme, that for a complex system
with many soft relationships, quantification itself can be damaging.104
Some of the better known qualitative modeling approaches include
Checkland’s Soft System Methodology (SSM), which is a “process of enquiry”,
Eden’s Strategic Option Development and Analysis (SODA), using cognitive
mapping for strategic options development and Senge’s use of Cause-Loop-
Diagrams (CLD) in building learning organizations.105
The goals of qualitative
McKinsey Quarterly, No. 2, 1992, p. 5; Kim, Daniel H. and Peter M. Senge:
“Putting systems thinking into practice”, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 10,
Nos. 2-4, Summer-Fall 1997, p. 280.
101
In Sterman, John D.: Business Dynamics – Systems Thinking and Modeling for a
Complex World, Boston, 2000, pp. 4—5.
102
Maani, Kambiz E. and Robert Y. Cavana: Systems Thinking and Modelling –
Understanding Change and Complexity, Auckland, 2000, p. 21.
103
In Forrester, Jay W.: “System dynamics, system thinking, and soft OR”, System
Dynamics Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1994, p. 226, it is stated: “Understanding
comes first, but the goal is improvement;“ in Fey, Willard and John Trimble:
“The Evaluation and Development of Knowledge Acquisition in System
Dynamics Studies”, in Proceedings, System Dynamics Conference, System
Dynamics Society, 1992, p. 174, the process orientation of system dynamics is
compared to the product (being a model) orientation among hard system
developers.
104
Groessler, Andreas, Peter Milling and Graham Winch: “Perspectives on
rationality in system dynamics: a workshop report and open research questions”,
System Dynamics Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2004, p. 84.
105
Checkland, Peter: “Soft System Methodology”, in Rational Analysis, Jonathan
Rosenhead (ed.): Chichester, 1989, pp. 71—100; Eden, Colin: “Using cognitive

32
modeling include individual learning, challenging and alignment of mental
models, establishment of consensus and the search for ways to improve the
system.
Although quantitative modeling in organizational interventions also
includes simulations, the overall goals seldom differ radically from the goals of
qualitative modeling, but differ rather in the means of reaching those goals.
Devotees of quantitative models argue that softer models like Cause-Loop-
Diagrams leave open the risk of different interpretations of the same model by
different individuals. This is mainly due to the fact that the qualitative models do
not incorporate any test of logic. In mathematical formal models, built-in logical
constraints force model builders to have a more precise description and
understanding of the model. Forrester states that qualitative studies to a higher
degree depend on intuition compared to quantitative studies, where level and rate
diagrams discipline the thinking process in model formulation and simulation.106
Forrester gives examples where Harvard Business School graduates arrive to
wrong policy recommendations, inconsistent with their own quantitative system
description.107
This is in accordance with observations by other researches
observing students revealing significant differing interpretation of relatively
simple Cause-Loop-Diagrams.108
Whereas the opinion differs with respect to the
general applicability of quantitative vs. qualitative studies, there is a broad
agreement that determinants for selection of methods include: (1) problem
characteristics, (2) how the methods fit with the decision-making context, and (3)
purposes and goals of the decision situation.109
mapping for strategic options development and analysis”, also in Rosenhead
(ed.): Rational Analysis, Chichester, 1989, pp. 21—42; Senge, Peter M.: The
Fifth Discipline, New York, 1994. Though it should be noted, that in Forrester,
Jay W.: “System Dynamics, System Thinking, and Soft OR”, System Dynamics
Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1994, p. 253 it is argued that Senge’s system archetypes
and behavioral descriptions are based upon extensively explored system
dynamics models.
106
Dynamics Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1994, p. 252.
107
Forrester, Jay W.: “System Dynamics, System Thinking, and Soft OR”, p. 240.
108
Observations by faculty members at Mannheim University.
109
Milling, Peter: “Kybernetische Überlegungen beim Entscheiden in komplexen
Systemen”, in Entscheiden in komplexen Systemen, Wirtschaftskybernetik und
Systemanalyse, Band 20, Berlin, 2002, pp. 12—16.

The discussion has until now focused on the usage of modeling in
decision-making. As a side-remark, it is interesting to note, that system dynamics
has also been used to study the concept of decision-making. Based on a study
investigating a multiplier-accelerator model of capital investments, Sterman
concludes that it appears to be feasible to do experimental exploration of
dynamic decision-making strategies in aggregate systems, with the results being
directly compared to formal models of behavior.110
In this discussion, it is interesting to take a look at some of the critics of
the usage of system dynamics in strategic decision-making. Mintzberg has
criticized the utility of system dynamics, being concerned whether the
methodology allows sufficient creativity, and he states that analytical thinking
can be as wrong as intuitive thinking, especially as he finds that analysis does not
seem to encourage creativity.111
It is worth noticing that Mintzberg in his criticism
uses the argument that system dynamics focuses on analyses and aggregation and
pays little attention to comprehending and synthesizing, which is a standpoint
that most system dynamics practitioners have opposed to.112
It is also worth to
notice that his criticism was stated more than 20 years ago. The field has
developed since then, especially in the “softer” aspects with extensive research
within system thinking and participative model-building approaches, which focus
on discussions and involvement. Nevertheless, his concerns regarding creativity
should still be taken into consideration, as additional focus on how to conceive
creative potential new policies to be simulated in system dynamics models could
add value.
110
Sterman, John D.: “Misperceptions of Feedback in Dynamic Decision Making”,
in Milling, Peter M. and Erich O.K. Zahn (eds.): Computer-Based Management
of Complex Systems, Proceedings of the 1989 International Conference of the
System Dynamics Society, 1989, p. 30.
111
In Mintzberg, Henry: The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, New York, 1994,
pp. 298—299 and pp. 326—328, system dynamics is criticized for being shallow
in depth and not embracing creativity and intuition, although on pp. 376—378 in
the same book, credits are given to a number of system dynamics case stories.
112
The whole article of Lane, David C.: “Should System Dynamics be Described as
a ‘Hard’ or ‘Deterministic’ System Approach?”, Systems Research and
Behavioral Science, Vol. 17, 2000, pp. 3—22, is a discussion of the
misinterpretations of system dynamics, and also holds the quote “It may seem
paradoxical but the results of a quantitative system dynamics study are
qualitative insights” (p. 17).

34
Another interesting criticism of system dynamics, or actually of the earlier
modeling approaches, is made by de Geus, who states that most managers have
resistance to computer models to a degree where a computer-model becomes a
barrier for starting up discussions and exploration of mental models.113
For this
reason De Geus proposes a system dynamics modeling approach where soft
mapping techniques are used to start up the process capturing mental models.
Using soft modeling techniques in the beginning of the modeling activities is also
incorporated in many other modeling approaches.114
De Geus furthermore warns
against having expert modelers transform the soft models to hard models, as
subject matter knowledge is needed in this process.115
This also complies with the
arguments for participative modeling, namely, that insights are gained primarily
through participation in the modeling itself and that insights are difficult to
transfer to others, who were not involved in the modeling process.116
Akkemans
furthermore agues, that each type of diagram provides a different and useful view
of the problem situation, and that synthesis cannot be automated.117
113
De Geus, Arie P.: The Living Company, Boston, 1997, p. 71.
114
Luna-Reyes, L.F. and D. L. Andersen: “Collecting and analyzing qualitative data
for system dynamics: methods and models”, System Dynamics Review, Vol. 19,
No. 4, 2003, pp. 271—296 give an overview of many qualitative data collections
methods to be used not only in the beginning of a modeling process but also in
the later stages. Furthermore, Hodgson, A. M.: “Hexagons for system thinking”,
European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 59, 1992, pp. 123—136,
introduces a soft modeling technique that is incorporated in many modeling
approaches; e.g. in Group Model Building.
115
De Geus, Arie P.: The Living Company, Boston, 1997, p. 72.
116
See Bakken, Bent E.: Learning and Transfer of Understanding in Dynamics
Decision Environments, Boston, 1993, p. 31; Vennix, Jac A. M.: Group Model
Building, Chichester, 1996, pp. 97—99.
117
Akkermans, Henk: Modelling With Managers, Breda, 1995, p. 116.

II. Cognitive and Behavioral Rationale for the Usage of
System Dynamics
Interventions in social systems are typically discussed in terms of impact on an
individual level, group levels (formal and informal groups) and organizational
levels.118
On the individual level, learning and change of intentions and behavior
are often the focuses of interest. On the group level, alignment of mental models
and understanding group dynamics are often seen as corner stones, and on the
organizational level, interest often focuses on the creation of a learning
organization. This will be addressed in the next three subchapters.
1. Individual Learning and Change of Behavior in a Complex and
Dynamic Environment
Human beings have a tendency to think in events or limited linear causal
structures and more often than not, they underestimate or ignore complex
dynamic processes (illustrated in figure B-2).119
As a consequence, human
decision-makers leave out concerns for side effects and self-reinforcing dynamics
and fail to adjust their decision strategies to account for delays in the system and
expect feedback to arrive before the system can provide such information.120
118
These three levels for impacts of interventions are widely used in the system
dynamics literature, see Rouwette, Etiënne: Group model building as mutual
persuasion, Nijmegen, 2003, pp. 21—27 for a discussion on the three levels in
the literature of decision-making. In Argyris, Chris: Interventions Theory and
Method – A Behavioural Science View, Reading, Massachusetts, 1970, p. 38,
the three levels are listed together with an additional level; called intergroups
(formal and informal).
119
In Dörner, Dietrich: The Logic of Failure, New York, 1996, p. 6 cognitive
limitations in analytical, serial and visualized thinking are mentioned (as
opposed to female, “parallel” or non-western thinking); In De Bono, Edward:
Lateral Thinking for Management, England, 1971, pp. 4—9, it is argued that
linear vertical thinking being overly dominant in our education system. In
Vol. 63, No. 2, March 1956, p. 95, limitations on the amount of information
humans are able to receive, process and remember are discussed.
120
Bakken, Bent E.: Learning and Transfer of Understanding in Dynamics Decision
Environments, Boston, 1993, pp. 29—30; Kampmann, Christian P. E.: Feedback

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inherent sovereignty, it is evident that the State governments have
failed to afford that protection for which they were instituted. If they
have thus failed, it has been in consequence of their subversion and
loss of power to fulfill the object for which they were established.
This subversion was achieved when the General Government, under
the pretext of preserving the Union, made war on its creators the
States, thus changing the nature of the Federal Union, which could
rightfully be done only by the sovereign, the people of the States, in
like manner as it was originally formed. If they should permit their
sovereignty to be usurped and themselves to be subjugated,
individuals might remain, States could not. Of their wreck a nation
might be built, but there could not be a Union, for that implies
entities united, and of a State which has lost its sovereignty there
may only be written, "It was."
[Footnote 86: Article IV, amendment.]
[Footnote 87: Article V, amendment.]
[Footnote 88: Article V, amendment.]
[Footnote 89: Article VI, amendment.]
[Footnote 90: Article I, section 9.]
[Footnote 91: The first act of Congress providing for an enrollment
and draft was passed on March 8, 1363, three and a half months
later than this order.]
[Footnote 92: See chapter on exchange of prisoners.]
[Footnote 93: Baltimore "Gazette," September 25, 1866.]

CHAPTER XLV.
Inactivity of the Army of Northern Virginia.—Expeditions of
Custer, Kilpatrick, and Dahlgren for the Destruction of
Railroads, the Burning of Richmond, and Killing the Officers of
the Government.— Repelled by Government Clerks.—Papers
on Dahlgren's Body.—Repulse of Butler's Raid from Bermuda
Hundred.—Advance of Sheridan repulsed at Richmond.—
Stuart resists Sheridan.—Stuart's Death.—Remarks on Grant's
Plan of Campaign.—Movement of General Butler.—Drury's
Bluff.—Battle there.—Campaign of Grant in Virginia.
Both the Army of Northern Virginia and the army under General
Meade remained in a state of comparative inaction during the
months of January and February, 1864.
On February 26, 1864, while General Lee's headquarters were at
Orange Court-House, two corps of the army of the enemy left their
camp for Madison Court-House. The object was, by a formidable
feint, to engage the attention of General Lee, and conceal from him
their plans for a surprise and, if possible, capture of the city of
Richmond. This was to be a concerted movement, in which General

Butler, in command of the forces on the Peninsula, was to move up
and make a demonstration upon Richmond on the east, while
Generals Custer and Kilpatrick and Colonel Dahlgren were to attack it
and enter on the west and north.
Two days later another army corps left for Madison Court-House,
and other forces subsequently followed. At the same time General
Custer, with two ten-inch Parrott guns and fifteen hundred picked
men, marched for Charlottesville by the James City road. His
purpose was to destroy the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, running
by Charlottesville to Gordonsville, where the junction was made of
the railroad running north from Lynchburg, with the Central running
to Richmond. The capture of the army stores there, the destruction
of the tracks running south, west, and east, and cutting the
telegraph, would have severed the communication between Lee's
army and Richmond by that route. This movement, with the
destruction of railroads by General Kilpatrick, and of the Central
Railroad and the James River and Kanawha Canal by Colonel
Dahlgren, would have isolated that army from its base of supplies.
[Illustration: General Wade Hampton]
Three hours later, on the same day on which General Custer
started, General Kilpatrick with five thousand picked cavalry and a
light battery of six guns, left Stevensburg, near Culpeper Court-
House, for the lower fords of the Rapidan. His object was to make a
dash upon Richmond for the purpose of releasing the United States
prisoners, and doing whatever injury might be possible. He moved
rapidly, destroying railroads and depots, and plundering the country,
but found no obstacle except in being closely harassed in his rear by
Colonel Bradley T. Johnson with his sixty Marylanders, who, with

extraordinary daring, activity, and skill, followed him until he reached
the line of the defenses of Richmond. There, while attacked in the
rear by Colonel Johnson and his pickets driven in, he was at the
same time opposed in front by Colonel W. H. Stevens, who, with a
detachment of engineer troops, manned a few sections of light
artillery. After an engagement of thirty minutes, Kilpatrick's entire
force began to retreat in the direction of the Meadow Bridge on the
Central Railroad. At night his camp-fires were discovered by General
Wade Hampton, who dismounted one hundred men to act as
infantry, and, supported by the cavalry, opened his two-gun battery
upon the enemy at short range. He then attacked the camp of
Davies's and of a part of two other brigades. The camp was taken,
and the whole force of Kilpatrick fled at a gallop, leaving one
hundred and five prisoners and more than one hundred horses.
Colonel Dahlgren started with General Kilpatrick, but at
Spottsylvania Court-House was dispatched with five hundred men to
Frederickhall, a depot of the Central Railroad, where some eighty
pieces of our reserve artillery had been parked. His orders were to
destroy the artillery, the railroads, and telegraph-lines. Finding the
artillery too well guarded, he proceeded to destroy the line of
railroad as far as Hanover Junction. Thence he moved toward the
James River and Kanawha Canal, which he reached twenty-two miles
west of Richmond. Thence his command moved toward the city,
pillaging and destroying dwelling-houses, out-buildings, mills, canal-
boats, grain, and cattle, and cutting one lock on the canal. The first
resistance met was by a battalion of General G. W. C. Lee's force,
consisting of about two hundred and twenty of the armory-men,
under command of their major, Ford. This small body was driven
back until it joined a battalion of the Treasury Department clerks,
who, in the absence of their major, Henly, were led by Captain

McIlhenney. The officers and men were all clerks of the Treasury
Department, and, like those of other departments and many citizens
of Richmond, who were either too old or too young to be in the
army, were enrolled and organized to defend the capital in the
absence of troops. Captain McIlhenney, as soon as he saw the
enemy, promptly arranged to attack. This was done with such
impetuosity that Dahlgren and his men wore routed, leaving some
eighteen killed, twenty to thirty wounded, and as many more
prisoners. About a hundred horses, with equipments, a number of
small-arms, and one three-inch Napoleon gun were captured. Our
loss was one captain and two lieutenants killed, three lieutenants
and seven privates wounded—one of the latter mortally. This feat of
the Clerks' Battalion commanded the grateful admiration of the
people, and the large concourse that attended the funeral of the
fallen expressed the public lamentation.
Dahlgren now commenced his retreat. To increase the chances of
escape, the force was divided, he leading one party in the direction
of King and Queen County. The home guard of the country turned
out against the raiders, and, being joined by a detachment from the
Forty-second Battalion of Virginia Cavalry and some furloughed
cavalry-men of Lee's army, surprised and attacked the retreating
column of Dahlgren, killed the leader, and captured nearly one
hundred prisoners, with negroes, horses, etc.
On the body of Dahlgren was found an address to his officers and
men, another paper giving special orders and instructions, and one
giving his itinerary, the whole disclosing the unsoldierly means and
purposes of the raid, such as disguising the men in our uniform,
carrying supplies of oakum and turpentine to burn Richmond, and,
after releasing their prisoners on Belle Isle, to exhort them to

destroy the hateful city, while on all was impressed the special
injunction that the city must be burned, and "Jeff Davis and Cabinet
killed."
The prisoners, having been captured in disguise, were, under the
usages of war, liable to be hanged as spies, but their protestations
that their service was not voluntary, and the fact that as enlisted
men they were subject to orders, and could not be held responsible
for the infamous instructions under which they were acting, saved
them from the death-penalty they had fully incurred. Photographic
copies of the papers found on Dahlgren's body were taken and sent
to General Lee, with instructions to communicate them to General
Meade, commanding the enemy's forces in his front, with an inquiry
as to whether such practices were authorized by his Government,
and also to say that, if any question was raised as to the copies, the
original paper would be submitted. No such question was then
made, and the denial that Dahlgren's conduct had been authorized
was accepted.
Many sensational stories, having not even a basis of truth, were
put in circulation to exhibit the Confederate authorities as having
acted with unwarrantable malignity toward the deceased Colonel
Dahlgren. The fact was, that his body was sent to Richmond and
decently interred in the Oakwood Cemetery, where other Federal
soldiers were buried. The enormity of his offenses was not forgotten,
but resentment against him ended with his life. It was also admitted
that, however bad his preceding conduct had been, he met his fate
gallantly, charging at the head of his men when he found himself
inextricably encompassed by his foe.

Custer and Kilpatrick, who were to coöperate with him in the
expedition, especially the first-named, manifested a saving degree of
"that rascally virtue," as Charles Lee, of Revolutionary memory,
called it. After the feeble demonstration upon some parked artillery
which has been described, he fancied that he heard the roaring of
cars coming with reënforcements, and retreated, burning the bridges
behind him—a precaution quite in vain, as there were none there to
pursue him.
Kilpatrick, followed as above stated by Colonel Bradley T. Johnson,
who hung close upon his rear, finally reached the defenses of
Richmond. There, out of respect to the field artillery he encountered,
he turned off to cross the Chickahominy, and that night he was
routed by the cavalry command of our gallant cavalier General Wade
Hampton. Thus ended the combined movement with which Northern
papers had regaled their readers by announcing as made "with
instructions to sack the rebel capital."
During the first week in May, Major-General B. F. Butler landed at
Bermuda Hundred with a considerable force, and moved up so as to
cut the telegraph line and reach by a raiding party the railroad at
Chester, between Richmond and Petersburg. General Ransom, then
in command of the defenses at Richmond and those of Drury's Bluff,
with a small force, attacked the advance of General Butler, and after
a sharp skirmish compelled him to withdraw.
Meantime, because of the warning which Stuart had sent, General
Ransom was summoned to Richmond to resist an impending assault
by General Sheridan on the outer works north of the city. Taking the
two disposable brigades of Gracie and Fry and a light battery, he
hastened forward, arriving at the fortifications on the Mechanicsville

Turnpike; just in time to see a battery of artillery, then entirely
unsupported, repulse the advance of Sheridan. During the night the
clerks and citizens, under General G. W. Custis Lee, had formed a
thin line along part of the fortifications on the west side of the city.
As the day advanced, Oracle's brigade was thrown in front of the
works and pressed forward to feel Sheridan; but it was regarded as
worse than useless with two small brigades to engage in an open
country many times their number of well-appointed cavalry, Sheridan
showed no purpose to attack, but withdrew from before our
defenses, and the two brigades returned to the vicinity of Drury's
Bluff—the approach on the south side of James River, by forces
under General Butler, being then considered the most imminent
danger to Richmond.
After the battle of the Wilderness, on May 4th and 5th, as
hereafter narrated, General Grant moved his army toward
Spottsylvania Court-House, and General Lee made a corresponding
movement. At this time Sheridan, with a large force of United States
cavalry, passed around and to the rear of our army, so as to place
himself on the road to Richmond, which, in the absence of a
garrison to defend it, he may have not unreasonably thought might
be surprised and captured.
Stuart, our most distinguished cavalry commander—fearless,
faithful Stuart—soon knew of Sheridan's movement, perceived its
purpose, and, with his usual devotion to his country's welfare, hastily
collected such of his troops as were near, and pursued Sheridan. He
fell upon Sheridan's rear and flank at Beaver Dam Station, where a
pause had been made to destroy the railroad, some cars, and
commissary's stores, and drove it before him. The route of the
enemy being unmistakably toward Richmond, Stuart, to protect the

capital, or at least to delay attack, so as to give time to make
preparation for defense, made a détour around Sheridan, and by a
forced march got in front of him, taking position at a place called
Yellow Tavern, about seven or eight miles from Richmond. Here,
with the daring and singleness of purpose which characterized his
whole career, he decided, notwithstanding the great inequality
between his force and that of his foe, to make a stand, and offer
persistent resistance to his advance. The respective strength of the
two commands, as given by Colonel Heros von Borke, chief of
General Stuart's staff, was, Stuart, eleven hundred; Sheridan, eight
thousand. While engaged in this desperate service, General Stuart
sent couriers to Richmond to give notice of the approach of the
enemy, so that the defenses might be manned.
Notwithstanding the great disparity of force, the contest was
obstinate and protracted, and fickle Fortune cheered our men with
several brilliant successes. Stuart, who in many traits resembled the
renowned Murat, like him was always a leader when his cavalry
charged. On this occasion he is represented when he was wounded
to have been quite in advance, to have fired the last load in his
pistol, and to have been shot by a fugitive whom he found cowering
under a fence, and ordered to surrender. The "heavy battalions" at
last prevailed, our line was broken, and our chieftain, though
mortally wounded, still kept in his saddle, invoking his men to
continue the fight.[94] Our gallant chieftain was brought wounded
into Richmond, a noble sacrifice on the altar of duty.
Long accustomed to connect him only with daring exploits and
brilliant successes, there was much surprise and deeper sorrow
when the news spread through the city. Admired as a soldier, loved
as a man, honored as a Christian patriot, to whom duty to his God

and his country was a supreme law, the intense anxiety for his
safety made us all shrink from realizing his imminent danger. When I
saw him in his very last hours, he was so calm, and physically so
strong, that I could not believe that he was dying, until the surgeon,
after I had left his bedside, told me he was bleeding inwardly, and
that the end was near.
Grant's plan of campaign, as now revealed to us, was to continue
his movement against Lee's army, and, if, as experience had taught
him, he should be unable to defeat it and move directly to his
objective point, Richmond, he was to continue his efforts so as to
reach the James River below Richmond, and thus to connect with
the array under General Butler, moving up on the south side of the
James. The topography of the country favored that design. The
streams in the country in which he was operating all trended toward
the southeast, and his change of position was frequently made
under cover of them. Butler, in the mean time, was ordered with the
force of his department, about twenty thousand, reënforced by
Gilmer's division of ten thousand, to move up to City Point, there
intrench, and concentrate all his troops as rapidly as possible. From
this base he was expected to operate so as to destroy the railroad
connections between Richmond and the South. On the 7th of May
he telegraphed that he had "destroyed many miles of railroad, and
got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against
the whole of Lee's army."
At this time Major-General Robert Ransom, as before mentioned,
was in command at Richmond, including Drury's Bluff. His force
consisted, for the defense of both places, of the men serving the
stationary or heavy artillery, and three brigades of infantry—
Hunton's at Chapin's Bluff, and Barton's and Gracie's for field service.

To these, in cases of emergency, the clerks and artisans in the
departments and manufactories, were organized, to be called out as
an auxiliary force when needed for the defense of the capital It was
with this field force that Ransom, as has been related, moved upon
Butler, and drove him from the railroad, the destruction of which he
had so vauntingly announced.
A few days thereafter he again emerged from his cover, but this
time changed his objective point, and, diverging from the south bank
of the James River, moved toward Petersburg, and reached the
railroad at Port Walthal Junction, where he encountered some of
General Beauregard's command, which had been ordered from
Charleston, and was driven from the railroad and turnpike. The
troops ordered from Charleston with General Beauregard had, by
May 14th, reached the vicinity of Drury's Bluff. In connection with
the works and rifle-pits on the bluff, which were to command the
river and prevent the ascent of gunboats, an intrenched line had
been constructed on a ridge about a mile south of the bluff, running
across the road from Richmond to Petersburg. This ridge was higher
than the ground on which the fort was built, and was designed to
check an approach of the enemy from the south, as well as to cover
the rear of the fort. In the afternoon of the 14th I rode down to visit
General Beauregard at his headquarters in the field. Supposing his
troops to be on the line of intrenchment, I passed Major Drury's
house to go thither, when some one by the roadside called to me
and told me that the troops were not on the line of intrenchment,
and that General Beauregard was at the house behind me.
My first question on meeting him was to learn why the
intrenchments were abandoned. He answered that he thought it
better to concentrate his troops. Upon my stating to him that there

was nothing then to prevent Butler from turning his position, he said
he would desire nothing more, as he would then fall upon him, cut
him off from his base, etc.
According to my uniform practice never to do more than to make
a suggestion to a general commanding in the field, the subject was
pressed no further. We then passed to the consideration of the
operations to be undertaken against Butler, who had already
advanced from his base at Bermuda Hundred. I offered, for the
purpose of attacking Butler, to send Major-General Ransom with the
field force he had for the protection of Richmond. In addition to his
high military capacity, his minute knowledge of the country in which
they were to operate made him specially valuable. He reported to
General Beauregard at noon on the 15th, received his orders for the
battle which was to occur the next day, and about 10 P.M. was, with
a division of four brigades and a battery of light artillery, in position
in front of the breastworks. Colonel Dunovant, with a regiment of
cavalry not under Ransom's orders, was to guard the space between
his left and the river, so as to give him information of any movement
in that quarter. General Whiting, with some force, was holding a
defensive position at Petersburg. General Beauregard proposed that
the main part of it should advance and unite with him in an attack
upon Butler wherever he should be found between Drury's and
Petersburg. To this I offered distinct objection, because of the
hazard during a battle of attempting to make a junction of troops
moving from opposite sides of the enemy; and proposed that
Whiting's command should move at night by the Chesterfield road,
where they would not probably be observed by Butler's advance.
This march I supposed they could make so as to arrive at Drury's by
or soon after daylight. The next day being Sunday, they could rest,
and, all the troops being assigned to their positions, could move to

make a concerted attack at daylight on Monday. He spoke of some
difficulty in getting a courier who knew the route and could certainly
deliver the order to General Whiting. Opportunely, a courier arrived
from General Whiting, who had come up the Chesterfield road. He
then said the order would have to be drawn with a great deal of
care, and that he would prepare it as soon as he could. I arose to
take leave, and he courteously walked down the stairs with me,
remarking as we went that he was embarrassed for the want of a
good cavalry commander. I saw in the yard Colonel Chilton, assistant
adjutant and inspector-general, and said, "There is an old cavalry
officer who was trained in my old regiment, the First Dragoons, and
who I think will answer your requirements," Upon his expressing the
pleasure it would give him to have Colonel Chilton, I told him of
General Beauregard's want, and asked him if the service would be
agreeable to him. He readily accepted it, and I left, supposing all the
preliminaries settled. In the next forenoon Colonel Samuel Melton, of
the adjutant and inspector-general's department, called at my
residence and delivered a message from General Beauregard to the
effect that he had decided to order Whiting to move by the direct
road from Petersburg, instead of by the Chesterfield route, and,
when I replied that I had stated my objections to General
Beauregard to a movement which gave the enemy the advantage of
being between our forces, he said General Beauregard had directed
him to explain to me that upon a further examination he found his
force sufficient; that his operations, therefore, did not depend upon
making a junction with Whiting.
On Monday morning I rode down to Drury's, where I found that
the enemy had seized our line of intrenchments, it being
unoccupied, and that a severe action had occurred, with serious loss
to us before he could be dislodged. He had crossed the main road to

the west, entering a dense wood, and our troops on the right had
moved out and were closely engaged with him. We drove him back,
frustrating the attempt to turn the extreme right of our line. The day
was wearing away, a part of the force had been withdrawn to the
intrenchment, and there was no sign of purpose to make any
immediate movement. General Beauregard said he was waiting to
hear Whiting's guns, and had been expecting him for some time to
approach on the Petersburg road. Soon after this, the foe in a
straggling, disorganized manner, commenced crossing the road,
moving to the east, which indicated a retreat, or perhaps a purpose
to turn our left and attack Fort Drury in rear. He placed a battery in
the main road and threw some shells at our intrenchment, probably
to cover his retiring troops. General Ransom, in an unpublished
report, says that, at the time he received the order of battle, General
Beauregard told him, "As you know the region, I have given you the
moving part of the army, and you will take the initiative." He further
states that at dawn of day he moved to the south of Kingsland
Creek, formed two lines with a short interval, and at once advanced
to the attack. A dense fog suddenly enveloped him, so as to obscure
all distant objects. Moving forward, the skirmishers were quickly
engaged, and the fighting was pressed so vigorously that by sunrise
he had captured a brigade of infantry, a battery of artillery, and
occupied about three quarters of a mile of the enemy's temporary
breastworks, which were strengthened by wire interwoven among
the trees in their front; this was not effected, however, without
considerable loss in killed and wounded, and much confusion, owing
to the denseness of the fog. General Ransom's report continues:
"Having no ammunition-wagons and requiring
replenishment of infantry cartridges, and knowing that delay
would mar the effect of the success gained, I sent instantly to

Beauregard, reporting what had happened, and asked that
Ransom's brigade might come to me at once, so that I might
continue the pressure and make good the advantage already
gained."
He then describes the further delay in getting ammunition, and his
renewal of the request for Ransom's brigade, which he had
organized and formerly commanded, but, instead of which, two
small regiments were sent to him, the timely arrival of which, it is to
be gratefully remembered, enabled him to repulse an advance of the
enemy. It would be neither pleasant nor profitable to dwell on the
lost opportunity for a complete victory, or to recount the possible
consequences which might have flowed from it. On the next
morning, our troops moved down the river road as far as Howlett's,
about three or four miles, but saw no enemy. The "back door" of
Richmond was closed, and Butler "bottled up."
Soon after the affair at Drury's Bluff, General Beauregard
addressed to me a communication, proposing that he should be
heavily reinforced from General Lee's army, so as to enable him to
crush Butler in his intrenchments, and then, with the main body of
his own force, together with a detachment from General Lee's army,
that he should join General Lee, overwhelm Grant, and march to
Washington. I knew that General Lee was then confronting an army
vastly superior to his in numbers, fully equipped, with inexhaustible
supplies, and a persistence in attacking of which sufficient evidence
had been given. I could not therefore expect that General Lee would
consent to the proposition of General Beauregard; but, as a matter
of courteous consideration, his letter was forwarded with the usual
formed endorsement. General Lee's opinion on the case was shown
by the instructions he gave directing General Beauregard to

straighten his line so as to reduce the requisite number of men to
hold it, and send the balance to join the army north of the James.
[Footnote 94: Address of Major H. B. McClellan before Army of
Northern
Virginia Association.]

CHAPTER XLVI.
General Grant assumes Command in Virginia.—Positions of
the Armies.—Plans of Campaign open to Grant's Choice.—The
Rapidan crossed.—Battle of the Wilderness.—Danger of Lee.—
The Enemy driven back.—Flank Attack.—Longstreet wounded.
—Result of the Contest.—Rapid Flank Movement of Grant.—
Another Contest.— Grant's Reënforcements.—Hanover
Junction.—The Enemy moves in Direction of Bowling Green.—
Crosses the Pamunkey.—Battle at Cold Harbor.—Frightful
Slaughter.—The Enemy's Soldiers decline to renew the Assault
when ordered.—Loss.—Asks Truce to bury the Dead.—
Strength of Respective Armies.—General Pemberton.—The
Enemy crosses the James.—Siege of Petersburg begun.
It was in March, 1864, that Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, having
been appointed lieutenant-general, assumed command of the armies
of the United States. He subsequently proceeded to Culpeper and
assumed personal command of the Army of the Potomac, although
nominally that army remained under the command of General
Meade. Reënforcements were gathered from every military
department of the United States and sent to that army.

On May 3d General Lee held the south bank of the Rapidan River,
with his right resting near the mouth of Mine Run and his left
extending to Liberty Mills, on the road from Gordonsville to the
Shenandoah Valley. Ewell's corps was on the right, Hill's on the left,
and two divisions of Longstreet's corps, having returned from East
Tennessee, were encamped in the rear near Gordonsville. The army
of General Grant had occupied the north bank of the Rapidan, with
the main body encamped in Culpeper County and on the
Rappahannock River.
While Grant with his immense and increasing army was thus
posted, Lee, with a comparatively small force, and to which few
reënforcements could be furnished, confronted him on a line
stretching from near Somerville Ford to Gordonsville. To Grant was
left the choice to move directly on Lee and attempt to defeat his
army, the only obstacle to the capture of Richmond, and which his
vast means rendered supposable, or to cross the Rapidan above or
below Lee's position. The second would fulfill the condition, so
imperatively imposed on McClellan, of covering the United States
capital; the third would be in the more direct line toward Richmond.
Of the three he chose the last, and so felicitated himself on his
unopposed passage of the river as to suppose that he had,
unobserved, turned the flank of Lee's army, got between it and
Richmond, and necessitated the retreat of the Confederates to some
point where they might resist his further advance. So little could he
comprehend the genius of Lee, that he expected him to be
surprised, as appears from his arrangements contemplating only
combats with the rear-guard covering the retreat. Lee, dauntless as
he was sagacious, seized the opportunity, which the movement of
his foe offered, to meet him where his artillery would be least
available, where his massive columns would be most embarrassed in

their movements, and where Southern individuality and self-reliance
would be specially effective. Grant's object was to pass through "the
Wilderness" to the roads between Lee and Richmond. Lee resolved
to fight him in those pathless woods, where mind might best
compete with matter.
Providence held its shield over the just cause, and heroic bands
hurled back the heavy battalions shattered and discomfited, as will
be now briefly described.
In order to cross the Rapidan, Grant's army moved on May 3d
toward Germania Ford, which was ten or twelve miles from our right.
He succeeded in seizing the ford and crossing. The direct road from
this ford to Richmond passed by Spottsylvania Court-House, and,
when Grant had crossed the river, he was nearer than General Lee to
Richmond. From Orange Court-House there are two nearly parallel
roads running eastwardly to Fredericksburg. The one nearest the
river is called the "Stone Turnpike," and the other the "Plank-road."
The road from the ford to Spottsylvania Court-House crosses the Old
Stone Turnpike at the "Old Wilderness Tavern," and, two or three
miles farther on, it crosses the plank-road.
As soon as Grant's movement was known, Lee's troops were put
in motion. Swell's corps moved on the Stone Turnpike, and Hill's
corps on the plank-road, into which Longstreet's force also came
from his camp near Gordonsville. Ewell's corps crossed Mine Run,
and encamped at Locust Grove, four miles beyond, on the afternoon
of the 4th. On the morning of the 5th it was again in motion, and
encountered Grant's troops in heavy force at a short distance from
the Old Wilderness Tavern, and Jones's and Battle's brigades were
driven back in some confusion. Early's division was ordered up,

formed across the pike, and moved forward. It advanced through a
dense pine-thicket, and, with other brigades of Rodes's division,
drove the enemy back with heavy loss, capturing several hundred
prisoners and gaining a commanding position on the right.
Meantime, Johnson's division, on the left of the pike, and extending
across the road to Germania Ford, was heavily engaged in front, and
Hays's brigade was sent to his left to participate in a forward
movement. It advanced, encountered a large force, and, not
meeting with the expected coöperation, was drawn back.
Subsequently, Pegram's brigade took position on Hays's left, and just
before night an attack was made on their front, which was repulsed
with severe loss to the enemy. During the afternoon there was hot
skirmishing along the whole line, and several attempts were made
by the foe to regain the position from which he had been driven. At
the close of the day, Ewell's corps had captured over a thousand
prisoners, besides inflicting on the enemy very severe losses in killed
and wounded. Two pieces of artillery had been abandoned and were
secured by our troops.
A. P. Hill, on the 4th, with Heth's and Wilcox's divisions of his
corps, moved eastwardly along the plank-road. They bivouacked at
night near Verdiersville, and resumed their march on the 5th with
Heth in advance. About 1 P.M. musketry firing was heard in front;
the sound indicated the presence of a large body of infantry.
Kirkland's brigade deployed on both sides of the plank-road, and the
column proceeded to form in line of battle on its flanks. Hill's
advance had followed the plank-road, while Ewell's pursued the
Stone turnpike. These parallel movements were at this time from
three to four miles apart. The country intervening and round about
for several miles is known as the "Wilderness," and, having very little
open ground, consists almost wholly of a forest of dense

undergrowth of shrubs and small trees. In order to open
communication with Ewell, Wilcox's division moved to the left, and
effected a junction with Gordon's brigade on Ewell's extreme right.
The line of battle thus completed extended from the right of the
plank-road through a succession of open fields and dense forest to
the left of the Stone turnpike. It presented a line of six miles, and
the thicket that lay along the whole front of our army was so
impenetrable as to exclude the use of artillery save only at the
roads. Heth's skirmishers were driven in about 3 P.M. by a massive
column that advanced, firing rapidly. The straggle thus commenced
in Hill's front continued for two or three hours unabated. Heth's
ranks were greatly reduced, when Wilcox was ordered to his
support, but the bloody contest continued until night closed over our
force in the position it had originally taken. This stubborn and heroic
resistance was made by the divisions of Heth and Wilcox, of Hill's
corps, fifteen thousand strong, against the repeated and desperate
assaults of five divisions—four divisions of Hancock's and one of
Sedgwick's corps, numbering about forty-five thousand men. Our
forces completely foiled their adversaries, and inflicted upon them
most serious loss.[95] During the day the Ninth Corps of the enemy
under General Burnside, had come on the field. The third division of
Hill's corps, under General Anderson, and the two divisions of
Longstreet's corps, did not reach the scene of conflict until dawn of
day on the morning of the 6th. Simultaneously the attack on Hill was
renewed with great vigor. In addition to the force he had so
successfully resisted on the previous day, a fresh division of the
enemy's Fifth Corps had secured position on Hill's flank, and
coöperated with the column assaulting in front. After a severe
contest, the left of Heth's division and the right of Wilcox's were
overpowered before the advance of Longstreet's column reached the

ground, and were compelled to return. The repulsed portions of the
divisions were in considerable disorder. General Lee now came up,
and, fully appreciating the impending crisis, dashed amid the
fugitives, calling on the men to rally and follow him.
"The soldiers, seeing General Lee's manifest purpose to
advance with them, and realizing the great danger in which
he then was, begged him to go to the rear, promising that
they would soon have matters rectified. The General waved
them on with some words of cheer." [96]
The assault was checked.
Longstreet, having come up with two divisions, deployed them in
line of battle, and gallantly advanced to recover the lost ground. The
enemy was driven back over the ground he had gained by his
assault on Hill's line, but reformed in the position previously held by
him. About mid-day an attack on his left flank and rear was ordered
by Longstreet. For this purpose three brigades were detached, and,
moving forward, were joined by General J. R. Davis's brigade, which
had been the extreme right of Hill's line. Making a sufficient détour
to avoid observation, and, rushing precipitately to attack the foe in
flank and reverse while he was preparing to resist the movement in
his front, he was taken completely by surprise. The assault resulted
in his utter rout, with heavy loss on that part of his line.
Preparations were now made to follow up the advantages gained
by a forward movement of the whole line under General Longstreet's
personal direction. When advancing at the head of Jenkins's brigade,
with that officer and others, a body of Confederates in the wood on
the roadside, supposing the column to be a hostile force, fired into
it, killing General Jenkins, distinguished alike for civil and military

virtue, and severely wounding General Longstreet. The valuable
services of General Longstreet were thus lost to the army at a critical
moment, and this caused the suspension of a movement which
promised the most important results; and time was thus afforded to
the enemy to rally, reënforce, and find shelter behind his
intrenchments. Under these circumstances the commanding General
deemed it unadvisable to attack.
On the morning of the 6th the contest was renewed on the left,
and a very heavy attack was made on the front, occupied by
Pegram's brigade, but it was handsomely repulsed, as were several
subsequent attacks at the same point. In the afternoon an attack
was made on the enemy's right flank, resting in the woods, when
Gordon's brigade, with Johnson's in the rear and followed by
Pegram's, succeeded in throwing it into great confusion, doubling it
up and forcing it back some distance, capturing two brigadier-
generals and several hundred prisoners. Darkness closed the
contest. On the 7th an advance was made which disclosed the fact
that Grant had given up his line of works on his right. During the day
there was some skirmishing, but no serious fighting. The result of
these battles was the infliction of severe loss upon the foe, the gain
of ground, and the capture of prisoners, artillery, and other trophies.
The cost to us, however, was so serious as to enforce, by additional
considerations, the policy of Lee to spare his men as much as was
possible.
A rapid flank movement was next made by Grant to secure
possession of Spottsylvania Court-House. General Lee
comprehended his purpose, and on the night of the 7th a division of
Longstreet's corps was sent as the advance to that point. Stuart,
then in observation on the flank, and ever ready to work or to fight

as the one or the other should best serve the cause of his country,
dismounted his troopers, and, by felling trees, obstructed the roads
so as materially to delay the march of the enemy. The head of the
opposing forces arrived almost at the same moment on the 8th;
theirs, being a little in advance, drove back our cavalry, but in turn
was quickly driven from the strategic point by the arrival of our
infantry. On the 9th the two armies, each forming on its advance as
a nucleus, swung round and confronted each other in line of battle.
The 10th and 11th passed in comparative quiet. On the morning
of the 12th the enemy made a very heavy attack on Ewell's front,
and broke the line where it was occupied by Johnson's division. At
this time and place the scene occurred of which Mississippians are
justly proud. Colonel Tenable, of General Lee's staff, states that, on
the receipt of one of the messages from General Rodes for more
troops, he was sent by General Lee to bring Harris's Mississippi
brigade from the extreme right; that General Lee met the brigade
and rode at its head until under fire, when a round shot passed so
near to him that the soldiers invoked him to go back; and when he
said, "If you will promise me to drive those people from our works, I
will go back," the brigade shouted the promise, and Colonel Venable
says:
"As the column of Mississippians came up at a double quick
an aide-de-camp came up to General Rodes with a message
from Ramseur that he could hold out only a few minutes
longer unless assistance was at hand. Your brigade was
thrown instantly into the fight, the column being formed into
line under a tremendous fire and on very difficult ground.
Never did a brigade go into fiercer battle under greater trials;
never did a brigade do its duty more nobly." [97]

A portion of the attacking force swept along Johnson's line to
Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt movement on that flank.
Several brigades sent to Ewell's assistance were carried into action
under his orders, and they all suffered severely. Subsequently, on
the same day, some brigades were thrown to the front, for the
purpose of moving to the left and attacking the flank of the column
which broke Ewell's line, to relieve the pressure on him, and recover
the part of the line which had been lost. These, as they moved, soon
encountered the Ninth Corps, under Burnside, advancing to the
attack. They captured over three hundred prisoners and three battle-
flags, and their attack on the enemy's flank, taking him by surprise,
contributed materially to his repulse.
Taylor, in his "Four Years with General Lee," says that Lee, having
detected the weakness of "the salient" occupied by the division of
General Edward Johnson, of Ewell's corps, directed a second line to
be constructed across its base, to which he proposed to move the
troops occupying the angle. Suspecting another flank movement by
Grant, before these arrangements were quite completed, he ordered
most of the artillery at this portion of the lines to be withdrawn so as
to be available. Toward dawn on the 12th, Johnson, discovering
indications of an impending assault, ordered the immediate return of
the artillery, and made other preparations for defense. But the
unfortunate withdrawal was so partially and tardily restored, that a
spirited assault at daybreak overran that portion of the lines before
the artillery was put in position, and captured most of the division,
including its brave commander.
The above mentioned attacking column advanced, under cover of
a pine-thicket, to within a very short distance of a salient defended
by Walker's brigade. A heavy fire of musketry and artillery, from a

considerable number of guns on Heth's line, opened with
tremendous effect upon the column, and it was driven back with
severe loss, leaving its dead in front of our works.[98]
Several days of comparative quiet ensued. During this time the
army of General Grant was heavily reënforced from Washington.
"In numerical strength his army so much exceeded that
under General Lee that, after covering the entire Confederate
front with double lines of battle, he had in reserve a large
force with which to extend his flank and compel a
corresponding movement on the part of his adversary, in
order to keep between him and his coveted prize—the capital
of the Confederacy." [99]
On the 18th another assault was made upon our lines, but it
produced no impression. On the 20th of May, after twelve days of
skirmish and battle at Spottsylvania against a superior force, General
Lee's information led him to believe that the enemy was about to
attempt another flanking movement, and interpose his army
between the Confederate capital and its defenders. To defeat this
purpose Longstreet was ordered to move at midnight in the direction
of Hanover Junction, and on the following day and night Swell's and
Hill's corps marched for the same point.
The Confederate commander, divining that Grant's objective point
was the intersection of the two railroads leading to Richmond at a
point two miles south of the North Anna River, crossed his army over
that stream and took up a line of battle which frustrated the
movement.

Grant began his flanking movement on the night of the 20th,
marching in two columns, the right, under General Warren, crossing
the North Anna at Jericho Ford without opposition. On the 23d the
left, under General Hancock, crossing four miles lower down, at the
Chesterfield or County Bridge, was obstinately resisted by a small
force, and the passage of the river was not made until the 24th.
After crossing the North Anna, Grant discovered that his movement
was a blunder, and that his army was in a position of much peril.
The Confederate commander established his line of battle on the
south side of the river, both wings refused so as to form an obtuse
angle, with the apex resting on the river between the two points of
the enemy's crossing, Longstreet's and Hill's corps forming the two
sides, and Little River and the Hanover marshes the base. Ewell's
corps held the apex or center.
The hazard of Grant's position appears not to have been known to
him until he attempted to unite his two columns, which were four
miles apart, by establishing a connecting line along the river. Foiled
in the attempt, he discovered that the Confederate army was
interposed between his two wings, which were also separated by the
North Anna, and that the one could give no support to the other
except by a double crossing of the river. That the Confederate
commander did not seize the opportunity to strike his embarrassed
foe and avail himself of the advantage which his superior generalship
had gained, may have been that, concluding from past observation
of Grant's tactics, he felt assured that the "continuous hammering"
process was to be repeated without reference to circumstances or
position. If Lee acted on this supposition, he was mistaken, as the
Federal commander, profiting by the severe lessons of Spottsylvania
and the Wilderness, with cautious, noiseless movement, withdrew

under cover of the night of the 26th to the north side of the North
Anna, and moved eastward down to the Pamunkey River.
At Hanover Junction General Lee was joined by Pickett's division of
Longstreet's corps, which had been on detached service in North
Carolina, and by a small force under General Breckinridge from
southwestern Virginia, twenty-two hundred strong. Hoke's brigade,
of Early's division, twelve hundred strong, which had been on
detached duty at the Junction, here also rejoined its division. On the
29th the whole of Grant's army was across the Pamunkey, while
General Lee's army on the next day was in line of battle with his left
at Atlee's Station. By another movement eastward the two armies
were brought face to face at Cold Harbor on June 3d. Here fruitless
efforts were made by General Grant to pierce or drive back the
forces of General Lee. Our troops were protected by temporary
earthworks, and while under cover of these were assailed by the
enemy:
"But in vain. The assault was repulsed along the whole line,
and the carnage on the Federal side was fearful. I[100] well
recall having received a report, after the assault, from
General Hoke—whose division reached the army just previous
to this battle—to the effect that the ground in his entire front,
over which the enemy had charged, was literally covered with
their dead and wounded; and that up to that time he had not
had a single man killed. No wonder that, when the command
was given to renew the assault, the Federal soldiers sullenly
and silently declined. 'The order[101] was issued through the
officers to their subordinate commanders, and from them
descended through the wonted channels; but no man stirred,
and the immobile lines pronounced a verdict, silent yet

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